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A Defection Case that Marked the Times

Some Far-out Thoughts on Computers

Reviews

Recent Works on Improving Intelligence Analysis

Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence

The Emergency State: America’s Pursuit of Absolute Security at All Costs

The Tourist Trilogy: The New Genre?

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence in 2012
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At Cold War’s End

A Defection Case that Marked the Times

John Tellaray, with an introduction by Michael Sulick

In November 1989 the opening of the Berlin Wall heralded the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Less well known is that this historic event also sparked the greatest wave of Soviet defectors in the history of the CIA and resulted in a windfall of intelligence on past and then ongoing Soviet activities.

The fall of the Berlin Wall opened the floodgates to hundreds of Soviet citizens offering to trade secrets in return for an escape from their crumbling empire. In East Berlin alone, the CIA screened four Soviets a week to verify their claims of access to intelligence. To separate the wheat from the chaff, at one point the CIA set higher standards for contact with potential Soviet defectors and agents and even discouraged acceptance of some. The world, after all, was changing dramatically. The superpower conflict appeared to be fading into the past as the USSR disintegrated and a new era of cooperation seemed to be looming.

Harbingers of this new era were even evident between the CIA and the KGB, the two archrivals who epitomized the Cold War conflict. The CIA director had quietly met with his opposite number in the KGB both in Washington and Moscow. Other senior Agency officials had also met with KGB counterparts, and the chief of the CIA’s Soviet Division had a special telephone on his desk to communicate directly with the KGB.

The two former adversaries held discussions on cooperation regarding mutual threats of terrorism and proliferation. Prospects appeared even brighter after the August 1991 coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev backfired. Just a few months after the coup, in response to a US request regarding the massive bugging of the US embassy in Moscow, the newly appointed reformist KGB director, Vadim Bakatin, passed to CIA the Soviet blueprints of the penetrated building.

During Bakatin’s tenure, the monolithic KGB was disbanded and its extensive, sweeping powers were split among new external and internal intelligence services and other agencies. Perhaps a new era was truly dawning.

a Milton Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB* (New York: Ballantine, 2002), 432.
c Bearden and Risen, 363.
d Ibid., 369.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Soviet defectors, however, told a different story. The story was sufficiently compelling that CIA Headquarters relaxed its restrictions on potential Soviet defectors and resettled over a dozen in the United States between 1989 and 1991 because of the value of the intelligence they provided. They came from many areas of US national security interest: military personnel, weapons scientists and, most especially, KGB officers.

The KGB was particularly shaken by the turmoil in the Soviet Union and was polarized over the dramatic changes introduced by Gorbachev. A younger generation, disillusioned by the corruption and hypocrisy of the KGB, welcomed the reforms, but their more traditionalist communist superiors struggled to preserve the status quo and still trumpeted the United States as the “main enemy” bent on destruction of the nation’s way of life. The biggest part of the flood of KGB defectors, not surprisingly, came from the younger generation, majors and colonels who remained unconvinced by the arguments of their seniors and the myths of the service’s past glory.

The story told by these defectors proved that the Soviet Union was changing less dramatically than indicated by Gorbachev’s supposed reforms. Defectors from the scientific community, such as Ken Alibek and Vladimir Pasechnik, revealed that the Russians were still developing a biological warfare program in violation of international agreements. They were also still developing other weapons systems: a pilot passed the CIA information about the combat tactics of the air force’s most advanced fighter plane.

KGB defectors in turn revealed that the Moscow was still gathering secrets from spies in US government and industry and actively seeking new sources. Unfortunately, because of the KGB’s effective compartmentation, none of these defectors was privy to the most convincing proof of this, the Russians’ continued handling of CIA officer Rick Ames after the dissolution of the KGB until his arrest in 1994. The Russians also continued to collect information from FBI agent Robert Hanssen. The flood of defectors, however, may have stanchèd the flow of secrets to Russia, since Hanssen—apparently afraid that one of them might compromise him—dropped contact with Russian intelligence for eight years.

One of these defectors was handled by John Tellaray, then a senior officer assigned to a capital abroad. His account below confirms that the KGB was not only actively recruiting US citizens to spy on the nation but had made significant progress in building networks in the US corporate sector. The information provided by the defector about this network augured an intensified effort by Russian intelligence to steal America’s economic and scientific secrets which continues today.

The development, of course, should not be surprising—one of the young officers who embraced the views of KGB hardliners during the Gorbachev era, Vladimir Putin, is now the president of the Russian Federation for a second time and an enthusiastic supporter of the Russian intelligence services.

