MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, War, Navy and Air Force agree that if the Congress passes a universal military training act and/or a selective service act these measures, taken singly or together, will not of themselves cause the USSR to resort to military action within the next 60 days.

R. H. Hillenkoetter
Rear-Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

16 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, War, Navy and Air Force have reassessed Soviet intentions for the next sixty days and come to the following conclusions with respect to the possibility of Soviet military action:

a. An examination of all pertinent available information has produced no reliable evidence that the USSR intends to resort to military action within the next sixty days.

b. The weight of logic, as well as evidence, also leads to the conclusion that the USSR will not resort to military action within the next sixty days.

c. There is, nevertheless, the over present possibility that a miscalculation or incident may result in military moves toward areas at present unoccupied by the USSR.

K. M. Hillenhofer
RADM, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
15 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Under date of 22 December 1947, CIA reported that there was a possibility of steps being taken in Berlin by the Soviet authorities to force the other-occupying powers to remove from Berlin. Delay in the formation of an acceptable Eastern German Government and in Soviet attempts to force the Western Powers from Berlin has probably been caused in large measure by the firm attitude of US officials in Berlin. While no further reports have been received indicating that the USSR has decided to force the Western Powers from Berlin, the recent US-French-British discussions in London concerning the formation of a West German State to be included in a Western European Union invite some form of Soviet response stronger than the mere protests received so far.

Soviet response will be timed to follow overt allied implementation of the London decisions and will consist of the announcement of plans, such as a plebiscite, for an Eastern Zone "all-German state," claiming to represent the whole German people. Announcement of such plans would be followed by an intensified Soviet campaign to oust the Western Powers from Berlin. The most urgent dangers are: (1) "incidents" arising from the presence in Berlin of young, undisciplined troops; (2) aggravation of the situation by German zealots who want an East-West war; (2) any tendency towards war hysteria or lack of firmness and patience on the part of US officials in Berlin.

[Signature]
T. H. Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

Encl:
Copy, Memo for President, 12/22/47
SECRET

22 December 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The presence of the CGH in London may cause the USSR to undertake a program of intensified obstructionism and calculated insult in an effort to force the US and the other Western Powers to withdraw from Berlin all representatives except a small Allied Control Authority group. The implementation of such a program could create a situation of great tension which might lead to armed clashes between Soviet personnel and that of the other occupying powers.

The failure of the CGH to reach agreement on any question and the CGH's subsequent indefinite adjournment will result in an accelerated consolidation of eastern Germany. The USSR will attempt to incorporate thoroughly the economic system of the zone into the Soviet economy and to orient the political system still more closely to the Soviet ideology. Soviet authorities will encounter difficulties in accomplishing both objectives because of the presence of US officials and troops in Berlin.

The problem of this personnel involves the ruthless and forcible consummation of all eastern Germany, helps to sustain non-Communist opposition, and demonstrates that the US does not intend to abandon the partition of the country. Berlin, of course, could hardly serve as the capital of an eastern German state, should the USSR eventually establish one; so long as the Western Powers maintain troops in the city, the Kremlin is aware of this situation.

The Kremlin is aware, also, that the present quadripartite occupation of Berlin furnishes the US with an excellent listening post and a base of operations for intelligence activities in the Eastern Bloc as well as providing political refugees from Soviet areas with a convenient haven. Easterners of propaganda themselves, the Soviet authorities are highly sensitive to the propagandistic value of the continued presence of US and the other Western Power forces and the guarantees they provide of relative political freedom for the residents of the city.
The USSR, consequently, cannot expect the US and the other Western Powers to evacuate the city voluntarily. The USSR, therefore, will probably use every means short of armed force to compel these powers to leave the city.

These devices may include additional obstruction to transport and travel to and within the city, "failure of services" such as electric supply; reduction of that part of the food supply which comes from the Soviet zone; flagrant violations of Komandatura agreements; instigation of unrest among Germans in the US sector, disregard of the elected municipal government, a deliberately intensified campaign of insult or personal injury to US personnel and terrorization of their German employees.

The degree of danger inherent in such a campaign will depend on the accuracy with which Soviet authorities gauge US determination to remain and the state of discipline of US officials and troops. Overly enthusiastic resort to insults or personal violence by Soviet troops on Communists could well create "incidents"; street fights, bribery, and other public disturbances which, in turn, might well lead to high-level repercussions of the greatest character. Only the greatest determination and tact on both sides could prevent a serious incident from deteriorating beyond control of the Berlin authorities. Even if Soviet estimates of limits to US patience are accurate the situation could and probably would be aggravated by the activities of German malcontents, who for one reason or another, seek to bring about an open and immediate West collapse.

The KGB will probably defer its maximum effort to force Western Powers evacuation of Berlin until it has fully calculated the risks and considered the problems in the light of Soviet strategy elsewhere. Nevertheless, in view of probable irresponsible action by local Soviet officials, the day-to-day developments in the immediate future will test the firmness, patience, and discipline of all US personnel in Berlin.

R. H. MILLS

Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence