STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

Vol. 37, No. 5 *1994*

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A progress report

Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide

James A. Barry, Jack Davis, David D. Gries, and Joseph Sullivan

"Intelligence failure" is a frequent topic of discussion in news media and academic journals. The focus usually is on a failure of the Intelligence Community to predict events abroad—a dramatic development like the overthrow of the Shah of Iran or a longer term trend like the collapse of Communism. Observers also criticize policymakers who fail to heed intelligence warnings, as in the Vietnam war or US involvement in Lebanon. But there is a third type of weakness that can reduce the effectiveness of intelligence and policy—the failure of communication between intelligence officers and policy officials.

In recent years, both intelligence officers and policy officials have taken important steps to improve understanding of each other and to bridge the cultural gap that can reduce effective communication between the two groups. With this in mind, the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy have sponsored an ongoing dialogue between current and former intelligence officers and policy officials in the hope that discussion of their experiences will provide valuable insights for current and future practitioners. This article summarizes the results of about 20 interviews and three seminars that include more than 60 intelligence officers and policy officials.

The "Tribal Tongues" Phenomenon

Observers of US national security decisionmaking have noted that a cultural barrier between policy and intelligence can defeat efficient use of intelligence. According to this view, intelligence officers tend to look at issues in abstract, scholarly terms, while policy officials are more pragmatic and activist in their outlook. Intelligence officers complain that policymakers ignore reality abroad; policy officials counter that intelligence officers are too detached from the reality of Washington and do not have to take responsibility for their errors of judgment. Mark Lowenthal has dubbed this difference the "tribal tongues" phenomenon. In his view, intelligence and policy officials, like Britons and Americans in George Bernard Shaw's famous quip, are "divided by a common tongue."[1]

Strategies for Improving Relations

Over the past decade, a number of intelligence officers and policy officials have overcome these divisions and created successful strategies for integrating intelligence into the policy process. The key element in all these strategies has been a recognition that intelligence and policy personnel have to function as members of a team, and that direct communication, feedback, and careful tailoring of support are essential.

Although officials participating in the dialogue differed as to whether intelligence or policy officers should take the lead in forging closer relationships, all agreed that the effective use of intelligence in policymaking is a shared responsibility. They also noted that, although intelligence officers have to "sell" their products to policymakers, it is the quality of intelligence support that makes for strong relationships. Many interviewees criticized the high volume of general intelligence publications and complained about overclassification.

Both intelligence and policy officials stressed the need for timely, actionable intelligence, tailored to the requirements of particular officials and events. They agreed that there is a continuing need to foster expertise and objectivity. And officials from both camps stressed the need for intelligence agencies to coordinate their efforts and reduce unnecessary competition and redundant products.

Thus far, the dialogue has identified a number of techniques that foster closer intelligence-policy ties. The following sections describe the elements of these techniques and provide anecdotes that illustrate how successful policy and intelligence officials have worked together.

Experiences of Policy Officials

Finding Out What Intelligence Can Do. Policy officials have benefited from planning their relationships with intelligence providers. For some first-time appointees, this required accepting a quick tutorial on how the key intelligence agencies work. Many policymakers also took steps to understand the various types of intelligence reporting and how best to use them. Knowing the potential and limits of espionage or technical sources and how intelligence collectors evaluate them has been invaluable to policymakers in trying to deal effectively with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty:

- CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has produced classified handbooks for policy officials detailing the support that it can offer.

- The Intelligence Community has tutorials available in the form of briefings, videos, and handbooks on collection sources and analytical methods.

Many policy officials have found that intelligence officers know details of the policy environment abroad that can help policy officials to refine ideas and package them to improve the chances of a policy success.[2] They can also be valuable sources of information that can be shared with foreign leaders in support of US policy:

- During the Cuban missile crisis, intelligence officers briefed key foreign leaders on the facts of Soviet missile deployment while policy officials sought support for the US response. Similar briefings for foreign officials became a cornerstone of US efforts to gain allied support for arms control proposals.

- Intelligence officers have worked closely with policy officials to develop information to support demarches to foreign countries on weapons proliferation and technology transfer issues.

Making Time For Intelligence. A number of the policymakers interviewed said that they found it useful to make themselves and their top staff aides available to intelligence and shared their schedules and agendas with intelligence counterparts:

- Some intelligence units have arranged to keep policymakers informed while they travel abroad via specialized cables timed to arrive at their various ports of call. In at least one instance, such specialized support alerted an Ambassador to the position of a foreign official hours before their meeting.

- With advance notice of meetings of the NSC Principals' or Deputies' Committees, intelligence officers have provided briefing papers, talking points, and tailored reporting to support policy discussions.

Encouraging Participation. A number of policymakers have brought intelligence officers directly onto their teams:

- Rotational assignments of intelligence officers to policy agencies have benefited both intelligence and policy organizations. One former NSC senior director had both CIA and DIA officers on his staff.

- Many policy officials invite intelligence officers to senior staff meetings. Others ask intelligence representatives to travel with them, to contribute "think pieces" for their private use, or to meet informally to discuss current developments.

Policy officials have used intelligence officers as soundingboards, relying on their discretion to protect policy ideas in the formulation stage:

- Before his death in the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, Robert Ames, National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Near East, was a key member of the backstopping team on US policy toward Lebanon. Ames's contribution was unique because he was a manager of analysis who also had many years of operational experience.

- One NSC Staff senior director convened an informal weekly meeting of policy and intelligence officers to share information and brainstorm issues. No notes were kept, and no policy positions were taken.

Asking Questions. Policy officials have found it useful to lay out tasks and requirements to take advantage of the specialized resources available to their intelligence counterparts. In addition to assistance in obtaining information on short-fuse issues, intelligence—with appropriate guidance—can provide insights about over-the-horizon policy concerns:

- While they concentrated on short-range issues, policy officials often task intelligence to speculate on mid- and long-term issues that may become more important. One State Department analyst recognized the growing weakness of Philippine President Marcos some four years before his fall.

- One policy official thought of the Intelligence Community as a library. When she needed factual information on analytical insights urgently, she tasked her intelligence counterpart for a quick answer.

Many policy officials have made an effort to involve intelligence officers in conceptualizing issues and developing terms of reference for policy analyses:

- One DCI Intelligence Center has developed a strategic plan to anticipate policy objectives, identify collection and analysis requirements, and report to policymakers on foreign reactions to US initiatives.

- An intelligence organization that was not in the loop was asked to provide a "threat projection" to support a major weapon acquisition decision. The time period of the projection fell more than a decade short of the expected life cycle of the weapon. When criticized, the intelligence officers responded, "That is what we were tasked to do."

Experience has shown that it is also important that policy officials ask questions that intelligence officers can answer:

- "What should I do?" takes the intelligence officer over the line from intelligence to policy. Rephrasing the question as an intelligence requirement will often yield useful insights. "Whom do I have to convince in country X?" or "Under what circumstances would leader Y change his mind?" are examples.

- A policy official in charge of a traveling negotiating team asked for an analysis of the likely tactics of the other country. The analysis showed that the adversary was planning to exploit divisions in the US delegation, and the official reorganized his team members' responsibilities to limit the damage.

Providing Feedback and Sharing Information. Along with specific tasking, the policy officials who made effective use of intelligence have let intelligence officers know whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the support they received. Intelligence officers are used to criticism and debate, and they will accept and profit from direct and frank feedback:

- One former policy official made it clear he wanted to see the working analysts' rough drafts on tasking he posed and not the version varnished by layers of review and editing. The same policy official insisted on exchanges in his office with working analysts as well as their managers.

- Criticism of intelligence analysis in the early 1980s on the proposed Soviet-European gas pipeline permitted intelligence officers to sharpen their assessments and contribute to a shift in US policy from opposing the pipeline to limiting European dependence on Soviet gas.

Policy officials who wanted insightful analysis have also kept intelligence officers informed about important information that may affect their judgments as well as future issues or events:

- One intelligence staff used its knowledge of policymakers' concerns to convene monthly roundtable meetings of analysts and collectors and to produce calendars of future events; the result was reporting better targeted to policy needs.

- Because they were privy to reports from the special envoy, State Department intelligence officers

were able to provide timely support on US policy toward Lebanon in the early 1980s. CIA analysts, however, were not aware of the special envoy's activities, and they could not bring their expertise and sources to bear to meet his needs.

Initiatives by Intelligence Officers

Learning About the Policy World. Whatever steps policy officials may have taken, experience has shown that a major burden of bridging the cultural divide rests with the intelligence officers. Some intelligence collection and analysis units have developed training programs on the policy process. But intelligence officers have been most effective when they had direct experience in the policy process; only then could they anticipate policymakers' needs and develop collection or analytical strategies to support them. Intelligence managers have assigned "fast-track" officers to tours in policy agencies and on negotiating and backstopping teams. Intelligence liaison officers assigned to policymaking agencies have also provided valuable insights:

- CIA liaison officers at policy agencies have met regularly to discuss strategies for supporting their customers. The DI has appointed an officer to be the focal point for liaison support.

- Joint participation in war games and policy simulations has sensitized policy officials and intelligence officers to each others' cultures and contribute to closer working relationships.

Identifying Key Customers. Intelligence agencies have long produced large amounts of reporting and analysis that are disseminated broadly throughout policy agencies. But because of resource limitations, intelligence organizations have found it increasingly necessary to concentrate their support efforts on those policymakers who have the greatest impact on decisions.

In many cases this means focusing on senior officials, but many participants in this project advised that an effective dialogue is required at all levels of the policy process. Several noted that the relationship between intelligence experts and desk-level officers in policy agencies is particularly important, because it is here that the options are formulated for decisions by senior officials.

Intelligence officers have to devote considerable effort to determine the most influential individuals among policy officials. Here, too, liaison officers have helped by identifying who carries the most weight. Successful intelligence officers also have studied writings and public statements of key policymakers, watched them on TV talk shows, and read press reports on both policy issues and Washington politics. Many have worked initially through senior staffs to gain insights into the decisionmaker's priorities and, over time, to gain direct access:

- One NIO used issues raised in a policymaker's speech on regional policy to organize a series of sessions with intelligence analysts and policy officials.

- One important side benefit of the State Department reorganization that is now under way is the empowerment of lower-ranking officers—country directors and desk officers in particular—with greater influence over policy formulation.

Intelligence officers have had to look for matches between analytic or collection strengths and the professional needs of policy officials. Thus, during initial contacts, effective intelligence officers have briefed policy officials with specificity on how intelligence can advance their policy agendas—what services are available on what issues in what formats:

- Initial briefings of new policy officials have included a substantive overview, a summary of available products, and directories and phone numbers of experts in the policy official's areas of responsibility.

- In a first briefing of a new Under Secretary, a senior intelligence officer warned, "Here is an area in which I am going to frustrate you. I will keep you informed of developments, but the outlook is pessimistic, and no one has devised an effective strategy."

Taking the Initiative. One universal recommendation of experienced hands on both sides of the divide is that intelligence officers must take the initiative to establish ties to policy counterparts. Often, the good offices of those with access are used. For example, senior intelligence leaders have set up luncheon meetings with key officials; [3] liaison officers can help—indeed, almost any intelligence professional who has had experience working with the policy officer can facilitate access:

- Many appointees of new administrations served previously in government or have come from academic institutions. Some were well known to former intelligence officers. Others have been accessible through academic colleagues of intelligence specialists.

- Some intelligence organizations have set up informal conferences involving newly appointed policy officials and academic specialists, as well as intelligence officers. These events, especially the opportunity for wide-ranging, off-the-record discussions, have often facilitated continuing relationships.

With or without such assistance, many intelligence officers have taken steps to inform policy officials, especially new ones, of available expertise and services, and to educate them on the intelligence process. Such initiatives have often been tied to a major event, such as a visit by a foreign official or a trip by the policymaker. Intelligence officers have provided briefings for policy officials on the factors affecting the foreign visitor's views or the domestic politics of the countries on the travel itinerary:

- The CIA has long produced brief video profiles of foreign leaders. The objective, according to the head of the analytical office, is to make a policymaker's first meeting with a foreign official seem like the second.

- Other intelligence products highly valued by policymakers have included biographic and personality profiles on foreign leaders, maps and graphics, papers and charts that summarize complex data, and sensitive reports from intelligence sources.

The most effective intelligence officers realize that their information has to be delivered in a form that is useful for the policy official. Because policy officials are action oriented, the most effective intelligence has been presented in formats that are easy to use and at the lowest possible classification level. Generally, intelligence officers should favor oral presentations in conversations where policymakers can ask questions and challenge judgments:

- Intelligence advisers to senior arms control negotiators usually brief them each morning when abroad and visit them in Washington to hand-carry reports and analytical papers of particular interest.

- When briefing policy officials, intelligence officers often have been asked if their information can be used in a public statement or private demarche to a foreign country. Sometimes, intelligence officers have prepared a "sanitized" version of the information in advance.

Sustaining the Relationship. Recognizing that they are operating in a highly competitive "buyer's market," many intelligence officers have assumed most of the burden of sustaining effective ties. Here, responsiveness—tailormade support for the policy official's needs—usually induces reactions that nurture a lasting relationship. In keeping up their side of the relationship, the intelligence officers' access to all-source information provides a key comparative advantage for adding value to the policymaking process:

- Intelligence reporting and analysis has often put in perspective information that policy officials hear from their foreign counterparts.

- Articles in current intelligence publications like the *National Intelligence Daily* have been valuable to policymakers when they provide intelligence not available from the media, including details of foreign military deployments or political insights from agent reports.

Many intelligence officers ask policy officials to identify the media for exchange that suits them best—briefings, bull sessions, written reports—and the mixture of information, explanation, and prediction that provides the most benefit:

- A senior intelligence staff chief supplemented the formal intelligence assessments for his customers with short "private papers" that were not formally coordinated and were focused on current policy debates.

- A CIA operations officer gave the Assistant Secretary responsible for his region an envelope each week containing the 10 best field information reports.

- A newly appointed Deputy Secretary found that his weekly schedule included formal briefings by the heads of departmental intelligence units. One day, he asked his aide, "Who are those people in the back row?" "They're the desk officers—the experts," the aide replied. The Deputy Secretary cancelled the briefings and replaced them with weekly informal chats with the experts.

Regular and frequent exchanges have provided important benefits to the intelligence professional. The policy official, for example, has special knowledge of the alternatives under consideration by the US Government, on the terms of debate among US decisionmakers, and on the information transmitted privately by foreign counterparts. Moreover, exposure to the policymaker's personal analysis of issues can sharpen the intelligence officers' command of the subject:

- Many intelligence officers have developed close working relationships with policy officials by volunteering to participate in evening and weekend meetings, and to carry out supporting tasks, such as keeping the master text of a paper or advising on security matters.

- During the Gulf war, secure teleconferences among intelligence and policy officials were conducted frequently, providing both groups with up-to-date information and ready access to experts from each department and agency.

Stressing Actionable Intelligence. Policymakers are often uninterested in or hostile to the Intelligence Community's predictions. Policymakers look to intelligence primarily for facts. Many report a preference for "opportunity analysis" that helps them implement established policies or develop new ones by pointing to opportunities for using leverage to support US initiatives. Examples of opportunity analysis include:

- A memo prepared for a former President assessing the reasons for anti-US statements by a foreign leader and steps that could be taken to ameliorate his hostility.

- An assessment of public opinion in a key country and suggested themes for a US public diplomacy campaign.

- A cataloging of the strengths and weaknesses of a potential military adversary, together with suggestions on how to exploit the weaknesses.

In most relationships, timeliness has been all but synonymous with responsiveness in the policy official's mind. For some accounts, secure fax machines have also met the standard of timeliness. Examples of timely intelligence support include:

- Quickly disseminated, lightly annotated reports affecting the dynamics of a negotiation.

- Customized support cables for traveling officials.

- Regularly updated data sets, graphics, and biographies.

'What If' and "Low Probability–High Impact" assessments and other forms of alternative analysis have also provided vehicles for adding value to the policymaking process.[4] Under circumstances of high uncertainty and policy sensitivity, they help place the focus on the policymakers' questions and concerns.

Some Special Issues

Multiple Voices and Information Overload. Policy officials are sometimes confounded by the multiplicity of intelligence officers and organizations that clamor for attention. And nearly all the policymakers

interviewed for this project complained about the deluge of intelligence reporting and analysis that they receive. They have been particularly critical of intelligence that is too general, that adds little to what is available from open sources, or that is hard to use because it is too highly classified.

The support that a policymaker requires, and the appropriate contact within the Intelligence Community, varies depending on the issue, specific information needs, or personal considerations. Departmental intelligence organizations such as the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence components of the military services are close to officials in their departments, can provide support quickly, and are sensitive to departmental concerns. National intelligence organizations such as the CIA have collection and analytical responsibilities that transcend the requirements of any single department. The CIA was created specifically to provide intelligence that was independent of the departments' policy agendas.

The National Intelligence Council, with its NIOs, is responsible for producing National Intelligence Estimates that draw on the analytical resources of the entire Intelligence Community. NIOs, who specialize in regions or functional issues, come about as close to "one-stop shopping" as can be found in the US intelligence establishment; they can provide a window into all the elements of the Intelligence Community. They represent the community at policy meetings, and they are conversant with the views of all intelligence agencies. Many develop close and effective working relationships with policy counterparts. DCI Centers for counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counternarcotics and nonproliferation also provide a single focal point for policy support on these issues.

Intelligence officers have to understand the full range of policy needs, to provide feedback to all concerned intelligence organizations, and to tap all the resources of the Intelligence Community. Senior intelligence managers are increasingly aware of the weaknesses of generalized intelligence products and the need to avoid unnecessary duplication and competition. With the prospect of shrinking intelligence resources, these issues require continuing attention.

Dealing with Congress. For Executive Branch officials, there are few experiences more exasperating than seeing a carefully crafted policy initiative undercut because of intelligence reporting that fosters opposition from the Congress. Yet the Congress is a legitimate intelligence consumer that has become increasingly active.

Our system of government makes struggles between the Congress and the Executive Branch inevitable, intense, and political. Despite its aspirations to objectivity and detachment, intelligence will inevitably be used in those struggles. The disruption has been minimal when policy officials have alerted intelligence to the political sensitivity of issues, and the intelligence officers have informed policy officials in advance of reporting or analysis that may be controversial.

The intelligence officer's commitment to objectivity and to "leveling the playing field" has run into roadblocks when it had to be balanced against the policy official's commitment to advancing the President's program. Intelligence officers have felt a professional obligation to offer the same basic intelligence judgments to all parties, but no similar obligation to report on US policy; indeed, they have generally been reluctant to comment on policy even if asked.[5] When briefing Congressional staffs, for example, the CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff invited State Department representatives to field policy questions.

Intelligence Analysis and Covert Action. Some policymakers have been especially concerned about the objectivity of analysis on regions where the CIA is conducting a covert action, or where senior intelligence officers have expressed strong policy views.[6] This is a concern for intelligence managers as well. With the ending of the Cold War, covert action is likely to diminish in scale; according to DCI R. James Woolsey, the portion of the CIA budget devoted to covert action has declined to 1 percent. But it remains incumbent on intelligence officials to ensure objective analysis regardless of the operational involvement of the Intelligence Community. Policy officials responsible for covert action have been best served when they were appropriately

agnostic, pressed intelligence analysts on the basis for their judgments, and sought out alternative views among informed (and appropriately cleared) critics.

A Final Caution

This report has documented a clear trend toward an increasingly close relationship between intelligence and policy. This is becoming the new orthodoxy, supplanting the traditional view that intelligence should be kept at arms length from policy and concerned principally with the objectivity of its assessments. The authors, and most of the intelligence and policy officials interviewed for this project, support the new trend. But there also is continuing validity in the traditional concerns.

Intelligence managers have to recognize that more effective policy support requires the building and maintaining of expertise. Intelligence officials know that professional knowledge and expertise are their principal assets in the policy process. In view of the new issues now facing the Clinton Administration, the Intelligence Community has to develop the expertise to provide support on topics that previously were low on the scale of priorities or not covered at all.

Similarly, intelligence managers have to continue to foster professional integrity, and they cannot hesitate to render judgments that conflict with policy assumptions. There is a delicate balance to be struck between the intelligence officer's obligations to provide warning of adverse policy consequences on the one hand and to assist policymakers in crafting strategies for promoting US interests under conditions of great risk and uncertainty on the other. This is particularly challenging when the DCI or other senior intelligence officials are deeply involved in policy deliberations and have their own views about policy matters.

The track record of intelligence is far from perfect. Failure to warn of such profound changes as the fall of the Shah of Iran and the 1973 Middle East war indicate a continuing need to strengthen collection and analysis. But these have also been situations from Vietnam to Lebanon in which the insights of intelligence analysis proved to be more correct than the views of officials who were immersed in policy arguments. This suggests a need for intelligence to follow a balanced approach, warning of dangers and helping to identify opportunities.

Policy officials also need to respect the professional objectivity of intelligence officers, and, while using their expertise to the fullest, must not try to make them into policy officials like themselves. To do so would undercut those very characteristics of intelligence officers that make a unique and valuable contribution to policy formation.

NOTES

1. "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers," *Washington Quarterly,* winter 1992. Reprinted in the summer 1992 edition of *Studies in Intelligence.*

2. One former official, particularly successful in using intelligence, used an analogy dear to the hearts of Washington Redskins fans when he called intelligence officers his "analytical hogs."

3. In most administrations, DCIs have had regular meetings with the National Security Adviser and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Feedback from these meetings is an excellent source of information on the issues that these senior officials are focusing on and which officials in their organizations should receive intelligence support.

4. "What If" analysis seeks to determine the conditions that could change the analyst's judgment of the likely behavior of a foreign country; "Low Probability–High Impact" assessments deal with important contingencies that may be unlikely but which would have a major consequence for US policy.

5. This general observation may be less true at the most senior levels, where the distinction between intelligence and policy may be blurred.

6. Former Secretary of State George Shultz has noted in his memoirs that he became so concerned about DCI Casey's policy advocacy that he began to mistrust intelligence analysis in general.

One of time's arrows

The Intelligence Revolution and the Future

Wesley K. Wark

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in the summer 1993 issue of Queen's Quarterly, *a Canadian publication.*

The intelligence revolution is a distinctly 20th century phenomenon, one of the least well understood developments of our time. It began with the surfacing of some extraordinary fantasies into the political consciousness of modern Europe. As the century opened, French society shuddered its way through the scandal known as the Dreyfus affair, in which a French Army colonel of Jewish extraction was accused of spying against the state. The charges were trumped up, but before their fictionality could be revealed they set off a wave of anti-Semitism, heightened by manifestations of French national insecurity (see Bredin).

In Britain, a handful of patriotic and market-sensitive thriller writers seized on the alarms of the day to create both the genre of spy fiction and a panic about the clandestine activities of German spies ready and waiting to subvert the country from within whilst a German Army landed on Brighton Beach. The spy panic had no foundation in reality, but was taken very seriously by the authorities. In response, the British Government strengthened the defence of vulnerable installations in the country, tightened the official secrets laws, created a counterintelligence service (the forerunner of MI5) to uncover the alleged German spies, and constructed a foreign espionage agency (eventually to become MI6) to report on German plans and preparations (which were nonexistent) for invasion of Britain (see French, pp. 355–70). The arrival of a handful of British spies in Germany in the years before 1914, and their inevitable capture by the Prussian police, sparked in turn a German version of the British spy panic. In both cases societal anxiety about espionage and the emergence of fictional images of the dreaded spy preceded the reality.

In Russia, the secret police (the Okhrana) and the underground Bolshevik party played such an intricate game of subversion and surveillance that the identities of the two organizations soon became alarmingly blurred, with Okhrana agents engaged in assassination attempts and other forms of provocation, which were indistinguishable from the "real" activities of their opponents (see Andrew and Gordievsky). The drama of espionage even touched the Canadian psyche. When the Yukon gold rush erupted in 1896, the government took seriously the idea that the inflow of miners, speculators, adventurers, procurers, etc., masked an annexationist bid by the United States. Canada sent its spies south of the border to investigate the activities of a (non-existent) conspiracy known as the Order of the Midnight Sun.[1]

From the beginning, the reality of espionage has been cloaked in fictionality. A public fascination with spying quickly found expression in a Manichean image of espionage both as a force threatening civilization and as a redemptive power whose individual master spies could alter the course of history and save the day. Spy fiction subscribed to this formula from the outset; as a cultural force it was soon joined by the cinema, which projected the myth of espionage from the printed page onto the silver screen.[2] Two of the greatest films of the interwar period, the German film-maker Fritz Lang's *Spion* (1928) and Hollywood's version of the Mata Hari story (1932), starring Greta Garbo, helped sustain the emergent cult of intelligence by portraying a panic-stricken world endangered by spies, and saved in turn by secret agents. The glittering and insouciant Mata Hari presented a special kind of challenge, but Hollywood proved capable of redeeming the world even from the presence of Greta Garbo. Whose day was to be saved depended, of course, on whose day was threatened. The enemy could be the Jew, the foreigner, the not-quite gentleman, the corrupted, the bomb throwers, the women. Why the day needed to

be saved was very much a product of national insecurities that began to mount at the turn of the century. At their heart were fears about the pace of technological and societal change caused by the impact of the industrial revolution.[3] In the wake of its manifold upheavals, traditional measures of the international balance of power were threatened and the domestic structures of government upset.

The industrial revolution begat the intelligence revolution. The consequences included the rise of powerful, expansive, and intrusive intelligence "communities" whose coming both mirrored and helped create the national security state in which we all lived during the Cold War—and whose demise, complete with "peace dividends," may have been prematurely announced.

With so much attention now being paid, at century's end, to recapitulation and to uneasy prophecy about the future, it may be timely, as the contents of this special issue suggest, to consider the nature of the intelligence revolution from as many angles of inquiry as possible. In this essay, I hope to demonstrate the nature and implications of the establishment of intelligence agencies as a permanent fixture of the state. Other contributors endeavor to explicate the widespread impact of intelligence in diverse fields of history, politics, and culture. Above all, it is hoped that the contents of this special issue will go some way to suggesting the kind of force that intelligence services have become through their intervention in global politics, in domestic affairs, and through the ways in which representations of espionage have been shaped for consumption in the cultural marketplace. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the fantastic nature of the origins of modern intelligence services continues to imprint itself on our consciousness; Manichean images about the damning or redemptive missions of intelligence agencies continue to hold sway in public discourse. Yet the very idea of an intelligence revolution suggests that such static concepts are untenable. The intelligence revolution has unfolded at great speed, and continues to speed along, in an uncontrolled, irreversible, and possibly even unpredictable fashion. It is one of "time's arrows," to borrow from Stephen Jay Gould, bringing change to the political and intellectual history of the 20th century.

The linear progression of the intelligence revolution suggested by the Gould phrase is, however, far from smooth and straight. A graph of the revolution might suggest instead an historical roller coaster, the peaks marked by the impact of the three great conflicts of the century: World Wars I and II and the Cold War. In each of these conflicts, states looked to intelligence as a weapon of defence and as an aid to victory. Under the intense pressure of wartime, or quasi-war conditions, the power of intelligence services expanded; their size increased; they moved closer to the inner circle of bureaucracy; they grew more skilled in the performance of their task of threat assessment; and their societal status was affirmed by cultural productions of all kinds. War's end brought demobilization, sometimes of a drastic order, and greater invisibility for intelligence services, but only until the next crisis erupted. In the post-Cold War era, we are perhaps in another period of between-crisis, making it all the more necessary to investigate the workings of the intelligence revolution as it has been, for its own sake, and in order to assess what might come next.

The intelligence revolution's roller coaster ride blurs the structural components that have made for long-term changes. One of these components has been the growth, punctuated by great acceleration in wartime, of the scale of the intelligence enterprise. At the beginning of the 20th century, intelligence services were operated by only a handful of the major powers, were minuscule in size, existed on the peripheries of government bureaucracy, and possessed very little power. Despite what the first generation of spy fiction writers suggested, their sub rosa capabilities were minimal. The contrast with the situation today could hardly be more striking. Intelligence services are nowadays pervasive institutions of the state. They are no longer restricted to a handful of European great powers, but have been exported throughout international society. They have moved into or near the inner circles of decisionmaking. Their scale is, in the case of the major services, quite massive; their reach is global; their data collection capacities generally outstrip their ability to analyze events; and their budgets are staggering. As research centers, intelligence services can even overpower their academic and corporate competitors. The first working computer was developed at Bletchley Park

during World War II as part of the immensely successful British effort to master German codes. Today, there is probably no greater concentration of research and development activities in the field of computer technology than that undertaken by the National Security Agency (NSA), responsible for the monitoring of global, coded communications on behalf of the US Government (see Bamford). As the scale of the enterprise has increased, the clandestinity of "secret services" has increasingly become a polite fiction. Intelligence communities have access to knowledge and power on a scale unimagined by their precursors.

This change has been paralleled by a revolution in government attitudes toward the conduct of foreign and military decisionmaking. The days when princes and cabinets could make private decisions based on their own readings of the international situation, a practice that still lingered at the beginning of the 20th century, are now long gone. The modern condition of permanent national insecurity, the expansion of the international system, and the proliferation of weapons of destruction have forced governments to look increasingly to intelligence services to shape the flow of information about the outside world both for the purpose of long-term planning and for immediate warning. It was one marker of this change that in the late 1940s, in the midst of fears of Soviet expansionism, the newly established Central Intelligence Agency began to be described in official rhetoric as the "nation's first line of defence." This rhetoric has proved enduring; it was reaffirmed by President Bush in 1989 and by Bush's last Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress in April 1992.

The very integration of intelligence assessments into government decisionmaking has introduced, in turn, complex problems in the relationships between intelligence agencies and government, not least to do with the politicization of intelligence to serve the preconceptions of regimes in power, and the employment of intelligence agencies as clandestine and unaccountable arms of executive action. The rise of covert operations, a form of intelligence activism, illustrates this problem in its most brutal form, besides being a phenomenon unimaginable at the onset of the century.

A third and vital component of the intelligence revolution involves massive changes in the application of technology and communications. One of the greatest obstacles to the performance of premodern intelligence services was the slow and unreliable means by which information flowed from the source to the government; this problem was compounded by the fact that intelligence services knew only one way to collect information, namely by relying on reports by secret agents—"humint" in the jargon of modern espionage. Between the days of the classical empires of the Mediterranean world and the 19th century, secret agents performed an unchanging role as the "eyes and ears" of the prince. Since 1900, a great transformation has occurred. Humint remains as one medium of intelligence collection, but its traditional importance has been usurped by new technologies—of signals intelligence (sigint) and machine surveillance (imagery). Signals intelligence is used to vacuum the ether, to search for and unlock the significant messages that flow through a global communications network. Imagery employs devices ranging from spy satellites to spy planes to spy cameras to keep a distant or close watch on activities perceived as posing threats to national security. Sigint and imagery consume big budgets and require great technological application to be utilized; in most cases expense and sophistication keep these instruments out of the hands of all but the largest and most globally oriented intelligence services. A First World/Third World divide thus opens up in the global spread of intelligence. Technology also tends to drive intelligence budgets, determine data flows, and distort priorities for watchfulness. The technological revolution has been so thorough going and so fast paced that it threatens to run beyond the control of intelligence services themselves.

In other ways, too, the technological revolution carries unprecedented dangers. The arrival of new means to collect and process information has helped instill a romantic vision of the perfectibility of intelligence. Sharpen the focus, turn the surveillance dials, and one will have the perfect image, and true intelligence assessment. But no intelligence channel carries all the messages needed by governments, and the result of overreliance on technological wizardry can be complacency, even blindness to threats.

Cases—from the shock of Hitler's Ardennes offensive in the winter of 1944 to the unanticipated fall of the Shah of Iran—attest to this problem.

The technological revolution in intelligence gathering has also bred a memorable dark vision, expressed most alarmingly in the literature of dystopia. George Orwell's novel of warning, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, is rarely thought of as a spy novel, and for good reason. But it contains a frightening picture of the surveillance state and its machinery. Espionage and counterintelligence are fundamental to the survival of the regime of Big Brother, and so powerful as to breed massive corruption and fatalistic compliance. Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* attempts a feminist revision of Orwell's dystopia, complete with an updated Thought Police, "The Eye," who travel the neighborhoods, their blacked-out vans painted with the corporate symbol of a luminescent eye.

The technology of sophisticated, even scarifying data collection has been complemented by a revolution in communications, which has replaced the letter carried by steamship with the phenomenon of simultaneity (see Der Derian). Events and their reportage are no longer separated by weeks or days, but can now occur at the same instance, an experience suddenly translated from the command post to everyone's living rooms by CNN's coverage of the Gulf war. Between supply and demand for intelligence there exists nothing but fiber-optic cable, the microchip, the computer circuit, all a part of the futuristic "cyberspace" of instantaneous communication. The implications of this communications revolution for intelligence, yet another acceleration in a whole series of leaps forward that began with the coming of the telegraph and the wireless radio, have scarcely begun to be appreciated.

The cumulative effect of such changes in the power of intelligence services, their bureaucratic positioning, and their data collection capabilities have enforced a massive paradigm shift in the practice of espionage. But what of societal attitudes toward intelligence, the view from outside looking in? Intelligence services rarely publicize their doings; clandestinity rules. Spy agencies are the last domain of secret diplomacy. Popular culture has instead served as the medium by which the rise of intelligence services to power in the 20th century has been disseminated, understood, and legitimized. Spy fiction, spy films, investigative journalism, TV docudramas, memoirs by veterans of intelligence, popular histories, and, a latecomer, scholarly studies, have all served in varying degrees to shape our knowledge of the clandestine world. In this domain, the linear properties of the intelligence revolution do not appear; the metaphor of "time's arrow" seems less than relevant. Instead, one sees a cyclical phenomenon, in which cultural production alternates between two poles—embracing the world of espionage by celebrating its supposed ability to redeem a complex world in which ordinary, individual citizens are powerless; and then rejecting clandestinity as a dangerous field of corruption of power, morals, and individual rights.

Changes in the genre of spy fiction over the course of the 20th century perhaps exemplify this phenomenon as well as any. The cycles can be briefly sketched.[4] The first generation of patriotic thriller writers, authors like William le Queux and John Buchan, painted a picture of a political world in which justice triumphed and civilization was saved from profound dangers, but only because of the interventions of heroic secret agents. Their fictions were often coded as camouflaged fact, or "faction," a device especially beloved by William le Queux. Then, in the interwar period, Somerset Maugham, Graham Greene, and Eric Ambler succeeded in politicizing the genre, overthrowing its romantic and heroic conventions, and substituting a bleaker vision of espionage as a metaphor for political and moral decay and as a powerless enterprise in a world of heavily armed social Darwinistic states. In the early 1950s, at the height of the Cold War, the cycle turned again, to bring forth Ian Fleming's James Bond, whose manly code sought to save the male gender and the West at one and the same time. But John le Carré and Len Deighton, and a host of imitators, were soon poised to renounce the Fleming mythology and reenergize the vision of espionage as corruptive and futile, with the spy as self-made victim.

The one constant factor in the popular culture portrayal of espionage, amidst the cyclical pattern, has been its emphasis on the individual and on the singular event. Its understanding of history as man-made and indeterminate has thus been at odds with the implications of the intelligence revolution as a series of transformations in power, bureaucratic politics, and technology. Such opposition can be healthy, insofar as it positions popular culture as a critique of intelligence. But the gap that exists between the revolutionary dynamics of the growth of intelligence and the cyclical portrayal of espionage in various modes of popular culture as a microcosm of societal anxieties and ills is large and unlikely to be bridged successfully in the near future. Bridgebuilding might be conceived as a prolonged function of increased openness in the conduct of intelligence, a more publicly acknowledged role for intelligence services in decisionmaking and public education (or propaganda), and an expansion of the serious study, within and without the academy, of intelligence services and their impact on domestic politics and international relations. The most delayed of all the intelligence revolutions has in fact been the scholarly one. The serious study of intelligence began only in the mid-1970s, and remains divided among a whole range of research projects (see Wark, 1993). As this scholarly study expands, the dominant concepts and cliches of popular culture's view of espionage are bound to be challenged. But it would be a reasonable wager to suppose that the public fascination with espionage as a realm of clandestinity, a realm in which selected individuals can escape powerlessness, ignorance, taboos against violence, and even the law, is unlikely to fade away.

To know how intelligence services have changed, and to know how they have been depicted in popular culture, provides little help with another perennial question asked of intelligence services. What about their performance? Are they worth the cost, and the nightmares? In particular, we might ask how well they repaid the investment during the Cold War, when the stakes were high and the bill enormous? From the historian's perspective, it is too early to say. The documents are not in, the passions scarcely cooled, the time for reflection not yet established. But one can turn the question upside down and wonder what the Cold War would have been like without revolutionized intelligence services? In this spirit, Thomas Powers has recently provided one subtle accounting. In a review essay in the *New York Review of Books*, Powers used a wrestling metaphor to denote the role of the two great adversaries in the Cold War intelligence contest:

> Intelligence services touch, watch and listen to each other at a thousand points. The intimate knowledge revealed by the wrestler's embrace freed both sides from the ignorance, rumor and the outbreaks of panicky fear that spark big wars no one wants. (Powers, p. 55)

Powers's persuasive answer begs, however, another question. How useful is it to think analogously about intelligence services, and just what are the best metaphors? This becomes an important issue, particularly when one considers the predictive function of intelligence. Is intelligence akin to the physical sciences—is it like meteorology? Is it at its best making behavioralist, structural, or evolutionary forecasts?[5] Here the standard metaphor of intelligence—that of the jigsaw puzzle—belies the weakness of the predictive scope of espionage assessments. For puzzles have only one outcome, and the construction of the picture does not depend on an exercise of imagination and knowledge concerning the many possible faces of the finished product, but simply on mechanical skill.

We do not yet possess any thorough study of the discourse of intelligence, though the link between intelligence failures and such conceptual traps as mirror imaging and worst case analysis have been identified.[6] One interesting avenue for exploration has been suggested by the concept of "chaos" as applied to natural science, and more recently to international politics.[7] Intelligence services, chaos theory would suggest, live in an indeterminate and unpredictable world. Their record at prediction is bound, for that reason, to be spotty. Intelligence failures are also bound to be inevitable, and to occur with something like the same frequence as weather forecasting errors and firefighting miscues. To return to the Thomas Powers quote, it may not be a question of what intelligence services get right, but rather of what large-scale disastrous misunderstandings they might help to prevent.

Whether to avoid the worst of misunderstandings, or to engage in something more positively ambitious, intelligence undoubtedly has a future. It is a future secured on the basis of the forward-thrusting momentum of an ongoing intelligence revolution, and on an accumulative historical precedent that has cemented the identification of intelligence and national security, for better or for worse. The interesting questions are: what exactly will intelligence services do in the future? And what will we make of what they do?

What intelligence services will do will depend on the nature of changes that we can only glimpse, but which are already under way in the basic definitions of national security.[8] The old concept is fated to be thoroughly undermined. As political sovereignty becomes increasingly a fiction, national security will have to be redefined. Senator David Boren, the chairperson of the powerful Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has already talked in print of the need for the US intelligence community to give thought to sharing secrets with the United Nations, and this is but one straw in the wind (see Boren, p. 57). National security will not in future mean simply the security of the nation-state; rather it will mean the security of a pluralized system of governance, across which "citizens" are likely to spread their loyalties and their appeals for safety and prosperity.

Equally, the concept of threats to whatever becomes the new national security will undergo change. The outbreak of war and violent civil disturbance will remain as dangers, but the relative sureties of intelligence targeting that were a feature of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War will be replaced by an explosion of new threats and challenges to understanding and control. Terrorism has already proved itself to be a difficult target for intelligence services, and will continue to remain so, by its very nature. Nuclear proliferation and the spread of deadly chemical and biological warfare techniques, as the experience of the Gulf war demonstrated, will be high on the agenda for present-day and future intelligence services. The drug trade is newly established as a national security problem, and intelligence services are already being required to deal with it. On the horizon are other threats. One concerns increased competitiveness within a global economy, with unpredictable and wrenching shifts of economic power. The temptation will be great, whatever the implications might be for the classical liberal doctrine of the nightwatchman state, to utilize intelligence services as weapons of advantage in trade wars and as a means to stave off uncompetitiveness and at least delay loss of economic power. Intelligence services engaged in economic spying may in future create a kind of black-market flow of research and development leads, to compensate for lack of capability at home. Fears about ecological degradation may lead to a new role for intelligence services in monitoring environmental change, pollution, and conceivably the enforcement of international legislation. Population flows, whether of legal or illegal immigrants, will also be a national security concern in future, especially as they stem from political or environmental instability abroad. States and other organizations will require advance warning of such population flows in order to effect a balance between resources and demography, and to maintain a fragile civic tolerance. There are even more wonderful scenarios for future CIAs. When UFOs were in the collective mentality, governments in the United States and Canada turned to their intelligence services to assess the reports that piled up on alien spacecraft. Should project SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) ever receive a signal from outer space, there will be yet another role for intelligence services, not in arming the lasers, but in trying to decode the messages.