Tellaray’s account also demonstrates that one other key aspect of intelligence remained immutable despite the dramatic changes affecting the CIA and KGB in the final years of the Cold War—the complex, often frustrating relationship between case officer and source. Each of the many Soviet defectors in that period was unique; each had his own demands, expectations, fears and eccentricities. These relationships required the skills of a professional intelligence officer to ensure the security of the source, to praise them when they were productive and prod them when they were not. As evidenced in his account below, John Tellaray embodies the professionalism that resulted in an intelligence treasure trove from the host of Soviet defectors in the final stages and immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

Watching my rearview mirror for surveillance, I veered from the high-speed lane onto the exit ramp, made a right at the first intersection and stepped on the gas. The precautions were needed, even in a friendly country, because the director of its security service had vowed to use any excuse to throw a senior CIA officer out of his country. Indeed, five minutes into our first meeting, he accused the Agency of a political assassination that had taken place before my arrival. Still, the threat to me was minimal compared to the risk the KGB officer I was driving to meet was taking. If compromised in a private engagement with me, he

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a Ibid., 464.
b Ibid., 433.
would be returned to Russia and executed. For that reason, I knew he was taking similar precautions.

The officer had approached me the previous Sunday as I was opening the gate to my driveway to drive my car into the courtyard. We had never met but we knew of each other. I will call him Nikolai. Wasting no time, he demanded that he and his family be put on the next plane to the United States. He was defecting.

He and I immediately became engaged in a battle of wills. We were professional intelligence officers working for enemy services and each of us had a mutually exclusive goal. He had been agonizing over this life-changing move for months. As he stressed during our initial meetings, having personal knowledge of KGB colleagues who had been executed in unsuccessful attempts to do what he was doing, he knew he was taking his life in his hands. He had made up his mind, convinced his wife, and all he wanted from me was a new life in the United States, starting tomorrow! He would reveal his information only after arriving in the United States and obtaining a commitment of resettlement from the CIA.

My mission was to assess his credibility and his value before I put him on a plane. What I didn’t anticipate was that it would be just as difficult to convince Langley to pay attention as it would be to convince Nikolai to defect my way.

Saying he was sure my house was bugged by the host country’s security service, Nikolai refused to come into my house. Instead, our first meeting was a two hour walk in the nearby woods. It was drizzling, but neither of us noticed. He insisted at each subsequent meeting that he would terminate our contact unless I could give him Washington’s answer immediately. Keeping him from bolting was my first priority, and I measured progress by cups of coffee or bottles of beer. My goal was to obtain information on the KGB’s secret plans and intentions, starting with threats against US interests, as well as any insights into what was going on in the Kremlin. The Berlin Wall had fallen, and his country was undergoing wrenching changes.

“I know what you are doing,” he would say, as his eyes burned with anger and frustration. “But I will never be your agent!”

Initially, CIA Headquarters was not anymore interested in my plan than was Nikolai. There was a school of thought at Langley that, since the Cold War was over, a KGB officer was not any more valuable to the CIA than a foreign taxi driver. However, there was a noticeable change in attitude when I began sending reports to Washington on topics that were clearly of immediate importance.

Adding to Nikolai’s tension was his teenage daughter who couldn’t wait to return to her friends in Moscow. Neither he nor his wife had shared their plans with her because they feared what her reaction might be.

One night we were meeting in a café two hours outside the capital. As usual, he was irritated and upset that I could not give him a positive answer. Although he had frequently threatened to walk out, this time he got up and walked to the front door, where I caught up with him. Nikolai was a decorated officer, more used to giving orders than to taking them, and he had felt thwarted and exasperated from the outset.

As he was starting to open the door to the street, I asked him, “How long have we been meeting? What would happen if your service discovered that you were meeting with the CIA? Now tell me this. What have you achieved from taking this chance?”

With his hand still on the door, Nikolai looked through the glass out to the dark street beyond, and then looked at me. “We are almost there,” I said. “Your risk is about to pay off. You would make a big mistake if you walked out that door. You have put yourself and your family in danger and so far have gotten nothing in return.”

I put my hand on his elbow to guide him back to our table. All of a sudden Nikolai’s body language underwent a metamorphosis. His shoulders drooped, his eyes teared up and he looked down. His confidence and feistiness disappeared, acceptance set in.

That meeting was a watershed in our relationship. Whereas I had elicited reportable information from him before, he became a cooperative partner in that café. Our meetings became more frequent and he raised the bar, handing over top-secret KGB documents. Doing so required me to take great risks, day and night. Eventually, after a final, difficult and most fruitful effort, I could tell him that he and his family would be on the next available flight to the United States.

During the last days of the operation, I had two worries. First, that his daughter might blow the whistle unwittingly, or unwittingly, and send her father to Lubyanka. Further, I did not want to take the chance that he and his family would come under suspicion by either the local security service, which knew Nikolai to be a
KGB officer, or by his own KGB colleagues during the exfiltration.

