COMMUNIST TACTICS AGAINST WEST BERLIN

The vulnerabilities inherent in West Berlin's isolated position and dependence on Western aid and protection will be exploited by the Communists in their long-term campaign designed to weaken Western determination to maintain Allied rights in West Berlin, force the West to deal with East Germany, exclude Western influences from the city, and undercut its political and economic strength. The Communists hope to undermine the will of the population to resist and thus bring West Berlin under complete Communist control, either as a "free city" or in some other manner.

Character of Communist Threat

Berlin is a trump card in Moscow's strategy to gain recognition for East Germany. In its note of 27 November 1958 to the Western Allies, the Kremlin asserted that "the most correct and natural solution" to the Berlin problem would be to unify the city and incorporate it into East Germany. As a "compromise," however, the Soviet Union offered to underwrite the creation of a demilitarized "free city" of East Berlin from which all Western "subversive" activities would be eliminated.

Moscow asserted its intention of turning over to the East Germans those remaining occupation functions it now exercises, if its proposals should be unacceptable to the Western powers. The USSR added, however, that no changes would be made in present controls over Allied military transport for six months.
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provided the Western governments did not seek "complications."

During this period the Kremlin can try to exploit divergent Western estimates of the importance of maintaining a position in West Berlin by force and of continuing to refuse recognition to East Germany, and continue its war of nerves against West Berlin citizens.

Allied Military Position

The Allied garrison in West Berlin consists of only 6,626 combat troops and some 2,500 service personnel; there are also some 14,000 West German police there. In East Berlin, on the other hand—apart from Soviet personnel attached to the Kommandatur at Karlshorst—there is an East German force of some 18,000 security police of various types, backed by a 10,000-man Workers' Militia. Within ten miles of the city there are some 20,000 Soviet and 16,000 East German soldiers, as well as 6,450 security police.

Allied military forces in East Berlin are almost completely dependent on external sources of supply. Their line of communications extends across East German territory and is subject to Communist interference at any time.

Monoclon has already made certain moves toward taking over access control to East German autoroutes and appears to have actually transferred control duties. When controls are turned over, the East Germans may be phased into their new duties in order to test Western determination at each stage of the transfer.

Interference with Allied surface and air access need not be overt. Railroad access is particularly vulnerable, since all rail facilities are East German and all locomotives and train crews of Allied military

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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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trains are supplied by the 

Bulwark regime. There are 

many means of harassment, some 

outwardly minuscule but none-

theless effective, that could 

interfere with access but which 

would not lend themselves to 

effective Western retaliation 

or protest.

East Germany has already 

challenged the Allied right to 

use the air corridors and is 

likely to reiterate its demands 

for control. Without resorting 

to direct use of force, the 

Communists could make Allied 

flights to Berlin a hazardous 

proposition by means of elec-

tronic interference or by crowd-

ing the air corridors with 

planes.

Harassment of Civilian Supply

East German traffic has 

been highly vulnerable to har-

rassment, and Bonn has hereto-

fore been reluctant to resort 
to reprisals. West Berlin is 

almost entirely dependent on 

Western sources of supply for 

its population of 2,200,000 and 

for its booming industry. In 

1959, approximately 39 percent 
of freight from the West to the 
city, including 65 percent of 
it's foodstuffs, was carried by 

truck, mainly on the Holmstedt 

autobahn; 61 percent of outgoing 

freight went by truck. Rail-

roads carried approximately 34 

percent of incoming shipments 

and hauled out some 15 percent, 

while canal barges accounted 

for a corresponding 26 and 23 

percent. Only a small propor-

tion of Berlin's supplies come 

from East Germany, notably 

brown-coal briquettes for heat-

ing, some construction materials, 

and certain perishable food-

stuffs.

Civilian travelers and 

freight move along the autobahn 

and three other designated 

highways. The Berlin-Holmstedt 

railroad line carries the greatest 

number of passengers and the 

bulk of the freight transported 

by rail. Barges move through 

the Mittelland Canal and Elbe-

Havel routes.

