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Chapter 3 · NEW SERVICE'S PLACE IN FCC

Unlike later sponsors of FBIS--War Department and CIA--FCC was never a primary user of the FBIS product. For FBIS this had certain advantages, but also certain marked disadvantages. The primary advantage was that FCC did not seek to shape development of the new service to serve its own purposes. This was of special significance in the formative years. Experience during the war showed rather conclusively that if foreign broadcast monitoring had been under the direction of OWI it would have concentrated on propaganda broadcasts needed by OWI in establishing policy and directing its international broadcast program. Under OWI direction much of the information that provided valuable intelligence to such agencies as the War, Navy, and State Departments, and BEW, would have been slighted. FBIS would have become merely an arm of OWI. An even better illustration is the monitoring done under direction of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) in the field. FBIS trained the first men who set up a monitoring post under PWB and even continued to pay salaries of some of the men, but when actual direction of operations passed out of the hands of FBIS, the monitoring became virtually valueless to the FBIS headquarters office in Washington. It served PWB and PWB alone.

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Under FCC sponsorship FBIS was not subjected to this one-sided growth. It was given freedom to discover where its services were most useful and so shape its activities as to give the greatest benefits to all government agencies. It actually was independent subject only to general FCC administration. When a policy or operation had been decided upon within the confines of the FBIS administrative office, there was very little likelihood that FCC would offer any objections, though its formal approval was required for every change made in FBIS. On the rare occasion when an FBIS recommendation was turned down by FCC, it usually was because in some way it affected the other branches of the Commission. A good example is recorded in August 1943. Tom Grandin, on a trip to the West Coast, became convinced that immediate steps should be taken to investigate the advantages of locating a monitoring post in Hawaii. He asked permission to go on to Hawaii, and his petition was backed up by a letter from Owen Lattimore, in charge of OWI work on the West Coast. Graves reported to Leigh on 5 August 1943, after taking the matter up with Chairman Fly, that the request had been "emphatically rejected." The main reason given was that Grandin could learn no more in Hawaii than RID engineers already there could learn.

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The primary disadvantage to FBIS of having as sponsor an office with no direct interest in its product became painfully apparent in the fall of 1945. When Congress rescinded more than half of the remaining fiscal year's appropriation for FCC National Defense Activities, FCC decided that the money must go to RID, which was "an integral part of the FCC regulatory activity," and FBIS must be abandoned.*

Shortcomings in FCC Support

Dr. Leigh praised Chairman Fly as an able man who "devoted himself primarily to his regulative and administrative duties rather than to the Commission's relations with Congress,"** and there is no doubt that he and other FCC personnel who had direct contact with FBIS did their best to give the

* The FCC statement to the Senate Finance Committee on 26 October 1945 further explained: "The monitoring of foreign broadcasts, however, is an activity that FCC took on just prior to the war as a service to the operating agencies of the government. No use has been made of this monitoring by the Commission, and now that the war is over it believes that the activity should be transferred to the State Department, which is the principal agency interested in the contents of broadcasts intercepted. The Commission recognizes that foreign broadcast monitoring is an important part of the government's intelligence program, and would like to continue FBIS until an orderly transfer can be made to the State Department." FBIS Records, National Archives.

** "Politicians versus Bureaucrats," article by Robert D. Leigh in HARPERS MAGAZINE for January 1945.

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service adequate support. However, there were noticeable shortcomings, most of them traceable to the nature of FCC. The organization had an efficient legal department that was meticulous in seeing that every expenditure was within the law as it affected FCC. Many new war agencies, in the legislation setting them up and in their appropriations, were free from old restrictions that applied to established government units. These new agencies frequently could spend money for benefits denied to FBIS. Leigh in a memorandum to FCC on 28 September 1942 expressed "shock" at learning that FBIS was likely to be denied an AP or UP ticker, and that money spent for newspapers had to be limited to \$50 a month. Graves in another memorandum for FCC on 27 March 1943 noted that apparent discrepancies between FCC appropriations and some others were arousing "embarrassing questions" among FBIS employees, such as why OWI was allowed to pay living allowance and per diem concurrently, and why OSS and OWI could buy uniforms for their employees stationed with the armed forces while FBIS could not.

