

Chapter 2 IMPACT OF PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The FBMS station in Washington, with its Broadcast Recording Unit (BRU) at Silver Hill, was an operating organization on 7 December 1941. The Portland post also was operating, though it was not yet in any sense prepared to cope with the demands soon to be made upon it. Personnel had been sent to the other three field stations, but it could not be said that they were operating. Nothing had been filed from Puerto Rico. At Kingsville, George Chesnutt still was sampling Latin American broadcasts and mailing some of the more interesting transcripts to Washington. London was in a position to render immediate service, as the staff there had the entire output of the BBC monitoring operation from which to draw. However, the three editors in London, and Lloyd Free, still were attempting to complete arrangements with BBC and had done nothing toward establishing adequate communications with Washington. It must be said that when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor suddenly plunged the United States into war, FBMS was in position, but only partially prepared.

Increased Demand for Services

With Lloyd Free still in London, Harold Graves and Tom Grandin took over at 316 F St. on 7 December 1941 and

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tried to make the best use of the overwhelmed staff.* The Wire Service was most immediately affected. State Department in the evening of 7 December requested that the wire continue filing throughout the night, and when this was successfully accomplished, asked that the service continue on a 24-hour basis. On Pearl Harbor Sunday, State was the only A Wire client, receiving copy 8 hours each day, but by the next Sunday six users were getting 24-hour service. By 6 January 1942 the service was going to 10 offices and several others were awaiting installation. Grandin wrote Rand on 28 February 1942 that the A Wire was then serving 18 defense offices, and carrying an average of 25,000 words a day.** He added that the increased demand for the Daily Report paralleled that for the Wire Service, and that no one in the office had had time to consider the problem of assigning programs

* ON THE BEAM, the FBMS monthly house organ, in its issue for 24 December 1941, described the hectic scene: "Translators became monitors, Daily Report editors became wire editors -- and some of them did double duty. Typists became transcribers, and august officials of the service from the director's office down, took a hand at punching the teletype." FBIS Records, National Archives.

** A request to CSC on 13 January 1942 asked that FBMS be furnished an available list of qualified candidates for a new class of editors to be called "Government Agency Correspondents." They were wanted for filing intelligence to government offices by wire, and must be "outstanding journalists or broadcasters" with "wide experience abroad and thoroughly familiar with international affairs." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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to Kingsville and Puerto Rico.

Goodwin Watson informed the Portland office on 23 March 1942 that Chinese and Russian copy being filed to Washington was nowhere near sufficient to give the analysts a firm basis for meeting the demands of their subscribers. One of the Portland editors, Bradford Coolidge, spent several days in Washington in March in an effort to obtain a clearer idea of what was needed. In a letter to Portland he asked that monitors make freer use of their own observations, for example, the amount of applause, or the absence of it, during a public address. He added that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information (OWI) both reported that they were depending on the FBMS for most of their current intelligence.

In the weeks following the start of the war, most agencies commenting upon FBMS services wanted more information, but there also was praise. R. C. Tryon of COI wrote Free on 23 December 1941 that his staff regularly combed the Daily Report for information of value, and were all "greatly impressed by the increasingly wide scope of the coverage." Letters of commendation for FBMS efforts came from such officials as Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA); Milo Perkins of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW); Col.

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W. W. Pettigrew of the War Department Military Intelligence Service; and J. O. Rennie of the British Information Service. Praise for FBMS information came from as far away as the Ambassador's office in Peru.

Of course all field stations tried in the days immediately following Pearl Harbor to supply the home office with all information possible, and the small staff in Washington was so hard pressed that Free wired Rhodes on 17 January 1942 to hold the file down to 2,000 words a day, as Washington simply was not staffed to handle any more. The strain of the first month of the war was beginning to tell on the overworked staff. Of course there also were some thrills along with the hard work. When Italy declared war on 9 December 1941, FBMS monitors and editors had the news on the A Wire ahead of the news agencies, and FBMS had registered its first important "scoop."

By the summer of 1942, letters of praise were common, but there also was developing a persistent demand for increased services. Elmer Davis, who had been named head of the new Office of War Information (OWI), replacing much of COI, wrote on 15 August 1942 that "without the service supplied by FBMS, OWI could not function," but added: "We feel that for our purposes a considerable increase of coverage would be very desirable."

