


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**SECRET**

*March 2, 2001 Cressey email to Rice and Hadley, 1:24 p.m., re BIN LADIN on the USS COLE*

- CIA: major conf. earlier this week at Tarnak Farm
- March 1 al-Jazira: photos of UBL extended family having belated Tarnak wedding reception for son
- on TV [al-Jazira], UBL read new poem—about the Cole attack...
- they'd agreed on non-DC mtg on AQ strategy led by Hadley; request date
- Hadley then asks for list of participants before scheduling; Cressey suggests

B5



Non responsive

Not Responsive

TS


March 22, 2001 Cressey email to Hadley, 5:23 p.m., re For SGH—Need for Terrorism DC Next Week

-ordered list of issues TNT wants raised at DC next week:

1. Predator: if Hadley and Rice won't issue Clarke's "restart" memo to CSG, let DC decide  
-"If we want to resume operations in the May/June timeframe, we need a decision now."  
[underlined in original; earlier, they'd always asked for April/May timeframe]
2. NA aid: "If we want to provide assistance to the Northern Alliance, and for it to make a difference in this round of fighting, we need a Deputies decision now." [underlined in orig.]
3. Uzbek aid: help Uzbeks vs. IMU, [redacted]
4. Dealing w. Taliban: now mentioning UBL trial  
-doubt sincerity, but must decide whether Taliban willing/able to expel UBL/AQ  
-if no, decide: try to get new Tal leaders; esp. replace Omar?
5. Pakistan: create working group on CT? specific message to Mush re AQ?  
-per Rice, "not much to discuss on how to handle UBL"
6. PD: "We are losing the public relations battle in the Islamic world on al-Qida."  
-most Muslims think UN sanctions meant to hurt Afghans, see USG as "hopelessly anti-Islam."  
-DC should weigh more resources to State here; Muslim opinion solidifying against us
7. Cole: "The investigation continues on the law enforcement side, but we know all we need to about who did the attack to make a policy decision."

-will send TNT discussion paper March 23, 2001

Not Responsive



Not Responsive

**SECRET**

*March 24, 2001 Clarke email to @NSA, 1:17 p.m., re Yemen's View on the USS Cole*

-Embassy Sanaa report: Yemeni PM tells visiting S/CT Hull, "We are not saying publicly, we are being very careful, but we believe 99 percent that it's UBL."

**TS**

*March 22, 2001 Cressey email to Rice and Hadley, 3:49 p.m., re Terrorist Threats*

-CIA report: AQ preparing attack on US interests in Saudi

[REDACTED] source: Saudi muj linked to Abu Zubaydah getting trained in Afgh, and several of them may be in Saudi for Khobar-style attack


[REDACTED]  
-rare step; last done May 2000 Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri went underground (Cole plotter)

[REDACTED] in 2000, int'l muj network (incl. Ibn Khattab in Chechnya) starts training a group in Georgia and another in Afgh for attacks inside Israel and on Israeli targets elsewhere

-TNT: Abu Zubaydah's taken this over; links to Jordan Millennium plotters

-serious rise in recent SIGINT bw. muj discussing "wedding" (i.e. attack)

1.4c



Not Responsive

1.4b 1.4c

1.4b

Not Responsive

**TOP SECRET**

*June 21, 2001 Clarke email to Rice and Hadley, 2:27 p.m., re Al Qida Video claims responsibility for Cole attack*

-seemingly AQ-distributed 90-minute video has surfaced in Gulf

-shows Cole footage: "Thanks to Allah for the victory on the day we destroyed the Cole"

Not Responsive

**TOP SECRET**

*June 30, 2001 Clarke email to Khalilzad, Crawford, and Cressey, 12:09 p.m., re Option for integrated al Qida-Afghan-Pakistan paper*

-offers Option 2: Pressure against al Qida, the Taliban Leadership, and Pakistan

-goals: reduce AQ capabilities so no longer signif threat; change Tal leadership so they'll end haven and get Pak to help make that change happen

1.4c

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. Recruit Afghans to push Taliban to dump Omar and to recruit [REDACTED] (in Taliban, tribals, NA)
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. Talks w. Pak, UAE, Saudi, others: we'll work with Taliban who'll end terror haven; benefits and costs to Pak/Afgh from change or lack thereof
- e. DOD should be ready to hit Taliban command/control, units, mil infr, terrorist command/control, terrorist infr (tunnels, bunkers)  
-State ready to back strikes, esp. w. Pakistan (airspace)

Not Responsive