Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s

National Intelligence Estimate

Key Judgments and Executive Summary

These Key Judgments and Executive Summary represent the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.

- Secret -
NIE 11-14-89

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Information available as of 1 March 1989 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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Key Judgments

We judge that the Soviet leadership's security policies will produce, during the period of this Estimate, the most significant changes in Soviet general purpose forces since Khrushchev's drastic force reductions. We further assess these policies are designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership revitalize the Soviet economy by shifting resources from defense to civilian sectors. We also believe decisions already undertaken signal a sharp divergence from existing force development trends, and they have necessitated a dramatic alteration in our forecast of future Soviet general purpose forces.¹

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he inherited a technologically backward economy that had experienced a decade of slowing growth characterized by industrial bottlenecks, labor and energy shortages, low and declining labor productivity, and decreasing efficiency of capital investment. Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, he began to establish the political and ideological foundation for imposing his own priorities for resource allocations, clearly signaling a more intense competition between civilian and military needs. In doing so, he:

- Reaffirmed the traditional party authority for formulating military doctrine, which the Brezhnev regime had allowed to become dominated by the professional military hierarchy.
- Promoted a debate carried out in doctrinal terms over "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive sufficiency," but which reflects a more fundamental examination of "How much is enough?" for defense.
- Attempted to dampen demand for defense spending by using arms control forums and foreign policy initiatives to reduce external threats.
- Broadened the Soviet concept of national security as part of the "new thinking" policy to give greater weight to its economic and political components.
- Embraced vigorously the position adopted by previous Soviet leaders that the impossibility of victory in nuclear war is basic to the political dimension of Soviet military doctrine, and that the pursuit of capabilities associated with achieving victory is too elusive and costly.

Gorbachev's initial "ground-laying" objectives were largely achieved during his first few years in office. The regime did not order cutbacks in military programs immediately, however, preferring instead to reduce the

¹ See Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, alternative key judgment on page ix. (NF NC)
burden by attempting to increase the efficiency of the defense sector. Despite these efforts to alleviate what Soviet officials describe as a “crisis” in the economy, after four years Gorbachev has failed to bring about a rebound in economic growth. Determined to succeed in his revitalization campaign and recognizing that the defense industrial sector offers an important source of additional help for his modernization program, Gorbachev, in 1988, decided to take stronger action to invest more in consumer-oriented projects. He evidently decided to act at that point because, in addition to the obvious lack of progress on economic programs and the rise in consumer dissatisfaction, the regime was faced with some key deadlines in the preparation of the 1991-95 Five-Year Plan. The results have become most vividly evident with announced policy initiatives designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership reinvigorate the economy by shifting resources from defense to the civil sector:

- Unilateral reductions and restructuring of Soviet general purpose forces that will cut 500,000 personnel from peacetime forces by January 1991, including 240,000 personnel from Soviet forces west of the Urals and 50,000 personnel from those in Central Europe. Forces remaining opposite NATO will be converted into a “clearly defensive” structure.

- Cuts in overall defense spending of 14.2 percent and defense production levels of 19.5 percent over the next two years that clearly reflect plans for a reduced force structure and reductions in rates of equipment modernization.

- Increases in the defense industry’s direct contribution to production of consumer and civilian investment goods that will cut significantly into defense output. (sign: NC)

Despite these dramatic actions and their apparent far-reaching implications, there remains considerable uncertainty about the durability and consequences of Gorbachev's initiatives on military matters. The amount of progress that is achieved on economic revival will largely determine Gorbachev's ability to sustain his reforms, his willingness to undertake additional initiatives, his standing with the party leadership, the support he receives in pursuing related programs, and his ability to control the impact of external factors that could impinge on his objectives. (sign: NC)

Nevertheless, we believe it is highly likely that further decisions to reduce planned defense spending and to shift investment from defense to the civil sector will become apparent during the coming 13th Five-Year Plan (1991-95). We reaffirm the recent assessment in NIE 11-23-88 (sign: NF, NC), December 1988, Gorbachev's Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead,
that Gorbachev will divert additional resources from the defense sector to the civil sector. Over the longer term, Gorbachev probably will continue to impose constraints on the defense budget, and we judge that Soviet defense spending will continue to decline as a portion of GNP through the turn of the century.

We believe that the doctrinal concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive sufficiency" have been articulated primarily to strengthen Gorbachev's control over defense resource decisions to support economic revival. We also believe that, by the turn of the century, these concepts probably will have become lasting features of Soviet national security policy, helping ensure continued party control over defense policy and defense spending.

Decisions by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies to reduce their general purpose forces and cut defense spending over the next two years would reverse the long-term trend of continuing growth in size and offensive capabilities of these forces. As a consequence of the planned cuts, the offensive capabilities of Warsaw Pact theater forces will decline through the first half of the 1990s.

We judge that the USSR will maintain large general purpose forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone to reinforce its status as a superpower, to deter aggression, to carry out wartime missions, and to underwrite its political objectives in the region. Within emerging economic constraints, we also believe the Soviets will modernize their still formidable general purpose forces. Furthermore, the Soviets will want to minimize the erosion of their relative military position due to both Warsaw Pact force reductions and continuing improvements in NATO military capabilities. Absent a far-reaching conventional arms control agreement, the Soviets will maintain the capability to conduct large-scale offensive operations deep into NATO territory but only after general mobilization. For the period of this Estimate, Warsaw Pact forces, led by the USSR, will remain the largest aggregation of military power in the world, and the Soviets will remain committed to the offensive as the preferred form of operations in wartime.

Even with reductions in defense spending and procurement, the Soviets will continue to maintain the world's highest level of weapons production through the turn of the century. Although Soviet weapons projected through the 1990s will involve mostly evolutionary improvements over present types, a steady stream of better military technology will be available to Soviet force developers throughout this period. Indeed, the military expects perestroika to yield significantly improved military technologies.
In addition to reductions in procurement funds, the significantly increased unit costs of high-technology weapon systems will further reduce traditionally high Soviet procurement rates. The increased effectiveness of these weapons, however, will reduce the number of such systems required to maintain the combat capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces. These factors will almost certainly lead to a less than 1-for-1 replacement rate for more advanced Soviet weapon systems over the course of this Estimate. As a consequence, we expect to see a continuation in the recent trends of declining production rates and deployment patterns for high-technology equipment.

