Chapter 5  INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Because of the nature of its work as a service agency, FBIS at various times made contacts with most government offices. Some of these contacts were casual and infrequent. For instance, direct contact was made with the White House only during extremely important developments, though A Wire editors were startled a few times to learn that President Roosevelt was listening in during a telephone conversation, and one time Winston Churchill was on the line asking questions. Some government agencies received the A Wire or the Daily Report, affirmed when queried that they wanted the service to continue, but made no other contacts with FBIS. Still others, such as the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), depended a great deal on information furnished by FBIS, but as they had no concern with FBIS methods, they took their information, offered their appreciation, and that was the extent of the relationship.

But there was one important government office that was concerned primarily with the gathering and distribution of information. This was OWI. As FBIS also was engaged solely in the gathering and distribution of information, its fortunes were closely linked to those of OWI. The relationship had to be close, and friction was inevitable. COI already was operating when FBIS was
organized. Col. William (Wild Bill) Donovan was the Coordinator of Information, with his office frequently referred to as "The Donovan Committee." COI was the first office to get FBIS service on a regular and extensive basis, through a special wire installed to carry broadcast transcripts to its Washington and New York offices in October 1941. This was first referred to as the "COI Wire," or the "Donovan Wire," but later became the B Wire. A few months after the war started, COI was reorganized by executive order. Many of its activities were taken over by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under Donovan, and others by the Office of War Information (OWI) under Elmer Davis. FBIS continued to serve Donovan's unit, but it was with OWI that it had the closest relations.

Relationships at Headquarters

As was true with RID, contacts at the top usually were proper, cordial, and cooperative between FBIS and OWI. Chairman Fly and Dr. Leigh on the one hand, and Elmer Davis and Milton Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of OWI, on the other, always recognized the mutual interdependence of the two offices, sought to avoid controversy and dispute, and worked to make mutual relations smooth and efficient. On operational levels, where contacts were more functional, cooperation was not always smooth.
Distrust and suspicion sometimes arose, and issues had to be settled at a higher level. It is a tribute to the leadership of the two organizations that at the end of the war OWI and FBIS were working together more smoothly than they had been at any earlier time, with their mutual activities functioning more effectively.

Misunderstandings arose from time to time in the Washington and New York offices, but it was in the more remote stations that most conflicts were recorded. The type of material desired on the B Wire was understood by FBIS staff members, and the only early complaint was that OWI continually asked for more. At first, as FBIS did not have trained teletypists, COI sent its own teletypists to the FBIS office. This arrangement apparently gave OWI an attitude which FBIS personnel interpreted as a feeling of ownership, so on 14 August 1942 Leigh suggested to OWI that the teletypists be transferred to the FBIS payroll; OWI agreed. Then on 30 September Leigh wrote Robert Sherwood of OWI, cautioning him that the steady increase of material ordered by the New York office would demand an increase in FBIS staff. He explained that as a service agency FBIS would supply the material requested, but wished first to make sure that it actually was needed. In
December 1942 there was an exchange of letters between Leigh and OWI officials concerning the need for closer liaison between the two offices. Eisenhower suggested regular meetings between OWI and FBIS personnel at the working level, and FBIS personnel were invited to visit operations in the New York office.

In July 1943 Stewart Hersley, chief of the Wire Service Section, made a trip to New York to learn more about OWI operations there and discuss needs of the service. He reported later that by altering methods used on the B Wire, primarily by filing more textual material, he had got OWI to accept a considerably lower volume of copy. He issued instructions to B Wire editors explaining the most vital needs of the New York office, and apparently both offices were pleased with the changes. There never were any serious problems between Matthew Gordon's office and the A Wire, though wire editors sometimes were miffed at frequent calls for what seemed to them superfluous demands for clarification or explanation.

Two developments late in 1943 illustrate the extent of mutual understanding between the headquarters offices of FBIS and OWI. In October OWI asked that Tom Grandin be assigned temporarily to OWI to make a survey of monitoring activities and needs in the Middle East and
Mediterranean area. A letter from Fly on 19 October 1943 approved the arrangement. FBIS was to continue to pay Grandin's salary, with OWI bearing all travel costs. In preparing his statement to be given before the Cox Committee in November 1943, Dr. Leigh elicited the testimony of Milton Eisenhower, who stated emphatically for the record that OWI never wanted to take over FBIS, for that would destroy its essential character as a service organization.

Relations between OWI and the FBIS Analysis Division took a somewhat different turn. FBIS analysts felt that one of the greatest services they could render to OWI employees would be to make quickly available to them effective counter propaganda to use in international broadcasts. They attempted to do this,

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* Rhodes on 6 September 1943 sent Leigh a seven-page single-spaced letter in which he discussed at length the need for Grandin to make the trip, pointing to advantages for both FBIS and OWI. In his opinion Grandin should spend two weeks in Algiers, and then considerable time organizing the Cairo office. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

** Page 366C, Volume III, Report of the Special Committee Investigating the FCC, GPO, 1944. The Committee counsel had argued that FBIS should be taken from the FCC and put under OWI, a move that no doubt would have pleased some lesser OWI officials. Eisenhower, who apparently had a better grasp of OWI-FBIS relations, argued that since OWI was not a service agency, it would monopolize the services of FBIS and destroy its usefulness to other departments of government.
but with their limited staff and the need to analyze developments for other government agencies they were never quite able to satisfy OWI. It set up its own analysis branch, with the result that there was considerable duplication. This bothered Leigh, who had a special aversion to duplication in government activities. He wrote O. N. Riegel of OWI on 7 September 1942 expressing a hope that in coming months the two services could "mesh their analysis efforts" so that efforts and talents of the people could be applied more usefully. Weekly meetings between OWI and FBIS analysts were arranged, but were not considered a great success. On 22 December 1942, in another letter to an OWI official, Leigh mentioned the "regrettable lack of any well conceived plan" for closer and better cooperation between OWI and FBIS analysts.

Goodwin Watson, head of the Analysis Division, came up with a new idea. Writing on 30 December 1942 to Ralph Casey, who was studying relations between OWI and FBIS, Watson suggested the possibility of distributing FBIS analysts among other offices, bringing them "closer to the people who use our findings." He said many offices felt that they would be better served if they obtained the raw materials from FBIS and "controlled the full process of the analysis." It was
evident that such an idea would not appeal to all analysts. Some admitted that they were not on very good terms with their OWI counterparts. Nevertheless, Leigh announced on 19 April 1943 that an agreement had been reached whereby the Bureau of Research and Analysis of the Overseas Branch of OWI would use the FBIS Analysis Division exclusively for reporting and analyzing radio broadcasts, and "to promote good working arrangements and to conserve space," the Analysis Division would be moved to the Social Security Building, where OWI was housed. Graves, explaining the move on 13 May 1943, said the Division would "function as an integral part of OWI," at the same time "continuing its other duties."

