Unclassified extracts from Studies in Intelligence Volume 52, Number 4
(December 2008)

What Analysts Need to Understand:
The King’s Intelligence Studies Program

The US Coast Guard and OSS Maritime Operations During World War II

Reviews:

Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II

An Ordinary Spy

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Books Reviewed in 2008
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   Center for the Study of Intelligence
   Central Intelligence Agency
   Washington, DC 20505

ISSN 1527-0874

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On 10 October 2008, CIA accepted another work from artist Keith Woodcock into the CIA Intelligence Art Collection. “Rescue on the Plain of Jars” commemorates the efforts of Air America employees—who, under extremely dangerous and difficult circumstances—played essential roles in US efforts to resist communist aggression against the Kingdom of Laos during 1961–75. Air America pilots also rescued a substantial number of US military pilots downed in Laos during the Vietnam War. (See Studies 52 2 (June 2008) for an article about the entire collection.)
Teaching Intelligence Analysts in the UK

What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies Program

Michael S. Goodman and Sir David Omand

Origins

In April 2007, a British newspaper the Mail on Sunday ran a story headlined “Can Sherlock Holmes restore the reputation of our bungling spies?” The report observed, “Spies and Whitehall officials are being given a crash course in Sherlock Holmes’ deduction techniques to prevent a repeat of the intelligence failures in the run-up to the Iraq war.” Although not quite accurate, this was the first public mention of an innovative course created in the aftermath of Lord Butler’s report on intelligence and Iraqi WMD.¹

In this article we shall outline some of the conclusions we have drawn from the first four courses that we have run over the past two years. What do experienced analysts—those with five to 10 years on the job—need to know? Or, rather, what do analysts need to understand?

We are not concerned here with the acquisition of subject knowledge or the honing of techniques of analysis. Such teaching is best delivered in a secure environment with the classified databases and tools to which analysts would have access in their work. Exposure to an academic environment, such as the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, can add several elements that may be harder to provide within the government system: close access to academic disciplines, such as military history, intelligence history, international relations, social sciences and so on; an introduction to the relevant literature; and exposure to a variety of critical views, including the unorthodox. But most of all, it offers a containing space in which analysts from every part of the community can explore with each other the interplay of ideas about their profession.


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other the interplay of ideas about their profession.

We have earlier written how "intelligence is not a new phenomenon, the academic study of intelligence is." That article went on to describe how "intelligence" as an academic discipline is studied and taught in the United Kingdom. It is worth briefly reiterating some of its findings as they pertain to the training of government intelligence officers. The CIA had recognized as early as 1960 how beneficial it would be to use universities as a means of intelligence training. Put simply, it was felt that by enhancing the understanding of practitioners of intelligence, they would be able to work more effectively. Such a course would be led by someone with "extensive and well-rounded intelligence experience" and as a whole would "apply the teachings of many academic disciplines."

Lord Butler, in his 2004 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, called for an increase in the number of British intelligence analysts and suggested forming a specialization of analysis with scope for advancement within it across the entire British intelligence community. It fell to David Omand, then UK intelligence and security coordinator, to start to turn the report into action. He chaired a high-level implementation group with the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the heads of the UK intelligence agencies and the permanent heads of the government departments most concerned.

It was recognized that:

- The high level of secrecy that is inevitable within an intelligence community means that training has to be largely in-house, but that, in turn, makes it more important to provide opportunities for analysts to meet and develop a wider professional outlook.

- Care is needed that analysts do not come to see themselves as a professional "closed shop" that might make it harder for the intelligence agencies to rotate their intelligence officers between operational, analytical and managerial duties, bringing the experience of their service to bear during their tours of duty in the analytical environment, for example when seconded to the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff or to the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).

- The label "analyst" should be interpreted widely to include researchers who regularly use secret intelligence, for example in the Foreign Office or in the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), and not just be confined to "all-source analysts."

A professional head of intelligence analysis (PHIA), working within the Cabinet Office's Intelligence and Security Secretariat, was subsequently appointed to promote the idea of greater professionalism in analysis and to help generate this sense of profession, albeit a virtual one. One of her early initiatives was to commission us at King's College London to develop a course for experienced analysts.

With a small staff, the PHIA's main tasks are to provide advice in the security, defense and foreign affairs fields on gaps and duplication in analyst capabilities, on recruitment of analysts, their career structures and interchange opportunities; to advise on analytical methodology across the intelligence community; and to develop

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3 P.J. Dorondo, “For College Courses in Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 3 (1960).
5 Dorondo, A15–A16.
more substantial training on a cross-government basis for all analysts working in these fields. The overall aim of these tasks is to enhance the analytic capability of the United Kingdom’s intelligence community to enable it to work together more effectively and provide the highest quality intelligence to ministers and policy makers.

Approach

The aim set for the course can be summarized as promoting multidisciplinary understanding of the concepts, issues and debates regarding intelligence. Analysts will thus become more aware of issues around the meaning, value, nature and proper use of intelligence, and more confident in their own discussions of these topics. Fostering that sense of being part of a single UK intelligence community, and of belonging to the virtual profession of analysts, represents a key underlying motivation for the course.

To achieve this aim we offer the analysts encouragement to look at their profession from four points of view, based on Stafford Thomas’s pioneering fourfold typology of intelligence studies:6

• The functional approach: studying an intelligence cycle appropriate for the needs of a 21st century national security strategy, looking at the development of intelligence activities, processes, and technologies. The choice of analytic methodology is examined, drawing on the experience of other professions grappling with problems of knowledge.

• The historical/biographical approach: studying the historical experiences of the use of intelligence, good and bad; examples examined have included the controversy over Iraqi WMD, the Falklands War, and UK counterintelligence against the Soviet Union.

• The structural approach: studying the institutional development of the UK intelligence community, especially the Joint Intelligence Committee and the more recent JTAC. We look in particular at how the UK intelligence community has adapted to an era of avowal, greater openness, and judicial and parliamentary oversight.

• The political approach: looking at the part that pre-emptive intelligence now plays in operational decision-making in counterterrorism and other areas. This provides the opportunity to sensitize the analysts to the institutional dynamics of analytical organizations and the obvious pathologies that can occur in the relationship between the intelligence community and its customers. The ethics of intelligence gathering, sharing and public use are examined in the context of current counterterrorism strategies.

These four ways of looking at the subject are interwoven through the classes, each two hours long, typically comprising a mixture of lecture and discussion. Learning in the 10-week course is assessed by means of a 4,000-word essay, marked to King’s College London MA marking criteria. For this, participants are explicitly required not to rely on practical experience but to utilize the wide intelligence studies literature. In their essay they will normally choose the one approach with which they have come to feel most comfortable. One outcome of this is that those who take and pass the course are given a number of credits, which they can then use toward one of the nine MA degrees offered by the Department of War Studies, or indeed any other MA offered within King’s College London; in effect it is a means of encouraging thinking about

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6 Thomas, 239.
broader personal and professional development.

What do the sessions cover?

1) The functional approach

Starting with the functional approach, the emphasis is on developing an awareness—a self-consciousness—of the mental processes that we all employ when we do what we call “analysis.” There is much we can learn here from other professions and from recognizing the differences between them. We draw attention to the relevant methods of analysis employed by journalists, physicians, historians, paleontologists, detectives, mathematicians, and physical and social scientists. Each group has something of methodological value to offer to the debate in terms of what makes for reliable evidence, how to judge between competing theories, what makes theories useful, and how uncertainty is dealt with.

One unusual example is paleontology, an academic discipline that has had to develop a methodology and tools for assessing fragmentary and often incomplete evidence, on an internationally collaborative basis, and drawing general conclusions from the evidence. For instance, from the example of modern human origins (MHO) comes discussion of paradigm shifts and competing hypotheses and how best to select between them when direct experimentation is not possible. One intelligence tool that we explore is the use of the Heuer model, as developed by the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and which provides a structured way for analysts to relate competing hypotheses to their essential assumptions. The need for care over deception, in the form of examples such as the Piltdown fraud, can also be introduced here.

From the mathematicians comes the Bayesian approach, where we emphasize the way that new information can be reliably and consistently incorporated to revise an estimate of the believability of a hypothesis. Heuristics, such as those of the mathematician George Polya, are introduced, including his advice to draw diagrams, try and recognize when similar problems have been solved in the past, and the notion that if a problem is too hard to solve,

attempt solution of a related but much simpler version.

At the same time the fuzzy logic school provides the analysts with cautionary lessons concerning the less than Cartesian categories of the typical real-world problem. A general issue young analysts invariably raise at this point is how far such theoretical examinations of decisionmaking can have application to their real-world problems. An example we have used will illustrate the point. The example below sets out an apparently simple practical problem that just might be posed to an analyst supporting an arms control inspection regime:

You are an imagery analyst looking for an unlawful biological warfare trailer. You think it could be hidden in one of three equally likely locations, A, B or C. You pick one, say site C, and start to prep the arms control inspectors for a snap inspection. The host country then unexpectedly throws open one of the other sites, site A, to journalists so it is obviously not there. You have the chance to change your advice to the inspection team and tell them now to go to site B or stick with your original choice, C. Should you change, or stick to C?

When posed this question, analysts immediately split into two camps. The minority quickly spots the underlying structure of what in North
America is known as the “Monty Hall problem,” from the name of the game show host. As a problem in probability it is straightforward, if paradoxical. The majority of analysts who have not come across the problem refuse to believe the result when they first come across it but can be persuaded to follow the probabilistic reasoning, as set out in the graphic below.

That, however, is the start of the teaching point. The analysis of the probabilities in the graphic depends upon a set of strict assumptions that are not explicit in the question. For the intelligence analyst little, if anything, should be taken for granted, especially statements from the opponent. What unlocks a proper analysis of the problem for the analyst is understanding where implicit assumptions are being made about the reporting being received. For example, do we assume that the opponent knows which initial site was picked (the question does not say so)? If not, the solution is quite different. Would it be safe not to assume he knows, given the history of arms inspection regimes? Is the opponent engaged in deception, using the media as a shield? Can it be safely assumed that the opponent who threw open the site was privy to the secret of where the bio-trailer was actually located? And so on.

In the end, the problem reduces to a number of alternative hypotheses, on a number of different assumptions, and the analyst can use the Heuer table approach to rank these. Our calculations show that the problem is asymmetric: the wise analyst will advise switching on the grounds that some assumptions will improve the prediction, while on others it makes the chances no worse.

One of the objectives of taking the analysts through such exercises is to emphasize that prediction may not match reality because the model of human motivation being used to interpret the intelligence has built-in inappropriate assumptions. This lesson about the nature of explanation is important for analysts to understand. The point has been well made by a leading quantum physicist, as originally attributed to Bertrand Russell in his philosophy lectures, but which we adapt to the intelligence world. Imagine a chicken farm where the chickens spy on the farmer and intercept a message that he is ordering much more chicken food. The JIC of chickens meets. Is their key judgment that at last peaceful coexistence has come and the farmer is going to feed them
properly in the future? Or is it that they are all doomed since they are about to be fattened for the kill? It is the same raw reporting, but different implicit assumptions about human behavior.

The fact that the same observational evidence can be extrapolated to give two diametrically opposite predictions according to which explanation one adopts, and cannot justify either of them, is not some accidental limitation of the farmyard environment: it is true of all observational evidence under all circumstances.9

Or, to put it another way, as the Nobel prize-winner Paul Dirac said of the early Bohr model of the hydrogen atom, it is possible to get the right answer for the wrong reason.

We have found that many young analysts implicitly possess an inductivist model of their work, involving experience of being able to generalize from patterns or from changes to patterns.

We emphasize too the risk of overinterpreting evidence and contriving ever more complex explanations to fit available data. As the late Professor R. V. Jones, the father of scientific intelligence, put it in a dictum he called Crabtree’s bludgeon:

No set of mutually consistent observations can exist for which some human intellect cannot conceive a coherent explanation.11

Discussion with analysts usually leads to their volunteering examples from their experience of the human tendency to try to explain away apparently contradictory evidence that might confound the favorite explanation of the moment. A temptation we have all noticed is likely to be unconsciously stronger if that explanation is known to be favoured by the senior customer, or if deciding upon it has been particularly stressful for the organization, in which case a form of cognitive dissonance may effectively blank out discussion of alternative explanations.

