Lessons from Vietnam

Intelligence in Small Wars

George W. Allen

This article is based on a paper presented at the 1991 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C.

The military triumph in Desert Storm has engendered the widespread sentiment that America has finally "kicked the Vietnam syndrome" and can face the future free of the guilt and ghosts. By implication, we can forget Vietnam and confront the post-Cold War world with new confidence and optimism.

But it was with much the same upbeat spirit that America sallied forth to save South Vietnam from communist domination. It is worth remembering what we did there and how we did it. As one study on the Vietnam War observed, "there is much to learn, but little to emulate."

Small Wars

Vietnam was unique in its own historical setting, geographic environment, internal political fragmentation, and its Cold War setting. The conflict ran the gamut from political terrorism to "mid-intensity" war. The American intelligence experience in Vietnam included its entire professional repertoire, some facets reasonably well performed, some embarrassingly flawed.

But the credo "no more Vietnams" reflects wishful thinking if it means America can evade all future challenges to its interests.

Since World War II, history records our involvement in a succession of low- and mid-intensity conflicts, including the most recent ones in Panama and the Persian Gulf. The future almost certainly holds a similar spectrum of conflicts for America, most of which will resemble one aspect or another of the Vietnam experience.

We probably will not be able to avoid some involvement in counterinsurgency campaigns, whether unilaterally or as part of a coalition, if a president deems our interests are threatened. Meanwhile, insurgent groups will seek our support to overthrow regimes hostile to our interests; special operations will be required to rescue hostages or endangered American citizens; there will be peacekeeping operations, deterrence operations, and perhaps raids to block the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and delivery systems in hostile countries; and expeditions to help friendly nations defend themselves from aggressive neighbors.

Timely and comprehensive intelligence will be needed to define these threats; provide geographic, political, cultural and economic background information on the areas of operations; assess the capabilities of enemy and allied forces in the areas; and assist in monitoring the progress of the campaigns. Without such intelligence, policymakers are handicapped and thus may fail to act appropriately.

Intelligence can perform its potential role only if planners and decisionmakers understand its capabilities and are prepared to exploit them, and only if intelligence managers understand the needs of the policymakers and are prepared to meet them. Most of the shortcomings of intelligence in the Vietnam War were due in some measure to a lack of such understanding and preparedness by both parties.

Intelligence Before Intervention

In the broadest sense, policymakers guide and direct the intelligence effort by indicating areas of interest and general priorities. Astute intelligence managers
and analysts, however, are self-energizing as they monitor the world looking for events, developments, trends, or patterns that may affect American interests, even when these may not be on the busy policymaker’s current list of priority concerns. To reduce surprise and its ensuing handicaps, the intelligence system also “tweaks up” appropriate collection mechanisms as necessary and without prodding at the first signs of incipient crisis.

Some observers generously give the community satisfactory marks in this surveillance function on Vietnam, but its performance was mixed. Intelligence repeatedly signalled in the late 1950s that Hanoi’s post-Geneva threat was a massive infiltration around the DMZ to support unconventional warfare in the south. The weaknesses of the Saigon government and its vulnerability to growing guerrilla activity in 1960 and early 1961 were also duly assessed by the intelligence community. These were drowned out, however, by the “noise” of euphoric reporting from Saigon from 1956 to 1959 on the “miracle” of President Diem’s survival and his government’s apparent stability.

The ensuing complacency was evident in the essentially routine approach to assisting the development of Saigon’s internal security capabilities. Starting in 1954, the military advisory group (MAAG) in Saigon concentrated on organizing, equipping and training a conventional army to defend against an orthodox invasion, and it was unconcerned with internal security. Before 1960, MAAG had negligible interest in Vietnamese military intelligence. The CIA Station worked routinely with civil intelligence organizations and with appropriate Vietnamese Army special operations elements. Both the US Embassy and CIA Station filed reports on the growing level of armed dissidence in the south and on the government’s growing alienation from the people, but these were mitigated by reports giving at least equal emphasis to the regime’s accomplishments.