The head of this OWI division, Eugene Katz, said in a letter to Leigh on 18 June 1943: "Our relations with the FBIS Analysis Division are so friendly that we can think of nothing now which warrants a formal reappraisal of the agreement." Part of the agreement was that in June the arrangement would be reappraised.

**FBIS-OWI West Coast Cooperation**

Joint operations to avoid duplication of FBIS and **

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*Theodore Newcomb, who was second only to Watson in the Analysis Division, wrote on 15 February 1943: "Unfortunately -- and off the record -- our relations with them (OWI analysts) are far from the best. There is only one person from whom I guarantee you would get a friendly ear, Otto Klineberg. He used to be with us and is now with them." FBIS Records, National Archives."
OWI analytical effort was not the only agreement, nor even the first one, to be worked out by the two offices at top level. The first formal agreement concerned West Coast operations. OWI early established an office in San Francisco, which broadcast to the Far East and was a counterpart of the New York office. It depended heavily on FBIS broadcast transcripts and assumed somewhat of a proprietary attitude toward the Portland station. Edd Johnson of the San Francisco OWI office wrote Lloyd Free on 4 February 1942 informing him that a bottleneck was developing at Portland because the station there had no professional teletype operators. At that time B Wire machines were manned by OWI teletypists, a fact of which Spencer Williams was not aware until so informed by OWI in San Francisco. He wrote Grandin on 16 February, no doubt at Johnson's suggestion, asking if it would be satisfactory for OWI in San Francisco to send teletypists to Portland to operate FBIS machines. Washington turned down the proposal.

FBIS officials already were concerned that OWI, in conjunction with the CBS, was monitoring in San Francisco, partially duplicating the Portland effort. Graves reported the situation to the Bureau of the Budget on 20 May 1942, which ruled that OWI could not engage in monitoring. One suggested solution was that
the San Francisco staff and monitoring operation be transferred to Portland. OWI officials at San Francisco vigorously opposed this. In a letter to Grandin on 24 July 1942, Warren H. Pierce of the San Francisco OWI argued that only four of the 13 employees of the CBS-OWI post could be transferred, that its reception was much superior to that of Portland, and that OWI needed the operation close to its San Francisco office. OWI employees in San Francisco even had told the office of the British Ministry of Information (MOI) in that city that Portland was badly understaffed and MOI should depend upon OWI rather than FBIS for its daily wire on Far East broadcasts. This advice was reported to Rhodes in London, who passed it on to Washington.

The final result was that Leigh reached agreement with OWI officials in Washington. OWI formally requested that FBIS take over the San Francisco station and operate it. Leigh announced terms of the agreement on 29 July 1942. American citizens at the station were to be transferred to FBIS. OWI was to pay the alien employees, but they also would be under FBIS supervision. OWI would maintain communications facilities with the San Francisco office, and Portland would send a senior editor to San Francisco at once to direct the monitoring operation. OWI also agreed to transfer $44,000 to FBIS
to maintain the new station until FBIS funds were available, though it later found this was illegal and the Bureau of the Budget approved an addition to the FBIS supplemental appropriation for that amount.

This settlement did not end friction between OWI and FBIS employees on the West Coast. Reporting on a trip to the Coast, Graves said on 3 September 1942 that he had learned a lot of things he could not learn any other way, especially about the "seething confusion of OWI." Norman Paige, in a letter to Grandin on 30 September 1942, noted that "On relations with OWI, the pixie parade of the analysts is again starting." Graves, in a memorandum to FCC on 10 July 1943, devoted three pages to an analysis of OWI West Coast complaints. Though he agreed that the OWI demand for more thorough coverage of the Far East radio was justified, he mentioned other considerations. For one thing, FBIS owed just as great an obligation to the Army, Navy, and BEW as it did to OWI, and their needs were not always coordinate. He also expressed a belief that one of the

* Paige further said: "Their particular beef this time is that Portland does not furnish text fast enough for their appetites. Their secondary squawk comes to open wonder as to why the Portland staff has not arrived here, and why fabulous new additions have not been made. FYI, somehow they have added considerably to their own staff, which takes on the general appearance of a board meeting each afternoon, symbolic of a Walt Disney conference." FBIS Records, National Archives.
complainants, Vincent Mahoney, might have a grudge against FBIS because his position as head of the San Francisco monitoring post had been taken away from him by Bureau of the Budget action.

The continuing demand of the San Francisco OWI for more copy was partially met on 27 September 1943 with inauguration of the X Wire. It carried to OWI San Francisco all Far East material monitored in London, Washington, Kingsville, and Puerto Rico. Soon this wire was moving 3,000 words a day. Instead of having a separate staff, like the B Wire, the X Wire was handled by the A Wire staff. Leigh wrote Vincent Mahoney on 20 November 1943 explaining that the 3,000 words was only about half of that available, but if OWI wanted the remainder a duplex system would need to be installed at a cost of about $2,500 a month. This could be done, provided OWI bore the expense.

Another move was made to placate the San Francisco OWI staff. Brad Coolidge was informed through a letter from Goodwin Watson on 5 November 1943 that following conferences involving Mahoney; Owen Lattimore, newly named head of the West Coast OWI; Leigh; and Audrey Menefee, chief of FBIS Far East analysis in Washington, it had been decided to develop analysis in the San Francisco FBIS bureau. Coolidge was to be freed from the news desk to devote all his time to liaison with
OWI, making studies that OWI seemed to need. Spencer Williams was not enthusiastic about the plan. After a visit to the West Coast, Stewart Hensley said in a report for Leigh on 3 March 1944 that "FBIS-OWI relations in San Francisco are not good generally." He described Mahoney and others in OWI as "particularly emphatic" in their indictment of certain FBIS editors, and gave as his judgment that they were probably justified.

