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Chapter 8 ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET PROBLEMS

Any new governmental unit normally would expect dozens of problems to iron out, and such an organization as FBIS, dealing with new operations and new and untried procedures, could expect to get more than its share. In FBIS, however, there were a few persistent and recurring problems that forced the service to make major readjustments in seeking a solution. At least four of these, some peculiar to the nature of FBIS, deserve special treatment.

Budgetary Limitations

The most persistent handicap to the orderly building of an efficient monitoring system was the shortage of funds. There was no complaint during the first year of operation, but on 13 May 1942 Harold Graves reported that in 14 months FBMS had grown from nothing to a staff of nearly 400. He estimated that employees needed for a complete and efficient system would total 623. To reach that goal, it was clear, the service would need to increase its income substantially each year. Yet on 27 November 1941 Graves reported to FCC that the Bureau of the Budget had reduced the requested \$1,013,250 for personal services in Fiscal 1942-43 to \$657,574 -- only \$11,000 more than was actually available for the current year. This \$11,000 was for planned Alaskan monitoring of Japanese and Siberian broadcasts; no increase in

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personnel was provided anywhere else. The requested \$122,000 for communications, he reported, had been cut to \$52,000. Actually, by October 1942, just one quarter into the new fiscal year, the Bureau of the Budget approved a substantial supplementary appropriation, but it eliminated funds requested to expand analysis work in Washington and London. Projected plans for two analysts in London had to be delayed a year. The total eventually provided for personal services in 1942-43 was \$1,132,227.

Effects of the Overtime Pay Act were not as disastrous as they first appeared thanks to a supplemental appropriation in the fall of 1943. The table of organization, 473 in the spring of 1943, was reduced to 447. By March 1944 it was back up to 502, though of course not all positions were filled. This was still far short of the 623 Graves wanted for effective monitoring. In the spring of 1943 the Monitoring and Translation Division had 150 employees covering broadcasts in 45 languages. To keep within the budget, ten languages were dropped. Another important change was elimination of the distinction between monitors and translators. After the spring of 1943 all linguists were called monitors, no matter how deficient they might be in the actual processes of monitoring. After 1943 adjustments all FBIS posts were said to be listening

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to about 1.2 million words a day, a little more than the BBC was monitoring. Processed copy was 40,000 words a day.

The cut in the 1944-45 budget demanded drastic revisions. Leigh reported on 5 January 1944 that new commitments in London and Hawaii and in the handling of Romaji copy would make it very difficult to get through fiscal 1943-44 without a deficit. With the reduced budget in prospect at the start of the fiscal year, 1 July 1944, reductions had to be decided upon months in advance.

One decision was to liquidate the Analysis Division, as information brought out during the Cox Committee hearings indicated that subscribers could do without analysis better than other FBIS services. The Southern European Review ceased publication on 20 April 1944, the Weekly Review and the Central European Review on 27 April, the Western European Review on 28 April, and the Eastern European Review on 3 May. Far East analysts remained, organized into a Far East Division under Audrey Menefee, with analysts and editors publishing the Far East section of the Daily Report.

A very small European analysis staff continued irregular special reports, utilizing material sent

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by the two analysts in London. At the end of 1944 all European analysis was dropped, leaving only the Far East analysts. In the summer of 1943 there had been 48 employees in the Analysis Division.

The Morning Review, a roundup of enemy propaganda themes broadcast during the past 24 hours which reached subscribers' offices early in the morning, was abandoned in March 1944. It had been started in December 1943. The size of the Daily Report was cut, as well as the staff to produce it, at an estimated saving of \$127,000 a year. Consideration was given to elimination of the Daily Report entirely, limiting distribution to the Wire Service, but this plan was rejected. The processing and duplication operation, reduced in size by the cut in publications, was organized under a single shift. The estimated saving here was \$33,500. Two top positions -- Chief Editor and Senior Administrative Officer -- were abolished, but two lower-paid employees were added to the administrative staff. The Kingsville and Puerto Rico stations were closed to make way for expansion of Far East monitoring, but it was decided to maintain the London office at full capacity and make no reduction in the Wire Service. Monitoring in Washington was drastically reduced, with regular sampling and coverage of special programs replacing

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full monitoring. By the end of 1945 only 35 monitors were on duty in Washington covering 15 languages.