It is legitimate to ask about this forecasting: why should any of these roles fall into the hands of intelligence services, rather than some other kind of organization? The answer is that intelligence services, historically, fill information vacuums, and will seek out future roles in order to maintain and justify their existence and place in the power structure. A more important answer perhaps arises from consideration of what intelligence services have already become, as a century-long intelligence revolution has worked its changes. They have become, in effect, large, government-directed think tanks, engaged in the business of research and development, armed to the teeth with information technology, and possessing a multiplicity of expensively earned talents. The

old cadre of spies is hardly even the thin end of the wedge. The intelligence officer might be a manager, a computer analyst, a linguist, an econometrician, and so forth. Few are spies, as the term is popularly understood; few would probably want to be. The film *Three Days of the Condor*—starring Robert Redford as a CIA analyst whose job it is to read spy novels in order to extract plots for a giant CIA data base, and who turns into a "real" intelligence agent in order to uncover a nefarious plot—may have been a last gasp attempt to merge the new reality with the old fantasy.

The obstacle to intelligence services providing information on such future threats as outlined above rests not in the arena of their capabilities, but rather in regard to their dedicated preservation of secrecy. Intelligence services love secrecy; in the organizational mentality it is what distinguishes them from other, more mundane bureaucracies, or from the university academic, for that matter. Secrecy also helps insulate intelligence services from criticism. But relinquishing clandestinity will be the price intelligence services will have to pay for an injection of new roles and new mandates in the future. This may be an easier process than it seems. When spy satellites are busy training their cameras and sensors on illicit fishing or whaling boats, when UN spy planes in distinctive blue and white overfly the latest zone of conflict or environmental disaster area, the question of preserving official "national" secrecy will be moot. CIA Director Robert Gates's belief, aired in testimony to Congress on 1 April 1992, that the US intelligence community will in future continue to be "the nation's first line of defense" already has a nostalgic and old-fashioned ring to it. The future, it is safe to say, will not be so like the past.

If the future for intelligence services is hard to read precisely, the same holds true to even a greater extent for the future of cultural responses to espionage. Cold War formulas for the depiction of spying are clearly dead. What will take place? Two guesses might be hazarded: the first is that old formulas will be replaced by nonformulaic treatments. The metaphor of spying as an escape from the homogenization and nondrama of quotidian reality has penetrated deep into the popular consciousness and has already become the subject for treatment in a range of cultural production, including serious fiction, that is well outside the spy thriller genre. A second guess is that the old formulas will be replaced by new formulas, with female spies, counterterrorists, ecological warriors, and nonwestern settings well to the fore. Spies are overdue to appear and capture science fiction. As the historical tradition of modern espionage lengthens and is revealed, the material for historical novels and the romance will become increasingly tempting. It may even be hoped that the more we come to know about intelligence work in the past, the more seriously we will take the role of intelligence in the present and future. The fascination that sustains the cult of espionage will, I predict, remain, but will be altered and perhaps even attenuated by a loss of innocence about what intelligence has been, is, and might become.

NOTES

1. Little more is known. The incident is touched on in Wesley K. Wark, "Security Intelligence in Canada, 1864–1945: The History of a 'National Insecurity State,' " in ed. Keith Neilson and B. J. C. McKercher, *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History* (Westport, Connecticut: 1992).

2. For a capsule survey, see Alan R. Booth, "The Development of the Espionage Film," in *Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence*, ed. Wesley K. Wark, (London: 1991), pp.136-60.

3. This phenomenon is explored by David Stafford in *The Silent Game: The Real World of Imaginary Spies* (Toronto: 1988).

4. These passages draw on an earlier piece: Wesley K. Wark, "Introduction: Fictions of History," in *Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence* (London: 1991), pp.1-16.

5. I am indebted here to the very skillful and wide-ranging arguments of John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93).

6. A valuable study of intelligence failure is Richard K. Betts's, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," *World Politics* XXXI (October 1978), pp. 61-90.

7. The "chaos" concepts in these two areas are examined in James Gleich, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: 1987); and James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Continuity and Change*, (Princeton: 1989).

8. For another account of the future role of intelligence, see Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security* (Princeton: 1989), ch. 7.

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Problems and alternatives

Government Spying for Commercial Gain

Mark Burton

With the end of the Cold War, the roles and missions of US intelligence organizations are under scrutiny. Assumptions that presuppose the primacy of economic competitiveness in the post–Cold War era are spurring a reevaluation of the traditional view that the US Government should not use its intelligence assets to give US companies competitive advantages over foreign firms. Analysis of the concept of such government-sponsored industrial spying, however, reveals numerous potential problems. These include legal issues, limited cost effectiveness, multinational corporations and, potentially, an increased risk of international conflict if such actions are pursued aggressively. Nevertheless, other countries are doing it, US companies are victims of it, and the US Government has to decide what to do about it.

For the US, the options range from maintaining current policies to enacting drastic measures, including high import tariffs or economic sanctions, against those countries whose governments spy on US businesses. A more reasonable alternative would be the establishment of one or more international agreements between the US and its allies—and possibly other countries—that would restrict governments from using their intelligence capabilities to spy for commercial gain.

Other Categories of Economic Intelligence

Before examining problems and alternatives, however, it is important to distinguish between different categories of economic intelligence. These other categories should not be confused with a government's use of its intelligence assets to spy on foreign businesses and the passage of their information to national commercial enterprises for competitive advantage.

"Traditional" Economic Intelligence. What could be termed the "traditional" approach is one in which US intelligence organizations collect and analyze economic data on behalf of US Government decision-makers. Unlike government-sponsored industrial spying, the traditional approach does not provide intelligence to private individuals or corporations to enhance their competitive status. Instead, the main objective is to supplement political and military data on target countries to obtain the best possible assessment of current conditions and indicators of future trends.

The traditional approach is perhaps best depicted by Sherman Kent in his classic text, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy,* first published in 1949. Regarding economic intelligence, Kent asserts that intelligence reporting has to be aware of new economic doctrines and track national policies and economic developments in other countries.[1] Kent continues:

> . . . it must watch for new crops and the development of new methods of agriculture, changes in farm machinery, land use, fertilizers, reclamation projects, and so on. It must follow the discovery of new industrial processes, the emergence of new industries, and the sinking of new mines. It must follow the development of new utilities and the extensions of those already established. It must follow changes in the techniques and implement of distribution, new transport routes and changes in the inventory of the units of transportation . . .[2]

This is the brunt of Kent's view of economic intelligence. He shows that the scope of "traditional" economic intelligence is broad, but nowhere does he mention support for private commercial interests.

Advocates of government spying for commercial gain might point out that Kent deliberately deals only with "high-level foreign positive intelligence" in his book and that this restriction necessarily precludes industrial spying. Kent states, however, that intelligence is "the knowledge upon which we base our high-level national policy toward the other states of the world."[3] This does, indeed, exclude support to private commercial enterprises. The absence throughout the book of any reference to such commercial support implies that Kent did not believe government industrial spying should be used for commercial gain.

Traditional economic intelligence is still important today. During his April 1992 testimony to Congress, then Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates summarized some of the results of National Security Review 29, signed by President Bush in March 1992. According to Gates, "financial and trade issues and technological developments that could adversely affect the United States were considered of major importance."[4] Gates also noted that "policymakers identified new requirements . . . indicating that the Intelligence Community has a wider range of customers than ever with interests that extend beyond traditional natural [sic] security concerns."[5] Despite the importance of economic issues and the expansion of traditional national security concerns, however, Gates did not advocate that the US Intelligence Community supply US businesses with intelligence data on foreign industries.

Business Intelligence. Business intelligence does include spying to support commercial interests; in fact, that is the whole point. While a great deal of business "intelligence" involves overt acquisitions of data, spying does occur. As noted in a 1991 business magazine article on corporate spying:

> Trade-secret laws bar acquiring data through "improper means" such as theft. But the line between what companies legally may do and what they ethically should avoid is fuzzy. Questionable tactics include posing as a reporter to get into a rival's boardroom or hiring a plane to look over its plant . . .[6]

The difference between this category of economic intelligence and that of government spying for commercial gain, however, is that business intelligence does not involve government.

Gray Areas. There are gray areas in which businessmen may provide information to their country's intelligence service regarding foreign competitors or clients. Conversely, defense contractors or other national security-related businesses may be provided government intelligence data because they are required for a special project, such as the development of a weapon system. But in both of these cases, intelligence is being used for national security purposes and not for commercial gain. In the case of a defense contractor, the contract and, hence, profit, has already been obtained. The intelligence information is simply being used to improve the characteristics of a given system being produced by the contractor.

Some Problems

Distinguishing between these different categories of economic intelligence is important because the traditional and business categories do not pose the problems that government spying for commercial gain does. The difficulties in resolving these problems support the argument that the US Government should not use its intelligence assets to collect intelligence for private commercial interests, even if other countries do.

Legal Issues. Even if one ignores problems arising from violations of international trade and patent laws—because they are essentially unenforceable—domestic legal issues will have to be addressed. For example, like any government resource, intelligence assets are funded with tax dollars. Would it be legal—and fair—for the government to use taxpayer-provided resources to benefit private corporations directly and, hence, private citizens? Is it constitutional for most citizens to pay the government so that a select few can profit from it?

The argument can be made that industries and technologies "critical" to US national security should be given special treatment by the government, especially when foreign governments are using their own intelligence assets to undermine US businesses. This would, however, require an extremely liberal interpretation of the Constitution's provision that the government promote the "general welfare."

A more difficult issue, if the above argument is accepted, would be that of determining exactly which industries and businesses would receive intelligence assistance. One former US intelligence official was quoted in a 1992 newspaper article as asserting:

> . . . that intelligence agencies believe it would be impossible to distribute such data fairly among US companies and that it might lead foreign intelligence agencies to retaliate by stepping up their spying on US companies abroad.[7]

Another legal question would be deciding who would have the authority to determine which companies could receive intelligence data. What would be the legal basis for this authority? Moreover, what would be the legal precedent for government support to private business outside the intelligence arena?

The answers are not clear. Any attempt to distribute intelligence would be complex. And issues of fairness would most likely lead to lawsuits and costly court battles in which companies vie for "national security" status and, thus, intelligence privileges.

One possible solution to the legal questions of distribution would be to give all US companies intelligence privileges. This, however, would be a logistic nightmare, particularly from a security perspective, and the financial costs would be enormous.

Cost Effectiveness. Some estimates state that spending for the current "traditional" approach to intelligence was about $19.2 billion in 1990.[8] Expanding intelligence support beyond government consumers would likely prove to be even more expensive. This calls into question the cost-effectiveness of any program in which the government supplies intelligence to US companies.

There is no guarantee that government-supplied intelligence would enable US companies to compete successfully against foreign companies. As noted in a *Business Week* article on the subject, "economic intelligence isn't a silver bullet that will magically improve US competitiveness. Careful attention to quality, management, and the market count, too."[9] Furthermore, such intelligence support could actually damage long-term US competitiveness by discouraging innovation and creating a dependence on foreign firms. Although difficult to prove, precedent for this may be found in other countries.

The former Soviet Union, for example, had a long history of successful spying on Western industries, yet it was not able to keep up with the pace of Western technology. Nonetheless, Russian intelligence still touts the value of industrial espionage.[10]

France also spies on US companies, and one press article claims that "a secret CIA report recently warned of French agents roaming the United States looking for business secrets."[11] The value of such intelligence operations is unclear, however, especially when balanced against operating expenses and the political costs of possible discovery. The same article noted that the French intelligence budget was increased by 9 percent for 1992—despite the end of the Cold War—and that the FBI delivered protests to Paris after French intelligence was found to be operating against IBM and Texas Instruments.[12] It is hard to determine just how much the French have truly gained from their "intelligence-for-profit" activities, and whether or not the gains have exceeded the costs incurred.

A former trade negotiator, Michael B. Smith, claims that "other countries have active intelligence programs directed against our companies to give their companies a leg up. We ought to emulate them."[13] Stansfield Turner, a former Director of Central Intelligence, appears to agree. He argues that, "We steal secrets for our military preparedness. I don't see why we shouldn't stay economically competitive."[14]

The Soviet and French examples, however, call into question the validity of this argument that US intelligence should spy on behalf of US companies just because other countries engage in the practice. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to perform an accurate cost-benefit analysis. There is a strong possibility, however, that the additional money spent on such intelligence collection might produce better results if it were spent on improvements in education, research and development, or other areas which could, in the long term, help to increase US economic competitiveness.

Multinational Corporations. The problems associated with legal issues and cost-effectiveness are aggravated when dealing with multinational corporations. In drafting legislation to allow government intelligence collection on behalf of US companies, how would multinational corporations be handled? Would it be cost-effective for the government to collect and give intelligence data to a US-based multinational corporation, only to have the US headquarters pass the information along to its divisions abroad? But if multinationals are excluded, would not their US divisions then be put at a competitive disadvantage by their own government? Moreover, what are the legal implications of, for example, the CIA spying on a foreign-based division of the Ford Motor Company?

These problems regarding legal issues, cost-effectiveness, and the special case of multinational corporations indicate that implementing a government "intelligence-for-profit" program would be an arduous task of questionable merit. Another problem with government commercial spying that is broader in scope and more difficult to define may be the most important: the danger of increasing the risk of international conflict.

The Prospect of International Conflict. Competition among businesses is good, but among countries it is not necessary. Indeed, government involvement in commercial competition can be dangerous. If they cannot compete, companies can reduce their size or go out of business, but countries cannot. Furthermore, unlike companies, countries have the ability to tax and to raise armies. This presents two potential problems: taxation to subsidize government-backed commercial interests can incite anger in other countries and foreign companies, with retaliatory subsidies angering the original subsidizer; and countries, because they cannot simply declare bankruptcy and go out of business, could resort to armed conflict if they fear a significant failure in the realm of commercial competition. Add to these the uncertainties associated with political leaders—whose egos might not allow them to consider relinquishing power just because of economic woes—and the danger of "business-induced" international conflict becomes readily apparent.

Government intelligence collection for commercial gain is a high-risk strategy because it only encourages such national economic rivalries. If it is pursued vigorously, it could lead to international conflict. The US has the opportunity to lead the international community away from such conflict and toward those free market principles that prevailed over socialism during the Cold War. A truly free international market will probably not be achieved in the near future, but it is an admirable goal.

If the US were to adopt an "intelligence-for-profit" approach, it would be sending potentially antagonistic signals to its allies and all of the other members of the international community. Still, the problem of *other* countries using this approach remains.

Gates, for example, has warned that nearly 20 foreign governments are carrying out economic intelligence gathering that harms US interests.[15] In addition, R. Patrick Watson of the FBI has said that "we're finding intelligence organizations from countries we've never looked at before who are active in the US."[16] Gates adds that foreign intelligence agencies of traditionally friendly countries "are trying to plant moles in American high-tech companies [and] search briefcases of American businessmen traveling overseas."[17]

For now, the US does not appear to be willing to engage in such practices, but it will take defensive measures. According to an April 1992 press report concerning Gates's testimony before a Congressional panel:

> Some members of the panel pressed Gates to help US companies by seeking out commercial secrets of foreign competitors. But in his testimony Gates ruled that out, saying the CIA would limit itself to helping US companies safeguard themselves against foreign intelligence operations.[18]

There are several alternative options to Gates's approach, however, that the US can take, including more active measures.

Alternative Approaches

It is reasonable to argue that Gates's defensive approach is wise, especially for the short term. But counterintelligence measures merely combat the problem without removing its cause. In the long term, the US would benefit if it could develop a more substantial solution to eliminate the cause of the problem.

Retaining Traditional Measures. This does not mean that traditional economic intelligence or defensive measures should be dropped. As Gates noted in a December 1991 speech, US intelligence has:

> ...long assessed key aspects of international trade and economics, with special focus on foreign technological developments as well as on countries or governments that try to steal our technology or seek unfairly or illegally to disadvantage American business. These economic challenges to the United States will grow, and we in intelligence must play our appropriate role in helping the government to meet them.[19]

This "role" for US intelligence in the economic sphere is a reasonable one. It can be carried out without providing select private individuals or businesses with intelligence that would give them a competitive advantage. The US could stop here, which would essentially mean maintaining the status quo as far as economic intelligence is concerned. If the role of US intelligence should stop at this traditional level, however, what alternatives are there outside of the intelligence arena to constrain other countries from pursuing government-sponsored industrial spying for commercial gain?

Economic Reprisals. One possible way to deter other countries from using their intelligence resources for industrial espionage against the US is to pursue some form of economic reprisal against offending states. A somewhat obvious difficulty would be determining, and then publicly proving, that a suspected country's intelligence service was spying on US companies for commercial gain.

Even if such activity could be proved, choosing an appropriate response might be difficult. Would high import tariffs be appropriate? Under some circumstances, the imposition of such tariffs by the US might spur retaliatory tariffs by the offending country and possibly its allies, and prove to have a detrimental effect on US exports to those countries. In short, would the "cure" of high tariffs be worse than the overall "affliction" of foreign spying on US business?

More extreme measures, including economic sanctions, might increase the risk of international conflict even more than industrial spying. Economic reprisals, then, do not appear to be a practical alternative to government spying for commercial gain. The problems associated with these reprisals, however, do demonstrate the increased potential for conflict caused by "intelligence-for-profit" pursuits by highlighting the frustration that can be faced by a country that is being victimized.

International Agreements. International agreements might be a more acceptable alternative to government-backed commercial spying. The US could pursue such agreements in a number of ways. One would be a single treaty that any country could sign if it so desired, with each signatory pledging not to use its intelligence services to spy on any of the others for commercial gain. Other approaches could include bilateral or multilateral agreements, particularly between the US and its strongest allies.

Such agreements would be preferable to unconstrained government-sponsored commercial spying not only for the US but also for all signatory countries. They do not entail the moral, legal, financial, and logistic difficulties associated with this particular type of spying and with the distribution of the intelligence, once it has been collected.

In addition, such agreements would limit the potential for conflict by providing a formal and predetermined means of response if one of the signatory countries is suspected of such spying. This would eliminate the need for unexpected antagonistic economic reprisals. Such agreements also would provide assurances to otherwise potential economic rivals that governments would not use their intelligence resources to achieve competitive advantage.

Moreover, these agreements could include statements acknowledging the role of traditional economic intelligence. This could be seen as a loophole, however, so the signatories might prefer not to mention it at all, leaving it with the status of an unspoken assumption. But any government probably would not be willing to give up its capability to assess the economic status of other countries for its own national security (noncommercial) purposes.

The agreements could contain provisions for cooperative defense measures to be taken against nonsignatories that use their intelligence services against the businesses of one or more of the signatory countries. These measures could include "tip-offs"—or more substantial intelligence sharing—regarding offending countries and retaliatory actions, including joint diplomatic protests or trade restrictions. For agreements to be effective, however, these additional provisions would not be absolutely necessary.

It could be argued that intelligence collected by businesses would pose a problem for such agreements. This would be especially true concerning any agreement involving the Japanese, who purportedly do most of their economic spying using business assets.[20] Strictly speaking, this type of intelligence would not have to be addressed in these agreements.

The issue of businesses providing intelligence to their respective governments, however, would be a contentious one. Signatory governments could agree, perhaps, that such intelligence would be allowed as long as it is not redistributed to other companies.

This might be especially difficult for Japan, given the purpose of its Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI). As a result, Japan might have to limit its participation in such agreements or reassess the purpose and functions of MITI. Overall, though, the issue is resolvable, as long as the countries engaged in the process are sincere in their efforts to restrict government involvement in industrial spying.

Conclusions

While current US policy, as recommended by Gates, does not include providing private business with government intelligence data for commercial gain, the question is apparently still open. It is a valid question and not simply a search for new missions by intelligence organizations seeking to preserve their budgets.

Nevertheless, the problems associated with legal issues, cost-effectiveness, multinational corporations, and the increased risk of international conflict indicate that government-sponsored spying for commercial gain is not worth the effort. Defensive counterintelligence policies aimed at combating foreign intelligence in the economic arena are worth continuing, but they are not a true long-term solution to the problem.

The formulation of one or more multinational agreements is, perhaps, the most reasonable long-term approach to take. Just as countries have developed treaties to reduce the dangers associated with military rivalry, so too can they develop mutual understanding and agreements regarding economic rivalry. Such agreements, if taken seriously, could foster an international environment in which economic competition would not be the harbinger of conflict among nations but would instead be the stimulus for business innovation and improved living standards worldwide.

NOTES

1. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 34.

2. Kent, pp. 34-35.

3. Kent, p. 3.

4. Robert Gates, testimony before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee and the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on "Intelligence Reorganization Legislation," 1 April 1992 (from a *Reuters* news transcript, 1 April 1992).

5. *Ibid.*

6. Michele Galen, Joseph Weber, and Stephanie Anderson, "These Guys Aren't Spooks. They're 'Competitive Analysts,' " *Business Week,* 14 October 1991, p. 97.

7. John Burgess and John Mintz, "CIA, FBI Chiefs Warn Panel Over Economic Espionage," *The Washington Post,* 30 April 1992, section B., p. 13.

8. Amy Borrus, et al., "Should the CIA Start Spying for Corporate America?" *Business Week,* 14 October 1992, p. 96.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Alexander Chernyak, "Agents Tout Value of Industrial Espionage," *Pravda,* 28 February 1992, pp. 1 and 3.

11. Douglas Waller, "The Open Barn Door," *Newsweek,* 4 May 1992, p. 7.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Borrus, et al., p. 7.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Burgess and Mintz, sec. B., p. 11.

16. Waller, p. 7.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Burgess and Mintz, sec. B., p. 11.

19. Robert Gates, "The Future of American Intelligence" (A speech to the Intelligence Community), 4 December 1991.

20. Borrus, et al., p. 96.

A CIA officer-in-residence

Taking Care of Business

David W. Overton

During the 1992-93 academic year, I was an officer-in-residence for CIA at the Amos Tuck School of Business, an MBA-granting institution at Dartmouth College. In that time, I:

- Conducted my own course on the political economics of the transforming socialist economies.
- Cotaught courses on the international environment of business and Japanese business systems.
- Served on the steering group for a program in leadership development for undergraduates.
- Lectured to a course for Ph.D. candidates in engineering.
- Lectured on economic conditions in Eastern Europe to a student club composed mostly of East Europeans.
- Helped host a total of 10 Russian economists searching for the holy grail of capitalism.
- Teamed with a Russian graduate student to present a two-part program looking at the effectiveness of Boris Yeltsin as a national leader.
- Talked with and counseled seven residents of former Communist countries on learning and living in the United States.
- Helped design and present (with guest speakers) a three-session program on how the Agency looks at leadership challenges and effectiveness around the world.
- Authored a review article for a brand new publication, *Global Competitor*, that is a collaborative effort between Tuck School and the Fletcher School of Tufts University.

In the process, I learned a good deal about what some well-educated Americans and foreigners think about the Agency. I had the chance to observe some of the best of US higher education in action. I also had some time to think about how American businessmen view the changes taking place in the world today. And, on the lighter side, I found myself in a few situations that seemed decidedly out of the ordinary for an Agency employee.

It is worth keeping in mind that, unlike many officers-in-residence, my purpose at Tuck was not to teach a course on intelligence and its relation to policymaking. I was billed as an economist who could make useful comments on the international environment for business. Like all other officers-in-residence, I foreswore recruiting and intelligence gathering while I was in the program.

I should also underscore that I found the year in academe and—especially at Tuck—enormously rewarding. I had a good time, learned a lot, met many fine professionals in teaching, and was gratified by the general appreciation for candor and intellectual rigor I encountered among colleagues. I also came away with a deeper understanding of how US business is trying to adjust to a rapidly changing international environment, and, in that light, is willing to support and assist US business schools in many ways.

The School

Dartmouth College, from which I graduated in 1961, is the ninth oldest college/university in the United States. The Tuck School is the oldest graduate school of business in the world, beating out Harvard's similar institution by eight years. Across the street from Tuck is the Thayer School, the oldest professional school of engineering in the United States.

In recent years, Dartmouth has been much in the news for political demonstrations on campus and for the high jinks that have surrounded what the press refers to as "the college newspaper," *The Dartmouth Review.* The distinguishing features of this newspaper are its hard rightwing editorial opinions and its generally confrontational tone. Once you get to Dartmouth, it does not take long to discover that there is a rich assortment of student activities, of which *The Dartmouth Review* is just one. In fact, most natives think of *The Dartmouth*, the much older newspaper, as the campus newspaper, even though it is, in any given year, likely to be only one of a half-dozen student newspapers.

Seen from the distance, Dartmouth, therefore, appears at once old and rowdy. If you were going there expecting the quintessential ivy-draped school with a rich assortment of strange characters, you would be disappointed. If you were operating on the reputation the school has in the Ivy League, you would probably expect to see drunken students littering the central green as you drove into town—and again would be sorely disappointed.

Because I knew much of what I was getting into, I did not harbor too many of the classic misimpressions. In fact, I enjoyed the concern some of my friends and colleagues at the Agency expressed for the danger I was putting myself in by entering a campus that was a free-fire zone between Fascists and Communists, between the Visigoths and the politically correct. I am sure their concerns would have disappeared quickly if they had heard Dean Ed Fox of Tuck welcome the incoming class of '94 with a speech that included a reference to the good fortune they had in having a visiting scholar from CIA for the year.

The Student Body

This is not to say there was no potential for discord. In particular, at the outset I had no clear idea what foreign reactions to my presence might be. About 20 percent of the 350 students at Tuck School come from foreign countries, and there are substantial numbers of foreigners elsewhere on the Dartmouth campus. In fact, over half of the students in a graduate engineering course to which I spoke twice were from foreign countries, including seven students from the former Soviet Union and one from China.

A clue to the likely behavior of most of the American business students was that, on average, they had been out in the working world, mostly in business, for five or six years before they enrolled at Tuck. As someone who had had a fair amount of interaction with US business through Agency programs, I was confident that we enjoyed a good reputation with this audience. And, if I had to hide in someone's hall locker, I had one colleague from the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) who was enrolled in the first year and another student whose aunt had been my supervisor at Headquarters.

Mixed Reactions

During the year at Tuck, I learned that this brand of business student—and almost all other students I encountered at Dartmouth—will suspend disbelief long enough to listen to someone from the Agency discuss substance and thereby learn indirectly about us. The few uncomfortable moments I had on campus were almost entirely with faculty members, and those episodes did not amount to much. One Tuck faculty member, an Indian national, was disquieted by my presence, although he was never anything but courteous to me. I offered several times to help with the international aspects of what he was teaching, and I was routinely turned down. On the other hand, two US-naturalized Indians on the faculty were both friendly and eager to talk with me.

Some few of the undergraduate faculty with whom I came in contact expressed surprise and discomfort with my place of employment, but they were largely outnumbered by others who had no problem. One American economics professor with whom I had numerous pleasant exchanges went ballistic when I suggested I could help with her course, but an Englishman and two Israelis in that department were happy to interact with me professionally. An Hispanic in the economics department was the person who arranged for me to speak to the East Europeans about their economies.

One of the strangest experiences I had with faculty uncomfortable with my presence was an event that involved a visit by two Russian economists. The Russians were being hosted in their travels around the United States by a Dartmouth alumnus who was a former student of an economics professor I had known for about 20 years. The economics professor, a former Agency employee, invited me to participate in the Russians' visit, and I arranged for them to field questions from my students. I did not discover until the last moment that the event was being cosponsored by an organization whose leaders had already made it plain they did not like the idea of a CIA employee on campus. When I showed up at their luncheon, the first three people I met were students from former Communist countries to whom I had lectured in one context or another. The students, who were outgoingly friendly to me, did not know the leaders of the organization, so I ended up introducing them. In the circumstances, it would have been rude to ignore me, so the people who did not care for my presence were civil.

One program that looked like it had promise at the outset and then faded was a required course for Ph.D. candidates in engineering. The course was designed to encourage them to think about nonengineering subjects so as to avert the tunnel vision that often accompanies intense study in that general field. The associate dean of engineering who was teaching the course invited me to do a unit on key developments in the international economy and, satisfied that I could teach, was willing to have me coteach a unit on weapons proliferation with him. To get a feel for his course, I sat in on a few sessions.

At the end of the term, the dean called me to say that it would perhaps be wiser if I did not plan on participating in the follow-on course in the winter term. I said that was fine, but asked if there was any particular reason. Somewhat embarrassed, he mumbled that some of his students had objected to "being brainwashed by the CIA." I asked if the Russians had been the ones complaining. He replied, "Hell, no. They loved you. It was a couple of the Americans who are pretty naive. But I think they would make enough of a fuss that it would be counterproductive for you to come back." (The associate dean subsequently introduced me to the brightest of his Russian students, who ended up helping me with a few presentations on Russia.)

Foreign students from non-Communist countries seemed comfortable with my presence. The Japanese, who are generally quite reticent in the US business school environment, did not seek me out, but they were forthcoming in group and one-on-one discussions. One of the first foreign students to make a point to drop by my office to talk with me was a Frenchman who went out of his way to say that he thought having someone from intelligence on a business campus was a real asset, a viewpoint that apparently was shared by his several countrymen in the program. In the three courses in which I participated regularly, I interacted with 23 foreigners out of a total of 78 students. This included several who were in more than one course. Because these were electives, they could have opted out if they were truly ill at ease with me.

Reasons for Receptivity

I believe there are several reasons why some students found it easy to accept me:

- I knew how to teach and knew my material.
- I memorized the names of any students with whom I was ever in contact and addressed them by name when I saw them in the halls.
- An invitation to do one unit of a required first-year course got me broad exposure to about 150 students, who apparently liked the unit.
- The students were eager to listen to people who had had practical experience, as compared with some faculty members who had come directly from graduate school.
- Superb unclassified Agency publications that I used as course material made a favorable impression on the students, as did guest speakers from Headquarters.

The last two points deserve expansion.

Practical Experience. Much of what is taught in business schools is taught by the case method, which provides a large group of people with a common data base around which to reason. The main drawback of the case method, in my estimation, is that it discourages the student from reaching out for other data. And, from the faculty's point of view, once you have absorbed and presented the cases a time or two, you have little incentive to look for new material. This can create an atmosphere in which the range of experiences and examples on which you draw is fairly narrow.

Because the professor with whom I cotaught in two courses had been an academic, a business consultant, and a senior US Government official for 10 years, we had ample opportunity to consider whether the academic or the practical backgrounds seemed to play best to teaching business students. In the two courses for which he was the listed instructor and the one for which I was, we concluded that being able to provide concrete examples of teaching points, knowing where to go to get data, and being able to absorb large amounts of information quickly were assets that depended on practical experience. The students' evaluations of our courses emphasized that these were the characteristics they appreciated most.

Agency Publications and Speakers. The Agency's publications and guest speakers merit additional comment because of the positive impact they had on the faculty and students. My students in the course dealing with transforming socialist economies were taken with the currency and incisiveness of the annual unclassified versions of the presentations to the Joint Economic Committee on the former Communist countries. One Ukrainian learned that I had an unclassified monograph on Ukraine, asked to borrow it long enough to read, and brought it back saying it was an excellent piece of work. To thank a Muscovite who helped me with several presentations at various points in the year, I gave him a copy of the unclassified version of *The World Factbook.* The next day I had a letter in electronic mail from him that said he was in bad shape from so little sleep because he had sat up most of the night flipping through it. One of my students, a native of Harlem and an honors graduate in electrical engineering from Princeton, did some of the background work for his term paper in the *Energy Atlas of the USSR* and returned it to me with a note that said it was a terrific source. (He will be working for a US company helping to develop Russian oilfields.)

I invited several speakers from the Agency, and the response to them was outstandingly positive. Students sought me out to say how much they enjoyed the sessions. I based two of eight final exam questions from which the students had to choose on the presentations of two of the speakers. More students chose to write on these topics than any others. One speaker did a two-hour presentation to a group that included some rather critical observers from a steering group for a leadership course, and the most jaundiced member of the steering group later told me that the presentation was "dynamite."

Strange Happenings

Inevitably, the frequent interaction between faculty and students on which Dartmouth prides itself was bound to yield a few strange occurrences for an Agency employee. Moreover, they took virtually no time at all to materialize.

The first strange event started off simply enough. Tuck School typically gets its faculty and their spouses pointed in the right direction for the new academic year with a first-class reception in the stately Hanover Inn. The food and drink are super, the school picks up the tab, and the attire is business suit or dress. My wife and I had no more than entered the lounge where the reception was being held than a waiter approached us with hors d'oeuvres. A rather outgoing Russian who was obviously working to help cover college costs, he asked me what "Visiting Scholar" on my name tag meant. I told him, neglecting to identify my employer. That was his next question, which I dutifully answered. Emboldened by the experience of meeting his first CIA person, the waiter launched into an energetic pitch for me to buy some astronomical quantity of diesel oil that his relatives were trying to sell. "The oil is definitely there in tanks. The trick is just getting it out of Russia, and I am sure CIA could figure

it out." I had yet to talk to any of the faculty, but I was convinced that those in hearing distance of the waiter were going to be hard to persuade that I was any kind of scholar.

Another fascinating turn was with a Bulgarian who presided over a student activity called "European Entente," the largely East European group to which I had spoken on its economies. After the session, he asked, rather confidentially, if he could come by my office sometime. Reminding myself that, if he asked to sell state secrets, my charter required me to turn him away, I told him he could.

Oleg showed up several days later, knocked on my door, and asked, in a whisper, if he could come in. I said yes again, braced to throw him out as soon as he launched into the state secrets thing. It turned out that his family had access to good wood for construction, and they had asked him to find suitable milling and other equipment to make precut houses. Could I help him hook up with some people to advise him on what US machinery in this line was good? (I subsequently did.) The whisper? He had had a sore throat.

What I Learned About Business Schools

I deserve to be both brief and humble about this aspect of my experience because I was only exposed to parts of the two-year program, and most of what I saw had to do with economics, international business, and communications. I cannot, in good conscience, claim that I know much about marketing, finance, accounting, and a whole range of other business subjects. Nonetheless, I did have several broad impressions of the nature of business education at Tuck School:

Collegiality. The small size of the faculty and the easy access students have to it contribute to a fair atmosphere of collegiality at Tuck. At any point in the year I was there, the faculty consisted of 35 to 40 teachers of various stripe. Most were available most days of the week for students to arrange appointments or drop in.

The interaction between faculty members was a different story. Some worked closely with colleagues with whom they were either coteaching or developing some joint paper or project. Others reflected the introverted behavior that makes for good analysts. Perhaps the most interesting test of their ability to cooperate was faculty meetings, which, in my perception, were consistently too long because some of the participants were either trying to demonstrate their analytical ability or to stake out territory on some issue with which they were associated.

And yet, in fairness, I was impressed with a Tuck practice of sharing around all of the syllabuses for each term so that we could keep abreast of what others were doing and volunteer to help if we saw an area in which we could contribute.

I took advantage of this opening by offering my services to talk about performance evaluation and training in large establishments in a course on human resource development. Conversely, because I had seen a case study done by one of my colleagues on a machine tool plant in Guangzhou, I was able to use it in my spring course.

Economic Literacy. Economic literacy in the US population at large is nothing to brag about. Still, I saw students who had majored in economics as undergraduates, taken solid—required—courses in microeconomics and macroeconomics at Tuck, and still had a hard time understanding the content of a balance-of-payments statement.

The issue here was not the students' native intelligence or willingness to work. By and large, they were generally smart and quick studies. The problem was partly the relevance of economics education in the United States and partly the fact that some economic concepts are best absorbed on the job practicing economics. Five or so years selling computer software systems, working for a brokerage house, or managing a manufacturing process for a US corporation is not necessarily good preparation for economic analysis.

Globalization. The top business schools are very competitive in seeking the best candidates. Tuck routinely ranks in the top six US graduate business schools overall and number one in the satisfaction of its graduates that they got their money's worth.

No US business school that wanted to be remotely competitive would say anything but that it was "globalizing" its curriculum to ensure that US businessmen would be effective in dealing in the rapidly growing American export sectors.

There are two basic ways to score in the globalization game. One is to increase the international cases and examples that are used across the board in the curriculum, and the other is to add more international courses to the offerings. The first is the less costly approach; it is also the less reliable because course adjustments are made during a term to deal with a variety of unforeseen events, and a teacher who is not comfortable teaching international issues will be likely to drop that material first.

The second approach poses some interesting challenges. Do you organize the courses around distinctive features of doing business in particular parts of the world, such as Japan or the transforming socialist economies? Or do you try to teach on topics that have some degree of universality, such as the evolution of international financial institutions or the ways in which you enlist your own government in the process of helping your foreign sales or acquisitions?

The common approach so far has been to try a little bit of everything. The difficulty with this, from the perspective of someone who has spent 30 years analyzing international economic events, is that the sum of the parts does not constitute a whole that is particularly illuminating to the students. Thus, my course on transforming socialist economies was, in my opinion, useful to help people understand what the governments in question were trying to do in the way of economic reform and how it might affect US or other Western businesses. But it did not provide the practical basis for setting up a joint venture in Prague. Moreover, little else in the curriculum would have helped in that regard.

The plain truth is that the "globalization" of US business schools has a long way to go. The good news is that we are not behind the rest of the world.*

Current Intelligence. No surprises here. Still, we need to be reminded from time to time that the Agency and its better customers set a high standard for understanding what is happening around them in the world.

The contrast in criteria for sources between the academic world and the intelligence world is quite striking if you have just come from the latter to the former. The professor with whom I was associated in the fall and winter terms, who had regularly received morning briefings from DI liaison while he was in Washington, was going through withdrawal pains in not having the same sort of information access he had once had. We both marveled at the comparative willingness among both faculty and students (more so the latter, of course) to accept the data or viewpoints of one or another newspaper or journal without digging in to find out how accurate they were on the particular point.

In the student realm, this jibed with a comment made to me by a Dartmouth classmate of mine who had taught at Tuck in the international arena just before I got there. He noted that, had he to do it over, he would organize "prayer breakfasts" in which everyone would come for free croissants and coffee, in exchange for which they would have to agree to read one of the leading business or financial newspapers and be prepared to discuss the key issues with others present so that all would be exposed to more than one source.

Management Training Gap

Having been the Deputy Director for Curriculum at Office of Training and Education for two years, I had a sense of some of the practical courses that

* Editor's Note: Since this article was written, Tuck opened a Center for the Study of Intelligence Business in March 1994.

Agency employees value in the management realm. I cannot generalize for all business schools simply from one, but my best intelligence tells me you should not be surprised if the curriculum at any given business school has little or nothing to say about conducting meetings, dealing with problem employees, or figuring out what kinds of training will be most beneficial to your work force.

Overall, it is my sense that business schools are still struggling with many issues of human resource management and development and how to include them in curriculums. If that is too broad a generalization, it is certainly fair to say Tuck School is still struggling with these issues.

A US Business Perspective

My year in academe provided frequent contact with US business people and required that I do more than usual to stay up with the business press. Because the Agency is still shaping its approach to economic intelligence in relation to US business abroad, what can be deduced from these sources is worth a few words.

There has been a good deal of attention over the last 15 to 20 years directed at business practices of foreign competitors that US citizens believe are questionable from the standpoint of our sense of what is right. This discussion often ends with pleas for clearer "rules of the road" or calls for "a level playing field" among competitors. And, when neither of these outcomes occurs, the arguments shift to retaliation against foreign firms or mimicry of them.

A little time working in the environment of international business quickly leads one to the recognition that there are several different kinds of capitalism, and no one of them has a lock on how the world's economic systems will ultimately be shaped. As someone worrying about how to present ways to understand what was happening in the transforming socialist economies, I soon realized that—despite press and academic assertions that the new capitalist economies would gravitate toward models common in their regions—the jury was still undecided on specific outcomes. We do know, for example, that the Germans have invested a lot of time in developing trade and business ties with Russia, but the Russian central bank is patterned on that of the United States and US investors led the field in new investment commitments in that country in 1992.

The past few years have been an important watershed for the directions in which the international commercial and financial systems are evolving. After extended periods of strong growth, our two major economic competitors, Japan and Germany, have stumbled both economically and politically, leaving businessmen everywhere to ask whether the attention others were paying to these two models was well placed. Meanwhile, the United States is seeing a renewed emphasis on the importance of Latin American markets to our economy, even as we try to sort out the pluses and minuses of a North American Free Trade Agreement.

In the background, important changes continue to be made to the ways in which international financial transactions are conducted, and both markets and instruments for equities in East Asia, the Third World, and the former Communist countries have proliferated.