FCC had very small staffs located outside Washington, with personnel transferring back and forth frequently. All supplies were handled through a central office, and FCC administrative officials kept careful check. With wartime transportation difficulties and field office

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personnel inexperienced and unable to anticipate their needs long in advance, there was considerable delay in getting needed supplies and much dissatisfaction with FCC.* At first all hiring had to be done in Washington. This caused delay in getting urgently needed personnel at work. Leigh wrote to Williams on 27 August 1942 saying that RID and FBIS combined had finally persuaded FCC to except appointment of minor employees, so in the future chauffeurs, custodians, guards, messengers, mimeograph operators, clerks, stenographers, and typists could be appointed in the field with only the approval of Leigh and the FCC secretary, which could be obtained within 24 hours. Thompson Moore also wrote on 10 February 1943 that FCC finally had been convinced that it was losing money by not allowing purchase of paper and supplies in the field, and was acting to make this possible.

In London, problems were greater and more varied. FCC previously had no staff abroad, was not familiar with problems facing overseas employees, and was not legally entitled to grant certain benefits possible in such departments as State. The first problem was in the

* Edward Rand wrote to Thompson Moore on 28 February 1943: "I never cease to be astonished at what appears to be the absolute indifference of those at FCC (not FBIS necessarily) to the needs of this bureau in the way of supplies, equipment, and so forth. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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method of paying the London staff. Finally arrangements were made through State, and the Embassy in London advised the three London editors that they were entitled to per diem, which they accepted. On 13 April 1942 Free wired Rhodes that their per diem was illegal and would have to be refunded. Each of the men had to repay about \$540 over the following year.* Living expenses in London were high, and FBIS employees felt keenly the fact that they were not treated as well as most other Americans in London. Rhodes wrote on 17 February 1942 that the Embassy had informed him that, with the exception of FBIS men, all Americans in London working for the U.S. Government were getting \$6 per day per diem except employees of COI, who had a special living allowance.** Letters from London continued to complain of the relative penury FBIS employees were forced to accept. Finally in September 1942 the London staff was notified that FCC

* Replying to the Free wire, Rhodes the next month sent one-quarter of the repayment and discussed terms for repaying the balance on installments. Rhodes stated rather bitterly that he expected something like this to happen, as "FCC did not seem to understand the problems involved in members of its staff working abroad." FBIS Records, National Archives.

** Writing on 28 June 1942, Rhodes listed payments for a number of Americans in London. Salaries ranged up to \$9,000 a year, all were getting \$6 to \$10 per diem, and one COI employee was allowed \$200 a year for entertainment. IBID.

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had found it possible legally to pay a living allowance to overseas employees. The amount approved was \$750 a year. In 1944 this was raised to \$1,500 for a married man and \$1,000 for a single employee. When Charles Hyneman, the third director of FBIS, visited London early in 1945, he was surprised to learn that FBIS employees still were far below other Americans in living allowances, and succeeded on 1 July 1945 in obtaining for them the standard allowances. He insisted that the full amount be paid, despite the difficult financial situation FBIS faced at the time.

FCC shortcomings in another area also were revealed early in 1945, with one FBIS official, Ben Hall, needling Hyneman to seek improvement. In a memorandum to Hyneman on 25 May 1945, Hall pointed out that his own promised promotion to a CAF-13 had been held up for months in FCC, along with Porter's promised CAF-14. What was worse, Hall said, many monitors who were entitled to promotions had not received them, job descriptions submitted to FCC in January still had not been forwarded to CSC and monitors were growing restless and threatening to resign.*

* Hall urged: "Seriously, I think it is about time that we approach some one pretty high in the Commission on the slow service we have been receiving. ...As division chief I dislike the idea of having to force my people to continue handling jobs with higher classifications at their lower grades." Job 49-19, CIA Records Center.