A well-documented case that illustrates the pitfalls here, which we give the analysts to examine, is the 1982 “yellow rain” allegation of Soviet BCW agent use in Laos and Cambodia.12 In that case there were good reasons for initially giving credence to the reports, but as contrary evidence began to emerge it was explained away by ever more complex explanation. Thus, as an example, the alleged agent particle size was smaller than might have been expected, well, that just showed how fiendishly clever the enemy was because smaller particles could be ingested more quickly through the lungs as well as through skin absorption. In the end, analysis by labs such as the UK’s Porton Down showed no trace of BCW agent and the organic substance found was probably


10 Ibid.


12 With acknowledgments to Professors Meselson and Perry Robinson, who generously allowed us to draw on their work on this subject as part of the Harvard Sussex program.
pollen from clouds of defecating wild bees—as perhaps the analysts might have found out if experts on the fauna of the region had been consulted initially, another useful learning point. There may well have been covert activity going on in the region, but this was not the way to go about uncovering it.

We introduce the students gently to postmodern critiques of international relations and the role of intelligence—the only session that we might describe as turbulent since our experience is that most analysts are impatient with modern structuralist thinking. However, it is important for analysts to realize how the language they habitually use, such as intelligence collection, production, analysis, assessment and so-called finished product (and the meaning that different generations of customers may ascribe to words such as probably) are categories that can shape and constrain thinking.

In discussion with analysts we have found our own thinking about the “intelligence cycle” being reshaped. The depiction of the intelligence cycle in the graphic on the right uses “access” to cover all three types of information that can be turned into intelligence: traditional secret information, such as diplomatic reporting) and the third increasingly important category of private information covered by data protection legislation (such as financial, credit, travel, passport, biometrics and communications records).

We have found that the analysts respond readily to the term “access,” that deliberately conjures up the image of the analyst and the collector working together and the development of a new skill set of mission management to connect them. We only have time in the course for the merest glimpse of the technological possibilities that the future will bring here for their work, for example in data mining and pattern recognition software.

Our description of the cycle uses “elucidation” to describe the ways in which usable intelligence can be created by shedding new light on what is going on in theaters of interest, providing a crucial element to situational awareness and providing surer explanations of what has been experienced from which more reliable predictions can be generated.

As Winston Churchill put it: “The further back you look the further ahead you can see.”
Certainly the traditional evidence-based inferential work is still there, as it was during the Cold War, but so is seeing inside the head of the enemy. The term “dissemination” is used to convey the sowing of seeds in the minds of other analysts as well as customers, and to a much wider group of potential users, including local police officers or operators of the critical national infrastructure, interested in data streams, pictures, maps and video as well as written reports of the traditional kind.

From these discussions we have the impression that analysts are being pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, the center of gravity of UK intelligence work has shifted to “action-on” intelligence, to use the old SIGINT expression. That brings a very close interaction with the user operating in real time or near real time, a feature of both support for military operations and support for what in UK parlance we might call the civil authority, including law enforcement over terrorism, narcotics, proliferation and serious criminality.

On the other hand, the demands for high-level analysis have become more demanding, with military involvement in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where strategic judgments depend crucially on deep knowledge of language, customs, history, religion, tribal relationships and personalities, and topography that place exceptional demands on the analyst. The future will hold many demands for such deep analysis of global phenomena, such as resource shortages and the security impact of climate change, posing real challenges for the next generation of young analysts.

2) The historical/biographical approach

Under the heading of the historical approach, the analysts have been able to hear Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman analyzing the dynamic interaction between UK and Argentine intelligence in the run-up to the invasion of the Falkland Islands and showing how perceptions of the moves made by one side affected the other. For example, Argentine intelligence incorrectly assumed that a nuclear attack submarine was leaving Gibraltar for the South Atlantic. The UK government was not unhappy to have such a deterrent message understood, but the Joint Intelligence Committee failed to assess that the Argentine junta would, as a result, actually accelerate its plans for invasion before supposed British reinforcements arrived. Such dynamic situations are much the hardest that the intelligence analyst ever has to face. Another important lesson is that dictators may not react the way democracies would.

Different lessons about the use of intelligence have been provided by Gill Bennett, until recently chief historian of the Foreign Office, with her analysis of the meticulous intelligence case built up against Soviet espionage that allowed the UK to expel 105 Soviet officials in 1971 (Operation Foot), a blow from which their effort against the UK never recovered. She contrasts that with the hasty and botched action in 1927 against ARCOS, the Soviet trade society that had been fomenting industrial subversion. In attempting to defend his action, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin revealed to Parliament the contents of an

intercepted Soviet telegram with the obvious result that readability of Soviet diplomatic cyphers was promptly lost.

3) The structural or institutional approach

It would be fair to say that we have found the analysts less knowledgeable than they need to be about the history of the wider intelligence community outside their own employing agency or organization. In particular, the history of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee has many lessons for the analyst in understanding the developing relationship with the policy customer.

Examples abound of JIC key judgments that illustrate predictive intelligence at its worst and best. At its worst, we examine the conclusions of the recently declassified Nicoll Report that provide the basis for a rich discussion of mirror imaging, perseveration, transferred judgment, etc., all made worse by group think. At its best (leaving aside the double negative which would be disapproved of today), we have the following historical key judgment based on fresh HUMINT in 1939:

Apparently the reason which was supposed to have led Herr Hitler and his advisers to come to this decision was that they felt the rearmament of the democratic powers was proceeding at such a pace that Germany's relative strength would inevitably decline. This was therefore the moment to strike...by reason of [intelligence reports] which show which way the wind was blowing, it is unfortunately no longer possible to assume that there is no likelihood of Germany “coming West” in 1939.

And this judgment from 1956 on Suez:

Should Western military action be insufficient to ensure early and decisive victory, the international consequences both in the Arab States and elsewhere might give rise to extreme embarrassment and cannot be foreseen.

This shows a nice delicacy about reaching a judgment, not about the enemy but about your own government’s proposed actions.

One of the course sessions that has been the most popular has been that dealing with the history of avowal and oversight. We examine how the use of pre-emptive intelligence in countering terrorism has brought greater public awareness and, at times, criticism of intelligence work. We engage the analysts in a vigorous debate about the ethics of intelligence, one of the most appreciated sessions on the course, given sensitivities over the uses that may be made of their intelligence to guide military or police action.

On a lighter note, we have devoted one session in each course to examining how the serious media now operate. Students have been fascinated to talk to the foreign editor of a leading journal and to a leading BBC correspondent to learn first hand about how the process of serious reporting is managed, open and private sources handled, and editorial discretion exercised, since in journalism, as in intelligence analysis, to edit is to choose. Writing accurately and clearly, to a tight deadline, is a skill that both professions have to exercise.

Our media representatives readily concede, however, that there is one big difference. As

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17 Cited in P. Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World. (London: John Murray, 2002).
We have many more publicly documented case studies of problems in intelligence assessment to draw on than there are documented successes.

the Economist put it many years ago on the retirement of Sir Kenneth Strong as the director general of defence intelligence:

Modern intelligence has to do with the painstaking collection and analysis of fact, the exercise of judgment, and clear and quick presentation. It is not simply what serious journalists would always produce if they had time: it is something more rigorous, continuous, and above all operational—that is to say, related to something that someone wants to do or may be forced to do.18

4) The political approach

Under this heading, the course examines the analyst/customer (variously called the producer/consumer) relationship. Two models are compared at the outset of the course, broadly the school associated in the literature with Bob Gates’s time as DCI and that espoused decades earlier by Sherman Kent. Most of the analysts feel comfortable adapting their approach to circumstances. We discuss times when the former approach is more appropriate, for example in strategic assessment of issues of peace and war (Iraq), and times when a very close mutual understanding is needed (uncovering terrorist networks).

We have many more publicly documented case studies of problems in intelligence assessment to draw on than there are documented successes. The Butler inquiry has provided useful case histories, including A.Q. Khan and Libya, to balance its strictures about intelligence on Iraqi WMD. In the course, we do however look in detail at the now reasonably well documented controversy over pre-war associations between al-Qa’ida and Iraq and, in particular, the case of Curveball and Iraqi BW trailers.

We encourage the analysts to distinguish between intelligence “gaps” and intelligence “failures.” Certainly, as far as domestic counterterrorism is concerned, they need to accept that the former will always exist—the analysts are, we find, very balanced in their views about the acceptable limits of surveillance. To be classed as a failure, there has to be a reasonable expectation that the analysts could have had access to actionable intelligence that would have provided timely warning were it not for some negligence, including that resulting from over-stretch, inadequate training, personal dereliction of duty, institutional rivalries and so on. The analyst needs to be alert to the first warning signs of incipient failure conditions.

In looking at the relationship with the user, the writings of Professor R.V. Jones provide examples during WW II when he resorted to advocacy rather than presenting facts neutrally, fearing important warnings were not being heeded. Who could blame an analyst for advocacy, faced with, say, a General Percival in Singapore refusing to accept the reality of the impending Japanese invasion or a secretary of defense, as Robert Macnamara admits in his own memoir, resisting appreciation of the true state of affairs developing in Vietnam?

But the analysts are quick to recognize this must never, ever, become the slanting of intelligence. And the analyst must encourage the customer to recognize that what the analyst is painting is an impressionist portrait, without the complete detail that you would find in a photograph. So what is included as the essential highlights and what is left out as distracting detail is a matter of analytical judgment. Customer and

18 The Economist, 1 October 1966: 20.
analyst alike need to be conscious of this.

We look, therefore, in a final session at institutional dynamics as they might apply to teams of analysts and their interactions with users. What modes of behavior are likely to encourage innovation and creativity (or not)? How much latitude should the dissenting analyst expect, and what safety valves exist, such as the use of the intelligence counsellor, an independent senior retired figure who can be consulted in confidence over professional issues of conscience? What are the first symptoms of group think and blame culture? We find that most of the answers here come from the analysts with little or no prompting from the tutors, demonstrating that recent experiences have had their impact on the intelligence community.

Conclusion

To conclude, as a result of having worked with four iterations of the course, we think we have a better understanding of what, outside the professional tools of their trade, it would be helpful for the up and coming analyst to understand better. Much of this understanding revolves around self-knowledge and development of sound instincts of curiosity.

The first permanent secretary that David Omand ever met was in the Ministry of Defence in London over 35 years ago. He sat in a large, elegant Whitehall office and inquired kindly about how this new recruit was settling in and then he said, “You may wonder what a permanent secretary does all day. Let me tell you.” He went on, “I sit behind my desk and I transfer papers from my intray to my outtray. And, as I lift them, I sniff them, and 35 years in Whitehall has given me the ability to tell when advice going through to the minister is soundly based and well timed, and it has also given me the nose to detect a wrong’un.”

This encounter was, of course, before the advent of managerialism in the British public service. But his words were good advice in relation to developing strong professional instincts. Perhaps, for he was a highly educated man, he had in mind Wittgenstein’s account of a visit to a tailor, when the experienced customer who knows his own mind came to indicate his choice from an endless number of patterns of suiting—almost beyond words of explanation—no, this is slightly too dark, this is slightly too loud, this is just right.19 The experienced mind is demonstrated by the way choice and selection is indicated.

Much of the early career may necessarily be spent in acquiring mastery of the necessary technical skills of the analytic trade, processing raw intelligence, in searching through imagery or communications patterns and collating data of every kind. For experienced analysts, however, what will make the difference are the instincts—which we believe can be developed—that can be brought to bear to generate hypotheses worth testing on the evidence base. It may rest on the ability to get into the mind of the adversary, to understand the responses of a foreign culture, to sense when new thinking is needed, and—in the words of that permanent secretary—to spot a wrong’un. It will rest also on deep understanding of the world inhabited by the users of their intelligence, to understand what intelligence they need to do their job better, and also to sense what they do not yet know that they need to know, and that the intelligence community might

For experienced analysts, however, what will make the difference are the instincts—which we believe can be developed—that can be brought to bear to generate hypotheses worth testing on the evidence base.

To conclude with the words of Richards Heuer, which might have been written for the course at King’s College London:

Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.20

20 Heuer, Ch. 4.

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As the Intelligence Community continues its transformation and the Coast Guard intelligence program experiences enormous growth, members of both communities would be well-served by reflecting on the contributions Coast Guard intelligence has made in the past. From its beginning as the Revenue Marine in 1790, the Coast Guard’s unique authorities, industry access, and organizational culture of adaptability have allowed it to make great contributions to intelligence and to important military successes in our nation’s history.

Archived documents, many originally classified, and published histories show that Coast Guard intelligence officers have turned up in some unlikely places—sometimes by design, sometimes by accident, but most by dint of the nature of Coast Guard operations and missions. Examples include scouting and information gathering by revenue cutters during the War of 1812; Rum War cryptanalysis and code breaking in the 1920s; HF/DF decryption work under the Office of Naval Intelligence before and during World War II, including the work of Field Radio Unit Pacific; contributions to ULTRA; and the Maritime Unit of the Office of Strategic Services. The Coast Guard’s contribution to the latter effort was barely noted in the official history of OSS written after the war’s end.¹ This article is intended to illuminate this little known aspect of intelligence history.

