Subject arrives at 1510 hours on 23rd July, 1961

Subject opens package and shows HAUJA camera.

They have 4 types of camera: one S24CH, one cine-camera, a new German one, and two ordinary Soviet ones. I got this from PAYLOV yesterday, for my trip to RUSSIA. This camera is now loaded with a British made film (E123RD). I brought this for you to take the men back in case operational use is made with this camera in the future - and secretly I'd like to have the photographic instrument to work on our best to use it. I have an exposure and time chart here which they gave me, and I would like it checked.

6. That is nice, we will do all this before you go on your trip.

4. I have one very interesting thing to tell you. I was even thinking of calling you yesterday. SHAPCHENKO came up to me yesterday after I had had my conversation with PAYLOV, and said "May I ask you? Would you like your advice, you are my former boss, I've seen trouble concerning my work", before that I had read a telegram from KGB inquiring about his family, a reply has been sent mentioning the 300 loan and the banking suppliers. PAYLOV had already sent off the telegram about ANIIA, here is the text: "During the British Industries Fair in MUNN, such and such a film exhibited two prototypes of a portable computer ANIIA. At the present time the film has signed a contract with certain capitalist companies for the supply of this machine (mentioning number). During the fair our specialist in MUNN considered the advisability of acquiring the ANIIA computer. The English firm had then replied that they can only sell it on too basis of one thousand at a time. The English specialist who maintains scientific - technical relations with the Committee has promised (subject's name) to obtain an ANIIA machine against cash down and subsequently pass it on to us. The prices of the machine is 3000. Please reply urgently whether it is advisable to give this to us, via (subject's name) to the British specialist or there may be the possibility of requisition after delivery of the machine. Let us have your instructions."

3. Did you mention the dates of the visitation? No, I gave PAYLOV all the other details orally. He asked me to bring this over and to arrange a meeting with VORON at the embassy at 10 o'clock on Monday. VORON was in and told PAYLOV and so that he is leaving LONDON by air on either Saturday or Tuesday.

5. Then I went with SHAPCHENKO to his office. I have been in five rooms already which are involved with intelligence work, I will draw it up for you later. SHAPCHENKO's trouble consists in the fact that the "Center" has ordered him to drop his Indian contact as he was suspected of being an "agent provocateur". The Indian in question is a journalist, a young man, representative of an insignificant Indian paper. I reported this to you in the typewriter text begins with 2, and on the 23rd July he is supposed to have gone on a trip to PEG, as a member of a delegation of journalists.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
19 JUNE 1962
(Pages 2-3 missing from the original document)
25. Subject then refers to Dr. WINTER and how displeased he was by his transfer from KOREA. He explains that he was moved because of war trouble. 8. The people in the (st) Ministry of Foreign Trade who have spoken to me about him, were of a very low opinion as to his abilities. They thought him a fool. Subject then repeats that KOREA, the Ambassador, treated him (Subject) in a very friendly manner.

26. OK, now, about KOREA, am I to bring him? Am I?
27. All right. And thank about KOREA. On the 10th I will take NEWS to meet RAVEN. Prior to my departure I need receipts, head bills, which KOREA should obtain for me.

28. Subject mentions the Jodin radio, and George tells him to be silent and know. The radio is shown him. George explains in detail that this radio is being given to him as a gift for 800$ to his wife and good friends. The gift is from the heart against our better judgement and should show him that money is no problem but security is. Therefore, the tape recorder (personal use) is cut since he would be suspected having it and it was a disaster by trying to record KOREA if the latter should visit subject.

29. Furthermore Subject should abide by our advice and decisions re future requests of a security risk nature and suspend his acquisitive desires. Subject was visibly touched and thanked us profusely.

30. OK. However, I will have KOREA take it in, rather than taking it out. The set was removed from its packing box and Subject was shown the components, operation etc. The unpacked also permits it to take in and out of our embassy easily. Subject mentioned that he has already asked his personal aide to examine the set in the Czech embassy. He explained how it is possible that it can be taken in and out of our embassy. Since KOREA has requested to post-us the set in the 5th August due to his son's sudden disappearance, the schedule was reviewed and it is decided to have his son's leave from 28th August and KOREA's arrival be 28th August, the 23rd August decided upon.