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The London staff also had early problems in hiring personnel. As late as 18 March 1942 Rhodes was seeking permission to hire teletype operators, and in April his request that an American editor in London be employed was rejected. Each local employee had to be approved by FCC, and the delay in recruiting a staff was maddening. In the spring of 1942 Rhodes hired two teletypists, after receiving FCC permission, at the British pay rate of \$750 a year. When the papers finally came through from Washington the employees were listed as CAF-3 with pay at \$1,620, the standard pay for teletypists in Washington. It was not until August 1942 that Rhodes finally got authorization to hire the clerical staff needed, at British pay rates, without prior approval on each individual.*

Two weeks after U.S. forces landed in North Africa in 1942, a letter from General Eisenhower's headquarters asked U.S. and British monitoring units in London to send

* A Moore memorandum for FCC dated 18 August 1943 patiently explained that an office like London could not operate efficiently unless a certifying officer were given authority to administer routine requirements. He asked that the London Bureau Chief be authorized to accept bids in the name of FCC for routine supplies, equipment, and contractual arrangements; to issue travel orders; and to appoint local employees at local salary rates; and that money be transferred through State from time to time to meet these expenses. Moore also wrote Rhodes telling him that an effort was being made to get this authority for him. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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a qualified man to Algiers to explore possibilities of setting up a monitoring post under direction of PWB. After London conferences it was decided that FBIS should undertake the survey. Peter Rhodes returned to Washington for conferences, and upon his return to London proceeded immediately to Algiers, arriving there 19 December 1942. After Rhodes submitted plans, the military requested two more editors from London. "Duke" Ellington, one of the original London editors, and James A. Jones arrived in Algiers on 7 January 1943, and two monitors from Washington were sent to Africa two weeks later. By the end of January, FBIS had a staff of five in Algiers, including Rhodes, who had been there six weeks. They already were monitoring and recruiting additional personnel.

On 5 February 1943 FCC received an urgent cable from Eisenhower's headquarters saying that the FBIS staff in North Africa was badly in need of funds and suggesting steps to ameliorate the situation.* This delay in getting

* The message, signed by Col. R. C. Jacobs, had the following paragraph: "No funds have been provided by FCC for monitoring group which is performing essential work under Rhodes in an excellent manner. Reference our frequent messages, it is requested that you cable immediately for credit American Consul Algiers authorization for \$10,000 to be drawn upon by Hazeltine. To date obligations for personnel and equipment have been met by personal loans and by borrowing from other funds." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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funds to North Africa was not altogether the fault of FCC, for efforts had been made, but an organization with more overseas experience probably could have unraveled the snarl sooner. Another wire addressed to Leigh on 12 February threatened to place FBIS employees under OWI or some other agency unless unvouchered funds were placed in Colonel Hazeltine's hands immediately. With the help of Army Finance, funds soon were made available, but FBIS employees in North Africa experienced other support problems. As civilians working with an Army detachment, all the FBIS personnel had to be in uniform. After repeated requests that they be authorized to buy uniforms with FCC funds allotted to Colonel Hazeltine, the FBIS staff finally was informed near the end of February that FCC had no legal authority to spend money for military uniforms. FCC had asked for a ruling from the Comptroller General on this question, and the ruling, dated 20 February 1943, stated that "in the absence of specific statutory authority therefor," FCC could not spend money for military uniforms. No specific statutory authority could be found, so the men in North Africa had to buy their own uniforms. OWI and OSS both had employees in the area, all of them civilians and

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some of them working with the FBIS staff. They were entitled to free uniforms.*

Domestic Foreign Language Program

Because of its position as a working branch of FCC, FBIS was for nearly a year engaged in work other than monitoring of foreign broadcasts. It was made responsible for policing domestic foreign language broadcasts. This work was started by FCC in September 1940, a year and half before FBMS was launched. At the time there were more than 200 U.S. broadcasting stations with programs in foreign languages, and with the war in Europe these programs continually came under suspicion. Following a growing flood of complaints, FCC decided to monitor all foreign-language broadcasts. Under the direction of Eric Dawson, a Foreign Language Broadcast and Translation Section was set up. At one time it employed 24 translators and a sizeable staff of typists to process the recordings delivered by FCC engineers. FCC announced on 29 July 1942 that the entire section had been transferred to FBIS.