All of this is putting a premium on US businesses being better informed and smarter about what is happening abroad that may affect them. Unfortunately, business school curriculums are not changing apace, and, on balance, the numbers of people in the US business world dedicated to analyzing foreign events is probably a good deal smaller today than 10 years ago. The good news in this, it seems to me, is that the market for US Government analyses of international business and economics to support our industry is growing and will continue to grow for the foreseeable future.

A basic tension

Openness and Secrecy

David D. Gries

The American system of government is rooted in openness. Article I of the Constitution provides that "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same" and that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published" by the government. When combined with First Amendment guarantees of a free press, these provisions created the basis for open government. The Founding Fathers believed that openness was vital because the Colonies' disputes with the government of King George III taught them that participation of the governed could succeed only if the governed were well informed.

Throughout their history, Americans have relied on free elections, Congressional hearings and investigations, speeches and appearances by executive branch officials, and an inquiring press to make good on the Founding Fathers' promise of open government. Until the start of World War II, Congress and the executive branch openly debated most foreign affairs issues, and the press reported the results. Information about the small standing army was readily available both to Americans and to foreign representatives.

This system worked well until World War II brought the need to keep military plans and the capabilities of weapon systems from enemy eyes. Although Article I of the Constitution permitted Congress to withhold such records "as may in their Judgment require Secrecy," little of this occurred until the war started.

As the war progressed and our national security was threatened, breakthroughs in jet-engine technology, radar, sonar, rocketry, and atomic weapons required special protection. Openness in operations of the legislative and executive branches, previously the guarantors of the Founding Fathers' promise, was sharply curtailed.

Elaborate systems were devised to ensure secrecy, not only for spectacular achievements like reading German and Japanese wartime codes, but also for daily activities of the foreign affairs, intelligence, and military components of government. With the advent of the Cold War, conflict between the old tradition of openness and the new requirement for secrecy became a significant issue.

This conflict continues. According to the President's Information Security Oversight Office, in 1981, at the height of the Cold War, US Government officials were making more than 10 million classification decisions annually, thereby creating an enormous stock of classified documents.

The Reagan administration sharpened the conflict by relaxing regulations requiring periodic review of classified documents for declassification. By 1985 classification decisions had reached an annual rate of 15 million, endangering the open government envisioned by the Founding Fathers.

But, with the end of the Cold War and the decline in direct threats to national security, the need for secrecy has been reduced. Many previously classified national security documents are being released and many newly created documents issued in unclassified form. By 1992 classification decisions had fallen to 6 million.

The Special Case of Intelligence

Intelligence documents, however, are a special case. Intelligence budgets are even exempt from the Constitutional provision requiring public accounting by government agencies. Although the intelligence agencies, like the rest of the government, are starting to

question excessive secrecy, reduced threats to national security have not translated quickly into reduced protection of intelligence from public disclosure.

New standards have to be established on what to release and what to protect. New ways of thinking have to evolve to challenge the intelligence agencies' culture of secrecy. Because intelligence documents are often highly sensitive, however, care has to be taken before releasing them to the public.

During the special circumstances of World War II and the Cold War, the American people were willing to support a permanent, organized, secret intelligence effort and to delegate oversight of its performance to a limited number of members of the executive and legislative branches. Whether the public will continue to support a large intelligence effort in the more benign climate of the 1990s is by no means certain. Because the case can be made only by providing the public with information needed to judge intelligence performance, openness is a necessity. The alternative is to watch intelligence budgets shrink and return to the situation prevailing before World War II, when the intelligence effort was limited, sporadic, and largely unimportant.

Historical Review

To understand the problems associated with reducing secrecy in intelligence, it is first necessary to understand how the current system evolved. Collecting wartime intelligence was a key concern of the Founding Fathers. The Second Continental Congress set up a Committee of Secret Correspondence to oversee espionage operations and appointed Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, among others, as members. Protecting intelligence secrets got off to a bad start, however, when the Committee had to fire Thomas Paine, briefly the Committee's secretary, for leaking classified information. After the Revolutionary War, the intelligence effort lay dormant until World War II, though there were isolated bursts of activity during the Civil War, World War I, and other emergencies.

The National Security Act of 1947 and executive orders issued by administrations since then have codified experiences from World War II and the Cold War and have established a foundation in law and regulation for today's system for controlling intelligence secrets. Many of the basic concepts are drawn from the successful Anglo-American effort during World War II to prevent Germany and Japan from learning that the Allies were reading their codes. The guiding principle of this effort was to limit and control distribution of information. The lesson of concealment was evident in President Truman's 1952 decision to establish the National Security Agency but to keep secret its mission of collecting intelligence from foreign electronic signals.

The advent of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft in 1956 and of orbiting reconnaissance satellites in 1960 created new kinds of intelligence requiring new systems of protection. These took the form of special clearances for those permitted to receive the information and special handling procedures for distributing it. Later, the National Reconnaissance Office was established to manage satellite programs, but the government did not acknowledge its existence until 1992. All these events combined to create an inward-looking culture of secrecy that is hard to change.

Current Needs for Protection

The new standards for secrecy evolving in intelligence agencies reflect the changing circumstances of the 1990s, for intelligence has to respond to the customers it serves and the new foreign policy environment. Today's foreign policy environment is less threatening to our national survival, but it also is less predictable and more complex than in the recent past. Issues are becoming transnational in scope, and coalitions rather than unilateral actors are forming to deal with them. The former Soviet Union, an intelligence target that once accounted for more than half of all intelligence spending, has been replaced by the new targets of nationalism and ethnic violence, proliferation of advanced weapons, narcotics and terrorist activities, economic security, the environment, and regional issues.

New customers for intelligence are displacing old ones as regulatory, law enforcement, and economic agencies compete with traditional customers in the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. Links to policy and military customers are becoming closer and the demand for

actionable intelligence greater, putting pressure on the Cold War principle that intelligence should be closely held, highly classified, and protected from public disclosure during regulatory or law enforcement actions.

Accordingly, to determine what needs safeguarding today, the concept of protecting intelligence sources and methods embedded in the National Security Act of 1947 has to be adjusted to fit the new policy environment and customer base. Among the sources of intelligence, at least three merit protection: clandestine agents who provide the US with needed information, technical collection systems that gather information from space or from sensors, and foreign governments, which volunteer information in confidence.

Similarly, key methods have to be protected. Among them are techniques that clandestine agents use to collect information, capabilities of technical collection systems, location and details of intelligence installations abroad, cooperative relationships with foreign intelligence services, and special analytical methodology.

The task before intelligence agencies now is to build higher fences around fewer secrets, limiting protection only to sources and methods that merit it, while disclosing as much as possible of everything else. To accomplish this, careful consideration of the gains and losses from disclosure has to replace the habit of automatic classification. The bias has to favor disclosure, and classification decisions have to be clearly justified. Only in this way will intelligence agencies be able to serve customers of the 1990s who need unclassified information for use in demarches to foreign governments, in regulatory and law enforcement actions, and in support of military forces subordinated to international organizations. And only in this way can the intelligence agencies help to reduce the conflict between open government and the requirements for secrecy.

Secrets and the 1990s

Although a good start has been made in reducing secrecy in intelligence agencies, a number of problems remain. One is assembling the large numbers of people needed to declassify old documents at a time when personnel budgets are shrinking. Another is finding ways to present current documents directly to the public and the press rather than indirectly under the imprimatur of other government organizations, as has usually been the case in the past.

Imaginative thinking also has to be applied to the question of deciding what old information to make available. For example, environmental scientists want daily satellite imagery of the former Soviet Union going back to 1961 because it contributes to an understanding of land use, soil mechanics, snowmelt, and climate change. Cold War historians want information on major events of the last 45 years. Intelligence archives contain information whose value to the public such experts can determine. But, even with their help, culling tens of millions of documents with limited resources is difficult.

Maintaining permanent intelligence organizations in a democratic society is still experimental. The outcome depends in part on rolling back the culture of secrecy and revealing as much information as is consistent with protecting sources and methods. Intelligence activity, formerly a requirement of the Cold War, is now an issue of new national policy. Like other such issues, it will be decided by an informed public acting through elected representatives.

One sign that progress is being made is the decision of the last two Congresses to cut intelligence budgets less than defense budgets. Another sign is that many foreign intelligence services have turned to Washington for advice on how to open their organizations to greater public scrutiny. Ideas that were first expressed in our Constitution are inspiring them to begin accounting publicly for some of their activities and funds. Although the process of reducing secrecy in American intelligence is painful and progress is slow, the goal of making government more open is worth the effort.

A case study

Lebanon and the Intelligence Community

David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta

Since 1987, the Central Intelligence Agency has funded a program with the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, on Intelligence and Policy. Under this program, which is managed by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, the Kennedy School conducts seminars and develops case studies that help to illuminate issues related to the use of intelligence by policymakers. This article is an abridged version of a case written in 1988 at the Kennedy School of Government.

When the Reagan administration committed US Marines to Beirut International Airport in September 1982, it had the very highest of hopes. The White House meant to use American leadership and power to achieve great things in Lebanon: to end its festering civil war, banish occupying Israeli and Syrian armies, and infuse its battered government and armed forces with the strength they needed to run and protect their country. It meant, along the way, to bolster American influence in the Middle East, win a proxy superpower victory over the Soviet-backed Syrians, and, domestically, banish the "Vietnam syndrome" by demonstrating America's capacity for forceful and resolute action overseas. None of this came to pass. The administration withdrew a year and a half later in near ignominy, with its policy in tatters, Beirut in flames, and more than 250 Americans dead, most of them victims of a devastating and humiliating terrorist bombing.

Throughout America's Lebanon adventure, US intelligence analysts, particularly CIA analysts, were uncommonly convinced that much of the administration's policy was misguided and ill fated. They eagerly awaited the administration's call for a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), the premier instrument of US intelligence analysis, in which they might spell out the evidence and reasoning behind their reservations. While they waited, they pushed other established channels of communication, and their professional proprieties, to the limit in an attempt to get their message through. But dissatisfaction with Lebanon intelligence was almost universal: policymakers felt increasingly ill served, and analysts felt increasingly ill used. The two sides agreed only, if for different reasons, that intelligence analysis was not playing its proper role. The intelligence process may not, in the end, have offered up many insights about Lebanon, but Lebanon, in retrospect, says a great deal about the intelligence process.

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Intelligence and Analysis

In the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the Office of Near East and South Asian Analysis (NESA) was responsible for Lebanon intelligence. The typical NESA Middle East analyst had a graduate degree in some aspect of Middle Eastern studies and an abiding interest in the region's history, religions, and cultures; many understood at least one of the region's languages and had lived in the Middle East at some point.

These analysts were prepared, as was the rest of the DI, both to alert the White House and executive departments to emerging issues of importance and to respond to executive requests for analysis on any particular topic. A constant stream of different and carefully defined intelligence products, known to analysts as "artforms," flowed out of NESA. Most elemental were "talking points." CIA personnel routinely performed dozens of briefings every day (the most important usually being those that always began National Security Council meetings); talking points were typically a few topical items—the intelligence equivalent of a TV headline update—singled out by Agency analysts to be highlighted in those

briefings. Talking points generally ran to hard fact, with a minimal interpretive gloss: for instance, that a particular Lebanese militia had just moved heavy weapons within range of the Marines' airport positions. It was then up to those being briefed to decide what they made of it all.

One step—but a giant step—up from talking points were the intelligence community's two morning "newspapers," the *President's Daily Brief* (PDB) and the *National Intelligence Daily* (NID). These were very similar, the major difference being that the PDB went only to the president and vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was very secret both in theory and in fact, and thus routinely contained information of very high classification. The NID circulated as well to a large number of senior policy-makers and members of Congress, was secret in theory but somewhat less so in fact, and was therefore written more circumspectly. These artforms ran about 15 pages each and were heavily weighted toward topical reporting—of troop movements, terrorist activities, meetings between foreign leaders, weapons tests, and the like—presented in a series of very brief capsule summaries, but also included one or two short (two pages maximum) analytical "feature" pieces.They were written at the CIA but drew on information from throughout the Intelligence Community.

The prestige artforms, and the only ones weighted toward analysis and interpretation rather than reporting, were the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and the SNIEs. These were designed specifically to convey the Intelligence Community's most considered opinions on topics of greatest moment to executive policymakers. NIEs address matters of perennial concern, such as Soviet military capability or Central American political trends. They were long—some tens of pages minimum—prepared according to an annual schedule established by a committee of intelligence and policymaking representatives, and often took months to write. Consensus was highly valued, and each intelligence agency had formal review rights and opportunities to register demurrals. As a measure of the weight accorded NIEs, they went out over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): formally, as community products, they were the DCI's estimates, although as a matter of convention DCIs are expected not to meddle with their content.

SNIEs were estimates that had not been placed on the annual schedule because nobody had anticipated the need. They tended to be written in response to urgent requests from executive policymakers confronted by some sort of crisis, and followed a fast track through the Iitelligence bureaucracy. They were still supposed to represent the community's consensus, all agencies still had review opportunities, and the DCI still had to sign off, but the drafting process was kept down to a few weeks or, in special cases, a few days. Many analysts see SNIEs as the highest of all artforms, because they offered an opportunity for thorough, sophisticated intelligence to make a concrete, immediate contribution.

William Casey, as President Reagan's new DCI, singled out estimates from the beginning as an area deserving his special attention. He thought, according to people close to him, that estimates, as the distillation of the Intelligence Community's knowledge and wisdom on particular subjects, were very important. He also thought, according to the same people, that they were often not particularly timely or responsive to policymakers' needs. This was not a new thought in intelligence circles; according to analysts and policymakers alike, estimates very often became battlegrounds for extended interagency fights over competing views and fine points of language. To achieve consensus for the final version, the drafters often had to tone down their prose and conclusions with numerous qualifiers and reservations, as well as add footnotes to register different agencies' unresolvable disagreements. The result, too often, was that estimates expressed, mushily, the lowest common denominator of Intelligence Community opinion.

Casey was determined to make estimates more useful. He demanded that turnaround times be cut, language be declarative, and key evidence highlighted. "He'd often look at SNIEs, NIEs, long-term analytical pieces, and mark them up and send them back," a colleague says. "He was proud of his own skills as a writer, and therefore was not the least reluctant to offer editorial judgment." Casey's hands-on approach to estimates served to heighten, at least for a time, CIA analysts' fears that their new boss—who as a Cabinet member was a key administration figure and whose strongly activist conservative views were well

known—would try to politicize the estimation process. As time went by, that concern largely faded. The new DCI seemed to respect analysts' intellectual autonomy; in one episode carefully noted in intelligence circles, he sent back a SNIE reporting that the Nicaraguan contras—whom he supported wholeheartedly—had no domestic political base, only to release it when analysts reaffirmed their arguments. At the same time, he reserved the right to hold his own views, on the contras as on other matters, and to advise the president accordingly.

That was, for the most part, fine with analysts. Over the years, analysts and policymakers had come to an elaborate understanding of their respective rights and privileges. It was subtle and largely implicit, but both sides followed it strictly and defended it fiercely. At its core was the right of analysts to say what they thought. Nothing—not the president's policy, not the DCI's preferences, not political implications—was supposed to get in the way of objective analysis. Analysts and policymakers alike believed this (at least in theory), but analysts were often positively combative about it. "If somebody asks me something, and I have information to come to a position, then that's what they're going to hear," says one ranking CIA analyst. "I don't give a damn if it's 'helpful.' If they don't want to know the answer, they shouldn't have asked the question."

The one major and mutually agreed upon limit to analysts' right to free expression was an absolute injunction against the tendering of policy advice. Whether in talking points or SNIEs, analysts had to stop on the near side of the line dividing their thoughts about the rest of the world from their thoughts about implications for American behavior. In Casey's contra SNIE, for example, analysts could say that the contras had no political base, but they could not say further that the US should reassess its Nicaragua policy. The rule, aimed at preserving analysts' objectivity and neutrality, was almost always scrupulously observed.

When it was not, analysts soon heard about it. Policymakers, especially those in the White House who were CIA analysts' premier clients, tended to value above all else their right to make policy decisions without intelligence backchat. The Intelligence Community, in their view, was their servant, not their overseer.

In the experience of a long-time top intelligence official, NSC staff follow a very predictable course, from administration to administration, in their relationship with CIA analysts. "You go through a sort of honeymoon period, and then a distancing," he says. "In the early days, they're sort of dazzled by all the sources the CIA has to offer. All the classification and secretiveness is very appealing to them, and so they go through an early stage when they're inclined very much to solicit the views of the intelligence agency. You can almost chart when you've passed between a year and a year and a half. At that point, no matter what their background, they become very confident in their own judgment. Their relationship with CIA analysts is superb when they have the same view. When they don't have the same view, increasingly the CIA guys will get cut out of the picture. Will not even know what's going on."

Managing the tensions created by both sides' insistence on autonomy in their respective spheres had long been a major issue in the structure and management of the Intelligence Community. Since the Ford administration, the key instrument for bridging the gap had been the US National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system. NIOs were experienced analysts, often but not always drawn from the CIA, who were specifically responsible for ensuring that analysis responded to policymakers' needs. They were specialized (there were, for instance, NIOs for the Middle East, for the Soviet Union, for terrorism, and the like), were independent of the individual intelligence agencies, and reported directly to the DCI. Their main job was liaison. NIOs met regularly with NSC officials, assistant–secretary–level officials in the State Department and the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to find out what was happening and how the intelligence community might help, and with the top management and analysts of the CIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and

Research (INR) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to organize the relevant reporting and analysis. They also coordinated and oversaw the production of NIEs and SNIEs. The NIO system was no panacea—tensions between analysts and policymakers still existed—but both sides generally found it a useful and productive link.

The US in Lebanon: The Policy

The story of relations among the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department (but especially the White House) and the Intelligence Community (especially the CIA) during America's involvement in Lebanon was to be far more a story of tensions than one of links. From the beginning, feelings ran high. "During the summer of 1982, there was a very heady atmosphere in Washington," says one CIA analyst. "Policymakers were envisioning practically a strategic revolution in Middle East policy. They thought if they played Lebanon right, everything—the East-West problem there, the terrorist problem, the internal Lebanon problem—could all be cleared up at once. That was seen even then as naive by the analysts in the trenches. And when intelligence began to pooh-pooh this idea, it wasn't well received..."

Everybody agreed that Lebanon was important, less in and of itself than as a cockpit of regional tension. Its recent history was one of almost constant internal strife and foreign intervention. Internal politics had been dominated by struggles, often armed, between Christians, especially the strong minority Maronite sect (and its Phalange militia), and Muslims, especially the Druze and Shiite sects (and their militias). According to an informal 1943 compact, the Maronites claimed both the Lebanese presidency and a slim parliamentary majority, but Muslim dissatisfaction with the arrangement was widespread.

Complicating matters immensely were several hundred thousand displaced Palestinians, including well-armed and well-financed PLO members, who had settled in Lebanon because of its proximity to Israel and because no Lebanese Christian faction was strong enough to drive them out. The Palestinians took over a large portion of southern Lebanon, made common, often violent, cause with Lebanon's Muslims against the Christians, and often launched raids over the border into Israel.

In 1975, Lebanon's religious and political tension erupted into a civil war. The fighting was vicious, and atrocities common on all sides. The Christians, unable to handle both Lebanon's Muslims and their Palestinian allies, eventually invited Syria's President Hafez Assad to send forces to stop the fighting. Assad did so; he sympathized mainly with Lebanon's Muslims, but as a regional power broker he was more concerned with preventing Lebanon from becoming an even more powerful Palestinian stronghold.

Once in Lebanon, Assad—who had long aspired to annex Lebanon as part of a historical "Greater Syria"—never fully withdrew, keeping a garrison in Beirut and occupying much of the country's north and east. The Syrian president, who had strong Soviet ties, continued to support Lebanese Muslim parties and militias to keep the Christians weak and off-balance. Beirut itself split into its Muslim western half and its Christian eastern half, each controlled by a bewildering patchwork of sectarian militias.

The Palestinians remained strong and active, and Israel responded to the PLO in 1978 by taking over a belt of Lebanon just north of their common border and placing it under the control of a renegade Lebanese army officer sympathetic to Israel. By the early 1980s, the Lebanese Government, such as it was, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) held unchallenged sway only over the presidential palace and a few square miles of downtown Beirut.

The situation was a constant worry in Washington. With Syrians and Israelis so uneasily and narrowly separated, another Middle East clash, possibly escalating into a superpower face-off, seemed only a slip away. Nor did the situation seem, in any wise, stable. Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon, the powers in the ruling conservative Likud Party, were known to be looking for a way to break the PLO's back in Lebanon for good

and remake Lebanon's political landscape in Israel's favor. They were negotiating terms with a young but rising Lebanese Maronite strongman, Bashir Gemayel: if Israel moved into Lebanon and subdued the Palestinians (and perhaps even the Syrians), and helped install Gemayel as president, would he ensure that the PLO stayed toothless in the long run, and perhaps even sign a peace treaty with Israel? (Lebanon, like all other Arab states except Egypt, had technically been at war with Israel since 1948.) By early 1982, the US Intelligence Community was convinced that Israel would shortly invade Lebanon.

On 6 June, Israel did. The Israeli advance was resisted by the PLO and the Syrians, but to little avail. The Palestinians were beaten back, and the Syrians agreed to a cease-fire after Israel, in what was widely regarded as a stunning military tour de force, destroyed the extensive Soviet-supplied Syrian air-defense system in Lebanon and shot down a quarter of its air force. Early pledges to the US to stop the invasion when it reached 40 kilometers into Lebanon were quickly broken, and Israeli columns soon reached and laid devastating siege to Beirut, cutting off power and water to Muslim quarters and pounding the city, over US strong protests, with heavy artillery and airstrikes.

The US made itself a key player immediately. President Reagan directed veteran diplomat Philip Habib, already in the region as his special envoy, to arrange a general cease-fire. Over the course of the summer, as the Israeli siege continued, Habib did so. Late in August the bargain was struck: the PLO would evacuate its 15,000 military personnel in Beirut to other Arab countries, Israel would lift its siege and let them go, and the US would guarantee the safety of the Palestinian civilians left behind. Things moved fast thereafter. On August 23, with strong US and Israeli support, the Lebanese parliament elected Bashir Gemayel president. Gemayel, who had a "special relationship" with the CIA's Directorate of Operations, personally assured Habib that when the PLO military was gone their families would be safe. A contingent of US Marines, in company with French and Italian forces, was brought in to supervise the evacuation.

During the evacuation, on 1 September Reagan moved to capitalize on America's sudden Middle East eminence by announcing what came to be known as the Reagan Plan. The plan built on the Camp David accords by proposing that Jordan's King Hussein negotiate with Israel on behalf of displaced Palestinians, probably for some sort of Jordanian-administered entity in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Although Begin and his Likud Party immediately rejected the idea, Jordan and other Arab countries cautiously endorsed it. The administration was pleased; even Israel's rejection had some positive aspects, as it increased US credibility with the Arab world. Meanwhile, the evacuation went off without a hitch, and the Marines were called home.

Victory, as Washington viewed events thus far, soon turned to ashes. On the afternoon of 14 September, Gemayel was assassinated at his Phalange militia headquarters, almost surely at Syrian direction. Within days, the Israeli Army allowed Phalangist militiamen into two Palestinian camps, Sabra and Shatilla, in Beirut, where they murdered at least 700 civilians in reprisal for Gemayel's death. The United States, France, and Italy, horrified that the US guarantees of Palestinian safety had been so bloodily violated, moved their forces back into Beirut.

This time, Reagan's goals were far more ambitious, as he made clear in a television speech shortly after the Marines returned. Now, he meant to cure Lebanon's plight. The Marines, he said, were in Beirut as a peacekeeping force pending the withdrawal of "all foreign forces" and to assist in Lebanese state-building. Spelled out, that meant that the US was going to try to send both the Syrians and the Israelis back home, ending their direct involvement in Lebanese affairs, and to strengthen Bashir Gemayel's brother, Amin, who had in turn been elected president, until he could run Lebanon. The Reagan administration was determined, says an NSC official, "to let Lebanon be Lebanon."

The president's policy was, according to a variety of sources, largely that of special presidential envoy Habib. He had Reagan's ear and respect. Moreover, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who had had

strong policy views on the Middle East, had resigned in June, and his replacement, George Shultz, was not exercising the same sort of influence. And although usually powerful Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger entertained strong doubts about Habib's policy—he believed the Marines lacked a military mission in Lebanon and were at substantial risk there—he had been overruled in bitter debate.

"Habib sort of took the decisionmaking process by storm," a State Department official says. "In Habib, you had a guy who was on the scene, who has an imposing history, who's respected, and who has the confidence of the president and acts accordingly." Habib had such primacy that even much of the administration's foreign-policy bureaucracy was left out of Lebanon matters. "He was handling [day-to-day policymaking] basically out of his hip pocket in the field," says Bing West, who was then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. "It was not an interagency process. It was basically Habib reporting back to the White House and to Shultz, and the interagency process trotting along behind."

Habib was confident that he could negotiate speedy Israeli and Syrian withdrawals: so speedy, he thought, that the Marines would be home by Christmas. His strategy was to accord diplomatic priority to brokering an Israeli disengagement agreement with Lebanon. He believed that Syria would withdraw almost as a matter of course once Israel did, a belief "premised," says a senior White House official of the time, "upon Saudi statements, and winks and nods, that yes, we know—we the Saudis—that when you get Israeli withdrawal, you will get Syrian withdrawal, and that Syria has no greater ambitions vis-à-vis Lebanon." Habib and Shultz also believed that the US could count on moderate Arab—chiefly Saudi—pressure to move Assad when the time came. Thus, Syria was kept generally informed of US activities as Habib moved to get Lebanese-Israeli talks under way, but Habib chose not to involve Assad more deeply. Once the Syrians and Israelis were home, Habib thought, Lebanon could be reunited under a Gemayel presidency supported by a revitalized LAF. It would be a great American victory.

The US in Lebanon: The Analysis

The Intelligence Community doubted it. Almost every aspect of Habib's policy was subject to grave reservations among Middle East analysts, who were in uncommon agreement in their views on the matter. "There was a very unusual unanimity of opinion on the realities of Lebanon and the costs of being involved there," says a Defense intelligence official. "Usually there's a tendency in the intelligence coordination process—among CIA, DIA, INR—to soften judgments. With Lebanon, there was a tendency to make it even harder, even alarmist, to point out to policymakers—hard over, up front, early on—that this is a real can of worms."

The doubts began with Syria. All students of the Middle East—not just those with access to classified information—recognized Hafez Assad as one of the region's most determined and fractious leaders. Analysts believed that even if his old ambition to absorb Lebanon were frustrated, he would still regard Lebanon as his back yard, and that he would still be determined to remain a major player in Lebanese events. They feared for any Lebanon policy that slighted or underestimated Syria's interests and power. "What happens in Lebanon is vital to Syria," says one INR analyst. "There was no way Assad was going to let things happen there unless he got something out of it."

The analytic community also believed that the Reagan administration was being overly optimistic about the chances of a quick Israeli withdrawal. Israel's interests, they thought, ran against the existence of another powerful, autonomous Arab nation in the region, particularly one lying along its own borders. And the Reagan Plan, whose aims for the West Bank Israel viewed with dismay, gave Israel a big stake in delaying any resolution in Lebanon, because Jordan's King Hussein had made it clear that while he might negotiate with Israel, he would not do so as long as it occupied Lebanese soil. Prudence, the analysts thought, required skepticism about Israeli pliability.

They also doubted the wisdom of the administration's fundamental goal of unifying Lebanon. "Lebanon is not what it seems," says a Defense intelligence official. "It's not a nation: it has no borders, you can't say what a citizen is. People in the administration went into this thing with blinders on." In particular, long-time close observers of Lebanon's murderous political scene did not recognize Amin Gemayel as either a statesman or a strongman. Nor did they see his family, or the Phalange militia it more or less controlled, as representative of what passed for the Lebanese polity, or even of its powerful Maronite Christian minority. The Gemayels and the Phalange, most thought, were really just another faction, albeit a strong and important one. "My personal feeling about the Reagan administration is that at that point they tended to see the world in terms of black-and-white, good-or-bad," says a CIA analyst. "This led them to see the Christians in Lebanon as good and the PLO, the Muslims, and the others as bad, when we knew that the Maronites were just as ruthless and manipulative as anyone else."

The analytical community feared, finally, the implications of using Marines as an instrument of US policy in Lebanon. Even before the Marines had returned, INR analysts had explicitly warned that the Marines would not be able to play the neutral role the administration had written for them. "The government in Lebanon is not seen as the Lebanese government; it's seen as the Christians' government, and not even all the Christians recognize it as their government," an INR analyst explains. "Therefore, any move on our part to support that government would be seen as support for the Christians, not as support for a settlement. The presence of the Marines would be seen as putting off an inevitable distribution of power, and sooner or later they would become targets. I remember someone high up saying, 'Don't write that or the Defense Department won't go in.' But we're independent, and it was in our daily reports." The rest of the analytic community agreed. All in all, analysts had little but foreboding for America's future in Lebanon.

Waiting for the Phone To Ring

The Intelligence Community very much wanted to spell out its case, and waited eagerly for the White House or another part of the administration's policymaking bureaucracy, to request a SNIE. It waited, as time went by, in increasing frustration. "The NSC didn't come calling on us," says one CIA Middle East analyst. "They didn't know enough to know what they didn't know." As a result, analysts had to put off addressing, at length and in one place, the kinds of questions they were eager to answer during a crisis: Who are the major players here? What do they have at stake? What will they settle for? How easily will we be able to influence them? How will US actions be viewed?

There were various theories among analysts about why the call did not come. Decisionmaking, it was fairly clear, had become highly centralized in Habib's inner circle, although exactly what he and his circle were up to was less clear (though analysts had no way of knowing it, even the president's national security adviser, William Clark, was experiencing some difficulty following and shaping Habib's actions). Habib clearly had strong feelings of his own and, presumably, felt no need for analytic contributions. There were also signs that the inner circle had already settled all of the strategic, and many of the tactical, questions.

One former mid-level Pentagon official recalls that he, and the intelligence representatives he worked with, often emerged from policy sessions wondering why they had even been asked to attend. "I think the Intelligence Community and working-level policymakers were often feeding information up to deaf ears," he says. "Phil Dur [an NSC aid] would come to meetings where we were supposedly discussing possible policies, and referring to the intelligence we had, and say, "That's all fine, but we're going to do this, the decision's already been made." The NSC adviser and the special envoy made all the policies, and it didn't matter what anyone else said." The same official also felt that analysts were rather deliberately disregarded. "Senior policymakers knew that the Intelligence Community was opposed to what was going on," he says. "They just didn't want to hear about it."

All analysts knew for sure, though, was that they weren't getting the chance they wanted to write their SNIE. They were left with lower-level artforms to get their points across. They wrote talking points almost every day for Casey's briefings to the president and the Middle East NIO's briefings at the assistant secretary level, and they reported key bits

of intelligence in the PDB and the NID. "These were much more on the tactical day-to-day stuff than big perspective pieces," one State Department official recalls. "What's new with Begin? With Gemayel? How many men do the Israelis have? What river have they reached? I don't remember any big warning that getting involved in Lebanon could be hazardous to your health."

Many of the bits and pieces reported this way were not particularly encouraging; before long, for instance, it was known that the Soviet Union had begun a $3-billion military resupply of Syria, that the Lebanese Christian community was not rallying behind Amin Gemayel, and that Israel was changing the road signs in southern Lebanon to Hebrew. Analysts, certainly, were trying to paint a consistent and cautionary picture. "I think, in the overall context of the NID and the other smaller stuff, that our reporting was as strong as it would have been in a SNIE," one senior CIA analyst says.

The trouble was, as analysts saw things, that pulling their main arguments from the welter of fact in the lesser artforms was something of an exercise in connecting the dots. "Shultz complained to Casey at one point that an important analytical line had not shown up in the NID," the CIA analyst says. "I thought he was wrong, and when I checked—read months of reporting—I did find it there, but much more obscurely than I had remembered. It was very much present, on the other hand, in our talking points and some of our own internal work. The lesson is that lots and lots gets said, but in different places in different ways, and you can never be sure just what gets across."

Few in Reagan administration policymaking circles seem to have felt the lack of a comprehensive Intelligence Community estimate on Lebanon. "I've never been a fan of estimates," says a senior State Department official. "They're usually mushy and cautious. I'm kind of interested when they're on a subject I don't know about, because I'll pick up facts. But estimates often seem just to be instruments of bureaucratic warfare." The same official, on the other hand, welcomed the daily reporting. "A policymaker usually has some expertise of his or her own, after all," he says. "I use the Intelligence Community as a resource of factual information, but I don't need it for opinions. I have my own."

Many in intelligence, though, thought it was fundamentally incorrect to approach Lebanon—and other similarly complex foreign policy problems—solely through the mechanisms of daily reporting. "The problem is when you're dealing with mysteries rather than secrets," says a senior CIA official. "The Lebanon policy as it evolved was based on mysteries, not just facts." In his widely shared view, the important questions in Lebanon were the intangibles: how far can Assad be pushed? What will the Druze settle for? What is Amin Gemayel's potential for growth? Unless the Intelligence Community stumbled on very unusual information—some kind of definitive proof, for instance, that Assad would not leave Lebanon—these were "mysteries" on which reasonable people could differ. Analysts' only edge in such a debate was superior knowledge and insight. It was an edge they readily claimed. "Lebanon was so complex that it was hard to get [the NSC] to concentrate on its intricacies," says one CIA analyst. "When you told people there were 40 militias operating in West Beirut alone, you could see their eyes glaze over. So they didn't know who the actors were or what they wanted. But I've been following the civil war in Lebanon since it broke out; that's my career. We couldn't say what we wanted to say in bits and pieces."

Despite the Intelligence Community's frustration at not being asked to write a comprehensive Lebanon estimate, analysts did not try particularly hard either to spark a request for an estimate from somewhere in the administration or to volunteer something comprehensive of their own. It was not that they simply did not care—something that had happened in the past, according to the analysts. "There have been times," one says, "when we've been content just to sit here and be right." Rather, it was that in tandem with the injunction against analysts offering policy advice, there was also a very strong expectation that the analytic community would not speak unless it was spoken to. It was there to provide a service, as defined by its policy masters, and it focused its attention on areas selected for it by those masters, not on other areas it might find of independent interest.

As a practical matter, it was a limitation only on analysis, not on reporting raw data. Analysts were largely free to study, and to think, what they liked, but they were not free to fire off their conclusions at will. Larger and more explicitly political judgments, especially—as about contras' standing—always required a specific request, from, say, an NSC aide.

These restrictions had evolved over the years as the intelligence and policymaking communities sought to ensure that analysts would play an objective, neutral role in the policymaking process. Intelligence and analysis would be sullied if analysts shaped, or were thought to shape, their views to support executive policy factions; likewise, if analysts themselves promoted, or were thought to promote particular policies. "There's sort of an analysts' credo," says a senior CIA analyst. "It says, 'I'm an analyst; I am objective and pure. I know that the closer I move to policy, the more likely people are not to see me that way anymore.' " Where Lebanon was concerned, therefore, despite the desire of analysts, particularly CIA analysts, for a formal estimate, volunteering what would have been a thinly veiled comprehensive critique of the Reagan administration's major foreign policy initiative was never seriously considered.

Though CIA analysts followed the rules on Lebanon, many are nonetheless not entirely comfortable with how they handled things. "We could, on our own hitch, have done something like alternative scenario papers on what Syria would and would not accept," one midlevel analyst says. "We never looked hard at that in any formal way. But even that would have been walking a fine line. Analysis shouldn't be prescriptive, and much of what we presented on Lebanon was bad news that wouldn't let the policy go ahead smoothly. It was very difficult."

There was plenty for analysts to feel uncomfortable about, for Habib was making little diplomatic progress: the Marines did not come home at Christmas, and the first months of 1983 showed little more movement. As the months went by, the analysts' bits and pieces analysis, and its Cassandrish tone, seemed to wear increasingly thin. "Analysts were never penalized for being overly pessimistic, only for being overly optimistic," says one State Department official. "The intelligence people would remind us over and over again of the difficulties. I'd say, "Your intelligence is true but it's not conclusive. The US has the ability to influence events."

It also grew increasingly sensitive. Caspar Weinberger was resisting the Department of Defense role in Lebanon ever more strongly, and the NSC and the State Department were fighting to hold off his objections. The struggle's glare served to highlight even lesser analytic findings. When two CIA analysts presented a set of talking points outlining unpleasant forces that might be set in motion by a proposed program to use US military advisers to train the LAF, they quickly heard that policymakers were not pleased. "I remember being told, 'This is the president's idea and you're telling him it's a bad idea,' " one says. "And I said, "No, I'm not. I'm just saying that these are the possible consequences you should take into account as you make your decisions. But it was clear they thought I was taking sides."

Langley's Circumscribed View

Most analysts had little notion at the time, however, that sides were being taken. This was not necessarily something they felt they needed to know, because there seemed no good reason why the struggle between State and Defense ought to have affected their analysis. But they were also in the dark about much that clearly did matter. Working-level CIA analysts, for instance, had no idea at the time that special envoy Habib was predicating his entire strategy on the premise that Syria would all but automatically withdraw from Lebanon once Israel did. They had no idea about the terms of the Reagan Plan until they were published in the *New York Times*, and no idea of what was under discussion in the Israeli-Lebanese disengagement talks Habib was mediating, the keystone of his plan to obtain Syrian and Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon, until an agreement was finally ratified on 17 May 1983.

Though the analytic community's charter was to support the rest of the executive's policy activities, nothing ensured that they were privy to the actions policymakers took and the choices they faced. Lebanon was not exceptional in this regard. "I conclude, looking back," says a recently retired senior Intelligence Community official, "that I frequently had a far clearer view of what was happening in policy formulation in other countries that I did in my own."

There was a real price paid in the relevance of the Community's analytic work. Syria, for example, rejected the 17 May agreement out of hand as

unacceptably advantageous to Israel (Assad also declared Habib persona non grata in Damascus, and Robert McFarlane replaced him as special envoy). When the CIA's analysts learned of the agreement's terms, they were dumbfounded that Habib had let it go through. "Anybody who thought that Assad would buy 17 May," one says bluntly, "was smoking pot." Secretary Shultz, at least, felt ill served. "Shultz thought that the intelligence hadn't adequately warned him that Syria wouldn't accept the agreement," the analyst says. "Well, I could have written a good Syria estimate. But we didn't even know the terms until we saw them in the newspapers."

Because the Intelligence Community is forbidden to monitor US behavior, most of the information that comes its way about US activities, both foreign and domestic, does so at the pleasure of its policymaking masters. The process can be capricious, especially between the CIA and the White House. "There's a fierce independence at the NSC that says, 'Everybody else works for us,' " says a longtime top intelligence official. "There's no systematization that ensures analytic input into NSC decisions. It's always been resisted at the NSC level because it would constitute a check on their autonomy." The common result is a nagging uncertainty in analytic circles about just what the US is up to.

The situation was exacerbated by a number of mundane but still very real factors, chief among them distance and security. "First, you just have the mechanics," says the official. "It's a lengthy trip down, [at least a half-hour drive from Langley to downtown Washington]. It's difficult to get a parking place anywhere near the offices of the State Department or the NSC. You've got the problem of how do you get in: the security badges are no longer given out, as they used to be in the old days, to let you sort of go in and wander and visit. So, unlike the Pentagon, where it's still fairly easy for someone to get a badge and go wander the halls and work their constituency, you can't do that at the NSC. There isn't anything to naturally encourage the informal visit."

The situation was not much different traveling from Washington to Langley. Visitors had to phone ahead for security clearance, stop at drive-through checkpoints, and then wait in the building's lobby for their host to come and escort them through yet another security checkpoint. (In a nice bit of bureaucratic skirmishing, some Pentagon officials have begun to refuse to visit CIA headquarters because CIA officials coming to see them are put through much less rigorous security hoops.)

There was nothing in that process to encourage the informal visit, either. "Every once in a while I'd find time to go talk to the Agency analysts," says a mid-level Pentagon official who worked on Lebanon for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Every time I did it was really useful. But it took so long I could hardly ever manage it; it really meant killing half a day."

These problems most vexed CIA analysts; there was far less distance between policymakers and INR and DIA analysts. For one thing, INR analysts had extensive access to Habib's cable traffic, which meant they were far more keyed in to current events (although they clearly chose not to share all they knew with their CIA colleagues). Both DIA and INR analysts also enjoyed far closer, less formal relationships with the policymakers they served. "The INR has direct access to the secretary of state," a top INR official said. "INR analysts deal with policymakers every day. They attend State Department staff meetings, they can knock on doors when they have questions or suggestions." DIA analysts report easy, regular contacts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down through the defense bureaucracy. "At all levels of the DIA, people were talking to their opposite numbers in those two organizations," a DIA analyst says. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Vessey was particularly noted for reaching down to analytic specialists for personal briefings on issues of the moment.