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Charles B. Fahs of OSS said in a letter dated 13 August that his organization had found the services "indispensable in our work," but continued: "It would be of real assistance in our work if the service could be expanded." Ambassador John Winant in London praised FBMS activities there, but on 24 July 1942 asked that lateral services to the various American offices in London be provided. The London staff proceeded to meet this request as rapidly as possible, and by October 1942 Peter Rhodes was able to report that teletypes in the offices of OSS, Army and Navy attaches, Army and Navy Public Relations, and Army Intelligence were carrying to those offices simultaneously the information being filed to Washington. On 13 November 1942 Rhodes wrote that the British Political Warfare office, BBC, and the Ministry of Information (MOI), had now decided they wanted a daily wire from the United States summarizing Japanese and other Pacific Coast monitoring, as the material they had been getting from the Daily Report was too late in reaching them.

Changing Requirements

Harold Graves, in a statement for the Government Manual appearing in December 1941 but obviously prepared before Pearl Harbor, listed three main purposes of FBMS in performing its functions of recording, translating,

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reporting, and analyzing foreign broadcasts: 1. To keep abreast of propaganda pressures, both on this country and others in which the government has an interest; 2. In cooperation with other agencies to interpret present conditions in, and future policy of, countries whose broadcasts are analyzed; 3. To make available to the government news and information not available in media other than radio broadcasts. He stressed propaganda from foreign sources and interpretation of developments, listing the providing of broadcast information as a minor, somewhat incidental, by-product. In a message to the Silver Hill staff on 20 January 1942, Lloyd Free listed the three main purposes of FBMS as follows: 1. To supply the government with an up-to-the-minute complete news service on developments outside the country; 2. To furnish appropriate defense agencies with intelligence gleaned from broadcasts; 3. To give a picture of the general propaganda strategies employed by foreign governments, so that counter-measures, if necessary, can be taken immediately. This explanation was a virtual reversal of the purposes listed by Graves a month or two earlier, and this reversal, in general, portrayed the changing requirements levied upon foreign broadcast monitoring. Free also noted that Silver Hill engineers were supplying information to 250

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persons handling 400,000 words daily, with the Daily Report and the analytical Weekly Survey going to 460 officials regularly.

Emphasis now was upon speed, thoroughness, and volume. FBMS was expected to provide more information, to provide all the information available in certain categories, and to provide it faster. This change in emphasis affected all phases of FBMS work. Officials were under pressure to staff the Puerto Rico and Kingsville offices as rapidly as possible and establish regular schedules of coverage for them. The plan to send BBC-monitored dispatches through 5-minute telephone conversations at intervals during the day was discarded before it actually had been tried. Arrangements were made to use a Western Union cable, and Press Wireless was contacted in an effort to find a service that could handle a larger volume at lower cost. In an effort to get as much material from BBC monitoring as possible within the limitations of staff and communications, London editors were asked to prepare a roundup of 500 to 750 words a day, filed by cable.

The newly organized OWI increased its demands on FBMS. The OWI office in San Francisco wanted an expanded file from Portland, and the requirements it levied led the Portland staff to feel that to meet them it would be working for OWI alone. Grandin in a letter to Portland

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on 6 January 1942 reminded the staff that the A Wire needed news and intelligence, that propaganda was secondary, but that the OWI need for propaganda also must be met insofar as possible. Portland would simply have to make the fullest effort possible to meet both needs. Watson informed Free on 4 April 1942 that his conversations with OWI officials led to the conclusion that the BBC simply was not covering the required programs, and the only solution was FBMS monitoring in England to cover about 20 hours of broadcasts daily that apparently were of no interest to the British.

