EAST GERMAN PRESSURE FOR ACCESS CONTROLS APPEARS SUSPENDED

The USSR has apparently decided not to press at this time for increased East German authority on the access routes to Berlin. This decision, probably related to the forthcoming Khrushchev-Kissinger talks, is supported by two almost apologetic Soviet replies to recent US protests over East German harassing tactics. The East Germans will probably be restrained from interfering with Allied traffic at least until after the Khrushchev-Kissinger visit.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

27 August 1961

EAST GERMAN PRESSURE FOR ACCESS CONTROLS APPEARS SUSPENDED

The USSR, in a move probably related to the upcoming Khrushchev-Dean talks, has apparently reversed a June decision which appeared to forecast increased East German harassing tactics against Allied traffic to Berlin and has decided not to press at this time for more East German authority on the access routes.

General Baharov, the Soviet commandant in Berlin,

PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 33

517
replying, on 29 August to his American counterpart's protest over East German interference with official American travelers on the autobahn, said these harassments "seemed unnecessary" and that he would look into the matter. Having just returned from a two-month absence, Eikhabov seemed surprised to learn of the matter. The acting Soviet commandant on 29 July had replied in a similar conciliatory vein to an American protest over East German interference with a US military train.

These two almost apologetic replies follow sporadic efforts during the Berlin crisis to assure East German authority on the autobahn. On 29 June the acting Soviet commandant had stated in a letter to the US commandant that, while the USSR accepted the responsibility to control Allied traffic at the checkpoints, the autobahn itself was beyond the Soviet "sphere of influence." The effort to impose East German control has mainly been on the autobahn, with only a few minor attempts to include East Germans in the checking procedures on the railroads. Moscow evidently considered the heavily traveled autobahn route most susceptible to East German encroachment.

This apparent Soviet decision not to press for East German authority on the autobahn routes probably does not please the East Berlin leaders, who are sensitive on the sovereignty issue and would like to push ahead to improve their regime's status wherever possible. Concern over this issue may be one reason party boss Ulbricht is presently conferring with Khrushchev on the Black Sea coast.

According to Albert Veneman, East German party politburo member, Ulbricht intends "to stay as close as possible" to Khrushchev in order to make sure the Soviet leader does not waver in his resolve to abide by previously agreed positions on the German and Berlin questions. Ulbricht may fear that Khrushchev, in his coming talks with President Eisenhower, may make
some concession at the expense of East German aspirations for sovereignty.

While an agreement that would bar East Germany permanently from trying to assert its sovereignty over the access routes is unlikely to result from the Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange, the East Germans will probably be restrained from interfering with Allied traffic at least until after the visit.