Relations between the CIA and policymakers were almost always handled at arm's length and on paper, even during crises. And crises, as analysts saw things, were when those methods worked the worst. As one CIA analyst put it, an analyst monitoring a spot not figuring highly in US policy would probably be routinely furnished almost all relevant policy documents because they would be so few, of such low sensitivity, and because there would rarely be

any hurry to make decisions. The resulting analysis would therefore be remarkably well grounded (even if hardly anybody in policymaking circles would be very interested in it).

In crises, the tables were turned: much was sensitive, everything was rushed, and analytic access to policy circles became catch-as-catch-can. "Special emissaries and their entourages tend to work around the formal chain of command," says one senior CIA analyst. "That's not wrong, but it's a complicating factor. We get out of the loop, and we don't get to see the factual information and meeting papers that you usually expect to see." Another senior analyst echoes this frustration: "Because you get cut out, even if you're cut in you never know if you're cut in absolutely. We had no access to secure telephone lines, and when Ambassador X calls so-and-so at the State Department, it may never get down on paper. This limits in a needless way the precision of the contribution we can make to policymakers. You know some of what's going on, and you may know all you need to know, but you don't know that. So you're often missing part of the equation."

Part of the equation complicating matters for CIA analysts was the Directorate of Operations' "special relationship" with Bashir Gemayel. Even before the Israeli invasion, a covert network had been in place for dealing with the Gemayels, a network that would have bypassed the analysts completely. Whatever information could be learned from Bashir Gemayel, and later from his brother Amin, and whatever actions the Maronites undertook at the behest of top US administrators would be largely beyond the analysts' ken.

One Intelligence Community senior official suspected that the Gemayel relationship may even have accounted, at least in part, for the decision not to initiate a SNIE. According to this official, that wouldn't have been an unusual outcome: "If a policy matter is drifting toward a policy decision that may end up introducing covert operations, and the DCI is sort of inclined toward that there will indeed be a couple of people at the CIA who know, they'll be the people in Operations, but in those kind of situations it unhappily is not uncommon for the analytical side to be cut out entirely. And not even know that a topic is under discussion."

Even policymakers, though, report difficulty keeping track of all that was happening around Lebanon. "When the Lebanon crisis hit, it was early in the Reagan administration," a Defense official says. "The administration had not really jelled yet. So when this crisis landed, it was the big game in town. It was almost a sign of how important you were to get in on that act, and to be as much a part of it as possible. Everyone at high levels was trying to get in the rowboat: show that they were in on the action, going on the trip, that their organization was in on it. That's a destructive syndrome. You want your information to be coming in like a Mozart concerto, instead of like Niagara Falls, which is the way it came in."

Few who did get in on the act took care to keep the Intelligence Community up to date on what they learned; many bypassed even their own organizations. Army Gen. Carl Stiner, for example, who traveled as the Joint Chiefs' representative with special envoy Robert McFarlane, reported directly to the chiefs, bypassing not only the Intelligence Community but even the military chain of command. "We'd go to meetings at Defense," one administration official says, "and their intelligence people and uniformed people would be saying one thing, and the chiefs would say, well, that's not what Stiner says. It was crazy. Everybody's entitled to their own opinions, but we couldn't even get together on the facts."

Analysts, in fact, believed that they were essentially locked in a losing battle for policymakers' attention. "There was so much competing information coming to them from the Israeli leaders, from Mossad [Israeli intelligence], from the Lebanese Christians," says a CIA analyst. They didn't begrudge policymakers those sources (at least not explicitly). They did, however, still feel that they could make a special contribution evaluating the information that came in that way, a contribution they couldn't make without full access.

Less directly, because they knew little of what came to pass in meetings between Habib, Shultz, or their parties and Begin, Assad, the Gemayels, and other Middle Eastern leaders, they felt unable to judge those leaders' actions intelligently. How could they

say what Assad was up to when he was surely reacting to what Habib was doing, and Habib's actions were themselves a mystery? "This kind of thing allows policymakers to say, I hope without malice, 'Look, you just don't have the whole picture,' " says a senior CIA analyst. "Sometimes I think it is malicious. The only reason we don't have the whole picture is that they won't tell us."

NIOs: The Missing Link

Policymakers are familiar with the analytic community's complaints about being cut out, on Lebanon and on other matters, and many—if not most—will have none of it. "Whatever the Intelligence Community might say, elements of the Community who had an interest in the Middle East were involved throughout the process at every level, whether it was in interagency working groups at the lowest level or right up to the National Security Planning Group: meetings, conference calls, whatever," says an NSC aide. "Either the DCI or his deputy or representative was always there. So they have no reason for saying they didn't know what was going on. Whether those people managed their system well so that their people knew what was going on, I can't speak to, but they were always represented, they always got sensitive materials, and there was very little involvement by the policy community on the operational side of what the CIA was doing."

For the most part, the representative at those meetings, and the only one explicitly charged with ensuring that relations between policymakers and analysts were smooth and productive, was one of the three analysts who in turn served as Middle East NIO over the course of the Reagan administration's involvement in Lebanon. They alone mixed a substantive role, as the Intelligence Community's executive regional analyst, with the procedural responsibility of maintaining effective liaison between the two communities. By all accounts, they enjoyed access, and exercised frankness, out of bounds to even the most senior ordinary analysts. "[Graham] Fuller [Middle East NIO from the middle of 1983 on] and I had lunch all the time," says a senior State Department policymaker. "He was the Cassandra on this, always saying that Syria would never go along and that the moderate Arabs wouldn't be able to exercise any influence over Assad." But they were not able to correct, and to some extent may have exacerbated, miscommunication and ill will between the two groups they served. NIOs, as Lebanon makes clear, play by complicated rules of their own—rules they to some extent make up as they go along. Considerable confusion can occur along the way.

The central challenge of an NIO's job is to inform analysts of what policymakers think and need sufficiently to allow them to do timely, relevant work, while protecting policymakers from the exposure of particularly sensitive thoughts and plans. The two parts of the job inevitably conflict. To get the most out of analysts, NIOs would have to routinely pass on everything they pick up, even in the most rarefied policy circles; to most thoroughly insulate policymakers, they would have to pass on very little. Neither suffices, and NIOs routinely inhabit some middle ground: but only they, usually, know just where that ground ends.

Robert Ames, for instance, a legendary CIA Middle East specialist who was first Middle East NIO, then chief of the CIA's NESA office (a job he held until he was killed in the April 1983 bombing of the US Embassy in Lebanon), enjoyed exceptional closeness to the policy process. George Shultz was so impressed with his depth of knowledge that he made him, first, part of the small team that formulated the September 1982 Reagan Plan, and then part of the team backing up Habib on what became the 17 May agreement.

It was a dream role for an NIO, but the analysts he oversaw nevertheless remained in the dark about such things as Habib's policy toward Syria and the substance of the disengagement talks—things Ames certainly knew. "Ames's being on the Shultz's policy planning group was a sanity check to us, but there were limits to what he could tell us," a senior CIA analyst says. "At certain points he just had to leave it at, 'Trust me.' And that's right; NIOs should feel constrained."

Further down the line at the CIA, working-level analysts found themselves swimming in even murkier waters. "Ames was in constant meetings with Shultz and the others, and he would send back for information and analysis," one says. "But we didn't know the context." They would respond as best they could, but they never knew for sure if they were contributing anything useful.

Ames, and the NIOs who followed him, all had good reputations among the analysts under them for being as open as possible. "Some NIOs don't tell you anything because they can't be bothered, or they don't like what they had for lunch, or God knows why," a CIA analyst says. Ames et al were not seen as arbitrary; their basic rule seemed to be, when uncertain about what it was safe to pass on, err on the side of caution. The State Department and the White House were not of their own accord telling analysts the substance of the May 17 talks; therefore NIOs would not, either. Only NIOs, however, knew where they drew the lines on any particular matter.

Analysts at least knew that the lines were being drawn. Many policymakers didn't seem to; they just thought that analysts were being unresponsive. Some policymakers didn't seem to recognize that NIOs too subscribed to the analysts' credo. Ames, for instance, although part of Shultz's inner circle, refused to tender policy advice even when asked, according to another member of the 17 May negotiating team. And when Graham Fuller, who reportedly had very strong feelings about what the US was doing in Lebanon, was NIO, he wouldn't say, "You should do this or that," according to a CIA official. "He'd say, 'Shouldn't you be cautious about this or that?' He'd be careful not to cross that line." To many policymakers, analysts—as represented by the NIO and the artforms—didn't seem to be taking into account information that policymakers had given the NIOs; they also seemed to carp chronically without providing any clear-cut warnings or advice about opportunities in Lebanon. "The Agency ran its own show," an NSC aide says. "The hierarchy knew what was going on." The resentment, in some policymaking circles, was palpable.

The October Estimate

By the fall of 1983, events in Lebanon were making it very clear that the administration's policy was not going ahead smoothly. The US was apparently no closer than it had been a year before to getting the Syrians and Israelis home; despite the 17 May accord, or perhaps because of it, both armies were firmly entrenched. Amin Gemayel's presidency seemed to be growing ever more precarious as Syrian-backed Muslim factions pressured him to renounce his treaty with Israel. The Marines suffered their first casualties at the airport, caused by shellfire from Druze turf in the surrounding Shouf Mountains, late in July, and continued to take intermittent hits from that point on. On 28 August they fired, for the first time, on Druze positions in the hills, and were shortly declared enemy forces by influential Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Then, in the first week of September, Israel pulled its army out of the Shouf part way back toward its own border. The LAF, backed by the Maronite Phalange militia, tried to take the ground the Israelis had vacated and were beaten back. US vessels off Beirut deployed both F-14 fighters and naval gunfire in their support.

As the center ceased to hold in Beirut, analytic activity in Washington quickened. The call for an estimate still did not come, however. "In August, with the fighting in Beirut's suburbs, the questions picked up," says a CIA analyst. "Policymakers wanted to know what the capabilities of the various factions were, but not what was the overall dynamic. Usually we're asked that question, but not that time." Beirut continued to crumble. Late in September the US battleship New Jersey, which mounted enormous 16-inch guns, took up station off the city. Robert McFarlane negotiated a cease-fire with Assad in Damascus and the fighting in the Shouf and the airport shelling ceased. It was a good sign, but before Gemayel could even carry out his part of the bargain McFarlane had struck for him—undertaking negotiations with Lebanon's important factional leaders—Jumblatt took a giant step toward partitioning the country by putting the Shouf Mountains

under a Druze "civil administration council" and calling for the desertion of all Druze LAF personnel. Over 600 Druze complied.

At this point, the US Intelligence Community finally got a chance to write its Lebanon SNIE. It's not clear just how or why the charge to write the SNIE came down; classification clouds the genesis of particular requests. Analysts speculate that things had gotten so bad that the NSC was moved to ask; that the Pentagon—which was trying hard to convince President Reagan to pull the Marines out of Beirut—might have sought the estimate to use as ammunition in its bureaucratic battle with the State Department; even that Graham Fuller, then the Middle East NIO, might finally have been driven to request it himself. In any case, the time had come, and the analytic community, especially the CIA, was primed.

"The October SNIE was a watershed event," one midlevel Agency analyst said. "It was the first time the entire Intelligence Community was putting its imprimatur on the views that had been present all along in the daily intelligence. At one frozen moment in time, it says, "Here's how all the people in the community feel." Even some who thought that most of what the community wanted to say had probably, over the past year, seeped through in the daily intelligence, relished the chance to write the estimate. "I can't believe that it wasn't known what that SNIE would say," says one CIA analyst. "But there was, maybe, a certain amount of "We've been telling these . . . people . . . this, and we're going to tell them again, and this time we're going to rub their noses in it."

From the time Fuller called representatives of the various intelligence agencies together to plan the SNIE, it was clear to everyone that it was going to be unusual. To a degree that participants say was totally unprecedented, the CIA, the DIA, and INR agreed on virtually every point the SNIE was to make. The estimate was correspondingly strongly worded. "It was, as we would put it, a 'starchy' estimate," says a senior CIA analyst. "That wasn't surprising; the situation was so hopeless, I don't see how it could be any different. We live in a world of analytic grays, but this was clear-cut. There was no need to try to anticipate and adjust for the usual DIA/INR shadings. Also, Casey and [deputy DCI Robert] Gates had been pushing for more policy-relevant estimates. Still, I don't remember any others—ever—that read like this one did . . ."

The SNIE stressed the Community's belief that Syria would not be swayed on Lebanon, that Assad was powerful and able, that he would not walk away without some major prize, that the 17 May agreement offered him nothing, and, that having learned from America's experience in Vietnam, he would wait out any military pressure the administration exerted. "It said there was no easy way to move Assad," one analyst says. "Not that it couldn't be done, but that it couldn't be done on the cheap." It said that the Gemayel government was in serious military trouble, that the LAF would probably never be able to perform any duty more ambitious than maintaining some internal security, and that even that would be beyond it if soldiers were asked to fight against their own religious communities. They stressed again the incredible complexity of the Lebanese polity and the unreliability of Gemayel and his minority Maronites. "It may not have been timely," says a CIA analyst. "But I defy anyone to say it wasn't relevant."

Casey was reportedly more than a little taken aback, and the SNIE's editing process was grueling and contentious. "There was lots of blood on the floor," a CIA analyst recalled. It was a struggle waged almost entirely within the CIA. INR and DIA were aware of the dispute, but they took it a good deal less to heart, mostly because they'd had more of a chance, over the last year, to make their feelings known inside their respective departments. The DCI challenged each key finding in the estimate; analysts think he did so partly because he supported the administration's policy and had to be convinced that his people were right, and partly because he knew the effect the document would have outside the Agency.

"Casey and the other senior management probably anticipated a real backlash from Shultz, so the SNIE got a good scrubbing from them," a CIA analyst says. "They insisted on there being evidence behind the assertions. The feeling was, "General so-and-so

doesn't say this about the LAF, they say they're going along quite well, and now you say they can't do anything. This is going to carry a lot of freight, and I better be sure we can stand behind it."

Some think that the DCI was impressed by what he heard from his people. "I think, although I obviously don't know, that Casey was converted during this process," a CIA analyst says. "He asked hard questions, but he let the estimate go out." Others think that he simply couldn't force his people to back down. "I think the SNIE finally got through the process because the NIO and the NIO system said, "This is what the analysts really think. If you don't want to know about it, don't ask the question," says another. Some think both factors were at work. In any event, Casey finally put his name on the SNIE. CIA analysts were exultant.

Impact

Their feat was a near nonevent in policymaking circles. It was read, in some circles at least, as was evidenced by a degree of backlash from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who didn't care for its characterization of the LAF, and from the Office of Policy Planning at the State Department, which didn't care for any of it. It had no discernible impact. The administration was occupied more than full time with the worsening situation on the ground in Lebanon and with its own cutthroat bureaucratic struggles (Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger were by then locked in almost literal combat over whether to escalate or withdraw).

Many key policymakers don't remember the SNIE at all, and, many who do, remember it with the greatest frustration. "It was not their job to say Assad couldn't be swayed," says an NSC official. "It was their job to analyze what might sway him, that he has vulnerabilities and here's what they are, and what it will cost: you'll have to kill x number of his soldiers or hurt his economy by this much, or undermine Alawi [the minority Syrian religious group Assad belonged to] control of Syria and change the regime. Was it because they didn't agree with the policy that they could identify no pressure points the US could exert against Syria and Lebanon, or was it because there were none? Well, to my dying day I'll believe it was because the people there who wrote the SNIE didn't believe in putting US pressure on Syria and wanted the US to put pressure on Israel instead. But I never had time to do a postmortem on a SNIE; many of them were useless because they were overtaken by events by the time that you got them."

Denouement

On 23 October 1983, terrorists, believed to be allied with Iran, blew up the Marine barracks at Beirut International Airport with a truck bomb and killed 241 Marines. Throughout November and December the US directed naval gunfire and air raids against Druze, Shiite, and Syrian positions in the Shouf, losing two planes and one pilot to Syrian antiaircraft fire. The administration remained firm in Gemayel's support, but Congressional pressure for withdrawal mounted. In late January and early February 1984, the LAF was torn apart by internal religious tension, and the White House determined to get out of Beirut. The last Marines were evacuated on 26 February. Within days, Amin Gemayel had gone to Damascus to seek rapprochement with Assad.

Assignment Trieste

A Case Officer's First Tour

Richard Stolz

Editor's Note: Richard Stolz joined the CIA in 1950. In addition to his tour in Trieste, he served in eight other overseas posts, and he was Chief of Station at four of them. Before retiring in 1981, he was also chief of two Directorate of Operations (DO) area divisions. In late 1987, then DCI Webster asked him to return to the Agency to serve as Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), a position he held through 1990. In February 1991, President Bush awarded Stolz the National Security Medal.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent.

Winston Churchill
Fulton, Missouri
6 March 1946

The reason I went to Trieste instead of some other place in the spring of 1951 would not make much sense in this day of highly structured and intensely negotiated overseas assignments for fledgling case officers. Briefly, when I showed up for work at "L" Building by the Reflecting Pool the day after Labor Day of 1950, my interlocutor did not quite know what to do with me. He leaned out the open window, called to the first person he recognized walking along by the pool, told him to come into the office, and said, "Now what are we going to do with this nice young man?" It turned out that the person worked in the then Foreign Division "P," which covered Southeast Europe within the Office of Special Operations (OSO). It also turned out that there was an empty desk in the rabbit warren that was the Balkan Branch, whose operational responsibilities included the then Free Territory of Trieste. So I sat there until the next training course—or what at the time passed for a training course—started a couple of months later. I have often wondered where I would have ended up if another person had answered the summons. Tokyo? Cairo? This was homebasing, old style, but neither I nor anyone else seemed to mind.

I spent most of my time in the Branch doing name traces, working from masses of 3 x 5 cards located in the Central Registry in "I" Building. One of my favorite cards was "TITO, first name unknown, last name unknown." Training exercises included doing hopelessly inadequate casings and sketches of Union Station.

I was a GS-7 making $3,824 per annum. My wife Betty and I were happy, but we also were anxious to get overseas and into action. After all, I had promised her a life of romance and adventure!

Going in Style

We left for Trieste in May 1951. The first leg of the trip was to Le Havre on the Ile de France. We traveled first class—not bad for a junior "Department of the Army Civilian (DAC)." The government paid for the deck chairs but not for the blankets, or was it the other way around? Jersey City political boss Frank Hague, Metropolitan Opera director Rudolph Bing, and singer Ezio Pinza were among our fellow passengers. This was definitely a step up from my last boat trip in the opposite direction in April 1946, on a troopship going home after a couple of years as an infantry soldier in World War II. From Paris to Trieste we rode the Simplon-Orient Express, which, for anyone weaned on the novels of E. Philips Oppenheim, was in itself excitement enough. I remember thinking that the Iron Curtain could not be very far away.

Historical Review

Trieste, an ancient city known to the Romans as Tergeste, had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 19th century and up to World War I.

Unclassified

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It was an important commercial outlet to the Adriatic Sea and beyond. The Istrian Peninsula, including Trieste, was annexed to Italy after the war. The area's inhabitants were, and are, an interesting mix of Italians and Slovenes, with a number of other nationalities and ethnic groups.

As World War II drew to a close, Tito and his partisan army believed, with some justice from their point of view, that Trieste was well-deserved war booty. It was a natural port for them, they had fought for it, and, as I recall, they had been given some reason to hope that the Allies would let them have it as part of a general settlement after the war.

Thus, it was with bad grace and some violence that the Yugoslav army retired from the outskirts of the city in August 1945, under intense US and British political pressure backed by the threat of military force. Our policy at the time was to support our new Italian ally's essentially legitimate claim to the city, if not to the surrounding territory. Pending a final settlement, an interim compromise called for the establishment of a Free Territory of Trieste (FTT). The US and the UK would administer Zone A, which comprised the city of Trieste and its immediate surrounding area, and the Yugoslavs would administer Zone B, the predominately Slovene area to the south of the city. We and the British each had 5,000 troops in our Zone, and the Yugoslavs had 10,000 in theirs. The border between the two zones was as rigidly controlled as the borders between Italy and Yugoslavia proper.

By 1951, Tito's break with Stalin was complete, but his relations with the US, at least in Trieste, were poor. Zone B was totally dominated by the Yugoslav Communist Party. Zone A had an Italian Demo Christian majority, but it also had a large pro-Cominform, Soviet-run party whose boss was Vittorio Vidali and a smaller pro-Tito Communist Party whose leader was Branko Babic.

To further complicate the local situation, several thousand refugees from throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR had escaped to Trieste and were living in poor conditions in several camps, one of them a former prison. Hundreds more were coming in every month. It could not have been a better spot for a first tour.

Boy Spy Arrives

We spent a sleepless first night in Trieste in a rather nondescript hotel. The place was a madhouse. We were unaware that competitors in the national bicycle race had arrived the same day as we did, and the two bicycling national heroes were also staying in our hotel, along with what seemed like thousands of their noisy fans. The Italian passion for bicycle racing was the first of many new experiences for us.

Under my DAC cover, I was assigned to the 17th Detachment of the US Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC). I believe that Chief of Station Burt Lifshultz, who was under cover, had made the deal locally to place three or four of us in the CIC and that he had not burdened Headquarters with the details. (Those were the days!) The Detachment was in a large building in the center of town. I remember a large, square, inner courtyard with a balcony all the way around on the second floor. The reason I remember the balcony so well is because there were about 10 memorial wreaths, dried by then but still intact, marking the points along the railings from which Italian partisans had been hanged by the local fascists just before the end of the war. It was a vivid daily reminder of the lingering temper of the times.

I owe a great debt to the civilian chief of operations of the 17th CIC. The day I reported in to him, he said, "I do not want to see you for 10 days. Spend it getting to know this city, public transportation, bars, cafes, Communist Party Headquarters, and the harbor, and find a place to live. When you come back, I will see how much you have learned. Then we can put you to work." Today's junior case officers would do well to be given similar instructions. I learned a lot over the next three years, but never quite enough to satisfy him.

Detachment Tasks

The detachment was providing basic counterintelligence support for the US military mission, doing some work against the Yugoslav military mission in Zone B, debriefing East European refugees in the

camps, and vetting prospective "war brides," who in those days required security and health checks before marriage to US soldiers was permitted. All CIC personnel wore civilian clothes, which allowed for a great deal of leeway. I remember one sergeant saying to another on their way to interview one of these girls, "You call me 'Major,' and I'll call you 'Sir.' "

I was put to work debriefing refugees. This was a natural cover job because one of the Station's major tasks was to conduct crossborder operations into Eastern Europe.

Trieste Station

In those days in OSO and until 1958 or so, there was a Southeast Europe Division (SE), the follow-on to Foreign Division "P," a West Europe Division (WE) and an East Europe Division (EE). SE had responsibility for Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and the FTT. There was some bureaucratic friction between SE and WE because the latter had Italy and therefore also had a close and legitimate interest in Trieste and our operations. I believe WE viewed us as its Base, and this rankled SE. But, for those of us in the trenches, it did not make much difference one way or another.

We did not have Operating Directives or other such devices, but we all understood that our tasks included:

- Intelligence collection on Yugoslavia.
- Crossborder operations to collect intelligence on the other countries of Eastern Europe.
- Refugee debriefing for intelligence gathering.
- Penetration of Communist and Fascist parties.

Targets of opportunity also were included, but not covert operations as they are understood today. On one occasion, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the euphemistic name of the then covert action arm of the Agency, heard that an Albanian "ship," the Queen Teuta out of Durres, regularly stopped at Trieste. We were instructed to check this out and examine the possibility of using limpet mines to put it out of action. Another case officer and I soon discovered that this ship was a small, wooden-hulled tub that was hauling sand up and down the Adriatic. We had some difficulty in persuading OPC that their idea was not a good one.

Some Success

We were reasonably successful, in the context of the times. The context, in the case of intelligence on Eastern Europe, was that there was little ground truth in Washington about what was happening there. Our reporting filled a large gap. By today's standards, I suppose a lot of our stuff would not have been disseminated. Then, however, we had no American presence in Bulgaria, and the embassies in the other countries were for all practical purposes confined to quarters. Our agents would return to their home countries with our documentation, clothing, legends, and intelligence requirements and usually would bring back the information we wanted. Their other principal task was to assess and recruit internal reporting sources. Given the almost total control of the communist regimes over the population, this was a risky business.

One case involved a principal agent in Trieste whose wife had remained behind. We sent another agent, with the former's permission, to contact her. When he got to the lady's apartment and checked it and her out, he discovered that she was living with a state security officer. The second agent returned safely and told us about it. We had a difficult time figuring out how to handle the cuckolded agent without telling him the true state of his wife's affairs.

Key Target

Headquarters was especially interested in intelligence on the FTT Communist Party (PCTLT) because it was a microcosm of a world communist party, with the same organizational setup and methodology. PCTLT boss Vittorio Vidali was an able and ruthless operator who had lived most of the years between the wars in Moscow. He had been involved in the murder of Trotsky in Mexico City and also of the Italian socialist leader, Carlo Tresca, in New York City in the 1930s.

For about a year, Betty and I lived in the same apartment building as Vidali. I remember one uncomfortable moment when, coming out of my apartment door, I found myself between him and his huge Slovene bodyguard as we were all going down the stairs on the way to work. The bodyguard started to make a move at me, but Vidali, in an amiable mood, waved him away.

A fellow case officer recruited a young man during this period who developed access to senior Communist leaders. He provided us with a lot of good intelligence, and we all took great pride in the fact that this agent became one of the first to be put on what we knew as the "100-a-year" list—agents who could be granted entry and citizenship in the US without the customary waiting period. I took over the case when the original case officer left. The agent was hard to handle because he combined an enormous ego with an unfortunately correct perception of his own worth to us.

Another strong memory is that of a "cold" recruitment attempt I made of a ranking PCTLT leader, which was based almost entirely on technical information that indicated he was in disfavor with Vidali. I cornered him on his way home one rainy day. As we walked, I made my pitch and suggested moving on to a safehouse for further discussion. He said "thanks, but no thanks," turned around, and, according to our countersurveillance team, went straight back to party headquarters. Two days later, there was a small item in the party newspaper about the need for "vigilance." The item reported that an American *tipetto* (little type) speaking "perfectly comprehensible but accented Italian" had tried to subvert a party worthy. So much for cold recruitment attempts. I have never liked them and question if one has ever succeeded. The attempt stands as one of the more stupid things I have done.

Balance Sheet

On the whole I believe the Station more than paid its way. It was an excellent place to make mistakes because we controlled the real estate—not quite as much as we did in Berlin in those days, but almost. All of us learned a lot.

One "housekeeping" episode was particularly instructive. A case officer collapsed one morning in a diabetic coma with absolutely no advance warning. (He eventually survived, but it was a close call.) He was totally out of action, and we were not able to talk to him for almost a month. Like many of us at that time, he was so busy that he had left no recoverable records of future meeting times and places with his agents, to say nothing of recent contact reports and current assessments of his agents' reliability. The Station thus had little to go on to pick up where he had left off on some very important cases. Somehow we managed, but it was a struggle. Some aspects left us feeling rather ridiculous. This experience led to my conviction—some might say obsession—as DDO that case officers and Headquarters have to keep at least minimal records and contact reports, as well as current agent validation documentation.

Partition

In 1953 and 1954 there was an intensification of the struggle between Italy and Yugoslavia over the future of the FTT, and we and the British had our hands full in keeping the situation from boiling over. Both sides insisted that both Zone A and Zone B belonged to them. A number of people were killed in Zone A in the rioting which occurred during this period, some by the local police force, which had been trained by and supervised by the British authorities.

To get people off the streets, these police frequently used a successful tactic invented by the then Italian Minister of Interior. They would drive a convoy of Jeeps very slowly, in four-wheel drive, down the narrow streets and rhythmically and loudly beat the sides of the Jeeps with rubber hoses. Anyone who did not duck into a doorway or run away down the street got hit. I can still remember the sounds of those Jeep motors and the sharp thud of the hoses on both metal and people.

On another occasion, in 1954, several hundred members of the profascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI) party marched on the Allied Military Government (AMG) building. I was marching with them on

the sidelines to report on what was happening. Just as the demonstrators reached the AMG building and were confronted by police armed only with clubs and shields, there was an explosion not 20 yards from me. One man in the crowd fell to the ground. He had been about to hurl a handgrenade at the police, but he had pulled the pin too soon and had blown off his own leg. (He was later elected to the Italian Parliament and thus escaped trial.)

Separation

Although the Station—or at least I—did not know it in 1954, highly secret and ultimately successful four-power negotiations were going on in London and Vienna to settle "the Trieste question." (The solution would provide for an even split with only very minor modifications: Zone A to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia.) What we did know was that in the late fall of 1953 all British and American dependents were ordered out of the territory on short notice. This was designed to put them out of harm's way and to put pressure on the Italians and Yugoslavs by showing that we really meant business. The American military dependents were sent to Viareggio, a summer resort town on the west coast of Italy, which had a number of empty hotel rooms at that time of year.

No one in the military hierarchy had made any real plans for the evacuation of CIA dependents, so we made our own arrangements. This worked out well for us because Betty and our baby daughter, Sarah, spent from about November 1953 to the spring of 1954 in Florence. We had spent a few days' vacation there the previous spring, and I was able to get a room at a decent rate. Florence, that beautiful, historic gem of a city, remains one of our favorite places.

This interlude, however, was not all a bed of roses. The separation was painful. I suppose this memory is one of the reasons why, as DDO, I was always uncomfortable with the idea of divided tours for married Agency couples.

In early spring, when the Station decided that the possibility of returning its dependents to Trieste had improved, I arranged to have Betty and Sarah moved to a hotel in the closer town of Udine, the provincial capital of Venezia Giulia. From there, they moved to Monfalcone, a grubby industrial port town just on the Italian side of the then Trieste border.

The apartment we managed to find after a considerable effort was cold and miserable. In those days, incidentally, all case officers were expected to take care of themselves as best they could, insofar as housing and logistics were concerned. We were assumed to be self-reliant.

Betty and Sarah never did get back to Trieste, except for occasional brief visits. By late spring of 1954, my tour was about over, and I was called home for consultations—which ultimately resulted in my assignment to Munich to work on SE targets. I took the night train from Trieste to Rome to fly from there to Washington. Betty had a view of the main railroad line from Trieste to Venice from the apartment. She knew when my train was due to pass by, and when it came she flashed lights on and off to speed me on my way. I saw them, and I wept.

Farewell to All That

In July the time came for us to strike camp and move on. But now, even after 40 years, I have strong memories of our first post. Not of everything, of course. But of professional lessons learned, to be sure. Even more important, of friendships lasting to this day, of shared joys and hardships, disappointments and frustrations, and also the sense of excitement and adventure, fun and achievement, and, yes, of patriotic duty. I learned that mutual trust and taking care of one another as best we can is the lifeblood of our organization. It was the beginning of my lifelong love affair with the men and women of the CIA.

The Sears catalog

Reflections on Mail-Order Tradecraft

Jon A. Wiant

The announcement from Sears last January that it was shutting down its catalog sales operations provoked a wave of nostalgia among those of us who had grown up with this mail-order enterprise. Some of my colleagues noted that the Sears "Wish Book" was not only rural America's alternative to the big-city department store, but it was also the lifeline to American goods for many serving abroad. Long before Lands End, L.L. Bean, Talbots, or anyone of the dozens of other catalogs which now clog our pouches and overseas postal system, Sears kept us in clothes and commodities. And, if we had good tailors, Sears sometimes provided the models to inform the local craftsmen on contemporary styles.

My reflections, however, were of a different order. When it is written, the history of the Sears catalog also deserves a small chapter on the contribution it made to intelligence operations.

Low-Level Agents

In September 1966, I arrived in Hue, Vietnam, to take over direction of a small, bilateral operation with the Vietnamese that involved running agents into the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Secret Zones in western Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces along the Laos border. It was a limited activity, not as structured, complex, or spooky as the Special Forces' operation I had been working on the Cambodian border for the preceding six months. The agents I inherited were a mixed lot. Some were highland peasants from the Nam Hoa and Ashau Valley areas; many were Bru, one of the smaller Montagnard groups living around Khe Sanh and Lang Vei and as far into eastern Laos as Tchepone. From an operational perspective, however, they all had two things in common.

First, they had some natural access to the areas of our interest. Whether as hunters, rattan gatherers, aloe wood collectors, or charcoal makers, they had a good reason to travel in the Secret Zones and the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in the Vietnam/Laos border area. They were our eyes and ears on the ground, recruited to report on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army troops and facilities they encountered in their travels in the jungles. Most of the agents were organized in small nets of a half-dozen under a principal agent who, in turn, was controlled by a Vietnamese agent handler with an American case officer counterpart. The American case officer typically worked with two or three agent handlers.

Second, most of the agents lived in what anthropologists called "non-monetized local economies." These were essentially barter economies where the piaster, the national currency, was largely incidental to local life. The typical financial incentives that sustained agent operations in the lowlands were only marginally relevant to these highlanders. My predecessors had tried to recruit agents with the offer of a few hundred piasters for a 10- to 15-day mission into a Secret Zone, but the proposals either were rebuffed or resulted in more fraudulent operations than real ones. While the Bru were indifferent to the recruitment attempts, a couple of the enterprising Vietnamese agent handlers contrived some fictitious agents who looked quite good on paper. The agent handlers had salted away several thousand piasters before their scam was questioned and they were relieved.

Good Results

My immediate predecessor was more successful with the proposal to pay the agents with rice and other commodities. Initially, there was considerable enthusiasm for this arrangement, and several local

leaders signed on as principal agents with the agreement to recruit folk from their villages as agents. By late spring of 1966, there were several nets operating and providing a steady flow of information. While not always precise—we never mastered debriefing in Bru nor matching our maps with the Bru command of topography—this intelligence seemed to be welcomed by provincial authorities, by our Special Forces colleagues at the camp in Khe Sanh, and by the commanders under the Third Marine Amphibious Force, the major US command in the region. Occasionally, and always belatedly, word would also come back from the Air Force that pilots had seen secondary explosions on one of our reported targets. This was usually good for a bonus bag or two of rice.

Payment Problems

This was the state of things when I arrived. The nets were productive, but there were problems. The Vietnamese district chiefs in Nam Ho and Khe Sanh were exacting their tribute from these operations and were claiming a third of the rice and food we were providing. Attempts to dislodge them were futile, and the principal agents were less than enthusiastic about pushing their agents into new areas when their "earnings" were steadily eroding under these extractions.

One of my case officers working out of the village of Khe Sanh, whose cover depended upon maintaining a modicum of cooperation from the Vietnamese district chief, had supplemented the rice payments with bottles of Johnny Walker to both the village chiefs and the agents. This worked well for a while, but two missionaries involved in a Bible translation project for the Bru took strong exception to this practice. It was bad enough that the Bru brewed their own jungle toddy, but it was far worse that Americans would contribute to their debasement with higher levels of distillation. Word soon percolated down from Saigon that we would not use Johnny Walker for incentives.

Shortly after my arrival, I conferred with my case officers and the Vietnamese agent handlers to discuss how we might pick up the operational pace. I was particularly keen on pushing the agents deeper into Laos and keeping them out longer, especially in the areas along the Ho Chi Minh trail. My colleagues were skeptical that even doubling the rice payments would have that much effect. More cooking oil was suggested, but we doubted that would be that much more persuasive. B195, the best of the Vietnamese agent handlers—the only one who was conversational in Bru—noted that he had recently bought a couple of canvas "be-bop" hats as bonuses for a principal agent and these had been big hits.

Sears to the Rescue

This got me thinking about an alternative scheme to pay the agents. My wife had just sent me a Sears catalog through the APO. It was sitting on the corner of my desk. I started thumbing through it while we were talking, and it suddenly struck me that this might be the answer to our problems. That evening I sat down with the catalog and flagged several pages of clothes and other wares that I thought might appeal to the agents. I then created a basic pay scale, indexing items to the length and inherent danger of a mission. The following morning I sat down with B195 and his case officer and proposed they take the Sears catalog with them for the next meeting with the principal agent whose net was working between Lang Vei and Tchepone. I gave them my recommended pay schedule and mission index, but I also suggested that, in the best of Sears fashion, they should let the principal agent browse the catalog. They departed for Khe Sanh and I set off to scrounge another copy of the Sears catalog as a reference for the base.

Three days later my communicator came in with a message from the case officer. He and B195 had met with the principal agent and the Sears proposal was a resounding success, albeit many of my suggested offerings had been supplanted by substitutions from the principal agent's catalog browsing. Would I please send six boys' size 10/12 and 14/16 red velvet blazer vests with brass buttons—the Bru were of small stature. Each would be payment for a 20-day mission. Several boys' stamped leather cowboy belts were also requested.

Satisfied Customers

I immediately sent the order to Sears. Three weeks later the package arrived, and I pouched it to the case officer in Khe Sanh. The response of the agents exceeded even our optimistic expectations. The vests were a great hit. The agents paraded around the village in them, and we could not have organized a better recruiting drive had we passed out gold. While this showy display of Sears sartorial splendor posed some security problems that troubled me later, there was also no question of the renewed enthusiasm for jungle missions of longer duration. Within days, I posted another order to Sears. This one also included an order for a large bra. I was quite puzzled by this and only discovered much later that the bra, slung over a bamboo pole, was used to delicately harvest a jungle fruit.

We continued the Sears incentive program for several months. Intelligence production rose sharply as we expanded our coverage into new areas, and we received consistently high evaluations on the agent reporting. The Vietnamese agent handlers negotiated their own incentives, and they soon began sporting blue denim CPO jackets, a new mark of esprit. While I was greatly pleased with the results, I also found myself embroiled in a serious disagreement with our budget people who had never blessed this irregular use of operational funds. For a while, I feared that my contribution to agent handling was going to come a cropper under the auditor's eye; the presumption that I was running some scam held powerful sway. It took my most persuasive operational arguments and some creative accounting before all parties were pleased.

Phasing Out

The deployment of marine units into the Khe Sanh area in Spring 1967 forced a major change in our operations. The modus vivendi we seemed to enjoy with the North Vietnamese forces was rapidly replaced by an increasing series of hostile engagements leading up to the major battles of Hill 881 and 881 North, harbingers of the siege of Khe Sanh the following year. Marine reconnaissance teams gradually replaced our agent efforts. As both bombing and firefights increased in the area, even the red vests ceased to be powerful incentives to venture deep into the jungle.

Although I continued to experiment with the Sears catalog with my lowland agents, it never had the appeal we found in the mountains. The catalog, and my band of red-vested agents, are now both history, a history that briefly intersects in one bright moment of tradecraft and the market spirit.

Allen Dulles in wartime

The Exploits of Agent 110

Mark Murphy

This is the centenary of the birth of Allen Dulles. Although he is primarily remembered for his active role as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) during the Cold War, it was in World War I and World War II that he first made his mark as an intelligence officer.

In 1916, after passing the Foreign Service exam and finishing his master's degree at Princeton, 23-year-old Allen Dulles left for his first posting, as third secretary in the US Embassy to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Vienna. It proved to be a short-lived assignment, however. On 6 April 1917, the US declared war on Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Dulles left for another posting at the US Legation in Bern, Switzerland.

When Dulles arrived at the legation, no one knew what to do with the extra help, so the first secretary took him aside and said, "I guess the best thing for you to do is take charge of intelligence. Keep your ears open. This place is swarming with spies. And write me a weekly report."

Dulles was elated. "I cannot tell you much about what I do," he wrote his father that night, "except that it has to do with intelligence."[1]

Two Painful Lessons

Switzerland was swarming with spies—British, French, Italian, German, and Austro-Hungarian. In addition, Czech, Slovak, Slav, and Croat exiles were scheming and plotting to return home as soon as the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed. And then there were all the German and Russian émigrés waiting for the war to end.

In the midst of such intrigue, it took Dulles less than a week to flout one of the oldest rules of intelligence. He was at the office late one afternoon, finishing up as duty officer and looking forward to a tennis date, when the telephone rang. A man with a heavy German accent introduced himself as Vladimir Ilich Lenin and urgently requested a meeting for that same afternoon. Dulles assumed the caller was just another emotionally unstable émigré trying to get back to his homeland, looking for some sort of help. Dulles told him to stop by the next morning. "Tomorrow will be too late," Lenin replied impatiently, "I must talk to someone this afternoon." Dulles, however, was unyielding.[2]

The next morning, Lenin was on his way to Russia in the sealed train provided by German officials. On 16 April, he arrived at Finland Station in Petrograd, where he was greeted by a large crowd of workers, soldiers, sailors, and Bolshevik supporters. Shortly thereafter, in one of his first political declarations, he called for peace negotiations with Germany.