In April 1942 arrangements were made for an exclusive teletype line between Portland and Washington to be used 24 hours a day. Teletype service between the Portland office and the BRU station two miles away was installed to carry Domei code interceptions, which previously had been transported by car. In the summer of 1942 Portland was instructed to start handling the Russian and Chinese communiques; Japanese communiques were transmitted from the time of Pearl Harbor. Graves noted in a letter on 11 June 1942 that there had been practically no news from Japan since the outbreak of the war except by radio, which was an adequate testimonial to the importance of the work being done at

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the Portland station.*

Specialists in the Analysis Section found themselves inundated by an avalanche of special requests. As explained in the "Manual of Information" issued in April 1942, the analysts were trained in research and had ready access to all broadcast transcripts. Very few of their clients, with other tasks to perform, had time to familiarize themselves with the numerous details carried in the broadcasts. They presented the FBMS analysts with questions, and were supplied with the answers, based on detailed study. Many of these requests were made by telephone and could be answered eventually in the same way. Others called for special reports, some quite lengthy. R. C. Tryon of COI wrote Free on 23 December 1941 praising the response of FBMS analysts to requests for radio references to Turkey, for trends in Japanese-language broadcasts, and for certain false claims made by the Axis radio. Far East analysts in May 1942 were able to correct a false impression prevalent in the United States to the effect

* In the letter Graves also noted that an official of BEW had told him that 95 percent of the economic information from Japan was coming through FBMS, and that many other agencies were equally as dependent on FBMS for current information. Because domestic Japanese programs were being heard -- a fact that should be kept secret -- FBMS was giving the government an insight into Japan's morale and national feeling. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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that Japanese agents in Hawaii were in constant touch with Japan through radio contacts. A serious volcanic eruption of Mauna Loa on the Island of Hawaii following Pearl Harbor was kept out of U. S. news columns through the military censorship clamped on the area. FBMS analysts were able to report that the Japanese radio had made no mention of the eruption, though Tokyo had reported with elation a minor eruption in the Philippines -- presented as evidence of divine displeasure at the acts of the Americans.

Perhaps the greatest change in the Analysis Section brought about by the war was the closer relationship with analysts of OWI. This organization, because of broadcasts to enemy nations, found it necessary to pay careful attention to broadcasts from those nations, especially propaganda, and depended greatly upon interpretations and studies of FBMS analysts. Largely because of the needs of OWI, Goodwin Watson and a German specialist, Nathan Leites, were sent to London in September 1942 to establish an analysis operation to work closely with OWI in London and supply Washington with reports based on transcripts never filed to Washington. Watson remained in London only a short time, but a two-man analysis staff remained throughout the war, in close cooperation with the OWI broadcasting staff. Chairman Fly pointed out in the

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fall of 1942 that FBMS analysts produced material used "in war, in diplomacy, and in counter propaganda."*

Increased demands on FBMS and changed requirements also brought budget problems. In 1941 the Bureau of the Budget had approved an appropriation of \$674,414, but Congress cut this to an even \$600,000. After Pearl Harbor a supplemental request for \$209,000 was granted. The chief point made in justification of the request was that monitoring and processing had to be speeded up. This demanded larger expenditures for staff and communications. Immediately after the granting of this supplement, plans had to be made for the 1942-43 budget. Graves, in a report to FCC on 18 May 1942 declared that FBMS would need about twice as much money for 1942-43 as it had the previous year, but it was obvious that the Bureau of the Budget

* Fly address before the Detroit Athletic Club on 25 November 1942. He said: "We listen to the same people talking to their own nationals abroad, to neutral countries or to the world at large. This affords a rich field for the work of our analysts. All of them, social psychologists, are familiar with a particular country, its language, its native customs, its traditions, its economy, and the psychological pattern of its people. Fever charts of Axis propaganda lines are plotted. Trends of enemy diplomacy or military operations are often foreshadowed in clear outline." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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had in mind deep cuts in his estimates.* FCC approved a request for \$1,400,000, but this was cut to \$838,000, making necessary another supplemental request in the fall of 1942 for \$404,000 and a second one in 1943 of \$415,000, making a total of \$1,658,000.

Growth and Revision

Among the changes provided for in the 1942-43 budget was formalization of the already existing News Service Section, which by the start of the new fiscal year was operating three wire services. The new one was the C Wire, serving CIAA, which numbered among its duties broadcasting to Latin America. The A Wire at the time was going to 20 offices. A new problem that began to plague FBMS in 1942 was interference from OWI and CIAA transmitters. If the broadcast frequency of one of these stations got too close to an important foreign program, monitors would have difficulty in

* In his report, Graves made the following points:
1. FBMS was now a source of news and intelligence of first-rate importance because of the closing of much of the world; 2. FBMS originally desired only information on propaganda, for which a sampling was sufficient, but as a source of information it must expand; 3. The war had greatly increased in scope since the original budgetary requirements were formulated; 4. New agencies and old ones expanded by the war had greatly increased the demand for monitoring. He added that FBMS was covering one-fourth of foreign broadcasts, and for a satisfactory job two-thirds would need to be covered.

