بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

بدأت شيخي الفاضل في قراءة كتاب حروب أوباما للصحفي المخضرم بوب وهو الكتاب الذي نصح الشيخ حفظه الله الأمريكان بقراءته وأنا بدوري أوصي المجاهدين وخاصة القيادة والمسؤولين الأمنيين والعسكريين بقراءته، ففي الكتاب استراتيجية العدو في مواجهتنا، وقد ظهر لي أهمية الكتاب من الصفحات الأولى، وسأحاول في هذه الرسالة أن أنقل لكم بعض ما رأيته مهما وخطيرا فيها، وأظن شيخي الفاضل أنكم ستشاركوني الرأي بضرورة وسرعة ترجمة هذا الكتاب، وأقترح أن يكلف أخ بذلك حتى ولو طلب منه التفرغ التام لذلك.

وأبدأ بنقل جزء من مقدمة الكتاب:

Information in the book was supplied by more than 100 people involved in the Afghanistan War and national security during the first 18 months of President Barack Obama`s administration. Interviews were conducted on “background,” meaning the information could be used but the sources would not be identified by name. Many sources were interviewed five or more times. Most allowed me to record the interviews, which were then transcribed. For several sources, the combined interview transcripts run more than 300 pages. I have attempted to preserve the language of the main characters and sources as much as possible, using their words even when they are not directly quoted, reflecting the flavor of their speech and attitudes.

Many key White House aides were interviewed in-depth. They shared meeting notes, important documents, recollections of what happened before, during and after meetings, and assisted extensively with their interpretations.
Senior and well-placed military, intelligence and diplomatic officials also provided detailed recollections, read from notes or assisted with documents.

Since the reporting was done over 18 months, many interviews were conducted within days or even hours after critical discussions. This often provided a fresher and less-calculated account.

Dialogue comes mostly from the written record, but also from participants, usually more than one. Any attribution of thoughts, conclusions or feelings to a person was obtained directly from that person, from notes or from a colleague whom the person told.

I interviewed President Obama on-the-record in the Oval Office for one hour and 15 minutes on Saturday, July 10, 2010.

On Thursday, November 6, 2008, two days after he was elected president of the United States, Senator Barack Obama arranged to meet in Chicago with Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence (DNI).

McConnell, 65, a retired Navy vice admiral with stooped shoulders, wisps of light brown hair and an impish smile, had come to present details of the most highly classified intelligence operations and capabilities of the vast American espionage
establishment he oversaw as DNI. In just 75 days, the formidable powers of the state would reside with the 47-year-old Obama. He would soon be, as the intelligence world often called the president, “The First Customer.”

McConnell arrived early at the Kluczynski Federal Building, an austere Chicago skyscraper, with Michael J. Morell, who had been President George W. Bush`s presidential briefer on 9/11 and now headed the Central Intelligence Agency`s analysis division.

Two members of Senator Obama`s transition team from the last Democratic administration greeted them: John Podesta, Bill Clinton`s chief of staff for the final two years of his presidency, and James Steinberg, a former deputy national security adviser in the Clinton White House.

“We`re going to go in with the president-elect and hear what you guys have got to say,” Podesta said.

McConnell paused awkwardly. He had received instructions from President Bush. “As president,” Bush had told McConnell, “this is my decision. I forbid any information about our success and how this works” except to the president-elect. McConnell knew Bush had never been comfortable using the terminology “sources and methods.” But what the president meant was that nothing should be disclosed that might identify human spies and new techniques developed to infiltrate and attack al Qaeda, fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defend the nation.

كيف أنه لم يكن مسموحًا حتى للمقربين من الرئيس المنتخب أوباما من الإطلاع على سير العمليات الاستخبارية ضد القاعدة وذلك بأمر من الرئيس المنتهية ولايته ولكنه لازال رئيسًا، وسنعرف السبب في الفقرات التالية.