31. OK. Regarding the military articles you want our help to write, it seems that since you are an artillery officer and have not been given access to the JODIN data by KOREA and other artillery studies, you should look over the material that you received to see what manuals or data there is on the same subject - anti-tank weapons, and on Anglo-American military material - and give us the bibliography.
32. I'll consider this and I will get a list of subjects and magazines dealing with Anglo-American forces which KOREA's people held in the GPO Information Directorate. I will even have the subject matter - anti-tank weapons could be O.K. I will also try and send photocopies of my other papers and articles which I can get - through KOREA.

33. OK. Just send us a bibliography. If I will send you a complete list of what we have on your subject. Then if you can send us the material back I'll have it even properly.

34. OK. How to reassure you that your information is definitely reaching our leaders - here is a report on President KOREA's speech. I want to give it to you last. I was point out to you that in a number of statements, excepting those thoughts which you suggested were mentioned. (Subject was daily tested).
28. As I reported to you last spring about the situation at
the time of EMRUSCIUS's coming to power, when he kicked out the
opposition, EMRUSCIUS adopted the same technique with the
same methods as before. EMRUSCIUS is using this tactic with the help
of his party officials. During his rule he has personally imprisoned approximately 1500 officials to General"...out of a total of 3000, and also imprisoned a number of old
Generals to higher ranks, up to the rank of Marshal, and Chief
Marshal. He relies on their support. But both the President and the
Central Committee still have a number of people who supported EMRUSCIUS, and the Presi-
dent and the Central Committee are still in one of them. There are also unconfirmed rumors that EMRUSCIUS fights
occasionally with EMRUSCIUS. - MMKDI is in opposition with regard to
some of EMRUSCIUS's opinions, arrangements etc. EMRUSCIUS is not
agreeable with the cause. They do not care for his policies, comments,
and plans. They blame him for the miserable state they have to live.
I hope he is a political adventurer.

29. As among the leaders (politicians?) there exists a secret
opposition, which cannot be secret because the majority are still
EMRUSCIUS's protégés and the others are not yet put in prison. But
there could be a distribution of forces and a split as a result
of the KULIN question. All of them are aware of the weaknesses,
with regard to the economic and military situations. They
will say, "It is too early to go to war, we've got to wait. That's
the point of leasing up the situation because of the KULIN question. They have
existed for the last 10 years." Should this occur, it is possible
the EMRUSCIUS will carry the day and win once again, on the other
hand the reverse might happen. We have to look into this
long-term. They could either remove EMRUSCIUS, saying he was
ill or else he might resign - as KULIN did, or they could say
"You go on being the boss, but let's a talk on the KULIN question.
Let's think something up." Let's say outside that we are defenders
of the peace, the Anglo-Americans have taken a similar step of
our own position and are preparing for war. We don't want war, there's
no hurry, we'll settle the KULIN question another day. There are no
sorts of diplomatic words that can be found in order to meet the situation
and the people and its again.

30. The KULIN Congress will decide what action is to be taken.
They will not appear, but we have told you before that when there is one of those big gatherings they have secret
meetings, the plenum, the plenum, and I am positive that this
matter will be discussed. It might even be discussed before the
official opening of the Congress. As we must keep in mind these
plenum meetings. (Subject continues on this theme for some
time, repeating roughly what he has already said.) - Finally:
1) EMRUSCIUS may crush all opposition and proceed to sign the
General peace treaty, inviting local hostilities and risking
general war.
2) EMRUSCIUS may be forced to compensate and delay signing the peace
treaty in view of Western opposition and propaganda this move
as his desire for peace - still postponing possible action to
next Germany and Berlin to a further date.
3) EMRUSCIUS may be deposed.

/ 30. .......