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Chapter 9 CHANGE IN WAR FOCUS

The decision to establish a monitoring station in Hawaii was approved by FCC on 21 January 1944. After reading Williams' report on his Hawaii investigation, Leigh wired him to come to Washington at once for conferences. Already Leigh had expressed enthusiasm for a Hawaii station, calling it much more practical than one in Alaska. He had taken the precaution of placing a request for funds to monitor in Hawaii in the 1944-45 budget before Congressional hearings were launched on 13 December 1943. Verbal approval by FCC already was given, but after conferences with Williams and a thorough examination of his findings in Hawaii, FCC pronounced its formal blessings on the project.

This decision came none too soon. Preparations for the Normandy landing were going on full blast, and most observers were predicting that the war in Europe would end in a matter of months following the landing. Odds that war in Europe would be over by the end of 1944 were considered good. These same observers were forecasting that in the Pacific heavy fighting would continue. Very few thought the Japanese would surrender before they were thoroughly defeated, and some of the most knowledgeable authorities considered that they might be able to hold out for years after the war ended in Europe. With peace in Europe still more than a year

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away, attention already was beginning to focus on the Pacific. Subscribers to FBIS products acknowledged that its coverage of the European radio had been excellent. Its weakness was in Far East coverage, and with the change in focus, improvement in this area was essential.

Expansion in the Pacific

Norman Paige, who had opened the San Francisco station, was selected to organize the Oahu project. Satoru Sugimura, a native of Hawaii and a veteran Portland monitor, was named to recruit and train a Japanese monitoring staff, and RID named Waldemar Klima to head BRU operations. They arrived in Honolulu in March 1944, with Williams accompanying Paige to get him started, and were given temporary quarters in the RID Punchbowl station. The first local monitor hired was Kiyoshi Nakano, who later handled monitoring on Iwo Jima and remained with FBIS for ten years; the second was Tadao Tamaru, who later trained monitors in Tokyo. Paige and Sugimura started at once to train the staff and process recordings made by RID. Klima tried recording at several RID sites, but put up antennae at the HA-9 RID site at Waialua, 40 miles away, and established it as the BRU station. By November the staff had grown to 11 and daily wordage filed to San Francisco was 2,500. The original plan was to use

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the telefax system shipped from Puerto Rico to file copy to San Francisco, and it actually was installed in the Punchbowl. Reception in San Francisco was unsatisfactory, and never improved much. Fortunately, it was not necessary to perfect this circuit, as the Army Signal Corps soon agreed to transmit material to the Mainland at no expense to FBIS. It was only necessary to get copy to the Signals office at Ft. Shafter, outside Honolulu.

The Honolulu file was received enthusiastically in Washington, as well as by such Honolulu offices as OWI, OSS, Naval Intelligence, and G-2. Operations began during the period of good Japanese medium wave reception, and this material had long been coveted by FBIS subscribers. However, the old problem of erratic reception plagued BRU here also. At times reception was astonishingly good. At other times interference, static, and fade-outs made it impossible to get complete texts. Eventually the engineers decided that reception would never be satisfactory on Oahu and advocated moving to Kauai, perhaps to the site Rudesill had originally recommended.\*

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\* An article by Klima written at the request of George Sterling and dated 20 April 1964 gives considerable detail concerning engineering problems on Oahu and the search for an improved location on Kauai. See "Monitoring Enemy Propaganda Broadcasts," 9-2 Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive Files.

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Charles S. Hyneman, who succeeded Leigh as FBIS director on 27 July 1944, found himself involved in Pacific problems almost immediately. Paige, in charge of the Hawaii operation, obviously was more interested in a Pacific outpost well beyond Hawaii than in the Hawaii station. He urged immediate steps to establish such an outpost, and gained the approval of military officials in Honolulu. FBIS officials in Washington approved the plan for an investigative trip to the outposts, as well as Klima's recommendation for an eventual move to Kauai. Paige wanted to make the trip in June 1944, but military operations in the Mariannas forced a delay. In a letter to Edward Hullinger dated 27 June 1944 he complained of delaying tactics by the Navy, declaring that the Army was ready to move.

Final military endorsement eventually came through, with Paige, Klima, and Sugimura departing for the Marshalls via Naval Air Transport on 31 July 1944. They first went to Naval Headquarters on Kwajalein, then to Ebeye and Namur. Reception tests completed, Klima and Sugimura flew back to Honolulu on 14 August. Paige went on to Guam and Saipan. He reported both the Army and Navy "extremely cooperative," and stated that FBIS would have a choice of two prime locations for an outpost: on Guam under Navy sponsorship; or on Saipan under the Army.

