

# **Complex Social and Value Networks: The Jihadi Case (Global Network Terrorism)**

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# ***Joining Global Network Jihad***


(data from Marc Sageman,  
currently being updated at University of Michigan)

- ***Friendship: 70%***
  - Band of mostly normal – even nice – guys
  - Idealistic, compassionate toward their “fictive kin”
- ***Kinship: 20%***
  - Sons, brothers, first cousins
  - Importance of in-laws & marriage to cement bonds between Mujahedin
- ***Discipleship: 10%***
  - Southeast Asia: *Jemaah Islamiyah*
    - Pesantren Al Mukmin: Abu Bakar Ba’asyir & Abdullah Sungkar
    - Pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem: Mukhlas

# Jihadi Database

- In October 2005 we began creating a database of Southeast Asian Jihadis, merging this database with Marc Sageman's database 400-500 Qaeda associates
- To date, we've gathered information on over 500 Jihadis from Southeast Asia—using open sources and informants (including Ngruki graduates)


# The Qaeda Network (2003)



# Jihadi Database - Details

- Database documentation includes alias, date of birth, nationality, education, organizational affiliation, operations completed, family connections, acquaintance connections, bio, etc.
- Relationships between Jihadis include connections through family (nuclear), marriage, school (e.g. Ngruki), Afghan training, Philippines training, geographical location, etc.

# Personal vs Operational Links



# Jihadi Database - Applications

- Jihadi connections are managed in an Access database and also downloaded into UCINET, a social networking analysis tool
- Social network analysis allow us to model relationships within and across affiliated groups throughout the world to better understand their importance for new member induction and ongoing terrorist activity

# Hypothesis - Leaderless Jihad

- Social network analysis allows us to test the hypothesis that Jihadi groups are moving from a hierarchical organizational model towards a leaderless resistance model
- Under a leaderless resistance model, small groups engage in resistance or violent activity independently without central coordination. Leadership figures provide inspiration to members and affiliated organizations - however, jihadis engage in terrorist activity without consulting the leadership.
  - The concept was first popularized by the former Klansman and Aryan Nations member Louis Beam, and made into a jihadi doctrine by Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri),



# Modeling and Quantitative Analysis

- Our database and subsequent social network analysis provide the first major opportunity to test the leaderless resistance concept with quantitative data
- Anecdotal evidence from the database supports our hypothesis that JI and other organizations are moving towards leaderless resistance
- Modeling the Internet: Websites (e.g., Global Islamic media Forum) treated as actor/agents in the network, now appear to be taking the central roles that physical agents, such as Bin Laden, once played

# Al-Qaeda is Dead, Long Live Al-Qaeda

- What is emerging is this (10 points to remember):
  1. The old Al-Qaeda network has severely fragmented and decentralized. It has not launched a successful attack since Djerba in October 2002.
  2. The mostly Egyptian and Saudi hardcore around Bin Laden really don't know who many of the new terrorists are and can't communicate with them if they did know.
  3. Most jihadis today live in the diaspora, joining the jihad outside their country of origin (> 80%), and are therefore not worried about retaliation against home populations.

## Who Joins Jihad?

- 4. There is no recruitment per se to jihad, only enlistment. Most people join the jihad through friendship (about 80%) and kinship (about 20%); the rest is mostly through schools, but we have been doing research within the schools and find that those have provided suicide bombers (e.g., in Indonesia) less than 10% of the students join the jihad, and of that 10% most do so through friendship and kinship, roughly along the lines of the non-madrassah individuals who join jihad.
- 5. The preferred cell size is 8 members. Different cells have increasingly LITTLE physical contact with one another. They are often self-constituting, and self-mobilizing, and then radicalize through the internet.
- 6. Outside of Palestine, most jihadis are married (the testosterone theory of jihad should be chucked), and in Palestine anyone who says he wants to do it for the virgins is Paradise is rejected by leaders of Hamas or PIJ as being unworthy of sacrifice.
- 7. A plurality of suicide bombers have college education or advanced technical training (except for the Maghreb-European contingent), and are professionals or semi-professionals. The largest single professional category represented is engineer.