FBIS Headquarters continued to make what it considered an honest effort to meet the needs of the San Francisco OWI without destroying its service to other agencies. On 1 March 1944 Hensley wired Williams that starting the following day, Washington would try to move on the X Wire the entire take of Romaji copy being translated in Washington. An illustration of OWI demands that seemed excessive to many FBIS personnel was its insistence that BBC broadcasts be covered thoroughly, as they were needed by OWI broadcasting units. In August 1944,

* After his opinion was requested, Williams wrote to Leigh on 27 October 1943: "Brad takes his work with OWI very seriously, but I have not seen any evidence that OWI does, although Vincent Mahoney, who is devious and does not always say what he thinks, has said some non-committally polite things. As far as I am personally concerned, there is nothing in this work that I regard as indispensable and on occasions some of it gets in my way. This arises, of course, from the fact that the nature of what Brad is supposed to do with OWI has never been strictly defined." FBIS Records, National Archives.
after FBIS had been forced to make severe cuts in its Washington staff, it was monitoring daily 268 broadcast programs, of which 93, nearly 35 percent, were from the BBC. These were for the most part of little value to anyone but OWI.*

When plans were being made to establish the Denver post, more rough spots in FBIS-OWI relations cropped up. Brad Coolidge, who was sent to Denver to open the operation, reported to Leigh on 30 April 1943 that he had held a conference with OWI official Clayton Osborne, who was "not receptive" to OWI-FBIS cooperation in Denver. He quoted Osborne as saying that OWI "discourages its Orientals" from contacts with other groups. Coolidge added that he wished he could send Leigh a recording of the entire conversation, so Leigh "could savor its full flavor." As usual, Leigh took the issue to officials in OWI with more authority than Osborne, and the Denver project was not later marked by any notable FBIS-OWI feud. Leigh informed OWI officials that the Denver FBIS office was "placed next door to OWI by design." This was no doubt true, but it was BEW rather than OWI that was in greatest need of the monitored product processed in Denver.

* Undated History of FBIS, Job 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.
FBIS-OWI Problems in London

It was in London that the sharpest clashes between FBIS and OWI arose; yet it was here that eventually cooperation between the two groups was the most sanguine. But this smooth London operation did not develop until after the conflict reached a crisis and difficulties were ironed out by a formal agreement between heads of the two offices.

COI sent two men to London early in 1942 to arrange for use of BBC monitored material, planning a file from London to New York via RCA. Peter Rhodes informed Lloyd Free of this fact in March, and was authorized in April to confer with BBC monitoring officials at Evesham to see what they jointly could do to meet COI needs. Free admonished Rhodes to establish close liaison with COI representatives.

Free also wrote Thomas Early of COI on 11 April 1942 asking a clarification of his agency's needs in London, explaining that there had been "considerable confusion" because of differing opinions enunciated by COI officials. One thing was clear; COI wanted more copy. Rhodes wrote Tom Grandin on 19 June 1942 that he had accepted a COI offer to supply an additional teletypist to facilitate movement of FBIS copy, but did not believe the arrangement should be permanent.

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By mid-summer of 1942 evidence of a brewing OWI-FBIS feud in London was apparent. When the British Ministry of Information (MOI) received an offer through its representative in San Francisco of a daily OWI file on the Far East superior to that furnished by FBIS, it went immediately to Rhodes. Rhodes wired Grandin on 25 July 1942 saying that MOI demanded a clarification of the status of U.S. monitoring. Was OWI or FBIS responsible? It was apparent that British monitoring officials favored FBIS, for the OWI offer of a Far East file was rejected and such a file requested from FBIS. Rhodes also was asked by the British to sit in on all meetings of BBC and MOI with monitoring officials of other allied nations. Chairman Fly wrote the State Department on 1 August 1942 recalling that FBIS had been established in London with State Department approval, and asked that MOI and BBC be informed of the official responsibility of FBIS. Even before this letter was written, MOI had informed all its offices that any question concerning U.S. monitoring should be cleared through FBIS. Rhodes so informed Washington in a wire dated 28 July 1942.

These developments failed to dampen the enthusiasm of some OWI officials. Representatives in London insisted on discussing with the BBC the possibility of a teletype
line from Evesham to the OWI London office, and as the BBC would not discuss the matter unless FBIS also were involved, Rhodes accompanied an OWI representative to Evesham to negotiate jointly with the BBC. Because of certain technical offers made by OWI, the request for a second line from Evesham to London, supplementing the one FBIS already had been assigned, was received favorably. Rhodes informed Grandin of this development on 3 August 1942. Then on 14 August Rhodes wrote again, alerting Washington to the fact that Edd Johnson, now in charge of the New York OWI office, had written Harry Lerner in London saying that OWI must have more copy, was planning to send three or four editors and four teletypists to Evesham immediately to set up its own service, and operations would start by 5 September. Rhodes' primary worry was that OWI would carry out this plan and be in operation before FBIS had sufficient staff to properly man the Evesham office and make use of the new line granted by the BBC. In the meantime, OWI had launched plans for a second wire, to be used exclusively by OWI. Rhodes realized that close OWI-FBIS cooperation in London was necessary, but expressed a strong view that the monitoring operation should be controlled by FBIS and warned that friction would become serious unless agreement were reached. Rhodes wired
Washington on 27 August 1942 saying that plans were complete for an FBIS staff of editors to start working in Evesham on 5 September, but that OWI was making plans for a full duplication of the FBIS effort. The BBC, he said, was perplexed by these plans, but was attempting to give the Americans the services they wanted. Rhodes also revealed some bitterness as a result of the apparent affluence of OWI, in contrast to the tight budgetary restrictions placed on FBIS.

Meanwhile, Dr. Leigh was working through the top command of OWI. Grandin cabled Rhodes on 29 August 1942 to inform him that Milton Eisenhower had cancelled the OWI request for a second London-Evesham teleprinter line, had removed Evesham monitoring editors from the OWI budget, and had instructed OWI to transfer to the FBIS payroll the staff being assembled at Evesham. Obviously this information was at fault, for on 14 September 1942 Rhodes informed Grandin by wire that the OWI London office had been informed by OWI officials that they had no knowledge of such Eisenhower action. However, OWI in London delayed further moves to await developments. Leigh again took the matter up with Eisenhower. In a letter dated 24 September 1942 he agreed that OWI needed more copy, but argued that it could be supplied best by an expanded FBIS operation in England. Apparently Eisenhower was having difficulty
getting a meeting of the minds in his own organization; for at least two months the situation remained static, to the satisfaction of no one.

On 17 November 1942 Leigh wrote Philip Hamblett of OWI London, presumably with the approval of Eisenhower, explaining the situation as he saw it. He pointed out that the BBC recognized FBIS as the U. S. monitoring authority, and added that he saw no reason why operations in England should be different from those at domestic stations. The problem arose largely, he believed, from failure of OWI to inform FBIS of its needs in sufficient time for FBIS to obtain and allocate funds. He suggested a second wire and expansion of the London editorial staff at OWI expense, but with the operation remaining under FBIS direction.