Funds available for fiscal 1944-45 totaled \$969,636 for personal services and \$407,166 for communications. The engineering staff also suffered some reductions. Dave Cooper wrote to BRU at Portland on 22 July 1944 saying that the staff of engineers there must be held to 12, including four code monitors.* Subscribers were notified on 13 September 1944 that FBIS no longer could mimeograph leader speeches and issue them in English and the original language. Leigh, issuing his farewell statement to the staff in ON THE BEAM for 4 July 1944, stated that FBIS now was entering its third stage. The first period was one of creation, the building of a monitoring system with no guiding precedents. The second stage was one of development and defense: Expansion and opening of bureaus; making of cooperative arrangements with OWI and foreign nations; defense of the integrity and operations of FBIS. The third stage, he said, would be one of new dependence on FBIS for information as the war moved to the Pacific.**

* Forbes letter to Tarbell on 28 June 1944 placed staff ceilings of 40 and 28, respectively, on the San Francisco and Portland stations. Job 49-19, CIA Records Center.

** Leigh's final remark: "Directors come and directors go, but FBIS goes on night and day through the years. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Some Congressional hostility toward FCC and FBIS still was evident even after punishment had been duly administered. On 12 December 1944 Stephen Greene sent a memorandum to FCC calling attention to a critical speech made by Senator Gillette denouncing the "news blackout" put into effect by some executive agencies and citing as an example discontinuance by FBIS of the Southern and Eastern European Surveys. Greene pointed out that it was solely the appropriation cut which caused these publications to be abolished. Commissioner Jett of FCC relayed these facts to Gillette on 14 December 1944, and four days later got a reply thanking him for his "thoughtful courtesy," but not acknowledging the Senator's error.

For fiscal 1945-46 the House approved an FBIS appropriation of \$1,166,000. While inadequate, this was expected to enable FBIS, under its new Director Charles A. Hyneman, to continue essential operations.* Thus Hyneman was considerably alarmed early in 1945 to get a request from Senator McKellar to report to his committee the effect a ten percent cut would have on

* This provided for a staff of 280 at old salaries with no arrangement for night differential. It assumed that the war with Japan would continue throughout the fiscal year and that European and Latin American monitoring would end no later than 31 December 1945. Job 51-13, CIA Records Center.

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FBIS operations. Hyneman reported that such a cut would make it necessary to halt monitoring of European and Latin American broadcasts at the beginning of the fiscal year rather than the end of the calendar year as planned. Yet, despite this warning, Hyneman insisted that FBIS employees in London should enjoy the same living allowance as other U.S. Government employees, and succeeded in getting the measure approved.

Shortage of Qualified Personnel

As the war progressed, finding qualified personnel to fill FBIS positions became increasingly difficult. A letter signed by Chairman Fly informed CSC on 4 March 1943 that FBIS was in need of 53 CAF-2 typists, with the clerical staff so badly depleted that loss of a few more would seriously damage FBIS work. Answering OWI complaints of poorly prepared publications, Leigh explained on 19 November 1943 that the problem was a shortage of "time, manpower, and equipment." Typewriters were poor and some typists were worse. Inter-office memoranda during 1943 showed considerable concern over poor clerical work. FBIS officials depended upon CSC for relief, as chief complaints of clerical employees were low grade and the inconvenience of night work. Finally, CSC approved reclassification of 97 FBIS positions, mostly clerical; 172 had been requested.

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In the six months ending 1 July 1942 the number of departures was 33 percent of the entire staff; in the six months ending 1 July 1943 it dropped to 26 percent. Attempts also were made to get night differential payments, but this was not successful. The first night differential was paid 1 July 1945.