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Despite his earlier impatience with the Navy, Paige favored the Guam site, though he declared that both the Army and OWI were anxious for an FBIS post on Saipan. The only trouble with Guam was that the area selected for FBIS operations still was being cleared of Japanese, and would not be available before November. Because of this, he recommended a temporary post at Eniburr immediately, to be moved to Guam when possible. He claimed he could start operations within two days if he had approval for the immediate transfer of personnel.\*

Klima and Sugimura were not so enthusiastic about monitoring on Eniburr. Both of them reported that

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\* Paige, a voluminous letter writer, made several reports from the outposts and from Honolulu after he returned. These observations are from a letter to Hullinger dated 17 August, and one to Hullinger-Hyneman on 6 September. Paige urged that FBIS move fast, both on Kauai and on Eniburr, but though he was vague concerning details for the Kauai operation, he asked that he be authorized at once to take three engineers, three Japanese translators, and two English monitors to Eniburr. FBIS Records, National Archives.

Paige got one proponent in FBIS for his plan to hurry the forward post. Hullinger in a 27 June 1944 memorandum for FCC urged that steps be taken to establish a post at Eniwetok. He claimed that State, OWI, OSS and FEA would back up the measure by letters, and though the Army and Navy would not "stick their necks out," they also approved. Hullinger proposed a major listening post at Eniwetok, with the Honolulu post used only for relays and backstopping. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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Hawaii reception was far superior to that of Portland, but Sugimura said that tests they ran in the Marshalls showed very little improvement over Hawaii. Following instructions from Washington, Klima made tests on Kauai as soon as he returned from the West Pacific and recommended that the Hawaii post be moved to Kauai as soon as possible. In a letter to BRU chief David Cooper on 7 September 1944 he pointed out that no reception tests had yet been run on either Saipan or Guam, while Kauai would be a definite improvement over the Waialua site and could be put into operation in a short time. FBIS officials overruled Paige on the immediate move to Eniburr, and Hyneman on 18 September instructed Klima to proceed with plans for Kauai.

Fly wrote to General Richardson on 29 September 1944 confirming FCC approval for an FBIS monitoring station on Kauai and an outpost later in the West Pacific. He also announced that Hyneman would leave immediately for Hawaii to complete agreements and plans. While in Hawaii, Hyneman gave final approval to the site selected by Klima on Kauai at the Kekaha Sugar Plantation. He met with Adm. Chester Nimitz as well as Gen. Robert C. Richardson during his trip. Target date for opening the Kauai post was set for 1 November 1944.

Hyneman wrote full descriptions of his meetings on

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Oahu and Kauai and plans for the new station. In a letter to Shepherd and Cooper in Washington, Newton Edgers in San Francisco, and Masters in Portland, he described on 13 October 1944 his meetings with Army officials in Honolulu. Two officers went with him to Kauai to support the negotiations, and recommended to the Army in Honolulu that the Kekaha site, then occupied by the Army, be relinquished to FBIS. Hyneman arrived on Kauai on 9 October 1944 and stayed three days, completing agreements with both the Army and the Kekaha Sugar Co. The Army agreed to spend \$29,195 to reconstruct and repair buildings on the site, and retain ownership of the temporary buildings it had moved there. Kekaha Sugar Co. agreed to lease the four acres of land and the permanent buildings on it, and give antenna rights in the surrounding cane fields, for a rental of \$150 a month.\*

In a letter to Satoru Sugimura on 21 October 1944, Hyneman described the layout on Kauai and asked Sugimura

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\* A letter from Shepherd on Kauai to Hyneman dated 6 March 1945 recommended that the Army be reimbursed \$29,195 for its work in renovating the Kekaha area. Shepherd quoted this figure, the same one quoted to Hyneman in the fall, as the amount claimed by the Army, adding that according to "private information" the Army actually had spent \$45,000. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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to take the position of chief monitor, recruiting and training Japanese monitors for both Kauai and a western outpost. He told Sugimura that he planned to send Paige to the outpost, but doubted that his plan for 8 to 10 OSS translators there ever would materialize; at any rate, perhaps Sugimura would have other ideas on staffing the outpost with translators. It was obvious by now that Hyneman was somewhat disillusioned with Paige. He wrote Shepherd on 19 October 1944 that upon his return to Honolulu from Hilo he had a letter from Paige urging that plans for Kauai be abandoned.