Peter Rhodes was in Washington and New York briefly in November, and held informal discussions with OWI officials in both cities. Upon his return to London, Rhodes wired Grandin and Leigh on 26 November 1942 asking that they inform Milton Eisenhower that Edd Johnson in New York, following their "inconclusive conference," had notified Max Lerner in London that FCC had agreed to an immediate increase of the OWI staff, and instructed him to make arrangements with the BBC for their arrival. Rhodes protested vigorously this Johnson action, calling
it "unauthorized." There followed a series of acrimonious messages between Rhodes and Lerner. The latter charged that Rhodes had intentionally misrepresented Johnson's position and protested his effort to "put Edd on the spot." Both men were careful to see that their home offices got all copies of this debate, and if the feud did nothing else, it demonstrated to London staffs of both organizations that they would get nowhere by squabbling, but must learn to cooperate.

The controversy finally was settled in Washington. Leigh wired FBIS in London on 9 December 1942 and followed this with a letter giving full details on 11 December. It was agreed that OWI would have its own editors at Evesham, but under administrative supervision of FBIS. FBIS and OWI each would maintain a wire service from Evesham, with both wires going to both organizations in London and in the United States. The chief gain for FBIS was that it would get at Headquarters the entire output of the OWI staff in England, thus doubling its volume, and at no extra cost to FBIS.

There was considerable skepticism concerning the workability of this arrangement. It was recognized that FBIS and OWI editors at Evesham would have to cooperate closely if duplication were to be avoided. All editors would have to familiarize themselves regularly with two
separate files. Because of space limitations at the BBC monitoring post, the two editorial staffs were at first physically separated, but it was agreed that this should be changed as soon as practicable, and the change actually came about rather quickly, before 7 March 1943. In reply to a letter from Leigh asking about application of the new agreement, Vincent O. Anderson, new acting chief in London, wrote on 20 January 1943 that there had been problems, but operations were on the whole surprisingly smooth, and were likely to remain so as long as Lerner was in charge of the OWI London staff.

The record shows no further OWI-FBIS clashes in London, and there was no further change in working methods until May 1944. Leigh wrote on 8 May 1944 that Hamblett and Lerner had agreed with FBIS officials that OWI should cease filing BBC monitored material and limit its output to about 6,000 words a day of analytical information for use of international broadcasters. A letter from Julian Behrstock, then chief of the London office, on 17 May 1944 noted the end of "this dual functioning," which he said had been "tolerable" but only because the FBIS and OWI
staffs "got along together especially well.** Two OWI editors were transferred to FBIS, though initially their salaries continued to come from OWI funds. OWI-FBIS financial arrangements got pretty well snarled. The FBIS administrative officer in London tried unsuccessfully on 16 June 1944 to give Washington an accounting.***

Problems of Overseas Monitoring

Peter Rhodes was plagued by other OWI plans in addition to those at the BBC monitoring post. While he was in Washington for conferences preparatory to going to North Africa, Vincent Anderson notified him from London that FBIS should move fast, as OWI already was sending broadcasting teams to Casablanca, Rabat, and Algiers and would be needing monitoring services very soon. Back in London, Rhodes found his departure for Algiers unexplainably delayed. Writing on

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* Behrstock further added that this "OWI duplication" apparently "was strictly an Edd Johnson idea," and with his departure from OWI it was ceasing. Indication that the BBC was never quite happy about the arrangement is seen in an exchange of letters between Behrstock and BBC monitoring director Robert Burns in January 1944. Burns agreed reluctantly to Behrstock's request that OWI editors be allowed to treat directly with the BBC on matters affecting OWI copy alone. FBIS Records, National Archives.

** In a letter to Behrstock on 24 May 1944, Shepherd had described FBIS-OWI financial relations as "a mystery" to him, and asked if a clarification were possible. The London administrative office attempted to show an accounting for the past year and came up with a figure of $7,000 owed by OWI. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.
2 December 1947, he complained that "Someone is tangling up our efforts to get into the field and do a job. Who and why I don't know." He clearly was suspicious that it was OWI. Writing to Leigh on 4 December 1942, he expressed puzzlement as to why OWI had reportedly sent a cable to London saying he should not proceed to Algiers. He thought it had been established that he would be part of the same team as OWI, under PWB, but now he suspected that OWT was planning to send its own monitoring team to North Africa. Writing again to Leigh from Algiers on 22 December 1942, Rhodes reported that Milton Eisenhower, upon a visit to North Africa, had assured him that FBIS should handle the monitoring there, "naturally working as part of the psychological warfare team under Colonel Hazeltine." He believed -- and was probably correct -- that some OWI officials had sought to block his trip to North Africa so that OWI could independently establish monitoring, but were overruled in their own organization.

There was no more trouble with OWI in North Africa, but other forces eventually induced FBIS to give up its control of monitoring there and turn the operation over to OWI. In the meantime FBIS officials in Washington learned that OWI was placing other monitoring teams
abroad. In March 1943 a special request concerning broadcasts from the Middle East was referred to London, and BBC efforts to get the answer revealed that OWI was monitoring in Istanbul. A query to Elmer Davis through the office of Chairman Fly verified this fact. Fly noted in a letter to Davis on 2 April 1943 that FBIS, though charged with responsibility for monitoring, had discovered by accident the OWI operation in Istanbul as well as earlier OWI monitoring in New York and San Francisco. This ignorance of what other government agencies were doing to duplicate FBIS efforts led to waste and inefficiency. "Joint planning and distribution through FBIS" would seem to be necessary attributes of a proper solution to the problem. Fly agreed that OWI was prepared to monitor in Istanbul and FBIS was not, and acknowledged that it might be proper for OWI or some other service to monitor in other locations, but there should be a mutual exchange of information, to say the least. There were other exchanges. Elmer Davis assured Fly on 9 April 1943 that OWI wanted to cooperate to the fullest extent, and was ready to draw up new plans and agreements. Fly reiterated on 1 May that there was no objection to Istanbul monitoring, but FBIS should have the monitored information for distribution to its clients.
This problem of FBIS relations with the OWI overseas was of deep concern to Dr. Leigh. He continued to study the problem, gather information on actions of OWI, and keep Fly informed. He counted heavily upon the study being made by Ralph Casey. In September 1942 he and Milton Eisenhower had agreed that someone independent of both offices should make a thorough study of OWI-FBIS relations and recommend changes. They had agreed upon Casey, and he had accepted the task, after approval by the Bureau of the Budget. Actually, the study was intended for the Bureau of the Budget, to aid in resolving instances of OWI-FBIS duplication. Leigh had suggested Casey, and was confident that his final report would please FBIS, but cautioned Theodore Newcomb of the Analysis Division on 18 December 1942 that Casey's discussions with OWI were "delicate," and FBIS staff members should take care to avoid giving the impression that they considered Casey "our man." Leigh wrote Casey on 23 January 1943 suggesting a visit to Washington for conferences with him and Milton Eisenhower, as the question of "cooperative allocation of functions" was delaying important services. MOI, he said, had consulted FBIS regarding OWI plans to set up a monitoring operation in New Delhi, for MOI recognized FBIS as the responsible U.S. monitoring agency.
Chairman Fly, Leigh further explained, would not accept the thesis that getting the job done was more important than FBIS, and had considered taking the matter to the President. Leigh again wired Casey on 31 March 1943 informing him that his report was urgently needed.