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hearing the latter. Roger C. Legge, who handled the Program Information Unit, kept up with these frequencies, and if he notified the U.S. broadcasters he usually could get the beam changed slightly to eliminate interference. Legge started publication of "Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasters" in March 1942. A revised edition came out in September. Several consultants in various localities were checked regularly for changes in broadcast schedules and for new programs. They regularly sent their findings to Legge for inclusion in his publication.

By January 1942 FBMS had outgrown its quarters. In April a move was made to 1424 K St., N.W., where four floors were assigned to FBMS. Lloyd Free tendered his resignation in April to accept a commission in the Army. During most of the war years he was military attache in the U.S. Embassy in Switzerland. Possible successors included James G. McDonald, recommended by Free, and Ralph Casey, director of the Journalism Department of the University of Minnesota. The man eventually chosen was Dr. Robert D. Leigh, for 14 years President of Bennington College and its organizing president, who also held several important government positions. He was paid \$1,000 more than the \$8,000 Free received, and to legalize this salary, provision

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had to be made in the appropriation bill. This item successfully negotiated, Leigh took over on 15 July 1942. During the intervening months Graves was Acting Director.

One of Leigh's first recommendations was that the name of FBMS be changed to the Broadcast Intelligence Service. His reasoning was that this name was less unwieldy and more accurately reflected the duties of the organization. FCC insisted upon keeping the word "foreign" in the name, so on 26 July 1942 FBMS became the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). Later, in investigation of FCC, counsel for the Cox Committee charged that Leigh changed the name of the service to "dignify its activities," make it sound more like a war agency, and influence Congress to grant appropriations.*

On 30 May 1942 FBMS had 430 employees, compared with 215 on 30 November 1941. This rapid staff increase naturally called for some reorganization. In January 1942 Ellis G. Porter, former editor of newspapers in Baltimore and Philadelphia, joined the staff to direct publication of the Daily Report. Grandin remained as Chief Editor, but his department became known as the News and Intelligence Division, with a Report Section and a Wire Service Section. Monitoring, which also had been under Grandin's

* Hearings of the Special Committee to Investigate the FCC, Volume I, pages 123-124. GPC, 1944.

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supervision, was combined with translation to form the Monitoring and Translation Division, with a Monitoring Section and a Translation Section. A Monitoring Executive was appointed to direct the monitors. He was administratively responsible to the Monitoring and Translation Division, but received operational direction from the News and Intelligence Division. The Analysis Section became the Analysis Division.

The rapid increase in demand for FBMS publications placed a heavy burden on the clerical staff, and an effort was made to limit distribution. It was pointed out on several occasions that FBMS was different from a commercial organization, interested in expanding its circulation for the purpose of profit. FBMS wanted to make sure that its publications were sent only to those who actually needed and used them. Consequently a questionnaire was sent to all subscribers in July 1942 asking them to appraise the value of FBMS Daily Reports. Each subscriber was asked to place himself in one of the following four classes: 1. Those who read for interest only, making no direct use of the material; 2. those who read for application but seldom found anything useful; 3. those who found that abandonment of the books would diminish their own effectiveness; 4. those who considered the books a major source of

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information and would be seriously handicapped by their loss. This questionnaire proved effective. Those who failed to reply or who placed themselves in Classes 1 or 2 were dropped, making it possible to cut circulation about 50 percent. Some of those dropped asked later to be restored to the circulation list, while new requests for books continued to come in. In about six months the circulation was up to what it had been before cuts were made. Use of this system has continued, serving at intervals to eliminate dead wood from subscription lists.