Since the late 1970s, the Soviets have improved their capabilities to conduct longer and more intensive conventional operations against NATO, including increased training for defensive operations against attacking NATO forces. The Soviets assess NATO to be a tougher military opponent on the conventional battlefield today than in past decades. Furthermore, they believe improvements in NATO doctrine and projected force modernization will make NATO an even more formidable conventional opponent over the course of this Estimate.

Soviet pessimism regarding the utility of nuclear war and NATO’s increased conventional capabilities have caused the Soviets to prepare for the possibility that a NATO-Pact war might remain conventional. But they believe they must also prepare for nuclear war both to deter it and to wage it if it happens. Indeed, we judge that the Soviets still believe a NATO-Pact war is likely to escalate to the nuclear level due to NATO’s doctrine of flexible response. Therefore, we expect the Soviets to maintain sizable nuclear forces subject to limitations imposed by current and future arms control agreements. Furthermore, we believe that, should an agreement with NATO governing quantities and modernization of short-range nuclear forces not materialize, the Soviets will continue to expand and modernize their tactical nuclear missile force by the mid-1990s.

Following a trend we identified in the overall peacetime readiness posture of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces opposite NATO during the period of this Estimate will be designed to accommodate the following:

- Primary emphasis will be placed on the ability to mobilize and deploy large reinforcements before hostilities, not on the ability of forward forces to initiate a quick, unreinforced attack.
• In line with the Warsaw Pact’s recent decisions to reduce and restructure its theater forces, these forces will be maintained at sufficient readiness to defend against a sudden attack and act as a defensive shield to allow for the full mobilization and deployment of Pact forces.

We consider Pact initiation of hostilities without mobilization to be extremely unlikely. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the Pact might initiate hostilities from a condition of partial mobilization if it perceives an opportunity to achieve decisive results against NATO, or if it needs to forestall NATO from achieving decisive results against the Pact.

Our judgments regarding Warsaw Pact sustainability in a future war with NATO differ substantially from those made several years ago. In 1985 we stated unconditionally that the Warsaw Pact logistic structure in Central Europe could support 60 to 90 days of theater offensive operations against NATO. We now judge that overall Pact sustainability is a function of the resilience of NATO’s forward defenses. If NATO’s forward defenses were to collapse within three days of intensive operations, ammunition stocks in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO) would be sufficient to support the Pact’s Theater Strategic Operation for up to 90 days. If, on the other hand, Pact forces were to require at least two weeks of high-intensity operations to achieve a decisive breakthrough, the Pact would not have enough ammunition in the Western TMO to sustain a theater strategic operation beyond a total of about 30 to 45 days. If confronted with the prospect of some shortfall in ammunition supply, the Pact would move additional ammunition stocks from elsewhere to the Western TMO, or adjust war plans to avoid or at least minimize any adverse impact on combat operations.

Soviet general purpose forces are fielding new weapons of virtually every type, and we believe this trend will continue throughout the end of the century. Motivated by the need to counter NATO’s deep-attack, high-technology conventional weapons and extended-battlefield concepts, for example, the Soviets have been able to match or exceed NATO’s capabilities in nearly every major ground forces’ weapons category. Rates of equipment modernization probably will decrease through the end of the century as the Soviets reduce defense production to free resources for the civil sector. However, we expect that the Soviets will resist cutting substantially research, development, testing, and evaluation in an effort to close the military technology gap with the West. As in the past, Soviet forces in the Western TMO will likely be the first to receive new equipment.
The Ground Forces are the largest element of the Soviet armed forces, and their development determines the overall direction of Soviet theater forces development. We see no evidence that this will change. We now judge, based on the plans for reductions in force levels, defense spending and military procurement, that a 25-year period of Soviet Ground Forces growth has ended, and the decline in their overall size could go beyond that already announced. We further judge that a resumption of growth in the Ground Forces is highly unlikely before the turn of the century.

In order to meet the targets for reductions set by Gorbachev for January 1991, Soviet Ground Forces will be considerably restructured over the next two years, but we cannot confidently predict their final form. Before Gorbachev's cuts, the Soviets had begun to move toward combined-arms formations. Although the final balance of tanks and mechanized infantry is still in flux, we believe that combined-arms doctrine will guide Soviet force restructuring through the 1990s.

Despite cuts in defense spending and procurement, we judge the Soviets will continue to modernize their Air Forces, albeit more slowly than in the past. Beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing through the turn of the century, the Soviets are expected to introduce light, medium, and Stealth bombers, Stealth and non-Stealth fighter-bombers, and at least one new fighter. The announced reduction of 800 combat aircraft from the Air Forces, however, signals a significant change in the pattern of force expansion of the past two decades. We now judge that the Soviet Air Forces will remain at their post-reduction levels until after the end of the century.

Soviet naval general purpose forces continue to have the major missions of protecting the Soviet missile-launching submarine force and defending the USSR against NATO strategic and theater forces. Although the Navy can be expected to bear a share of spending reductions, major emphasis will be placed on improving antisubmarine and antisurface combatant operations, gradually modernizing Soviet naval aviation, and increasing the availability of sea-based airpower as larger aircraft carriers enter service during the 1990s. Support for land TMOs remains a primary wartime task of naval theater forces, and we project a slow continuation of several organizational and weapon trends that should provide land theater commanders with more capable naval forces for combined-arms operations.

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact defense industries have been expanding and producing a larger share of the NSWP military inventory. But announced defense spending cuts and the weakened state of NSWP economies will cause military production in the NSWP countries to decline during the period of this Estimate. We also judge that NSWP forces will fall further
behind Soviet forces in technology and organization during this same period. The relative contribution of the NSWP armies to overall Warsaw Pact military capability is also likely to decline somewhat over the next few years. (NNNC)

A major objective of the Soviet leadership's current foreign policy is to reduce political support in the NATO countries for increased defense spending to support NATO's force modernization program. Gorbachev will continue to negotiate for conventional arms control agreements to slow Western military modernization and facilitate his own defense program. In addition, Warsaw Pact foreign policy over the period of this Estimate will seek to weaken the position of the United States and Canada within the North Atlantic Alliance. (NNNC)

*Alternative Key Judgment.* The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, while recognizing the significance of the ongoing changes in the Soviet Union, believes the likelihood of large unilateral reductions in military expenditures beyond those already proclaimed by Soviet leaders is not as high as implied by the majority view in the Estimate, particularly for the longer term. Notwithstanding the potential importance of new developments in Soviet military policies discussed in this Estimate, the Director, DIA, believes present evidence and future uncertainties make the elements of continuity in Soviet military policy as important as the changes for US national security and defense planning. (NNNC)
Executive Summary