# Virtual Jihad: The Internet as Organizer

- 8. Perhaps most interestingly, we have begun entering websites into our database and modeling them as agents. We are finding that web agents control resources and information much as did physical agents, like Bin Laden, did before (e.g., the Global Islamic Media Front site is very important today - used by Zarqawi and European jihadis to plan bombings)
- 9. Although websites are assuming central actor and hub positions in the network, the network itself is shifting profoundly to an acephalic "leaderless resistance." See the online musings of Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri, the new global jihadi Web "star" and principal theoretician of "leaderless jihad."

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri), *Da'wah lil-Muqawamah Al-Islamiyyah Al-'Alamiyyah (A Call for the Islamic Global Resistance)*.

- There are striking similarities to the 1983 treatise on "Leaderless Resistance," by Louis Beam, former Aryan Nations ambassador and Texas Klu Klux Klan leader, <http://reactor-core.org/leaderless-resistance.html>, and a looping back into the Aryan Nation's new doctrine of "Aryan Jihad," [www.aryan-nations.org/about.htm](http://www.aryan-nations.org/about.htm).


# The Madrid Example

- 10. This changing jihadi landscape is revealed in the formation of the cell responsible for the 2004 Madrid train bombings. As early as October 2002, the substitute imam of the Takoua Mosque in Madrid, was informing Spanish police under the codename “Cartagena” that a band of friends, unhappy with the mosque’s seemingly moderate preachings, had begun calling themselves *Al Haraka Salafiya*, “The Salafi Movement.”
- According to Cartagena, they met “clandestinely, with no regularity or fixed place, by oral agreement and without any schedule, though usually on Fridays.” Soon, the informal group of mostly homesick Moroccan descendants and émigrés “reached the conclusion that they had to undertake jihad.” By November 2002, opinion within the group began to shift against “going to other countries to undertake jihad, when operations were possible in Morocco and Spain.”
- A detailed action plan only began to coalesce later the following year, however, around the time the internet tract “Iraqi Jihad, Hopes and Risks” began to circulate a call for “two or three attacks ... to exploit the coming general elections in Spain in March 2004” on the Global Islamic Media Front Web, [ii] which the Madrid plotters had been systematically logging on to since the spring of 2003. The police reports show that targeting trains to force Spain out of the coalition in Iraq was only a late goal emanating from an informal network dedicated to the simple but diffuse project of undertaking jihad to defend and advance a Salafist vision of Islam.


# Proviso

The following slides are only illustrative of overall trends in connections. Many of the actual connections illustrated will have to be revised, weighted and coded for reliability. Others will likely be eliminated, and still other connections, which are not now represented, will be included at a later date. Marc Sageman is not associated with any of the graphics, which are based on elaborations from partial data, some of which he provided.

# Pooled Series Madrid Network: The Fallacy of Aggregation




# Evolving Madrid Network: 1980s







# Evolving Madrid Network: 1990-1995




# Evolving Madrid Network: 1996-1999




# Evolving Madrid Network: 2000




# Evolving Madrid Network: 2001



# Evolving Madrid Network: 2002




# Evolving Madrid Network: 2003-2004



# Singapore Leadership Hierarchy


- Below Hambali were regional Malaysian leaders such as Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, who helped with planning, financing, and connections
- Local Singapore leaders such as Ibrahim Maidin and Mas Selamat bin Kastari were responsible for recruiting all of the local Singapore operatives and providing inspiration and direction
- Local fiah leaders directed and carried out operational reconnaissance
- Overall, the Singapore foiled bombing plans are a perfect example of the now defunct JI hierarchical leadership structure and attack planning

# Network Model of Madrid and Singapore






# The al Qaeda Link: Madrid & Singapore



- Red – M30 Mosque Madrid
- Blue– Core Arab Madrid
- Black- Ahmidan Drug Gang
- Lime Green- JI Leadership
- Dark Green- Fiah Abuya
- Violet- Fiah Musa
- Grey- Peripherals
- Yellow – al Qaeda