Official announcements by enemy governments, especially leader speeches, were obtainable only from radio broadcasts, and were in great demand. When such a speech or statement was broadcast, everyone wanted a full text immediately. Some officials also wanted it in the original language. OWI was responsible for public relations, but through an agreement between FBIS and OWI it became common practice for FBIS to process these documents as rapidly as possible and distribute them as special releases to government officials and the news media rather than incorporate them in the Daily Report. Dr. Leigh reported in October 1942 that techniques for handling leader speeches had been so perfected that a two-hour Hitler speech delivered during the night could be on the A Wire in full text in four to six hours, and special release copies could be on the desks of subscribers when their offices

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opening in the morning. The processing of speeches that had to be monitored in England did not progress so rapidly, as BBC was slow to adapt its practices; eventually, under FBIS encouragement, the time span was cut. During the war this speedy processing and distribution of leader speeches, from both enemy and allied countries, frequently served to correct faulty impressions resulting from earlier but fragmentary news reports.

As soon as FBIS administrators could find time and line up personnel, an effort was made to staff adequately Puerto Rico and Kingsville. Both stations had to depend largely upon local hiring for translators and clerical staff, and Puerto Rico even recruited its own editorial staff. One editor hired in Puerto Rico in February 1942, Gordon Goodnow, was later head of the Report Division and still is with the organization in 1967. In March 1942 Puerto Rico got its telefax transmission equipment in operation, so by the spring of 1942 all four field stations had 24-hour direct communications with Washington. Originally, field station chiefs corresponded directly with any Washington executive. They were instructed in December 1941 to confine correspondence with Grandin to editorial matters, to write Free in regard to policy decisions, and to send correspondence regarding administration and personnel jointly to Free and Thompson Moore, Senior

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Administrative Officer. The confusion resulting from this arrangement led to new instructions from Free in January 1942 that all field correspondence should be funnelled through Grandin. Graves reported on 24 March 1942 that FBMS was then listening daily to 600,000 words in Washington, 300,000 in the three domestic field offices, and London editors had access to three-fourths of the approximately one million words monitored by BBC.

Puerto Rico was expected to monitor broadcasts from Africa and the Mediterranean area, while Kingsville was to cover only Latin America. By the summer of 1942, however, it was apparent that reception at Puerto Rico was disappointing, and more attention was given to expansion of Kingsville. In the fall of 1942 Elliot Tarbell was sent to Kingsville as chief, with Chesnutt remaining as an editor. At that time the entire staff did not number more than a dozen. Portland coverage was particularly vital with the start of the war, so immediate steps were taken to strengthen its staff. Spencer Williams, a foreign correspondent for years in the Soviet Union, was hired as Portland chief, and Carter was transferred to the Analysis Section. This move obviously was a shock to Carter, and was interpreted by the Portland staff as a reflection on their work. Graves assured the staff that Carter had been sent to Portland temporarily, and that with the new situation it was considered that his talents could be used to better

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advantage in Washington.* Shortly after his return to Washington Carter transferred to OWI.

The most important development--important both from the standpoint of foreign broadcast coverage and increased FBIS prestige--came in the summer of 1942. OWI was not satisfied with FBIS coverage, especially on the West Coast, and indicated that it might start monitoring on its own. FBIS was anxious that other government agencies stay out of monitoring, that it be recognized as the sole unit with that responsibility. In a report to an examiner of the Bureau of the Budget on 20 May 1942, Graves noted that four other offices were reported to have engaged in monitoring, but only that done by OWI in New York and San Francisco could be considered duplication of FBMS work.** Actually FBIS was not worried

* The Portland staff wired Washington protesting Carter's transfer. In his reply on 17 December Graves attempted to mollify the personnel. He stressed the importance of Portland's work, noting that a speech by the Japanese Navy Minister texted in Portland was the first news concerning the speech to reach the desk of Secretary Knox. Williams already was in Portland, so in a separate letter to him Graves explained the reason for sending the message to the staff rather than to him. FBIS Records, National Archives.

** Graves said some Embassies had monitored abroad and reported on the information they obtained; the Navy had done some small-scale listening to Japanese broadcasts in Hawaii; and the FBI was reported to have done some monitoring for its own purposes, but had not reported its results. These he did not consider to be duplicating FBMS efforts. IBID.