In 1960, the US Army initiated action to provide the Vietnamese military with a HUMINT collection capability for wartime use, and the CIA began efforts to help create a Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) to provide coordination and direction to Vietnam’s many separate military and civilian intelligence services. The Station also helped to draft a limited counterinsurgency plan early in 1961. Such measures were too late, however. The Viet Cong had already extended its clandestine network over wide areas of the countryside, and the Saigon regime’s ineffectual internal security apparatus never fully recovered from that initial setback. William Colby, CIA’s Station Chief from 1960 to 1962, has acknowledged that he may not have been forceful enough in causing appropriate actions to be adopted at the time or on the scale needed. He was not alone in this regard.

In future conflicts, intelligence should send “scouts out” as soon as it detects initial signs of an incipient crisis to assess the developing situation. A team of specialists from Washington and the theater military command should go to the field to assist the CIA Station, the Embassy and the defense attaches in appraising the situation. This assessment should:

- Examine the aims, strategy and strengths of the opposition.
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the threatened government, including its intelligence services.
- Judge whether the local government has the will to follow policies and programs that would engage the populace politically and psychologically on its behalf.
- Evaluate the likelihood that the government will embrace accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law in conducting internal security programs.
- Determine whether the internal security and military forces are reasonably free of corruption, and the extent of their popular standing.

Without assurances on these last three points, there would be meager prospects for developing effective internal security programs, and little likelihood of Congressional approval for US assistance.

With such a preliminary assessment, the intelligence community should then be able to inform policymakers of an emerging crisis in time to permit action for ensuring the protection of US interests.
Intelligence-Policy Exchange

The structure of the intelligence-policymaker exchange shapes the extent to which intelligence can illuminate national policy plans and strategies. CIA was well integrated into the decision machinery of the Eisenhower era. It blended less well with the more freewheeling, ad hoc approach of the Kennedy administration. Products such as the National Intelligence Estimate, designed to support long-term planning, were dysfunctional in the Kennedy-Johnson era, contributing to the policymakers’ sense that intelligence was unresponsive and irrelevant to their needs.

In the 1960s interagency working groups routinely included CIA representatives, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the State Department’s intelligence bureau (INR) supported the work of their departmental masters. The DCI usually participated in appropriate NSC meetings in the Kennedy era, but he was not always included before late 1967 in the “Tuesday lunch” group of principals that counseled President Johnson on national security matters. Moreover, CIA operators and analysts sometimes found themselves unsuited to the purpose of the working group with which they were meeting.

In part to improve its dialogue with policymakers and to enhance internal coordination of CIA activities related to Vietnam, a Vietnamese Affairs Staff (SAVA) was formed in the DCI’s office in 1965. Its principal roles were to represent the Agency on major policy working groups and task forces, to broker analytical studies within CIA to support these groups, and to ensure that the analytical and operational sides of the agency were not working at cross-purposes. A prototype for later CIA task forces and special centers, the staff was also a precursor of the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) function.

SAVA functioned reasonably well in its policy interface and analysis-brokering roles. But it had no formal, community-wide authority and hence little influence or leverage over DIA and INR, and its influence on national estimates was uneven. Some of the Agency’s best work on Vietnam, however, such as the “will to persist” studies commissioned by Secretary of Defense McNamara, were brokered and reviewed by the staff. On the other hand, SAVA did not always march in step with the CIA analytical consensus; it was perceived in parts of CIA as being too close to the policymakers and as too willing to provide “intelligence to please.”

Some Johnson administration officials criticized CIA for “continual carping” about the war and for purveying “pessimistic” and “negative” assessments. CIA, however, did not have a single institutional viewpoint on Vietnam. Its generally “pessimistic” tone was the result of the consensus-building processes of internal coordination and product review, reinforced by a deeply ingrained professional ethic that emphasizes the objectivity of analysis.

The intelligence community might be faulted for trumpeting too much the strengths and durability of the Hanoi regime and for not focusing enough on its vulnerabilities. Its failure to do this on Vietnam was largely a reflection of the dysfunctional national security planning machinery of the Kennedy-Johnson era, although this was aggravated by the sometimes openly expressed rancor in the intelligence-policymaker exchange.

More successful solutions to the intelligence-policy interface have emerged since Vietnam, such as those created to integrate intelligence into the strategic arms negotiation process and to support the policy-review machinery in the Carter administration. In these situations, the CIA was able to bring intelligence to bear directly on the development of US policies and programs, to broker the preparation of intelligence studies in support of further deliberations, and to participate in assessing the viability of policy options under consideration.