The problem of finding qualified personnel was not limited to clerical positions. Competent editors were hard to locate, and capable linguists, easy to find before the war, became more and more scarce. Leigh regarded inadequate pay as the chief cause of inability to find satisfactory replacements. In a plea for higher grades for monitors in 1942 he pointed out that nearly half of all FBIS linguists had college degrees; about ten percent had Ph.D.'s; one-fourth of them were authors of books or articles. Yet most of them were receiving little more than \$2,000 a year and only one as much as \$3,200. There was a steady movement of analysts, monitors, and editors to new war agencies, such as OWI, OSS, and CIAA. FBIS management was reluctant to attempt to hold them, since in most cases they were going to higher-paid positions. On 7 July 1942 Goodwin Watson wrote Nelson Rockefeller concerning an offer that had been made by CIAA to FBIS analyst John W. Gardner. Watson said that of course

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FBIS was reluctant to let him go, but he thought the solution was for officials of the two offices to discuss the matter fully and decide where he could do the most good.

Eventual CSC approval of reclassifications made FBIS positions more attractive. Ben Hall wrote the chief of the Portland Bureau on 29 January 1945 that positions now were fairly well standardized with CSC approval. A trainee linguist would get a salary of \$2,300; monitors up to \$3,200. Editorial trainees would start at \$2,600 and advance to \$4,600. Clerical employees were graded up to CAF-5. This represented a considerable improvement in three years.

Another manpower problem was the needs of the armed services. Original FBIS policy was to seek deferments for editors, linguists, and analysts, but not for clerical or administrative employees. Criticism of government agencies that requested deferments grew stronger as the war progressed, and FBIS did not feel it legitimately could make further appeals. The practice was adopted of merely writing a draft board to outline the work of the individual, with no request for deferment. When the Cox Committee was set up it immediately requisitioned all information on statements to draft boards, which made it even more incumbent upon

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FBIS to refrain from attempts to hold men who were eligible for the draft. The result was more and more FBIS employees called into the armed forces. In order that the best use might be made of FBIS training, information was released to such agencies as OWI and OSS on former FBIS employees in the armed services. Some were sought out by PWB and placed on monitoring teams. In a memorandum on 5 November 1943, Leigh proposed a policy of asking draft boards to defer men in key positions for as much as six months, or until replacements were available. Men in 1-A were no longer to be considered for appointment, and a special effort must be made to locate qualified women, and men permanently deferred for physical reasons.

A considerable file of correspondence with draft boards exists. Senior Administrative Officer Thompson Moore wrote a San Francisco draft board on 30 January 1943 explaining that although West Coast employee Hans Frankel's name did not appear on the first list of key employees, his responsibilities now clearly placed him within that group as defined in a letter from the President's office. Hyneman reported on 15 November 1944 that no further effort could be made to gain deferment for Brad Coolidge. FCC had declared further efforts contrary to policy, as FBIS had had sufficient time to train someone to replace him. Spencer Williams complained

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in a message to Washington on 25 March 1944 that just as he finally had found a man who was not a Japanese national or a Nisei to handle Romaji, FCC had refused to request his deferment and he had resigned.

In a desperate effort to solve the engineering shortage, Hyneman wrote officials in G-2 on 21 April 1944 suggesting that five Morse code operators in uniform be assigned temporarily to FBIS. Much more intelligence material of value to G-2 could be obtained, he explained, if FBIS had personnel to exploit it.

Recruiting and holding competent Japanese monitors and translators led to some unique practices. The most promising source of such personnel seemed to be the war relocation camps, so visits to these were started in 1942. Directors of such camps were notified by FBIS on 18 December 1942 that Mrs. Mary J. Mueller soon would visit the camps in search of translators. Mrs. Mueller reported on her trip to Graves on 31 December. She was handicapped first because the best prospects were Japanese citizens, who were ruled out. The second problem was that promising Nisei she located were opposed to going to Portland. The trip did lead to the hiring of a few satisfactory monitors, and FBIS officials continued to comb relocation centers for prospects, even as late as June 1945.