* As late as 7 November 1945, more than a year and a half after Rhodes had been transferred to OWI, he reported that he had never received any living allowance under FCC. He placed his claim at \$5,175, pointing out that he had been overseas since 1 December 1941, was transferred to OWI on 15 March 1944. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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At the time of the transfer, approved by FCC following a recommendation by RID Chief George E. Sterling, Harold Graves, and Chief of Counsel for FCC, the staff included Eric Dawson, eight translators, and a half dozen stenographers and typists.*

By the time FBIS took over this work, the number of foreign language programs had dropped considerably, with 140 on the air and only 56 of those considered sufficiently important to bear watching. Two FBIS analysts were assigned to analyze the programs processed, with David Truman in charge. In a report to Dr. Leigh on 13 February 1943, Truman outlined work accomplished by his unit. He said the original plan was to monitor each of the programs at least once before the end of the year, but that experience showed it was not worth while to spend time monitoring unless there was reason to believe a particular station was not operating correctly. Therefore, before the end of 1942 there had been 12 analytical reports prepared, but the unit had adopted the practice of fully processing and analyzing only when the legal division of FCC or the Office of

* The most complete description of domestic foreign language broadcast monitoring is found in the testimony of Robert D. Leigh before the Special Congressional Committee Investigating FCC, starting on page 3022, Volume III of the Committee Report, GPO 1944.

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Censorship suggested it. George Sterling was informed on 24 May 1943 that FBIS had abandoned the processing and analysis of domestic broadcasts. Remaining translators and clerical employees were transferred to other work inside FBIS. Leigh made clear to FCC that if the Legal Department of FCC were to present individual cases to questionable domestic foreign language broadcasts, either on its own initiative or on that of Justice or some other department, FBIS would perform the desired work with its regular staff.

There was one development in intra-governmental relationship worth recording in connection with FBIS handling of domestic foreign language broadcasts. Wartime operations of the Office of Censorship encompassed possible action against domestic radio stations broadcasting improper material, and it was assumed that foreign language programs were most likely to contain such material. Office of Censorship announced on 22 August 1942 that it would institute monitoring and analysis of these programs to "establish a clearer understanding" with broadcasters concerning their wartime responsibilities. Leigh wrote J. H. Ryan, Assistant Director of the Office of Censorship, on 25 August 1942 noting these plans, and calling such an operation "needless duplication," as FBIS was staffed and equipped to do such monitoring and analysis, and could supply

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Censorship with all the information needed. The response from the Office of Censorship was not considered satisfactory, so on 21 September 1942 Leigh wrote the Bureau of the Budget citing the needless duplication envisioned by Office of Censorship. The result was a meeting on 16 October 1942 with representatives from the Bureau of the Budget, Office of Censorship, FBIS, and OWI present. OWI later withdrew, but FBIS and Censorship reached agreement with approval of the Bureau of the Budget. Leigh outlined terms of the agreement to FCC in a report dated 19 October 1942. All monitoring of domestic foreign language programs would be the responsibility of FBIS, with no duplication by Censorship. The Office of Censorship would be responsible for removing all violators from the air, and in completing its case against any broadcaster it would call upon FBIS to provide information contained in broadcasts.

This marked the second successful attempt by Director Leigh in three months to prevent other government agencies from duplicating the work of FBIS, and to reserve FBIS responsibility for broadcast monitoring. The Bureau of the Budget had taken OWI out of foreign broadcast monitoring in July, and in October induced the Office of Censorship to leave domestic foreign

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language monitoring to FBIS.