Paige was not happy over Hyneman's decisions. He informed Hyneman on 6 November 1944 that the Navy was ready for an FBIS move to the West Pacific; any delay would be the fault of FBIS.\* He also was unhappy because he could not get permission to publish articles based on his Pacific trip. On 7 November 1944, even before he received Paige's complaints, Hyneman

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\* Paige added: "You realize that as long as I am on the job, and in view of past performances, I demand the right of approval on men selected to travel and work with me." This apparently was a reference to the projected use of OSS men. Hyneman in a memorandum dated 7 November said Lt. Withrow of OSS could not understand why Paige insisted on OSS civilians rather than officers with OSS already available. Hyneman concluded that perhaps Paige was afraid the OSS "would want to run the show." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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appointed Russell M. Shepherd to take charge of Pacific operations. He assumed that Shepherd would delegate to Paige the running of the West Pacific outpost when it was established.

The original plan was for Portland to close as soon as Kauai was in operation, with San Francisco to remain open. Upon visiting the West Coast on his way to Hawaii, Shepherd recommended that this policy be reversed, with Portland remaining open for an indefinite period and San Francisco to close as soon as practicable.\* This recommendation was approved. Shepherd transferred personnel from both West Coast stations to Kauai, but more from San Francisco. As soon as the Kauai station was in operation, San Francisco ceased monitoring, but remained open for some months as a relay point until copy from Kauai was flowing smoothly. Then a small

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\* In a message from San Francisco, Shepherd stated that despite talk of San Francisco's reception advantage, "Portland seems to have a slight edge." He explained further that Portland was more of a "going concern, due to fewer changes in supervision" and fewer upheavals in monitoring schedules. Actually, what played the greatest part in inducing Shepherd to reverse plans was the personnel situation at San Francisco. Two factions among the editors had been squabbling for a year, with Spencer Williams doing little to settle the duelling. Tarbell was bitter at the situation he found there, and already had resigned prior to Shepherd's arrival. Newton Edgers had been placed in charge of the station, effective 1 October. Shepherd was not enthusiastic about Edgers being in charge, and decided to close out the station and move Edgers to the Pacific. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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staff under the direction of Roland Way remained throughout the San Francisco Conference setting up the United Nations to supply American personnel at the Conference with a daily file of monitored material. The San Francisco station finally closed on 25 June 1945.

Progress on the Kauai station was not as rapid as had been hoped, but on 23 November 1944 the first contingent of transferees from Honolulu arrived and operations soon got under way. By 4 December it was possible to close out FBIS activities at the Punchbowl, though FBIS maintained an office in downtown Honolulu to facilitate distribution of broadcast information to Oahu offices. The entire transmittal of material from Kauai was through Signals, over land lines on both Oahu and Kauai, and by radio from one island to the other and to San Francisco. There were communications problems -- breakdowns in the land lines, delays in transit, insistence on the part of Signals operators that military forms be used -- but the improved reception on Kauai more than made up for these inconveniences. David Cooper, who spent several months in the Pacific, helping with the construction and getting BRU organized, said in a report on 24 March 1945 that Kauai received clearly many programs that could not be heard at all on the West Coast, and no Far East broadcast was received better on the Coast than on Kauai.

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Of course not everyone was pleased at developments. Rudesill, who originally had selected Kauai, attempted in a memorandum to Hyneman on 18 September 1944 to reverse the trend. He argued that any monitoring station in Hawaii should be limited to coverage of Japanese medium wave, that both San Francisco and Portland should be retained and improved. In fact he opposed any station in Hawaii, declaring that all that was needed was a "very small" outpost in the West Pacific. Other West Coast employees were bitter over plans to close eventually both stations, and announced that they would under no circumstances transfer to Kauai. Hyneman in a letter to Shepherd on 8 March 1945 remarked that there were several problems which he wanted to study, including "the matter of sabotage of Hawaii on the West Coast.\*"

Plans for the West Pacific outpost went ahead, though Paige resigned in January 1945. Newton Edgers replaced him, and departed for Guam on 18 January. Sugimura, and John Pfau accompanied Edgers, and three Japanese translators from Kauai left by boat the next day. Monitoring on Guam started as soon as equipment