Dulles later remarked that, following that episode, he decided he would see "all kinds of queer people, with and without beards." As DCI, he would often entertain new recruits with the story.[3]

During his first few months in Switzerland, Dulles also learned something about the harsh realities of espionage. He had been dating a young Czech woman, only to learn from British intelligence that the Austrians had blackmailed her into spying. Because of the information she provided, at least two Czech agents had been executed, and an important British source had been compromised. Dulles, following a British plan, took her out to dinner and then strolled into the old section of town, where two British officers were waiting to take her away.

Dulles later remarked, "I never heard what happened to her. I learned that anyone can be blackmailed. And it is often the most patriotic citizen who is turned into a traitor."[4]

Other Assignments

Following the surrender of German troops in November 1918, Dulles was assigned to the Boundary Commission at Versailles, where he went to work on the newly created nation of Czechoslovakia.

In 1920, Dulles returned home and went from one diplomatic assignment to another: head of the Near East Department in 1922; working on the Dawes Plan from 1923 to 1924 to help Germany make good on its reparations payments; and delegate to the International Conference on Arms Traffic in 1925 and the Disarmament Conference in 1926.

Dulles seemed on track to become an Assistant Secretary, but by the mid-1920s he was ready to leave. He was bored with the Foreign Service, and his salary of $8,000 proved inadequate to support his growing family. He started taking night courses at George Washington University Law School, and he passed the bar exam in 1926. When he was nominated a short while later to the post of Counselor to the US Legation in Peiping, without a salary increase, he decided to resign.

Legal Career

In late 1926, Dulles joined his older brother, John Foster Dulles, as a member of the prestigious New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. He was soon handling cases on his own, and by 1930 he was a partner. He also became known as someone with a knack for solving problems and facilitating negotiations.

Still, Dulles was not completely content with the life of a New York lawyer, and he soon accepted two diplomatic offerings. First, as a legal adviser to the Three-Power Naval Conference of 1927, which led to restrictions on the size of US, British, and Japanese navies. And in 1932 and 1933, he was an adviser to the US delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Dulles believed that another war was inevitable. "We must do something," he exclaimed more than once as Hitler began to tear up the Versailles Treaty, rearming Germany and reoccupying the Rhineland in 1935. He began to speak out against the neutrality legislation of the mid-1930s. In a speech to the New York Young Republican Club in April 1936, he called for a policy of trade at your own risk and travel at your own risk.[5]

On to the OSS

In the summer of 1940, at the Republican Party Convention in Philadelphia, Dulles received an interesting offer from an old acquaintance, William Donovan. A World War I hero and Wall Street corporate lawyer, Donovan had recently been to England on a factfinding tour for President Roosevelt. He predicted the US would be at war before the end of 1941, and he described to Dulles his plans for a wartime intelligence service.

In June 1941, after Roosevelt named Donovan to head the newly established Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), the latter called Dulles and asked him to open the New York office. Dulles accepted, but when he set up the so-called Bruening Committee, a front to support the German resistance, the State Department criticized it for harboring "hopelessly reactionary Generals and Junkers" and "dangerous communists," and FBI Director Hoover complained to Roosevelt that COI was hiring "a bunch of Bolsheviks."[6] Donovan, acting on orders from the President himself, told Dulles to disband it.

Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Donovan pushed for a more powerful intelligence service, which he got on 13 June 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Donovan initially wanted Dulles to help open the London office as deputy to David Bruce, but Dulles asked instead for Switzerland. "A less glamorous post," he later wrote, "but one where I felt my past experience would serve me in good stead."[7] Donovan approved, and he assigned Dulles to set up OSS/Bern.

Back to Bern

On 2 November, Dulles left New York on a Catalina flying boat bound for Lisbon, carrying a special codebook for communications and a $1 million letter

of credit. From Lisbon, he caught another flight to Barcelona. He then boarded a train for Geneva. When it reached the last station before the Swiss border, a Vichy French official ordered all to disembark for a passport check. A German Gestapo officer observed the procedure and doublechecked some of the passports, including the one belonging to the lone American traveler. Dulles described the scene: "The Gestapo man carefully put down in his notebook the particulars of my passport, and a few minutes later a French gendarme explained to me that an order had just been received from Vichy to detain all Americans and British presenting themselves at the frontier and to report all such cases to Marshall Petain directly."

For the next half hour or so, Dulles nervously paced the platform. He considered trying to escape into the French countryside, where he would hope to meet up with Resistance fighters, but he decided against it. Finally, with the train about to leave, the gendarme rushed over to Dulles and motioned him to climb aboard. "Go ahead," he whispered "our cooperation with the Nazis is only symbolic."[8] The Gestapo officer was nowhere in sight, having gone to the neighborhood bistro for lunch.

Setting Up Shop

The day after Dulles—whose codename was Agent 110—arrived in Bern, the *Journal de Geneve*, citing a source in Swiss customs, identified him as "a personal representative of President Roosevelt" assigned to carry out "special duties." Dulles welcomed the publicity, as OSS did not stress cover for its senior officials. Donovan believed they were better off in the open, where would-be informants could easily find them, and Dulles, in one of his many intelligence axioms, liked to say, "Never try to conceal what cannot or need not be concealed." That the Germans considered him "the most influential White House man in Europe" would help him immensely over the next few years.[9]

Dulles rented an apartment in a 15th-century home in the old section of town, and he promptly removed the light bulbs from the outside street lamp. He hired a butler, a chef, and a maid so that he was soon living in upper-class European style.

It was not as easy for Dulles to find help at the US Legation, where the only other OSS employee was a secretary. He was able, however, to recruit several US citizens left in the country after Germany and Italy sealed its borders. A Standard Oil man agreed to collect intelligence on the petroleum business; a National City Bank man began secret purchases of foreign currency for OSS operations; a Boston socialite named Mary Bancroft signed on as a reports officer; and a German-born naturalized American named Gero von Schulze Gaevernitz volunteered as an assistant.

Communications

Getting information out of Switzerland was a time-consuming task. At first, Dulles and his staff relied on US Legation and Swiss commercial radio facilities to send diplomatic messages, with two staffers spending about 90 percent of their time enciphering and deciphering cable traffic.

After the liberation of Corsica in October 1943, they began to send secret information via the diplomatic pouch. The reports were microfilmed in Bern, sent to Geneva, and handed to an engineer on the Geneva-Lyon run, who hid the film in a secret compartment over the firebox so that if German troops searched the train he could open the trapdoor and destroy the film.

At the Lyon station, the film was passed to a courier, who took it by bicycle to Marseille. From there, it was given to the captain of a fishing boat bound for Corsica, where it was picked up by a plane from Algiers. This circuitous route took approximately 10 to 12 days.

Collecting information was easier. Switzerland was filled with travelers, refugees, international businessmen, and various anti-Nazi German exiles. Dulles found Catholic and Protestant clergymen willing to provide information on church movements in Germany, and German laborers able to reveal details about heavy industry in the Rhineland. A German-Austrian businessman told him about the structure and capabilities of the midget "Beetle" tank a year before the Germans first used it at Anzio.

Switzerland was not neutral in the strictest sense of the word, and it certainly was not as neutral as it was in World War I. German officials regulated all of its exports with transit permits so that approximately 85 percent of all Swiss trade was conducted with Germany and Italy. Swiss industries collaborated with the German military in developing machine tools, precision machinery, guns, diesel engines, airplane parts, and torpedoes. Swiss banks freely serviced German banks, lending them money, providing them with US dollars and other foreign exchange, and acting as intermediaries for German accounts.[10]

The Most Valuable Spy

To conduct this trade and diplomacy, a number of German officials lived in Switzerland or frequently traveled there. One such intermediary, Fritz Kolbe of the Foreign Office, would become the single-most-important source for the Allies—and Dulles did not even have to recruit him. Like most of the valuable German sources in World War II and most of the great spies in history, he was a walk-in.

Kolbe had joined the Foreign Office in 1925, serving overseas for a dozen years, before returning to Berlin in the late 1930s. When he saw Hitler's anti-Semitism and aggressive militarism, he thought about resigning, but a Catholic priest persuaded him to fight Nazism from within. Shortly thereafter, Kolbe was assigned as an assistant to Ambassador Karl Ritter, who handled liaison between the Foreign Office and the Supreme German Military Command, and he was told to screen all incoming Foreign Office cables. Before long, he was making courier missions to Switzerland, an ideal location to contact British or US intelligence operatives.

On 17 August 1943, Kolbe cleared Swiss customs carrying a 12-inch by 18-inch envelope with two red wax seals bearing the imprint of the Foreign Office and addressed to the German Legation in Bern. Inside was a smaller envelope, which he delivered to the Legation. He then headed for the British Legation, the large envelope filled with Top Secret cables. But the British were not interested. No high-ranking diplomat, in their view, would offer to provide state secrets without first establishing contact through an intermediary. Kolbe had to be a crackpot or a double agent trying to deceive them with false information.

Later that evening, a British military attaché told Dulles about Kolbe, "a cove with a funny name," whom they had dismissed. "He'll undoubtedly turn up at your shop in due course."

Instead of going himself, however, Kolbe sent an intermediary this time. Dr. Ernesto Kocherthaler, a German-born Spanish citizen arrived at the US Legation early the next morning and told temporary OSS staffer Gerald Mayer that a German diplomat traveling through Bern with classified documents was prepared to meet with US officials. He then handed Mayer 16 Foreign Office telegrams, all classified Top Secret. He told him to study them and to respond as soon as possible because the diplomat would have to return to Berlin in two days.

Dulles took a careful look at the cables when he arrived at the office that afternoon. He said there were three possibilities:

> This could be an attempt to break our code. The Germans figure we'll bite, cipher this stuff, and radio it on to Washington. They monitor everything, including the Swiss commercial radio channels. They'll be listening for these dispatches in the hope that a foreknowledge of the contents will give them the clue they need to decipher it. Or perhaps our friend is an agent provocateur. He plants information with us and then tips off the Swiss police that we are spying. His rendezvous with us is proof and we are kicked out of the country. Still, there is just the glimmer of chance that this man is on the square.[11]

Dulles told Mayer to set up a second meeting, this time with Kolbe, at Dulles's apartment at 10:30 a.m. the next day. Kolbe arrived on time, bringing the rest of the classified material, 186 pages in all, including a map of Hitler's headquarters at Rastenburg. When Dulles asked Kolbe about his motivation, he said, "I hate Nazis. . . . All I need for my services is help, encouragement, and support after the war."

"It's hard to say what will happen after the war," Dulles cautioned. "It's got to be won first."[12] That night he sent several of the more sensational cables to OSS/Washington with the designation "eyes only" for Donovan.

Dulles and Kolbe met again the next morning, and Dulles gave him the alias "George Wood." For cover purposes, he arranged for a young Swiss girl named Emmy to pose as Kolbe's girlfriend. If Dulles needed to see Kolbe, he would have Emmy send a postcard that read something like: "Missing you. Wish you were here." If he needed information on a particular subject, there was a code system: for example, Emmy would request information on Japanese military matters by asking Kolbe to buy some more "Japanese toys and trinkets," and the next batch of documents would include up-to-date telegrams from the German Legation in Tokyo. Dulles also gave Kolbe a special OSS camera so he could photograph documents and send the rolls of microfilm in an envelope addressed to Emmy.

Kolbe traveled to Switzerland as often as possible in late 1943 and early 1944, using the double envelope and other tricks to smuggle classified documents. By the spring of 1944, he had provided over 1,200 documents—none of them more than two weeks old. Among other things, Dulles learned that a secret radio transmitter in the German Embassy in Dublin was directing submarine raids on Allied shipping, that President Franco of Spain was about to smuggle large amounts of badly needed tungsten to German war plants, and that the valet to the British Ambassador in Ankara was a Nazi spy.

Skepticism at Home

The only problem with the "George Wood" cables was that few people in Washington or London were taking them seriously. Dulles had acquired a reputation for sending information that contradicted what was being learned from ULTRA, the special codebreaking program, which had gone into effect in late 1942. On 29 April 1943, Donovan had warned him:

> It has been requested of us to inform you that: "All news from Bern these days is being discounted 100 percent by the War Department." It is suggested that Switzerland is an ideal location for plants, tendentious intelligence, and peace feelers but no details are given. As our duty requires we have passed on the above information. However, we restate our satisfaction that you are the one through whom our Swiss reports come and we believe in your ability to distinguish good intelligence from bad with utmost confidence.[13]

When the first of the "George Wood" cables arrived in August 1943, there had been plenty of skeptics. Donovan ordered a survey of the material, and he then sent a large sample to British Intelligence (SIS), whose deputy chief, Sir Claude Dansey, dismissed the source as "obviously a plant" and said, "Dulles had fallen for it like a ton of bricks."[14] Kim Philby, head of the Iberian section of SIS and later revealed to have been a Soviet spy since the mid-1930s, also dismissed the cables. Of course, this was perfectly consistent with the Soviets' postwar plans: they did not want "good" Germans to overthrow Hitler and surrender before Soviet troops were on the scene. To investigate the material once and for all, Donovan set up a special panel.

Vindication

Over the next few months, OSS/Bern and OSS/Washington exchanged a series of cables on the new source. Finally, on 29 December 1943, Dulles sent the following message to Donovan: "I now firmly believe in the good faith of Wood, and I am ready to stake my reputation on the fact that these documents are genuine."[15] On 10 January 1944, Donovan passed 14 examples of the "George Wood" reporting to Roosevelt with the comment that it represented the first major penetration into the German Government. Dulles had persuaded Donovan, and that was all that mattered.

For Dulles, vindication came later in the war when the British concluded their survey of the "George Wood" cables and pronounced them genuine. SIS went so far as to call their source the prize catch of World War II. Kolbe would provide over 1,600 documents, most of them cables from German military

attachés in 20 countries, which gave OSS a "picture of imminent doom and final downfall" of Nazi Germany.

A Second Key Source

Dulles would also pick up another valuable German source—Hans Bernd Gisevius of the German Consulate in Zurich. Gisevius, who came from an old family of civil servants, had been ousted from the Gestapo in a 1933 purge and then later dismissed from the Berlin police force for criticizing the SS. But somehow he had been hired by *Abwehr*, the German intelligence service, which sent him to Zurich in early 1943. Like Kolbe, he first contacted the British, who quickly lost interest once they learned that he would not steal documents from the German Consulate. "The British," he wrote after the war, "above all, stuck to the old-fashioned scheme in which the enemy was considered solely as an object of espionage."[16]

Then, after making contact through an intermediary, Gisevius called on Dulles at his apartment. "I will not demean myself by being a thief, stealing trivia from office filing cabinets," he said, "but I will give you a list of every general in Germany who wants to see Hitler dead, and I will help you communicate with them. In the meantime, I will tell you when my friends are planning to assassinate the Fuhrer."[17]

On 13 March, Gisevius continued, an explosive device would be placed in Hitler's personal plane for a flight from Berlin to Poland. Would the US Government openly support the anti-Hitler movement in the event of a putsch?

Dulles hesitated: "How do I know you can be trusted?"

The German produced a black notebook and began to read from it. Dulles was astonished—here were messages recently sent from OSS/Bern to OSS/Washington and OSS/London. Gisevius explained that the special German codebreaking component, the B-Dienst Group, had broken the US Legation code system. Dulles knew then that he had a legitimate source.

Gisevius, Kolbe, and a variety of other sources provided Dulles with a steady supply of order of battle information. By early 1944, nearly half of all OSS/Bern reports dealt with battlefronts in northern Italy, Germany, and the Balkans: troop movements, supplies, military-related transportation, tanks, guns, German weapons, and the results of Allied air raids. Most requests from OSS headquarters took only seven to 10 days to answer, and US military intelligence described the information as "timely and of value."[18]

Paramilitary Operations

Dulles also took an active part in supporting guerrilla groups in Italy and in a number of German-occupied countries. In Campione, a small piece of Italian territory located 250 yards inside Switzerland on Lake Lugano, he and his staff provided 20 rifles and 100 handgrenades for local partisans, who then carried out a bloodless revolution on 28 January 1944. In the months following D-Day, Dulles set up a sub-base on the Swiss-French border to establish direct contact with advancing US troops of the 12th, 6th, and 7th Armies and to support Charles de Gaulle's Free French guerrillas.

With all this activity, Dulles had acquired a reputation in Switzerland, London, and Washington as a real operator. Although his two most important sources, Kolbe and Gisevius, had been volunteers, Dulles had stood by them despite the objections of British intelligence and widespread skepticism back home. Sir Kenneth Strong later wrote, "What Switzerland needed during World War II was a well-known market for intelligence, and this is what Dulles provided."[19]

Germany's Secret Weapons

Of all the reports sent from OSS/Bern, few would be read with more interest than those pertaining to Germany's secret weapons. In early 1943, Hitler had promised to hit England by the end of the year with a new "vengeance" weapon, which everyone knew was an intercontinental rocket. At the same time, there also were reports that German chemists and physicists were working feverishly on an atomic bomb project at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in

Berlin. Allied leaders feared that the rockets, if they really existed, could be equipped with atomic warheads. For OSS stations, this was top priority.

The first clue came in February 1943, when a Swiss industrialist told Dulles that the so-called V-1 and V-2 rockets operated somewhat along the lines of an aerial torpedo. The next breakthrough came when Gisevius, in one of his first meetings with Dulles, revealed that the V-1 was a pulse-jet-powered cruise missile, capable of carrying 1 ton of explosive for 250 miles at a maximum speed of 450 mph; the V-2 was a liquid-fuel rocket, weighing 13 tons with a 1-ton warhead. Gisevius also revealed that the rockets were being produced and tested on the island of Peenemunde in the Baltic Sea.

Another source, an Austrian named Kurt Grimm, added to the data on the V-1 and V-2 rockets with photographs of camouflaged rocket factories, which had been smuggled to Vienna by Austrian scientists working at Peenemunde. Grimm passed the photographs to an accomplished skier and mountain-climber named Fritz Molden, who journeyed through the Alps into Switzerland—evading Nazi ski patrols the whole way—and delivered them to Dulles at a safehouse.

None of these reports led to the bombing of Peenemunde, however. US and British war planes were already operating at full tilt in mid-1943, bombing German cities and supply lines or dropping paratroopers into combat. Peenemunde might not have been bombed at all if Dulles had not decided to send a rather peculiar report to OSS/Washington in early August 1943.

A Crucial Report

Stanley P. Lovell, the Director of Research and Development for OSS, who was better known as "Professor Moriarity" because of his sabotage and assassination devices, was the first to realize what the report meant. Like most OSS officials, he began his day reading carbon copies of radio messages received over the preceding 24 hours and stacked according to a code number designating their importance. At the top of his in-box on this particular morning was a report on German troop movements in Russia. Lovell read it carefully and then skimmed through the others. Near the bottom of the stack was a cable from Agent 110 in Bern:

> One of my men got dry clothes and a breakfast for a French worker who swam the Rhine to Rehen last night. Told following story. Said he was forced labor guard for casks of water from Rjukan in Norway to island of Peenemunde in Baltic Sea.

Lovell tossed the cable aside, and then he suddenly snatched it back. The week before he had attended a seminar on nuclear fission during which scientists had emphasized the importance of heavy water. Approximately 11 percent heavier than normal water, heavy water slowed down fast neurons so that they could fission uranium, the chief component of atomic bombs.

As Lovell reread the cable, he knew the "water" had to be heavy water. He pulled out several OSS maps and encyclopedias and found out that Rjukan had the largest hydroelectric plant in Europe. It was also believed to be the only place in the world that produced heavy water.

Lovell rushed down the hallway to see Donovan and told him that the radio message from Dulles "may be the most important message we will ever receive." He also said he believed the information tied into the mysterious "ski sites" on the French coast. Forty feet long and curved at the end like a ski, there were at least 70 of them from Hazebrouck to Valognes. Lovell pointed out that every ski site was pointed directly at London, Bristol, Birmingham, and Liverpool. According to Lovell, they had to be launching sites for unmanned missiles containing enough nuclear fission bombs to destroy each of those cities. "If we bomb the very hell out of Peenemunde," he said, "we could stop it cold before it has a chance to start."[20]

Donovan checked the information with American scientists Dr. Vannevar Bush and Dr. James B. Conant, both of whom confirmed the importance of heavy water in nuclear fission. He then sent Lovell to London to brief OSS station chief David Bruce, who then briefed the commanders of the Royal Air

Force and the US Air Force. Both agreed on the need for immediate action and, on 17 August 1943, the RAF carried out a massive air raid on Peenemunde, killing at least 1,000 Germans, including many scientists and technicians.

The attack, which took place less than 10 days after Dulles sent his report to OSS/Washington, would set back the first V-1 and V-2 launches from November 1943 to June 1944. As it turned out, Dulles was in London, having a drink at the Savoy Hotel, when the first of the V-2 rockets landed in June 1944, causing a complete panic.

During the next 10 months, until the German surrender in May 1945, over 20,000 V-1 rockets and 3,000 V-2 rockets were fired, with most launched against England and Belgium. They killed 8,588 Britons and wounded nearly 50,000, and they destroyed nearly 30,000 homes and damaged another 102,000. On the Continent, the rockets killed approximately 3,700 persons and wounded over 6,000 others. According to one estimate, the damage would have been eight times greater without the air raid against Peenemunde.[21]

Ironically, Peenemunde had nothing to do with the German atomic bomb project. Workers were helping to transport heavy water out of Rjukan, but from there it was being shipped to Wolfgast, not Peenemunde. It was then transported by train to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. Peenemunde was merely a cover.

Operation Sunrise

Dulles was to score other intelligence coups before the war's end. In particular, he was instrumental in the success of Operation Sunrise, which culminated in the surrender of all German forces in northern Italy on 1 May 1945. Operation Sunrise represented a fitting final achievement as Dulles prepared to leave Switzerland and return to Sullivan and Cromwell, still eight years away from being named Director of Central Intelligence.

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One man's history in OSS

At Work With Donovan

John D. Wilson

In 1941, I was serving as editor of the *Survey of Current Business* in the Department of Commerce, having left a position as Instructor of Economics at Harvard. I was due to return to Harvard in February 1942, but the Japanese attack on 7 December caused me to cancel that. Then, in March, Professor Edward S. Mason, a distinguished economist, asked if I would join the staff of the Research and Analysis (R and A) Branch at the Coordinator of Information (COI), the forerunner of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Mason was then a member of the guiding board of analysts of R and A. He put to me an irresistible proposal: that after a brief indoctrination, I travel to London to explore and report back on how the British were handling economic intelligence.

My indoctrination at COI of less than three weeks focused principally on reports on Germany, Britain, and the general state of the war. I received only rudimentary information about the overall organization and functions of the COI, and I knew nothing of its continuing turf battles.

I was given a letter signed by COI chief Col. William J. Donovan which laid out the objectives of my mission as Special Assistant to the Director of the R and A Branch, William L. Langer. My objectives were to establish close liaison with the head of the COI office in London, with the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) and with the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). I was to return to Washington whatever information I could obtain from the MEW, and I regarded the exploration of intelligence activities there as my primary task. It provided intelligence for economic warfare purposes, such as preclusive buying, as well as for military needs. The British had developed the technique of analyzing aerial photographs of German plants to a high degree, using their own plants as prototypes. Although a similar source was not available for the Soviet Union, MEW also appeared to have acquired a surprising amount of information on that country. MEW intelligence, like R and A in Washington, was manned to a considerable degree by experts from academic life.

I shipped back to R and A many documents freely provided by the various divisions of MEW. These and other sources of information I returned proved of high value. I also sent to Colonel Donovan highlights of the JIC Committee meetings, as well as a summary of conclusions of some of the papers.

Meeting the Chief

My first meeting with Donovan would occur in London in June 1942. As I awaited his arrival, I had no idea of the critical juncture at which the COI then stood. For months Donovan had staved off assaults on the organization from the military, Budget Bureau, State Department, and others. Only through Donovan's relationship with President Roosevelt did the COI survive.

I learned later that the President had fashioned two orders that laid out the future direction of the COI. One provided for the consolidation of information agencies into an Office of War Information, to which the COI's Foreign Information Service was transferred. The other placed the remaining functions and staff of COI under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a supporting agency, renamed the Office of Strategic Services.

Although these orders were on the President's desk, and all concerned were acquainted with the details, the President had not yet signed them when Donovan set off for London on 12 June. He arrived to find that, as of 13 June 1942, he was officially the head of the OSS.

I soon received an invitation from the Colonel to join him at breakfast in his suite at Claridges, his favorite hotel. I was very curious about this man about whom I had heard much, but had not yet met.

He proved to be a medium-sized, rather heavy-set, genial Irishman who greeted me with "Hello, John, so nice to see you again." The "again" rather tickled me, as it was in character for the soon-to-be General Donovan. He was friendly, informal, and sought to put others at ease.

Donovan was much interested in the sessions of the JIC. A major reason for his journey to London, however, lay outside my range of knowledge and competence at that time: the need to coordinate subversive activities of the new OSS with those of the British. This was especially the case with Special Operations (SO)—organizing and aiding resistance groups in enemy territory and carrying out acts of sabotage and subversion. Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) already had established a capacity in these fields, while the COI, with help from the British, had been rapidly building up its own resources. The need for close coordination and division in areas of activity had become evident. Donovan on this visit achieved agreement on arrangements to meet these objectives.

With Donovan's return to Washington, my own mission in London also drew to a close. I had searched through the intelligence section of the MEW from top to bottom and sent back a steady stream of studies and documents. On 26 June I headed back to Washington, where Langer told me that I was to serve as his special assistant in charge of building up and administering support of R and A units abroad. I continued at this task until October 1943. My performance was interrupted only briefly in April 1943, when I was appointed an ensign in the US Naval Reserve and underwent a short course of indoctrination in the Washington area.

R and A

A few words about R and A are appropriate at this point. Never before and probably never since has such a unique group of scholars been assembled—historians, economists, political scientists, geographers cartographers, and others, many of them leaders in their fields. They numbered over 900 in all at the peak. During the war, they produced some 2,000 reports, as well as basic handbooks on foreign countries and countless memorandums. Initially R and A was organized along functional lines—economic, geographical, and psychological (political) divisions, not always communicating with each other. But in January 1943 the branch was reorganized in a way that reflected the military's theaters of operation overseas. This forced the academic disciplines to work together, although not always harmoniously.

Organization Overseas

R and A followed the troops, establishing outposts in each theater of operations when accorded permission. These outposts provided information for Washington headquarters, as well as for use within the theater itself. London led the way, followed by Algiers in late spring of 1943. As the troops advanced and territories were secured, R and A sent in units that reported on local conditions, attitudes, and personalities—at Caserta, Bari, and Rome in the Mediterranean Theater. Other outposts were set up in Cairo and Istanbul to monitor developments in the Balkans and the Near East. In the Far East, units operated in Kandy, Ceylon, and finally at China's wartime capital in Chungking and later Kunming. My major concern, however, was London—vitally important because it was the location of SHAEF Headquarters and a multiplicity of information sources.

Recruiting for R and A abroad was a pleasure. OSS had been awarded a military allotment, and it held a high priority in claiming individuals for transfer within the services. At this point, many academic experts had been drafted and were assigned to infantry and other units. I was able to identify some of these men personally, while others were recommended by R and A divisions. Those selected would be plucked from a humdrum existence, given sealed orders, and transportation to report to a mysterious address in Washington. On arrival, they became part of the OSS military detachment assigned to R and A.

Unfortunately, the OSS allotment was long on enlisted personnel and short on officer slots. Many enlisted men, as a result, were permitted to operate in civilian clothes. This enabled them to deal more effectively with high-ranking opposite numbers in the Army and Navy.

New Assignment

In October 1943, Langer informed me that Lt. Col. Otto Doering, head of General Donovan's secretariat, had asked that I be transferred to a unit working in direct support of the General as European Theater Officer. In that job, I exercised a primary role in coordinating the support by branches at Washington headquarters of their activities in the European Theater. To carry out that task I spent March and April in 1944, before D-Day, at OSS headquarters in London, as well as at its Field Detachments, including the OSS airfield at Harrington from which night drops behind enemy lines were launched. I reported back to Col. Doering on the OSS operating units' need for further support and recommended priorities among them.

I also served as the representative at headquarters for Col. David Bruce, the head of OSS in the European Theater, on matters not put directly to General Donovan or one of the assistant directors. Thanks to Bruce, OSS in London possessed outstanding leadership. Years later he was to serve as a special representative in the Vietnam peace negotiations and as Ambassador to Great Britain, France, and Germany. His social, intellectual, and personal qualities enabled him to interact with leaders at the highest level. He was ably supported by his deputy, Col. Russell Forgan. A young naval officer I had known in Washington, William J. Casey, served as a staff assistant to Bruce and Forgan.

The General Joins the Invasion

General Donovan was not one to sit and direct OSS from an office chair in Washington. In many ways he was a hands-on leader, traveling frequently in the field. And where decisive action occurred, he was apt to be on the spot. It was not surprising, then, to find him in England in early June of 1944 preparing to participate in the cross-channel invasion of Normandy. He and Bruce accompanied the invasion fleet and on 7 June went ashore on Utah Beach. Concurrently, more than 100 OSS agents reported on enemy troop movements behind the lines, while an equal number worked with French Resistance in sabotaging rail and communications links.

Again in mid-August, when action shifted south to capture Marsaille, the General joined the invasion force with leaders from the OSS unit in Caserta—a unit that provided much of the intelligence required in planning the operation.

Planning for a CIA

On 14 September 1944, General Donovan returned to New York following the invasion of southern France. For some time, he had been considering the need for continuing a central intelligence agency after the war ended. He asked Lieutenant Colonel Doering to draft a memorandum setting forth the mission and basic characteristics of such an organization, and he sent this to Budget Director Harold D. Smith, in response to Smith's request for Donovan's plans after the conquest of Germany.

The memorandum was carefully crafted, and I had commented on several drafts. Basically, it called for continuing an OSS-type of agency, to be run by a director appointed by the President, but guided by a board of representatives from the State, War, and Navy Departments. The agency would be responsible for all secret activity, including secret intelligence, counterintelligence, cryptanalysis, and subversive operations. It would operate only outside the US, using its own communications and both vouchered and unvouchered funds. In a word, essentially OSS as it then stood.

Donovan sent a copy of the memorandum to Isador Lubin, an assistant to the President and a strong supporter of OSS. Lubin showed it to the President, who, on 31 October 1944, formally invited Donovan to consider postwar intelligence needs and organization.

Doering's memorandum was then circulated to all interested parties. The continuation of a central intelligence agency in peacetime gained some support from civilian agencies but little from the military. Nevertheless, the idea survived.

Meanwhile, in November 1944, I was appointed Donovan's assistant executive officer for Europe and Africa, as the theater officers were phased out. I monitored cable traffic with those areas, had access to pouch material, and continued to coordinate the support of activities by Branch headquarters in New York.

New Job for Casey

In mid-December 1944, the Germans staged a surprise counterattack through the Ardennes in Belgium. They advanced to a road center called Bastogne, defended by Americans. A few days before Christmas, Donovan flew to Paris. He regarded the Ardennes offensive, which by 28 December was failing, as an Allied intelligence failure. He then appointed Bill Casey as the new chief of intelligence for the European Theater.

Casey had been head of Bruce's Secretariat since October 1943, and I had interacted with him on many occasions. He was enterprising, energetic, and highly intelligent; in effect, he had become Bruce's executive assistant.

Donovan told Casey that his mission was to penetrate Germany. Because he would be dealing with military personnel at a high level, Casey was allowed to revert to civilian status, becoming inactive in the Naval Reserve. Colonel Forgan, who had succeeded Bruce as head of OSS in Europe, and Casey soon met with General Betts, General Eisenhower's American deputy G-2. Betts informed them that crossing the Rhine would become the main Allied operation, with the Ruhr and the Frankfurt areas as major targets. Most needed was information on troop movements behind the lines. Forgan and Casey also visited Sir Stuart Menzies and Sir Gerald Templar, heads of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the German section of SOE, respectively. Both were skeptical that Germany could be penetrated, and they had no plans for a similar operation.

Still, Casey persisted. He wrote down a list of objectives, headed by troop movements through rail centers, and set about selecting agents and preparing all necessary documents. He was able to obtain some agents from prisoner-of-war camps. In London, Casey sought agents among Poles, Belgians, Dutch, Czechs, and Russians, all of whom could carry the cover story of a foreign worker, as well as Germans.

Meanwhile, plans were taking shape in SHAEF for a wide Allied sweep to the Rhine. At the end of January, Casey visited General Betts again at SHAEF Headquarters outside Paris and told him that OSS was prepared to send 100 intelligence observers into Germany. He and Betts then developed a list of 20 major cities to be covered.

Early dispatch of missions was limited by availability of aircraft and inclement weather. Only six got off in February. Then, on 1 March, a team of native Berliners was dropped near the city and found themselves free to move about. By end of the March moon period, Casey had 30 teams operating. Meanwhile, the Allied armies had made great strides. They reached the Rhine on 7 March, after a two-day advance, and crossed that key barrier on 23 and 24 March.

Casey managed to keep ahead of the rapidly moving troops, providing timely intelligence through OSS detachments, but only with great difficulty. From 17 March to 25 April, 58 teams were sent into Germany, accomplishing a task the British judged had minimal chance of success.

Planning Ahead

It became apparent to us all in the Winter of 1945 that Germany would soon be defeated and divided by the Allies into previously agreed zones of occupation. OSS prepared for this by organizing 208 officer and professional personnel and a somewhat larger backup clerical and enlisted group to be concerned solely with intelligence. This force was put in place in April 1945, some weeks before V-E Day on 8 May.

At the request of the War Department, R and A had produced a 2,000-page civil affairs handbook on Germany for planners and administrators, and top R and A experts were appointed advisers to American

representatives to the Allied Control Council. X-2, OSS counterintelligence, became exceptionally busy interrogating Gestapo and Abwehr officers and helping track down Nazi intelligence agents still at large.

In January 1945, at a meeting involving Donovan, Allen Dulles, and Robert D. Murphy, US political adviser to General Eisenhower, it was agreed that espionage should not be limited to the American zone but that it also should be conducted in the British, French, and Russian sectors. Donovan had become increasingly suspicious of Russian intentions to cooperate with the West in postwar policies and programs. So when a German intelligence officer on the Eastern Front, Gen. Reinhardt Gehlen, fled to the Alps to surrender to Americans with his files and his group, he was taken to OSS headquarters. The Gehlen organization was debriefed, and it was allowed to continue operating its network in Russia.

After V-E Day, Colonel Forgan retired, and Donovan divided the Continent into country missions, with Dulles in charge of Germany. OSS was assigned a headquarters in Wiesbaden, a small unit was also located in Berlin, and special detachments remained attached to Army Groups and Army Headquarters.

Seeking a Consensus

In the spring and early summer of 1945, I accompanied Donovan on three lengthy trips to Europe. On 6 April, just before departing on the first trip, a development concerning the proposed central intelligence agency arose. Again, the initiator was Isador Lubin in the White House, who told the President that action on the matter appeared to be stalled.

The President then signed a memorandum requesting that Donovan "call together the chiefs of the foreign intelligence and internal security units in the various executive agencies so that a consensus of opinion can be secured." Donovan immediately sent letters to 12 agencies asking them to comment on his proposal and, after his return on 25 April, to meet with him to obtain the desired consensus.

Back to Europe

My first trip with Donovan included London and Paris, followed by visits to all OSS detachments with armies and Army Groups in France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany. While traveling with Donovan, I came to admire more than ever his outstanding qualities. He had immense energy—he seemed to require only five hours of sleep—and great intellectual curiosity. In London and Paris, I had to supply him with a steady stream of books that he read upon retiring and frequently before rising—always history, biography, and the best of fiction. Donovan also was a man of great charm, a witty and extremely interesting conversationalist to whom figures of speech came quite naturally. He was inherently modest, and he was considerate of others.

In London

London remained a major base for OSS, containing the largest number of personnel outside the United States. R and A and X-2 were particularly active, and SI (espionage) and SO operations continued to be launched from the airfield at Harrington. London also provided the headquarters for OSS operations in Scandinavia. Donovan met with branch chiefs and reviewed these operations, especially the efforts to supply the Resistance forces in northern Norway. The British had not cooperated fully in this activity, refusing to allocate RAF aircraft manned by Norwegian pilots. In late March the use of American aircraft with inexperienced pilots had resulted in a disastrous drop in Norway of a group headed by Lt. William Colby, years later Director of Central Intelligence. Two planes crashed, men were killed, and many supplies were dropped irretrievably off target.

In Paris

We arrived in Paris on 12 April, occupying the suite overlooking the Place Vendome reserved for General Goering during the German occupation. We had

hardly settled in when we learned of the death of President Roosevelt. Donovan had been concerned about the President's health, and, before leaving, had set up some extensive briefings on the organization and activity of OSS for Vice President Truman. Because of the President's untimely death, however, the briefings did not occur.

OSS Without Roosevelt

Roosevelt's death deprived OSS of a leader who understood the agency's complex relations with military and other intelligence units. The situation with Truman was entirely different. He lacked knowledge of OSS, and he relied heavily on Budget Director Smith, who had his own views on the organization of postwar intelligence. Smith informed the President that he would be presenting these views, and he cautioned him against taking any action on postwar intelligence.

Donovan did not meet with Truman until 14 May,almost three weeks after Donovan's return from Europe on 25 April. The visit lasted 15 minutes, and Donovan was not given any encouragement.

Meanwhile, replies had come in to Donovan's request of 6 April for the views of interested departments on the proposal for a central intelligence agency. The most important was conveyed by Secretary Stimson of the War Department, who wrote on 1 May that the Departments of "State, War, Justice and the Navy have together examined the proposed Central Intelligence Service and are in substantial agreement that it should not be considered prior to the termination of hostilities against Germany and Japan." So, for the time being, the proposal was put on the shelf.

At this point, OSS was again the object of a calculated series of press attacks, chiefly in articles by Walter Trohan, a reporter considered to be close to J. Edgar Hoover. These appeared at a time when the House Appropriations Committee was considering the OSS budget request for the coming year. The articles accused OSS and the War Department of harboring Communists, requiring Donovan and General Bissel, G-2, to go to the capital to defend their personnel.

Trohan evidently also was responsible for the printing on 9 February of the full text of Doering's memorandum, outlining a central intelligence agency, which appeared in *The Washington Times-Herald* and *The New York Daily News.* The next day newspapers throughout the country picked up the story. Some opposed the idea of such an agency, but *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* editorialized that the proposal should be considered. The JCS, however, concluded that it would be inexpedient to push ahead with the proposal for the time being.

Traveling Again

On 17 May, I again accompanied Donovan as he left the US on a dual mission: to complete the visits to OSS detachments that had been interrupted by the death of the President, and to participate in preliminary planning for the trial of war criminals. Donovan had been appointed US deputy prosecutor for these trials, teaming with Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, as the chief US prosecutor.

For 10 days, in London and Paris, the Supreme Court Justice and the General ironed out details with the British and French on the conduct of the trials. There remained meetings with the Russians, to be held later, that could prove difficult.

As always, Donovan received many visitors in London—among them this time were Isador Lubin, still a special assistant to the President; Ambassador Pauley, the wealthy oil man in charge of the Reparations Mission; and Dr. Sproul, President of the University of California. On one morning, the voice at the end of a phone said, "This is King Peter." The King of Yugoslavia was seeking Donovan's political and personal counsel.

I knew that Donovan and the OSS had been involved with Peter, a King essentially without a throne once Tito had taken power. Donovan had inserted an agent into the court of Peter—Bernard Yarrow, a former deputy to New York District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey.

Yarrow reported on political developments involving Peter and on Peter's relations with the British—a risky matter. These reports went to the President, the State Department, and the JCS. Tito had invited Peter to accept a regency to manage his affairs and a government drawn mainly from Tito supporters. Although Churchill and Roosevelt urged acceptance, Peter turned down the proposal. The British then sent Peter's full government back to Yugoslavia to sign the agreement.

Other Visits

We next moved south to OSS installations at eight locations from 3 June to 7 June. Caserta, the first, was the largest and most important. Allied Force Headquarters for Italy and North Africa was housed there in the King's summer palace. In Verona, on 4 June, Donovan was met by General Gruenther, Chief of Staff of Gen. Mark Clark.

The next day, we flew on to Salzberg and Pilsen. A tour through the great Skoda Iron and Steel Works in Pilsen revealed heavy damage to the plant but much less to machinery, which led us to conjecture that Germany's recovery might be more rapid than expected.

We went on to Munich and Frankfurt. From the air, both appeared to be obliterated, but still functioning. Frankfurt now housed SHAEF, and our own headquarters stood nearby in Wiesbaden. After stops again in Paris and London, we returned to Washington on 12 June. The respite was brief, for we would be off again in another 10 days.