# Status Update: Madrid, al Qaeda and Singapore



# Suicide Bombing: Strategic Logic or Moral Logic?

- Current analyses stress the “strategic logic,” organization, and risk assessments involved
- These are important but not sufficient to explain exponential growth in suicide attacks.
- *At the level of the organization, strategic calculations of utility are often critical.*
- *But for the individual and community, moral imperatives often trump utility and rational choice.*



**What gets ordinary and even smart people to blow themselves up?**

## EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES:

### 1. Suicide Terrorism as an Organizational Strategy *Costly Signaling*

- *Sacrificing* its “*best and the brightest*” signals the organization’s *costly commitment to the community, whether transnational (Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah) or national ( Hamas, Hizbollah).*
- This *underpins trust in the organization*, thus *increasing* the organization’s *political “market share”* in the community.

# *Sheikh Hamed al-Betawi*

## Spiritual guide of *Hamas*

(interview September 2004)

- Our people do not own airplanes and tanks, only human bombs.
- Those who carry out martyrdom operations are not retarded, not hopeless, not poor, but are the best of our people.
- They do not flee from life. They are educated, not illiterate, successful in their lives.

- ***Recruitment*** into most Jihadi groups is not like recruitment into a national police or army or university.
- Almost entirely a *grass-roots operation* that is *bottom up rather than top down* in the sense that individuals in the organizations bring in other *family members, friends, co-workers or co-worshippers*
- Organizations seek *operatives* who are usually *better educated and well off* relative to surrounding population, often with families and good careers or prospects
- Because *such people show willingness to invest in the future and delay immediate gratification*, unlike most regular army and police, and thus *can sustain resource-deficient insurgencies*

- *Decentralized kinship, ethnic and religious networks* also offer good prospects for *sustaining resource-deficient insurgencies* because they provide a social structure that underpins the maintenance of reputations and the efficient gathering of information about candidate members to ward against defection.
- In Arab society, family reputation based on purity of lineage and honor is still a main determinant of economic, social and political status. This thick web of social ties also makes difficult for counterintelligence to penetrate.



# *Abu Bakr Ba'asyir*

## *Emir of Jemaah Islamiyah*

(interview August 2005)

- *There is no nobler life than to die as a martyr for Jihad. None. The highest deed in Islam is Jihad. If we commit to Jihad, we can neglect other deeds, even fasting and prayer. (Note: this is a radically new view of Islam)*
- *A martyrdom action cannot be postponed to care for family or because the community may suffer in retaliation. There is duty to family but duty to God always comes first. (Note: this suggests moral imperatives that prohibit trade-offs and preclude negotiation across moral frames)*
- *Of course, a roadside bomb is preferable if the martyr can be used for bigger purposes (note: this suggests rational calculations of utility within a moral frame)*

# Sacred Values

- Religious behavior often seems to be motivated by *Sacred Values (SVs)*. A sacred value is a value that incorporates moral and ethical beliefs and is “independently of its prospect of success.” Max Weber (1978, I:24) distinguishes the non-instrumental “value rationality” of religions and transcendent political ideologies from the “instrumental rationality” of *realpolitik* and the marketplace.

# Hypothesis

- High cost personal sacrifices to (non-kin) others in society seem to be typically motivated by, and framed in terms of, non-instrumental values. This includes Jihadist conceptions of martyrdom, which also involves moral commitment to kill infidels for the sake of God.


- This suggests that non-instrumental values possess inherent qualities that instrumental values may lack (passion, obligation), and that these two sorts of values can interact in intricate ways.
- (Of course, one can always recast non-instrumental values in instrumental terms, just as one can always frame any perceptual or conceptual relationship in terms of “similarity”; but the issue is whether in doing so explanatory power to predict further judgments and decisions is helped or hindered.)

# Palestinian Refugee and Israeli Settler Experiment (Jeremy Ginges and Khalil Shikaki)

- Participants were randomly assigned first to two scenarios (“recognize” or “relinquish”) and then to one of three types of trade-offs (“taboo”, “taboo+”, or “tragic”).

- Relinquish Scenarios:
- **Taboo** - suppose the United Nations organized a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians. Under this treaty:
  - Palestinians would be required to give up their right to return to their homes in Israel.
  - There would be two states – a Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.
- **Taboo+** - Additional clause:
  - In return, the USA and the European Union would give Palestine 10 billion dollars a year for 100 years.
- **Tragic** - Additional clause:
  - On their part, Israel would give up what they believe is their sacred right to the west bank.