“John, sorry,” McConnell said. “I`d love to be able to accommodate, but I didn`t make these rules.” He related Bush`s instructionsâ€””only the president-elect and anyone designated to take a top national security cabinet post could attend. “Neither of you are designated. So I can`t. I`m not going to violate the president`s direction.”
“Okay, I got it,” Podesta said, barely concealing his irritation. Podesta had had all-source intelligence access before, as had Steinberg. He thought this was not helpful to Obama, who was largely unfamiliar with intelligence briefings.

Obama arrived still in full campaign mode with ready smiles and firm handshakes all around. He was buoyant in the afterglow of victory.

Two months earlier, after receiving a routine top secret briefing from McConnell on terrorism threats, Obama had half joked, “You know, I’ve been worried about losing this election. After talking to you guys, I’m worried about winning this election.”

Mr. President-elect, we need to see you for a second,” Podesta said, steering him off to a private room. When Obama returned, his demeanor was different. He was more reserved, even aggravated. The transition from campaigning to governing "with all its frustrations "was delivering another surprise. His people, the inner circle from the campaign and the brain trust of Democrats he had carefully assembled to guide his transition, were being excluded. The first customer elect was going to have to go it alone.

McConnell and Morell sat down with Obama in a private, secure room called a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, or SCIF. It was an unusually small room in the center of the building where a bathroom might normally be located. Designed to prevent eavesdropping, the SCIF was windowless and confining, even claustrophobic.

فترة السرية التي تهدد أمريكا أصبح قلقا من أنه ربح الانتخابات تبين لنا هذه الفترة مدى خطورة ما يشكله المجاهدون بفضل الله على الأمركان

لقد قال أوباما على سبيل المزح الممزوج بالحقيقة أنه كان قلقا من الهزيمة في الانتخابات ولكن بعد تلقيه للتقرير السري عن الأخطار الإرهابية التي تهدد أمريكا أصبح قلقا من أنه ربح الانتخابات تبين لنا هذه الفترة مدى خطورة ما يشكله المجاهدون بفضل الله على الأمركان

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At first, this would be something of a continuation and amplification of the earlier briefing McConnell had given candidate Obama. There were 161,000 American troops at war in Iraq and 38,000 in Afghanistan. Intelligence was making significant contributions to the war efforts. But the immediate threat to the United States came not from these war zones, but from Pakistan, an unstable country with a population of about 170 million, a 1,500-mile border with southern Afghanistan, and an arsenal of some 100 nuclear weapons.

Priority one for the DNI, and now Obama, had to be the ungoverned tribal regions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border where Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda network, and branches of the extremist insurgent Taliban had nested in 150 training camps and other facilities.

Combined, the seven regions forming Pakistan`s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were about the size of New Jersey. The extremist groups and tribal chiefs ruled much of the FATA and had footholds in Pakistan`s Northwest Frontier province.

 cómo se informaron, la situación más crítica es en la región de los montes en Pakistán, y en este párrafo se menciona la existencia de 150 bases de los islamistas en esta región, y se puede leer en uno de los informes anteriores que se decidió "si se produce un atentado en Estados Unidos, se darán instrucciones para la eliminación de 150 bases, y el que se detenga el hombre y decida qué son, a Dios se le agradecerá". Se menciona el método de observación de estas bases y el que provoca este razonamiento es una prueba de las fuerzas de las mismas en el campo de los objetivos de mayor importancia.

كم هو معلوم فإنهم يرون الخطورة الكبرى في منطقة القبائل في باكستان وفي هذه الفقرة إشارة إلى وجود 150 مركزا للمجاهدين في منطقة القبائل وقد قرأت في أحد التقارير سابقا أن بوش كان قد قرر في حالة ما إذا حصل أي عمل "إرهابي" داخل أمريكا فإنه سيعطي تعليقاته لرصف 150 مركزا، والامر الذي يشتبه الإنسان هو لماذا لم يقصفوا الجوامع والله أعلم هو حتى يصلوا إلى الأهداف الكبرى عن طريق مراقبة هذه المراكز وما يبعث على هذا الاستنتاج الأمور التالية:

