Washington 14 September 1961

Dear [Name],

I am writing my part of the answer to your letter while here to discuss the programs with which your letter is concerned. While I may not follow your letter point by point in this response, I believe all items requested of me will be covered in the following categories into which this letter is organized:

a. The Intelligence Scene in Berlin

b. CH Programs in Berlin

c. Reorientation of the Berlin Base to Meet New Situation and Tasks

I. The Intelligence Scene in Berlin

The border between East and West Berlin has been converted into a Communist-style international border across which traffic in either direction is rigidly controlled. The unique asset of Berlin is, therefore, a thing of the past. But it is essential to bear two points in mind: traffic is still crossing the border in both directions, including West Berliners, West Germans, East Berliners, and almost any nationality you wish to name. Crossings number hundreds-total East and West, counting a round trip as two crossings—daily; and the unique nature of the Sector Border prior to 13 August means that there is no substitute for it in West Germany (or elsewhere) as a means of achieving access to East Germany.

The border between the Federal Republic and East Germany is tightened up as part of the measures launched 13 August to (in our assessment) accomplish the division of Germany, and in another week or so a restricted zone will have been established along the entire FedRep-East German border to a depth of perhaps 25 to 35 miles, in addition to the erection of physical barriers at points judged by the East most vulnerable to black crossings.

While the border between West Berlin and East Germany is being converted into a plowed strip - barbed wire - watch towers - patrolled border, the border between East Berlin and East Germany is now virtually uncontrolled—a change of the past few days. In short: A West Berliner can visit East Berlin, with appropriate excuse (this varies but East-West traders, newsman, students, and a few compassionate travelers are getting passes). Once in East Berlin, a suitably outfitted agent can presumably cache his West documents, and on East German documentation and suitable cover story travel into East Germany. We have been waiting for just such pattern to emerge from the chaotic and unpredictable administration of...
border controls which has obtained until very recently, and will now begin to test in practice this presumed operational potential.

Refugees are still reaching West Berlin at a rate in excess of 30 or 40 a day. By contrast, only a little over 100 reached Bavaria in the period 13 to 31 August.

While not denying that there is a role for the agent to play in collection of imminent indicators, I believe we should not overemphasize this.

The intelligence problem is still very much one of gathering political intelligence about intentions too. This by way of lead-in to my conception of the intelligence collection missions of KB:

a. Reactivate agents now out of touch with us. This involves courier missions to some agents; courier missions to deaddrop communications material and instructions; resupply missions to agents with S/W commo and pads. Our more than 100 agents in East Berlin and East Germany are probably a greater asset than anything we will ever be able to build up inside East Germany through new recruitments. They must be preserved, recontacted securely, in some cases reoriented (many, especially two of the may have great potential as S/W assets if we can get radios to them). Some of our West Berlin assets may be usable for resupply missions, and we will need to recruit support agents in West Berlin for contact, caching, and observation missions.

b. Recruit new sources for East German coverage. Opportunities appear to lie in East-West traders in touch with East German officials; in the contacts of West Berlin students with East Berlin students (taking due note of inherent political dangers and existing prohibitions on student operations); in non-Germans, especially nationals of the developing areas.
(who may be recruited in West Berlin and elsewhere) for their contacts with East Berliners (they currently have fairly easy access to East Berlin) or even as long-term agents for legal infiltration into East Germany probably as students; recruitment of East Berliners who visit West Berlin (at the moment a small and pretty hopeless category largely party faithful and socializers but one which may expand); and CE operations (Chief of LKV Berlin told me 12 September his double agent operations are proceeding unhindered by the border changes.

c. Support operations by providing leads, case officers for recruitments, and cover support from Berlin to recruits who return to East Germany.

d. Greatly expand our contacts among West Berlin newspaper, business, and professional circles for (a) reports on East Berlin morale and suggestions for possible CE operations to counteract bad morale; (b) leads to persons having contacts in the East; and (c) for their own eastern contacts. A few sources on West Berlin morale — we won’t overdo it — will not bring us into conflict with State, and will provide us coverage now not available; the principal purpose of West Berlin contacts, though, will be as avenues to sources in the East.