A Time of Change in Soviet General Purpose Forces and Policy

We judge that the Soviet leadership's current security policies will produce during the period of this estimate the most significant changes in Soviet general purpose forces since Khrushchev's drastic force reductions. We further assess that these policies are designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership to revitalize the Soviet economy by shifting resources from defense to civil sectors. We also believe decisions already undertaken signal a sharp divergence from existing force development trends, and they have necessitated a dramatic alteration in our forecast of future Soviet general purpose forces.1

When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he inherited a technologically backward economy that had experienced a decade of slowing growth characterized by industrial bottlenecks, labor and energy shortages, low and declining labor productivity, and decreasing efficiency of capital investment. Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, he began to establish the political and ideological foundation for imposing his own priorities for resource allocations, clearly signaling a more intense competition between civilian and military needs. In doing so, he:

- Reaffirmed the traditional party authority for formulating military doctrine, which the Brezhnev regime had allowed to become dominated by the professional military hierarchy.
- Promoted a debate carried out in doctrinal terms over "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive sufficiency," but that reflects a more fundamental examination of "How much is enough?" for defense.
- Attempted to dampen demand for defense spending by using arms control forums and foreign policy initiatives to reduce external threats.
- Broadened the Soviet concept of national security as part of the "new thinking" policy to give greater weight to its economic and political components.
- Embraced vigorously the position adopted by previous Soviet leaders that the impossibility of victory in nuclear war is basic to the political dimension of Soviet military doctrine, and that the pursuit of capabilities associated with achieving victory is too elusive and costly.

Gorbachev's initial "ground-laying" objectives were largely achieved during his first few years in office. The regime did not order cutbacks in military programs immediately, however, preferring instead to reduce the burden by increasing the efficiency of the defense sector. Despite these efforts to alleviate what Soviet officials describe as a "crisis" in the economy, after four years Gorbachev has failed to bring about a rebound in economic growth. Determined to succeed in his revitalization campaign and recognizing that the defense industrial sector offers an important source of additional help for his modernization program, Gorbachev, in 1988, decided to take stronger action to invest more in consumer-oriented projects. He evidently decided to act at that point because, in addition to the obvious lack of progress on economic programs and the rise in consumer dissatisfaction, the regime was faced with some key deadlines in the preparation of the 13th Five-Year Plan (1991-95). The results have become most vividly evident with announced policy initiatives designed primarily to help the Soviet leadership reinvigorate the economy by shifting resources from defense to the civilian sector:

- Unilateral reduction and restructuring of Soviet general purpose forces that will cut 500,000 personnel from peacetime forces by January 1991, including 240,000 personnel from Soviet forces west of the

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1 See Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, alternative judgment on page 1.
Urals and 50,000 personnel from those in Central Europe. Forces remaining opposite NATO will be converted into a "clearly defensive" structure.

- Cuts in overall defense spending of 14.2 percent and defense production levels of 19.5 percent over the next two years that clearly reflect plans for a reduced force structure and reductions in rates of equipment modernization.

- Increases in defense industry's direct contribution to production of consumer and civilian investment goods that will cut significantly into defense output.

Despite these dramatic actions and their apparent far-reaching implications, there remains considerable uncertainty about the durability and consequences of Gorbachev's initiatives on military matters. The amount of progress that is achieved on economic revival will largely determine Gorbachev's ability to sustain his reforms, his willingness to undertake additional initiatives, his standing with the party leadership, the support he receives in pursuing related programs, and his ability to control the impact of external factors that could impinge on his objectives.

Nevertheless, we believe it is highly likely that further decisions to reduce planned defense spending and to shift investment from defense to the civil sector will become apparent during the upcoming 13th Five-Year Plan. We reaffirm the recent assessment in NIE 11-23-88 (December 1988, Gorbachev's Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead) that Gorbachev will divert additional resources from the defense sector to the civil sector. Over the longer term, Gorbachev probably will continue to impose constraints on the defense budget, and we judge that Soviet defense spending will continue to decline as a portion of GNP through the turn of the century.

**Gorbachev and the Formulation of Defense Policy**

Gorbachev's decision to include the military as one target of his perestroika ("restructuring") campaign has brought into sharp relief his attempts to tighten party control over the Soviet armed forces. Soon after taking office as General Secretary in early 1985, Gorbachev and his allies moved quickly to reaffirm party control over military issues, in particular its authority for formulating military doctrine. Although most attention has focused on the defense spending implications of Gorbachev's programs, it has become clear that he is also using perestroika as a tool to tighten the party's grip on the military's political accountability. The mid-1988 19th Party Conference and subsequent remarks by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze calling for oversight of the Soviet military by nationwide elected bodies provide strong indications of the leadership's determination to broaden and intensify review of national security matters, especially defense spending.

**Reasonable and Defensive Sufficiency.** The concept of "reasonable sufficiency" is emerging as a major announced theme of Soviet security policy, and it is being linked closely to Gorbachev's new formulations of military requirements. Sufficiency has been generally defined by Gorbachev and other party officials as a level of military power adequate "to repel aggression, but insufficient to conduct offensive operations." The concept remains under discussion in the Soviet Union, and the debate has largely focused on three central issues:

- A contest over resources as Gorbachev seeks a doctrinal basis for strengthening his control over defense resource decisions.

- The need to influence Western audiences in a direction favorable to Soviet defense and economic policy objectives.

- The belief by at least some leaders that Soviet national security can be better ensured if both sides reduce their military forces.

We judge that in presenting this concept the Gorbachev leadership is attempting to establish a new basis for determining "How much is enough?" for defense. It has been linked to two other announced policy outlooks: that overall defense posture should be judged by "qualitative" as well as quantitative measures; and, that further increases over existing force...
levels do not necessarily result in greater security. By advocating these concepts, Gorbachev seeks to promote policies that will benefit his economy by reducing the burden of military spending, mitigate the effects of reduced spending by attempting to manage the future military threat through aggressive arms control policies, and reap political benefits that would contribute to his goals by reducing the Western perception of the Soviet threat. We believe that the concept's long-term implications are inextricably linked to the fate of Gorbachev's reform programs. We further judge that, as long as leadership backing within the party for his emphasis on industrial modernization holds up, and, barring an unforeseen deterioration in US-USSR relations, Gorbachev's concept of sufficiency will provide the basis for Soviet security policy.