These arrangements are not unlike those employed by the military to integrate intelligence into the work of a commander’s staff. Similarly close and continuous working relationships need to exist between intelligence staffs and decisionmakers at all levels in any future small war. Intelligence should even-handedly help the policymakers assess the consequences and implications of each option. This synergistic relationship should continue into the execution phase, with intelligence helping to monitor the ongoing situation and to assist the policymaker and commanders as they fine-tune their programs and operations and make corrections.
Unified Intelligence Planning and Direction

The intelligence community had no formal, standing coordinating mechanism on Vietnam. As a result, each agency and intelligence service at every level tended to go its own way, engaging or withholding its resources in accordance with its own perceptions of priorities and requirements. For example, the “command relationships agreement,” under which all CIA assets in a combat zone would come under the control of the appropriate military theater commander in time of war, was not implemented in Vietnam; America never “declared war.” Instead, MACV and the CIA Station jockeyed constantly over “turf.” The ensuing duplication of effort and competition in the field were lamentable.

The intelligence community needs to work out doctrine and procedures for collaborative action in limited conflicts. When such conflicts seem likely, a special community-wide task force should be formed under a senior officer designated by the DCI to manage the expansion of US intelligence coverage of the threatened country and to coordinate supporting activities. This task force should work directly with the policymakers, providing close and continuous substantive support to policy deliberations. Its chief would function as the intelligence staff officer of any interagency working group setup to develop and manage the totality of US operations.

A joint intelligence task force should also be formed in the field to manage US intelligence activities there. Until substantial US military forces are deployed, this should be headed by the CIA Station Chief. It should integrate all US intelligence activities in the country, augmented as appropriate from external resources to ensure competence in all necessary skills. The reinforcement should include a team of analysts drawn from CIA, DIA, State, NSA and the military services to form a small, all-source analytical center. Intelligence trainers, technicians, and advisers would also be needed to work with the local intelligence services as appropriate.

Monitoring And Net Assessment

The role of the intelligence community in monitoring and assessing situations abroad in which US political and military stakes are high has long been a vexing issue. There is no effective institutional mechanism for combining intelligence, or “red,” and operational, or “blue,” data into a comprehensive net assessment of the relative capabilities of friendly and enemy forces in ongoing conflicts and of the likely outcome of their interacting strategies. Military staffs have a built-in “net assessment” process in which the contributions of the intelligence officer are routinely integrated with those from other staff elements to give the commander a continuously updated grasp of his own situation relative to that of the enemy. Attempts to approximate this process effectively at the national level have, with the notable exception of procedures for verifying arms-control agreements, tended to sink under the weight of political and bureaucratic bickering and constraints.

Officials responsible for friendly forces and their operations understandably do not welcome independent evaluations of their work. Uneasy with reporting from operational channels, however, Washington officials turned frequently to the Intelligence community in general, and often directly to the CIA, for evaluations of trends in the Vietnam War. Secretary McNamara repeatedly asked DCIs McCone and Helms for more intelligence. He urged McCone in December 1963 to have CIA survey all intelligence systems in Vietnam—US and Vietnamese, military and civilian—with a view to finding some means for improving Washington’s understanding of what was happening in the countryside. In 1965, he asked CIA to make periodic, independent assessments of bomb damage inflicted by US airstrikes on North Vietnam. In 1966, his request to CIA for an assessment of Hanoi’s “will to persist” evoked a massive study evaluating all aspects of the war affecting Hanoi’s perseverance. His subsequent request that CIA develop a means for periodically measuring trends in the pacification effort led to the Hamlet Evaluation System, which was inaugurated in January 1967 and continued in use until the end of the war. Sensitive to the political incongruity of having CIA produce a “report card” on US programs in the field, Helms
persuaded the defense secretary to have the military advisory detachments in each of Vietnam’s 244 districts produce these monthly evaluations.

Our national security machinery needs to develop an effective means for synthesizing intelligence and operational data in an impartial and multidisciplinary net assessment process in which policymakers could have confidence. To ensure objectivity, this process should be institutionalized under the National Security Council and performed by a small staff of experienced and knowledgeable officers drawn from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as from other members of the intelligence community. This arrangement would relieve intelligence of the thankless task of being the primary transmission belt for bad news on the progress of small wars. Such a system might also lead to a better understanding of the realities of the conflict at the decisionmaking level and point the way to policy correctives which would facilitate success, or at least avert defeat.