- كما سبأني قريبا أنهم أطلقوا على أحد الجواسيس المهمين في المنطقة اسم SHOOTING STAR
كان بيت نائب جد مشهور ولكن لم يستهدف إلا لما كان فيه
الشيخ الحافظ رحمه الله
كثير من القصوفات المتاتالية كانت تستهدف نفس المجموعة كم
حصل مع إخوة العمل الخارجي رحمة الله قصف أبي أنس ثم
الشيخ عبد الرشيد ثم قصف الأخ عبد الحفيظ ثم الأخ عبد
الله الشامي
وحصل نفس الشيء مع الكتيبة التي كان مسؤولا عنها الأخ
نظامن رحم الله الجميع
ومؤخرا مع الإخوة في ميزر ثم الإخوة المرتبطين بالأخ محمد
خان رحم الله الجميع وكذلك مجموعة الشيخ إلياس
وقد يكون هذا النتائج في الاستهداف ناتج عن أن الجاسوس اخترق
المجموعة، وخلاصة القول أنه لن نفهم أسباب ناجح العدو في
الاستهداف الدقيق إلا إذا جمعنا استنتاجاتنا مما يصدر عن العدو مع
التحقيقات التي تجري مع الجواسيس وفي رسالة أخرى بعض
الاقتراحات ت الهيئة تقرر من اللجنة الأمنية لعل الله يفعليها.
وأرجع مرة أخرى لموضوع المراكز وأقترح الشيخ الفاضل بأن تصدر
قرارات بعدم التجرد على المراكز المحروقة أو التي استعملت لعدة
سنوات وأشتر هنا لبعض ما أعرف منها

1- البيت الأخ نايب في ديجون ومع الأسقف الشديد فقد سمعت أنه في
اليوم الذي قصف فيه الحاجي محمد رحمة الله كان قد مر على
البيت رغم أن الشيخ الحافظ قصف هناك ولست متأكد من هذه
المعلومات

2- البيت الآخ كفاية في ديجون

3- البيت الإخوة لال ولعنصت علي في سيلجا

4- مدرسة نورك والمجمع المحيط بها ولا يستطيع أن مجموعة الأخ
لقمان رحمة الله رصدت من هناك

5- البيت صادق نور رحمة الله وبت الطلعة في مير علي

6- البيت تأصيل وأختر زمان في ديجون

7- البيت رسول جان في باي خيل

8- بعض المراكز في خيصر لا أعرف أسماء أصحابها

9- كل المراكز التي مر عليها أكثر من ثلاثة سنوات وكانت عليها حركة
كثيرة

In September 2006, Pakistan had signed a treaty ceding full
control of the FATA’s North Waziristan region to Taliban-linked
tribal chiefs, creating a kind of Wild West for al Qaeda and the Taliban insurgents attacking the U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

In the earlier briefing, McConnell had laid out the problem in dealing with Pakistan. It was a dishonest partner of the U.S. in the Afghanistan War. “They’re living a lie,” McConnell had said. In exchange for reimbursements of about $2 billion a year from the U.S., Pakistan’s powerful military and its spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), helped the U.S. while giving clandestine aid, weapons and money to the Afghan Taliban. They had an “office of hedging your bets,” McConnell said.

Dealing with the ISI would break your heart if you did it long enough, McConnell had explained. It was as if there were six or seven different personalities within the ISI. The CIA exploited and bought some, but at least one section known as Directorate financed and nurtured the Taliban and other terrorist groups. CIA payments might put parts of the ISI in America’s pocket, McConnell had said, but the Pakistani spy agency could not or would not control its own people.

The Pakistani leadership believed the U.S. would eventually withdraw from the region, as it had toward the end of the Cold War once the occupying Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan in 1989. Their paranoid mind-set was, in part, understandable. If America moved out again, India and Iran would fill the power vacuum inside Afghanistan. And most of all, Pakistan feared India, an avowed enemy for more than 60 years. As a growing economic and military powerhouse, India had numerous intelligence programs inside Afghanistan to spread its influence there. Pakistan worried more about being encircled by India than being undermined by extremists inside its borders.