Casey had helped to work out the OWI-FBIS agreement on analysis work, but on the question of overseas monitoring he was noncommittal. Leigh, disappointed, wrote Fly on 5 April 1943 that he had hoped Casey would "deal directly with the problem," but he merely noted the duplication, so it was up to FCC and OWI to settle their problems.

The final decisive force was the FBIS money shortage. Fly wrote Elmer Davis on 20 April 1943 that FCC would be glad for OWI to undertake work in Australia, as FBIS did not have the necessary funds. The same argument applied in New Delhi. Leigh continued negotiations with OWI officials, primarily with Hamblett, and on 16 June 1943 they signed a formal agreement. It recognized OWI responsibility for broadcasting and FBIS responsibility for monitoring, acknowledged the inability of FBIS to provide OWI with needed information in certain foreign outposts, and agreed that this gave OWI ample reason to conduct monitoring in those posts. OWI was left free to undertake monitoring at any point it was deemed
necessary outside the United States and British Isles, but accepted the obligation to supply FBIS with its monitored material, with FBIS paying communications costs where facilities were not already available. FBIS also was given the right to attach one or more editors to each OWI monitoring station to make sure that FBIS would receive the material it needed. The Bureau of the Budget approved the agreement, after noting that this did not obligate it in advance to approve FBIS requests for funds to finance editors assigned to OWI posts. This completed the series of OWI-FBIS agreements, and incidentally, ended the series of clashes between the two organizations.*

* ON THE BEAM for 14 August 1943 said that the history of the war years would show "at least three treaties" between OWI and FBIS. It mentioned the agreement in London, the transfer of FBIS North African personnel to OWI, and the overseas agreement. Actually, the North African transfer was not a formal agreement, but transfer of FBIS analysts to OWI was, and the most important formal domestic agreement was that taking OWI out of monitoring in the United States, the one reached in regard to San Francisco monitoring. FBIS Records, National Archives.

Some administrative agreements were made in implementing this final arrangement. A Shepherd memorandum dated 15 February 1944 said FBIS would pay communications costs on 500 words a day from Naples or Bari. Another memorandum on 20 May 1944 reported an informal agreement by OWI on 1 February to pay half the cost of all traffic from Cairo. The February charge of $568.32 was split between FBIS and OWI. Job 49-19, CIA Records Center.
Financial relations between the two units remained complicated. The question of responsibility for communications was never clear, and most FBIS personnel assigned to OWI foreign posts were placed on the OWI payroll. Theoretically, FBIS was liable for reimbursement for salaries paid these people, but claims were seldom made. After a visit to London in 1945, Charles Hyneman wrote a memorandum for Russell Shepherd recommending steps to restore Spencer Williams in New Delhi and Edward Berkman in Cairo to the FBIS payroll. Hyneman said: "I have no objection to OWI's paying their bills, but I think they are in a bad spot as long as they work for us but have someone else in control of their movements and their fortunes." Berkman had also been worried about this situation, and Hyneman wrote him saying he would be restored to the FBIS payroll. Leigh reported on 16 October 1943 that Leonard Leiberman and B. F. Ellington had been transferred to the OWI payroll as of 7 October. Hamblett wrote to ask if FBIS would insist on reimbursement back to June, and Leigh replied that it would not. Leiberman took charge for OWI of the Bari post, which included a news team and a Balkan monitoring team.
Relations with the Armed Forces

Wartime intelligence gleaned from the enemy radio was of course a valuable asset to the military and was widely used. Yet, being strictly a civilian organization, FBIS had its problems with the Armed Forces, and its authority was sometimes questioned. Secretary of War Stimson gave early endorsement of monitoring, writing Fly on 18 July 1941 that his examination of the spot bulletins convinced him that the new service would make a valuable contribution to War Department information. Both War and Navy were among early subscribers to the 24-hour A Wire service, and interest also was shown outside Washington. Several military units in London were eager to get lateral services offered by FBIS in London, while in San Juan the G-2 office in February 1942 requested the full file sent from Puerto Rico to Washington and offered to supply Army teletype operators so the service would not be delayed. The offer was accepted on a temporary basis. In August 1942, when the Bureau of the Budget suggested that an Army representative be brought in to testify before Congressional committees as to the value of the FBIS product, Col. John V. Grombach of G-2 readily volunteered his services. There was never any formal agreement with the Armed Services as to fields of responsibility, but Graves said in a memorandum on
19 November 1942 that there was a "tacit understanding" that the Army would depend upon FBIS for monitoring of voice broadcasts, while FBIS would leave to the Army interception of code messages from the enemy.

During the war a high percentage of Daily Report copies went to military subscribers. In January 1943 the confidential classification on these publications was changed to restricted, in part because military officials had complained that the higher classification limited the book's circulation. Col. Alfred McCormack of G-2 wrote on 17 February 1943 testifying to the adequacy of FBIS coverage. He said that irregular Army intercepts of enemy broadcasts also were sent to his office. As a test, he had checked 24 of these intercepts against FBIS releases and found all but one were adequately covered by FBIS. That one had been fully reported in the American press. The Daily Report faced a growing demand for use in military training courses, and occasionally, because of its limited publication facilities, FBIS was forced to reduce the number desired for a single address. Comments solicited

* Leigh wrote a Naval officer on 2 January 1943 announcing the change and saying he regretted that the earlier classification had handicapped the Navy in making full use of the Daily Report. FBIS Records, National Archives.
from military officials discounted the value of analytical material, but stressed the importance of obtaining every possible intelligence item FBIS could intercept.