Since its inception, the Coast Guard has been involved in the collection and maintenance of information that might today be equated to intelligence. In performing duties involving the security of the homeland, the Coast Guard has charted local coastlines and collected information on the movement of ships and other vessels, ship


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manifests, cargoes, and crews, most of which was passed to customs collectors in ports and to Treasury Department headquarters. More than 122 customs inspectors and surveyors and 10 revenue cutters in ports up and down the coast of the young United States supplied Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton “an unending stream of intelligence.” In effect, Hamilton possessed an overt human information and intelligence collection system that spanned the entire length of the eastern seaboard and into the Caribbean.

This type of collection took on an almost modern appearance when, during the War of 1812, the officer commanding the defenses of Wilmington during the British blockade of Delaware Bay issued instructions—collection guidance today—to the revenue cutter General Green to obtain information on the size and disposition of the blockading squadron, the involvement of local pilots, landings on the bay’s shores, the status of provisioning and water, and so on. The order also instructed the cutter to get information about British behavior from local watermen and to examine local boats for British contraband and collaborators.

This combination of information gathering, scouting, and reporting would form the found-
dation not only for how information was collected and organized in ports across the United States but also dictated the conduct of law enforcement intelligence collection until Prohibition and the war against the rum runners in the early 1920's, when the use of HF/DF spotting and location technology introduced an early form of COMINT to the Coast Guard and US intelligence. These practices ideally placed the Coast Guard in a position to respond to executive orders President Franklin Roosevelt issued in 1941, before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, to bring the Coast Guard into a wartime footing under US Navy command.

**Guardian Spies of WWII**

The Coast Guard would have myriad duties under the Navy that would eventually involve it with Colonel Donovan as Coordinator of Information and later as the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The history of OSS has been well documented. What remains little known, however, is the relationship between OSS and the Coast Guard, including the formerly classified history of the use of Coast Guard signals intelligence; Coast Guard men attached to OSS West Coast Schools and Training; Domestic Coordination at Area D on the Potomac River using the Coast Guard's Captain of the Port authority for "protection zones"; and the secret "Philadelphia Plan" designed to use OSS personnel to train the newly formed Coast Guard Auxiliary for antisabotage operations at East coast ports.

In these maritime activities, Coast Guard men recruited for their swimming, diving, boat-handling, and signaling skills were at the heart of the OSS Maritime Unit (MU) and Operational Swimmer Group (OSG) operations. After they were organized and trained, these men were deployed with the OSS MU to Europe and the China, Burma, India (CBI) Theater of Operations and to the Navy's Underwater Demolition Team 10 in the Pacific.

By August 1944, OSS had 226 men assigned to its Maritime Unit. Of these, according to declassified personnel rosters, almost 75 were from the Coast Guard. Another 40 were attached to the West Coast training schools. This small contingent was part of the largest expansion of the Coast Guard in its history, one that transformed the small peace-time Coast Guard fleet into a force of "160,000 men, manning 30 destroyer escorts, 75 frigates, 750 cutters, 290 Navy vessels, and 255 Army vessels, among scores of smaller craft."

The Creation of Area D and a New Marine Section

It took nearly 17 months for the OSS Maritime Unit to move from conception in early 1942 to its first operational assignment in Europe in late July 1943. During this time a British naval officer, CDR B.G.A. Woolley, was brought in to organize and train its operatives. According to a history of the Maritime Unit prepared late in the war by its chief:

Comdr. Woolley was assigned by General Donovan to assist in a study of British methods of training operatives and raiding forces. Thus far in the war, the British had been conspicuously successful in infiltrating agents by sea and executing acts of maritime sabotage. Details of their equipment and experience were obtained by Comdr. Woolley and in great part formed a basis for O.S.S. future maritime activities.


5 LT Dennis Roberts, USN, "Maritime Unit History," 1944. The history was compiled for Roosevelt's OSS history project. The declassified report is in the possession of Mr. Tom Hawkins of the Naval Special Warfare Foundation. Provided to author via e-mail on 22 January 2007.
A location on the Potomac River, designated Area D, had been acquired for Woolley’s activities—even before a unit was officially established. The site was located in an area of about 1,200 acres just south of Quantico, Virginia, with roughly two miles of water frontage on the south bank of the river.

Because his marine section was not officially a stand-alone branch of OSS, CDR Woolley had to “beg, borrow, and steal” necessary resources for his start-up operation. He did not get control of the grounds from the OSS component that had controlled it until March 1943, along with supplies and equipment.6

Cabin cruisers had to be acquired for training. Their acquisition was no small matter because the Coast Guard and the Navy had already acquired many cabin cruisers suitable for service at the beginning of the war, and a shortage existed. OSS had to conduct an extensive search to identify vessels 70–90 feet in length for its purposes. OSS files show that this process took about 10 months.

Navy and Coast Guard officers eventually identified two suitable cabin cruisers, the Maribel and the Marsyl, which were licensed by Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) authority, and slots at local marinas and yacht clubs in the DC area were obtained. In addition, the boats received special COTP protection for maritime training missions, which often were conducted at night and inevitably looked suspicious.

As intensive training was about to begin in the summer of 1943, CDR Woolley worked with Washington area Coast Guard Captain of the Port H.G. Hemmingway to establish special protection zones for maritime training, obtain documentation, and provide security. These pioneering arrangements and the training practices CDR Woolley imported became the foundation for clandestine maritime training in the United States. The training center also went on to pioneer new equipment and methods in the maritime environment that were exported to several theaters between 1943 and 1945.

The arrangements lasted until late in 1943, when new training sites were located and camps organized. In November 1943, a Special Maritime Unit, consisting of approximately 40 officers and men was recruited and commenced training at Camp Pendleton, California. By this time, Donovan had approved the use of Coast Guard men for OSS operations, moving the OSS–Coast Guard relationship from one of cooperation to participation.

The warm water off southern California had a great deal to do with the decision to relocate phases of MU training from the East to the West Coast. In February 1944, another camp was established on Catalina Island. Two months later, in May, a training base was set up in Nassau, British Bahamas, after tests proved that these warm waters and exceptional weather conditions made it ideal for swimming exercises. Severe pollution in the Potomac was also a factor in relocating swimming activity.

From Coordination to Frogmen: Becoming Operational Coast Guard involvement in operations had been formally broached in a 3 September 1943 confidential letter from chief of

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6 Ibid., Chap. 1.
The Security Arrangements

Classified letters exchanged on 15 June and 16 June 1943 between Captain Hemmingway and Commander Woolley outline the coordination arrangements.1

Commander Woolley to Captain Hemmingway, 15 June 1943:

"It would be appreciated if you would kindly issue the necessary permit for the vessel to pass up and down the river Potomac while she is in government service with the Office of Strategic Services. The work performed by the vessel is of a secret nature which has been explained to your predecessor"

Captain Hemmingway to Commander Woolley, 16 June 1943:

Agreeable to your request of this date, a renewed license for the MARIBEL to cruise the Potomac River is enclosed herewith. This office will depend on you personally to comply with the first paragraph of your letter of this date, in case it becomes necessary to do so [regarding transfer of the MARIBEL from government service]. In case of your detachment from your present duty it is requested that you bind your successor to the same requirements"

On 17 June, CAPT S. E. Barron, Chief of Staff for the Coast Guard District Potomac River Naval Command, sent Commander Woolley a copy of the protection order stating that:

The "MARIBEL," a flush-deck type gas screw motor yacht, 66.8 feet in length, 16.3 beam, official number 2251123, is engaged in special government work. Patrol vessels of the Coast Guard Patrol Base, Washington, are to give her free passage and are not to board her. She operates often at night, blacked out, in the vicinity of Clifton Beach. Such patrol vessel commanders are to bear this in mind and are to keep clear of her. In directing other vessels, such patrol commanders, shall see that such vessels stay clear of her."

1 All cited exchanges can be found in National Archives, College Park, MD: Record Group 226-328-92-9

OSS Special Operations CAPT Carl O. Hoffman (USA) to CAPT Ward Davis (USN), chief of OSS Naval Command. Captain Hoffman stated:

I have proposed to the General [Donovan] the use of Coast Guardsmen for OSS work.... The reason for the proposal is that most Coast Guardsmen are well trained in communications and incidentally trained in the use of sidearms. If wherever possible we can draw our men from the Coast Guard we have gained in time as more than half their training is complete.... Many of the Coast Guardsmen are likewise trained in Small Boat Handling which will prove useful in an emergency.2

This letter was critical in moving the organizational relationship between the Coast Guard and OSS from one of coordination to full use of Coast Guard men in all aspects of MU training, education, mission support, and operations, including those involving the Operational Swimmer Groups.

When OSS asked the Coast Guard to provide personnel for its operational swimmer program, it got a mixed response. The assistant commandant of the Coast Guard, RADM L. T. Chalker, wrote to the executive officer of the OSS, LTC O.C. Doering, that the Coast Guard could not provide the number of officers requested:

For some time the Coast Guard has been faced with an acute officer situation which has been brought about by manning a considerable number of Naval craft in addition to taking care of our own expanding needs. For this reason the Commandant is

2 CAPT Ward Davis (USN) letter to CAPT Carl O. Hoffman (USA), 3 September 1943. National Archives, College Park, MD. Record Group 226-Entry No.146A-Box 14. War Report of the OSS stated that "OSS Naval Com was responsible for the recruitment, processing and management of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Personnel. Officers were administratively detailed to OSS as an activity of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations; enlisted men were nominally assigned to the Potomac River Naval Command. In May 1943, when OSS Naval Command was established, the orders of all officers and enlisted me were amended to specify assignment to it.... The Naval Liaison Officer in the OSS Nav Com was the official contact between the branches of OSS and various naval intelligence units."
loath to make any commitments involving officer personnel.

Enlisted men could be detailed, however. The Coast Guard will make available the enlisted men asked for.... It is regrettable that circumstances make it inadvisable to supply the officer personnel as the Coast Guard always has tried to cooperate with the [Office of Strategic] Services whenever it has been able to do so.8

In the end, a few officers were assigned to OSS duty. But these men had leadership roles: LCDR Howard Shelby and CWO Wilfred Keil commanded boats and crews at West Coast Schools and Training at Camp Pendleton; LT John Booth became the commander of OSG II in the CBI Theater; CWO Thomas Medlicott also in OSG II; CWO Robert Butt led a landing unit and OSG III in the South East Asia Command (SEAC); and ENS Arthur Garrett led OSG I and UDT 10 in the Pacific.

The men recruited for OSS MU operations were trained and worked in joint teams that combined Coast Guard, Navy, Army, and Marine Corp counterparts. The below graphic, taken from the declassified Maritime Unit Manual of June 1945, highlights the recruitment and training of men from all military services, including the Coast Guard.

In his Maritime Unit History, Lieutenant Roberts noticeably overlooks (as did Roosevelt) the Coast Guard contribution, writing, "On August 31, 1944, the date which marks the close of this history, the Maritime Unit had total personnel of 226. These included: Officers and enlisted men, Army-60; Navy 143; and Marines-19. In addition, there were 4 civilians."9 Declassified records, however, clearly highlight the role of Coast Guard men, who, as of August 1944, constituted almost a third of the Maritime Unit and almost half of the 143 Navy men Lieutenant Roberts counted as "Navy" personnel, most likely because of Executive Order 8895, which attached the Coast Guard to Navy for the duration of the war.

The Final Test:
Operation Cincinnati was a full-scale exercise conducted by LT John Booth's OSG II, just after it completed its team training in Nassau. The objective of the exercise was to penetrate US Navy harbor defenses in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and just before OSG II deployed to CBI. The exercise served both to test Navy defenses and to evaluate the effectiveness of the new group's ability to conduct reconnaissance, infiltration, and sabotage operations from the sea before it was to deploy to Asia in the fall of 1944.

As the leader of an attacking "Red Group," Lieutenant Booth

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8 Letter from RADM L.T. Chalker, Assistant Commandant USCG to LTC O.C. Doering, Executive Officer of OSS in reply to a request for additional officer personnel. National Archives Record Group 226, Entry No. 136, Box 133, File 1418 (accessed by author 28 February 2008).