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about the monitoring in New York, but it was concerned over OWI efforts in San Francisco. At Woodside, near San Francisco, CBS had established a small listening post on property leased by a radio enthusiast named Mason Shaw, who was placed in charge of engineering for the activity. OWI in San Francisco had made an agreement with CBS to supply part of the monitoring staff and share in the output of the station. Copy received from Woodside was used to supplement FBIS copy from Portland. The Bureau of the Budget agreed with Graves' thesis that OWI was duplicating FBIS efforts, and refused to approve funds for OWI to continue monitoring. CBS had already decided to abandon the post on 1 August 1942, so OWI formally requested that FBIS take it over. With a promise from the Bureau of the Budget that it would support an FBIS request for supplementary funds to operate the station, FCC approved transfer to FBIS. Mason Shaw remained at the station for several months, on the FCC payroll but under supervision of an engineer sent down from Portland. Spencer Williams was named chief of the new station as well as Portland, and some staff members soon were transferred from Portland to San Francisco to direct the new operation. FBIS also transferred to its payroll the six monitors working for CBS and OWI. One of them, Herman Litwin, became a key staff member in FBIS

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and was still with the agency in 1967. Another, John Chi-chong Holt, worked later at Hawaii and Guam and was a top FBIS Chinese monitor until 1950. Holt also was one of the first aliens allowed to remain on the FBIS payroll.

The San Francisco monitoring station was an important link in the FBIS chain of monitoring posts for more than three years, but the circumstances of its transfer were more important because it established FBIS as the only government organization authorized to monitor foreign broadcasts within the limits of the United States. OWI made no further effort to invade this field.

Changes in the Analysis Division as a result of the war were varied. The sudden increase in volume of copy, and the desire of analysts to give defense agencies every bit of assistance possible, led to such a rapid increase in the size of the Weekly Survey that by summer of 1942 it had become unwieldy. Changes had to be made. By August the Weekly Survey had been divided into four books, each one covering a separate European area. A more brief and general publication was called the Weekly Review. Daily analyses for Latin America were issued to meet a request from CIAA, and the Radio Report on the Far East became a bi-weekly. In March 1942 the table of organization of the Analysis Division called for 37 analysts,

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assistants, and trainees, but with only 17 of the positions filled. In approving a supplemental appropriation in the fall of 1942, the Bureau of the Budget disallowed funds for expansion of the Analysis Division; so the planned table of organization was never reached. Goodwin Watson wrote in a memorandum to Graves on 27 April 1942 that he believed lack of acquaintance with those using the service was the greatest weakness of the Division, and he launched a series of interviews with subscribers to the Surveys. One result of these meetings was Watson's trip to London in the fall of 1942 to organize an analysis function there. In a memorandum written from London, Watson called the BBC monitoring system inadequate, as British and U.S. interests were often at variance. He recommended steps to place FBIS staff members at many points throughout the world, including Cairo, New Delhi, Melbourne, Chungking, Vladivostok, Stockholm, Gibraltar, and Istanbul, with analysts at those places roughly paralleling the number of editors. Nothing came of this recommendation, but plans for FBIS expansion abroad already were being developed.* A group was in

* In a memorandum to Leigh on 17 November 1942, Graves pointed out that plans were being considered to send representatives to some of the places Watson mentioned, but his recommendation was "not feasible." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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North Africa before the end of 1942; Leigh reported on 13 February 1943 that Anderson would soon go to Stockholm to explore monitoring possibilities; and other sites being considered were Cairo, Teheran, New Delhi, Simla, and Chungking.*

Manpower Problems

When FBMS was started, applicants for clerical jobs were plentiful. Although most linguists applying could not meet the requirements, a satisfactory staff of capable translators was found in a short time. Editors and analysts who would meet the original qualifications were scarce, but with standards lowered slightly it was possible to find suitable candidates. After Pearl Harbor it was different. Demands for manpower doubled overnight. Competition was intense. In addition to demands from industry and the military, new wartime government agencies began to bid for personnel. FBMS pay was in accord with CSC standards, but working conditions were unsatisfactory for many employees. Much work had to be done at night, and there was no extra pay for night work. Pressures of deadlines and mounting demands were damaging to the health

* Leigh also said that Rhodes considered the monitoring of German Hellschreiber urgent, but FBIS would not undertake this unless BBC definitely refused. What FBIS must do at once, he added, was start coverage of Morse in U.S. stations. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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of some persons. Up to the end of December 1941 there had been 45 resignations--about 20 percent--which was not considered excessive. In the six months ending 31 December 1942, the turnover had jumped to 64 percent, considerably above the government average. What was more startling, among the various clerical groups the turnover in the six months ranged from a low of 92 percent to a high in one group of 228 percent.