The West Coast Command would not allow FBIS to use

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Japanese monitors in San Francisco, which made Portland the only possible location for the few recruited. Many were opposed to going to Portland. Others were willing, and were given clearance to join FBIS, but were refused clearance to live in Portland. One Japanese monitor in Portland wrote Spencer Williams on 10 October 1943 saying Leigh was trying to get a permit for his fiancée to go to Portland so that they could be married; Leigh apparently did not know, the letter continued, that Williams already had applied for a permit and was turned down. Permission for the girl to reside in Portland never was granted, but eventually the monitor was transferred to Washington so he could be kept in the organization. It was much easier to get clearance for Nisei to live in Denver, so with the opening of a Denver post to translate Romaji the problem of finding Japanese translators was considerably simplified. The Denver staff later was transferred to Headquarters and gained the reputation of being one of the most efficient units in FBIS.*

Communications Problems

Probably all federal agencies had manpower problems

* Writing to Larry Tejiri on 8 January 1945, Edward Hullinger said: "The Romaji staff, without exaggeration, is regarded as one of the finest, if not the finest, language technician staffs in government." He added that in addition to being efficient, they were well liked as individuals. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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during the war, and certainly FBIS was not the only one with financial worries. The problem of communications was more peculiar. The instant FBIS started setting up field monitoring posts it had to answer the question of how information gleaned in the field would be transmitted to Headquarters. Private telephone and telegraph systems were available, and radio was used for long distance communications to some extent. It was assumed originally that these commercial facilities could be tapped, but there was no conception of the costs involved in establishing satisfactory communications for a far-flung monitoring system. Actually, it was believed at first that most field information could be sent airmail, with commercial communications facilities reserved for an occasional urgent message. That thinking was changed quickly by the war, though it undoubtedly would have changed soon under peacetime conditions.

Portland started sending transcripts by airmail, but this was soon considered unsatisfactory. Western Union then was utilized. All monitored material was summarized in one night letter, which was carried by car to the Portland Western Union office at 2:00 a.m. Even this practice raised communications costs much above original estimates. Soon after the war started it

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became evident that Portland would have to keep in touch with Washington 24 hours a day. The answer was a leased teletype line between Portland and Washington. OWI in San Francisco requested a copy of all material sent, and was willing to pay for the line from Portland to San Francisco. This helped some in meeting communications costs. By the time Kingsville was prepared to send any significant amount of copy, the lesson had been learned. Teletype service 24 hours a day was installed at once.

Puerto Rico offered a different problem. Naval radio facilities were available, and FCC sought as early as 1 August 1941 to learn if these facilities could be used for urgent FBIS messages. Administrative messages from Washington to Puerto Rico were accepted, but Rand reported on 5 January 1942 that Navy circuits were so overtaxed that they could not be depended upon at all for sending radio broadcast material. Airmail was resorted to until FBIS got its own telefax system installed in March 1942. The system did not work well. Engineers at Silver Hill found it impossible to copy a full program accurately. New antenna had to be installed, and it was May before the telefax could satisfactorily handle copy for Washington. Even then it was never considered an adequate setup. A skilled typist was

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required to transfer material from the tape in readable form, and errors were frequent.

It was between London and Washington that the major problems arose. The idea of transmitting information verbally by telephone quickly was abandoned, and London was instructed on 6 March 1942 to send all copy via RCA at regular press rates. The London office of Cable and Wireless would do the sending, with copy from the London FBIS office delivered to Cable and Wireless by messenger pending establishment of teleprinter arrangements. After a week, RCA was dropped and Press Wireless (PW) was used with lower negotiated rates. The idea of sending via PW directly from Evesham was considered, but never attempted. Teleprinter service between London FBIS and the Cable and Wireless cable head was inaugurated 4 April 1942, with service rapid and fairly satisfactory. After OWI started sending material over the same line, a contract was made with Western Union (WU), and the London staff alternated in sending over PW and WU, the latter being more satisfactory but also more expensive. In August 1942 another contract was negotiated with Commercial Cables, so FBIS and OWI had three lines available to the United States. Two serious problems remained: the question of priority and the high cost.

PW offered the lowest rates, but frequent delays caused considerable concern, both in Washington and London.