Problem of Divided Authority

Insofar as operation of FBIS was concerned, there was never any question regarding the chain of command. Final authority was vested in FCC itself; which delegated to the Director of FBIS the day-by-day running of the monitoring service. Any action involving expenditure of funds, any change in policy which affected the product of FBIS or its relations with other government departments, had to have FCC approval. Once he had that approval, the FBIS Director could depend on the full support of all divisions of FCC. FBIS field chiefs were directly responsible to the Director for operations outside headquarters. Disputes regarding authority, and frictions arising from divided interests, invariably arose at a level below the office of the Director of FBIS and involved relations between employees of FBIS and of RID.

FBIS, in a way, was an offshoot of RID, which provided the technical equipment and recorded foreign broadcasts even before FBMS was organized to continue the monitoring operation. A smoothly operating engineering establishment was essential to any monitoring operation, and it might well be that those in control of the engineering activity tended to feel a certain sense of

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ownership, a pride of preexistence, if not of superiority. During 1941 all phases of monitoring were referred to as part of the National Defense Activities (NDA), with the stationery used in all correspondence bearing that heading. RID was the heart of NDA, and FBMS still had a rather doubtful identity. William Carter from Portland wrote on 24 October 1941 that he had never yet got clear in his mind whether his organization was FBMS or NDA. It was not until 6 July 1942 that Harold Graves clarified this nomenclature in a memorandum which specified that use of NDA was to be abandoned. In the future the entire service would be called FBMS, with the RID staff assigned to FBMS designated as the Broadcast Recording Unit (BRU).

FBMS now was recognized as one of the five divisions of FCC. RID was a coordinate division. George E. Sterling, head of RID, was expected to give needed support to FBMS in the same way that the Legal Division, or the Administrative Division, gave support. The major difference -- and it was an important one -- was that RID support consisted largely of assigning RID personnel to work with FBMS. Engineers were assigned to BRU, but they still were in RID responsible to Sterling or someone designated by him as supervisor. At the same time these engineers were expected to provide services demanded by

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officials in FBMS, and that introduced the problem of divided authority. Cooperation between Sterling and the FBMS Director's office seems to have been smooth. FBMS needs at the various stations were presented to Sterling and he tried to supply them to the best of his division's ability. Sterling began to delegate his authority very early, announcing on 25 September 1941 that David Cooper had been named as "Acting Monitoring Officer in Charge" at Silver Hill and was authorized to sign all correspondence related to operations of the station. In administration of the station, supervision of personnel, care of equipment, and so forth, Cooper was responsible to Sterling. In actual operations related to monitoring foreign broadcasts, he was to follow instructions issued by the FBMS office in Washington. Similar instructions were issued by the RID chief to every Monitoring Officer in Charge assigned to an FBMS monitoring station.

Serving two masters is never easy, and confusion was bound to arise. One of the first operations causing conflict was the keeping of accurate records of frequencies, schedules, and programs. Originally this was entirely the responsibility of the engineers, but as FBMS began to gain experience it was apparent that monitors in Washington, Wire Service and publications

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personnel, were more vitally interested in keeping up with this information than were the engineers. Early in 1942 an attempt was made to transfer the task of keeping these records and publishing them to the monitoring office. Yet much of the work had to be done by the engineers, so after a few months the responsibility was transferred back to RID. Finally, in 1943, a well organized Program Information Unit got underway, was transferred definitely and finally to FBMS, and the engineers followed a regular routine of reporting to the Unit. Misunderstandings and friction still existed, for the Program Information Unit was forced to ask engineers for a great deal of special information, though the Unit itself in time performed much of the cruising. Eventually cruising became part of the regular work of the engineering staff, and major stations had "cruising monitors" assigned, but by that time the problem of divided authority already had been resolved. According to early Sterling instructions, the engineers were expected to devote their "free time" to cruising. The difficulty was that most of them never found any free time.