9 Roberts.
was in command of the operation, including the assault group and the mother ship. According to the operational order for the exercise, each man of the Red Group shall be equipped with wrist watch, waterproof compass, sheath knife, fins, sneakers, and faceplates. Each group shall carry waterproof flashlights. Each anchorage detail shall carry M-3's in waterproof covers. Anchorage detail of Red shall carry side-arms. Waterproofing of all demolitions shall be inspected by LT French (USA).10

The exercise was the first of its kind in an actual maritime environment and took place almost 40 years before the Navy commissioned a US Navy officer from SEAL Team Six to set up Red Cell teams in 1984 to ascertain the Navy's vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

Roosevelt gave Operation Cincinnati a good evaluation in his War Report:

In these tests, the lengthy training showed commendable results, because the swimmers were able to circumvent the net defenses in each instance. An additional point of value was proof that the Navy sound detection gear did not reveal the presence of underwater swimmers.11

Operation Cincinnati also provided proof of concept for equipment to be used in forthcoming undersea warfare operations. One key piece of equipment was an underwater breathing apparatus invented by Dr. Christian Lambertsen.12 Although other self-contained diving equipment was under development, the Lambertsen Rebreathing Unit (LARU) was the first unassisted diving capability employed operationally by the United States. It allowed MU swimmers to stay under water at a depth to 50 feet for as long as 90 minutes, allowing time to swim almost a mile. Other significant contributions included development of the two-man kayak, two-man surfboard, and use of the British submersible unit referred to as the “Sleeping Beauty,” which enabled swimmers silently to move agents past enemy defenses in either infiltration or exfiltration operations.

Field Operations

Europe

In January 1944, the first Maritime Unit members began to deploy to Europe and CBI. In the Mediterranean, highly successful clandestine ferrying operations were carried out in the Aegean Sea, as agents and supplies were landed and downed fliers and refugees evacuated. In Italy the MU sup-
ported the operations of the Italian amphibious group, the San Marco Battalion (see text box), and trained in maritime sabotage and sneak attack operations; in the United Kingdom, MU coordinated the use of PT boats and submarinechasers.” L-Unit I and II were part of the original MU Operational Swimmer training that began earlier in the war and deployed to the UK and European Theater of operations during January–June of 1944.

China, Burma, India
In January 1944, after training in Coronado, the Bahamas, and Guantánamo Bay, OSG II deployed to Burma, Ceylon, and Kandy as part of Detachment 101 and Detachment 404 of the OSS (January 1944–April 1945). The “Arakan Field Unit” was a combination of OSS Operational Group and MU men in which the latter were to provide coastal intelligence to the British-led XV Indian Corps for an advance south along the Burmese coast and to provide maritime services to all branches in theater.

OSG III trained in the Bahamas and deployed to Ceylon, the Southeast Asia Command, and Detachment 101 (October 1944–January 1945). By 1944 and early 1945 many of the Coast Guard men attached to the MU were deployed to the OSS missions and sub-missions in both theaters of the war.

One example of the many operations conducted in CBI was an operation called “Cleveland” on 25 January 1945. Although many of the missions conducted by OSGs were dangerous and often far behind enemy lines, Operation Cleveland was nevertheless unique in that its objectives were to obtain intelligence of a target area; to capture a native for the purposes of interrogation; and to ascertain generally, enemy strength in the area. Several men of OSG II, including LT Booth and Chief James Eubank of the Coast Guard were involved (the two are shown returning in the image to the right). An enemy agent was, in fact, captured, exfiltrated, and interrogated by OSS personnel. In addition, a survey of the coastline, terrain, and status of enemy forces was accomplished for the commander of CBI.

14 National Archives Record Group 226. File labeled SEAC Operations.
Of the 22 missions listed in the Maritime Unit Diary, Coast Guard men participated in all but two. The chief of the Maritime Unit in the China, Burma, India Theater said in his July 1945 report to OSS HQ in Washington DC that:

enough cannot be said in the praise of these [Coast Guard] men and the remainder of the group which joined on 13 January [1945], for the spirit in which they took up their new assignment and the cooperation and loyalty that they gave us. Their lot was not an easy one, but their previous training proved invaluable. They were engaged in the infiltration of agents where the existence of the enemy was known and in working their way many miles into enemy lines through mangrove swamps under enemy outposts, and dodging enemy M.L’s. We can be thankful that no men were lost through enemy action.16

Excerpt from OSS War Report on Maritime Unit Operations with San Marco Battalion in Europe1

In February 1944 an arrangement had been concluded between OSS and the Duke of Aosta to make available to OS the techniques and services of the Italian San Marco Battalion, an elite corps of Italian naval personnel specializing in amphibious operations and maritime sabotage. A volunteer group of five officers and 50 men from the battalion was assigned to OSS, along with the latest items of Italian maritime equipment. Included were swimming gear, two man “mattresses” with silent electric motors to permit clandestine landings, and other assault, reconnaissance, and demolitions equipment.

The San Marco were placed under the direction of OSS Maritime Unit Branch personnel. In May, they were based at Fasano, south of Bari, subsequently moved to Falconara, north of Ancona, and after the capture of Ravenna in December 1944, set up an advance base near that city. US PTs and British MTBs were used alternately with Italian MAS or MS boats under British Navy control. By the spring of 1945, the MU staff had been reconstituted as the Maritime Detachment of Company D and had added various locally procured fishing craft and speedboats to its equipment.

The first mission took place on 19 June 1944, a sabotage operation that succeeded in blowing a railroad bridge along the coast 100 miles behind enemy lines. A second such operation was carried out late in July. In the August moon period, the first operation for intelligence purposes was run, at Eighth Army request, to exfiltrate agents and an Italian with plans and photographs of a section of the Gothic Line in the Pesaro region. Several carefully briefed partisan guides and San Marco officers were infiltrated and returned successfully four days later. The material reached the Eighth Army four days before its attack on the Gothic Line in the Pesaro Sector.

A total of 10 clandestine maritime patrols on Lake Comacchio were accomplished, several small islands in the lake occupied, and a series of small offensive forays run against the enemy-held northern shore of the lake. By mid-April, partisan groups south of Chioggia were contacted and, with the more clement spring weather conditions, rapidly supplied both by air and by sea. Several other operations were run jointly with an Eighth Army detachment to infiltrate and recover agents and couriers.

16 National Archives. OSS Files. Record Group 226, Entry No. 549, Box 92, File 13. “Burma War Diary.” Drafted by LT J on Babb, Chief Maritime Unit, India, Burma Theater. July 1945. The “Burma War Diary” provides a summary of the activities of the MU in Burma, listing names, missions and responsibilities of the men conducting covert and sabotage operations in that theater up until the MU received orders to disband on 15 June 1944.

1 Roosevelt, 228–29

Conclusion

A Past Finally Recognized

The Coast Guard men attached to the OSS during World War II all are part of the long blue line of Coast Guard history. But even more, they helped lay the foundation for future Coast Guard operations and for defense organizations yet to come. The training, tactics and procedures pioneered by the OSS MU and OSGs of which Coast Guard men were such a big part would help build the foundation for future
covert diving operations, US Navy SEALs concepts, and Special Operations Command combat swimming operations. Indeed, in a ceremony at the Special Forces Command in 1998, the Coast Guard frogmen and the men of the OSS Maritime Unit were inducted as honorary members of the Special Forces, more than 50 years after their service in war.

Looking Ahead

In the summer of 2007 the Coast Guard reestablished, for the first time since WW II, the intelligence specialty for enlisted personnel and brought into the Coast Guard people who specialize in all-source, human, communications, signals, and counterintelligence missions. The Coast Guard’s new cryptologic program is the service cryptologic element for the Department of Homeland Security, and, under revisions to Executive Order 12333 introduced by President Bush in July 2008, intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Coast Guard were authorized to:

- Collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence including defense and defense-related information and intelligence to support national and departmental missions;
- Conduct counterintelligence activities;
- Monitor the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment;
- Conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation activities; and
- Conduct foreign intelligence liaison relationships and intelligence exchange programs with foreign intelligence services, security services, or international organizations.

Until the reintroduction of the intelligence specialty, intelligence duties were often performed by officers and enlisted personnel from other specialties in the service, a policy that left the Coast Guard at a disadvantage in building long-term expertise to perform national intelligence duties.

Ironically, the reinvigoration of intelligence responsibilities in the Coast Guard since 9/11 has almost brought the Coast Guard back to its intelligence-related work of WW II. In the summer of 2008, the commandant of the Coast Guard announced a partnership with Naval Special Warfare in which Coast Guard men will be trained as US Navy SEALs.

The original guardian spies would be pleased.17

Readers can find more detail, including a bibliography of literature on the Coast Guard and its historical role at: www.uscg.mil/history and www.guardianspies.com.

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17 Readers can find more detail, including a bibliography of literature on the Coast Guard and its historical role at: www.uscg.mil/history and www.guardianspies.com.
Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II


Reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado

Victory in war and peace goes most often to those who know their enemies and themselves. A state that wages war without good intelligence is like a dim-sighted boxer who, even if he avoids losing, will suffer unseen blows a fighter with sure vision would likely have parried.¹ James C. McNaughton, a military historian whose career includes service as command historian for the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and US Army Pacific, has written a history of Japanese Americans whose service as linguists of the US Army Military Intelligence Service (MIS) contributed greatly to the US victory over the Japanese Empire in the Second World War and to the lasting bilateral alliance that followed. As the US Army chief of military history wrote in his foreword to the book, the history of the MIS in World War II suggests lessons for Washington in the "sustained struggle ahead" in the Global War on Terrorism.

In 1941, when the United States faced the looming prospect of war with Japan, the War Department moved to develop linguists by directing the Fourth Army to open an intelligence school at the Presidio of San Francisco. Lt. Col. John Weck-erling and Capt. Kai Rasmussen, both of whom had learned the language in Japan, proceeded to screen Japanese Americans as instructors and students, develop a curriculum, and otherwise build a school from scratch. The recruitment of John Aiso, a Harvard-educated lawyer famous among California's Japanese Americans for his intellect and drive, as chief instructor was a major step to putting the enterprise in gear. The school, training second-generation Japanese Americans (Nisei), moved in 1942 to Camp Savage, Minnesota, as the Western Defense Command was removing over 100,000 Japanese immigrants (Issei) and their American children from their homes on the West Coast and interning them

¹ According to a classic military treatise, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril." Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, translator (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84.

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in camps in the interior. In 1944, the growing school, by then designated the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS), moved to Ft. Snelling, Minnesota. Comparing the graduating classes gives some idea of the school’s impressive growth: 42 Nisei of the first class graduated on 1 May 1942; on 18 August 1945, 552 students graduated. Trained in interpreting, interrogation, and translation with materials ranging from standard textbooks to captured documents, thousands of Nisei and hundreds of Caucasian Americans left the school to serve as linguists in the war against Japan.

The US Army was far from alone in working to recruit, train, and deploy Japanese linguists, a situation the author brings to light by writing with some detail on developments in the US Navy as well as on an alphabet soup of intelligence organizations that included the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS), and Office of War Information (OWI). In addition to such major training centers as the MISLS, the Army Intensive Japanese Language School at the University of Michigan and the Navy Japanese Language School at the University of Colorado/Boulder, the book touches on other wartime programs, from Japane classes at the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to the Navy School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University. McNaughton even devotes some ink to describing the Japanese programs of the Allied forces of Britain, Australia, and Canada. Striking among the book’s myriad details is the contrast between the Army’s decision to recruit its linguists primarily from the pool of eligible Japanese Americans and the Navy’s preference in selecting Caucasians with experience living in Japan, an outstanding academic record, or some demonstrated aptitude in learning foreign languages.

From the early campaign to oust the Japanese from their footholds in Alaska to the invasion of Okinawa near the war’s end, Nisei graduates of the MISLS demonstrated their worth at the front lines time and again. Tactical intelligence gained from captured documents, prisoner interrogations, and enemy radio contributed greatly to US Army and Marine ground campaigns. Technical Sergeant Roy Uyehata, for example, learned in early March 1944 in a “routine interrogation” at XIV Corps headquarters on Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, that Japanese forces planned a major assault on American positions for 23 March, an auspicious imperial holiday. A tactical enemy map captured the day of the planned attack confirmed Uyehata’s discovery in detail; prepared, XIV Corps began the annihilation of the enemy with a preemptive artillery barrage just as they were moving into assault positions that night. Nisei linguists also showed extraordinary bravery in saving thousands of civilian lives in the fierce fighting for Saipan and Okinawa. Sgt. Hoichi “Bob” Kubo saved over 100 civilians in Okinawa from involuntary mass suicide by crawling alone into a cave and convincing the Japanese soldiers there to let them go. In two hours of negotiations, he gained their trust by sharing his K-rations, letting them know that his grandfathers had served in the Russo-Japanese War in the Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) famed 5th (Hiroshima) and 6th (Kumamoto) Divisions, and appealed to their sense of honor as warriors. For his bravery, Kubo won the Distinguished Service Cross, the Army’s second highest award for combat valor.
Nisei linguists also proved their worth in organizations far from the front lines. In such organizations as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) in Australia, the Southeast Asia Translator and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) in India, and the Signal Security Agency monitoring station at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia, Japanese Americans interpreted, interrogated, and translated. ATIS Nisei translated the captured Japanese Army List, producing in May 1943 a 683-page translation that proved a gold mine for detailed intelligence on the IJA order of battle. Nisei linguists also participated in the ATIS translation of a captured copy of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) “Z Plan” of 8 March 1944. The IJN, unaware, executed their compromised plan to disastrous loss in June at the decisive Battle of the Philippine Sea where, in history’s largest carrier battle, the IJN in effect lost its air arm.