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Most of the delay was traced to the office of Cable and Wireless, which blamed British Censorship. Agreements were made with Censorship, but delays continued. It was only after many meetings, some threats, and intervention through the State Department that Cable and Wireless changed its methods and procedures to give speedy service to FBIS messages.

Early in 1943 FBIS obtained indisputable evidence that Rome and Berlin were monitoring U.S. commercial radio circuits. As a result, only selected copy was routed via PW. Analytical material, and broadcast texts that it was felt should be kept from the enemy, were sent via WU or Commercial Cable -- at a much higher cost. A survey made in May 1943 showed London was filing 15,329 words a day, with nearly 9,000 moving via PW, the remainder divided equally between the two cables.

Because of high communications costs, London was at first held to a daily quota of 9,000 words. On 11 July 1943 the quota was raised officially to 15,000, but it was difficult even to hold down to this figure. Julian Behrstock reported on 1 October 1943 that because of bad reception in Washington and subsequent requests to London, and "the big war news," the quota had been consistently exceeded. By 30 September 1943 the accumulated excess for the quarter was 70,000 words. By the end of the year this had been reduced some, but on 2 July 1944 the London

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daily quota was raised to 18,000. The budget cut that went into effect on 1 July 1944 actually placed a greater burden on the London staff and London communications, for with a reduction in Washington monitoring it became more and more necessary to get material from London that could have been monitored at Headquarters. In August 1945 the daily average from London was 22,497 words.

The budget estimate of communications costs for fiscal 1943 was \$245,556, of which \$132,000 was for London. The actual cost from London was \$159,684. Portland communications costs during the same year were \$48,000. Stewart Hensley reported to Leigh on 14 May 1943 that the quota of \$426 a day for cable costs that he had allowed London at the beginning of the month had been exceeded by \$1,290 in just five days. On 11 May 1943, cable costs from London reached \$825. Much of this excess cost, Hensley reported, resulted from a tieup in PW, which forced London to file most copy by cable. On 15 April 1944 Hensley revealed communications allocations for the 1944-45 fiscal year--a total of \$329,029, with \$220,120 assigned to London. San Francisco was to have \$77,564. On 7 February 1945 Hyneman wrote Behrstock asking a detailed wordage report each month, to show amounts filed on each line. He said he was amazed to find that neither the FBIS nor FCC accounting office had

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an accurate record of FBIS communications costs. Hyneman had written Russell Shepherd in the Pacific promising him \$100,000 for communications, but had to write again on 8 March 1945 to report that all communications funds were exhausted; there was nothing for the Pacific.

FBIS officials in 1942 were unduly optimistic concerning communications possibilities. Peter Rhodes wrote Leigh on 9 September 1942 to inform him that a British representative on his way to Australia had promised to investigate the possibility of sending monitored material from there directly to Washington, where it would be combined with Portland copy. Fly wrote the Secretary of State on 23 December 1942 asking about communications facilities from Lisbon, Cairo, Algiers, and Teheran, saying FBIS hoped soon to be filing information from all those centers. Facilities did not develop that easily, and on 8 May 1944 FBIS still was trying to get a regular file out of Algiers. Leigh wrote OWI that day suggesting that the two offices might obtain the use of a joint circuit and thus get the large Balkan file that was said to be available from PWB monitoring.

The Army Signal Corps eventually came to the rescue of FBIS in solving some of its communications problems. Vincent Anderson wrote on 30 April 1943 asking that

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Signals be asked to carry a file of 5,000 words a day from London to Algiers. The Army already had agreed, he said, but wanted a formal request on file in Washington. A year later, when PWB monitors in the Mediterranean area asked for 10,000 words a day from Washington and London, the FBIS response was that the file was available if Signals could transmit it. In the Pacific there was never any need for high communications costs, for Signals took over the task from the start. Behrstock announced on 31 January 1945 that on 2 February Signals would start carrying part of London's traffic to Washington.