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\* Tarbell in a letter to Hyneman dated 26 September 1944 cited Paige as the chief culprit, saying he had been "knocking Kauai to members of the staff plenty." He added that he would like to apply "a kick in the pants," as Hyneman suggested, but was unable to administer it, and also had no replacements. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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could be installed, as Admiral Nimitz was anxious to get immediate broadcast reports there. Guam filed material to Kauai and to Washington, but a great deal of its usefulness came through its direct service to the military command.\* There was no organization similar to PWB working in the Pacific, so FBIS, which had been forced by War Department orders to drop its monitoring station in North Africa, found itself setting up the same kind of a post on Guam at military urging. OSS plans for cooperation with FBIS never were carried through, so Guam remained strictly an FBIS enterprise. On 13 August 1945, Stephen Greene, who only recently had arrived to take charge on Guam, taking with him engineer Don Fisher and monitors Kenneth Pak and Kiyoshi Nakano, proceeded to Iwo Jima. In 24 hours a monitoring post was in operation, also concentrating largely on serving the local command. One monitor, Nakano, remained on Iwo Jima and continued the work until 29 September 1945, when the post was closed.\*\*

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\* Hyneman said in a letter in January 1945 that the highest priority had been given to getting FBIS civilians to Guam, and quoted Captain Redman as saying: "In order to get the Admiral off my neck, I will have FBIS on Guam by Tuesday if they only have a pair of headphones-on." FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* Shepherd and John Pfau first surveyed Iwo Jima in February 1945 with the idea of setting up a forward post to supplement Guam and serve the military command in the region. They abandoned the project because of a shortage of land and a high level of interference from military equipment in the area. ON THE BEAM for 22 June 1945.

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The daily Kauai file reached 5,000 words in a matter of days, and by Christmas 1944 was close to 10,000. Paige originally had discussed with the Signal Corps a daily file from the Pacific of 6,000 words, but Hyneman got an agreement to transmit 35,000 words a day, though approval of that figure in the Army's Washington Headquarters was slow in coming. Sugimura spent most of his time recruiting and training Japanese monitors, and by the summer of 1945 had 17 at work on Kauai. The entire staff was about 50.\* In a memorandum dated 7 February 1945, Hyneman clarified a number of points concerning Pacific operations. All offices and monitoring posts were in a single bureau, the Pacific Ocean Bureau (PACOB), with Shepherd as chief. This included Honolulu, Kauai, Guam, and Iwo Jima. Shepherd was empowered to name the man in charge at any post.

Hyneman and Shepherd agreed on the policy enunciated by Hyneman in a memorandum of 24 February 1945 --

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\* In a letter to Washington dated 18 July 1945, Shepherd asked that total strength in the Pacific be raised by six persons, to 68. He placed the number of Japanese monitors working both at Kauai and Guam at 20, and estimated that monitoring could start on Okinawa six weeks after the Army gave the all clear for the advance. Portland was also being expanded. Ben Hall wrote a letter on 1 June to Philip K. Edwards, who was on his way to take over as chief at Portland, saying that he had requested a total of 66 personnel for the station, at a cost of \$174,960. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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that FBIS should consider the needs in a war theater as first priority, and attempt to supply the command with everything it wanted. This policy seemed to enhance the military estimation of FBIS. In a letter concerning possible cooperation with OSS, Shepherd said on 20 February 1945 that the matter was a "delicate one," since FBIS seemed to be "the only civilian agency favored by Army and Navy Commands" in the area. At the time of the Japanese surrender FBIS Pacific posts were the sole source of Emperor Hirohito's speech signaling the end of the war, and of various other stories out of Japan that made big headlines in the press.

#### Attempts at Constriction in Europe

Taking over management of FBIS in the first month of the 1944-45 fiscal year, following a 25 percent cut in appropriations, the primary concern of Charles S. Hyneman was finding ways to cut expenses. As the policy of expansion in the Pacific could not be reversed, he concentrated on further cuts in European monitoring. Hyneman had received fair warning that less money would be available in 1945-46, and that Congress would expect the service to make drastic reductions within 30 days after an armistice in Europe. He sought guidance from FBIS subscribers and found it

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a discouraging business. Any suggestion that monitoring of European or Axis broadcasts be discontinued or reduced met with protests. He distributed a questionnaire asking for reaction to cessation of all European and Latin American monitoring to accompany any armistice in Europe, or on 31 December 1944 at the latest. Opposition was so strong that he delayed action. He announced on 28 September 1944 that the London file would not immediately be reduced, but that with an armistice in Europe the subject would be reopened.