McNaughton relates not only Nisei triumphs but their hardships and handicaps as well. Many were recruited or conscripted for military service from behind the barbed wire of internment camps where their families remained confined. Japanese Americans with outstanding command of Japanese, even those who had gone to school or university in Japan (a Nisei subset known as Kibei), generally served under Caucasian officers less gifted in the language yet more likely to earn officer commissions. On the other hand, many Nisei linguists suffered from such handicaps as a rudimentary grasp of their parents’ language, limited formal education, and poor proficiency in English. Beyond the sting of racism, Nisei linguists at the front often had bodyguards with them and ran the risk of friendly fire from fellow soldiers mistaking them for the enemy. Technical Sgt. Fred Tanakatsubo was only one of those linguists who felt it necessary to tell his Caucasian comrades, “Take a good look, and remember me, because I’m going in with you!” The fight against Japan was for them, in a sense, a civil war. Many Nisei going into Okinawa, for example, worried that family and friends would die in the invasion. Second Lt. Harry Fukuhara was far from the only Nisei shaken at news of the atomic obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; his mother and siblings were residents of Hiroshima.  

Having contributed to victory in the war, Nisei linguists continued serving with distinction in the peace that followed. Lt. Ralph Yempuku parachuted on 27 August 1945, before the formal Japanese surrender, with an OSS team under Capt. John K. Singlaub onto the Chinese island of Hainan to rescue from a Japanese camp several hundred Australian and Dutch POWs in danger of execution. Nearly 100 Nisei went to Japan in the early weeks of the occupation to search for Japanese intelligence pertaining to the Soviet Union. Others sifted for documents relating to Japanese programs for weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional military and naval technology. Japanese Americans participated in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and other war crimes trials; some prepared defenses, others gathered evidence for the prosecution. Japanese Americans in ATIS, which took over the

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2 Fukuhara left his native Seattle as a teen when his mother took him and his siblings to her hometown of Hiroshima following his father’s death in 1933. He returned to the United States for college; his three brothers remained in Japan. He served in the US Army; they served in the Japanese Army. His mother and oldest brother suffered radiation sickness, with his brother dying before the end of 1945. “Futatsu no sokoku’ hazama ni ikite” [Living Between Two Fatherlands;], Tokyo Shimbun, 11 June 1996, p. 28.
NYK Building across from the Imperial Palace, translated Japanese letters and petitions to General MacArthur and monitored the media. Still other Nisei served in occupied Japan (1945–52) in such intelligence organs as the Civilian Censorship Detachment and Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC).

McNaughton's history of Japanese American linguists is so engrossing that his ending the story in 1946, on page 456, feels abrupt. The author does define his subject as Nisei linguists in World War II, but writing even an epilogue of “what happened next” would have been illuminating. Left untold are tales of Nisei veterans of the Second World War interrogating North Korean prisoners in Japan in the Korean War, executing CIC operations against the Japanese Communist Party and other targets during the occupation, and serving down through the years of the Cold War in various components of the military and CIA.3 Chiyoki “Chick” Ikeda, who earned a star on the CIA Memorial Wall, is one good example. Ikeda became an important officer in the latter half of the 1950s in the Directorate of Operations and served in a variety of positions, including in Japan, until his death in 1960. Ikeda managed a counterintelligence program that detected and turned Soviet agents among the tens of thousands of Japanese prisoners of war repatriated from the Soviet Union during 1947–48.

In fact, the story of the Nisei linguists extends from before the Second World War until the end of the Cold War. As McNaughton notes, the CIC had sent two Nisei officers, Arthur Komori and Richard Sakakida, under cover into Manila in the spring of 1941 to gather intelligence on Japanese fifth-column activity in the US colony.4 Perhaps the central figure of such a post-

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war epilogue would be Harry Fukuhara, a counterintelligence officer who retired from active military service in 1971 with the rank of colonel after governing an island in the occupied Ryukyu archipelago, became a Department of the Army civilian (DAC), then retired in 1990 as chief of the 500th MI’s Foreign Liaison Detachment (FLD). His decorations from President George H. W. Bush, DCI William Webster, and Emperor Akihito hint at the valuable role, far from the limelight, that Nisei played in US-Japan relations from the beginning of the occupation to the end of the Cold War. Former Administrative Vice Minister for Defense Maruyama Ko, a key military official of postwar Japan once explained, “What I would like to stress is that it was really fortunate for Japanese to have many Nisei working for Japan the way that Fukuhara did after the war.”

McNaughton’s Nisei Linguists is a wide-ranging work whose 12 chapters cover both the development of the language programs and the growth of the Nisei contribution over the course of the war. The numerous footnotes and long bibliography attest to the years of research devoted to this book, although the absence of Japanese sources is regrettable. This is an excellent history. Moreover, many readers will agree with the chief of military history that the book offers “valuable lessons to US Army officers both present and future” seeking to understand present foes in the Global War on Terrorism. As one example, McNaughton relates how MISLS taught harsh interrogation techniques at Camp Savage until “reports from the field indicated that compassion and kind treatment tended to work better.” A military that holds true to the legacy of its Nisei linguists by facing its enemies with fluent, literate, and compassionate intelligence officers will likely prevail.

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5 Fukuhara received the President’s Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service, the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, and the Order of the Rising Sun, 3rd Class. See “Colonel Harry Fukuhara to Speak at Reed High School On Friday, May 9th,” JACL News, May 2003: 1–2 (http://wolfsweb.unr.edu/homepage/vjohnson/jacl/jaclMAY03.PDF).
6 Names of Japanese in this review appear in their traditional order, surname preceding given name.
8 Many Japanese histories, memoirs, and media reports tell the stories of Nisei in service to one country or the other. One history of Japanese Americans is Kikuchi Yuki’s Hawai Nikkei nisei no Taiheiyono Senso [The Pacific War of Hawaiian Nisei] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1995). A story of Japanese Americans on the other side is Tachibana Yuzuru’s Tekoku Kaigun shikan ni natta Nikkei Nisei [The Nisei Who Became an Officer of the Imperial Navy] (Tokyo: Tsukiji Shokan, 1994). As Nisei who were living in the United States at the start of the war joined the US military and intelligence organs, so many of those in Japan at that time served as linguists in the IJA and IJN, the Foreign Ministry, and the official Domei News Agency which, like the BBC, monitored foreign media broadcasts.
When looked at closely, *Ordinary Spy* turns out to be a nasty and poorly executed look at our world.

“What is it like to work at the CIA? What kinds of people work there? What do you do?” These are questions relatives, friends, and curious strangers ask us all the time, assuming, as many do, that we are all involved in some aspect of espionage and can tell thrilling tales of the spy world. Alas, most of us in positions to be asked those questions are not so engaged and unable to give a broad view of what it is like to work in intelligence. Novelists have long tried to fill this gap, however, and the latest is former CIA case officer Joseph Weisberg. On the surface, his semi-autobiographical novel, *An Ordinary Spy*, is a satisfactory spy story but, when looked at closely, turns out to be a nasty and poorly executed look at our world.

The novel is narrated by Mark Ruttenberg, a young case officer fired by the Agency halfway through his first overseas tour. In preparing for his assignment, Mark comes across the case file for TDTRACER but finds that the file ends abruptly. No one can tell him the outcome of the case or one linked to it, LXMALIBU, and he goes overseas wondering what happened. His tour soon turns into a disaster. Mark starts developing a secretary, Daisy, at another embassy, but the case does not look like it will yield much intelligence, and he is instructed to drop it. Mark does so, but soon begins a secret love affair with Daisy. The chief of station finds out, and she sends him home for dismissal.

Mark then returns to his hometown of Chicago and takes a job as a high school history and literature teacher. Mysteriously, he receives contact information for Bobby Goldstein, another former case officer and TRACER’s handler. Mark goes to see Goldstein, and the last two-thirds of the book are Goldstein’s recounting of the full stories of the TRACER and MALIBU cases. Satisfied that he has learned the truth, Ruttenberg returns to Chicago and his teaching job. In the book’s closing pages, Daisy appears at Mark’s doorstep on a cold, rainy night, and we are left to believe that they will spend their lives together.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
As entertainment, An Ordinary Spy is by no means an exceptional espionage novel, but neither is it a bad one. The story moves along quickly and the plot, while not overly complicated, raises enough questions to hold the reader's interest, although Weisberg's decision to block out text—sometimes just a word or an acronym, other times up to an entire page—with heavy black bars, to give the impression of a redacted official report, makes the text choppy and at times hard to read. Weisberg's faux redactions start with the name of Mark's area division at CIA headquarters, move on to the country where Mark was stationed, and extend to the point of covering the names of dishes cooked by his characters. Despite this, undemanding readers will find that An Ordinary Spy is a perfectly agreeable companion for a cross-country flight or a day at the beach.

Weisberg has greater ambitions for his book, however. "My goal was to write the most realistic spy novel that had ever been written," he told the New York Times in December 2007. Achieving realism in an espionage novel—that is, giving readers three dimensional characters, a credible sense of place and time, and accurate details of how intelligence services work—is no easy task. Indeed, given that An Ordinary Spy is Weisberg's first novel, his belief that it can walk in the company of books by the masters of the genre, starting with Joseph Conrad and extending through Graham Greene and John le Carré, or even those of slightly lesser figures like Eric Ambler, Len Deighton and David Ignatius, is breathtaking. It is a claim worth looking at, too, because it raises the question of what constitutes a great espionage novel.

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The major espionage writers...understood clearly that international politics and espionage were serious businesses, with serious consequences.

Weisberg has much in common with one another. They are men of great literary talent, serious purposes, and wide ranging experiences that they bring to bear in crafting their tales. Conrad, for example, traveled the world as a merchant seaman before turning to writing, Greene had served in British intelligence during World War II, Le Carré was both a British diplomat and intelligence officer, and Ignatius covered the Lebanese civil war for the Wall Street Journal. These writers gave a lot of thought to what they had seen. Whether it was Conrad considering extremist politics in The Secret Agent (1907), Le Carré and Greene living through the violence of the mid-20th century and the uncertainties of the early Cold War period, or Ignatius mulling over the gruesome affairs of the Middle East in Agents of Innocence (1987), they understood clearly that international politics and espionage were serious businesses, with serious consequences. They have been able to give a sense of what it is like to be in the world of intelligence, deftly painting scenes that create a sense of foreign places, or capturing just the right aspect of bureaucratic routine to leave their readers with a sense of how things really work. Their characters, too, are fully formed people, with biographies and personalities as complex as any real person's. Often, they are middle-aged or older, with many years of experience in their trade that have given them wisdom and insight that their peers usually lack. They are smart but cautious, seeking ways to take action and control events but also with an understanding of their own limits and the limits of what they can achieve.

Taken as a whole, Le Carré's early novels probably are the best examples of how insightful espionage novels can be. Beginning with Call for the Dead (1961), and continuing through The Spy Who Came in From the Cold (1963), The Looking Glass War (1965), and the trilogy of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974), The Honourable School Boy (1977) and Smiley's People (1979), Le Carré created an entire intelligence world focused on the operations of the Circus, his stand-in for Britain's MI-6. He
gave the Circus its own history, tradecraft, and cast of officers, the most famous of whom was George Smiley. Smiley provided continuity in the books, dedicating himself to the craft of espionage despite the torments of his wife's unfaithfulness (including an affair with Bill Haydon, the traitor in Tinker, Tailor), operational failures, and bureaucratic battles. Le Carré used these novels, moreover, to explore the politics of the Cold War and such themes as the morality of spying, the effects of betrayal, how national rivalries twisted individual behavior, and the decline of British society.