The Budget Battle

It became difficult to maintain a positive outlook at OSS headquarters at this time. The series of false press articles prompted the House Appropriations Committee to ask the JCS for a statement on the usefulness of OSS and whether it should be continued. The Chiefs then put the question to the theater commanders. General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz responded as expected: OSS did not operate in their theaters, and they saw no need for it in the future. The India-Burma Theater, where fighting had ended, also found no further use for it.

But other replies were positive. China's Commander felt that the value of OSS was likely to be extremely high. The Middle East recognized the great contribution OSS made in the Italian campaign, and it believed the agency essential so long as conditions in Italy, Austria, and the Balkans remained unstable. The European Commander considered the future value of OSS to be high, and he said its cessation in that theater should not be considered under any circumstances.

These replies were sent to the Appropriations Committee on 29 May, when Donovan was in London. He was advised of them by cable, along with the JCS judgment that OSS "would continue to be useful in the conduct of the war." But the poison distilled by Trohan and other publicity had penetrated deeply. Even before the Appropriations Committee received the information it requested, it cut the budget, and the President cut it further. The end result was a budget, of $24 million, little more than half the amount originally requested.

Preparing for War Crimes Trials

In this unfavorable climate, Donovan on 22 June set off for London, and again I accompanied him. The major purpose of the trip was to complete arrangements for the war crimes trials. The next several weeks were given over to further discussions with the British and French, but with the Russians added. In the end, it was agreed that an international military tribune should be created, and that trials should be held in Nuremberg, Germany, in the American zone. Moreover, organizations as well as individuals should be indicted, including the Gestapo and the German general staff and corps of officers.

A rift soon developed between Donovan and Jackson, both stubborn men. Donovan urged the Justice to enlist the President's help in removing the war crimes indictment against the German general staff and officer corps, but Jackson could not be persuaded. Donovan then resigned as special assistant to the chief prosecutor.

But the OSS remained involved in the trials. The prosecuting team included OSS General Counsel James B. Donovan and Assistant Director Ralph Albrect. R and A research analysts helped interrogate the Nazi defendants and prepare briefs against them.

More of the Same in Washington

On 13 July, we returned to Washington, where Donovan found the situation of the OSS little changed. Further adverse publicity appeared alleging that OSS had large funds unaccounted for and that it was topheavy with representatives of international banking and business. Donovan met with newsmen on several occasions, and favorable reports also appeared, one notably in *The New York Times.*

Another attempt to keep alive the issue of a postwar central intelligence agency was launched, this time through Congress. Donovan urged Senator Harley Kilgore, Chairman of a Military Affairs Subcommittee reporting on Germany's war potential, to direct attention to the need for a central intelligence agency to assess that potential.

But events at this point were moving rapidly. Atomic bombs were dropped on Japan on 6 and 9 August 1945. On 2 September, Japan formally surrendered and World War II was over.

Budget Director Smith, busy trying to pare back wartime agencies, was ready for this moment. In July he had inquired about Donovan's plans for further reductions in personnel. The General responded that OSS was operating on a liquidation budget, cutting back operations to those consistent with obligations in the Far East, in occupied Germany and Austria, and with the maintenance of missions elsewhere in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He foresaw the completion of liquidation by 1 February 1946 at the latest.

At that point, Donovan wanted to return to private life. But he went on to raise the question of the disposition of OSS assets, and he again outlined the case for a central intelligence agency. He met with OSS branch chiefs to discuss the organization's future, and he also informed missions overseas of his response to Smith.

OSS Goes Public

For some time, those of us on Donovan's staff had been urging him to release information on OSS accomplishments as a counter to the barrage of misleading negative information. He finally agreed, and he and his branch chiefs met with newsmen in early September. They described the plight and problems of American intelligence, cited some of the accomplishments of OSS and individual officers, and laid out the controversy over the future of the agency, as well as Donovan's plan to return to private life.

The *Chicago Daily News* subsequently published five comprehensive articles, the last of which was entitled "If OSS Didn't Exist, It Would Have To Be Invented." Articles appeared throughout the country, as I and others marshaled examples of operations, including the work with Resistance groups in Europe that paved the way for invasions, collaboration with the underground in Japanese-occupied Thailand, and the release of Japanese-imprisoned General Wainwright and of the Doolittle air crews. *The Washington Post* reported "4,000 Stranded Flyers, Rescued by OSS Underground Railway," and *The New York Times* headlined "US Cloak and Dagger Exploits and Secret Blows in China Bared." All this helped to lift staff morale, but it had no decisive impact on Truman and Smith.

Final Rites

On 13 September, Smith again discussed OSS with Truman, and they agreed that the time had come to dissolve OSS. The Budget Bureau had drawn up an order transferring the R and A and Presentation Branches to the State Department and the remainder to the War Department as a Strategic Services Unit. Donovan had not been consulted on this proposal.

When he saw it, he asked if the JCS, to whom he reported, had seen it. This was a detail the Bureau had overlooked. The JCS then received the order, but they did not concur until 20 September. When they transmitted their decision to the Bureau, they were informed that Truman had that day already signed the order. OSS was terminated.

Truman also addressed a letter to Donovan, acknowledging the "capable" leadership he had brought to a vital wartime activity and reassuring him that the peacetime intelligence services were being erected on facilities and resources mobilized by OSS.

On 27 September, Donovan held a final gathering of employees. He left us on a positive note: "You can go with the assurance you have made a beginning in showing the people of America that only by decisions of national policy based upon accurate information can we have the chance of a peace that will endure."

On 1 October, R and A and Presentation personnel formally joined the State Department. The rest of us, 9,028 in all, formed the new Strategic Services Unit. Donovan was reassigned to duty with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. He returned formally to civilian status on 12 January 1946, there to carry forward his fight to establish a central intelligence agency.

I found that I would be eligible to retire from the Navy on 1 January 1946, and made plans to leave it and the Strategic Services Unit at that time. I received the Commendation Ribbon from both the Navy and War Departments. And thus ended what I later came to regard as the most interesting period of my life.

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Memories of Oberursel

Questions, Questions, Questions

Arnold M. Silver

Editor's Note: This article initially appeared in April 1993 in Intelligence and National Security, *Vol. 8, No. 2, which is published by Frank Cass, London.*

Immediately after the end of the Second World War in Europe, the US Army established in Oberursel, a small town about 20 kilometers outside Frankfurt-am-Main, a center that has a unique place in the history of US intelligence. Officially it was known as the 7707th European Command Intelligence Center. Unofficially it was referred to as Camp King.

During the war, the camp, known as Dulag Luft (Transit Camp Air) had been used by the Germans as an interrogation center for captured RAF and American Air Force officers. When the US Army took it over, all the necessary physical facilities were therefore available—quarters, stockade, small houses for special prisoners, and interrogation rooms. "Oberursel," as the camp was most frequently called, became the Army's center for detailed interrogation.

All the interrogators assigned to the center were graduates of the Military Intelligence Training Center in Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and almost all had served in IPW (interrogation of prisoners of war) teams attached to combat units during the war. The interrogators were able to cope with cases requiring fluency in German, Russian, French, Italian, Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Spanish, and Dutch; one had near-fluent Japanese, which he used only when cursing. After many interrogators had been transferred to military government positions in late 1945, a core of about 40 interrogators remained in Oberursel, divided into an intelligence section and a counter-intelligence section.

My own assignment to the center began in September 1945, after three pleasant months of doing nothing in the Provence area of France, most of the time near the famed Pont du Gard between Nimes and Avignon. At the end of May 1945, my IPW team, which had been attached to the 66th Infantry Division during the war, was transferred abruptly to the Marseille District through a War Department error. As the commanding general of the district made clear to us on arrival, he had not asked for us, did not want us, and, with all kinds of problems arising from 250,000 troops awaiting transfer to the Pacific, asked us to keep out of his hair. We obliged with pleasure, but then came that tragic day in early September when G-2 in the Pentagon discovered our whereabouts and ordered us to Oberursel.

My first assignment was to interrogate a fairly high-ranking Nazi, who, on entering the interrogation room, assured me with great emphasis that he had been, was then, and would remain a convinced Nazi. I found the statement so refreshing that I told the guard to bring in coffee and doughnuts for him. Refreshing because during the last two months or so of the war, almost every German prisoner we interrogated asserted solemnly that he was a member of "the resistance against Hitler." (At one point this caused the G-2 of the division to exclaim, "If they're all members of the resistance, who the hell is shooting at us?")

One of the most famous inmates of the camp from 1945 until the FBI finally picked her up in 1947 to take her to Washington to face treason charges was "Axis Sally" Eilers. An American citizen who had broadcast Nazi propaganda from Berlin to American troops in Europe, she was brought to Oberursel after the war not for interrogation, but to be held for the FBI. She was kept in a small, comfortable house on the post rather than in the stockade. The second commanding officer of the post visited her frequently, and on one occasion he told her that there were two categories of Americans: those who were with the Jews and those who were against the Jews.

He added that he was in the second category. Unknown to him, every room in the house was so well bugged that the sound of a mouse sighing could be picked up clearly. The recording of his statement to Axis Sally was later given to a powerful member of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, whereupon the colonel was forced into retirement.

When she was finally put on trial in Washington in early 1948, I was amused by the journalistic description of her as the "beautiful blonde" Axis Sally. Blonde she was, when her hair was properly dyed, but I can honestly say that I have never seen a woman with a face more like a horse than hers.

Another famous detainee in 1945-46 was Hannah Reitsch, the famous German test pilot who attempted in April 1945 to fly Hitler out of Berlin to the Berchtesgaden area. (He refused to go.) I mention her case only because of an incident in 1946. A US Army colonel in military government suggested that she be given the leading role in reconstructing the secondary school system in the US zone of Germany, pointing out that she had never been a member of the Nazi Party. Our recordings of her conversations with other German detainees showed that, although she had had the foresight to avoid membership in the Nazi Party, she was as convinced and unreconstructed a Nazi as we had ever come across. The recordings sufficed to kill the colonel's idea. Years later I learned that she was training the air force of Ghana.

Yet another famous detainee was the German adventurer Otto Skorzeny. Tried but acquitted of war crime charges—rightly acquitted, in my opinion—by a US military court at Dachau in 1946, he was then sent to Oberursel until a decision could be made what to do with him. US military intelligence had learned that his brother was being held by the Soviets in their zone of Germany and was to be used to lure Otto into the zone, where the Soviets planned to use him as a rallying point for the youth of the zone. I was assigned the task of questioning him and then recommending disposition.

Skorzeny, endowed with a remarkably strong physique, became famous during the war for two reasons. During the Battle of the Bulge, he put together and commanded a force of American-speaking German troops in US uniforms to infiltrate American positions. Early in 1945 he devised and executed a plan to rescue Mussolini, who at that time had taken refuge on a mountain in northern Italy. He was not a Nazi, and in fact any ideology was alien to him. He was purely and simply a man of action and a patriotic German.

On arriving in my interrogation room for the first time, he promptly warned me not to try to use any physical violence because he could overpower me in no time. He calmed down when I asked him in reply whether he could move faster than a bullet from a .45 calibre pistol.

After I had explained the facts about his brother and the Soviet plans for him, Otto, he asked for time to think over where he would like to go, and in the third or fourth session with him he told me he would like to go to Spain. G-2 in USFET (US Forces, European Theater) in Frankfurt concurred in my recommendation that he be resettled there. He became a rather successful entrepreneur in Madrid, but for years afterwards—I think I last heard about him in 1961—he approached each succeeding US Air Force attaché in Madrid with an offer to build a network of agents in the USSR for the United States. What surprised me (or did it?) was the fact that each succeeding Air Force attaché recommended to the Pentagon that Skorzeny be taken up on his offer, although there was not the slightest shred of evidence that he had the capability or the know-how to implement his proposal. The Pentagon rejected each of the recommendations from Madrid.

By the winter of 1945-46, the number of former Nazis being sent to Oberursel for interrogation had decreased almost to zero, and from that time on the counterintelligence section of the post was occupied almost exclusively with the interrogation of defectors from the East and of suspected Eastern agents arrested by the Army's Counterintelligence Corps (CIC). G-2 in the Frankfurt headquarters had ordered that both categories of people be sent to Oberursel for detailed interrogation. The intelligence section of the post concentrated on questioning Germans who, by virtue of their wartime functions, had considerable knowledge of Soviet industries.

Oberursel was also by that time the central point for screening and processing selected German scientists, especially those who had had experience with problems of rockets and space, for employment in the US. This was Operation Paperclip, later heavily criticized in some American circles because many of the scientists brought to the States had Nazi Party backgrounds.

The story of Oberursel would not be complete without recounting the "starvation episode." In December 1945 some members of Congress charged publicly that the Army was deliberately starving the Germans in the US Zone. At the beginning of January 1946 the commanding officer of the 7707th European Command Intelligence Center was ordered by Army headquarters in Frankfurt to dispatch all his interrogators in teams of two to question Germans in the US Zone at random as to whether they were receiving enough food. For the next two weeks this is what the interrogators of Oberursel did. We could have written our reports without leaving Oberursel, but ours not to reason why. We wrote our combined report on return to Oberursel, it was sent through channels to the Pentagon and thence to Congress, and nobody paid the slightest attention to it. The Army continued to include large amounts of peanut butter in the rations issued to the Germans. But at least I felt better on my return to Oberursel; a dentist I had questioned in Mannheim expertly filled two cavities in my teeth.

As a result of their interrogations of defectors from the Soviet and East European intelligence services, as well as arrested agents of these services, the interrogators in the counterintelligence section of Oberursel became experts on the services, especially the Soviet state security service (MGB at the time, then KGB) and, to a much lesser extent, the Soviet military intelligence service (GRU). However, as we received defectors from the Czechoslovak intelligence service and agents thereof, it struck us that this service, recreated under Soviet control, was rapidly becoming uniquely imaginative and proficient in its foreign operations. In 1959 it was therefore of more than passing interest to me when I learned that MI6, the British foreign service, was sending a team of officers to warn the internal security services of the European NATO countries that the Czechslovak service was so effective that at least as much attention should be given to it as was being given to the KGB.

In the spring of 1946 CIC in Salzburg foiled a Soviet attempt to kidnap an Austrian who had served German military intelligence (*Abwehr*) during the war by providing it with information on the Soviet military. The man the Soviets tried to kidnap was Richard Kauder, alias Klatt. He and two of his wartime associates were sent to Oberursel for their protection and for detailed interrogation. The two associates were the White Russian émigré, Gen. Anton Turkul, and another Russian émigré, Ira Longin, alias Lang, alias several other names. I was assigned to interrogate all three of them and ended up spending more time on that case than on any other case in my Oberursel career.

Much of what has been written about Klatt (he was better known by this alias than by his true name) and his wartime network consists of fiction rather than fact. To put the basic fact concisely, his entire so-called network for the *Abwehr* was a Soviet-controlled military deception operation from beginning to end.

SSU (Strategic Services Unit—the successor to the OSS until the CIA was established) in Frankfurt, with which I had close liaison, somehow became fascinated with "the Turkul case." Turkul was in fact a useless oaf who had lent his name to the Klatt network as the man who allegedly recruited sources in the USSR. He never recruited even one source, although Klatt managed to convince the *Abwehr* that Turkul was one of his principal agents.

Ira Longin was an intelligent liar who could spin off 60 cover stories in as many minutes. Allegedly he had been in Istanbul during most of the war and had communicated his reports on the Soviet military to Klatt in Sofia. How had he communicated them? After having tried to give me X-number of cover stories about his communications system, he was finally reduced to replying, "By telephone." The truth of the "Klatt network" had to be obtained from Klatt himself.

Klatt arrived in Oberursel accompanied by his Hungarian mistress and was kept in a comfortable, guarded house just outside the confines of the post. It was clear from the first interrogation session of several hours that he was going to resist making any admissions which might reflect adversely on his wartime operation or on his ability to reconstruct an agent network in the Soviet Union. It was equally clear why he had such a will to resist. Having no other means of making a living, he had sold himself and his alleged capability to the small SSU unit in Salzburg and looked forward, after his release from Oberursel, to serving US intelligence as he had served the *Abwehr.*

There were three facets in the interrogation of Klatt: (1) My face-to-face interrogation of him and, to a much lesser extent, of Turkul and Longin. (2) Unknown to and, surprisingly, unsuspected by Klatt, every room in the house where he and his mistress were kept was thoroughly bugged. His comments to her after each interrogation session were frequently more useful than the results of the direct interrogations. (3) My interrogation of former *Abwehr* officers who had dealt with him during the war. The most informative of these was Colonel Wagner, alias Delius, who had headed the *Abwehr* office in Sofia and in 1946 was being held by French intelligence in Bad Wildungen in the French zone of Germany, where I questioned him.

The following picture gradually emerged from these three means of obtaining information. An Austrian citizen resident in Vienna, Klatt learned in 1941 that the Gestapo was after him because he was half Jewish. Through an Austrian friend, Joseph Schultz, he met General Turkul, who was then in Vienna and who told Klatt that he could activate friends in the Soviet Union to report on Soviet military movements. Schultz then arranged a meeting between Klatt and Count Marogna-Redwitz, then head of the *Abwehr* office in Vienna, who was so impressed by Klatt's sales pitch regarding a "network" in the USSR that he obtained approval from *Abwehr* headquarters in Berlin to take Klatt on, at least on a trial basis. Klatt met Longin through Turkul and, without inquiring very deeply, bought Longin's allegation that he already had a network in the Soviet Union and could run it from Istanbul. For all practical purposes, Schultz was Klatt's principal agent.

The initial reports supplied by Klatt to Marogna-Redwitz impressed *Abwehr* headquarters enough to cause the *Abwehr* to intercede with the Gestapo on his behalf and, in early 1942, to move him to Sofia, where he was supplied with an elaborate suite of offices. Theoretically Klatt was under the control of Colonel Wagner, head of the *Abwehr* office in Sofia, but when Wagner began protesting to Berlin that in his opinion Klatt was either a complete fabricator or being used by the Soviets to pass military deception to the *Abwehr*, he was told by Berlin to support Klatt in every possible way. Apparently *Abwehr* headquarters evaluated Klatt's reports highly.

Wagner told me that one wall of Klatt's office was covered with a map of the USSR west of the Urals, with a small light near each major city. Whenever Wagner or another *Abwehr* officer visited Klatt, one or more lights flashed repeatedly, whereupon Klatt would exclaim, for example, "Ah! A report from Kiev has just come in." As Wagner's suspicions mounted and were expressed to Berlin, *Abwehr* headquarters warned him with increasing rigidity not to interfere with Klatt's work in any way. It was made clear to Wagner that Klatt's reports contained information of exceptional military value.

Klatt's description of his office in Sofia confirmed in every detail what Wagner had said, and he spontaneously mentioned Wagner's obvious suspicions of him. However, his behavior pattern and the contents of his responses to detailed questioning about his agents, subagents and communications systems led me by the end of 1946 to believe that (1) he had been totally dependent on Joseph Schultz for the information passed to the *Abwehr*; (2) the entire Klatt operation had been Soviet-controlled; (3) Klatt himself had not been under direct Soviet control but had suspected that his operation was; (4) he had not dared breathe a word of his suspicion to anybody for fear that the *Abwehr* would withdraw its protection of him vis-a-vis the Gestapo; (5) he intended to resist admitting his suspicion to me for fear that this would negate his chances of employment by US intelligence, a prospect held out to him in 1945-46 by SSU in Salzburg.

Early in 1947, MI6, which had a profound interest in determining whether the Klatt operation had been under Soviet control for deception purposes, obtained G-2's permission to send an officer to Oberursel to question Klatt. They had no interest in interrogating Turkul or Longin. The officer they sent was Klop Ustinov (the father of Peter Ustinov, the actor), who had had some experience with the Cheka in Moscow in 1917 and during the Second World War was considered to be one of MI5's top operators against the Germans.

Ustinov and I interrogated Klatt for several hours, during which it was evident that he was resolved not to admit any suspicion of Soviet control of his wartime network. By prearrangement with me Ustinov abruptly dismissed Klatt, who was then taken, also by prearrangement, to a cell in the stockade rather than to the house he had been occupying with his mistress. About an hour later the stockade guard summoned me urgently to inform me that Klatt had hanged himself but had been cut down in time. After the post doctor had examined him thoroughly and found that he was in no physical danger, I began questioning him and found that he no longer had the will to resist.

Klatt admitted that he had suspected as early as 1941 that he was being used by the Soviets through Schultz to pass deception to the *Abwehr* but for his own purpose of self-protection had refrained from questioning Schultz. As long as the *Abwehr* was satisfied, Klatt was happy. He admitted that toward the end of the war, just before fleeing from Vienna to Salzburg to avoid falling into Soviet hands, Schultz had "disappointed" him by telling him that he, Schultz, was a Soviet agent, had been one since 1939, and had conspired with the Soviets to build the "network" for which Klatt was the front man to the *Abwehr.* Turkul and Longin, according to Schultz, had been mere figureheads to help add an air of authenticity to the network, because, as Russian émigrés, they could plausibly have acquaintances in the USSR who could be developed into sources. Schultz, according to Klatt, told him further that neither Turkul nor Longin knew that the entire operation was Soviet controlled. Whatever they might have suspected, they were survivors who had learned years before that survival often depends on keeping one's suspicions to himself.

Klatt related further that in late 1945 he had had an unexpected visit to Salzburg from Schultz, who had proposed that Klatt join him in Vienna to establish an export-import business. Suspecting that Schultz was trying to lure him into Soviet hands, Klatt declined. In any case, by that time he had established contact with SSU in Salzburg and foresaw a rosy future for himself —as a fabricator, but this point was of course not made to the SSU people, who had so neglected to question Klatt in any detail that he was convinced he could outwit them to his own advantage. Space does not permit recounting here all the details provided by Klatt about his wartime activities and methods of survival. Suffice it to say that he was a maneuverer par excellence.

About mid-1947 Klatt, Turkul, and Longin were released. Klatt returned to Salzburg, but that was not the end of my contact with him. In 1952 I bumped into him on a street in Salzburg, whereupon he launched into an attempt to sell me a network that he now "really" had in the Soviet Union. I brushed him off in a few minutes, hoping I would neither see nor hear of him again. Another vain hope! In 1964 a CIA officer in Austria told me that he had established initial contact in Salzburg with a man named Richard Kauder, who appeared to have a network of sources in the USSR. In response to his request for traces from CIA's headquarters files, the officer had been informed that Kauder, alias Klatt, was "suspected" of having fronted for a Soviet-controlled operation against the Germans during the war, but, despite this, information on his current alleged network should be developed without making any commitments. I enlightened the CIA officer, but what SSU, which had received all my interrogation reports on Klatt, had done with them remained another bureaucratic enigma.

As defectors from Soviet intelligence and agents arrested by CIC were sent to Oberursel for interrogation, we were able to form a picture of some activities of the Serov Group. This was the large Soviet state security group (MGB at the time) stationed in East Germany and headed by Col. Gen. Ivan A. Serov, who in 1954 became chief of the KGB for over four years. It emerged from these interrogations that one of the Serov Group's primary objectives, if not *the* primary objective, was the long-range mass

penetration of every sector of life in the western zones of Germany. Thousands of Germans in the Soviet Zone were recruited to resettle in the western zones and aim at careers in politics, science, press, academia, business, banking, trade unions, and police and security services. Most of them signed recruitment statements before leaving for the western zones and were told that they would be contacted at some opportune time after establishing themselves in their respective careers. Very few of them were given any agent training.

Obviously the Soviets did not expect that all these fledgelings would eventually become valuable agents. As one defector told us, the Soviet rule of thumb was "one in ten": 10 percent of those dispatched to the West might eventually become agents of some value. Considering the fact that this kind of mass penetration was continued by the East German Ministry for State Security after its establishment by the Soviets in February 1950, until the Berlin wall and attendant border controls in August 1961 ended mass refugee movement from East into West Germany, arguments among counterintelligence authorities in the 1960s and 1970s about the number of Soviet/East German agents in West Germany struck me as being exercises in futility. My own view was that there was little security in West Germany, and whether there were 5,000 or 50,000 Soviet/East German agents in West Germany was uninteresting. The scale of arrests of former eastern agents in the former West Germany since reunification in October 1990 attests that West Germany was riddled with agent penetrations.

Another picture that emerged from the Oberursel interrogations concerned the Soviet penetration of émigré groups. From the time of the October Revolution of 1917, organizations of Russians, Ukrainians, and other ethnic nationals who fled abroad were, as potential counterrevolutionary movements, high-priority targets for penetration by Soviet state security organs. It was clear from the information amassed in Oberursel and disseminated to SSU as well as to the Pentagon intelligence agencies that there was scarcely an émigré group that was not penetrated by the Soviets at various levels. This was particularly true of Russian, Ukrainian, and Baltic groups, with the Russian National Labor Union (NTS), headquartered in Frankfurt, and the Bandera and Melnik factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), centered largely in Munich, representing focal points of Soviet penetration activity.

The information obtained on this subject by the Oberursel interrogators simply added to similar information obtained through bitter experiences of the British and French intelligence services in the 1920s and 1930s. The totality of the information was staggeringly convincing. It was astonishing, therefore, that in 1949 the CIA decided, in partnership with the British MI6, to mount "joint" operations with these groups to send agents into the Soviet Union. Given the scale of Soviet penetration of the groups, it could not be expected that such operations would benefit anybody but the KGB, and of course for the next four years or so CIA and MI6 suffered one disaster after another. There was not one successful operation. The mass of information militating against this kind of blindness on the part of those responsible for the decision to operate with émigré groups was simply ignored, resulting in many lost lives of émigré agents, but this did not hinder the careers of the responsible officers. Promotions in the intelligence field, as in some other fields of endeavor, frequently come fastest to those who commit the greatest blunders with maximum noise.

In the summer of 1946 former *Abwehr* Gen. Reinhard Gehlen and his group arrived in Oberursel from Washington. Gehlen, during the war, chief of the Foreign Armies East (*Fremde Heere Ost*) unit of the *Abwehr*, surrendered himself, his aides, and his files to the Americans in the spring of 1945, and the Pentagon leaped at this presumed opportunity to enlist German intelligence experience against the Soviets in the service of the United States. The group, accompanied by three US Army officers, was kept in a large building codenamed Alaska House, just outside the perimeter of the camp itself. About a year later the group was transferred to the Munich area and subsequently became the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*—BND) of West Germany.

The level of proficiency of the Gehlen group at that time in collecting and evaluating information on the Soviets was indicated by a tipoff I was given in February 1947 by one of the American officers working with the group. At the end of February the Soviets would begin a massive attack against the three western zones of Germany. This and similar false alarms, all evaluated as genuine by Gehlen himself, were perhaps attributable to the presence in the group of Col. Hermann Baun. In Gehlen's Foreign Armies East group, Baun had headed a unit codenamed Walli I, responsible for collecting information on the Soviet military from behind Soviet lines. Baun was a strutting, apparently self-assured officer, regarded by the Americans with the Gehlen group as a showpiece. Over their objections, I obtained permission from G-2 in Frankfurt to interrogate Baun about his wartime operations, almost all of which consisted of sending agents "black," usually by parachute, behind Soviet lines.

It did not take more than a few hours to determine that Baun was alcohol dependent. Interrogating an alcoholic is a cakewalk, provided that the interrogator controls the supply of alcohol. Suffice it to say that after several days of interrogation Baun admitted that not one of his wartime operations had been successful, a complete reversal of his—and Gehlen's—previous assertions to their American controllers. The Soviets had rolled up his agents one after another. My report on the results of the interrogation of Baun aroused nothing less than fury on the part of the US officers responsible for the Gehlen group, especially because it contained Baun's unequivocal statement that during his year or so in Washington he had not been interrogated in detail about his wartime operations. Queries from G-2 in Frankfurt to the Pentagon brought confirmation that this was true. Baun had been accepted as a valuable asset simply on the basis of his wartime position as chief of Walli I.

By the end of 1945 Oberursel was perceived by Germans in the US Zone as *the* US intelligence center in Germany. As a result, during the next two years or so we had a veritable stream of visitors, most of them former SS or Gestapo personnel, who offered their services to US intelligence. Almost every one of them asserted that he had a network of agents in the Soviet Union and, for the right price, of course, would place his network at our disposal. I doubt that a full week passed without our experiencing one or two of these volunteers, all of whom proved during interrogation to be fabricators. CIC offices in the zone underwent similar experiences, but Camp King was the target of the bulk of the fabricators, not one of whom displayed any great skill in fabrication. The Oberursel interrogators became out of necessity uniquely adept at spotting fabrication with a minimum waste of time.

There were other ways of wasting our time—or having others waste it for us. One of these was the torture charge. In the spring of 1947 a member of Congress alleged that the US Army was torturing detainees in Oberursel. As night follows day, an Inspector General team was dispatched from Washington to Oberursel to investigate the charge. As I had been appointed chief of the counterintelligence section in February 1947, it was my questionable pleasure to explain to the IG team that the metal contraptions fastened to the walls of the interrogation rooms were space heaters, inherited from the Germans who had previously run the camp, and that they served no other purpose. In answer to questions from the IG officers over several days I explained further that physical violence was not, and never had been, one of our interrogation techniques, nor would it be as long as I had my position. Their unduly long stay in Oberursel was clearly attributable not to their suspicion that we were in fact using physical violence on hostile agents held in the stockade, but to their fascination with some of the cases we were handling. We heard nothing further about the torture charge after their departure.

It may have been this charge that prompted an inspection visit to the post a few weeks later by Major General Walsh, then the senior intelligence officer on the staff of Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the US military governor. After Walsh had questioned every defector and agent then in the post about the quality of the food, the amount of exercise they were receiving, reading material, etc., he then sat down with all the senior interrogators to give us our ultimate, apparently divinely inspired instruction, which I can still quote verbatim: "Your main job is to convert them to religion." I recall with pride that not one of

the interrogators present fainted on hearing this instruction, which confirmed my long-held theory about the basic problem of the world: when man evolved or was created, somebody along the production line neglected to put limits on human stupidity.

These mosquito-bite diversions were more than compensated by the satisfaction in obtaining hardcore information from defectors, of whom one of the most outstanding in my memory was a GRU lieutenant. He was the source in 1947 of the only information available to the US Government on the Red-Bannered Danubian Flotilla, a GRU plan for a widespread commercial cover network of agents in western Europe. Having worked in the GRU control center in Budapest for this operation, the defector was able to provide more than enough information to indicate that this was a model of long-range, meticulous operational planning by the GRU. The reports of the defector's information attracted considerable attention in the Pentagon, SSU, the FBI, and selected internal security services of West European allied countries.

In early February 1948 we received the first signal that Oberursel's days as a center for detailed interrogation were numbered. General Clay issued a decree that Americans working for the Army or military government who had been citizens less than 10 years would have to leave the zone within 90 days. The grapevine had it that this decree was issued on the urging of the American Bishop Muench, then the religious affairs adviser on Clay's staff. Allegedly Muench had a particular aversion to CIC personnel, many of whom had been citizens less than 10 years, having fled Nazi Germany to the US.

When the decree was issued, we had about 20 first-rate, experienced interrogators left in Oberursel, more than half of whom were affected by the decree. Attempts by G-2 in Frankfurt to obtain exceptions for some of these professionals were promptly rejected by Clay's headquarters in Berlin. General Clay having usurped a function of the Supreme Court, there was no allowance for appeals.

Almost simultaneously, in early February 1948 the Legal Division of the military government office in Wiesbaden, responsible for the state of Hesse, began questioning the practice of holding people for interrogation without affording them the right of habeas corpus as defined in US law. It took several meetings with the chief of the Legal Division and his deputy to explain to them that there were two categories of people under interrogation in Oberursel: defectors, who had voluntarily placed themselves in the hands of US authorities in the zone, and hostile agents known or suspected to be operating against US installations, arrested by CIC and sent to Oberursel in accordance with procedures approved by G-2, USFET. Further, on completion of the interrogation every agent was either released or transferred to the custody of a US military government court for possible prosecution. Precisely what was to be done to neutralize espionage activity against US interests in the zone if arrest and interrogation were ruled out?

Unable to answer this question, the Legal Division backed off somewhat, at least enough so that G-2 could continue to carry out its assigned mission in this respect. However, from then on arrests by CIC decreased dramatically, partially as a result of pressure from military government and partially because of CIC's loss of experienced operators as Clay's citizenship decree was implemented.

As several interrogators began their preparations for return to the United States in accordance with Clay's decree, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia took place from 20 to 25 February, resulting in a stream of refugees from that country into the US Zone of Germany. On instructions from G-2 in Frankfurt, CIC screened the refugees, to the extent that screening was feasible, in order to send to Oberursel those who appeared to be particularly knowledgeable. By the end of March we had about 50 refugees, many with their spouses and children, in Alaska House. Among them were such luminaries as Gen. Frantisek Moravec, who had mounted intelligence operations against the Nazis before and, from London, during the war. Deputy Chief of Staff of the Czech Army after the war, he was demoted through Communist machinations to a division commander in 1947. G-2 was interested only in his order of battle information, so he was transferred from Oberursel to Frankfurt for questioning there.

Possibly the most interesting of this group was Vladimir Krajina, one of the top leaders of the Czechoslovak resistance against the German occupiers of his country. For me it was an eye opener to hear his accounts of his successful efforts during the war to avoid capture by the Gestapo, never sleeping twice in the same place. His intention in March 1948 was to return to his country to form a resistance group against the Communists, but this proved to be unfeasible. In 1949 he accepted a position as professor of biology at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver.

During the first few days of dealing with the influx of these refugees, there happened one of those incidents that proved again how small this planet is. While talking with some of the refugees at the bottom of a flight of stairs in Alaska House, I heard somebody call my name. Bounding down the stairs toward me was a giant of a man whom I immediately recognized as a former classmate of mine at college in Boston. He had fled German-occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939 and entered the college on arrival in the US. In early 1941 he decided to return clandestinely to his country to join the resistance. Now here he was in Oberursel, for the second time a refugee from his homeland. It was a great reunion after seven years. I soon found a job for him in a Munich institution that subsequently became Radio Free Europe, in which he was a chief scriptwriter.

By the end of April 1948 almost all the refugees from Czechoslovakia had been interrogated and then evacuated for resettlement in countries of their choice. By this time also, as a result of General Clay's citizenship decree the number of interrogators in the counterintelligence section was down to six and in the intelligence section three. The few new interrogators coming in were exclusively 18- and 19-year-old draftees who had taken a military intelligence course or two at Fort Hollabird, Maryland, and had a long way to go before they would develop any appreciable interrogation competence. CIC's operational capability was sharply diminished by Clay's decree and growing pressure from military government to cease arresting people, with the result that the flow of arrested known or suspected eastern agents to Oberursel had become a tiny trickle.

During the same period, the number of defectors from Eastern intelligence services decreased to a rate of less than one a month. I do not know whether the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, which the Soviets began in early April 1948, was a factor in this change from an average rate of three a month during the previous year.

An additional factor in my deliberations about the future was the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. It was obvious to us that sooner or later the Agency would move to take over responsibility for defectors from the East and establish its own defector reception center in Germany. (In 1949, CIA did in fact plan to establish such a center. Being in the Agency by then, I was offered the chance to become chief of the soon-to-be center, but declined because I was scheduled for an operational assignment to another country.)

There was another discouragingly portentous development in the spring of 1948. G-2 in the Pentagon began issuing to their field units instructions that reflected a growing bureaucratic rigidity. Most of these instructions did not affect Oberursel, but one that did concerned the format for interrogation reports. The sample format we received allowed for no deviation; it was to be followed without exception. It especially caught our attention that the new format allotted exactly two lines for a description of motivation (e.g., of defectors). We had previously used from one to several single-spaced pages to describe the motivation of defectors, which in many cases is a complex subject and is always fundamental in determining whether a defector is bona fide.

If there was any doubt in my mind as to whether the time had come for me to quit military intelligence and switch to CIA, the Pentagon allotment of two lines to a description of motivation removed that doubt.

My last interrogation task in Oberursel concerned an East German who asserted that he had attended a special course at a "Soviet command and general staff school" in the Soviet zone and knew the plans for a Soviet attack against the three western zones in

the summer of 1948. When I asked him to sketch the planned Soviet lines of attack in an outline map of Europe, he had tank divisions going over the Alps—of Switzerland.

He was unable to answer detailed questions about the alleged Soviet school he had attended. In their totality the results of the interrogation showed conclusively that he was a fabricator. A few months after I had left Oberursel, I learned in Washington that somebody in G-2 in the Pentagon had decided not to accept my evaluation of the German. A team of three officers was dispatched to Germany to reinterrogate him and after several weeks came to the same conclusion as I had.

I left Oberursel for the United States at the end of June 1948. Toward the end of that year I learned from a former Oberursel colleague who had just returned that within a few weeks after my departure three other experienced interrogators had left. By the end of 1948 there were only two persons in Oberursel who could be considered experienced, competent interrogators. The post gradually became a center for the debriefing of selected refugees from East Germany. (I have always regarded the word "debriefing" in a counterintelligence context as connoting an interrogation conducted by a lazy person.)

Was anything lost by the deterioration and ultimate collapse of Oberursel as an interrogation center? I will answer this question by citing Klop Ustinov, the British intelligence officer who visited Oberursel in 1947 to question Richard Kauder, alias Klatt. In 1952 the CIA officer who had been chief of the SSU unit in London in 1947 told me that, on returning to London, Ustinov had commented to him that the Western world had never before had such a concentrated and professional intelligence and counterintelligence interrogation capability as he had seen in Oberursel. Ustinov predicted that through the normal process of bureaucracy and without any conscious attempt by Washington to destroy this unique capability it would wither away and could not be replaced.

In August 1985 KGB officer Vitaliy Yurchenko defected to the United States. While under interrogation (or was it "debriefing?") in Washington, he decided to return to the Soviet Union. The case became something of a scandal in the US intelligence community, revolving around the fundamental question as to whether he had originally been a genuine defector or had been sent to the US by the KGB for deception and confusion purposes. Being retired, I had no access to any of CIA's information on the case, but I read every press account I could lay my hands on. According to one account, which rang true, John McMahon, then Deputy Director of the Agency, assured a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that from then on only one interrogator, rather than several, would be given the total responsibility for a defector. The interrogators of the 7707th European Command Intelligence Center had learned and were applying that principle by the end of 1945.

From out of the past

The Historical Intelligence Collection

Ward Warren and Emma Sullivan

Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

George Santayana
The Life of Reason

The CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC), with its 23,000 volumes of intelligence history, gives the Agency a running start in avoiding the fate that Santayana posited for those without mnemonic resources to fall back on. When Allen Dulles ordered the establishment of the HIC in 1954, he envisioned the collection as a working repository of books and periodicals on all aspects of intelligence, beginning with the earliest written accounts of intelligence operations and continuing to the present. He wanted it to be used by members of the Intelligence Community as a law library is used by lawyers.

The Founding Father

As a lawyer and as a charter member of the Intelligence Community, Dulles saw the common need of both groups for access to historical research, and, lest the point be missed, he assigned another lawyer, Dr. Walter L. Pforzheimer, as the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence to serve as Adviser on the HIC. The appointment was effective 31 January 1956, but the HIC had already begun operations officially on 1 January 1956 under Pforzheimer's supervision.

Pforzheimer, the Agency's first legislative counsel, was an enthusiastic book collector in his own right who had begun shortly after World War II to assemble a private collection of intelligence literature, including rare books and manuscripts. He discussed his inchoate collection with Dulles from time to time, and Dulles eventually asked Pforzheimer for an evaluation of the Agency's intelligence collection. "Negligible," was the one-word response. Dulles assigned Pforzheimer to change that.

Marching Orders

The initial notice, No. 1-130-3, established the specific scope of the duties and responsibilities of the Special Assistant. The collection was to concentrate on "all aspects of intelligence operations and doctrine in the past." The Adviser was to provide staff advice for the development and maintenance of the collection, prepare a master bibliographical checklist on the subject of the history of intelligence, and make recommendations for the purchase of appropriate items for the collection. The notice of establishment also gave the Adviser general authority to request support from other Agency components as needed and placed him under the Office of Central Reference (OCR) for logistics and administrative support. A separate personnel notice, No. 20-190-92, dated 31 January 1956, designated Pforzheimer as the Special Assistant, a title that was soon replaced by Curator.

Early notes and memorandums by Pforzheimer indicate the interest displayed by the higher levels of the Agency. One draft for Dulles to sign begins, "It is my desire that the CIA collect and preserve material of historical significance. . . ." Though written by Pforzheimer, it clearly reflected Dulles's inspiration. Then, in April 1957, Pforzheimer wrote, "A little over a year ago, the DCI expressed a desire that CIA should develop the best intelligence library in the world." To accomplish that goal, Pforzheimer initiated the transfer of 1,190 appropriate books from the CIA library to the collection, located first in Room 134B, M Building, at the E Street complex.