Host-Country Intelligence Services

Early attention in any conflict should focus on the capabilities of indigenous intelligence and security forces, on whom the US will depend heavily. These services have resources, access, and knowledge that we can never duplicate, but whose quality and effectiveness we might be able to enhance, through cooperative endeavors, to our mutual benefit. They are also the principal instruments for combating transnational and domestic terrorism, and they play a major role in protecting US personnel serving in their country.

Third World intelligence and security services, however, are characteristically unsophisticated and deficient in professional skills and experience. Moreover, the administrative and management abilities of their governments tend to be weak. When a crisis looms, early attention has to be given to the calibre of these services, their potential for professional maturation, the kinds of help they may need, and the likelihood that an assistance program would succeed.

An insurgency will be halted in its early stages if the government’s intelligence and security forces are trained in appropriate professional skills and work diligently within the framework of the local legal and judicial system.

Unfortunately, the Saigon regime had too many organizations involved in intelligence and security matters. These tended to compete with each other, rarely shared information, and jealously guarded their prerogatives. American initiatives to induce some degree of cohesion and coordination to this conglomeration proved to be short-lived and largely ineffective.

The Vietnamese took few initiatives on their own to achieve collaboration. The political fragmentation and disunity that characterized their society in general carried over into the leadership of the civil administration and the military. Their dominant concern was political survival against rival factions and groups.

The lack of unified direction on the US side was no model for emulation by the Vietnamese services. Liaison and advisory arrangements with the Americans ran in isolated, parallel and uncoordinated channels. The CIA worked with the National Police Special Branch, MACV’s J-2 staff worked with the Vietnamese J-2 and separately with its other military intelligence and security elements, except for the Vietnamese J-7 (communications intelligence), which worked with the US National Security Agency.

The military assistance command established an array of “combined” centers, integrating American and Vietnamese personnel to perform selected intelligence functions in common support of both US and Vietnamese conventional military operations. These included separate facilities for interrogating prisoners of war, exploiting and translating (into English) captured documents and materiel, and an analysis center. American specialists assigned to these centers outnumbered their Vietnamese counterparts by margins of up to three to one. MACV believed the combined centers permitted an effective marriage of US professionalism and technical know-how with innate Vietnamese area knowledge.

The lack of collaboration on the American side inhibited development of a coherent, comprehensive mix of intelligence capabilities for the Vietnamese. The Vietnamization program apparently contained no plan for giving the Vietnamese the intelligence capabilities they would need to stand on their own. The dismantling and withdrawal of the high-tech American
military intelligence structure in the early 1970s left the Vietnamese intelligence services larger, but scarcely more effective, than they had been before 1965.

There are, of course, limitations on what one nation can do for and with another's intelligence services. No intelligence service is anxious to bare its deepest secrets and most sensitive operations to foreign intelligence officers. Simply sharing information and exchanging reports can be threatening.

The extent of Vietnamese cooperation with American advisers and liaison officers depended largely on personal relationships. Americans who empathized with their counterparts, treated them with respect, tried to understand their perspective, and made some effort to learn at least a few basic Vietnamese phrases achieved greater cooperation than those who lacked those characteristics. The Vietnamese respected American professionalism, were in awe of gadgets and technical systems, and welcomed any training which they deemed relevant to their situation and their mission. But much of the US intelligence doctrine they learned was designed for conventional situations and for American concepts for the division of labor among intelligence and security institutions, and it was unsuited to the Vietnamese environment.

In any future conflict, a unified US intelligence task force in the field should work with the host government to develop a comprehensive plan for improving the effectiveness and cohesion of indigenous intelligence and security services. We cannot demand implementation of measures and procedures that would rend the political fabric of the government, but at the same time we should use the leverage of our proffered assistance to achieve the level of cooperation and performance needed for success.

We should insist on an explicit contract that spells out mutually agreed objectives, principles, and guidelines for collaboration. For each element in the aid package, there should be full mutual understanding of its purpose, and of the results expected, with agreed arrangements for periodic combined reviews. The contract should also spell out the values and standards of professional conduct that we expect to be observed and means for jointly resolving issues of noncompliance. Without such a mutual understanding on these issues and a commitment to conformity from appropriate authorities in the host government, there would be grave risks of failure in the combined effort.