Over the last few years, the principle of reasonable sufficiency has also been linked to the term “defensive sufficiency” (also translated as “defensive defense”). In this context it has been proposed by Gorbachev and other high-ranking Soviet officials as a basis for determining the organization, size, disposition, and strategy of Pact and NATO forces in Europe. Not surprisingly, even many Soviet military sources have been particularly skeptical about defensive doctrine, and several high-ranking officers have asserted that, while defense can prevent the enemy from defeating the USSR, it does not defeat the enemy.

Although usually placed by Soviet spokesmen in the context of its mutual applicability to both alliances, Gorbachev linked his late 1988 unilateral troop reduction and reorganization announcement to Soviet forces adopting a “clearly defensive” structure. The leadership's championing of reasonable and defensive sufficiency derives much of its impetus from economic requirements, and we believe its success ultimately will be determined by the policy agenda and political power of the party leadership rather than by resolution of a doctrinal discourse between military and civilian writers. We further assess, nevertheless, that, by the turn of the century, these concepts probably will have become a lasting feature of Soviet national security policy, helping ensure continued party control over defense policy and defense spending.

*Alternative Judgment:* The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Soviet objectives in promulgating the concept of reasonable sufficiency are designed not only to avoid the costs of an unbalanced continuation of the arms race, but are primarily to establish the basis for arms reduction proposals, to raise Western expectations regarding the prospects for substantial force reductions, and to undermine support for NATO modernization. Its long-term importance will depend primarily on how the West responds to Soviet initiatives and the progress made in the arms control arena. Should Gorbachev fail to achieve his minimum goals by the mid-1990s, the Soviets most likely would, despite the extremely high costs, revert to their traditional resource-intensive approach to develop the next generation of weapons and modernize their forces.

*Arms Control*  
In parallel with the doctrinal changes involving sufficiency Gorbachev has advocated “new thinking” on foreign policy. This “new thinking” emphasizes the political and economic dimensions of national security and the limits of military power. An important element of this “new thinking” has been an aggressive public pursuit of conventional arms control since early 1986. The Warsaw Pact's efforts at conventional arms control have featured a number of proposals by Gorbachev, by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, and, in addition, hundreds of statements and press articles by lower-ranking officials, all stressing the Soviet Union's desire for a conventional arms reduction agreement.

We judge that the Soviets and their allies have a number of interrelated military, political, and economic reasons to engage the West in conventional arms control:

- To improve the correlation of forces and reduce what they perceive as NATO's capability to launch a surprise attack.
- To impede NATO's force modernization plans and prevent or impede NATO's deployment of advanced-technology weapons, thus reducing the
urgency on the part of the Soviet Union to match or better NATO’s high-technology modernization programs.

- To make it politically easier to allocate economic resources within the Soviet Union from the defense sector to the civilian sector to carry out perestroika.

- To appeal to public opinion at home and abroad in a generalized way, while adding to Moscow’s overall arms control posture and enhancing the USSR’s image as a trustworthy and rational player in the international arena.

In early December 1988, Gorbachev announced major unilateral cuts in Soviet military manpower and equipment to occur during the next two years. A month later he announced major reductions in defense spending and defense production (see the table). While we believe that a mixture of economic, political, and military considerations went into these decisions, in our judgment, economic considerations—providing resources and manpower to the civilian economy—were the primary factor. Had the cuts been designed solely for political or propagandistic effect, we believe the withdrawal of the six tank divisions from Central Europe would have been sufficient. Politically, the reductions are designed to put pressure on NATO to move toward conventional arms control negotiations that would involve multilateral force reductions. The unilateral cuts are also intended to influence NATO electorates to withdraw support for new weapons procurement programs and expanding military budgets. Indeed, over the long term, the potential for slowing NATO’s modernization is probably a more important factor in Moscow’s calculations than the direct savings expected from the unilateral force cuts. Slowing or reversing NATO’s modernization reduces the pressure to develop matching programs and permits the Soviet leadership to concentrate on its economic problems.

Depending on the West’s response, Gorbachev might advance other initiatives, especially in the context of the conventional arms reduction talks, designed to keep political pressure on the West while holding down the defense burden at home. We believe further major unilateral force reductions would generate strong opposition which would coalesce within the defense establishment and among its allies in the political leadership. This opposition could be largely neutralized, however, if Gorbachev could demonstrate that NATO’s military forces were also being reduced unilaterally.

**Soviet Doctrine on Theater War Against NATO Nature of Future War.** We believe that Soviet views on the nature and results of a theater war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have changed in recent years. Soviet planning through the mid-1970s was based on a belief that NATO’s conventional capabilities were relatively weak and the alliance was almost certain to initiate nuclear warfare early in a conflict in an effort to avoid conventional defeat.

The Soviets now perceive that NATO’s conventional forces have become substantially more difficult to defeat. Consequently, NATO has become more capable of delaying and perhaps averting the collapse of its conventional defenses, and the necessity for NATO to resort to early use of nuclear weapons has decreased. The Soviets may also believe that the USSR’s ability to at least match NATO’s nuclear strength at the tactical, theater, and strategic levels has reduced NATO’s incentive to initiate nuclear use early. Nevertheless, we judge that, even under contemporary conditions, the Soviets generally assess a NATO-Pact war as likely to escalate to the nuclear level, and they continue to believe that escalation to general nuclear war is likely to be the outcome of the use of any nuclear weapons in the theater. (SF NF NC)

The Soviets may also have come to believe, however, that a NATO-Pact war might terminate before the use of nuclear weapons.
Announced Warsaw Pact Unilateral Reductions
To Take Place During 1989-90

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military Manpower</th>
<th>Force Structure</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>APC / IFV</th>
<th>Artillery Systems</th>
<th>Short-Range Missile Launchers</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Defense Budget (percent)</th>
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<td>1,530</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>17 (1989)</td>
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<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12 (1989)</td>
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<td>321,300</td>
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<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>131,300</td>
<td>13 divisions, 6 regiments</td>
<td>8,051</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>121,300</td>
<td>13 divisions, 6 regiments</td>
<td>7,851</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Soviet statements express or imply reductions in these categories, but no specific quantities have been announced.
* Central Europe includes Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.
* This figure is assessed from units announced to be withdrawn.
* Announced Warsaw Pact totals are currently lagging the computed totals of the reductions announced by individual countries.
* In addition, Poland has announced that in the past two years (1987-88) 15,000 men, two divisions, unspecified other units, 419 tanks, 223 APCs, 194 aircraft, and other types of equipment were removed from its forces.
* Two of the divisions are to be eliminated, and two are to be reduced in strength.
* This figure is based on the announced elimination of an "operational-tactical" (Scud) missile brigade (probably in the Warsaw Military District).
* Czechoslovakia has announced a reduction of 12,000 men in combat units, but is transferring these men and 8,000 men from support units to the military construction troops.
* A slight increase in defense spending (1.7 percent) was announced for 1989. No force cuts were announced.