While the above is doubtless not exhaustive, it represents a fair scale of operational opportunity remaining in Berlin, which will continue until and unless eastern authorities completely seal the border and prevent any contact between East and West Berlin.

II. CA programs in Berlin.

I have had some reservations about various types of CA programs in Berlin which I have explained pretty fully to. Let me say by way of introduction that I do believe there is a limit for CA operations, but that we must eschew the "jimmy" type operation for which we became so famous — via our groups — in years past. I would see three basic types of CA operations:

a. Operations to harass the East German regime;

b. Operations to dramatize the Berlin issue worldwide;

c. Operations to bolster or maintain West Berlin morale.

In the category of harassment of the East German regime I include operations to deter the East German border guards from shooting fleeing refugees; operations encouraging defection of border guards; operations to bring factual news to the East Germans and otherwise undermine the control of the regime over the populace. And I have discussed the possibilities of
erecting billboards at the Sector border; of painting signs on buildings facing the East; and of setting up mobile projectors to project slogans and straight news (including facsimiles of West Berlin papers), on various types of screens. Screens may be buildings, or under some conditions the low cloud cover not unusual for Berlin at this time of year. I am having information from projectors and plastic screen materials with the idea of building mobile projection trucks with the capability of projecting slides on a translucent plastic screen forming the side or back of the truck; such trucks would include a generator, and projection equipment to project on building sides, clouts, or billboards as well, and also could perhaps carry loudspeaker equipment. They could be used all around the border, including the West Berlin-East Germany border. The theme (other than straight news) most appealing to me at the moment is Willy Brandt's "Las dich nicht zum Lumpen machen" as a message to the guards on the border, likely to be the only audience shortly after the truck arrives, since the authorities would certainly clear away any crowds in sight of such moving signs. Still, the border guards are a good target for campaigns, such as the current one offering 10,000 marks for the identity of the murderer of the refugee who tried to swim the Teilow Canal. This program would be done by the Saat, as we see it, with our support.

The idea of a second TV channel is a good one, too. TV will reach East Berlin, because no special aerial will be needed at such close range.

More news signs like the one at Potsdamer Platz would be good, too, but will take a long time to construct and will probably be seen by very few East Berliners, since the Eastern authorities will clear out the people in range.

A somewhat minor point, but worth doing I think, would be transmitting some straight news and music program (perhaps VOA has one suitable) over AFN Berlin from 0300 (when AFN signs off) until 0900 or even until 0600 when AFN comes on again. State has recommended this recently, to counteract the current "pirating" of the frequency by Radio Moscow English language programs, which come in loud and clear on the AFN Berlin frequency as the "Star Spangled Banner" fades away. I suspect Radio Moscow is aiming at East German listeners to AFN as much as anything, and feel we should deprive them of this free ride.
Operations dramatizing the Berlin issue world-wide will show an upturn shortly, I hope, partly through greater concentration of the Berlin them9 (and expansion of its normal production) to include one to three pictures a day, two picture features a week, all to an expanded selling list which will shortly include journalists who have visited Berlin under any one of the several past and current programs stimulating such visits. is clearly interested in using his facilities to produce and spread Berlin items, which we will encourage. I think we can indeed do much more in this direction, and do think we should not discount the possibilities of worldwide interest in the variety of dramatic events characteristic of the current Berlin situation. Pictures are the big thing, I believe, and I feel I can (and shortly will) do much, much more in this line.

The plans for making Berlin a cultural center, for building up specialized industries, and even for establishing one or more technical commissions of the UN in Berlin (I would suggest the ECE, perhaps UNESCO, perhaps NNO) are all of great importance, although our own role as KUBARK in these may in some instances not be particularly large. Willy Brandt, party for election impact and partly because it is needed has started a program asking for still further tax advantages to Berlin residents (among other provisions) to help induce people from the Federal to move to West Berlin. The city will need to stop the previous outflow of approximately 20,000 to 25,000 annually of its working force (up to now replenished by refugees), and achieved an inflow resulting in a net gain in working force annually, to maintain vitality. Moreover, right now West Berlin critically needs over 20,000 workers to replace the East-West Grenzgarde of whose services the city was suddenly deprived on 13 August. Thus the economic proposals face some formidable initial problems, but should be pursued. Mayor Brandt's plans include proposals startlingly similar to your Long Range Plan, which we shall certainly encourage. Perhaps now would be a good time to lay out the proposal to Shep Stone and ask him to pursue it with the Senator, keeping us informed and bollering for help if it were needed.