Unfavorable Reception Conditions

Another problem that forced FBMS to make major adjustments was entirely peculiar to the nature of the service. When FBMS was set up it was assumed that broadcasts beamed to the United States -- which was all that FBMS would want -- could be heard from just about any point in the United States. Sites for monitoring posts were selected by examining a map showing FCC installations. It soon was learned that finding a suitable monitoring site was not that simple. Puerto Rico was expected to cover broadcasts from Africa and Southern and Western Europe. After the station was operating it was found that it could cover the Caribbean area adequately, but

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most European and African stations it could hear were monitored satisfactorily in Washington. It could receive from much of Latin America, but very little of significance that could not be covered by Kingsville. The plan to make Puerto Rico a major monitoring post was abandoned by the summer of 1942, with the staff significantly reduced. Puerto Rico was then allowed to run tests of Latin American stations with the idea of keeping it as a supplement to Kingsville, but this also proved impracticable. When the Overtime Pay Act forced a reduction in field staff, it was decided that Puerto Rico must be closed out. Leigh wrote Edward Rand to that effect on 3 April 1943. Tom Grandin then made a trip to Puerto Rico and recommended keeping the station open for a time, with only Rand, one translator, and one custodian retained. Late in the summer Rand wrote to Leigh urging that he again be allowed to build up the staff and attempt to monitor significant material, but was informed on 25 August 1943 that a final decision had been reached. The station was closed on 3 February 1944. Rand was transferred to Washington. Part of the staff already had been sent to Kingsville.*

* A memorandum to FCC signed by Leigh early in 1944 asked permission to close the station. Leigh described the Puerto Rican experience, pointing out that the original purpose of the station was to intercept broadcasts from Africa and to and from the Caribbean. Despite the general failure of the station to fulfill its original purpose, its material had been quite valuable at times, especially during Vichy control of the French islands in the Caribbean. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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The story of the Kingsville station was just as dismal. Kingsville was selected because it was a major RID station and was thought to be an ideal spot for monitoring Latin American broadcasts. Equipment was good -- the Kingsville antenna described as the best in FBIS -- and part of the year a significant number of important Latin American stations could be monitored adequately. However, it was learned soon that for six months of the year broadcasts were covered by a static that made translation difficult. Also, most of the personnel stationed at Kingsville found the climate depressing and living conditions not the best. George Chesnutt, the Texan in charge of Kingsville during its early tests, became so discouraged that he wrote in the summer of 1942 recommending that the station be abandoned. Instead, Washington decided to build it up and transferred part of the Puerto Rico personnel. After Elliot Tarbell was placed in charge, he was even more discouraged, and urged that an effort be made to find a better location.* Chesnutt and Rawls, the engineer

* In a letter to Leigh dated 3 August 1943, Tarbell urged Florida tests, arguing that Southern Florida was 800 air miles nearer to South America; that an additional full hour of evening reception could be obtained there; and that a change could be made with no loss in coverage. Tarbell thought static conditions would not be as bad in Florida, and certainly could be no worse. He added that Engineer Rawls had informed him that in his early reports from Kingsville he had been instructed by RID to say nothing of the static, with the result that Washington had been kept in the dark regarding true conditions at Kingsville. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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in charge at Kingsville, ran a series of reception tests in the fall of 1943. They traveled through much of Florida, making tests near Pensacola, Tallahassee, south of Miami, and other places. They agreed that the Lake Worth area was far superior to Kingsville as a reception point for Latin American broadcasts and recommended that the Kingsville post be transferred there. FBIS and RID made further surveys and decided that establishment of a station at Lake Worth was feasible. An actual site was located and an option on the property signed. Tarbell, anxious to get away from Kingsville, urged that the transfer be made at once.*