Anyone who wants to see Le Carré's mastery need only look at his early work. In just a few pages, the opening chapter of Call for the Dead provides a subtle and nuanced biography of Smiley, as well as an incisive description of the transformation of British intelligence from a small, clubby organization before World War II to the bureaucratic institution of the Cold War era. Gone, Le Carré writes, was the "inspired amateurism of a handful of highly qualified, underpaid men." Instead, they "had given way to the efficiency, bureaucracy, and intrigue of a large Government department," run by a politically savvy, ambitious, and cynical senior civil servant "feeding on the success of his subordinates." In his next book, Le Carré gave an unvarnished description of what it is like to work with spies. "What do you think spies are: priests, saints, and martyrs?" Alec Leamas, the protagonist of The Spy Who Came in From the Cold, famously asked. "They're a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors too, yes; pansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play cowboys and Indians to brighten their rotten lives," but whose efforts are nonetheless vital for the "safety of ordinary, crummy people like you and me." It is a statement that few people in the intelligence profession would dispute, and one that in a few sentences captures much of what espionage is about.

When measured against these standards, An Ordinary Spy's flaws quickly become clear. The problems begin with Weisberg himself, for he has little experience in intelligence or the wider world. According to the interview he gave to the New York Times, Weisberg graduated from college in 1987, and then traveled and worked as a job counselor. He joined the CIA in the early 1990s because he wanted meaningful work. Weisberg trained as a case officer but left the Agency after only a few years, and never served overseas. Like Mark Ruttenberg, he then moved to Chicago and, apparently, drifted for a number of years. Eventually he married and became a high school English and history teacher.

Weisberg's limited experiences do not seem to have given him much insight into intelligence or, for that matter, the human condition.
later, the point has become familiar and, in Weisberg’s hands, has declined into a cliché.

With little knowledge and little to say, Weisberg cannot create a convincing atmosphere. Spy novels often treat service headquarters as mysterious, forbidding places filled with intrigue, or lampoon them with descriptions of their bureaucratic follies. Weisberg, however, does neither, and his CIA Headquarters is merely an empty place that processes paperwork. Weisberg populates it with faceless drones who have titles—deputy chief, chief, chief HR—but not names, and who he typically describes as a “bland, decent guy stuck at GS-13 or 14.” Weisberg may be trying to make a point with this, but instead of giving us observations about the nature of bureaucracy or the people who work in it, he manages only to sound contemptuous of his former colleagues.

The same problems afflict the sections of the book that take place overseas. Weisberg blacks out the names of the country and city where the story takes place (why not just invent a place?), and all we learn about it is that it is hot, humid, and a fairly long airplane ride from Washington. It seems to be an uninteresting place, devoid of interesting characters. At the CIA station, as at Headquarters, people are faceless or objects of Mark’s contempt. He never refers to the deputy chief by name, only as DCOS, and in a strained conversation with another colleague, relates that “I felt like saying, ‘You are a stupid, stupid, man. Dull witted and slow.’”

These points tell us much about Mark Ruttenberg himself. Mark is not much of a character on whom to build a story. His most striking aspect is his passivity—like a log on a river, he bumps along as the current directs him, and never seeks to control events. Mark joined the Agency only because a former professor of his suggested it, but did so in a half-hearted way. “I’d actually thought at the time that he was recruiting me, and I spent months after that waiting for the phone to ring. When it didn’t, I sent in a resumé.” Mark behaves no differently overseas. Months go by as he makes few contacts, his energy level drains, and he often seems bewildered by what goes on around him; even the affair with Daisy seems just to happen rather than result from any passion or pursuit on his part. It is hardly surprising then that the bulk of the book—and the only sections in which anything interesting happens—are where Bobby tells his story.

Mark is also astonishingly self-absorbed. He has no close relationships, other than Daisy, and he seems to have almost no interest in learning about her. Mark also seems unable to understand why his actions should have unfavorable consequences. He knows from the start that the affair violated Agency rules but, as he is fired, he wonders “How had I gotten into this position?...I’d certainly never been fired from anything. Never been really unsuccessful at anything.” Yet, the account that Mark supplies of his brief pre-Agency life—college and a few years at a Washington think tank—gives no reason to believe he ever accomplished much of anything, nor that he even understands what it means to set goals and work hard to achieve them. Why Weisberg believes that such an individual can speak credibly of the world of intelligence and has earned the right to speak critically of his coworkers is perhaps the central mystery of An Ordinary Spy.

What are we to make of An Ordinary Spy? The title gives a hint of what Weisberg is trying to tell us—that intelligence officers are ordinary people, working in ordinary bureaucracies and, all too often, ruining the lives of other ordinary people. But to be an ordinary person does not mean being an empty, passive person, and an ordinary landscape does not have to be bleak and featureless. It is sad that Mark Ruttenberg, and presumably Joseph Weisberg, lives in such a world. Weisberg’s assumption that everyone else is stuck there, too, makes An Ordinary Spy a bitter, failed novel.

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Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA by Melvin A. Goodman
In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times by James E. Baker
Spies For Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing by Tim Shorrock
Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century by Philip Bobbitt
Torture and Democracy by Darius Rejali

General Intelligence


Historical

Declassified: 50 Top-Secret Documents that Changed History by Thomas B. Allen
Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott
The Final Dive: The Life and Death of “Buster” Crabb by Don Hale
The King’s Most Loyal Enemy Aliens: Germans Who Fought for Britain in the Second World War by Helen Fry
One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War by Michael Dobbs
The Real Enigma Heroes by Phil Shanahan
The Spy Within: Larry Chin and China’s Penetration of the CIA by Tod Hoffman
YEZHOV: The Rise of Stalin’s “Iron Fist,” by J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov

Intelligence Abroad

SMOKESCREEN: Canadian Security Intelligence after September 11, 2001 by J. Michael Cole
Current


The central theme of this book is that threats to the national security of the United States can and must be dealt with according to the rule of law if basic freedoms and liberties are to be protected. Author James Baker, a former legal adviser to the president, law professor, and judge, writes that “this book explains why and how the good faith application of law results in better security...and how national security law and process can improve national security.” (1-2) But he offers few specifics: in explaining “why,” he goes little beyond the implied maxim “obey the law”; With respect to “how,” he is silent beyond making the point that a lawyer’s guidance should be sought and considered before all major decisions are made.

In *The Common Defense* does provide a perspective on the lawyer’s role in national security. The first four of its 10 chapters describe the nature of the post-9/11 threats, the meaning of national security and national security law, and the constitutional framework that guides its application. Subsequent chapters examine the national security process, the use of military force and laws that influence the executive branch decisionmaking in these areas. Of particular concern to intelligence professionals, are the chapters on electronic surveillance, intelligence, and homeland security.

Judge Baker reviews the historical background of these topics from the American revolutionary period to the present. And while his characterization of Benjamin Franklin as “perhaps America’s greatest intelligence officer” (71) is questionable at best, he is on firmer ground discussing presidential departures from the law. He pays particular attention to wiretapping and surveillance. Departures in this area, he contends, have been corrected by judicial decisions restoring the rule of law. In this regard he pays special attention to the president’s authority for warrantless electronic surveillance and presents a detailed analysis from both sides. He also reviews the statutes that address intelligence (127) as they are applied to each of the basic functions of intelligence. Congressional oversight is included for good measure. Turning to homeland security, he examines the domestic threat, the complex structures and functions involved, the distribution of authority, and especially legal issues since 9/11.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Two general points are worth noting. First he argues that "lawyers are also essential role players in sustaining the process of intelligence...and not just speed bumps on the road to decision or used to clean up after the fact." (174-75) Second, he stresses that while lawyers and the "law can facilitate response...homeland security, like intelligence, ultimately depends on the human factor—leadership and the moral courage to face hard tasks and make hard choices." (306)

In The Common Defense concludes with a chapter titled "The National Security Lawyer," which provides guidelines for the roles an attorney must be able to play. To illustrate the challenges, Judge Baker uses a hypothetical case involving the need for a decision by the attorney general on a program for which he has not been cleared. The judge suggests how the problem can be resolved without sacrificing basic principles. What the book does not address is what to do when an operational situation is not covered by existing law.

Nevertheless, In The Common Defense is a valuable resource for better understanding of the rule of law and the pervasive role lawyers play in the national security process.


The reign of Justinian, the only Roman emperor never to visit Rome, was distinguished by his conversion to Christianity and the outbreak of the bubonic plague. At the time, the former explained the latter as sinners' justice. But the real cause of the plague remained unknown, and society endured periodic outbreaks of the Black Death until the 19th century. Philip Bobbitt suggests an analogous situation with contemporary society's view of terrorism—one can see evidence of its existence, doesn't understand why it occurs, but knows that current methods of eliminating the threat won't work. Terror and Consent tries to clarify the issue.

Bobbitt describes a solution that takes into account the major geopolitical and economic changes occurring, in part because of globalization, while stipulating that the "ways of thinking that brought us success in the past...are ill-suited to the future." (5) Unlike the IRA or PLO, which sought to replace one nation state or government with another, the al-Qaeda Bobbitt describes wants to eliminate the entire non-Muslim population of the world, use the nonbelievers' technology—WMD—to do it, and create a state of terror to replace consent-based states. How can this be prevented? Bobbitt defines new political and economic concepts—the market state, states of consent, wars on terror—to develop his complex theories. Critical to their success is yet-to-be developed strategic doctrine—though he proposes alternatives—the rule of law, and the knowledge necessary to preclude, not just punish, terrorist acts. This means a change in the definition of winning—preclusion, as in an anti-virus program. (213)
In a chapter devoted to intelligence, information, and knowledge, Bobbitt develops the idea that recent failures are better explained as “a miscarriage of the intelligence process.” (289) It is essential, he argues, that steps be taken to provide intelligence that precludes a state of terror—“by arresting a would-be terrorist who has yet to commit a crime [or] by preempting the state that has yet to complete its acquisition of WMD.” Success in these endeavors “depends on estimates about the future.” (291) Strategies that brought victory in the past will no longer do the job. He argues for new relationships between foreign and domestic collection to remove constraints on data sharing; new techniques such as data mining and less restrictive surveillance; an end to the “obsessive focus on warrants,” for which he cites several precedents; and greater reliance on civilian experts, despite the outsourcing implications. It follows from this that new laws will be needed. He makes several proposals intended to speed implementation. (417ff)

Bobbitt’s ideas in these areas are not entirely his own. He cites several forward looking analysts—Gregory Treverton at Rand, and Carmen Medina and Woodrow Kuhns at CIA—who stress that analysts must stop explaining only what has happened and concentrate on scenarios that examine what is likely to happen, using all available expertise in the process even though this “points the way to increased outsourcing of analysis.” (329) He does not advocate blanket outsourcing, however: “rendition…outsources our crimes and puts us at the mercy of anyone who can expose us.” (388)

In sum, with regard to intelligence, Bobbitt concludes that reform should deal with an intelligence process that gives authority with responsibility. As concerns the law, he argues it is necessary to “work out what a state is permitted to do in its search for terrorists and its efforts to suppress them.” (530) Terror and Consent deals head-on with what Bobbitt sees as the new terrorism of the 21st century and what must be done to keep it from succeeding. It is not light reading, but it is very much worth the effort.


The primary title of this book is Richard Clarke’s most memorable statement to the 9/11 Commission. The narrative is an elaboration of just what he meant. Clarke’s impressive 30-year career in government gives him a perspective that journalists and academics can never achieve and thus should be carefully considered. He takes a realistic approach as he examines US failures in war, terrorism, homeland security, cyberspace, and energy. In a key chapter titled “Can We Reduce Intelligence Failures?” he reviews, all the intelligence failures he can identify since the end of WW II. To make the point that these are not his judgments alone, he cites a number of recent books that have addressed the subject from various viewpoints, with special attention to Tim Weiner’s *Legacy of Ashes*. But he does one thing that the others do not: he makes specific suggestions for correcting problems and that is why the book is worth reading.
But his recommendations are not detailed fixes; they are suggestions providing no specifics on how the changes can be implemented. For example, as one of his 12 suggestions for improving intelligence he asserts that the DNI needs “to control all the US intelligence agencies and their budgets...and to rationalize their roles and missions.” (150–51) He does not address just how this is to be done. With regard to homeland security, he suggests “maintaining an active and positive outreach program to the US Muslim community” and the creation of “an active Civil Liberties and Privacy Rights Commission” to overcome suspicion about domestic security programs. As for cyberspace, he recommends that all federal networks be encrypted, that computer networks employ two-factor authentication systems, and that IT security research be increased. On the topic of outsourcing he hints at, but does not endorse, an interesting solution: pay intelligence officers operating under nonofficial cover $250,000 per year and allow them to retire on full pension at age 40. (109, 122ff) When it comes to international relationships, he suggests acting “boldly to reestablish our moral leadership, respect for international law, and support for human rights.” (356)

Whether or not one accepts Clarke’s suggestions, he has clearly articulated his view of the problems. It only remains for those still in government to decide if he has it right and then take corrective action.