Palestinian refugees who indicated that the “right of return” is a sacred value predicted the percentage of Palestinians who would respond to each type of trade-off with violence




# Israeli Settler survey

- A survey was given to out to 600 Jewish residents of the West Bank and Gaza on August 11, 2005, only hours before Jewish settlers were forced to leave Gaza. About half of those surveyed disagreed with the following statement:
- “There are extreme circumstances where it would be permissible for the Jewish people to give away some part of Eretz Israel [The Land of Israel].”



# Emotional reactions of ANGER / DISGUST to tradeoffs for peace



Hostility: taboo+ > “taboo” > “tragic”

For both the “recognize” and “relinquish” scenarios:

- participants in the “taboo+” condition (added instrumental value) showed greater hostility to the trade off than those in the “taboo” condition,
- who in turn showed greater hostility to the trade-off than participants in the “tragic” condition (added sacred value).

This is precisely the opposite of what one would expect if calculations were based on straightforward notions of economic or political utility.

## Taboo tradeoffs for Martyrdom Actions

- **Q34: suppose a martyrdom action (which some calls martyrdom attacks while others call suicide attacks) were scheduled in a week – would it be acceptable to delay a martyrdom action for a few weeks in the following cases?:**
  - **Q34- 1: In order to make a first hajj to mecca?**
    - (1) Yes            (2) No    (3) I reject bombing attacks            (4) DK / NA
  - **Q34- 2 : In order to wait out the morning period for a dead parent?**
    - (1) Yes            (2) No    (3) I reject bombing attacks            (4) DK / NA
- **Q35: if a chosen martyr's father became ill and his family asked him to take care of his father, would it be acceptable to delay the action indefinitely?**
  - (1) certainly yes            (2) yes    (3) no    (4) certainly no    (5) DK / NA
- **Q36: would it be acceptable to permanently forego martyrdom if there were a significantly high chance that the chosen martyr's family would be killed in retaliation?**
- **Q37: And what if the bombing attack led to the destruction of olive trees and the bombing of his home town and school and the death of the students? Would it be acceptable to forgo the attack in this case?**

# Non-Monotonicity

- **Q43: do you think god favors more the bomber (who some call a martyr while other call a suicide bomber) who manages to kill 100 of the enemy over the one who manages to kill 1 enemy?**
- (1) certainly favors him
- (2) favors him
- (3) does not favor him, as there is no difference between the two
- (4) certainly does not favor him, as there is no difference between the two
- (5) DK / NA

## Allowable Cost-Benefit Tradeoffs

- **Q40: What if the attack in question was the planting of a roadside bomb that does not entail risks of death to the person who will carry out the attack and the family asked him to take care of his father. Would it be acceptable in this case to delay the attack indefinitely?**
- (1) certainly yes      (2) yes    (3) no    (4) certainly no    (5) DK / NA
- **Q33: If a person wanted to carry out a bombing attack (which some call martyrdom attacks while others call suicide attacks) against the enemies of his country but someone more competent or qualified than him volunteered to carry out the attack, would it be acceptable to forego a martyrdom action in this case?**
- (1) certainly yes    (2) yes                      (3) no    (4) certainly no  
    (5) I reject bombing attacks                      (6) DK / NA

# (In)sensitivity to Quantity

- Who would the Ummah approve of less?
  - (1) a shaheed who kills 10 of the enemy
  - (2) a shaheed who kills 1 of the enemy
  - (3) no difference (4) DK / NA
- And who would the Ummah approve of more?
  - (1) a shaheed who kills 1 of the enemy
  - (2) a shaheed who kills 10 of the enemy
  - (3) no difference (3) DK / NA (4)

# What's our Program for the Future?

**To perform time-sensitive mappings**

**Of the distribution of Action-Producing  
Sacred Values over Social Networks**

**And to Plot the Paths these overlapping  
networks would likely take under  
various forms of Attack (in an  
evolutionary arms race)**