A reduction in Washington monitoring actually increased demands on London. Julian Behrstock in an office memorandum dated 15 May 1944 warned the London staff that Headquarters was depending on the BBC to make up for the loss in Washington copy. As a result the staff would have to file more summaries and excerpts in lieu of texts to keep within the word limitation. With the increase in Signal Corps filing, which reduced FBIS communications costs drastically, the London file was allowed to expand. In May 1945 London was filing 42,000 words a day.

In the autumn of 1944 Hyneman went to London with the intent of making severe cuts in the "comparatively large" London staff of 10 editors and 27 teletypists

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and clerical helpers. Prior to his departure a memorandum from Stephen Greene pointed out that the 16,000 words a day being filed by London in the summer of 1944 was less than Portland was filing with fewer editors and teletypists. Another practice questioned in Washington was the necessity for continuing to maintain editors at both the London and Caversham offices, a practice followed since 1942.\* Once in London, Hyneman began to see things in a different light. He discovered that in addition to sending the file to Washington, the London staff was providing lateral services to 140 offices in England, sending 10,000 words a day to PWB in Italy, and 5,000 words a day to PWB in France. Writing Shepherd in Hawaii on 26 February 1945, Hyneman acknowledged that he went to London with the idea of making severe staff cuts, "but they took me into camp, from Winant to the query clerks.\*\*"

Charles Hyneman continued to wrestle with the problem, but a letter to Shepherd on 8 March 1945 reflects his frustration. He complained that everyone still wanted

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\* A memorandum in Hyneman's file dated 20 November 1944. CIA Records Center.

\*\* Hyneman quoted Ambassador John Winant as saying: "FCC has the best mission in London; your men are doing one of the best jobs being done here." In the letter Hyneman concluded: "I decided that everything we were doing in the London and country offices ought to be continued." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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all that could be obtained from Europe, while an "economy minded" Senate Finance Committee was talking of another 10 percent cut in the budget.\* By 24 April 1945 he decided that the time for action had come. He announced a planned reduction and requested that all subscribers comment. It called for all Washington monitoring of Europe to stop within 30 days of an armistice or by 30 June 1945, whichever was first; for London lateral services to halt on 30 June; for the London file to continue until 30 December 1945, but limited to 15,000 words a day and filed via Signal Corps; and for the European Daily Report to continue until 31 December. Latin American monitoring was to continue until the end of the year in Washington.

Again Hyneman had to back down. He announced in ON THE BEAM for 22 June 1945 that as a result of pressure from subscribers, primarily the State Department, all monitoring would continue for another 90 days, pending a final decision in September.\* He also announced that

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\* Hyneman's exact words: "OWI, of course, continues to want everything before it happens, and OSS must have everything so it can save the world, but they still turn the teletype off at quitting time each day and let it cool all day Sunday." OSS had complained that cuts in the Daily Report hurt their services. When told that they could get all they needed from the A Wire it was learned that they had been cutting off the A Wire overnight and on weekends. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Congress had approved a Bureau of the Budget request for \$1,166,000 to run FBIS during fiscal 1945-46 -- a cut of about \$200,000. This, he said, would force elimination of all Washington monitoring by 31 December 1945.

Writing Fred Brace in London on 4 July 1945, Hyneman asked for an outline of essential lateral services. He declared that the State Department and other European subscribers would have to make up their minds to either dispense with these services or make their needs known directly to Congress. At the same time he notified State that many London lateral services would end 31 July 1945. This elicited a request from State that they be continued for another 90 days and a promise to intercede with the Bureau of the Budget and Congress. State did agree, on 2 August 1945, that Latin American monitoring could be halted.

#### Changes at Headquarters

In an effort to streamline the organization so that FBIS could continue to provide essential services and still live within its budget, Hyneman directed a thorough survey of services and operations during August and September 1944. Results of the survey were included in a report to FCC on 4 December 1944. The A Wire was carrying 40,000 words daily to 16 offices;

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B Wire carried 26,000 words to OWI; C Wire transmitted 8,000 to CIAA; D Wire carried 1,000 a day to London; X Wire was supplying OWI in San Francisco with 8,300; and PM Wire was sending 4,000 words a day to the War Department. The Daily Report, averaging 83 pages a day, was going to 467 offices in 52 departments; the Far East Review reached 337 offices in 35 departments; European analytical publications were going to 323 offices in 34 departments. No attempt was made to enumerate queries answered and special services rendered to government offices. Lateral services from London, Portland, and the Pacific were mentioned but not pinpointed.