The 1974 publication of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* set a precedent that some former CIA officers have elected to follow. The results include sour outpourings of career disgruntlement and undocumented claims of wrongdoing, malicious exposés of ongoing operations, and critical reviews of inadequacies an author argues should be put right. *Failure of Intelligence* is mostly the latter. The litany of so-called failures Goodman lists is not new, and he is candid that his criticisms are based on his experience as a CIA analyst and his assignments in the intelligence community, which he left more than a decade ago. Unlike some other critical authors, Goodman notes successes (chapter three) and offers ideas for correcting matters (chapter 13).

The principal issues covered in *Failure of Intelligence* include CIA “crimes”—covert action, rendition, lack of oversight, torture—9/11 and the terrorist threat, the Iraq War, and the politicization of intelligence. The last topic pops up throughout but is extensively covered in chapters five and six. While each director since Helms gets some notice, Goodman allocates most of his attention to Bob Gates—with whom he admits intense disagreement—and to the elements that served under him, especially in the analysis of the Soviet Union. Beyond charging politicization of official estimates, Goodman asserts

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1 Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).
3 Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (Stonehill, 1975)
that intelligence conferences and research studies sponsored by the Center for the Study of Intelligence were configured to "demonstrate that the 'CIA got it right.'" (154–55) Although he includes many quotes, these charges are not sourced and neither are his claims that the Agency "provided carefully selected materials to former consultants" so they could write reports supporting Agency views. Curiously, he does not cite articles that disagree with this view.4

Chapter 12, "DCIs and the Decline and Fall of the CIA," covers only DCIs from Casey to Goss, with an addendum from 2006 to the present. He compares this group with their predecessors and finds them wanting. These are judgment calls, but coming from an insider, they should be carefully considered.

The final chapter summarizes what needs to be done—presumably to stop and reverse the "fall"—with emphasis on the "what," the "how" is ignored. Most suggestions are familiar—tell truth to power, reform clandestine operations and covert action, improve oversight, etc. But one is new: "demilitarize the intelligence community." (331–34) Goodman sees this as a redistribution of power, but he does not suggest how it might be accomplished in the face of certain opposition from the Pentagon.

If the reader is not fooled by outrageous, undocumentable charges—NSA "broke the fourth amendment" and the director of CIA "actively lobbied on the Hill to permit CIA interrogators to torture and abuse suspects" (326)—and is willing to make the effort, Failure of Intelligence presents a good summary of the problems facing the CIA and the Intelligence Community today, though that may have been an unintended consequence.


As was customary at the time, Lord Burghley, adviser to Queen Elizabeth I, instructed the lieutenant of the Tower of London to ask the prisoner "for the alphabet of the cipher and if he shall refuse...put him on the rack." Used properly, the rake would leave the subject with "few marks" and this qualifies "the rack" as one of the many "clean techniques" that are addressed in Torture and Democracy. (4–5) Author Darius Rejali, described on the fly leaf as "one of the world's leading experts on torture"—presumably its history not its practice—offers "discrete, disciplined histories of each clean torture [technique] used...in the main democracies...[where] they seem to go hand in hand." (6, 8) His definition of democracies is broad and includes Russia, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Vietnam, China, Iran, and North Korea. There are 17 chapters, nearly 400 pages, on the techniques alone—techniques, he suggests, that

do not arouse sufficient public outrage because they leave few traces. Chapter 21 asks “Does Torture Work?” and gives evidence that it produces “systematically and unavoidably corrupt information” (469) but not in all cases. He acknowledges that his research “does not prove that torture never works to produce accurate information.... [It does] establish the specific conditions where torture may work better than other ways of gathering intelligence.” (478)

In a chapter with the curious title, “What the Apologists Say,” Rejali cites the Battle of Algiers (1956) as an example in which “professional torturers...produced consistently reliable information in a short time” and goes into detail to explain their methods. (480) He even quotes “journalist Ed Behr, no apologist for torture, ...that it had an indispensable role in the battle.” (487) After discussing several other countries where torture had mixed results, he addresses its supposed use by the CIA. “According to CIA sources,” which he does not cite, “fourteen CIA operatives [were] trained in six authorized techniques” (500), which he mentions, though he adds that he thinks more were authorized. In fairness, he goes on to quote one former Agency officer who expressed objections to torture. (502) He then discusses the cases of several al-Qaeda members and the situations at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, arguing that what some claimed as successes were in fact “persistent failures” (508) and that the CIA limits on “enhanced interrogations...are almost identical to those imposed by the Gestapo.” (503) In the end, he suggests, there is more to the American story associated with renditions that will surface in the future. In an appendix he cites sources that tell of American and Vietnamese torture in Vietnam.

Torture and Democracy doesn’t radiate scholarly objectivity but doesn’t conclude with an outright condemnation either. What it does do is provide a decent summary of this controversial issue.


Outsourcing is a real problem for author Tim Shorrock. It is not justified when Congress cuts the intelligence budget and the executive branch simultaneously increases the requirements. Nor is it acceptable during an emergency when new employees are authorized but not yet experienced. Since 9/11, Shorrock argues, outsourcing has created an “intelligence-industrial-complex” that consumes 70 percent of the intelligence budget and places national security in the hands of profit-making corporations rather than the elected representatives of the public. Even worse, contractors are now performing tasks that should be assigned only to federal employees, an issue, as Jeff Stein points out in his review of the book, that even some intelligence officers find intolerable. Furthermore, he argues, this situation has created a revolving door for personnel who leave government intelligence agencies and join corporate contractors and those who do just the opposite. Spies For Hire attacks several contractors supplying intel-

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Intelligence services—including the Disney Corporation for its work with the National Counterterrorism Center—and their evil profiteering. In his final chapter, “Conclusion: Ideology, Oversight, and the Costs of Secrecy,” Shorrock does not mention ideology, never explains how oversight will help, and what the costs of secrecy contribute to the problem or the solution. And he does not even mention the one solution that would solve the dilemma: sufficient positions at competitive salaries. Outsourcing may be as damaging as Shorrock contends, but he fails to make the case or provide a satisfactory alternative. Perhaps he could use some outside help.

General Intelligence


A handbook, according to Webster, is a ready reference intended to be carried at all times. At 5 pounds and 8 by 10 inches, The History of Information Security requires a backpack. It more nearly qualifies as a reference work. Editors Karl de Leeuw and Jan Bergstra, from the Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, have assembled 29 contributions from Europe and the United States, in six parts, that provide a far-reaching view of information security from the time that counterfeiting was a hanging offense in England (199) to the contemporary concerns with identity management, where penalties are less severe but professionally costly. The nine chapters on communication security range from the rise of cryptology during the Renaissance and the early use of postal interception for espionage purposes to examples in modern cryptology. In between is a new study of NSA, with 291 references, that discusses its role in the Cold War. There is a similarly stimulating analysis of KGB Cold War eavesdropping operations that is based mainly on Russian sources. The six contributions on computer security cover the history of this relatively new field, as well as mathematical modeling and standards. Of particular interest to the nonspecialist is the article on cybercrime that discusses the threats from viruses, worms, malware and the like. There are three contributions on privacy issues that deal with the conflicts arising from the need for secure personal, government, and corporate applications. The final article concerns information warfare, how it has changed since the telegraph was invented, the significance of cyberspace, and critical infrastructure protection issues that must be confronted.

Information security is part of modern daily existence—personal, corporate, and government. This work provides well-documented historical background and an astute assessment of the role information security will play in today’s society.
Historical


In a variation of the theme used in *Exploring Intelligence Archives* (see below), Thomas Allen has selected 50 intelligence documents that had an impact on history. They are introduced by former CIA officer Peter Earnest, now executive director of the International Spy Museum. Each of the seven thematic chapters—"Secrets of War," "Double Agents," "Counterintelligence," "Bodyguard of Lies," "Espionage Accidents," "Defense of the Realm," and "The Secret State"—is preceded by a short essay. The first case is of a letter from one of Sir Francis Walsingham’s agents apprising him of Spanish plans to invade England—the Spanish Armada. Its timely receipt allowed the Royal Navy time to plan for the attack. Another example is a copy of the encrypted letter sent by Benjamin Church to his British handler that was intercepted and decrypted by Washington’s cryptographers. Other instances discuss documents in the Walker, Ames, and Pollard cases. Not every case involves a document. The exception is the hollow nickel that contributed to the demise of KGB Colonel Rudolf Abel. One of the seldom seen documents, famous in its day, is the memorandum—"Le Bordereau"—that helped send Alfred Dreyfus to Devil’s Island. Of current interest is a letter from President Roosevelt to the attorney general acknowledging the Supreme Court’s ruling that wiretap evidence cannot be used in court without a warrant, and then authorizing wiretapping in cases of national security. Some details should be corrected in the second edition: Whittaker Chambers was never mentioned in VENONA, and the original form of the VENONA decrypts was paper obtained from Western Union, not radio intercepts. Allen has assembled an interesting collection of documentary material that shows the importance of espionage in history. It is an original, valuable, and informative book.


The general circumstances of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 are familiar to those who lived through it as well as to students of history, intelligence, and international relations. And many, if not most, have subscribed to the view that there was a genuine possibility, though a low probability, of nuclear war, even after the Soviets admitted 30 years later that they had in fact placed nuclear weapons in Cuba. As Max Frankel concluded in *High Noon in the Cold War*, neither Khrushchev nor Kennedy would have let it happen—close but not too close. One Minute to Midnight argues that the gap was much narrower than perceived at the time by the public and by historians since. Au-

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8 Max Frankel, *High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Presidio Press, 2004)
tor Michael Dobbs writes that the two leaders, challenged by their military commanders, came close to not having the final word. This is just one of the new facts Dobbs reveals.

Dobbs tells the tale chronologically from the viewpoints of both the antagonists. The first six chapters cover events from 22 to 26 October. The balance of the book is devoted to 27 October—Black Saturday—and 28 October when the crisis ended. He is able to do this because of new materials—tape recordings, photos, maps, memoirs—he discovered in US and Russian archives, and because he was able to interview more than 100 participants from both sides and of many ranks who had not told their stories previously.

One startling fact he uncovered was that the photo-interpreters at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) had actually looked at images of the nuclear weapons storage area in Cuba without knowing it. The photo-interpreters were looking for familiar signatures and didn't find them because of a chance diversion of the ships carrying the weapons led to their temporary storage at an old Cuban artillery post. Their location was not discovered, and they were later moved and readied to attack the naval base at Guantánamo.

Dobb's re-creation of the events of Black Saturday are particularly interesting for style and content. He tells of an unintentional U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union on that day and the president's reaction when he was told. He debunks several myths of the crisis, the best known being the circumstances surrounding Dean Rusk's "eyeball to eyeball" comment. A less known but interesting variation concerns the efforts of journalist John Scali and his meetings with Soviet official Alexander Feklisov to try and establish a basis for resolving the crisis. The State Department and Scali thought that is what was happening, but Dobbs, using his Russian sources, concludes that it did nothing of the sort. (166–68)

Perhaps the best part of the book is the chronological depiction of tension and frustration—leadership meetings on both sides were spirited and not always orderly. There were no simple answers, always competing alternatives reflecting personal and organizational agendas, and no way to tell which was best. Murphy's law kicked in as well—things kept going wrong, and the military clamored for an invasion. And yet the two leaders managed to control things. Dobbs makes clear the Cuban Missile Crisis was not the singular victory for JFK that the media suggested at the time and that sympathetic historians have maintained since. Kennedy made secret bargains that gave Khrushchev much of what he asked for. At times it is hard to understand why one side or the other did not succumb to its military's recommendations. For those who did not live through the crisis, One Minute to Midnight gives a balanced, detailed, sensitive account that is great reading.

During the 1930s nearly 10,000 anti-Nazi Germans and Austrians—mostly Jewish—fled to Great Britain. When the war began, 4,000 volunteered for service, swore allegiance to the King, and were initially placed in a Pioneer Corps—with men mostly digging ditches and women doing domestic duties. Beginning in 1942, some were accepted into combat units, and about 100 joined the Special Operations Executive (SOE), the Army Intelligence Corps, and MI6. *The King's Most Loyal Enemy Aliens* tells the story of these volunteers who served as POW interrogators and also in operations behind enemy lines. After the war, several thousand were inducted into the Intelligence Corps and sent to Germany to interrogate war crime suspects. Helen Fry has documented for history a heretofore little known contribution to intelligence in WW II.