The War Department issued a daily publication called the War Department Digest of Foreign Broadcasts, which relied almost wholly on the Daily Report and A Wire. A War Department official wrote on 12 January 1945 asking if it would be possible to get a greatly increased number of Daily Reports. He explained that he would like to discontinue the War Department Digest, which was entirely dependent on FBIS sources, with the latter being "much better, more comprehensive, more voluminous." When FBIS found late in the war that it would have to resort more and more to military communications if it were to continue operations on a satisfactory scale, it found most of the military quite receptive. Julian Behrstock wrote from London on 2 January 1945 that when he informed the Army Air Force, as instructed, that names of prisoners of war obtained from enemy broadcasts could no longer be relayed to London after 31 December 1944 because of communications costs, military officials advised the War Department that it was important this service be maintained, and that facilities of the Signal Corps should be offered to FBIS.
A letter from Paul Porter, who had succeeded Fly as FCC Chairman, on 22 February 1945 expressed appreciation of the service FBIS was getting from the Signal Corps and agreed to a Signals request that it be allowed to retain full copies of all FBIS messages.

It was in the Pacific that the military showed its greatest appreciation for the services of FBIS, and it was here that relations were closest. Both Army and Navy Intelligence in Hawaii had done some small-scale monitoring of the Japanese radio, as FBIS publications were too long in transit to be of much value to them. The military, in cooperation with OSS, also had done some monitoring in the Aleutians. When Spencer Williams was in Honolulu in the fall of 1943 investigating the possibility of FBIS monitoring in Hawaii, he talked to Robert C. Richardson, Commanding General, Central Pacific. As a result, Richardson wrote FBIS on 25 November 1943 requesting that broadcasts from Tokyo, Manila, Hsinking, and Chungking, monitored on the Pacific Coast, be prepared for his command. He offered to make arrangements to fly the copy daily by bomber from San Francisco to Honolulu. Arrangements were made, and attempts at monitoring by the military in Hawaii ended. One Japanese monitor who had worked for Naval Intelligence in Hilo was given
top priority for travel to the Mainland to join the FBIS staff.

The telefax transmitting system that Puerto Rico used to send copy to Washington was shipped to San Francisco and later to Hawaii, with the idea that when monitoring actually was begun in Hawaii it could be used for sending material to the Mainland. Before the system had begun to operate satisfactorily, actually before it had a real test, the Signal Corps offered to handle FBIS traffic between Hawaii and San Francisco. The offer was accepted. Commercial communications were never resorted to in the Pacific. Naval communications were used between Guam and Honolulu, Army communications from Honolulu to San Francisco.

The experience of Army and Navy Intelligence in trying to monitor Tokyo worked to the advantage of FBIS. In setting up monitoring operations in Hawaii and Guam, and in running tests in other Pacific Islands, FBIS had the full cooperation of both G-2 and ONI. One of the Honolulu contacts in G-2 was Maj. Frank Blake, who joined FBIS after the war and was in charge at various times of three different FBIS monitoring posts. Full Army cooperation was available in setting up of a monitoring post in Hawaii, and both the Army command under Gen. Richardson, and the Navy under Adm. Chester Nimitz, aided
in outpost tests and establishment of an outpost station. On Guam, FBIS was able under Navy jurisdiction to move in and start monitoring even before the island had been fully cleared of Japanese stragglers. Hyneman, in a conference with Elmer Davis on 28 August 1944 following a visit to the Pacific, remarked on the cooperative attitude of both the Army and Navy toward FBIS.

The most uncomfortable situation arose on Guam in 1946, after FBIS was taken over by the War Department. The staff on Guam had used Navy facilities, and when FBIS became part of the Army, inter-service antagonisms arose which had nothing to do with FBIS operations.

In Washington, relations with the military were not always so satisfactory. In several instances anticipated military support failed to develop, with unfortunate results. In the fall of 1942 FBIS was expanding as rapidly as possible to meet demands for broadcast intelligence, but was facing more and more handicaps. In spite of full access to the British monitored output, there still were serious gaps, with inadequate coverage of the Far East and important deficits in the Middle East, the Balkans, the USSR, Africa, and even Spain and Portugal.
Dr. Leigh was in close touch with a Colonel Middleton, assigned at the time to the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had been requested to prepare a report on foreign broadcast monitoring for consideration at the next meeting of the National Intelligence Committee. At Middleton's request, Leigh prepared for him a full report on FBIS capabilities and deficiencies, stressing gaps in broadcast coverage that needed to be filled "as a necessary auxiliary to continuing war operations," and suggesting that the Joint Chiefs consider giving support to filling these gaps. Leigh's report showed that to get the needed coverage, FBIS would require an additional $2,262,258 on an annual basis -- $621,865 for the remainder of the 1942-43 fiscal year. Leigh's hope was that the Joint Chiefs would swing their considerable support, thus making money available through a deficiency appropriation or transfer of funds from the Armed Forces. The report called for monitoring at Lisbon, Teheran, Cairo, and Stockholm, expansion of Pacific Coast monitoring, and funds for copying of German press transmissions in London. The document was forwarded to Colonel Middleton for presentation to the Joint Chiefs, and correspondence during the coming six weeks indicated that Leigh was placing high hopes on a favorable response.
George V. Strong read the report and wrote Fly on 21 December 1942 declaring that he believed the expansion Leigh recommended would be "of substantial value from a military standpoint" and it was his recommendation that it be carried out at the earliest possible date. Fly wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 28 December 1942 saying that FBIS was anticipating a "request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff" for monitoring posts at Lisbon, Algiers, Cairo, Teheran, and Stockholm. He desired information on communications from those points.

Leigh learned on 9 January 1943 that Colonel Middleton had been transferred, and his place taken by a Colonel Montague. He also learned that at the meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee the question of expansion of foreign broadcast monitoring had been removed from the agenda on the grounds that a message from General Eisenhower's headquarters asking that a monitoring staff be sent to North Africa showed that his command "was already dealing with the matter." Leigh's report was not read by the Joint Intelligence Committee and never reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further correspondence between Leigh and Colonel Montague showed that Montague resented the fact that Middleton had encouraged the report. Colonel Montague
claimed that Colonel Middleton had "no authority" to prepare a report for the Joint Chiefs, but only to "draft a paper on broadcast monitoring for consideration of the Joint Intelligence Committee."