This table is secret. No nation, no conflict.
though our evidence indicates that the Soviets would neither begin a NATO-Pact conventional war for limited goals nor conduct initial operations with limited goals in mind, they may be willing to accept partial achievement of their objectives rather than increase the risk of nuclear escalation.

Nuclear Doctrine. There is no indication that the Soviets have ever been sanguine about the consequences they would expect to suffer in a nuclear war. Moreover, evidence from the 1980s indicates the Soviets doubt they could prevail in any traditionally meaningful military-political sense because of the expected high levels of damage both sides would sustain from nuclear attacks. Since the early 1980s, Soviet leaders have explicitly renounced the possibility of achieving victory in a general nuclear conflict. We judge that the "no victory in nuclear war" position—publicly endorsed by Gorbachev and incorporated in the 1985 27th Party Congress Program—is basic to the political dimension of Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet leaders' public portrayal of their nuclear policy clearly serves their political interests and it does not mean a deemphasis of Soviet nuclear weapons development. The Soviets continue to recognize that circumstances might compel them to fight a nuclear war—regardless of whether they think a traditional victory can be achieved—and they intend to achieve the best possible outcome if it ever happens. At the same time, the Soviet leadership believes the best possible nuclear-war-fighting capability will produce the best possible nuclear deterrent as well. For these reasons, subject to an arms control agreement, we expect the Soviets to maintain a sizable nuclear delivery force and to continue to improve those weapon systems that constitute this force.

We have not detected any changes in the military-technical dimension of Soviet military doctrine that clearly demonstrate that the Soviets have changed their nuclear-war-fighting doctrine under Gorbachev. The coming 13th Five-Year Plan presents a key opportunity for him to affect decisions involving the future of the Soviet armed forces. Consequently, if the Soviets determine that the pursuit of capabilities associated with traditional Soviet means of victory is too elusive and costly, we would expect, by the mid-to-late 1990s, to acquire evidence of basic changes in the structure and development of the USSR's nuclear forces.

Conventional Doctrine. The Soviets have devoted considerable emphasis during the 1980s to the changing nature of conventional warfare. Their interest has largely centered on three themes:

- Should a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact occur, it might be a protracted, worldwide conflict fought with conventional weapons and continuing for weeks or months, perhaps even longer.
- Conventional weapons are becoming so accurate and lethal that the destructiveness of some new approaches that of low-yield nuclear weapons. They can be employed, therefore, to destroy many targets that previously required nuclear strikes. Their use, however, does not necessarily incur the risks of escalation to general nuclear war inherent in the use of even a single nuclear weapon.
- Military advantages afforded the USSR by its numerical advantages in conventional forces against NATO may be mitigated by Western progress in
advanced-technology conventional weapons, especially precision-guided, long-range weapons.

The acquisition of new conventional battlefield technologies by the West would create two problems for Pact operational planners during a war. First, the development and widespread fielding of such weapons by NATO could increase significantly the losses sustained by the Pact in conventional combat, thus raising the possibility of even otherwise successful operations becoming prohibitively expensive. Instead of the previous expectation of rapid breakthroughs and high-speed exploitation operations, the Soviets are now concerned that offensive operations would assume the agonizing character of “gawning through” numerous defensive lines. Second, long-range high-technology weapons could be used to isolate the European battlefield from Pact reinforcements. Without substantial, early reinforcement by mobilized forces from the USSR, the Soviets believe that they might not attain a sufficient correlation of military forces to ensure a rapid rate of advance.

In our view, these concerns have led to a vigorous advocacy by Soviet military leaders over the last several years for modernizing conventional forces through greater exploitation of new technologies. The military’s concerns for the high-technology conventional battlefield of the future have given them a strong incentive to support Gorbachev’s industrial modernization strategy, which is intended to keep the Soviet Union from lagging even further behind in the development of new weapon technologies. We believe, therefore, that through the mid-1990s the military will accept the promises of future benefits and will refrain from pushing for vigorous development and full-scale fielding of weapons incorporating costly technologies.

Soviet Doctrine on War Initiation

Our assessment is that the Soviets believe that a period of crisis—possibly of very short duration but probably lasting weeks and even months—will precede a war. The Soviets generally dismiss the notions of an accidental outbreak of a major war or a massive attack launched outside the context of a major crisis. However, as a result of NATO’s improved capabilities, the Soviets have expressed a growing concern that their opportunity to detect enemy preparations for an attack may have grown shorter. Soviet emphasis on defensive operations in their training, while undertaken for a variety of reasons, is consistent with the assessment that the Pact may have less warning and mobilization time than it previously believed. Nonetheless, we believe that the Soviet military still has confidence in its ability to detect enemy preparations for war at a preliminary stage—early enough to take effective action to deprive the West of gaining significant advantage from surprise.

Force Mobilization. The ability to mobilize large forces rapidly instead of maintaining immediate combat readiness of the entire force is the goal of Pact planners, based on their perception that a war in Europe will be preceded by a period of crisis. The Soviets expect that the forces of both sides will be fully or almost fully mobilized and prepared for combat before the onset of hostilities. We judge that Warsaw Pact theater forces positioned in Central Europe are maintained at sufficient readiness in peacetime to defend against a sudden attack and to act as a defensive shield to allow for the further mobilization and deployment of Pact forces.

The Pact would take steps during a period of tension to allow for a faster mobilization and transition to higher stages of combat readiness as the situation became more threatening. We estimate that the Soviets currently need at least two to three weeks to fully prepare their current forces in Central Europe for sustained offensive operations at authorized wartime strength.

We judge that, at the same time, situations could occur during the prehostilities phase that would convince the Soviets to launch a preemptive attack before reaching full mobilization. Such circumstances might include the belief that their mobilization progress had permitted them a decisive, albeit temporary, advantage in relative force preparedness. Alternatively, concern that NATO’s buildup was shifting the correlation of forces against the Pact could persuade the Soviets to attack. After the announced force reductions are completed by 1991, however, Soviet capabilities to attack from a condition of partial mobilization
will be significantly reduced. Therefore, by the early 1990s, the likelihood that the Warsaw Pact would exercise such an option will decline accordingly.