Nikolai Yezhov, head of the NKVD from 1936 to 1938, was the avatar of administrative annihilation—the Great Terror. He arranged for the execution of some 3,000 NKVD officers and more than 200,000 party members, staged the Moscow show trials, purged the Army high command, and sent millions to labor camps. Yet, Getty and Naumov barely mention these achievements; they focus on how Yezhov attained and then lost power under Stalin. A Bolshevik from the start and described by colleagues as friendly and pleasant, Yezhov gained recognition as a party secretary who mastered administrative personnel procedures and sent articulate reports to Moscow on time. He eventually maneuvered to win acceptance to the Communist Academy in Moscow and never left that center of power. In 1934, he supervised the investigation of the Kirov assassination and “demonstrated his willingness to relentlessly pursue any hint of disloyalty.” In 1935, Stalin made him a member of the Central Committee. The following year Stalin announced that Yezhov was replacing the unpopular Genrikh Yagoda as head of the NKVD—“surely things would go smoothly with Yezhov at the helm.” (205) And they did—for Yezhov—until his arrest, without any public announcement, in late 1938 after one of his assistants defected in Japan. At his closed trial Yezhov renounced a confession, was shot, and never again mentioned officially in Stalin's lifetime.

In this well-documented account, from Soviet archival sources, Getty and Naumov fill in gaps about this fanatical executioner’s early life, but they leave half the story untold. Perhaps another volume is forthcoming.

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9 See in this issue Stephen Mercado's review of *Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II*.

In 1956, expert diver Lionel “Buster” Crabb, made two dives under the Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze but only surfaced once. One year later, a headless body was found in a diving suit like Crabb’s. It was buried with Crabb’s name on the tombstone. Four years later journalist Bernard Hutton claimed in his book Frogman Extraordinary10 that Crabb was alive and serving in the Soviet Navy. The book included a photo of a man identified as Crabb. Some family members believed Hutton’s story, few others did. A 1990 book, Frogman Spy,11 reported new but inconclusive evidence that Crabb had survived, served the Soviets, and died in a Czech nursing home. The Final Dive goes over it all again and adds much new detail about Crabb’s family, his links to MI5, the Cambridge Five, Ian Fleming, and Lord Mountbatten. The author interviewed Crabb’s family members and some of his former colleagues, had access to letters and diaries, and claims to have found references to Crabb in the National Archives in Britain and the United States. But he does not provide any source notes, and he neglects the firsthand assessment of Nicholas Elliott, the MI6 officer in charge of the operation.12 In the process, Hale adds clumsy errors that detract from his analysis. For example, Anthony Blunt did not head the Cambridge Five (229) and Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo, was not Philby’s Abwehr contact (85). Donald Maclean did not work for MI5 (85), and Burgess joined Philby in America in 1950, not 1944.

While Hale ignores the claims of Crabb’s death in Czechoslovakia, The Final Dive is otherwise a comprehensive picture of what is known and alleged. But it is not easy to tell the difference. In the end he admits to only one certainty—the fate of Lionel Crabb remains a mystery.

Tod Hoffman, The Spy Within: Larry Chin and China’s Penetration of the CIA (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2008), 302 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

The People’s Republic of China often conducts espionage by relying on large numbers of people, each producing relatively small amounts of intelligence. The case of Larry Chin followed a more traditional path. Canadian journalist Tod Hoffman explains how Chin was recruited before being hired by the CIA and spied for 30 years before retiring with a medal and a pension. He was caught in 1981, tried, convicted, and sentenced to 133 years in prison. Although most of these facts were made public in 1985, Hoffman adds much new detail concerning Chin’s background, how he was detected, how he came to confess, and why he committed suicide. That Hoffman was able to accomplish this is due to the availability of court records and the cooperation of the FBI special agents, whom he identifies, who worked the case.

10 Bernard Hutton, Frogman Extraordinary: The Incredible Case of Commander Crabb (McDowell, Obolensky, 1960)
The most interesting aspects of the case concern the details of his recruitment by the Chinese, how he was detected, and how he came to confess. As to his discovery, a CIA agent in the Chinese Ministry of Security indicated to his case officer that a Chinese penetration had taken place somewhere in the US Intelligence Community. As required by law, the FBI was alerted. Hoffman describes the lengthy investigation that ensued and how Larry Chin, by then retired, came under suspicion. The FBI learned that Chin had a complex personal life that he managed to conceal from the CIA. He passed his polygraph examination, and no one suspected his years of espionage or his affection for women and gambling. Motivated more by self-interest than a belief in communism, he hid his illegal earnings and lived modestly. By checking his finances and interviewing former colleagues, the FBI gradually uncovered the truth. When convinced Chin was the right man, bureau agents devised a clever scenario to elicit his confession.

_The Spy Within_ is a well-told story about a spy who beat the security system and couldn’t resist telling the FBI how he did it.


The choice of adjective—splendid, super, neat, cool—to describe _Exploring Intelligence Archives_ might identify a reviewer’s generation, but it will not change the evaluation of the quality of this singular work of historiography. _Exploring Intelligence Archives_ challenges the assumption “that the real story behind policy-making is usually either hidden or excised from the historical record.” (8) Seldom does the documentary record speak for itself, and the authors have applied a clever method to assess what documents really tells us, whether the message is deceptive, and the extent to which it has been interpreted accurately by historians and journalists.

Various scholars examine 11 cases in this work. In each case, one provides background and an overview of essential details, which is followed by reproductions of a document or documents in question. Then comes one or more analyses of their content. Oleg Penkovskiy’s contribution is a case in point. Former CIA officer Charles Cogan asks whether Penkovskiy was “the spy who saved the world” as claimed by Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin in a book of the same name. (13) Cogan concludes that the claim was an exaggeration since Penkovskiy made no real-time contribution to the Cuban Missile Crisis, although the manuals he provided were a confirming factor—along with aerial photography—in the conclusion that offensive missiles were present in Cuba. Len Scott analyzes two other documents, one to assess Penkovskiy’s bona fides, concluding that he probably was genuine. The second document, based on Penkovskiy’s first debriefing in London, challenged the conventional wis-

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13 Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin, _The Spy Who Saved the World_ (Brassey’s Inc, 1995).
dom that the Soviets had in fact not deployed nuclear weapons outside Soviet territory. In this case he was correct, but Scott points out that the official US view was not changed until further evidence was acquired.

The other cases include French military intelligence and its response to German remilitarization of the Rhineland, the creation of the British XX committee that ran the Double Cross Operation against Germany during WW II, developments in Europe in 1946, the interrogation of Klaus Fuchs, the KGB view of CIA and other Western espionage against the Soviet bloc, and the Butler Report, the study of British intelligence prior to the Iraq War.

Exploring Intelligence Archives is a fine contribution to the study of intelligence and its role in foreign policy.


The movie *U-571* depicted the capture by US sailors of a German U-boat and the Enigma codes it was carrying. These enabled code breakers to read German messages and intercept their U-boats at sea. The movie did well at the box office, but in Britain it caused a furor because the feat had been performed by the Royal Navy, not Americans. The movie makers knew this too, and *The Real Enigma Heroes* tells of unsuccessful attempts made while the movie was in production to get mention of the truth in the credits. The producers refused because they said they had changed so many of the details, including the location, the U-boat designation—the real sub was U-559—and the fact that their fictional sub hadn’t sunk, as U-559 did in reality, taking with it two Royal Navy sailors as they transferred Enigma documents up and out of its communications room. Shanahan documents the story with first hand accounts, official records, biographical data, and photos of the crew. Considerable space is also devoted to the memorial association formed to remember the event. *The Real Enigma Heroes* corrects the historical record.

**Intelligence Abroad**


Former Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) analyst Michael Cole felt an "urgency in writing this book" that was "exacerbated by the increasing signals in 2007 that the United States was readying itself to wage war against Iran." (xiv) This confession of analytic prowess, gained after 29 months of service "amid the dullness and the ugliness that an intelligence officer deals with on a daily basis," (xv)—service he found boring—sets the tone of SMOKESCREEN. It is a critical chronicle that runs from his deficient training—"death by PowerPoint"—to his strategic world view—that America, not al-Qaeda, has made the world a more dangerous place after 9/11. In between he complains about CSIS tolerance of incompetence, ingrained institutional rac-
ism, the high value placed on “spineless intelligence officers” (70), and the lack of a foreign intelligence collection mission. He also finds that the “need-to-know-principle” is self-defeating and that there is a need for more oversight (undefined). He concludes that the “US intelligence Community remains a mess.” The corrective, he suggests, citing some wisdom found in “The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” (92), is with people not organizations, though he is not optimistic of success. Nevertheless, in chapter six, “Fixing the System,” Cole presents pages of recommendations for improvement. There is nothing profound or unexpected there, just common sense. But nowhere in his book does Cole address a key issue: why he wasn’t willing or able to stay and help correct the deficiencies. Instead he moved to Taiwan.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence 2008

Current Topics and Issues

America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise by David Armstrong and Joseph Trento (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps by Richard A. Posner (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations by Yonah Alexander (ed.) (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Commission by Philip Shenon (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times by James E. Baker (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark. (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants by Hans Born and Marina Caparini (eds.) (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA by Melvin A. Goodman (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)


Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century by Marc Sageman (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him by Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies by Athan Theoharis (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness by Thomas C. Brunneau and Steven C. Boraz (eds.) (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

The Search For WMD: Non-Proliferation, Intelligence and Pre-emption in the New Security Environment by Graham F. Walker (ed.) (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Spies For Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing by Tim Shorrock (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 by Amy B. Zegart (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Still Broken: A Recruit’s Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, From Baghdad to the Pentagon by A. J. Rossmiller (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century by Philip Bobbitt (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Torture and Democracy by Darius Rejali (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Why Spy?: Espionage In An Age of Uncertainty by Frederick P. Hitz (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)


Following book titles and author names are the Studies in Intelligence issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.
Books Reviewed, 2008

General Intelligence


Communicating with Intelligence: Writing and Briefing in the Intelligence and National Security Communities by James S. Major (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Detecting Deception: A Bibliography of Counterdeception Across Time, Cultures, and Disciplines— Supplement to the Second Edition by Barton Whaley (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)


Intelligence and National Security: A Reference Handbook by J. Ransom Clark (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)


Intelligence, Crises and Security Prospects and Retrospects by Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Historical

Comrade J: The Untold Story of Russia’s Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War by Pete Earley (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Declassified: 50 Top-Secret Documents that Changed History by Thomas B. Allen (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914 by Martin Thomas (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

The FBI: A History by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

The Final Dive: The Life and Death of “Buster” Crabb by Don Hale (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of World War Two Intelligence by Nigel West (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)


I Engaged in Intelligence Work by Colonel Dinh Thi Van (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Intelligence, Statecraft and International Power by Eunan O’Halpin, Robert Armstrong and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds.) (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

The King’s Most Loyal Enemy Aliens: Germans Who Fought for Britain in the Second World War by Helen Fry (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

The Kravchenko Case: One Man’s War On Stalin by Gary Kern (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Living With the Enigma Secret: Marian Rejewski 1905-1980 by Jan Stanislaw Ciechanowski (eds.) (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

A Man of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave, Australian Codebreaker Extraordinary by Ian Pefenningwerth (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America by Hugh Wilford (52 2 [June]. Michael Warner)

Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War by Polly A. Mohs (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of Strategic Services by Michael Salter (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service During World War II by James C. McNaughton (52 4 [December]. Stephen Mercado)
Historical (continued)

One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War by Michael Dobbs (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

Operation Freshman: The Hunt for Hitler’s Heavy Water by Jostein Berglyd (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)


Programmed to Kill: Lee Harvey Oswald, the Soviet KGB, and the Kennedy Assassination – The Training of a Dedicated Agent by Ion Mihai Pacepa (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

The Real Enigma Heroes by Phil Shanahan (52 4 [September]. Bookshelf)

RUSE: Undercover With FBI Counterintelligence by Robert Eringer (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Secrets and Lies: A History of CIA Mind Control and Germ Warfare by Gordon Thomas (52 2 [June]. Bookshelf)

Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World by Kristie Macrakis (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

The Sixth Man: the extraordinary life of Paddy Costello by James McNeish (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Intelligence Around the World

Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered Moss by K. Sankaran Nair (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

Intelligence: Past, Present and Future by B. Raman

The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane by B. Raman (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

SMOKESCREEN: Canadian Security Intelligence after September 11, 2001 by J. Michael Cole (52 4 [December]. Bookshelf)

The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists by Michael Ross with Jonathan Kay (52 1 [March]. Bookshelf)

My Years In a Pakistani Prison: The Untold Story of Kishorilal, alias Amaril Singh, alias Saleem, an Indian Spy in Pakistan by Kishorilal Sharma (52 3 [September]. Bookshelf)

Fiction

An Ordinary Spy by Stephen Weisberg (52 4 [December]. John Ehrman)