**Disappointment in North Africa**

Leigh's experience with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was followed by the Algiers debacle. As early as October 1942, definite plans were shaping up in England for African-Mediterranean monitoring. Rhodes reported on 23 October that a meeting had been held to discuss sending a team to Gibraltar or to Freetown in Africa, and that FCC expected to send trained staff members. Representatives of the military were in on the planning. Meantime the landing in North Africa took place and on 19 November 1942 a message signed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower asked that a monitoring staff be sent to North Africa. Rhodes interviewed General McClure in London, who gave him detailed instructions on what was expected of the North African team. After Rhodes arrived in Algiers his commanding officer messaged London asking that B. F. Ellington and James A. Jones be sent. Anderson reported this to Washington on 24 December 1942. At further requests from Eisenhower's headquarters, two FBIS Washington monitors were sent to North Africa, and on 10 March 1943 Colonel Hazeltine, in charge of PWB...
there, asked that the FBIS staff in the area be increased to 16.

FBIS had no funds available for such an expansion. It was obvious that growth of the North African post was now out of the hands of FBIS, and necessary funds would have to be found if requests were to be met.

In a memorandum dated 15 March 1943, Leigh declared that the Army would have to supply money for the North African post, or FBIS would have to drop it. On 19 March 1943 Fly wrote Secretary Stimson asking that War Department funds be transferred to the account of FBIS to carry on the monitoring operation in North Africa, including the Hazeltine-requested expansion. Statements made by Leigh and other FBIS officials in the coming weeks indicated a strong belief that the money would be forthcoming, for all information from North Africa showed that the monitoring operation had the strong support of General Eisenhower.

On 22 April 1943 Fly got his letter. It was signed by Acting Secretary of War Patterson, declared that the transfer of funds asked by Fly could not be made, and further stated bluntly that there was "no known authorization" for presence of FCC personnel in North Africa. The monitoring services provided by FBIS in North Africa, the letter continued, would not be desired after 31 May 1943.
In a memorandum for Chairman Fly dated 6 May, Leigh noted that despite Patterson’s statement that there was no authorization for FEIS personnel in North Africa, all moves to the area had been cleared through Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of General Staff, G-2; through General Eisenhower; and through the Chiefs of Intelligence and the Signal Corps in Algiers. The Hazeltine wired request for staff expansion had been captioned: "Eisenhower to Leigh." Leigh was puzzled as to interpretation of the Patterson letter: did it mean the monitoring operation was to cease, or that FEIS must relinquish its control? He continued to investigate, and on 31 May made a final report to Fly. General Strong, known by Leigh to be thoroughly cognizant of the importance of foreign broadcast monitoring, had informed him that the decision outlined by Patterson was a "direct and personal one" by Secretary of War Stimson.* Leigh and Strong decided that the best solution was to

* Stimson, the memorandum further explained, had been irritated by the large number of civilian agencies in North Africa, and was determined to cut them down by any means possible. FEIS was doubly vulnerable; it was a small group that could be absorbed by a larger group, and it did not have the money to finance its operation. The request for War Department funds had sealed the fate of FEIS in the area. FEIS Records, National Archives.
transfer the operation to OWI, and on 3 June 1943 Strong issued formal approval for attachment of at least one FBIS staff member to the group. The remainder of the staff was given the choice of transfer to OWI or return to FBIS in the United States. Alan Hamlett returned to the United States. Leiberman and Ellington transferred to OWI. Jones and Rhodes both remained on the FBIS payroll for some time.

After Rhodes went forward to organize other monitoring teams, Jones remained in charge in Algiers. The monitoring staff with headquarters in Algiers eventually grew to 250 men, though only the two remained on the FBIS payroll. Rhodes bore the title "Chief African and European Field Correspondent," and was expected to provide information files to FBIS Headquarters. FBIS London started in May 1943 to supply Algiers with a file of 10,000 words daily from BBC monitoring, but various handicaps, not the least of which was inadequate communications facilities, prevented war front monitoring units from supplying FBIS with much of value. In September 1943 Rhodes reported that the Algiers post was supplying 150 clients with information, and on 26 October 1943 he returned to FBIS the $10,000 contingency fund that had been set up at Army insistence, explaining that OWI now was bearing the monitoring costs and there was no further
need to draw upon FCC.

Contacts with other Governmental Units

A list of all U.S. Government offices with which FBIS had contacts during its first half dozen years would be almost the equivalent of a U.S. Government directory. In replying to charges by counsel for the Cox Committee, Dr. Leigh placed in the files of the Committee 42 letters from heads of departments, all testifying to their use of FBIS materials. A report for Hyneman on 4 May 1945 by Audrey Menefee showed that in April alone her Far East Division received 170 requests for special services. Answering these requests required 90 hours of work by her staff. OWI was responsible for 57 of these requests, but the other 123 came from a long list of offices, including the Red Cross, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the British and Australian Embassies. Even the War Relocation Administration, which became familiar with FBIS through its efforts to recruit Japanese monitors, found FBIS reports "extremely useful." Replying to a survey questionnaire on 19 July 1943, the manager

* Page 3085, Volume III, Report of Special Congressional Committee Investigating the FCC, GPO, 1944.
of one of the relocation camps asked that he continue to get the Daily Report, as he found it "essential" in handling rumors that "might be traced to Japanese broadcasts." A letter from the Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Surgeon General, on 26 August 1943 asked that it be placed on the Daily Report mailing list, as it had learned the publication "contains much valuable information of a medical and public health nature."

Naturally the State Department was one of the government departments most directly and fundamentally interested in information broadcast by the foreign radio, and its various offices made it perhaps the largest single subscriber to FBIS products. The State Department played a major part in organizing FBIS. Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, writing on 10 September 1941, described foreign broadcast monitoring as one of his "pet ideas for years" and praised progress already made by the infant service. Relations between State and FBIS personnel usually were cordial and straightforward at all levels of contact. Of course State approved every move made by FBIS outside the United States. Eventually, State-FBIS relationships became somewhat routinized and did not produce special and
unusual problems during the war as did those with some other organizations, though some State Department requirements levied on FBIS were beyond its capacity and some State officials apparently failed to realize the extent of the work their needs would demand. For example, on 19 April 1944 a State Department letter asked FBIS to cover four times a week a BBC broadcast beamed to the West Indies. Ben Hall reported that the project would require the time of one monitor 24 hours a week, and a study showed that the material consisted only of repeats from other programs or was "junk" that no one would have any use for. State apparently withdrew the request.