The best way out of this would be for Obama to broker some kind of peace between India and Pakistan, the DNI had said. If Pakistan felt significantly more secure in its relations with India, it might stop playing its deadly game with the Taliban.
In his September overview, McConnell also discussed strikes by small unmanned aerial vehicles such as Predators that had sophisticated surveillance cameras and Hellfire missiles. The covert action program authorized by President Bush targeted al Qaeda leadership and other groups inside Pakistan. Although classified, the program had been widely reported in the Pakistani and American media.

Only four strikes had been launched in the first half of 2008, Obama had been told. The U.S. had uncovered evidence that the Pakistanis would delay planned strikes in order to warn al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, whose fighters would then disperse. In June 2008, McConnell had taken human and technical intelligence to President Bush showing multiple conversations between an ISI colonel and Siraj Haqqani, a guerrilla commander whose network was allied with the Afghan Taliban.

In this section, the reference to the Pakistani intelligence being involved in the strikes is mentioned repeatedly, indicating that American intelligence was being aided by Pakistani spies in the fight against the militants, and at the same time, maintaining close relations with the Taliban.

Aman from the Americans has been referring to the past years of strikes as a result of prior Pakistani espionage, and they were informed of the strikes in advance. They also enjoyed secret relations with some Pakistani intelligence agents. It is believed that this agreement will remain even if there are other concerns.

The Americans believe that the Pakistanis are using deception to delay planned strikes in order to warn al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, whose fighters are then dispersed. In June 2008, McConnell presented human and technical intelligence to President Bush showing multiple conversations between an ISI colonel and Siraj Haqqani, a guerrilla commander whose network was allied with the Afghan Taliban.
“Okay,” Bush had said, “we`re going to stop playing the game. These sons of bitches are killing Americans. I`ve had enough.” He ordered stepped-up Predator drone strikes on al Qaeda leaders and specific camps, so-called infrastructure targets. It was like attacking an anthill—the survivors would run away in the aftermath. These “squirters” were then tracked to the next hideout, helping to build the intelligence data on terrorist refuges.

Bush had directed that Pakistan receive “concurrent notification” of drone attacks, meaning they learned of a strike as it was underway or, just to be sure, a few minutes after. American drones now owned the skies above Pakistan.

In addition, McConnell had given President Bush intelligence showing that the Pakistani ISI had helped the Haqqani network attack the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, on July 7, four months earlier. The U.S. had warned India, which had put its embassy in a defensive posture. But it was not enough.

Fifty-eight people were killed and more than 100 injured in a suicide bombing.

لا أدري صحة هذا الخبر وهل فعلًا حقایي هو المسؤول عن عملية السفارة الهندية، ولا أستبعد أن يكون هذا الأمر فيه شيء من الحقيقة، والذي يدفعني إلى ذلك هو مراجلتي للوثائق التي سربت لنا من الجيش الباكستاني فالواضح أن العدو الأول للجيش الباكستاني يبقى دائما الهند وأرى أن نحاول استغلال هذا الأمر في وضع سياستنا المستقبلية فلما لا يفكر الإخوة في استهداف مصالح هندية في أفغانستان قد يخفف عنا هذا فليلا ضغط الجيش الباكستاني.
McConnell had then moved during the September briefing to one of the most pressing worries. Al Qaeda was recruiting people from the 35 countries who didn`t need visas to enter the United States. It was paying them good money, bringing them into the ungoverned regions by the dozens, training them in all aspects of warfare "explosives and chemical" and trying to have them acquire biological weapons.

“We`re a big open sieve,” McConnell said. “They`re trying to get people with passports that don`t require a visa to get into the United States.” Al Qaeda had not succeeded yet, but that was the big worry. “We can`t find any cell in the United States, but we suspect there may be some.”

That got Obama`s full attention. Some of the 9/11 hijackers had operated for nearly 18 months in the United States before their attacks. As he had said at the end of that meeting, there were reasons to worry about winning the election.

As he had said at the end of that meeting, there were reasons to worry about winning the election.
The November 6 briefing to Obama picked up exactly where that earlier presentation had left off. McConnell could now provide him with a fuller description of how the intelligence community culled and collected information.