Friction between monitors and engineers arose early. Inter-office memoranda between Harold Graves and David Cooper in 1941 revealed short tempers and confusion, with

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engineers convinced that monitors and analysts failed to understand the problems of recording broadcasts, and monitors insisted that engineers were negligent. One common complaint of engineers was that after being instructed to record certain programs indefinitely, they would learn that only samples of a few days had been used. On 29 December 1942, Graves in a memorandum to Leigh described a meeting he had held with key personnel from the engineering staff and the monitoring room, and expressed a belief that the "unnecessary conflict" between the two units had been eliminated. He was overly optimistic.* On 26 June 1943 Graves wrote another report. Alluding to continued monitors' complaints, he expressed the opinion that in addition to a severe personnel shortage at Silver Hill, the site was bad, and that an effort should be made to find a better monitoring location, perhaps in New York.**

* Graves reported that John Quinn, Cooper's assistant, had paid an unheralded visit to the monitoring room, inspecting lines being monitored. He explained that Silver Hill suspected that certain lines being fed were not monitored. Percy Noel, in charge of the monitoring room, angrily resented this action, accusing Quinn of "spying." FBIS Records, National Archives

** The idea of relocating the monitoring site on Long Island was discussed at intervals over a period of several years, but evidently never got beyond the talking stage. IBID

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In field stations, with smaller staffs, engineers worked much closer with editors and monitors, sometimes in the same building. Normal frictions, enhanced by divided authority, were further exaggerated by personality conflicts. This situation soon was evident in Puerto Rico. In a letter to Free on 18 January 1942, Edward Rand complained that RID Chief Archibald would not send routine administrative messages for him over the RID Primary transmitter. This remained a sore point with Rand, and after the station had its own telefax system installed in March 1942, the engineer assigned to BRU, Paul A. Girard, still would not send such messages unless permission were received from Sterling. Permission eventually was granted, but Rand found other reasons to resent the RID position. After the two buildings to house Puerto Rican operations were completed, Rand requested another small one to store equipment and supplies. The buildings were the property of RID, and the RID staff could not construct the third building without Sterling's approval, which he refused. A report on construction progress made by Girard on 19 January 1942 shows that the engineers also had found flaws in Rand.* Frictions continued to develop, and on

* The report contained this paragraph: "Mr. Rand, it was noted very early, had no knowledge of NDA/FBMS operations, nor the methods involved, procedure in handling requisitions, invoices, bills of lading, and so forth. I have taken over most of this instruction work in order to relieve Mr. Archibald as much as possible. FBIS Records, National Archives."

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26 May 1942 Archibald reported to Sterling his version of a disagreement with Rand over the phoning of a message received through the Naval Radio Station.* Girard and Archibald eventually were transferred, but friction with Archibald's successor, Newcomb, was even worse. Rand complained in a letter to Grandin on 8 July 1943 that "Newcomb, in our first conversations, seems to have the idea that not only BRU, but FBIS as well, in all its details, editorial and otherwise, is within his jurisdiction, lock, stock, and barrel. More of this if it should get out of hand, which I hope it will not." On 4 October 1943 Rand informed Grandin that one of his problems was that Newcomb would not permit new BRU engineers to work longer than eight hours, though they were willing. Newcomb had a short time before, on 23 September 1943, reported to Sterling that BRU engineer Coston wanted a transfer, adding that difficulty could be expected for anyone "assigned here to work with Rand."

Puerto Rico was not the only field station where friction was apparent. On 15 April 1942 the RID office

* Archibald explained that he thought the message too sensitive to telephone, but Rand, angered at the delay in receiving it, ordered that in the future such messages be phoned to him immediately. Archibald implied that he would follow these instructions, but was not happy about it. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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answered a query from Rawls, head of BRU in Kingsville, explaining his responsibility. Rawls was told that he and FBMS personnel were expected "to cooperate fully in all matters, inasmuch as a strict demarcation of every duty and line of authority can hardly be made, considering the nature of the work."* On the other side, Grandin wrote Kingsville chief Elliot Tarbell on 16 November 1942 calling his attention to the fact that Kingsville engineers belong to a different branch of FCC, were not under his administration, "but simply cooperate with you." Grandin also tried to explain the divided responsibility, though without much success.