There were two reasons why the Lake Worth station

* Tarbell was extreme in his denunciation of the Kingsville location. Writing Leigh on 14 March 1944, he explained that he had not attempted to hire more monitors because of Congressional measures affecting FBIS, but added: "I am not sure if it makes too much difference if we have more translators. According to the best I can make of it, in more than 16 months down here, the average output of the Latin American stations, with the exception of occasional short spurts, is about the worst drivel imaginable. ... Despite all the efforts to make it look otherwise, the conviction has grown on me that a lot of money is being spent for what is being brought back." "I've had too much of Texas. If, after I leave here, I ever again see anyone wearing Texas boots, I shall shoot him as a predatory animal." Answering this letter, Leigh assured Tarbell that he would find conditions more pleasant at San Francisco, where he was being transferred. This prophecy was not borne out, for Tarbell was equally critical of much that he found there, and resigned from FBIS before he had been there long. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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was never opened. First, CIAA had changed its operations to the extent that it was not in as great need as it had been of monitored material from Latin America. In 1942 and early 1943 it urged FBIS to expand Kingsville, but by the end of 1943 had become lukewarm in its demands. In the second place, the appropriations cut in the spring of 1944 forced FBIS to cut its operations everywhere but in the Pacific. It was decided that Kingsville, of doubtful value at best, readily could be dispensed with. The last broadcast copy was filed from Kingsville on 8 April 1944. The second FBIS monitoring post was abandoned.

It was never the intention of FBIS officials that monitoring of Latin America would be completely abandoned. Before Kingsville closed, George Chcsnutt was sent to San Francisco in January 1944 to run reception tests. Similar tests were run at Silver Hill. It was found that a considerable portion of Kingsville coverage could be monitored from these two points. As Kingsville operations ended before any regular monitoring of Latin America was being done in San Francisco or Silver Hill, users of FBIS material began to complain of the shortage of Latin American information. The BBC, getting Kingsville broadcasts on the D Wire, had never shown any great enthusiasm

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for the material, but as soon as it was reduced the attitude changed. Leigh wrote to the BBC on 8 April 1944 assuring the British that both San Francisco and Washington would soon be monitoring essential Latin American broadcasts.

Portland reception also was disappointing, and though San Francisco was a slight improvement, the two combined could not begin to get all the Far East broadcast material desired. Also, since Japanese continued to be barred from San Francisco, Portland retained exclusive coverage of Japanese language broadcasts. In the early months of the war it was hoped that monitoring in Australia and India eventually would supply the needed material that Portland was not able to get, but communications from both places proved difficult, and the extent to which the material duplicated Portland coverage was a disappointment. The idea of monitoring in Alaska was soon abandoned as impracticable, and efforts to get monitored material through the Russians from Vladivostok proved fruitless. Rhodes wrote on 11 July 1942 that the U.S. Consulate General in Vladivostok reported that U.N. monitoring there was "impossible," but Rhodes added hopefully that if the Japanese attacked Siberia the attitude might change.

Reports began to drift in concerning monitoring in Hawaii by Naval Intelligence. Leigh said on 20 October 1942

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that RID reports from Hawaii were not promising and reported George Sterling as believing that Portland was a better monitoring point than Hawaii, though further tests should be made with improved antenna. Meantime, complaints of the inadequacy of Far East monitoring began to build up. Milo Perkins of BEW wrote Fly on 5 August 1942 expressing his disappointment that FBIS was able to cover only 15 percent of Japanese broadcasts. He cited the importance of information Portland was providing to bolster his argument that failure to get more was "extremely serious." Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) head Leo T. Crowley wrote Leigh on 10 November 1944 urging that FBIS attempt to cover Romaji code transmissions, adding that he understood Japanese medium wave could be heard in Hawaii and believed FBIS should seriously consider monitoring from there.

FBIS officials began to study RID reports from Hawaii. On 8 March 1943 Graves reported to Leigh that he had talked with RID Hawaii supervisor A. P. Walker, who verified reports that Japanese medium wave could be heard in Hawaii from February to April and perhaps longer. Graves further reported on 7 June 1943 that medium wave had faded out by the middle of May, and RID was of the opinion that substantial improvement must be sought elsewhere, perhaps on Midway. Leigh

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acknowledged to OWI in May 1943 that FBIS was monitoring only one-sixth of Japanese broadcasts, though adding that under the circumstances this was not bad. By summer of 1943 pressure from OWI for improvement was becoming intense. Williams sent a report reflecting OWI dissatisfaction. Following his study of the report, Graves wrote a four-page memorandum for Leigh. He was strongly skeptical that any additional worthwhile broadcast material could be obtained in Hawaii, pointed out the problems of housing, staffing, and communications if an attempt were made to set up a post there, but agreed that it was necessary to give the matter further study.