The extent of cuts already made was reflected in Hyneman's report. In the 1943-44 fiscal year FBIS expenditures reached \$2,016,607. At the time of the survey they were at a rate of \$1,564,389 for fiscal 1944-45. The average number of employees during 1943-44 was 459. This had been cut to 342. The number of monitoring stations had been reduced from six to four, not including foreign stations in the U.N. Monitoring System where FBIS personnel were attached. The average number of Daily Report pages had been cut from 100 to 83, and the average number for other publications from 160 to 85. Yet further cuts would have to be made.

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Chairman Fly wrote Elmer Davis on 15 September 1944 informing him that unless OWI could take over the cost of operation, the B Wire would have to be discontinued on 1 October. The PM Wire also was discontinued early in 1945, but no drastic changes were made in the other wire services until the middle of 1945. On 13 July 1945 Hyneman wrote primary subscribers to the A Wire requesting their reaction to reducing daily wordage to 20,000 and operating the service 12 or 16 hours a day. At the end of July the A Wire was placed on a 16-hour schedule. The Special Reports Section of FBIS, consisting of six analysts in the OWI office, was abolished on 31 December 1944.\* There was some resistance from State but after conferences it was decided on 18 November 1944 to take a "strong line" and tell State that the Special Reports Section would have to go.

Following the regular questionnaire on use of publications, it was found possible on 26 March 1945 to cut copies of the Daily Report by 135 and the Far

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\* A liaison study made among chief FBIS users reported on 29 April 1944 showed that State, War, FEA, and OSS, were reluctant to give up the analytical publications, but were unanimous in saying that if they had to choose they would prefer to drop them and keep the Daily Report. A study later in the year showed that former FBIS analysts now were serving most of the principal users. FBIS had only 9 analysts remaining, while 6 were with OSS, 7 with OWI, and several others with War and Navy. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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East Report by 118. The Daily Report staff, which comprised 45 editors in 1943, had been cut to 16 by December 1945. Part of these cuts in services were more acceptable because of the Special Services Section set up in 1944. A small staff examined all broadcast copy not used in publications or on the wire and sent individual copies by mail or messenger to interested offices.\*

Assistant Director Edward Hullinger resigned in December 1944 and was not replaced. Most of his work was taken over by Senior Administrative Officer Russell M. Shepherd, who had joined FBIS in September 1943. On 16 January 1945 FCC approved a reorganization of the FBIS headquarters office. Describing the changes in ON THE BEAM for 3 February, Hyneman said "it was more a redistribution of functions" than a reorganization, with the main aims being to increase liaison with clients; clarify policies regarding distribution of FBIS material; establish closer contacts with field offices; and more closely coordinate distribution and delivery. Ellis G. Porter was named Chief Editor,

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\* ON THE BEAM for 9 April 1945 described the Special Services Section as the "brain child" of Kurt Lesser. It reported that a mailing list of 50 interested users had been built up, and about 70 items were being mailed daily. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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with "liaison as his chief duty, along with determination of policies regarding distribution and the assigning of field tasks." Three divisions were set up. The Distribution Division under Stephen Greene was responsible for wire services and telecommunications, the Information Center, and the Administrative Services Unit, formerly called Mail and Files. The Far East Division under Audrey Menefee was not changed. It retained the only analytical work done in FBIS. The Monitoring Division, under Ben H. Hall, had supervision over all monitoring activities and the field offices.

In a memorandum for FCC on 2 March 1945 Hyneman suggested that the name of FBIS be changed to avoid confusion with FBI, which reported considerable trouble because of misdirected mail. He suggested International Broadcast Intelligence Service; Broadcast Intelligence Service; Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service; and Broadcast Reporting Service. Hyneman explained that "intelligence" and "reporting" were much more descriptive of FBIS operations than was "monitoring." There was a considerable movement of inter-office memoranda concerning choice of a name, and the preference seemed to be for Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service (FBRS). ON THE BEAM for 9 April 1945 reported that FCC had approved this change in name,

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but next month the publication announced that FCC had reversed itself. The new name was never formally adopted.

Hyneman was Director of FBIS slightly more than a year, from 27 July 1944 to 7 August 1945. He was transferred to other work within FCC and Russell Shepherd named as fourth FBIS Director. Upon leaving office, Hyneman prepared a long report for FCC outlining problems and progress during the year. His primary recommendation was for the immediate future: That the monitoring of Japanese-held territory, very important, must be maintained at a maximum. Selection of the PACOB Chief as new FBIS Director indicated FCC recognized that the focus of attention had changed to the Pacific.

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