One more example of the effects of divided authority should be sufficient. In the winter of 1943-44 Norman Paige was sent to Honolulu to take charge of monitoring there for FBIS. He was given use of RID facilities at the Punchbowl in Honolulu. There was no question of authority over these facilities; it was strictly an RID station and Paige had nothing but praise for RID

* The text of Rawls' letter is not available, but in it obviously he was questioning the authority of the FBMS station head, for the memorandum went into great detail to explain that Rawls was responsible for "technical decisions," for instance, that a program was unmonitored, but that the FBMS editor had the authority to tell him exactly what programs he wanted covered. After all, the memorandum said, "NDA and FBMS personnel are the same thing," as both are paid from NDA funds. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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cooperation. In February 1944 Waldemar Klima, following a period of training at Silver Hill, was sent to Hawaii to take charge of BRU for the new FBIS monitoring station outside the Punchbowl. Then the "old bugaboo" arose, as Paige put it in a letter on 24 July 1944. Paige said he had asked for clarification of the BRU-FBIS line of authority before going to Hawaii, but had not got it, with the result that one development was "almost a disaster." Klima, Paige explained, had been instructed by RID to investigate teletype and other possible communications to Kauai. He had gone to the Signal Corps, "stepping all over the plans I had been trying carefully to lay out for an over-all communications tieup that would include not only Kauai but all posts established out farther." Paige insisted that communications certainly were not within the RID realm of authority.* Edward Hullinger, Assistant Director of FBIS, replied that Klima "did a good job in nailing down the Kauai

* Klima also had his version of the dispute. In a memorandum to Cooper on 12 September 1944 he explained that in preparing the technical facilities for a new joint BRU-FBIS station the BRU head was responsible only to BRU, and naturally wanted "to make the determinations himself, or at least be consulted on them" Klima also mentioned a joint memorandum of 20 June 1944 on BRU administration signed by Hullinger and Sterling. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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communications," and suggested that Paige and Klima "live a goldfish bowl existence" in the future to avoid difficulty in BRU-FBIS cooperation.

Elliot Tarbell, sent to the West Coast to succeed Spencer Williams, wrote Hullinger on 23 May 1944 asking if anything had been done regarding the "exact status of BRU under FBIS." Noting that the matter had been discussed when he was in Washington, Tarbell expressed a desire to see the question of divided authority settled once and for all.* It was settled, and on 1 July 1944 BRU was transferred from RID and made an integral part of FBIS.** David Cooper was named Chief, Broadcast Receiving Division, of FBIS. In a letter on 17 August 1944 Cooper explained that he had not been promoted, that his duties remained the same, but that "In the reorganization BRU is considered a division of FBIS."***

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- * In a memorandum to Shepherd on 16 June 1944, Tarbell again urged that the question of divided authority be resolved. He reported that in discussing Washington decisions with BRU Chief Rudesill "he ran into the same thing" he had to contend with at Kingsville. Rudesill complained that FBIS was "trying to tear his staff up," and insisted that any request for change would have to come from Sterling before he would accept it. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.
- ** This date is given in an undated write-up of FBIS found in f. History of FBIS, RC Job No. 54-27, CIA Records Center. There seems to be no reason to doubt its accuracy.
- *** Earlier, on 20 January 1944, an administrative memorandum informed that Cooper had been named "Technical Supervisor of BRU." He still was attached to RID and would confer with Sterling on matters of policy, but also would act as a divisional chief in FBIS, reporting to the Director of FBIS as well as to Sterling. Apparently this effort to bridge the gap had been of little help. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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