Using the argument of difficult working conditions as a lever, FBIS officials repeatedly tried to persuade CSC to reclassify their clerical employees. Dr. Leigh reported on 7 January 1943 that he had some months before asked CSC to make CAF-3 rather than CAF-2 the basic grade for the great bulk of FBIS clericals. CAF-3 then paid a starting salary of \$1,620. Leigh said his request had been backed with voluminous justification, and that his initial talks with CSC officials were encouraging, but the request finally was rejected. The fight continued, and eventually some of the positions were reclassified. In a letter to the FCC personnel director in November 1942, Leigh suggested the upgrading of 172 positions, including 120 clericals at CAF-4 or lower. The list also included 25 monitoring and translating positions. In another memorandum to FCC on 28 November 1942, Leigh placed FBIS needs at 158 new

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employees at once, and 260 within the coming year, but offered little hope that the needs could be met.* As early as October 1942, FCC was being asked to assign more radio engineers to field stations.

Graves reported in a memorandum on 6 August 1943 that of 169 editorial applicants presented to FBIS by CSC prior to 15 May 1943, only 14 had been hired. Spencer Williams in a message to Washington on 18 August 1942 complained that Portland was badly in need of more editors, with staffing of the new San Francisco station coming up. Grandin had informed Williams in February that editors could be hired locally, but they must come from CSC registers. In January 1943 Leigh and Graves held another meeting with CSC officials and gained a tacit admission that CSC registers had failed to supply translators qualified for FBIS work. With this CSC admission, a vigorous campaign was launched to recruit monitors and translators.

* Leigh placed 35 editors, 23 translators, and 26 monitors in the urgent list, but no analysts. He explained: "These positions have no parallel in the United States, either in or out of government service. They are skills developed in this service without benefit of previous standards of comparison." He said the Civil Service rolls were "totally inadequate," and yet CSC had been reluctant to approve candidates found by FBIS. "It is clear that recruitment presents novel problems, and application of existing categories and peacetime procedures is inefficient and destructive of the purpose which FBIS serves." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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The greatest recruitment problem was in building up a Japanese language staff. To the three original Japanese translators sent to Portland, three more finally were added after nearly a year of recruiting. Williams complained in a letter to Grandin on 22 February 1942 that with OWI insistence on monitoring summaries, the Japanese staff was having to spend practically all of its time monitoring, making it impossible to process important texts in time. He urgently requested three more Japanese. However, a new problem had arisen. The West Coast command, under General DeWitt, had banished all Japanese, American citizens as well as aliens, from the West Coast. The six Japanese in Portland were excepted and supplied with special badges testifying that they were doing national defense work, but the threat that they too would be removed to relocation camps hung over the staff for months. Repeated requests that the number allowed in Portland be increased got no response, and expansion of Japanese language coverage was stymied. Rumors that the Japanese still would be removed from Portland continued, and as late as September 1942 Williams wrote Washington that the second in command on the West Coast had informed him that unless General DeWitt ordered otherwise soon, the Japanese would have to leave. Chairman Fly took the matter up directly with General DeWitt on

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17 September 1942, but it was not until 19 December that Graves was able to notify the Portland office that the Japanese definitely would be permitted to remain, and that a "limited number" of new monitors could be hired, provided their loyalty was "beyond question." There never was any possibility of sending Japanese to San Francisco, so Japanese language coverage had to be confined to Portland.*

The difficulty in getting an adequate Japanese staff in Portland led to consideration of a new monitoring post outside the West Coast Command. In January 1943 the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) asked FBIS to place a staff in Denver, and suggested BEW might bear part of the expense. Graves mentioned this possibility in a letter to Portland in December 1942, saying that the new staff might concentrate on translating Japanese code transcripts airmailed from Portland. In March 1943 Williams was notified that he could hire three more Japanese in Portland, so the Denver move was delayed for a time, but at the end of April 1943 an initial staff of

* A letter from Spencer Williams to Edward Hullinger on 19 November 1943 reminded him that the number of Japanese linguists in Portland was limited to eight under "DeWitt's reluctant promise to Fly." He suggested that General Emmons might be induced to raise this, but he was doubtful. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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three Japanese translators started work in Denver, in close coordination with BEW and OWI offices there. The Denver staff was expanded, largely as a result of intensive recruitment among the war relocation camps, and eventually was moved to Washington. It devoted all its efforts to translation of Romaji code copied in Portland, sent first by airmail and later by wire.