The above is by no means an exhaustive catalogue of actions most, if not all, of which would appear already to have policy approval. Let me urge, therefore, that indeed be sent to Berlin, because I cannot possibly run the base and a large CA program without any CA officer. His already well on his way to entrenching himself in Berlin, and will be just what we need there.
III. Reorientation of Berlin Base: and I have spent all our spare moments on the dual questions of reorienting the EOB effort and selecting officers for assignment elsewhere in Germany. Morale is, as you note, admirably high in Berlin Base, and most (or all) the officers currently want to stay there. But I doubt that there will be enough opportunities to justify the current number of officers, nor that the best talents of many of the officers now on hand will be utilized under the current conditions. The result, in the near future, will be a drop in morale. I think, if some officers do not soon get new assignments. There is the usual aura of uncertainty hanging over the base, and I want to announce as soon as possible the nature of the tasks EOB will do, and the nature of other programs being established in light of the threatening situation, to which EOB officers will be assigned. Every sign gives me reason to think that all officers selected for the proposed "Task Force" will be enthusiastic about it. Of course, has the respect of every officer on the base, and beyond this the officers in Berlin Base now want to do something about the threat to Berlin, which this proposed assignment will provide them every opportunity of doing.

Sending eight officers on TDY in the next week or so will avoid the occurrence of any stagnant period at the base (which, believe me, there has as yet not been) between the time of activating alternate communications with agents, the initial phase of which is now largely completed, and the decisions on further activities in Berlin and elsewhere.

I am thinking in terms of a base of about 75 people in Berlin. This will permit diversion of more than 20 case officers to other assignments, principally to the paramilitary and perhaps the black radio operations. Some officers will definitely be transferred from Berlin.

... others will tackle the "Task Force" in TDY status at least initially. Some officers will definitely be selected for transfer out of Berlin; others can only be selected after decisions are made with respect to the plans.

My present plans also call for a simplification of base structure. While tentative, plans now call for a CA branch of six or seven officers under [a positive intelligence branch under [who will also be Deputy Chief of Base if (7 leaves)]; and a CA Branch under [Pirm recommendations will be along in a matter of days. A small Coordination and Liaison Branch under ...] and an expanded Intelligence Support Staff under ... to exploit the numerous sources of useful information on Berlin aside from EOB agents, are the other main operational components. A case officer strength of around 30 can be achieved with the total strength figure of 75. Obviously, some personnel shifts are going to take a little diplomacy, but the urgency of the situation will obviate serious problems. I believe, I agree completely with [comment that the necessity of change will be recognized.
Finally to close what has become a rather long letter, let me state that all of us in Berlin, West Berliners, U.S. Army, and State Department alike, feel most strongly that no amount of propaganda, no clever deception operations, can make any real difference to the Berlin situation. Our policy stance will provide us the support of the West Berliners and the West Germans, or lose it. What is crucially important now is firm and unflinching response. We must maintain uncontrolled air access. And unquestionably, the greatest factor in maintaining West Berlin morale beyond the uncompromising maintenance of access is the presence of American troops in numbers sufficient to ensure that any attempt to take West Berlin by force, conventional or unconventional, must reckon with meeting and subduing American troops, with all the implications that entails. I do not think we have enough troops in Berlin yet; we cannot keep a very extensive level of patrolling going with the forces at hand. I have suggested to General Netteler every time he asks me (which is once a week at least) what more we can do in Berlin that the troops should be at the border, and more troops should be here. It's way out of my field, but I would suggest the Army rotate a combat group to Berlin every three weeks or so, and I do mean by road. That way an additional group would be in Berlin, and the soldiers would get valuable training. I suggest the Air Force, too, increase the flight of military aircraft to Berlin, even if they don't need to carry anything in or out just now. Increased flights would afford pilot training for Air Force officers who may soon be flying the route regularly, and would sound a note with the Berliners, valuable psychologically, of our determination — a determination backed up by readiness.