Civilian traffic, other 

than by air, is completely un-

der East German control. West 

German nationals on route to or 

from Berlin must present pass-

ports or identity cards but 

have not yet been required to 

obtain visas. West Berliners 

show their identity cards.

Civilian traffic could be 

subjected to a large variety of 

harassments, including physical 

interference, delays, taxation, 
or requirements for more docu-

ments. Generally, there would 

be nothing the West could do to 

prevent these harassments or to 

retaliate in an effective way. 

West German economic sanctions 

could be used but would not be 

sufficient to stop a determined 

Communist initiative.

Civilian Air Access

Three Western civil air-

lines (Pan American, British 

European Airways, and Air France) 

use the air corridors under 

safety guarantees from the Berlin 

Air Safety Center (BASC), with 

West Berlin's Tempelhof airport 

serving as the terminal. East 

Germany has already claimed that 

such aircraft have no right to 

fly through the corridors with- 

out its permission and have 

charged that they often carry 

illegal goods. If the Kremlin 

removes its representatives 

from the BASC, these airlines 

would have to operate without 

safety guarantees or deal 

directly with the East Germans, 

which would mean further de-

mands such as the right to ins-

pect manifests.

East German interference 

with civilian flights to West 

Berlin would be designed, 

among other objectives, to put an end 

to the transportation of refugees.
a long-sought objective. Such a step would seriously interfere with the use of West Berlin as an asylum for East Germans. More than half of all refugees from East Germany make their escape through Berlin. The percentage rose to 64 percent during June, July, and August 1958.

Harassment of West Berlin

Current Soviet tactics in the war of nerves against West Berlin have emphasized a "soft" approach, advertising the prospect of closer and "more natural" economic relations with East Germany. The USSR and East Germany have declared they are ready to place orders for industrial goods with the city's enterprises and undertake delivery of raw materials and foodstuffs. These orders would be designed to lay the groundwork for West Berlin's eventual economic assimilation.

The Communists could stop the shipment of East German goods to West Berlin, although this measure alone would have only a limited effect.

In connection with the West Berlin election of 7 December, in which the Communists received less than 2 percent of the vote, East Germany threatened certain West Berliners with reprisals if they did not support the Socialist Unity (Communist) party's electoral campaign. German employees of Allied missions were warned they would be blacklisted or worse if East Germany took over the whole city.

The East Germans have already taken steps to separate their transport system from West Berlin's and to eliminate their remaining dependence on transportation facilities in the Western sectors. The Communists also have the ability to harass transportation to and within West Berlin will increase as improvements are made in the railroad and canal bypass rings.

Measures to isolate West Berlin from the transport nets, although they would entail adverse economic consequences for East Germany, would be designed to limit travel from East Germany to the Western sectors, thereby sharply restricting the flight of refugees, and making it more difficult for the weary East Germans to view the West's "show window." East German authorities have already instituted measures to bar access and, if internal tensions increase, further controls are likely to be imposed. Restrictions are being put into effect to halt East German attendance at the "Green Week" agricultural fair in West Berlin, which in the past has been attended by more than 100,000 of Ulbricht's subjects.

It would be extremely difficult for the East Germans to seal off the Western sectors completely. The border passes through streets, squares, woodlands, fields, and lakes, and along canals. There are also several Western enclaves in East Zone territory. The East German police, border guards, and workers' militias could be posted at strategic points, but it would be impossible to seal the dividing line effectively. Instead, the Communists are likely to continue their tactics of intimidation, infiltration, and harassment.

Western Retaliation

The West has limited capability, short of force, to prevent continued Communist encroachments. There are no longer opportunities to retaliate against East German traffic passing through West Berlin. West Berlin must count on the Federal Republic for support, and Bonn has been highly
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The indications of nervousness have been revealed in West Berlin business circles, and there has been some movement of valuables and belongings out of West Berlin.

As this uncertainty concerning the future continues, the economic situation in West Berlin is likely to show progressive deterioration. Any substantial decline in orders for West Berlin firms would result in an increase in unemployment and a weakening of the West Berlin economy. (Concluded in b)