One wartime unit that came to depend to an unusual degree upon FBIS was the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW). In the early months of the war BEW discovered that FBIS was the reservoir for a wealth of economic information that did not get into regular publications. Graves reported to FCC on 27 May 1942 that BEW wanted to engage with FBIS in a joint effort. Field offices would be asked to file every small bit of economic information, while BEW personnel would cull through data not used in the regular services and aid FBIS in issuing a special 'economics publication. The idea of a joint FBIS-BEW publication was threshed about for some months, but
never got off the ground. BEW did station some of its own personnel in FBIS offices to collect material from transcripts discarded by the Wire Service and Daily Report. On 5 August 1942 Milo Perkins of BEW wrote Fly expressing disappointment that FBIS was unable to supply more Far East broadcasts, but praised the service as the exclusive source of economic information from a large part of the world. On 3 September 1942, answering a letter from Fowler Hamilton of BEW, Leigh, explaining that cable costs of $50 a day prevented FBIS from getting more material from London, suggested that BEW station a man in London to glean more economic information. On 29 January 1943 BEW offered to pay cable costs to get 2,800 words a day added to the London file. BEW also gave considerable help in setting up the Denver office, and Harold Graves wrote Spencer Williams on 2 January 1943 that efforts by BEW were largely responsible for Budget Bureau approval of funds to expand West Coast monitoring.

* Perkins described as "extremely serious" the fact that only about 15 percent of Japanese and Japanese-controlled broadcasts were being monitored, as BEW would like to get 100 percent. He cited several important developments that had been disclosed through broadcasts, including the shortage of Japanese transportation, and called expansion of FBIS Far East coverage "vital to the war effort." Fly replied on 10 August 1942, saying his letter would be brought to the attention of the Bureau of the Budget. FBIS Records, National Archives.
Another office which offered FBIS special problems was CIAA, under Nelson Rockefeller, who wrote Fly as early as 5 March 1942 expressing appreciation for the "invaluable aid" being supplied his organization by FBIS. Rockefeller wrote again on 29 July 1942. This time he praised material being received from Kingsville, saying that the CIAA daily news roundup of Latin American affairs was including 400 to 500 words a day obtained from Kingsville transcripts. However, he noted that the Kingsville bureau was far too small to supply his agency with the material it needed, and urged its immediate expansion. Fly replied on 3 August 1942 that FBIS would like to expand Kingsville, but this would depend on the adequacy of the requested supplemental appropriation.

CIAA also wanted more material from London, so Leigh informed it on 20 February 1943 that if it could bear the added cable cost of $3,328 a year, a special Latin American cable would be filed from London. CIAA agreed and the cable continued until April, when CIAA asked that it be discontinued. There was another instance in which CIAA changes in plans inconvenienced FBIS. Sometime in the summer of 1942 the office suggested a daily analysis of Latin American broadcasts and FBIS analyst John W. Gardner launched the project, which was praised

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by CIAA officials. Early in January 1943 a letter from Francis Jamieson of CIAA said that the "stopgap" daily analysis could now be discontinued, as CIAA was preparing its own analysis. Gardner, in a memorandum to Leigh on 13 January 1943, advised against attempting to dissuade Jamieson; but noted that when the analysis was requested and FBIS undertook the work at great inconvenience there was no suggestion that it would be temporary. Leigh wrote on 22 January 1943 saying that since State and other departments also wanted the daily analysis, it would be continued. Allen Rivkin of CIAA, in a letter dated 11 March 1943, again asked that the service be discontinued, as it was "no longer useful" to CIAA.*

After COI was reorganized, FBIS continued to serve OSS in Washington and in London, but relations were never close. Goodwin Watson wrote OSS on 8 February 1943 in reply to a request that would require the services of two more analysts. Watson suggested a

* Rivkin said further: "Our own CIAA propaganda analysis covers all the material you cover in your publication, in addition to a great deal more you do not cover." He then said: "Thanks for the other releases I get, however. I find them interesting and extremely helpful." FBIS Records, National Archives.

The Cox Committee counsel made much of this CIAA exchange in an effort to show that FBIS sought to force useless materials on its subscribers, but failed to mention the last statement in the Rivkin letter.
letter to help FBIS in getting supplemental funds to finance such an expansion. Colonel Donovan himself wrote a fly on 22 March 1943 praising the "invaluable service" rendered his organization by FBIS and suggesting regular conferences of FBIS analysts and OSS personnel. It was in the Pacific that FBIS and OSS interests came closest. On 8 August 1944 Naval Lt. James R. Withrow of OSS wrote Edward Hullinger, reporting that OSS had permission to establish a transmitter in the Aleutians and was awaiting permission from Admiral Nimitz to place one in the Central Pacific, where it would be glad to cooperate with FBIS. Hullinger discussed plans with Withrow while he was on the West Coast and received another letter from him on 13 October 1944 promising to provide Japanese monitors to expand the FBIS monitoring operation, both in Hawaii and in an outpost. He suggested eight to ten Japanese in the outpost, to be under supervision of three or more FBIS editors. Of course this cooperation was contingent upon a favorable reply from Admiral Nimitz to the OSS application for a transmitter station. The cooperative venture failed to develop, and Russell Shepherd wrote Hyneman from Hawaii on 10 March 1945 explaining the reason. The Navy, which was in control in the Pacific, "was not interested
particularly in psychological warfare," and had "failed to give OSS the welcome it had expected."

Probably the FBI and the Justice Department had the most unique tie-up with FBIS during and immediately after the war. Lloyd Free wrote the Department of Justice on 12 August 1941 that Americans occasionally made statements over the foreign radio and FBIS would be glad to supply details. J. Edgar Hoover wrote on 3 July 1941 expressing appreciation for a transcript sent him and requesting continued FBIS cooperation.

In the summer of 1942 leaders of an organization called "Friends of Progress" were charged with subversion on the basis of domestic broadcasts and publications, and tried in California. Harold Graves was asked to testify, using broadcast transcripts to show the source of some statements disseminated. Graves received a letter from the California Attorney General on 29 October 1942 thanking him for his assistance and reporting that all the accused were convicted. Graves also was called

* Shepherd further explained that Naval officials considered that with OWI transmitters in the Pacific, it was providing all the propaganda needed. Donovan, he said, had visited the Pacific and "got absolutely nowhere." This helped to explain the "favorable treatment" FBIS had received, Shepherd said, as it provided "the missing link" in the intelligence organization. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBI Headquarters Records.
upon to testify at the trial of William Dudley Pelley in Indianapolis, and during 1942 and 1943 there was a frequent exchange of letters between FBI and the Justice Department concerning identity of certain Americans broadcasting over enemy radio stations. FBI supplied evidence used in cases against a long list of broadcasters, including Fred W. Kaltenbach, Robert H. Best, Jane Anderson, Douglas Chandler, E. D. Ward, Edward Lec Delaney, John Holland, and Ezra Pound. In some cases Americans were reputed to have made broadcasts, but failure of FBI to provide verification prevented their being prosecuted.