“Mr. President-elect, we can share anything with you,” McConnell said in the soothing accent of his native South Carolina.

For example, the top secret code words for the Predator drone operations were SYLVAN-MAGNOLIA. The code words set up Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) to which only people with the highest-level security clearances and a need to know were granted access. The president-elect was now, of course, one of those people.

The U.S. had scored an extraordinary intelligence coup in the un-governed regions of Pakistan as the result of blending two intelligence cultures human sources and technical intelligence such as communications intercepts and satellite and drone imagery.

إن هذا النجاح الذي وصفنا بأنه غير عادي في بناء شبكة تجسسية تقنية وبشرية في منطقة القبائل حقيقة يجب أن نتعامل معها وأرى شيخي الفاضل أن نعيد النظر في طريقتنا في التعامل مع الجواسيس وأقترح شيخي الفاضل التشاور مع الأخوة في اللجنة الأمنية مثلاً بأن لا يسرعوا في اعتقال أو قتل الجواسيس الكبار بل تتم متابعتهم ومراقبتهم من أجل كشف الرؤوس الكبيرة التي تدير هذه المؤامرة وفي رسالة مقتراحات أمنية بعض الاقتراحات لهم وضعنا الأمني أكثر حتى نستطيع مواجهتهم بإذن الله.
أما يخصوص الشبكة التقنية فإني أؤكد مرة أخرى ما كتبته في رسالي:
- الأمانة السابقة:
  - تجنب استعمالنا لأي وسيلة اتصال تقنية من المنطقة هواتف
  - إنترنت مخابرة
- تتجنب شراء الأجهزة الإلكترونية من المنطقة موبيلات كومبيوترات
  - هاردسكس كاميرات وحتى فلاشات
  - نمنع أن يصبح أحد من الإخوة الجدد أي أجهزة إلكترونية معه
  - نطلب من أي أخ سيلتفي بالقيادة بأن لا يصحب معه أي جهاز أثناء اللقاء
- عند الاجتماعات نحاول إبعاد الأجهزة الإلكترونية عن مكان الاجتماع
  - عند حاجتنا لشراء أجهزة إلكترونية نتأكد من أن أخا موثوقا هو
  - الذي أشترى بنفسه
  - نتوقف ونشكل حازم التسبب في مسألة التصوير

But, he said, the real breakthrough had been with human sources. This is what President Bush wanted to protect at all costs. The drones were basically flying high-resolution video cameras armed with missiles. The only meaningful way to point drones toward a target was to have spies on the ground telling the CIA where to look, hunt and kill. Without spies, the video feed from the Predator might as well be a blank television screen.

McConnell provided extensive details about these human sources, who had been developed in an expensive, high-risk program over five years. The spies were the real secrets that Obama would carry with him from that moment forward. They were the key, in some respects, to protecting the country.

هنا يوجد ماك كولن ما تعرفه جيدا من أن النجاح المهم الذي حققه الأمريكيان في المنطقة هو الشبكة الجاسوسية البشرية التي تم زرعها في المنطقة، ويشير إلى أن هذا المشروع الذي بدأ التأسيس له هو إدارة
بوش دام خمس سنوات، وهذا الأمر كان قد أشار له ديك تشيبي في أحد
لقاءاته التي أجريها بعد خروجه من البيت الأبيض وهو نفس اللقاء الذي
قال فيه أنهم قريبين من الرجل الثالث في التنظيم مشيرا للشيخ الحافظ
رحمه الله

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President Bush had absolute views on protecting them. “His instructions to us are no one except you or one of your designated cabinet officials can be provided the information,” McConnell said. President Bush did not want any “tourists,” as he called them, and no “professors” who might be part of the Obama transition team but later reveal the spies in a speech, a book or a careless comment.

Obama indicated he understood.