In addition to diminishing Soviet capabilities for conducting a short-warning attack, Gorbachev's proposed force reductions in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone—particularly the 50-percent tank cut in Central Europe—will have a significant effect on the preparation time required for the Warsaw Pact to conduct offensive operations against NATO. Substantial reinforcement of Soviet forces in Central Europe by units from the western USSR and the mobilization of the logistic support structure are already required to launch a sustained theater offensive operation. Tank reductions in the forward area on the announced scale will create the need for even greater reinforcement. The scale of the reinforcement required to conduct a deep theater offensive operation will vary with the structure selected for the forces remaining in Central Europe. Although forces for a theater offensive operation will still be available, the bulk of two fronts will have to be moved forward from the Soviet Union before the onset of offensive operations. This movement will increase the preparation time beyond the two to three weeks we currently assess the Soviets require to prepare their forces for a sustained theater offensive.

Resource Allocations to the Military

Although he came to power intent on restructuring the Soviet economy, Gorbachev did not initially order cutbacks in military programs. In fact, our estimates of Soviet defense spending since 1985 indicate that it has continued to grow in real terms by about 3 percent per year. Thus far, we have not seen any scaling back or stretching out of major weapons development or production programs that can be directly linked to Gorbachev's economic initiatives. Gorbachev's announcement, however, that overall defense spending will be reduced by 14.2 percent and outlays for arms and equipment by 18.5 percent over the next two years indicates a significant change in the course of future defense spending. In addition, the defense industry has been directed to accelerate its contribution to the production of consumer and civilian investment goods. The cuts are clearly meant to help alleviate the economic burden of defense, and they could provide a meaningful boost to the civilian economy over the longer term.

In transferring resources from defense to civilian programs, Gorbachev probably will not limit the impact to any particular service or mission. A host of military, economic, domestic political, and foreign policy considerations will influence the implementation of spending cuts, and we believe that no element of the force will remain totally unscathed. We believe that we will get fairly clear signs early on of broad-based cuts in Soviet weapons procurement or changes in military activity, but measuring precise changes or the exact level of defense spending will be more difficult.

Weapons Modernization

Even with a reduction in defense spending, the Soviets will continue to maintain the world's highest level of weapon production through the turn of the century. A steady stream of improved Soviet military technology developments will be available to Soviet planners and design engineers throughout this period. Indeed, the military's future development of high-technology weapons is dependent on the same technologies which perestroika is intended to improve. Nevertheless, we judge the major portion of Soviet systems projected through the year 2000 will involve evolutionary improvements in systems now in service, rather than dramatic technological breakthroughs.

Manpower Issues

Since 1980, the number of draft-age males has declined, reflecting the demographic "echo" of the lower birthrate during World War II. The draft-age conscription pool reached its nadir in 1987, however, and, for the first time since the war, the USSR can count on a basically stable youth population. The shrunk conscript pool, nevertheless, has caused the Soviet military serious problems. It has had to lower its mental and physical standards significantly in order to provide the same number of draftees. In addition, the problems of managing a multiethnic military have become increasingly prominent. Soviet military writings have cited minorities' lower educational achievement, Russian language deficiencies, and higher levels of ethnic tension within units. The announced reduction of 500,000 personnel in the Soviet military—nearly 10 percent of the 5.5 million estimate of Soviet military manpower—should alleviate somewhat the military's difficulties in finding suitable conscripts to fulfill manpower requirements.
Sustainability

We stated unconditionally that the Warsaw Pact's logistic structure in Central Europe could support 60 to 90 days of combat operations against NATO. We now judge, however, that overall Pact sustainability will depend to a significant extent on how long NATO's defenses hold and whether NATO can seal off any breakthroughs:

- If Pact forces break through NATO defenses in three days and reach their immediate frontal objectives by D+14 or 15, we judge that sufficient ammunition stocks exist within the Western TMO to support fully such a campaign for 60 to 90 days.

- If Pact forces require about a week of high-intensity operations to achieve a major breakthrough, the Pact's total stocks in the Western TMO could support combat operations for approximately 60 to 75 days.

- If Pact forces require about two weeks of high-intensity operations to achieve a breakthrough or if NATO manages to seal any earlier major Pact breakthrough, the Pact would not have enough ammunition in the Western TMO to sustain combat operations beyond 30 to 45 days. (SN NC)

If confronted with the prospect of a shortfall in ammunition supply, Pact leaders would adjust wartime plans to avoid, or at least minimize, any adverse impact on combat operations. In addition, the Soviets would move stocks from elsewhere, such as the Strategic Reserve, to the Western TMO. (SN NC)

Future Soviet General Purpose Forces

Although the Soviets have announced that they will cut their general purpose forces, defense spending, and defense production over the next two years, we believe that the Soviets are determined to maintain large general purpose forces through the period of this Estimate. In addition to supporting their claim to be a superpower, the Soviets believe such forces are necessary to deter aggression, to carry out wartime missions, and to underwrite their political objectives in the region. We judge that these factors will continue to guide Soviet force development in the future. Absent a far-reaching conventional arms control agreement, the Soviets will maintain the capability to conduct large-scale offensive operations deep into NATO territory, but only after general mobilization. Furthermore, for the period of this Estimate, Pact forces, led by the USSR, will remain the largest aggregation of military power in the world, and the Soviets will remain committed to the offensive as the preferred form of operations in wartime. (SN NC)

Ground Forces. The Soviet Ground Forces are the largest element of Soviet general purpose forces, and their development largely determines the overall direction of theater forces development. We see no evidence that either of these conditions will change.

Cuts in the size of the ground forces announced by the Soviets, however, signal a significant change in the overall developmental path of the force. Before the announcement, the Soviet ground forces were expected to grow gradually in their overall size. The cuts—the most sizable since the early 1960s—diverge considerably from existing trends, and they alter significantly our forecast of future Soviet forces. Ambiguity persists concerning the actual implementation of announced force cuts and the restructuring of forces remaining after the withdrawal into what the Soviets term a "clearly defensive" orientation. We now judge, nevertheless, that a 25-year period of Soviet ground force growth has ended, and that the force will experience a decline in its overall size that could very well go beyond the magnitude of that already announced by the Soviets. We further judge a resumption of force growth, barring an unforeseen deterioration in the international environment, to be highly unlikely before the turn of the century. (SN NC)

Our assessment of current trends in Soviet force development leads us to conclude that restructured combined-arms formations based on mechanized infantry and tanks supported by artillery have replaced predominantly tank formations as the main component of land combat power. We believe this trend toward combined-arms formations will continue, but we cannot predict with any certainty the final organization of these units. (SN NC)

The Soviet ground forces are fielding new equipment in virtually every weapon category. This pattern of weapons modernization will continue for the foreseeable future but at a slower pace than in the past:

- The Soviets probably have begun fielding a tank referred to by the Intelligence Community as the
Future Soviet Tank-I (FST-I), with the capability to fire antitank guided missiles through its main gun. A new design, the FST-II, is expected to reach serial production by the mid-1990s. It will likely incorporate incremental improvements over previous designs and may, in addition, have a larger caliber gun.  