The needs of military intelligence in more conventional combat situations will not be markedly different from those in Vietnam. MACV's primary focus there was on the conventional battlefield. An in-depth "territorial" military intelligence structure may need less emphasis, but there will still be a requirement for interaction with local intelligence and security elements to ensure the security of US forces and to provide for operational coordination.

**HUMINT and Counterintelligence**

Effective internal security and counterintelligence operations, so essential in low-intensity and limited conventional conflicts, depend heavily on "labor-intensive" human intelligence collection. An expert on insurgency has described the kind of intelligence effort needed to provide accurate information about an insurgent organization, the identification and location of its members, and its intended activities:

This requires an effective intelligence apparatus that extends to the rural areas. The best way for the government to obtain the necessary information is to establish rapport with the people by means of good administration and prudent and diligent police work. That, in turn, calls for well-trained interrogation experts who can minimize violence by knowing the right questions to ask and competent agents who can penetrate the insurgent apparatus. The best agents are members of the insurgent organization who will betray its secrets and provide information (about) what is going to happen in the future.

Without productive police informant nets and reliable penetration agents, intelligence and security in most small war environments would be crippled. Moreover, military formations emphasize continuous patrolling to keep the guerrillas off balance and to seek out signs of their activity by observation and by patient and sympathetic questioning of the populace. Sympathetic interrogation of captured or "rallied" members of an insurgent movement will produce valuable information and leads for penetrating the adversary’s structure.
Counterintelligence is especially dependent on HUMINT methods. Available accounts about the counterintelligence effort in Vietnam suggest it was a major weakness in the war effort. Communications and operational security were judged to be poor to non-existent, and there was a sense that enemy agents were everywhere.

In future conflicts, we will have to take much more seriously than we did in Vietnam the threat to our intelligence activities and to the security of our people. Priority attention will have to be given to assuring ourselves of the trustworthiness of the host-country services, and we should make every feasible effort to enhance their effectiveness through training, advice, and technical support, with particular emphasis on HUMINT-collection activities.

**Politization, Integrity, and Credibility**

During the Vietnam War, the intelligence community at all levels was subjected to repeated pressures to alter its products to provide “intelligence to please.” These ranged from subtle editing aimed at softening “negative” statements to careful phrasing of policymaker questions so as to preclude consideration of potentially negative factors. In my direct experience they included:

- Instructions from “the Director’s office” in DIA to DIA’s current intelligence center in the spring of 1963 to refrain from expressing in DIA products analytical comments that were inconsistent with those of the military command in Saigon.

- The US Ambassador’s excision in early 1965 of pessimistic judgmental paragraphs from carefully coordinated and agreed CIA Station–Embassy–MACV intelligence assessments in order to “avoid discouraging the people in Washington from facing up to the hard decisions they are going to have to make.”

- A request to CIA from the National Security Adviser in the fall of 1967 for a summary of extracts from field reports showing only “favorable” developments in the pacification effort, which was then passed to the President as “at last, . . . a useful assessment from the CIA.”

Even John McCone, one of the more highly regarded DCIs, sometimes succumbed to political pressures. A senior CIA officer has recorded an instance in 1963, when McCone remanded the draft of a National Intelligence Estimate on Vietnam to the Board of Estimates on the grounds that it was markedly inconsistent with the more optimistic views he was hearing from his policymaker contacts. He urged that the drafters interview officials at the NSC, State and Defense with a view to incorporating their perspectives into the estimate. This was done, and the final estimate was much watered down from the original draft, which in retrospect was much closer to reality than the revised version.

Other reflections of pressures on the intelligence system to produce “good news” are reflected in works by former intelligence officers. The most publicized instance was the controversy over the size of the enemy’s forces in Vietnam, which culminated in the litigation between General William Westmoreland and CBS. This episode continues to be the object of inquiry and study by journalists and scholars.

The intelligence community’s attempt in 1967 to produce an estimate on enemy capabilities for pursuing the war in South Vietnam became controversial only because it coincided with administration efforts to persuade the public and the Congress that the war was winding down. The initial draft of the estimate reflected an analytical consensus at the working level in CIA, State, DIA, and MACV early in 1967 that recently available evidence clearly demonstrated that the community had substantially underestimated the strength of enemy forces, especially the irregular elements. Truckloads of captured documents and hundreds of interrogation reports provided a far more comprehensive picture of the composition and size of the enemy’s force structure than was previously available.