The CIA is so guarded with human sources that each one has a randomly selected code name such as MOONRISE. If the source is productive and undertaking great risks, word might get around the agency. He`s doing great, but when too many people know about him he is killed off. There is a burial ceremony, everybody`s sad. MOONRISE paid the ultimate price, his CIA case officer would say. Except MOON-RISE is not actually dead. His code name has changed. And now the CIA has another source called SHOOTING STAR. Same guy, new name. MOONRISE is SHOOTING STAR. It`s an elaborate and manipulative ruse in order to grant MOONRISE the ultimate protection death.

الذي فهمته من طلابيس هذه الفقرة أنه في حالة اشتهار الجاسوس فإنه يتم التخلص منه ولا أدرى الطريقة ولكن يحضروننا هنا حادثة قصف المسمى خالد والذي كان متهما بأنه جاسوس وكان من كبار
On the technical side, McConnell explained, the National Security Agency (NSA), which he had headed from 1992 to 1996, had developed a breakthrough eavesdropping capability. It had begun years before with a project code-named SHARKFINN that was designed to speed the acquisition, storage, dissemination and availability of intercepted communications, including cell phone calls and e-mails. The project advanced and was soon referred to as RT10, which increased the speed in real time to factors of up to 10 to the 10th power, or 10 billion times faster. It was now called RTRG “Real Time, Regional Gateway. RTRG meant there was a way to capture all the data, store it, and make it instantly available to intelligence analysts and operators, allowing the U.S. to react quickly in response to the enemy.

In Afghanistan, the program code name was JESTER. Specialized units called JACKAL teams operated countrywide to monitor the insurgency.

“They talk, we listen. They move, we observe. Given the opportunity, we react operationally,” McConnell said.

The human and technical intelligence pointed with confidence, McConnell said, to the Quetta Shura Taliban as the central insurgent group in the Afghanistan War. This “shura,” an Arabic word meaning council, was headed by Mullah Muhammad Omar,
the Taliban leader who had fled Afghanistan after the U.S. attack into his country after 9/11. There had been a $25 million reward on his head ever since.

Mullah Omar was in the Pakistani city of Quetta, just about 60 miles from the Afghan border in the province of Baluchistan. Unlike the vast desert of the FATA, Quetta had a population of almost 900,000, which made drone strikes virtually impossible.

“Here`s the center of gravity,” McConnell said.

“Well,” Obama asked, “what are we doing about that?”

Not that much, McConnell indicated.

The problem was sending American forces across the border into Pakistani cities where drones could not strike. Just two months earlier, on September 3, a day after McConnell had given candidate Obama his first briefing, President Bush authorized a cross-border operation into Pakistan. It was supposed to be a quiet, in-out Special Forces ground raid by about two dozen Navy SEALs on a house believed to be used by al Qaeda in the town of Angor Adda in the FATA. The plan was for the SEALs to seize al Qaeda`s documents and computers, their “stuff,” as McConnell called it.

But in that part of the world, people often ran toward automatic weapons fire and explosions”instead of away from the danger”to see what was happening, McConnell explained. Civilians were killed in the raid, causing all hell to break loose in the Pakistani press.

The raid had been poorly planned and coordinated, McConnell acknowledged. The Pakistani government angrily claimed it was a violation of their sovereignty. Bush was extremely upset about the civilian casualties, and said America would not do that again. In the Bush administration, there would be no more ground operations into Pakistan, period.

One important secret that had never been reported in the media or elsewhere was the existence of the CIA`s 3,000-man covert army in Afghanistan. Called CTPT, for Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, the army consisted mostly of Afghans, the cream of the
crop in the CIA`s opinion. These pursuit teams were a paid, trained and functioning tool of the CIA that was authorized by President Bush. The teams conducted operations designed to kill or capture Taliban insurgents, but also often went into tribal areas to pacify and win support.

McConnell said a second immediate threat was al Qaeda in Yemen, which was commonly referred to as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP. The group had attacked tourists and in September 2008 detonated two vehicle bombs outside the U.S. embassy in Yemen, killing 19 people, including six of the terrorists.

McConnell and Morell turned to the Iranian nuclear program. It was well known that Iran was trying to get nuclear weapons. Despite the suspension of some of the Iranian nuclear programs, others continued or could be restarted. And there were hidden facilities. McConnell said he was convinced that