In addition to improving the firepower and protection of their current infantry fighting vehicles, the Soviets should field a new IFV within the next year. A new armored personnel carrier also is under development. These new systems are designed to have improved protection and firepower and reflect the increasing role for these systems in Soviet combined-arms operations against NATO.

- The Soviets will field several new models of tube artillery by the end of the century. Primary improvements will include fully automatic ammunition loaders, new fire-control systems, increased armor protection, improved metallurgy for the cannon and chassis, and a longer tube for greater range in some models. In addition, the Soviets are developing improved artillery munitions.

- The Soviets will continue their ambitious short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) research and development program, and we project that they will continue to expand and modernize their tactical nuclear forces by improving the accuracy of their missiles and fielding an extended-range SS-21 and a solid-fueled follow-on to the Scud. A series of improved conventional munition warheads are also being developed to improve the effectiveness of SRBMs in conventional operations.

- The Soviets are projected to field several new air defense weapons to maximize their future air defense capabilities against helicopters and high-performance aircraft. Improvements will include improved seekers for better low-altitude engagement capability, multiple engagement radar, and more lethal warheads.  

Air Forces. Even before Gorbachev's announcement of force cuts, we had expected the size of the Soviets' air forces to remain relatively constant as they attempted to catch up with the West qualitatively. We now judge that the air forces will be maintained at their postreduction levels until after the turn of the century. We also judge that the Soviets will continue to modernize their air forces, albeit more slowly, during the period of this estimate in an attempt to narrow major technological gaps with the West. There is considerable uncertainty, nevertheless, over how the Soviets will implement the announced reduction in aircraft and how the air forces will implement spending and procurement cuts. Senior Soviet military leaders have placed great importance on retaining approximate air parity in the Central European air balance, and they have emphasized the importance of new weapon systems in developmental programming:

- Modernization of the Soviet fighter force probably will be based almost entirely on variants of the Fulcrum, Foxhound, and Flanker. We judge that the first follow-on fighter to appear would probably be a Fulcrum replacement.

- The Soviets will most likely continue to modernize their medium bomber force with improved variants of the Backfire, and we estimate that a new medium bomber will succeed the Backfire about the turn of the century. We further project that a new light bomber will begin to replace strategic aviation Fencer aircraft in the mid-1990s.

- The Fencer probably will continue to replace less capable fighter-bombers in front aviation ground attack units into the early to mid-1990s. We estimate that the Soviets will develop a new fighter-bomber around the turn of the century. This aircraft would probably have a substantial payload-radius capability, incorporate low-observable technology to improve its survivability, and be equipped with advanced navigation and weapons delivery avionics.
• The Mystic high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft is expected to enter service in the early 1990s. The Soviets are also augmenting their aerial reconnaissance capability by fielding a family of drones, including the soon-to-be-fielded DR-X-4.

• The Hind continues to be the workhorse of the Soviet attack helicopter force, and variants with improved capabilities continue to replace older models. Two new armed helicopters, the Hukum and Havoc may begin deployment in the early 1990s. Developmental programs are under way for a medium-tirotor and a heavy-tirotor helicopter, but they are unlikely to be fielded in significant numbers during the period of this Estimate.

• A new V/STOL aircraft is under development, and it may enter service with the Soviet air forces. The Soviets are also developing Stealth aircraft including a bomber and a fighter-bomber.

The Soviet strategic bomber force is currently undergoing its second reorganization of this decade. While we do not yet have the right evidence to firmly determine the intent or operational significance of the latest reorganization, it appears designed to give the Soviets greater flexibility in allocating heavy bombers between theater and intercontinental missions.

Soviet Homeland Air Defense Forces
The Soviets are continuing to modernize their Strategic Air Defense Force including the air surveillance network, the interceptor force, and the surface-to-air missile (SAM) force. This effort, with its emphasis on systems with good capabilities against low-altitude targets, appears to be focused on two main objectives: the development of a long-range capability to shoot down cruise missile carriers before they can release their weapons, and the development of a terminal defense to intercept penetrators that make it through the outer barrier. In addition to improving the capabilities of their current interceptor force, we expect the Soviets to deploy follow-ons to the Fulcrum, Flanker, and Foxhound over the next 10 to 15 years. Performance improvements on the follow-ons will include a radar capable of tracking multiple targets with small radar cross sections in lockdown operations, better maneuverability, and—in the Foxhound follow-on—a capability to intercept cruise-missile-carrying aircraft before they can launch their missiles. The SA-10 system, including future modifications, will dominate strategic SAM force modernization through the next 10 years. An SA-5 follow-on is projected to begin deployment in the 1990s, but we are unsure whether it will be a modification or a new design. In addition, the Soviets will develop one or more lasers with an air defense application, including those capable of causing structural damage and damage to electro-optical sensors.

The Soviets have reorganized their Strategic Air Defense Forces in the peripheral areas of the USSR by giving them back to the national air defense system. This probably was brought about by national air defense authorities to ensure that they controlled the forces required for territorial defense, and perhaps also to improve the responsiveness of Soviet air defenses to peacetime airspace violations.

Naval Forces. Although we do not know how the personnel and budget cuts announced by Gorbachev will be apportioned among the five services, these reductions could have a significant effect on the Soviet Navy's size and mix of forces. The Navy may be trying initially to meet some of its personnel and overall budget reductions by further reducing its operational tempo and retiring older combatants, and the Soviets have already accelerated the rate at which they are scrapping older surface combatants and submarines. Retirements, however, will have no impact on the Navy's need to cut procurement expenditures, and some major programs may have to be reduced, stretched out over time, or eliminated altogether. Surface combatants are likely to take the largest share of "hardware" cuts because of the traditional Soviet bias in favor of submarines and the fact that surface combatants are the most manpower intensive naval systems. Despite such reductions, we expect to see the Soviets continue to make qualitative improvements in their Navy that focus on its most important mission areas.
We see no significant operational change in Soviet naval support for land TMOs. We anticipate the slow continuation of several naval organizational and weapon trends that should provide land theater commanders with more capable forces for combined arms operations as a major wartime task of the Soviet Navy. Chief among these are:

- Integration of the newly developed SS-N-21 long-range land-attack nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile in theater nuclear strike plans. The high-altitude SS-NX-24 is now in development and it will also have a theater mission when it is initially deployed in the early 1990s.