Controversy erupted when representatives of the Washington intelligence community met to coordinate the estimate: DIA’s estimators announced that they could not agree formally to the new numbers because they were unacceptable to MACV. The problem was resolved only when CIA’s representative to a conference in Saigon obtained General Westmoreland’s approval of a carefully crafted revision of the offending portions of the estimate. The revision dodged the is-
The impact of politicization in this instance is apparent when the episode is viewed in the context of the White House’s concurrently strenuous effort to remove the Vietnam War as an issue in the 1968 presidential election campaign. To accomplish this aim, an interagency working group chaired by the National Security Adviser met weekly in 1967 to coordinate a campaign that would demonstrate that the administration’s policies in Vietnam were on the right track. Composed of the public affairs and Congressional liaison chiefs of the White House, State, and Defense, and including a CIA representative, the group directed actions by appropriate public affairs staffs in both Washington and Saigon.

Given the greater extent of Congressional oversight today, political pressures on the intelligence community to slant its products are likely to be far more counterproductive than in the Vietnam era. If elements in the Congress or the media detect even a hint of dissembling by CIA, or suspect a less than candid assessment, or that the objectivity of intelligence can be challenged, unfavorable publicity and Congressional scrutiny are certain. If these reveal suggestions that intelligence has yielded to political pressures to slant its products, the incumbent administration will face embarrassment and risk losing the Congressional support needed to implement its policies and programs.

Tensions between intelligence staffs and policymakers are inevitable, and they will be especially acute in any future conflict involving high stakes in American domestic politics. An effective intelligence–policy exchange could do much to ameliorate these tensions. In the final analysis, policymakers and intelligence managers and analysts would do best to remember that integrity may be the most important ingredient in the intelligence process, and credibility its most important product.

Other Significant Lessons

Relevant lessons also can be drawn in three other areas. First, analytical “surprises” produced two major intelligence failures.

In one instance, CIA’s gross miscalculation of the scale of communist supplies moving through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville gravely diminished its credibility with the Nixon administration. In the other, the intelligence community as a whole allowed the overly confident Johnson administration to be blindsided by the 1968 Tet Offensive when it discounted evidence that the impending campaign would entail a dramatic change in strategy and tactics with potentially enormous psychological impact. In both instances, analysts were victimized by mindsets which caused them not to revalidate old hypotheses and premises in the face of substantial new evidence that conflicted with the conventional wisdom. In future conflicts, intelligence managers should be attentive to situations in which “what if” analysis, “devil’s advocacy,” or other forms of “sanity checks” would be appropriate to reduce the likelihood of surprise.

If policymakers often tuned out unwelcome messages on Vietnam, their ability to do so might have been lessened had the intelligence community’s message been presented with greater cogency, clarity, brevity and relevance to issues of the moment. Careful reading of declassified National Intelligence Estimates reveals ambiguities which probably result more from forced consensus than from muddled thinking. They contain too much “two-fisted analysis” (on the one hand, yes, but on the other hand, no), and too many conditional judgments (if this, then that) without verifying the contingent clause, to be of any real value to policymakers. They too often presume prior knowledge that may be absent, and they too often demonstrate that unsupported judgments are inherently unconvincing. The community needs to overcome such imperfections to serve policymakers well in any situation.

Finally, deficiencies in numbers of qualified linguists and area specialists hindered the work of intelligence in Vietnam. Few advisers and trainers could communicate with their counterparts without using native interpreters, whose skills, knowledge and reliability were often deficient. Most personnel serving in Vietnam had not studied the area before arriving, and their short tours precluded the development of in-depth expertise before their departure, as well as engendering a lack of continuity and institutional memory.
The only unique contribution intelligence can make to the busy policymaker is a special, relevant insight on the meaning of information that stems from the analyst's specialized knowledge and experience. To be effective, the community has to try seriously and systematically to build and sustain an adequate number of qualified specialists to meet future contingencies.

NOTES


2. For a discussion of this issue, see Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy;" Foreign Affairs; Winter 1987/1988; p.221.


4. See James J. Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please?: The Order of Battle Controversy During the Vietnam War;" Political Science Quarterly; Vol. 106, pp.239-263.

5. The author represented CIA at a number of meetings of this task force.