The Graves report was dated 12 June 1943. On 5 July Spencer Williams sent another memorandum quoting Vincent Mahoney of OWI as stating positively that important Japanese broadcasts not heard in Portland had been picked up in Hawaii, and requesting that RID be instructed to record broadcasts there and send them to OWI for servicing. Mahoney also called San Francisco coverage of Filipino broadcasts "filthy," adding that they too were available in Hawaii. Williams verified that OWI "was in a dither," but added that to his knowledge only two items not monitored in Portland had turned up from Hawaii, though one of them was "very important" and was being used by OWI to pressure FBIS. Williams' parting shot was that he

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was sure OWI had in mind its own monitoring in Hawaii if FBIS did not act.

Writing to Williams on 16 July 1943, Graves asked for two things: Some convincing evidence that improved material was available in Hawaii; and some "full-dress indication" of OWI's interest that could be presented to the Bureau of the Budget. On 5 August 1943 Tom Grandin, on a trip to the West Coast, telephoned Washington to urge that action be taken at once. He wanted to go immediately to Hawaii, but that idea was vetoed by FCC. Upon his return to Washington, Grandin wrote a report dated 23 August 1943 in which he stated flatly that on the West Coast there was "considerable dissatisfaction with services rendered by FBIS." It was his opinion that the situation could not be improved on the West Coast. Grandin added that he had talked with Lee Dawson of RID, who thought additional Japanese broadcasts could be picked up in Hawaii and needed manpower could be recruited there.*

* Grandin made a five-point recommendation: 1. That a further effort be made to add to the Portland Japanese staff; 2. That more Morse operators be obtained to handle Romaji; 3. That Koreans be recruited to monitor Japanese in San Francisco; 4. That further reports be obtained on Hawaii with the aim of establishing a monitoring post there; and 5. That Budget Bureau authorization for more field personnel be sought. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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RID stepped up its recordings of Japanese programs in Hawaii, which were sent to Portland for processing. Opinion there was divided as to their worth. OWI and BEW, supported by some other agencies, continued to demand better Far East coverage. FBIS and FCC officials finally concluded that serious consideration must be given to Hawaii monitoring, and authorized Spencer Williams and E. F. Rudesill, head of the BRU staff at San Francisco, to make a trip to Hawaii for a complete investigation. They arrived in Hawaii on 15 October 1943, visiting Oahu and several other islands. Williams made a full report to Leigh dated 29 December 1943, and Rudesill reported to George Sterling. Williams remained in Hawaii until 23 November, but Rudesill developed an eye ailment and left for the Mainland the first week in November. Williams in his report said that RID and Army and Navy officials were very cooperative. He found Japanese monitors available in Hawaii, and because of the better treatment Japanese in Hawaii had received, recruitment would not be as difficult as on the Mainland. He recommended a post on Oahu rather than one of the other islands, because of living, travel and communications problems, and decided that of the four acceptable sites they examined on Oahu the one at the Waimano Home was the best. Rudesill, agreeing that reception conditions on Hawaii were good, reported that the best site

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he visited was at Koloa on the Island of Kauai.

OWI, upon learning of Williams' report, joined enthusiastically in urging an FBIS post in Hawaii. In a message to Washington on 3 February 1944 Rex Tussing, senior editor at San Francisco, quoted several OWI officials in San Francisco, relaying their argument that if Japanese medium wave were a duplication of shortwave, as many insisted, then Portland was missing a considerable amount of short-wave.* The State Department joined in urging a Hawaii post. Cordell Hull in a letter to Fly on 22 February 1944 said State would be "extremely glad" if FBIS could pick up Japanese medium wave, and he understood it could be heard in Hawaii. FBIS plans for a Hawaii station got under way.

* Mahoney was quoted as saying: "The continental prospect has not lived up to promise, and we altogether underwrite the proposed FBIS location in Honolulu, having every confidence that, if rapid communications between Honolulu and San Francisco are a certain aspect of the operation, it will result in important augmentation of intelligence from Japan and the Far East." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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