In the weeks since the August 13th seal-off of the sector border, the East German regime has taken further steps to break off any but the most essential contacts with the West and to transform East Germany from the close Western-inspired Soviet satellite into a state governed on distinctly Stalinist lines. Apart from erecting the physical impediments of concrete walls, barbed-wire fences, and deep trenches to prevent interchanges between the two parts of Berlin (and the two parts of Germany), the regime is taking internal measures clearly indicating its extreme apprehension about its ability to control the populace now that the safety valve – the possibility of fleeing to the West – has been all but cut off. The more inept indicator of regime anxiety was the mass conscripts drive conducted to recruit young people to join GDR military and paramilitary services. Every form of pressure, including assignment to disagreeable jobs at lower pay and with physical hardship, has been applied to induct youth between the ages of 16 and 24. Considering the low political reliability of this age group in the past (this age group comprises nearly half the refugee flow of the past two years) it cannot be assumed that the regime expects to forge reliable military forces from these unwilling recruits – at least in very short order – and the measure thus appears to be more to enhance internal security of the regime by imposing military discipline and punishment upon this age group and transplantsing youth to unfamiliar surroundings thus breaking up former acquaintance and contacts. A further measure of internal control has been the institution of forced labor for those the regime considers not employed in the “productive sectors of the state”, especially applied to the 30,000 or more East Germans and West Germans who held jobs in West Berlin until 18 August (“forced-brokers”) and who have since been ordered to jobs largely of a manual nature throughout the East Zone. Appeals of persons charged with anti-regime sympathies and discarding evidence of anti-regime sentiments or acts considered hostile to the state are everyday affairs; several instances have been recorded of life imprisonment sentences imposed on non-agents for defying East German authorities, in particular for helping others escape from East Germany.
3. In the past month the regime has shifted its attention to industrial production, now emphasizing the utilization of young people for work in industry and a "voluntary" campaign is in full swing whereby it is to fuel production productivity from the available labor force. According to a report by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, West Germany has achieved a 10% increase in industrial production. There is indication that the East German industrial production has at least remained steady, with a marked increase in the "productive" labor force. The regime's main goal appears to be increasing the production of goods and services.

4. The situation in the East is grim. The regime's campaign has been met with resistance, especially in the industrial sector. The government has resorted to increasing the work hours and decreasing wages to maintain production levels. The situation is especially critical in the heavy industries, where jobs are scarce and living conditions are poor. The regime's policies have led to a decrease in the standard of living for the majority of the population, who are increasingly disillusioned with the regime's promises.

5. The construction of the wall along the sector border and the successful sealing off of the East German populace has led to a severe economic crisis. The regime has imposed strict controls on the movement of goods and people between the sectors. The regime's policies have led to a decrease in trade and consumer goods, making life more difficult for the people of the East. The wall has become a symbol of the regime's inability to provide for the needs of the population.

6. Despite the numerous efforts made by the regime, the situation in the East remains critical. The population's resistance continues to grow, fueled by the regime's failure to deliver on its promises. The regime's policies continue to be met with resistance, leading to a growing sense of disillusionment among the population. The situation in the East is likely to deteriorate further unless the regime makes significant changes to its policies.

7. The situation in the West is also critical. The regime's efforts to maintain stability have been met with resistance, especially among the younger generation. The regime's policies have led to a decrease in consumer confidence, making it difficult for the economy to recover. The situation is especially critical in the industrial sector, where jobs are scarce and living conditions are poor. The regime's policies have led to a decrease in the standard of living for the majority of the population, who are increasingly disillusioned with the regime's promises.

8. Despite the numerous efforts made by the regime, the situation in the West remains critical. The population's resistance continues to grow, fueled by the regime's failure to deliver on its promises. The regime's policies continue to be met with resistance, leading to a growing sense of disillusionment among the population. The situation in the West is likely to deteriorate further unless the regime makes significant changes to its policies.
distance inside East Berlin rather than being employed directly west of the line between the two sectors. There was no satisfactory way of stopping the flood of refugees from East Germany unless the closing of the border (short of abandoning the use of East Berlin as the capital of East Germany) could be induced by mass deportations and forced marches of residents of East Berlin and the surrounding area. These steps would have caused the collapse of the East German economy. It was not at least made clear to these officials that any of these means were prepared to clash with their own forces if necessary.

The actions by the West on the 18th of August had a profound principal contributions to bolster morale in West and East Berlin alike. The first move was the visit to West Berlin of the Vice President of the United States and the transfer of an additional battle group to West Berlin on 20 August. This expression of the commitment of the United States to West Berlin was of tremendous significance in averting a crisis of confidence among the West population of West Berlin. The arrival of General Clay in Germany was a most visible positive sign and was welcomed by West Berliners following the dramatic deactivation of determination accompanied by a modest show of military forces overseas and at the Brandenburg Gate for the week of 22 October, which actions General Clay is basically credited with. The visit to Berlin by the US Army Commander Western Europe and the appearance of a US tank at both Brandenburg Gate and on 27 October with the appearance of East Berlin by Soviet tanks "outlining a 16-day period centering on 10 November to Berlin." This tangible Soviet recognition of its responsibilities in East Berlin did much to take away the initiative from the side of the government in the Berlin situation. There was a little doubt that the prestige of the Soviet side, and notably of the Berlin sector, has suffered a great loss and it can only be anticipated that the East will be least

From an operational standpoint, the period since the sector border closure has been one of intensive assessment of locally new operational conditions in operational planning at Berlin. The most instructive lesson from the impracticality of this " militarization" was that the sector border closure without submitting to Eastern negotiators. It has been a source of tremendous satisfaction that we have been able to continue to maintain contact with more than 3% of our agent assets via previously established alternative communications channels. The overall use and 

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collection activities through many Base assets despite the border closure.

At least 20 agents are being monitored in West Berlin, primarily at the

U.S. Embassy, with 10 agents monitoring "two". In addition to these agents,

the OSS has also assigned 5 agents to the "two". These agents are

withdrawing information and intelligence from the"two".

At this point, it is not yet known what the agents are monitoring.

However, it is clear that their activities are aimed at gathering

information about the status of the border and the activities of

agents on the other side.

The OSS is also monitoring the activities of the "two". These

agents are currently working on the "two". They are

assigned to the "two" and are working closely together.

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