MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Helms Re

Report on Large-Scale Soviet Military Preparations

1. When Mr. Osborn and I were discussing the above report
with Mr. Helms, upon its receipt yesterday afternoon, I told Mr.
Helms we should expect renewed consumer questions about the
possibility of deception. I pointed out that the material
had not only been accepted by most of our consumers, but that the
material was: a) extremely costly in terms of Soviet security; and
b) apparently inconsistent with any discernible Soviet policy purposes.
However, I said we must face up to the fact that was now
in a key position to give us information vitally affecting our own
reaction to recent Soviet moves. For example, could
assure us that all the preparations we were seeing over the
next few weeks were, indeed, part of the maneuvers already
described, in which case the Soviets would be able to take aggres-
sive military action without alerting our indications mechanism.
On the other hand, at some critical juncture, might tell
us that the Soviets were now ready to strike unless we made signifi-
cant concessions, even though, in fact, the entire Soviet effort was
bluff.

2. Mr. Helms agreed that such questions would probably arise,
but that we should take the position that the consumers themselves
would have to make up their minds as to the answer. He said all we
could vouch for was that, from strictly an operational standpoint,
we had been unable to fault and could see nothing in the
operational and CE aspects of the case which would cause us to
question the validity of the information being supplied.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
31 MAR 1992

JOHN MAURY
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JFM/r