Building the Collection

Pforzheimer then began to scour the world for additions to the collection. In the first year of the collection's existence, it expanded to 3,570 books. A trip

to Europe by Pforzheimer yielded 1,308 new books, bought in 10 European countries, at a cost of under $2,500. Other books were purchased from special funds or by OCR for the collection. By this time, the collection was no longer negligible.

The first year also saw a detailed definition of the scope of the collection. In April 1957, Pforzheimer emphasized that the collection should include such topics as military, strategic, and national intelligence, as well as espionage, counterespionage, unconventional warfare in all of its aspects—guerrillas, resistance movements, partisans, special forces, escape and evasion, subversion, clandestine press—and such other subjects as economic and psychological warfare, prisoners of war, cryptography, loyalty and security, and the various elements of intelligence tradecraft. As far as Pforzheimer could determine, "nowhere else in the world is there a collection of similar size and scope."

To ensure that the collection continued to be the best, Pforzheimer enlisted the support not only of Agency overseas posts, but also prevailed upon the Department of State to add his criteria to its list of publications to be procured by regional and part-time Publications Officers (POs) stationed overseas. An August 1962 Airgram served "as a guide to regional and part-time POs in their selection of the following intelligence materials." The list followed closely the criteria Pforzheimer had established for the collection. In addition, the Airgram said, "The only works of fiction appropriate to this requirement are those publications clearly based on fact, or on the actual intelligence experience of the author."

Lodged in the Library

With the construction and dedication of the new CIA Headquarters building in Langley, Virginia, the collection got more space and a new administrative master. On 24 September 1963, per CR 1-130-8 "the Historical Intelligence Collection and the personnel assigned to it are transferred to the CIA Library." Initially, the collection's new home was a small room in the library, but it was shortly moved to quarters on the library's mezzanine floor. It still occupies that location.

Quantity and Quality

The size of the collection continued to increase. Other trips by Pforzheimer helped to build the collection to 8,000 volumes by 1961. At the time of Pforzheimer's retirement in 1974, the collection numbered 22,000 volumes.

A mere statement of the quantity, however, does not do justice to the collection. Breadth and depth have to be considered to appreciate its real worth. Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist from before the Chin Dynasty, is included, as well as at least 150 different volumes on the Dreyfus affair; Reilly, ace of spies, is present in all his mendacious glory; the unriddling of Enigma and the discoloring of Purple are laid out in decrypted splendor; and 7 December 1941 lives in full-color photographs of Pearl Harbor and over 50 volumes explaining the intelligence failure that took place on that date. Separate collections document intelligence during the Civil War and the Revolutionary War, and a rare book collection goes back to 1683, when Johann Lerch in Vienna, Austria, exposed a Turkish spy. The rare book collection also includes a small, privately printed volume on the Boer War written in 1907 by an 8-year-old Allen Dulles. He directed, at the time, that all royalties go to a fund to help the victims of that war.

A New Curator

Edward Sayle was appointed to replace Pforzheimer. The new Curator came to the collection from the Office of Security, further establishing the principle that the Curator need not be a historian. Sayle contributed most to the collection, however, in just that area where a historian would have been most effective: he had a strong interest in the uses of intelligence in the American Revolution, and he organized the collection's material on that subject into a separate section. He also wrote a monograph on the historical underpinnings of the US Intelligence Community, for which he received awards within the Agency and outside. The National Intelligence Study Center viewed it as the "best scholarly article in 1986."

Imposing Duties

Sayle's arrival occurred under the aegis of the Central Libraries Division, which wrote a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on 22 November 1974 to guide him in his activities. At the end of three pages, the MOA has listed five duties under which are sublisted 14 tasks that, if undertaken seriously, would have required a staff of dozens instead of the single assistant assigned to the collection.

The detail in the MOA reflects the increasing complexity of life in the Agency during the 20-year existence of the collection. The Curator in 1955 was "to collect and preserve material of historical significance relating to the development of US Intelligence. " To do this he was to "survey available overt and classified documentary material in Agency repositories and make appropriate recommendations for purchase and acquisition." By 1974 the duties read:

> Duty 1: Manage and maintain the HIC and direct the activities of the library assistant assigned thereto.
>
> Duty 2: Analyze new materials for effect on the Agency and initiate appropriate action where necessary.
>
> Duty 3: Provide support and guidance regarding the literature of intelligence to appropriate Agency organizations.
>
> Duty 4: Conduct liaison necessary to the effective operation of the HIC.
>
> Duty 5: Study and develop improved systems for the retrieval of the large volume of clippings, items, and ephemera contained in HIC; translate into meaningful schedules, resource projects, and procedural requirements.

In addition, Sayle was to maintain the HIC "as an attractive and well-ordered work area; provide briefings concerning the collection; foster, where practicable, a greater awareness and use of HIC materials; and think about management problems and solutions in the division, office, and Agency context." Finally, he was to identify materials suitable for inclusion in the Intelligence Museum.

Professional Care

Sayle retired in 1984. His tenure encompassed the appointment of William Casey as DCI, which presented him with the delicate problem of servicing the Director's interest in Revolutionary War intelligence and assisting him in producing an expanded volume of his original work on that topic without misusing government funds and without "affording him services not commensurate with that given other Agency employees performing similar personal research." This perhaps overscrupulous approach to a unique situation indicates the highly professional care that Sayle gave the collection.

Under Sayle, the collection continued to grow in concert with the publication of new works in intelligence, the basic body of the collection having been completed by the time he took over. During Sayle's tenure, the collection expanded its responsibilities to support the Agency and the rest of the Intelligence Community, as set forth in Volume 40, No. 168 of the *Federal Register.* Sayle's 10 years as curator defined in practice what these instructions described in theory. As a result, he left an expanded opportunity for his successor, Kinloch Bull, who arrived in January 1984. Bull was not able to take full advantage of the opportunity, however, because of health problems that resulted in his retirement in July 1985.

The Fourth Curator

Bull was replaced by William Henhoeffer, the first professional historian to hold the post. Henhoeffer came from the Directorate of Intelligence, where he had served as an analyst. As Curator, he concentrated on the historical underpinnings of the Agency—the OSS and Gen. William Donovan—and produced presentations on both, as well as written histories of events in the life of Donovan and of various DCIs.

Changed Emphasis

The collection continued to grow slowly under Henhoeffer because new material was published infrequently and because a purging of some unnecessary

works had begun. At the time Henhoeffer became Curator, the emphasis had moved more toward service to the community in the form of research and analysis and away from expanding the collection. Henhoeffer also stressed the exhibition of intelligence artifacts, which had grown to be a large part of the Curator's duties by 1985.

Emblematic, perhaps, of the changed emphasis was Henhoeffer's 1989 speech to a Jedburgh reunion that wove the strands of William Donovan and the OSS into the memory of William Casey, the last OSS veteran to head the CIA. He ended his speech to the appreciative Jedburghs with the same words of the poet, Laurence Binyon, that Casey had used in his tribute to the Agency officers who had died in the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut:

> They shall not grow old,
> As we that are left grow old;
> Age shall not weary them,
> Nor the years condemn.
> At the going down of the sun
> And in the morning
> We will remember them.

Ability To Survive

Throughout its history, the HIC collection has been a target for reform or elimination. As early as 1957, an inspection report from the Inspector General's Staff recommended that it be consolidated as part of the regular Agency library, apparently on the belief that a separate collection had little use to the Intelligence Community. In 1980, under the zero-base-budget program, the Central Libraries Division considered elimination of the collection because it "was not part of the normal production process," in the words of the Library Chief at the time. On both occasions, the Curators were able to argue successfully for its retention.

On Henhoeffer's retirement in 1990, the question of the collection's future was once again addressed by Agency management. Acting DCI Richard Kerr eventually decided to transfer the exhibition function to the Office of Public Affairs, to keep management of the collection under the Office of Information Resources, and to change the Curator's function from a staff to a contract position under the control of the Center for Studies in Intelligence in the DCI's office. The responsibilities of the Curator were changed at the same time to reflect the turnover to an independent contractor and to enlist the Curator in the effort to implement the openness proposals of DCI Robert Gates.

A Testimonial

At this point, the collection may be fairly said to have reached Allen Dulles's goal. It is almost certainly the finest collection of its kind in the world, and it provides useful information from the past to help build our understanding of the future.

When one observes the number of books written by former intelligence officers or the even greater number written from open and covert conversations with former intelligence officers, it is easy to deplore the lowering of security standards. The collection, however, shows clearly that this has been a long-standing problem.

The oath of secrecy meant little to Matthew Smith, a British secret agent who, in 1699, explained in his *Memoirs of Secret Service* that he was obliged to publish the papers, not for ideological reasons, but for "the utmost necessity . . . and no worse fate can be procured me by those who I may displease by starving, which is almost my present condition." In other words, he needed money. Three hundred years later, Peter Wright, a British intelligence officer published his memoirs, *Spycatcher*, because the British Government had shortchanged him on his pension. Santayana must have smiled. The HIC, of course, contains both books.

Official scholars and action officers

Research Intelligence in Early Modern England

William H. Sherman

For most readers, the collection of essays issued by colleagues and admirers of the eminent historian Conyers Read is something of an enigma. There is no mention of Sir Francis Walsingham, Queen Elizabeth's Secretary and spymaster, or her Treasurer, William Cecil, the subjects of Read's classic studies. In fact, none of the essays even remotely concern Tudor politics. Instead, tucked in between essays on the "Relations Between British Inductive Logic and French Impressionist Painting" and "John Wesley and the American Revolution," is a contribution from Richard Humphrey of the US Department of State entitled, "'The Official Scholar': A Survey of Certain Research in American Policy." And the introductory essay is written by William L. Langer, a Harvard historian and a pioneer in the development of US intelligence institutions.

The reason behind these surprising items is that, for almost five years during World War II, Read was employed by the US Government as Director of the British Empire unit in the Research & Analysis (R&A) Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). According to Langer, when William J. Donovan was setting up the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), the forerunner of OSS, which would be responsible for "collecting, sifting, and analyzing all data bearing on national security," his "first step [was] to draw on the universities and to enlist the aid of those who not only had wide and deep knowledge of foreign countries and conditions but also had training and experience in the critical treatment of evidence . . . for the crucial area of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth there was agreement from the outset that the obvious person to direct the work was Conyers Read."[1]

This essay looks in some detail at this deployment of scholarly research by America's wartime policymakers and relates it to the seemingly distant history of early modern England. But the links are less tenuous, and more relevant, than one might at first imagine. The large group of Ivy League scholars–cum–intelligence officers, such as those described in Robin Winks's study, "Cloak and Gown: Scholars in America's Secret War,"[2] represents an interesting reincarnation of the civic humanism of the English Renaissance. Indeed, Langer claimed that, "as a student in England, (Read) came across the tradition which links learning to action and requires that education be repaid by service to the community."[3]

Read was not the only reviver of this tradition. Another great historian of early modern English politics, Wallace Notestein, Sterling Professor of History at Yale, was an avid recruiter for OSS, and one of the key operators in the "Yale Library Project."[4] The details and ethical complexities of this episode and others like it have been well rehearsed by Winks and also by Loch Johnson, in his article, "Cloaks and Gowns: The CIA in the Groves of Academe."[5]

Another relevant focus is the more general relationship between knowledge and action, a relationship that was crucial to the Renaissance humanists. In Harry Howe Ransom's formulation, it is the central force in any policymaking process: "Nothing is more crucial in the making of national decisions than the relationship between intelligence and policy, or, in a broader sense, between knowledge and action."[6]

Two Arguments

Two interconnected arguments can be offered about modern and early modern intelligence. The first challenges a common historical assumption that is clearly stated in R. Harris Smith's history of the

OSS: "[The] R&A [Branch] was the first concentrated effort on the part of any world power to apply the talent of its academic community to official analysis of foreign affairs."[7] I want rather to suggest that precedents for the intelligence activities of Professors Read, Notestein, and Curtiss are to be found in the 16th- and 17th-century England they studied. Indeed, one can and should go much further back: Smith's claim seems especially shortsighted in light of David McMullen's work on official scholarly agencies in 7th- to 10th-century China.[8]

Of course, there was no formal institution like the COI or the OSS in Elizabethan times. Nor was there anything like the $57 million budget allotted to the OSS in 1945, or a team of researchers anywhere near the 1,000 in the R&A branch.[9] But there was an effort by the government to tap into scholarly resources and to use them in providing the historical information and analyses necessary for framing sound policy.

The second argument is that this approach is useful in understanding the careers and contexts of many Renaissance intellectuals, with the infamous scholar John Dee as a particular case in point. It is ironic, given Notestein's and Curtiss's mutual interest in the history of the occult, that Dee did not figure in their studies and, given Read's wartime experiences, that the Renaissance intelligence network of which Dee was a part did not figure in his studies. Guided by this sense of comparison and irony, that network can be used to sketch an outline of the relationship between scholars and policymakers in early modern England.

Some Definitions

The starting point has to be the term "intelligence" itself. For those who are not a part of the Intelligence Community, the term probably evokes daring covert operations. And it was during the Elizabethan period that the word took on its associations with spying. But because espionage is only a small part of the intelligence process and has drawn inordinate attention, I want to suppress that association.

The Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage defines intelligence as "the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns . . . foreign nations or . . . areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning."[10] Ransom put it more simply: "The pursuit of intelligence is the pursuit of information required for decision or action."[11] And Sherman Kent more simply still: "Intelligence is knowledge for the practical matter of taking action."[12] Here, I am concerned with "research intelligence"—information of a specialized nature that is gathered and analyzed by scholars for application to government policies and actions.

Donovan's Blueprint

The best way to approach the mechanism within which research intelligence functioned is to look in more detail at the theories and practices of Col. William Donovan during World War II. They form the most clearly delineated and most thoroughly documented intelligence network that history has to offer.

Behind the series of offices that Donovan created was his "wave theory": the first wave, which should precede the subsequent waves of aggressive action, is the collection and analysis of information.[13] In Donovan's equation, "Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose."[14]

As America's entry into the war became inevitable, Donovan found the government alarmingly unprepared to initiate even the first of his waves. As he wrote to President Roosevelt, "Although we are facing imminent peril, we are lacking [an] effective service for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information as we might obtain . . . relative to the intention of potential enemies."[15] After arguing for the need to "analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of

Army and Naval officers, but also of specialized trained research officials," he recommended the establishment of the COI.

Lodged within the Library of Congress, with Poet Laureate and Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish as its chief administrator, the COI was "to provide translations, background studies, research reports, and analyses of policy issues over the whole area to be covered by the intelligence service."[16] Such was Donovan's grand scheme for using the academic community in managing information and directing it toward policy.

Key Points

In turning to the early modern material, there are several features worth highlighting and bearing in mind. First, in such a scheme the library and archive take on a new life. Besides preserving the nation's documentary past, they take on a political function as the source of materials that can determine or support policy decisions. As Archibald MacLeish put it in a letter to Donovan on 29 June 1941, "Libraries have a much more important role to play than they have played in the past in buttressing spot intelligence with the scholarly element, which is so necessary to giving that intelligence depth, weight, focus, and perspective."[17]

Second, the types of people involved in the intelligence process can be divided into the "official scholars" and the "action officers." These are the useful terms of Richard Humphrey, whose essay in the Read volume contains a perceptive critique of the Donovan scheme. The former category, the research community, consists of the "historical research staff," which "must produce evidence in the broad field of US diplomatic policy," and the "intelligence research staff," which "must assemble and analyze all obtainable data bearing upon . . . conditions and situations in other states throughout the world, as they bear upon American policy problems . . . . Taken together, the researches of these staffs provide part of the frame of reference within which the 'action officer' operates."[18]

Mixed Results

Perhaps the most important point about Donovan's scheme is that it never actually worked. The idealistic theories naturally deteriorated when put into practice: because of the perennial problems of conflicting personalities, unrealistic attitudes, and inaccessible authorities, Donovan's blueprint became an idiosyncratic and unsound structure. Nonetheless, the primary achievement of Donovan's agencies stands: in Ransom's words, they "brought recognition that scholars and the best of scholarly techniques have a fundamental role in uncovering the facts required for national decision."[19] And we should not overlook the practical achievements of Donovan's scholars, from Wilmarth Lewis's index card filing system that was the envy of all of Washington to the flour, developed by OSS scientists and named "Aunt Jemima flour," which could be baked into bread while remaining an active explosive.[20]

One of the most important features in Donovan's scheme—and one of the prime reasons for its failure—was the idea that the intelligence product would be factual and objective, that it would provide the necessary information bearing on a policy decision and not conclusions about the policy itself. Sherman Kent expressed this idea suggestively:

> Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives; it is not the drafter of policy; it is not the maker of plans; it is not the carrier out of operations. . . . It performs a service function. Its job is to see that the doers are well informed; its job is to stand behind them with the book opened at the right page.[21]

The First 007

This is a good place to introduce the early modern intelligence network and particularly the activities of John Dee,[22] one of the most colorful and enigmatic characters of the English Renaissance. Ironically, he evidently used "007" as a codename in some of his correspondence.

On 8 September 1597, Dee sent a paper to Sir Edward Dyer entitled, "The British Sea-Sovereignty: Of the Sea-Jurisdiction of the British Empire."[23] Dyer was an active go-between at the Elizabethan court. In the summer of 1597, he was acting on behalf of a Privy Council deep in heated negotiations with the merchants of the Hanseatic League. During the previous months, England saw its commercial relations with Central Europe degenerate critically. The English Merchant Adventurers were accused of foul play, and the Hanseatic merchants in England complained of increasing harassment. The conflict was waged on a petty level, but it eventually forced Emperor Rudolph II to issue a decree on 1 August 1597 effectively banning trade with the English merchants.

During the next months, the interested parties frantically exchanged diplomats to come to an agreement that would enable them to return to business.[24] It was at this time that Dyer wrote to Dee, requesting historical and legal information regarding England's territorial rights and jurisdiction in the Channel and the seas adjoining.

What Dee produced is extremely revealing, less in terms of its content than its form. It is a "directed reading" of the work he prepared at Dyer's request some 20 years earlier—the *General and Rare Memorials Pertaining to the Perfect Arte of Navigation* of 1576/7. With enough precision to make Kent's metaphor about opening the book to the right page stunningly literal, Dee guides Dyer through the relevant sections of that text:

> There, in the 20th page of that book, (against the figure, 9, in the margin) beginneth matter, inducing the consideration of her Majesty's royal sea limits . . . . And hereupon, in the 21 [st] page, both in the text, and also in the margin, is pregnant matter contained . . . . Then, peradventure, the consequences of the matter, will lead you on, to read the 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, and unto the middle of the 27th page . . . . Yet, a little more, your pains' taking, will get you some more matter, here & there, till you come to the end of the book. The marginal notes, sometimes, are of great moment. And so I end these, my brief directions and quotations, thus suddenly set down.

This is undeniably an instance of research intelligence at work. As such, it provides a glimpse at the web of activity behind the surface of Elizabethan policy, a glimpse which calls into question two myths: one, cited earlier, that claims that there was no systematic research intelligence before World War II, and another which claims that Elizabethan policy was created exclusively by the Queen, the Privy Council, and the Parliament.

Elizabethan Policymaking Process

The policies of England during the reign of Elizabeth have been the subject of many studies, but historians have only begun to consider the nuts and bolts of the process that generated them. Looking through the various collections of state papers, it becomes clear that the policies were by no means the product of just the inner circle of the Privy Council. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of papers offering information bearing on policy that were prepared by individuals outside—and sometimes well outside—that charmed circle. In effect, there was an extensive network of scholarly advisers who all, in differing degrees, contributed to the policymaking process.

It is difficult to get a sense of how this system worked. One of the clearest testaments to an Elizabethan intelligence network comes both secondhand and posthumously from Secretary Walsingham: in 1599, the lawyer and antiquary William Lambarde wrote a letter to his friend Sir John Leveson in which he discussed the rumors of war and complained that the ghost of Sir Francis Walsingham "groaned to see England barren of a serviceable intelligence."[25]

Winks suggests another stumblingblock: "Historians traditionally rely upon documentation" while the intelligence field is often "based upon the denial, the falsifying and the destruction of information."[26] In the early modern material, the frequent uncertainties of date and authorship—as well as the years and the elements—also take their toll.

Research Intelligence: Theory and Practice

Yet it is possible to find clear statements of the Elizabethan theories of research intelligence. Walsingham wrote a revealing letter of instruction to a nephew about to go abroad.[27] He suggested that he read Roman histories "as also all books of State both old and new." In these readings, he explained, "you have principally to mark how matters have passed in government in those days [;] so have you to apply them to these our times and states and see how they may be made serviceable to our age . . . the reason whereof well considered, shall cause you in process of time to frame better courses of action and counsel . . . . And in learning thus [you will frame] your understanding to make it a good treasure-house to serve the commonwealth." He also suggested that his nephew learn "as well of the experienced as of the learned," as well of the officer as of the scholar.

And for the Elizabethan practices of research intelligence there is also a contemporary guide, albeit an obscure one. Nicholas Faunt, who served as Walsingham's personal secretary, wrote a discourse for the instruction of Walsingham's successors.[28] Faunt believed that the job could not be done well without the "help of necessary collections made into books." He suggested the following "heads" or categories for these books of collections: "Books peculiar for foreign services," including 'A survey of the lands and the Commodities thereof, The defense of the Realm, The Charges of the Crowne, and The Courts of Justice.'" Most important,

> Many other books might be hereunto annexed being also of very good use in their places; as books of coinage and mint causes [,] . . . of orders touching her majesty's household [,] of precedents of all matters, . . . [,] of discoveries and new inventions, of descriptions most exactly taken of other countries[,] . . . with many other discourses [,] devices [,] plots, and projects of sundry natures etc. all which sometimes may serve to very good purpose, and which will be daily delivered to the Secretary [,] especially if he be known to make account of virtuous employment and of men that are liberally brought up, and have their minds elevated through . . . arts and faculties.

Faunt's complicated account provides more clues to the elements and the overall process of early modern research intelligence than any other source. He provides a sense of how scholarly research reached the Secretary of State, and what happened to it once it got there. He also introduces several keywords—collections, discoveries, discourses, devices, projects, and plots (also called plats or platforms), to which can be added briefs (or breviates), opinions, and advertisements—useful in indentifying certain documents as intelligence. Faunt depicts the mutual relationship between official scholars and action officers at a unique stage in its development when, with the encouragement of at least some policymakers, the ethical or moral humanistic teaching that scholars offered to their princes was giving way to more specialized and politically useful skills.

The Academic Community

Many Renaissance intellectuals opted for careers outside of the universities, in what might now be called the civil service. To give an idea of how wide the academic community was in early modern England and how closely it was connected to intelligence and civil service, I have divided the academic community into four sectors.

Freelance Scholars

The first group is what I call freelance scholars. These men did not have any official position, and they usually had no institutional profile whatsoever. Occasionally, one was granted a royal pension. John Dee received a yearly pension from King Edward VI and sporadic contributions from Queen Elizabeth. Usually, however, they had to find other means of support.

Many worked as secretaries or tutors to noblemen engaged in official business. The ninth Earl of Northumberland, the notorious "Wizard Earl," is known to have employed the mathematicians Thomas Harriot and Thomas Allen as resident scholars, and Mary, Countess of Pembroke, appointed Sir Adrian Gilbert as her resident chemist and laboratory

A 'Plat' of The Elizabethan Intelligence Network



technician. A few scholars were well enough established to own and work out of their own households, enabling them to offer their services to a wider range of clients.

Dee conducted his scholarly activities in his conveniently placed house in Mortlake, close to the city of London and even closer to the Queen's palace at Richmond. Despite complaints of abject poverty, he was able to maintain a household of at least 17 people, and to acquire a library filled with thousands of books, records, and scientific instruments.

Scholarly Professionals

The second group, the scholarly professionals, is even more diverse. It includes the educated men of the merchant class who so often sent economic intelligence to the Queen and her Secretary. For instance, John Johnson was one of the principal Tudor merchants. Late in his life, he joined the service of Lord Paget, Elizabeth's Ambassador to France, as his accounts secretary. He prepared a whole series of papers advocating the establishment of markets in England, and several remain in the state papers. They were eventually collected into a single volume, which he sent to Lord Burghley in late 1571. Burghley was sufficiently impressed to share it with the Privy Council; but, in the end, the plan proved impractical and was shelved.

Another merchant in the cloth trade, Thomas Trollop, was responsible for one of the most interesting state papers of the Elizabethan period. In June 1561 he sent the Queen a discourse entitled, "The brief contents of a little book entitled a profitable New year's gift to all England."[29] (This paper proposed the enrichment of the commonwealth through the manufacture of canvas and linen.) Trollop actually had a seven-page summary of his book printed, and sent a dozen copies of these "breviate notes," as he called them, to the Queen to be distributed to the Council.

The Clericals

The scholarly professionals would also include the large number of clerks, secretaries, and recordkeepers employed by the crown. For example, Sir Thomas Wilson the elder (1525-81) successfully combined academic and political activities. In addition to writing a popular textbook on rhetoric, he was the first keeper of the State Paper Office. In 1578, when the Queen created the "Office of her Majesty's Papers and Records for Business of State and Council," Thomas Wilson was appointed the "Clerk of the Papers."

When Wilson died, his nephew—also named Thomas Wilson (1560?-1629)—inherited the mantle. He studied civil law in Cambridge and, after failing to become a fellow of Trinity Hall, he was employed as an "intelligencer" and negotiator in Ireland and elsewhere. While in the service of Sir Robert Cecil (Lord Burghley's son and Secretary of State from 1596 to 1608), Wilson wrote the often-quoted treatise "On the State of England A.D. 1600." In 1606, he became Keeper of the Records and left behind many papers and projects for reorganizing the State Paper Office.

Legal Scholars

The third group, legal scholars, had two general types. First, those lawyers who served the state from within the legal institution. Dr. David Lewes, for example, was in the Court of Arches as Judge of the Admiralty, and he was often consulted by Burghley when a case of international law arose.

Then there were the lawyer-antiquaries, most of whom joined together to form the Elizabethan Society of Antiquaries. Their careers and interests were varied, but William Lambarde can be taken as representative. He was trained at Lincoln's Inn before entering public service, first as a Commissioner of the Sewers in Kent, and then as a Justice of the Peace and Alienations' Office Deputy. Under the patronage of Lord Burghley and others, he prepared antiquarian, historical, and topographical treatises, revised and drafted acts of the Privy Council; and wrote a set of papers called Collections on Chancery. At the apex of his career he was appointed Keeper of the Records in the Tower of London. In the words of Retha Warnicke, "While performing the required acts of his various posts, this

dedicated royal servant attempted to organize, to analyze, and to clarify existing procedures, methods, and goals, with the ultimate desire to have . . . law and order in the kingdome."[30]

The Universities

The last sector of the academic community was the universities. Their scholars seem to have played the least important role in the research intelligence network. There is little evidence of intelligence papers passing directly from university scholars to policymakers. Indeed, many scholars in the other sectors had left the universities out of frustration at their isolation and their lack of practical teaching. Several scholars, including John Dee, seem to have left because advanced scientific and technological research was almost impossible in the universities.

Dissatisfaction with the university curriculum reached a peak by the 1570s, and in the next decades there were many proposals for educational reform. Sir Humphrey Gilbert's plan to establish what he called Queen Elizabeth's Achademy put these reforms in a nutshell:

> such as govern Common Weales, ought rather to bend themselves to the practice . . . than to be tied to the bookish circumstances of the same. And whereas in the universities men study only school learnings, in this academy they shall study matters of action meet for present practice, both of peace and war.[31]

While the universities were not conducive to the generation of research intelligence, they did provide the education required for civil service careers. For this reason, Elizabethan policymakers treated the universities as a sort of recruiting ground, much like the COI and OSS did the colleges of the Ivy League in World War II.

In an autobiographical account of 1593, Sir Thomas Wilkes recalled that he was a student at Oxford in the early 1570s when then Ambassador to France Dr. Valentine Dale snatched him away as his secretary.[32] There is good evidence that the recruitment of university scholars and their employment as "facilitators" was an accepted practise.

Military Intelligence

Perhaps the largest number of intelligence papers surviving in the archives, especially in collections of foreign papers and in years of military engagements, are those that could be classed as military intelligence. These papers were produced by military theorists and practitioners from a range of backgrounds. Many came from the highly educated officers of the governing class. But even those military men with little education and few contacts had channels of access to the government. A Captain Goring, while on active duty in Ireland, sent to the crown a "discourse on the rebellion." Capt. William Mostyn sent to Robert Cecil his "plot for the suppression of the earl of Tyrone." Capt. John Braynard sent the Queen a letter of advice on the management of the war in Ireland, and provided Cecil with an abridged copy.[33]

In the same period, the military author Barnaby Rich offered the Queen "a looking glass . . . wherein to view Ireland."[34] From a different front came an anonymous paper for the Queen, which included a plan for the defense of the border against the Scots.[35] Again, there is evidence that these papers were taken seriously by the crown. On 31 May 1598, Captain Dawtrey sent the Queen his discourse on the rebellion in Ireland. A note of endorsement records that the discourse was read to her and that she directed it to Cecil, commanding Dawtrey to personally attend the Secretary in order to elaborate on his promises.[36]

Espionage

It may seem perverse that I have left spies and their foreign intelligence for last, but they were only one part of a broader intelligence community in Elizabethan England. This is not to deny that espionage was a common practice and an integral component in the making of foreign policy. Stories of Elizabethan daring and doublecrosses have had the same appeal to historians and the public as those of the 20th century. Walsingham, Burghley, and other important officials all had men planted in the major cities of Europe who were paid to send regular intelligence reports. Much of this information came from men with official positions abroad. And there is also evidence that young gentlemen traveling on the

Continent were expected to gather and transmit foreign intelligence. But the preparation and implementation of foreign intelligence has yet to receive a detailed and measured account.

Losing Impetus

Research intelligence in both Elizabethan England and modern America can be seen as a cold war practice by interventionists. The process gained its impetus from a sense of impending engagement or conflict with foreign states and a desire to be well prepared for that battle. Colonel Donovan exemplified this position. In early modern England, its advocates are mostly to be found among the "War Party," and its products mostly cluster around the cold war with Spain and the ongoing conquest of Ireland.

As World War II progressed, the R&A Branch of OSS decreased in size and importance in relation to the more action-oriented branches. I sense that the same thing happened in Elizabethan England. As Anglo-Spanish hostilities became more overt in the late 1580s and early 1590s, there was a noticeable lapse in the influx of research intelligence papers. Advertisements from spies abroad increasingly replaced discourses from scholars at home. And, in fact, there is some evidence that through the 1590s the position of "scholarly intelligencer" became more and more difficult to sustain.

An Impossible Balance?

The picture of the relationship between official scholars and action officers I have drawn is somewhat idealized. Michael Handel explains that the situation is always perilous, resting as it does on a delicate interpersonal balance: "the intelligence advisor walks a thin line . . . [his] ability to succeed depends on the 'chemistry' between him and the leader as well as on his credibility. Here the relationship . . . is asymmetrical, as it is a meeting between an expert without authority and an authority without expertise." [37]

Furthermore, while the ideal of the intelligence product is policy neutrality or objectivity, the reality is more akin to that suggested by Thomas L. Hughes as "Intelligence in search of some policy to influence and policy in search of some intelligence for support." [38] In early modern England, this captures the situation exactly. Official scholars faced the dilemma of backstopping and marketing their intelligence products or dropping out from the network entirely. In this context the complaints of John Dee and Thomas Wilson, which have been read by their contemporaries and modern historians as signs of their excessive ambition, seem not only justified but restrained. For it was not easy to function, as Robert Naunton told the Earl of Essex in 1596, with one's "nature . . . betwixt a pedagogue and a spy." [39]

NOTES

1. *Essays in Honor of Conyers Read*, ed. Norton Downs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. x-xi. For Langer's own double life during the war and after, see his autobiography, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower* (New York: Neale Watson, 1977).

2. London: Collins Harvill, 1987.

3. *Op. cit.*, p. vii.

4. In this operation, the OSS, Yale librarian Bernard Knollenberg, and Notestein conspired to send English Professor Joseph Curtiss on a secret mission to Turkey under the pretence of acquiring books for the Yale library (see Winks, ch. 3).

5. In S. J. Cimabala (ed.), *Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society* (Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publications, 1987).

6. *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 3.

7. *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 13.

8. *State and Scholars in T'ang China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

9. Ransom, *op. cit.*, p. 71; Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 370.

10. Cited in Ransom, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

11. *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

12. *Strategic Intelligence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 180.

13. Ranelagh, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

14. Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981), Appendix B, "Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information," p. 419.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Troy, *op.cit.*, p. 84; cf. Bradley F. Smith, Op. cit., p. 73 and ch. 8, *passim.*, and Ranelagh, pp. 50-62.

17. Troy, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

18. *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

19. Ransom, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

20. Winks, pp. 96-110, 113.

21. *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

22. Dee is the subject of many studies, the best of which is Nicholas Clulee, *John Dee's Natural Philosophy* (London: RKP, 1988). The classic treatment of Dee as Elizabeth's 007 is Richard Deacon, *John Dee: Scientist, Geographer, Astrologer, and Secret Agent to Elizabeth I* (London, 1968). My own study, *John Dee: The Politics of Reading and Writing in the English Renaissance*, is in press with the University of Massachusetts Press.

23. Three manuscript copies of this text survive: I quote B[ritish] L[ibrary], Harleian MS 249, art, 13. In this and all other quotations from early material I have modernized the spelling.

24. The relevant primary sources are scattered throughout the State Papers at the P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice]: see especially the Uncalendared State Papers Foreign, Hamburg and Hanse Towns.

25. Cited in Retha M. Warnicke, William *Lambarde: Elizabethan Antiquary*, 1536-1601 (London: Phillimore & Co., 1973), p. 135.

26. *Op. cit.*, p. 476.

27. The full text of the letter is printed in Conyers Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth, 2* volumes. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), I:18-20.

28. There are several manuscript copies extant, but the text has been printed in full in the *English Historical Review 20* (1905), pp. 499-508, and it is from this edition that I quote.

29. PRO SP12/17, no. 49.

30. *Op. cit.*, p. 101-102.

31. *Early English Text Society*, Extra Series 8 (1869), pp. 4, 10.

32. PRO SP 12/246, no. 52; cf. DNB.

33. PRO SP 63/180, no. 61, SP 63/202, part 3, no. 185, and SP 63/206, no. 116.

34. PRO SP 63/205, no. 72.

35. Calendar of Border Papers, Vol. I, No. 581.

36. PRO SP 63/202, Part 2, No. 52 (cf. Nos. 53 and 57).

37. Introduction to Handel (ed.), *Leaders and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 15.

38. Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle (eds.), *Intelligence: Policy and Process* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985), p.11.

39. Gustav Ungerer, *A Spaniard in Elizabethan England: The Correspondence of Antonio Perez' Exile* (London: Tamesis Books, 1974), Vol. II, p. 102.

Attaché observations

The Face of Moscow in the Missile Crisis

William F. Scott

This article originally appeared in the spring 1966 edition of Studies in Intelligence.

Soviet brinkmanship in the Cuban crisis of October 1962 focused the attention of Kremlinologists on a relatively new concept in the lexicon of international conflict, "crisis management." This term encompasses both the chess-like moves one opponent makes externally against the other and the internal measures he takes to control the crisis at home. It is on the latter that this article will chiefly bear.

A complete understanding of how an opponent has gone about the management of past crises is of course virtually out of the question. Censorship and security measures, along with misinterpretations and miscalculations on his part or his opponents, are but a few of the obstacles. But an insight into the enemy's habitual modus operandi in a crisis would be of such great importance in reading his intentions another time that even a modest contribution to such an understanding should be worthwhile.

The Weeks Before

What went on in the inner councils of the Soviet Union during the Cuban confrontation may never be known, but certain aspects, chiefly internal, of its management measures were witnessed by the military attachés of the American Embassy in Moscow. What follows is their worm's-eye view of the Moscow scene during that tense period, their observations reassembled and reviewed with benefit of hindsight. A worm's-eye view is the best available to foreigners in the USSR; they are permitted in less than 1 percent of the total Soviet land area.[1] This was true in 1962, and the restrictions have not been relaxed since then, the nuclear test ban treaty, grain shipments, and the advent of Brezhnev and Kosygin notwithstanding.

A number of events, which at the time seemed to have no semblance of a connection with Cuba, occupied the attention of the Moscow attachés during October. Early in the month an assistant US naval attaché was declared persona non grata. A second member of the US Embassy staff received the same news on 12 October. Then on the 20th all attachés were speculating on the significance of China's attack on India, which Soviet media did not mention until three days after the event.

The flow of news about Cuba traced a peculiar pattern in the weeks before the crisis broke. At the end of August Che Guevara had arrived in Moscow, and on September 2 his request for armaments and technical specialists to train Cuban servicemen was reported. After that, Cuban coverage came in a continual stream, reaching its high on 11 September when TASS fulminated about the "provocations of the United States which might plunge the world into universal thermonuclear war." From this point on the attention given by Soviet news sources to Cuba declined, though there were occasional articles such as that in *Izvestiya* on 28 September describing American reaction to the Soviet-Cuban agreement for the construction of a fishing port. From the 1st through the 23rd of October, Yemen received far more publicity than Cuba.

The Crisis Breaks

The first information about Soviet missiles in Cuba came to the attachés in the newscasts of the Voice of America and the BBC. When these were in Russian they were totally jammed, but the jamming of the English was less severe and a part of it could be understood. The overseas editions of the *New York Herald Tribune and* the *New York Times*, generally arriving at the US Embassy several days late, provided avidly devoured background information.

Soviet news sources did not report the blockade which President Kennedy had announced on 22 October until some 48 hours later. Then *Pravda* carried on the first page a Soviet version of the President's speech distorted in such fashion that the Russian people would not know about the Soviet troops and ballistic missiles in Cuba. This kind of news management made it difficult for the Western diplomatic corps to appraise the degree of importance the Soviet leaders actually attached to the situation.

The only Soviet reaction immediately manifest was to order all diplomatic travelers, including dependents, to return to Moscow. (An exception was made for the State Department officer accompanying the Robert Shaw Chorale on its tour of the Soviet Union.) Two USAF air attachés on the first leg of a Leningrad-Tashkent-Moscow trip were contacted by an *Intourist* representative and told the Soviet Government could not guarantee their safety outside of Moscow in view of the US action over Cuba. To test this travel ban, both US and other NATO personnel filed, under the normal official procedure, letters of intent to travel outside Moscow. These must be filed in advance of departure, giving the complete itinerary and dates; then, if there is no reply, it is understood that the travel can be undertaken. In all cases during the Cuban crisis notice came that "the trip cannot be registered for reasons of a temporary nature"—the standard phraseology forbidding travel to the vast bulk of the so-called open areas of the Soviet Union.

At the same time the US attachés put into operation a joint plan for comprehensive, around-the-clock intelligence observation in Moscow and environs, looking for anything out of the ordinary that might illuminate Soviet intentions and reactions to the situation. They were particularly alert, of course, for any indications that the Soviets were preparing Moscow for a thermonuclear exchange. Were government offices being evacuated? Were civil defense measures being taken? Were the normal number of trucks to be seen on the streets, both day and night, or was there an unexplained increase or decrease? How many people were in lines buying food at Moscow markets? What was the attitude of the people toward Americans in restaurants, theaters, and the subways; had this changed?

Among the places under scrutiny outside the city but within the 40-kilometer radius permitted were two civilian airfields, Vnukovo and Shermetyevo, the latter serving both domestic and international flights. All key installations such as these were checked at least once each day. The rounds were made primarily by automobile, although some districts were covered on foot and by subway—that deep and extensive system which, with its heavy blast doors, may constitute the world's largest and best civil defense shelter. As is customary in Moscow for US personnel, no one travelled alone, two-man teams being the general rule. The Soviet surveillance was normal—close and constant. Seasoned attachés accompanied new arrivals, and Department of State personnel assisted whenever their normal duties permitted. The attachés of the three services completely pooled their efforts, sending to Washington daily a single joint report. Responsibility for its preparation was rotated among the three, and it was coordinated with the Deputy Chief of Mission or his representative before being dispatched.

Business as Usual

On the surface, life in Moscow proceeded at a normal pace. After 24 October the Soviet television, radio, and press spoke daily of the "high-handed American aggressors" and the "criminal intentions of the enemies of peace," but there was still no mention that Soviet troops or ballistic missiles were in Cuba. Further, no significant changes could be detected in the life of the city, nor any changes in the Russian people's attitude toward Americans. Waitresses in hotels and restaurants, clerks in stores, and taxi drivers gave no sign that the famed Russian grapevine was working to inform the people of the critical turn of events.

During the week of 22 October, the Red Army held its usual night rehearsal for the annual November 7 parade in commemoration of the Bolshevik Revolution. To a newcomer the tanks, missiles, and other weapons rolled out would have presented an ominous sight; but the experienced attachés noted that rehearsal procedures were normal and the weapons almost identical with those deployed during the previous parade.