From the beginning FBIS was careful in ascertaining the loyalty of prospective employees, specifically urging character references to state their honest opinions on this subject. Soon after the war started the FBI~~S~~ was asked to check all FBIS employees for loyalty. In a letter to Fly on 2 June 1942, J. Edgar Hoover declined to make such a check, but agreed to carry out investigations in cases of "suspicion." When Dr. Frederick L. Schumann, who later figured in a Dies Committee attack on FBIS employees, was hired in May 1942 he was asked pointedly if he would have any objection to an FBI investigation. It was repeatedly made clear that FBIS wanted only employees of "unimpeachable loyalty." Yet problems did occasionally arise. In October 1943 a Japanese who had been working in Denver for some time without paypending approval of his appointment was dropped because "one of the investigatory agencies of the government" had reported unfavorably, despite the good recommendations previously

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received. In July 1942 CSC reported that "new information" cast doubt on the loyalty of two of the first three Japanese translators hired. In this case the two translators, who had worked for more than a year and were the most experienced Japanese linguists in Portland, were not dismissed.*

FBIS also was hesitant about hiring aliens, though CSC ruled that they could be used in special cases where it was difficult to find Americans with the necessary skills. Norman Paige, in helping to organize a staff in San Francisco, wrote Washington on 18 August 1942 asking an urgent ruling on the hiring of aliens, as several candidates capable in such languages as Thai and Burmese were available. The problem was discussed at length in Washington. On 30 September 1942 Graves reported that there were now seven aliens on the FBIS payroll. Five were clerical employees in London, and two were monitors in San Francisco. A new ruling was issued on 15 October 1942, which actually did not change the current practice.**

* Fly wrote CSC on 14 January 1943 asking that the matter be reconsidered, as it had been impossible to find satisfactory replacements. Apparently the case was dropped. FBIS Records, National Archives.

** Administrative Memorandum Number 3A, 15 October 1942: "No appointments of non-citizens shall be made where they are not absolutely indispensable or irreplaceable. All such suggested appointments shall be discussed with Mr. Leigh." IBID.

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The military draft also began to claim FBIS employees early in the war. In March 1942 Chairman Fly wrote the draft board of Lloyd Free giving his reasons for a requested deferment. Peter Rhodes was another key employee whose deferment was asked.

On 17 November 1942 President Roosevelt laid down the policy that young men should not be deferred from the draft because of federal employment, at the same time acknowledging that certain men, because of high skills, technical and scientific ability, or unique experience, would not be easily replaceable. He requested that heads of government agencies having men in such categories send letters giving full details. On 1 December 1942 Fly wrote such a letter, asking that all FCC engineers, analysts, editors, monitors, and translators be placed in the scarce category. A reply from Presidential Assistant William H. McReynolds on 10 December approved Fly's request. Nevertheless, as the war progressed, FCC was forced to tighten its qualifications for deferment. Many employees, including some translators in rather scarce categories, were lost to the armed services. A memorandum dated 8 April 1943 specified that further deferments would be sought only for administrators in CAF-12 or above; editors, correspondents and analysts in CAF-9 and above; and foreign language translators earning \$2,000 or more.

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Deferments would be asked for employees in these groups only after it was ascertained that their work was satisfactory and in the best interests of the war effort.*

* Job 49-24, CIA Records Center. The memorandum also listed total employment of FBIS as 434, of which 212 were males, 133 of them between the ages of 18 and 37. It stated that 31 men had been deferred after requests were made to draft boards, and 37 former employees were serving in the armed services. (Obviously there was already apparent a sensitivity to criticism of federal agencies asking deferments for employees. From 1943 FBIS seldom asked deferment, but merely instructed the draft board concerning the work a man was doing, leaving the decision to the board.)

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