- Continuing efforts to develop more effective sea-borne air defenses against enemy aircraft armed with air-launched cruise missiles or improved air-to-surface missiles.

- Continued gradual replacement of older naval Tu-16 Badgers with Tu-22M Backfire-C bombers, giving Soviet naval aviation greater potential for in-theater maritime strikes.

**Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces**

Following the Soviets' lead, and undoubtedly with Moscow's approval, all non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries, except Romania, announced force and defense spending reductions in January 1989. As in the Soviet case, there is a mixture of economic, political, and military considerations to these decisions. Nevertheless, we judge that weaknesses in the NSWP economies constitute the primary motivation for their decision to cut forces and defense spending. The reductions, however, do not represent as sharp a departure in force and spending trends as represented by the Soviet cuts. NSWP military procurement began slowing in the mid-1970s, and it has dropped significantly since the early 1980s. NSWP force size has been largely static since the 1970s. For these reasons, we had projected no force growth and slow rates of modernization even before the cuts were announced.

NSWP force cuts range between 5 and 20 percent of currently assessed force levels, and we judge that virtually all equipment cuts will be taken in older equipment that dominates the NSWP inventory (see the table on page 5). While considerable uncertainty exists regarding the individual impact of defense spending and procurement cuts on the armed forces' acquisition of newer equipment, we project that rates of modernization will slow beyond their already gradual pace. This may be offset somewhat by the reduced size of the NSWP forces and the elimination of the oldest equipment in their inventories.

NSWP countries maintain important defense industries, and their role in weapons production has increased substantially. They now account for about one-fifth of total Pact land arms production (a much smaller share of aircraft and ships), although the equipment they produce tends to be relatively less sophisticated and easier to manufacture than systems simultaneously in production in Soviet plants. We believe that, over the next decade, the Soviets expect NSWP industry to relieve Soviet industry of more of the burden of equipping NSWP forces while providing increased support for the modernization of Soviet industry.

We foresee modest improvements in NSWP forces during the projections period that, while insufficient to close the modernization gap between their forces and Soviet force standards in Eastern Europe, will enable them to fulfill important roles in Warsaw Pact plans for war against NATO. We project NSWP forces will gradually modernize their equipment and reorganize along Soviet lines through the end of this century:

- Ground force equipment modernization will consist primarily of T-72 series tanks, self-propelled artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and newer infantry fighting vehicles. Major restructuring may occur in the ground forces which could follow the lines adopted by the Hungarian ground forces.

- NSWP air force modernization will be a gradual process. The ground attack replacement is the Fitter-K, while the air defense forces will be improved through the fielding of the Fulcrum.
• The NSWP countries with naval forces do not appear willing or able to significantly increase their naval expenditures. Over the long term, older and less capable weapon systems in the inventories of the NSWP navies gradually will be replaced by more capable systems, though on a less than 1-for-1 basis due to budget constraints.

The Soviets almost certainly are resigned to accept NSWP force inadequacies, and we judge that they will continue to tolerate such deficiencies while insisting that the most glaring faults be rectified. The Soviets almost certainly are aware of the operational price they will pay if their NSWP allies are not able to perform their assigned missions alongside Soviet forces. The impact of these force deficiencies on operational planning will become more apparent to the Soviets after their force reductions in Central Europe and the western USSR are completed. In general, we forecast that the uneasy, and at times strained, relationship that exists between the Soviets and their allies regarding force modernization and reorganization will remain for the foreseeable future.

Soviet Policy Toward NATO

The major objective of Soviet policy toward NATO is to reduce European governmental and popular support for increased defense spending that would support NATO's force modernization program. If this policy is successful, it would reduce internal Soviet perceptions of the NATO threat, thereby enabling Gorbachev to make major shifts of resources from the defense to the civil sector without being accused of reducing Warsaw Pact security.

Soviet and Warsaw Pact policy toward NATO for the foreseeable future will likely follow two interrelated tracks. First, the Pact will engage the West in arms control negotiations at all levels. Second, it will pursue an aggressive course of public diplomacy, active measures, and unilateral initiatives aimed at influencing NATO governments and electorate to reduce defense spending and slow NATO modernization. Warsaw Pact public diplomacy will also exploit popular opposition in Western Europe to current NATO out-of-country basing policies and publicly burdensome NATO military training programs.

Warsaw Pact foreign policy over the period of this Estimate can also be expected to support another Soviet objective vis-a-vis NATO: the weakening of the position—of the United States and Canada within the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition to reducing the apparent threat from the Soviet Union in the eyes of West Europeans—thus reducing the need for NATO's continued dependence on the United States—the Soviets will encourage other NATO members to deal directly with the Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact foreign policy will also complicate NATO's efforts to reach agreement on positions for the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). An apparently accommodating Soviet security policy will undermine tough Western bargaining positions in the CST and increase pressure on the NATO allies to meet Soviet negotiating concerns, such as NATO ground attack aircraft and forward based systems.

A critical issue confronting NATO over the next decade is to identify, interpret, and react correctly to developments in Warsaw Pact general purpose forces. As decisions on the size and composition of Pact future general purpose forces become apparent, NATO will have to sort out the real from the declared changes in Warsaw Pact capabilities and intentions. Furthermore, NATO will have to accomplish this in an environment of increasing public skepticism about the Warsaw Pact "threat" and sagging support for NATO defense spending.

Even under the most favorable conditions of East-West relations over the course of this Estimate, NATO can expect to face a formidable Pact military force. We judge that military forces will remain, from the USSR's perspective, the primary basis of its superpower status. Thus, despite significant shifts of resources from the defense sector, the Soviet Union will continue to plan for and invest heavily in its general purpose forces while seeking to build a more capable economy to underpin Soviet military capabilities in the future.

Alternative Judgment. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, while recognizing the significance of the ongoing changes in the Soviet Union, believes the
likelihood of large unilateral reductions in military expenditures beyond those already proclaimed by Soviet leaders is not as high as implied by the majority view in the Estimate, particularly for the longer term. Notwithstanding the potential importance of new developments in Soviet military policies discussed in this Estimate, the Director, DIA, believes that present evidence and future uncertainties make the elements of continuity in Soviet military policy as important as the changes for US national security and defense planning. (-----)