Perhaps the most talked-about event in Moscow during the week of the crisis was the opening of the New York City Ballet. Khrushchev had let his dislike of abstract and modernistic art be known; and here Balanchine, the world's leading exponent of the modern school of theater, was opening with an unfamiliar concept of ballet in the city where that art form had its strongest tradition. The ballet was a success. Night after night the troupe played before a full and enthusiastic house. Soviet critics, initially rather reserved until they found that the regime was not offering serious objections, gave favorable reviews. Many high-ranking party members and Moscow's leading intellectuals attended. And at no time did they, or anyone else in the audience, suggest by their behavior an awareness of the world crisis centered off the southeast corner of the United States.

There was even a second cultural import from the United States in Moscow during that week. On 23 October, while the New York City Ballet was performing at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, an American opera singer, Jerome Hines, was featured at the Bolshoi. The central box was occupied by Comrades Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kozlov, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Planskiy, and Grishin. Khrushchev led the audience in the applause.

For the night of 26 October the US air attaché had invited four Soviet Air Force officers and their wives to be his guests at the New York City Ballet and a buffet served afterwards in a hotel (this in return for a hail and farewell luncheon the Soviet Air Force had given for the new attaché and his predecessor). When the invitations had been extended, about 16 October, a Soviet liaison officer had hinted that at least some of the guests would accept. With the news of 22 October it became unlikely that any would come; diplomatically, however, it was necessary to proceed with all preparations. The Soviets apparently were waiting for the invitations to be withdrawn, but the embassy protocol officer concurred that this should not be done. Finally, about noon on the 26th, the day of the party, the Soviet liaison officer called; he regretted that all the guests had been called out of town and so could not accept.

Maneuvers

There were, however, instances of manipulating both news and people for purposes of crisis management. On 25 October Soviet news media gave unexpected publicity to a telegram that Aleksey, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, had sent to U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations. It warned that mankind was threatened by the outbreak of a world war as a result of actions taken by the US administration against the Republic of Cuba. The United States was violating Christian teachings. To the attachés it seemed that Aleksey's telegram was more for Russian internal consumption than for U Thant. Stalin had used the Russian church in World War II to get popular support for his government; Khrushchev might be starting to woo the nation in case of similar need.

A second device, one familiar to Americans in recent years, were the "demonstrations." On 24 October, the day the Soviets reported the US blockade of Cuba without mentioning their own troops, missiles, and aircraft there, a halfhearted attempt at a student demonstration was made. Fifteen or 20 students threw a few ink bottles at the Embassy, then moved on to Spaso House, the Ambassador's residence some seven blocks away, and threw a few more. Then they disbanded. There hadn't been enough of them even to interfere seriously with traffic in front of the embassy.

The big official "demonstration," a highly organized affair, came on 27 October. The Soviets took every possible precaution that it not get out of hand. Hundreds of troops were moved into side streets within a few blocks of the Embassy to ensure complete control of the crowd at all times; these were in place before the demonstration started. The gathering of the crowd afterward in front of the Embassy was no more spontaneous than the movement of the troops had been. Truckloads of children were unloaded a short distance away, lined up ready to demonstrate, and handed signs denouncing "imperialism," "colonialism," and so on.

The youthful protesters had no notion that the Soviet leaders were squirming under a virtual ultimatum to remove their strategic weapons from Cuba; they had been told only that the "imperialistic capitalists" of the United States were planning to invade the homeland of the peace-loving Cubans. What they did know was that they were getting out of a few hours of school and work. There were not more than a few thousand of them, and their performance was unenthusiastic. After about two hours, apparently an order to disperse was given, and the demonstrators appeared happy to oblige. As the last stragglers departed, the security troops also moved out from the side streets where they had been keeping watch.

The Crisis Passes

The first hint about Soviet missiles in Cuba was given to the Russians at 1900, 27 October, a few hours after the demonstration, when the Moscow radio argued that ". . . if the United States believes it has the right to demand removal from Cuba of missiles described by Washington as offensive, then it will be natural to recognize the USSR's right to demand the withdrawal of American destructive rocket weapons from Turkey, a country that is our next door neighbor."

On Monday, 29 October, representatives of the entire Moscow attaché corps attended a reception at the Turkish Embassy. The Soviet Armed Forces sent token representation. By then, the general feeling among the attachés was that the crisis had at least receded. The Turkish attachés were worried lest a secret deal had been made and recently installed US missiles would be removed from their country.

That the crisis was fully ended became apparent on 1 November, during a reception at the Japanese Embassy. An unusual number of senior Soviet Air Force officers was present, and their attitude toward the US air attachés was more nearly appropriate to the days some 17 years earlier when the Russian and American allies met on the Elbe than to the aftermath of a desperate, hostile confrontation. Almost completely ignoring their Japanese hosts, the Soviet officers insisted on toasting and drinking with the US airmen. Clearly impelled by relief from tension, they offered toasts to peace, to friendship, and even to "the possible marriage of my grandson with your granddaughter." When a secret police officer attempted to break up the toasts between the Soviet Air Force chief of staff and the US air attaché, the chief of staff told him to "get the hell away." And this unprecedented behavior was no isolated accident: on 5 November during a reception celebrating the Italian national day, Soviet Air Force officers showed a similar great cordiality to the US attachés.

Net Observations

The attachés had seen nothing in Moscow during the entire period of the Cuban crisis to reflect the serious external tension. The only observable Soviet reaction was the ban on all travel in the Soviet Union, and this was not put into effect until after President Kennedy had announced the blockade. Two attachés who flew to Vienna by way of Kiev on 26 October were treated with exceptional courtesy on the aircraft and by customs officials in Kiev.

Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is still difficult to point out any unusual Soviet behavior during the month of October. The persona non grata actions against an assistant naval attaché on 5 October and a Foreign Service Officer on 12 October were probably, as thought at the time, in relation for the expulsion of two Soviets charged with espionage in the United States. The timing of the Chinese attack on India may have been entirely coincidence; it embarrassed the Soviets, who were training some Indian pilots in the USSR.

Although the public did not know it until months later, the Soviets' confidence in their own internal security was also shaken in October. On the 22nd, the day the United States announced the blockade, Penkovsky was arrested, implicating the top leadership of the secret police, as well as military intelligence. In December the Soviets, believing a US attaché to have been involved, updated an old film, entitled "Along the Black Path" and designed to alert the Soviet public against the US attachés, and showed it on television and in 14 Moscow movie theaters simultaneously.

From the viewpoint of crisis management and intelligence, this suppression of any outward sign during the Cuban crisis reemphasizes the Soviet ability to control news and deceive the people by that subtlest of propaganda devices, the half truth. And, as well as could be observed during that week, the Soviet public responded exactly as their leaders desired. One only hopes that this control would not be successful in suppressing all indications of preparation for hostilities, if there really were such preparations.

Did the Soviets never intend to do anything but withdraw from Cuba if it came to a showdown? Were the Kremlin leaders prepared for miscalculation and explosion of the crisis into open conflict? To what degree was the Soviet military machine alerted to this possibility? From the worm's-eye view in Moscow, such questions could not be answered. But complete domination of the internal environment ensured the Soviet leadership a high degree of flexibility in utilizing psychology and propaganda. In this respect, crisis management as practiced by the Soviet Union has the advantage over its counterpart in democratic countries.

NOTE

1. Edward Crankshaw, "Big Brother Still Watches," *New York Times*, 29 December 1963. US air attachés sent this article home as the best and most expressive description available of Soviet restrictions on foreigners. Crankshaw writes that ". . . the tourist's image is the image of the display put on for his especial benefit in certain selected places: half a dozen great cities, half a dozen collective farms, half a dozen villages, and one or two resorts. And if it is objected, as it so often is, that it is impossible to turn a whole city—Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Alma Ata, Tiflis—into a shopwindow, a display cabinet, the answer is that you don't know the Russians. Because this is precisely what the Soviet Government can do and does.

From COI to CIG

Historical Intelligence Documents

Editor's Note: With this edition, Studies in Intelligence *inaugurates a series of reprints of important documents that help illustrate the evolution of the CIA. The following documents chronicle presidential decisions leading to the eventual creation of the Agency.*

Document 1

Presidential Order establishing a Coordinator of Information (COI) on 11 July 1941.

In the summer of 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan as COI to collect and analyze intelligence information for senior policymakers. Donovan reported directly to the President.

Document 2

Roosevelt's Military Order of 13 June 1942 creating the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

The order replaced the COI with the OSS and placed it under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Donovan remained as Director of the new OSS.

Document 3

Roosevelt administration press release announcing the creation of the OSS on 13 June 1942.

In announcing the creation of the Office of War Information, the press release stated that the OSS was to continue to collect and analyze intelligence information for senior policymakers.

Document 4

Executive Order 9621 of 20 September 1945 abolishing the OSS.

At the end of World War II, President Harry S. Truman ordered the termination of the OSS on 1 October 1945. At the same time, he transferred several of its functions to other departments. He relocated the Research and Analysis Branch in the Department of State and transferred to the War Department the Secret Intelligence and Counterintelligence Branches which became the Strategic Services Unit.

Document 5

Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946 establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).

After a considerable policy debate about the nature of future US intelligence, President Truman established the interdepartmental CIG. Responsible for coordination, planning, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence, CIG was headed by a Director of Central Intelligence appointed by the President. Reflecting the views of the various established intelligence components, the directive ensured that the State Department and military services retained their independent capabilities and autonomy in the intelligence field.

DESIGNATING A COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Document 1

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator of Information, with authority to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.

2. The several departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all and any such information and data relating to national security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time request.

3. The Coordinator of Information may appoint such committees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the Government, as he may deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his functions.

Document 1

4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Information shall in any way interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

5. Within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to the Coordinator of Information by the President, the Coordinator may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services.

6. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator of Information.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 11, 1941.

Document 2

MILITARY ORDER

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The office of Coordinator of Information established by Order of July 11, 1941, exclusive of the foreign information activities transferred to the Office of War Information by Executive Order of June 13, 1942, shall hereafter be known as the Office of Strategic Services, and is hereby transferred to the jurisdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following duties:

a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. At the head of the Office of Strategic Services shall be a Director of Strategic Services who shall be appointed by the President and who shall perform his duties under the direction and supervision of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. William J. Donovan is hereby appointed as Director of Strategic Services.

5. The Order of July 11, 1941 is hereby revoked.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Commander-in-Chief

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 13, 1942.

Document 3

4485

HOLD FOR RELEASE --HOLD FOR RELEASE JUNE 13, 1942

2303

The following statement is for release to editions of all newspapers appearing on the streets NOT EARLIER THAN 8:30 p.m., E.W.T., Saturday, June 13, 1942.

The same release also applies to radio announcers and news commentators.

CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

- -

The President today signed an Executive Order consolidating in one new agency the information functions of the Government - foreign and domestic.

The new agency will be known as the Office of War Information. It will be divided into two main divisions. The first will deal with the dissemination of information within the United States. The second will deal with the dissemination of information in all foreign countries, except Latin America.

Into the new agency will be consolidated all of the functions and duties of the following existing informational agencies: the Office of Facts and Figures; the Office of Government Reports; the Division of Information in the Office for Emergency Management; the Foreign Information Service of the office of the Coordinator of Information. #

In addition, the Director of the new Office of War Information will have authority, subject to policies laid down by the President, to issue directives to all departments and agencies of the Government with respect to their informational services. He will have full authority to eliminate all overlapping and duplication and to discontinue in any department any informational activity which is not necessary or useful to the war effort.

While the actual information service of the different departments and agencies will continue to remain with such departments and agencies, their informational activities must conform to the directives issued by the Director of the Office of War Information.

The existing Office of Coordinator of Information (exclusive of the Foreign Information Service) is being transferred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operate directly under their supervision. Its name is being changed to the Office of Strategic Services, and it will continue to perform its functions of collecting secret and strategic information in foreign countries and performing general miscellaneous strategic services abroad, other than the dissemination of information by radio, leaflets, etc. These information functions in foreign countries will become part of the functions of the new agency - the Office of War Information; and the appropriate staff will be transferred to the new agency for this purpose.

To assist the Director of the Office of War Information, a Committee on War Information Policy will be established. The Director will be the Chairman of this committee; other members of the committee are set forth in the Executive Order. This committee will formulate basic policies and plans on war information; but the Director, after consultation with such committee, will have full power as the executive head of the new agency.

Document 3

The Director of the new Office of War Information will be Mr. Elmer Davis. An administrative officer to serve under Mr. Davis will be designated. Mr. William J. Donovan will serve as the head of the new Office of Strategic Services, reporting only to the combined Chiefs of Staff and to the President.

The information service for Latin America will continue to be handled by the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

The Executive Order prescribes close collaboration between The Director of Censorship, Mr. Byron Price, and the Director of the new Agency, for the purpose of facilitating the prompt and full dissemination of all available information which will not give aid to the enemy.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Document 4

TERMINATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
AND DISPOSITION OF ITS FUNCTIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Statutes, including Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There are transferred to and consolidated in an Interim Research and Intelligence Service, which is hereby established in the Department of State, (a) the functions of the Research and Analysis Branch and of the Presentation Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (provided for by the Military Order of June 13, 1942), excluding such functions performed within the countries of Germany and Austria, and (b) those other functions of the Office of Strategic Services (hereinafter referred to as the Office) which relate to the functions of the said Branches transferred by this paragraph. The functions of the Director of Strategic Services and of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, relating to the functions transferred to the Service by this paragraph, are transferred to the Secretary of State. The personnel, property, and records of the said Branches, except such thereof as is located in Germany and Austria, and so much of the other personnel, property, and records of the Office and of the funds of the Office as the Director of

Document 4

the Bureau of the Budget shall determine to relate primarily to the functions transferred by this paragraph, are transferred to the said Service. Military personnel now on duty in connection with the activities transferred by this paragraph may, subject to applicable law and to the extent mutually agreeable to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, continue on such duty in the Department of State.

2. The Interim Research and Intelligence Service shall be abolished as of the close of business December 31, 1945, and the Secretary of State shall provide for winding up its affairs. Pending such abolition, (a) the Secretary of State may transfer from the said Service to such agencies of the Department of State as he shall designate any function of the Service, (b) the Secretary may curtail the activities carried on by the Service, (c) the head of the Service, who shall be designated by the Secretary, shall be responsible to the Secretary or to such other officer of the Department of State as the Secretary shall direct, and (d) the Service shall, except as otherwise provided in this order, be administered as an organizational entity in the Department of State.

3. All functions of the Office not transferred by paragraph 1 of this order, together with all personnel, records, property, and funds of the Office not so transferred, are transferred to the Department of War; and the Office, including the office of the Director of Strategic Services, is terminated. The functions of the Director of Strategic Services and of the United States Joint

Document 4

Chiefs of Staff, relating to the functions transferred by this paragraph, are transferred to the Secretary of War. Naval personnel on duty with the Office in connection with the activities transferred by this paragraph may, subject to applicable law and to the extent mutually agreeable to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, continue on such duty in the Department of War. The Secretary of War shall, whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest, discontinue any activity transferred by this paragraph and wind up all affairs relating thereto.

4. Such further measures and dispositions as may be determined by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to be necessary to effectuate the transfer or redistribution of functions provided for in this order shall be carried out in such manner as the Director may direct and by such agencies as he may designate.

5. All provisions of prior orders of the President which are in conflict with this order are amended accordingly.

6. This order shall, except as otherwise specifically provided, be effective as of the opening of business October 1, 1945.

Harry Truman

THE WHITE HOUSE,

September 20, 1945

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
FILED AND MADE AVAILABLE
FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION
SEP 21 10 48 AM '74
FEDERAL REGISTER

9621

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Document 5

169, 69

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1946

OFFICE OF CONTROLS
JAN 25 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To The Secretary of State,
The Secretary of War, and
The Secretary of the Navy.

1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.

2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

FEB 13 1967

3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the

Document 5

appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.

b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the

gence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.

6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.

7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.

9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.

Document 5

10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

HUMINT bias

SIGINT in the Novels of John le Carré

James Burridge

This article originally appeared in 1992 in a National Security Agency publication.

The nine espionage novels John le Carré has written since 1964 have been widely read and analyzed on many levels—authenticity, political slant, and even literary symbolism. This article will look at the ways in which SIGINT has been portrayed in those novels—how often, how accurately, and to what effect. It will also demonstrate that, while le Carré has often found it handy to use SIGINT as a plot device, he does not hold SIGINT or the other technical intelligence disciplines in particularly high regard. Rather, he is a fervent partisan of HUMINT and a persistent critic of the technical disciplines and the people who practice them. A warning: the article will summarize some of the plots of these superb stories, so stop here if you intend to read them in the near future. (One ending is revealed here only because of the role played by SIGINT in the novel's outcome.)

There are no SIGINT references at all in le Carré's breakthrough 1964 novel, *The Spy Who Came In From the Cold*, nor in his third novel, *A Small Town in Germany* (1968). But SIGINT does play a key role in his second novel, *The Looking Glass War* (1965), which was much less successful both commercially and critically. In this book a decrepit intelligence department of the British Ministry of Defence undertakes to train an agent and infiltrate him in East Germany to check out tenuous reports of Soviet missile deployments there. The department hasn't run agents since WW II, but hopes that a success will put them back in business and increase their budget and influence. Out of touch with contemporary tradecraft and operating on a shoestring, they engage a WW II agent who became a garage owner after the war. One of the planners asks George Smiley if MI6 will loan them modern short-duration signal-agent comms gear for a "training exercise." When Smiley says that he cannot risk compromising new equipment and techniques, the MOD man says they'll have to use a WW II–era agent radio and asks Smiley how often a transmitting agent must change frequencies in order to foil direction-finding. Smiley says "every two or three minutes," but warns that there are several other factors—"luck, reception, amount of signal traffic, and density of population."

After refresher courses in marksmanship, unarmed combat, German, missile technology, ciphers, and communications, the agent "Mayfly" crosses the border carrying an ancient and heavy HF radio in his suitcase. His first transmission is so slow and clumsy that the listening Vopos initially believe it's a child rather than an illegal agent. A US SIGINT site in West Germany also intercepts Mayfly's report, and the Americans ask MI6 if it's one of their agents. The head of MI6 sends Smiley to the safehouse on the German border; Mayfly has killed a sentry, which has given the MOD cold feet, and, now caught in an unauthorized operation, they agree to close it down. When Mayfly makes his next transmission, only the East Germans and the Soviets are listening. He's easily located by D/F and captured (or killed). The British Government disowns him and issues a plausible denial. In the final cynical twist, Smiley learns that MI6 knew all along that the MOD was running a real operation and allowed it to continue in the hope that it would fail and keep the Ministry out of the HUMINT business forever. Le Carré has since said that this book was heavily influenced by the Bay of Pigs disaster.

In 1974, le Carré published *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, the first of a trilogy in which Smiley pursues the Soviet mastermind Karla, head of the KGB's Thirteenth Directorate. This is also the book that showcases le Carré's many colorful euphemisms for

intelligence functions and personnel, some of which have been widely adopted by the American and British media to describe the intelligence business. In *Tinker, Tailor* he also locates British SIGINT organizationally for the first time and names its practitioners—"wranglers." It is apparently a division within MI6, comparable to the dirty-tricks people ("scalphunters"), the bug detectors ("ferrets"), the forgers ("shoemakers"), and the operations support people ("lamplighters").

Tinker, Tailor is concerned primarily with Smiley's search for a high-level mole in MI6, recruited by the Soviet superspy Karla and run under his direction. A key element in the search is analysis of a failed operation in Czechoslovakia in which a British agent was shot and captured. When Smiley interviews the man who was duty officer during the operation, the man recalls having been informed by one of the wranglers that "all hell had broken loose on the Czech air: half of it was coded, but the other half was *en clair.* He kept getting garbled accounts of a shooting near Brno." Later, Smiley reminisces about meeting Karla in 1955 in New Delhi. Karla had gone to California to activate a dormant agent network and to establish its radio communications with Moscow Centre. A coding mistake on the Moscow end allowed the British cryptanalysts to break the system. When Karla traveled to New Delhi to assess a potential Chinese agent, the Americans allowed him to leave, rolled up his agents, and had the Indians arrest him. Smiley visited him in his cell and suggested that he come to England and tell all; Moscow would blame him for the fiasco in the US and he faced a bleak future at home. But Karla spurned the British offer. The Indians then deported him to Moscow, where he outmaneuvered the boss who wanted his head, had him shot, and replaced him. After that, Smiley notes, Karla never again used clandestine radio communications and never allowed his field agents to use them either.

An interesting aspect of this story is the way the mole manipulates compartmentation procedures. In 1971 the Soviets begin giving the mole relatively high-grade intelligence, and he tells three other top MI6 executives (whose assistance he'll need) that it comes from a source—"Merlin"—who will deal only with him. This accomplishes two things. First, Merlin's success puts one of the three executives, an unsuspecting and pliable man, on the fast track to head MI6. It also gives the mole a reason to meet regularly with the KGB officer who is actually running him. Smiley realizes that Merlin is the key and that the mole must be one of the four top executives privy to the compartment. The rest of the novel follows Smiley as he tries to determine which of the four is the mole. In this sense this is a cautionary tale about excessive compartmentation.

The next novel, *The Honourable Schoolboy* (1977), finds Smiley, after exposing the mole and uncovering the dry rot within the service, running MI6—"appointed the captain of a wrecked ship." Some believed that they had heard "the last beat of the secret English heart." One London rumor had it that it was the Dutch SIGINT service that was really responsible for identifying the British mole, by breaking a Moscow Centre code. Believing that every activity of the service was compromised, Smiley "scraps the lot," including the SIGINT service. He describes it as having been "working practically full-time for Karla for the last five years." We also learn that SIGINT operations were run from a headquarters in Bath and paid for by Foreign Office funds. Smiley's task at the beginning of 1974 is to rebuild the service and to produce intelligence that will induce the now very leery CIA "cousins" to return the Anglo-American intelligence relationship to its former status. He is also obsessed with putting Karla out of business. He and his team—former colleagues sacked or descredited by the mole—begin by looking at an aborted investigation of a Moscow Centre money-laundering operation for paying agents, run out of Vientiane. The operation is now in Hong Kong, and an agent—the "Honourable Schoolboy" of the title—is sent there to run it down. Against the backdrop of the fall of South Vietnam, the Schoolboy goes all over Southeast Asia gathering information. Leaving Udorn, Thailand, after using the comms facility at the CIA station there, he passes the US SIGINT facility and remembers having heard that 1,200 linguists work there.

Smiley's People (1979) was the last of the Karla trilogy. It seems that Karla had a daughter by a mistress he eventually sent to the Gulag when she became politically unreliable. The daughter is schizophrenic

and confined to an asylum in Switzerland; Karla has been illegally using operational funds funnelled through his man in Paris for a ghost agent to pay the considerable expense involved. The man in Paris is told to use couriers whenever possible, since Karla "is against excessive use of radio." Smiley notes that Karla's earlier vow not to use clandestine radio was apparently "subject to review." An Estonian émigré living in London, a former agent of Smiley's, learns all this through a complicated chain of events, but is killed on Karla's orders before he can tell Smiley; Smiley is again brought out of retirement to investigate the murder.

A Departure to the Middle East

The Little Drummer Girl (1983) was a departure from the earlier books in terms of both location and characters. Le Carré told an interviewer in 1983 that his original concept was for a novel about the Middle East set in London and Washington, but he couldn't find a credible way to involve MI6 and Smiley and ended up making the Israelis the central characters and setting it in part in the Middle East. This novel deals with the efforts of a team of Israelis to capture or kill a Palestinian terrorist ("Khalil") whose speciality is bomb attacks against Israelis in Europe. They grab and eventually kill Khalil's younger brother Michel and recruit a British actress named Charlie to pose as a sympathizer and Michel's lover. While SIGINT plays no role in this novel, the Israeli communications gear is described in some detail. Most of the operation is supported by a mobile comms van equipped with both secure voice and enciphered printer. When forced to use clear voice, they use the call signs and jargon of taxi companies and other legitimate users of mobile comms.

SIGINT Traps a "Perfect Spy"

SIGINT does play a significant role in *A Perfect Spy* (1986), which le Carré has described as his first work not submitted to Her Majesty's Government for prepublication review. It is the story of one Magnus Pym, MI6 station chief in Vienna in 1983. As the novel begins, Pym, haunted by the death of his conman father, has disappeared. His wife and colleagues are baffled and fear that he has defected. He has in fact gone to ground in a rooming house in a coastal town in the UK, where he is writing the story of his life for his teenage son. The novel's chapters alternate between the story of Pym's life up to his disappearance and MI6's efforts to discover where he has gone and why, and to keep the CIA from learning that there may have been another major British security disaster.

Pym was induced into the intelligence business after WW II by the MI6 Station Chief in Bern; Pym was studying at a university there and met the man, Jack Brotherhood, at the local Anglican church. Brotherhood uses Pym for various low-level tasks, such as collecting the names of leftists at the university and translating stolen documents. Pym tells Brotherhood about Axel, an illegal German refugee whom he has befriended at his rooming house, and Brotherhood informs the Swiss counterintelligence service in order to accumulate "barter material." They arrest Axel and deport him.

After graduating from Oxford in modern languages and taking a commission in Army intelligence, Pym encounters Axel again in Austria. Axel is described to Pym as a Czech Army officer who wishes to defect, but it's a ruse. Axel proposes that he become Pym's agent and gives him a great deal of classified information to establish his bona fides. Soon Axel tells Pym that their relationship has become known and that Axel can protect himself only by making it look as if Pym is Axel's agent. To pull this off, he will need legitimate classified information from Pym. Pym never seriously considers not doing it; he has vowed not to betray Axel a second time, and there is also the problem that his own reputation rests on what Axel is feeding him. (We learn later that the material Axel is providing looks good but is of little actual value.)

Upon demobilization in 1953, Pym enters MI6 and is sent abroad again—to Czechoslovakia, of course. He is soon caught and pitched by Axel again. This time, Axel says, they'll make each other into intelligence superstars, by "making straight for the biggest diamonds, the biggest banks." But what Pym will get from Axel over the years will be largely disinformation, supplied by nets of agents fully controlled

(knowingly or otherwise) by the Czechs and other East European counterintelligence services. Piling success upon success, Pym goes to Stockholm, back to London, to Berlin, and then to Washington as Deputy Chief of Station, followed everywhere by Axel. But the Americans begin to become suspicious; the East European networks produce good material only when Pym (and Axel) are actually there. Pym is summoned to London for an investigation, but MI6 does only a cursory check and sends him back to Washington with a clean bill of health.

The CIA keeps pushing, however, and sends a team to London to present new evidence of Pym's treason. This is after Pym has disappeared, but the British have concealed his absence from their American colleagues. Artelli, the SIGINT analyst in the American team, is described as a "distraught mathematician" from "Signals Intelligence." The new evidence is traffic analysis of clandestine communications from the Czech Embassy in Washington and from other Czech facilities in the US, particularly the Consulate in San Francisco in 1981 and 1982. The significant point is that the transmissions stopped every time Pym left Washington, and the assumption is that they're meant for Pym and aren't broadcast when he's away. Artelli adds that the communications techniques are old fashioned and give off a "sense of long habituation, one human being to another." Although the communications are unreadable, the cryptanalysts know that the keys are derived from some kind of text. Artelli also reveals that there are strange things going on with Czech clandestine radio in the last few days—the equivalent of blind calls to someone.

The Czechs, like the British, are trying to find Pym, although the CIA doesn't make the connection because they don't know that Pym is missing. Then, another team member brings up more new evidence—the travels of a Czech intelligence officer named Hans Albrecht Petz, a.k.a. Alexander Hampel, a.k.a. Jerzy Zaworski. Petz is Axel, of course, and his travels in Europe and the US coincide perfectly with Pym's. The British still refuse to believe it, arguing that the Czechs have mounted an elaborate deception to discredit someone who's been particularly effective against them. Their ambiguity about where Pym is and what he's doing convinces the Americans that he has flown the coop. Brotherhood, still in MI6, finally comes to believe Pym's treachery and learns from Pym's wife that Pym takes a battered copy of a 17th-century German book entitled *Simplicissimus* everywhere he goes. The book, actually *Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutschroughly* (The Adventures of a Simple German), was given to Pym by Axel when they first met in Bern, and it's a somewhat heavy symbol. The author, Johann Jakob Christoffel Brimmelshausen, fought on both sides during the Thirty Years War and used many pseudonyms which were anagrams of his name. Brotherhood tells the British SIGINT service to run the Czech clandestine traffic against the book, and it works.

Now everyone is looking for Pym—his wife, the British, the CIA, and Axel, who fears he is suicidal and wants him to defect to Czechoslovakia. The CIA Station Chief in Vienna, an old friend of Pym's from Washington now obsessed with nailing him, has enlisted his own wife to help watch Pym's wife there, and she sees Axel contacting his wife in a church. She immediately calls her husband at the US Embassy in London on an open phone and tells him with a clumsy prearranged code. The British, who have tapped the Embassy phones, intercept the call. But Pym's wife evades both the Americans and the British, makes it back to England, and tells Brotherhood that Axel has unknowingly let her know where Pym probably is. The book reaches its climax as all the interested parties rush to reach Pym first.

A Communications Deception

SIGINT plays a small but important role in le Carré's 1989 novel, *The Russia House.* It is his glasnost novel and his most political book to date. The central character is one Bartholomew "Barley" Blair, an alcoholic British publisher and saxophone player. A dissident Soviet scientist who met Barley briefly at a party tries to have a manuscript delivered to him via a Moscow book fair; it eventually ends up at MI6. According to the manuscript, Soviet military technologies—particularly missiles—simply don't work. The Soviet military research establishment has not only produced weapons that don't work, they've also faked the test results to conceal the failures

from their own government. The scientist, one Yakov Savelyev, wants the manuscript published in the West, believing it will lead to large-scale disarmament on both sides. The British and the Americans have another idea, of course. Their biographic research reveals that Savelyev—now codenamed "Bluebird"—is responsible for, among other things, telemetry encryption. Part of what he has provided is the original telemetry—before it was faked and before it was encrypted. They want to use Barley to determine whether the material is genuine and then have Barley run Bluebird as an agent in place. Against all his instincts, Barley agrees to do so.

After three weeks of training, Barley goes back to meet Savelyev in Leningrad, takes more material from him, and promises him he will get the manuscript published. Barley then travels to the US for a combination debriefing and interrogation by the CIA, now the senior partner in the operation. A senior CIA official warns Barley and the British that the American military-industrial complex doesn't welcome the Bluebird manuscript and will work hard to discredit it.

Barley returns to Moscow with a shopping list of questions for Savelyev, and the CIA smuggles in a truck full of "surveillance" gear to monitor developments. The British officer who has been functioning as Barley's case officer (identified only as "Ned") beginstogetcoldfeet,awarethattheAnglo-American shopping list tells the Soviets everything we don't know about their strategic weapons programs—and, by inference, everything we do know. The rest of the team ignores his concerns, convinced that everything is on track. But Ned is right—Savelyev has been caught and turned. Meanwhile, the Soviets practice a bit of deception to ensure that they'll get the shopping list. A Soviet military entity in Leningrad sends a message to Moscow authorizing Savelyev to take a recreational weekend there after he delivers a lecture; it is intercepted by a US SIGINT facility "in Finland" and decrypted. The Americans and the British buy it, although Ned suspects it was planted. He points out that it was enciphered by an ancient Soviet machine and that there are no other messages intercepted like it. Barley delivers the shopping list and then disappears, a good juncture at which to end this plot summary.

George Smiley's Valedictory

The Secret Pilgrim (1991) features the first appearance of George Smiley since Smiley's People. Ned of Russia House was made the scapegoat for the Bluebird fiasco and exiled to run the MI6 agent training school. He invites Smiley, his mentor and father figure, to talk at the graduation dinner of a class of agents, and Smiley agrees to do it. Every anecdote Smiley tells reminds Ned of an operation of his own, and the book is basically a collection of Ned's vignettes from three decades of espionage. There are no references to SIGINT as such, but in the stories both the British and the Soviets continue to rely heavily on clandestine radio through the 1980s.

What can we say about le Carré's apparent knowledge of SIGINT from this review of the novels? To use the Watergate question, what did he know and when did he know it? He seems to have a good grasp of clandestine radio techniques and counter clandestine SIGINT capabilities. If there is a tradecraft moral, it is that "agents shouldn't use radio." "Mayfly" in *The Looking Glass War,* Karla, and Pym are tripped up by successful counterclandestine SIGINT operations. Le Carré does not display much awareness of broader SIGINT applications, such as on political, economic, and military topics. This is consistent with what is known about his intelligence career—he was a case officer in the 1950s and 1960s and would probably not have had regular access to mainstream SIGINT reporting. There is also the matter of censorship by the British Government; le Carré claims that he submitted every novel before *Perfect Spy* for prepublication review. It is unlikely that official reviewers would have allowed any accurate information about British or American SIGINT activities to be published. In this regard it is interesting to note that no le Carré novel has ever referred to "NSA" or "GCHQ"; this could not possibly have been because he didn't know about those organizations.

People involved in any of the intelligence disciplines have an ambivalent attitude toward having their craft described in fiction. On the one hand, we sneer at the more lurid and fanciful fictional descriptions of our profession; on the other hand, we are appalled and often want legal action taken against writers who get it right. So, in this sense, as SIGINT professionals we should be happy that le Carré's references to our business are few and mostly uninformative.

HUMINT vs Technical Intelligence

But le Carré has another agenda, which is more interesting. He is not only a strong partisan of HUMINT as an intelligence discipline, but he also actively disparages the other more technical means of collection and analysis. He is to intelligence as the 19th-century Luddites were to the industrial revolution—a rabid foe of technology. This is manifested in several ways in the novels which may not be readily apparent from these brief plot summaries. For one thing, he portrays intelligence technologies as peculiarly—and offensively—American. Some of the most despicable characters in his books are British officials who make deals with the CIA to share the fruits of American intelligence money and technology. His heroes are HUMINT practitioners who detest depending on Americans and scorn nearly all uses of technology. Alleline, the mole's pawn in *Tinker, Tailor*, adored Americans, while MI6's Director, Smiley's beloved father figure, detested them and all their works. The mastermind in *Little Drummer Girl* was described as out of tune with Mossad's polygraphs "and their ever-growing faith in American-style power plays, applied psychology, and crisis management." The noble Jack Brotherhood in *Perfect Spy* objected to MI6's pandering to American "methods and example." Conversely, the people in his novels who are good at technology are often unpleasant characters. One particularly nasty MI6 officer in *Russia House* was described in this way: "Clive was a technology man, not at ease with live sources, a suburban espiocrat of the modern school. If he liked anything at all in life apart from his own advancement and his silver Mercedes, then it was hardware and powerful Americans, in that order." For Clive, human nature was "one vast unsavory nightmare." In *Secret Pilgrim*, Ned, in praising the successes of an MI6 officer against the Khmer Rouge, notes that espionage technology "can't break the codes of an army without radios." Ned also reflects with nostalgia on a time before MI6's registry was computerized, when it "could still find what it was looking for, or know for sure that it was lost."

Le Carré has developed this theme even more explicitly outside of his fiction. In a 1986 interview, he attributed what he called the "flagrant failures" of Western intelligence to an "obsession with high-tech espionage." In a 1989 interview, he said that "the shift of professional confidence from human assets to electronic ones is a direct consequence of US domination of Western intelligence." He went on to say that, when human agents are well recruited and well targeted, "they are affordable and often far more reliable than the inductive fantasies, which result from the reading of signals and codes and photographs."

There are several possible explanations for le Carré's animus against the technical intelligence disciplines and their practicioners. One is that it's a manifestation of an obvious anti-American bias, although he adamantly denies that he's anti-American and cites as evidence the number of obnoxious and incompetent Brits who appear in his novels. This means, he says, that he's evenhanded. Although the reader will have to make his or her own judgment, it seems to this writer that criticism of American power and policies is a consistent theme in both his fiction and in his public statements. It makes for a fairly simple equation—le Carré scorns SIGINT and imagery because they are dominated by the US; they exemplify American technological arrogance.

Another explanation may be that he has never really been exposed to SIGINT and imagery and doesn't understand their value or their complexity. A senior CIA HUMINT officer who came to NSA in another capacity as a retired annuitant told this writer that for his entire CIA career he thought that all NSA employees were like the State Department communicators he encountered in embassies—skilled communications technicians. This person was astounded to learn what we actually do in terms of signals processing, cryptanalysis, language work, and analysis. There are also people who disdain technology because they don't understand it and secretly fear it; it wouldn't be surprising if an early 1950's graduate of Oxford in modern languages harbored such attitudes. The answer may well be a mix of all three.

The Moral Cost of HUMINT

What is striking about le Carré's relentless public championing of HUMINT is his refusal to acknowledge its human and moral costs. The relative morality

of intelligence activities is a complex question. The current US official position is that some acts are so odious that they cannot be justified even when they would advance the national interest; an example is the apparent prohibition on assassinating foreign officials. (The purist may argue that assassinations, like covert actions, have nothing to do with intelligence, but past involvement in assassination attempts has blurred the distinction.) Acts less grave than assassinations that would otherwise be considered immoral and/or illegal are deemed acceptable if done in the national interest. There are dissenters on both sides of the political spectrum, of course. For some on the left, such acts can never be justified by invoking the national interest. For some on the right, there are no acts which cannot be justified if the threat to the national interest is sufficiently grave. (This is similar to the theological debate about a "just war.") A middle ground might be that there should be some proportionality between the gravity of the activity and the expected benefits—one should probably not blackmail an official of a foreign government to acquire the annual projection for rutabaga production. One way to measure the relative morality of various intelligence activities might be to assess their potential for harming individual human beings. The technical intelligence disciplines have little or no impact on human beings; HUMINT, by definition, involves the exploitation of people and carries a high risk of harming them.

Le Carré's failure to address the human costs of HUMINT is striking precisely because his novels are intensely concerned with questions of personal morality. As William Buckley noted in a 1983 review, " *'The Little Drummer Girl'* is about spies as *Madame Bovary* is about adultery or *Crime and Punishment* is about crime." There is endless agonizing in these novels about the moral dilemma of the case officer, whose task it is to obtain information by corrupting or seducing vulnerable human beings. Smiley speaks in *Honourable Schoolboy* about having to be "inhuman in defence of our humanity, harsh in defence of compassion, single-minded in defence of our disparity." The Schoolboy himself recalls Smiley speaking at the MI6 training school about being grateful that intelligence service provided the opportunity to repay one's country, but the Schoolboy notes that "the paying is actually done by the other poor sods."

There is a strong sense in le Carré's novels of what has come to be called by conservative American commentators the concept of moral equivalence—that if those who act on behalf of the West and the USSR both commit immoral acts, there is no real moral difference between the two. As George Will put it, "In [le Carré's] espionage novels the 'ambiguity' consists primarily of the idea that means as much as ends reveal where, if anywhere, justice lies in political conflict." So a case can be made that it's inconsistent and perhaps even hypocritical for a man so concerned with moral questions to uncritically promote the intelligence discipline most likely to harm individual human beings.

Why These Novels Matter

Since le Carré's writings and public pronouncements (whether because of ignorance, discretion, or censorship) don't appear to pose any threat to SIGINT sources and methods, does it matter to us what he writes? It matters because it adds to a public mystique about HUMINT that has a real (although intangible) impact on the way the Intelligence Community is perceived both by the public and by the rest of the government. Many former intelligence officials and other commentators have relentlessly pushed the idea that "American intelligence" was crippled when then DCI Stansfield Turner cut 820 CIA Operations Directorate billets (none overseas) in the 1977 "Halloween Massacre." Although the CIA and the rest of the Community continued to perform well after this event, some have gone so far as to suggest that some major US foreign policy mistakes in the late 1970s and early 1980s were due to this modest reduction of HUMINT assets. In a more recent example, the Congressional committees responsible for the intelligence budget added money for CIA HUMINT operations for both FY91 and FY92, while reducing the rest of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. In a perfect world decisionmakers should be so well informed that they couldn't possibly be influenced by an Ian Fleming, a John le Carré, or a Tom Clancy, but in this imperfect world it sometimes happens.

It is hard to develop an appropriate awareness in the right places of the actual and potential contributions of the SIGINT system without putting ourselves out

of business. It was one of the primary reasons for the establishment of J8, the Office of Corporate Representation, and it would make a good subject for a separate article in this publication. In the final analysis, we're obviously better off that a writer as widely read as le Carré doesn't write accurately about SIGINT. But it is galling to know that his books and public comments make marginally more difficult the task of ensuring that resources are allocated within the Intelligence Community on the basis of real contributions instead of on the basis of myth and mystique. It is also ironic that the CIA would benefit from all this in even a small way, since le Carré has made his distaste for that organization so obvious.

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