Once we decided on a date of departure, Nikolai and I thought that the best plan would be to tell his daughter they were going for a weekend trip and that she should pack lightly for one or two nights away from home. At the airport he would explain to her that they were all going to the United States because he was being assigned temporarily to New York. I also spent a little money to buy his daughter an electronic game to keep her mind occupied on the flight. A couple of months after the family’s arrival in the United States, the daughter was attending high school. She had not then been told that the move was permanent.

I had not shared the information that Nikolai was defecting with the local security service primarily because I was not confident the information would not reach the KGB. If this liaison service learned that Nikolai and his family were planning to travel to the United States from its international airport, or if it learned of the travel after the fact, the chief of the service, having already tried to PNG me, would assume the existence of another CIA conspiracy.

But good tradecraft had deprived the chief of any proof and both the foreign minister and the minister of justice had turned him down. I therefore made arrangements, with the help of a neighboring station, to fly Nikolai and his family out of another country.

We waited until Nikolai was in the air before turning information about him over to the local liaison service. In order to downplay the case, we shared it with a midlevel official whose career we wanted to boost. There were arrests made and I moved on to another assignment and lost track of the case. Back in the United States, we debriefed Nikolai extensively. The information produced hundreds of reports and led to shutting down several KGB networks in America and abroad.

Many years later I met the CIA officer responsible for Nikolai’s resettlement. He informed me that Nikolai had worked in the security department of a private company for a brief period, but it had not worked out and he had been on his own ever since. He also gave me Nikolai’s phone number and suggested that I call him. Nikolai’s handler assured me that, although Nikolai had characterized our relationship as “highly intense,” he had high professional respect for me.

I left the phone number on my desk for over a month, wary of getting involved with a defector’s problems. However, I did call him and he caught me up on some of his personal life since arriving in the States. He told me that to augment his CIA stipend, he had become a day trader in the stock market, working from home. I asked about his daughter, but learned nothing except that she was “fine.” He seemed to be modestly successful.

While Nikolai said that he welcomed my call, like the intelligence officer that he had been, he did not volunteer answers to questions I did not ask. He didn’t seem to regret forgoing the dacha that he had assured me, during our pre-exfiltration fencing, that his rank and party standing would have netted him had he returned to Moscow.

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Bringing the Computer into Intelligence Work

Some Far-out Thoughts on Computers

Orrin Clotworthy

Originally published in *Studies in Intelligence* Vol. 6, No. 4 (1962)

A Jules Verne look at intelligence processes in a coming generation.

Question: What does the size of the next coffee crop, bullfight attendance figures, local newspaper coverage of UN matters, the birth rate, the mean daily temperatures or refrigerator sales across the country have to do with who will next be elected president of Guatemala?

Answer: Perhaps nothing. But the question is not a frivolous one. There must be a cause behind each vote cast in an election. It may be a rational, emotional, superstitious, or accidental cause. The choice may derive from months of conscious effort to weigh the pros and cons of the aspirants to office. It may be an automatic, tradition-bound action that requires not even a cursory exercise of the thought process. Or the voter himself may not recognize why he decides as he does. But something will motivate him, and it may be closely correlative with one or more of the quantitative factors suggested in the opening question.

To learn just what the factors are, how to measure them, how to weight them, and how to keep them flowing into a computing center for continual analysis will some day become a matter of great concern to all of us in the intelligence community. I say “will” rather than “may” because it seems to me that this type of election analysis will be only the first faltering step by an infant quantified behavioral science that is going to be forced on us for its upbringing like a doorstep baby—and soon.

*Instant Estimates*

For elections offer a fairly simple starting point. They deal in tangible, discrete, measurable data—ballots. Ideally they reflect the attitudes of a populace, not just toward a handful of candidates but toward a host of related issues. Although in practice we have to compensate for incomplete
voter participation, ballot-box stuffing, and other imperfections, means will be found to make such compensations and we will still wind up with good readings on popular attitudes at a given moment in history. Elections are in a sense history’s benchmarks to which we can, and do, refer back when preparing estimates of public opinion in the long periods between them. They are also buoys to keep the analyst on course, a regular means of validating his estimates. When his prediction of an election outcome turns out to be way off target, he can find solace in that old Cape Canaveral philosophy, “We learn more from our failures than we do from our successes.”

Note that what is proposed is to bypass the voter himself in this analytic process, looking beyond him for the reasons underlying his decisions. As the pollsters have discovered, even in an enlightened, democratic society it is not a simple matter to develop accurate election predictions from a sampling of the electorate. In an underdeveloped or overpoliced state of the type that we in intelligence are so often concerned with, the additional problems of obtaining a valid sample of opinion through direct interviews are so immense as to force us to more subtle methods. Isolating the factors that influence popular attitudes in a given area at election time would be one approach.

Once we had succeeded in isolating these factors, could we not then begin to watch the key phenomena continuously, gathering them in and collating them so that at any instant we could read from them the temper of the populace under study? Ten years ago, the answer would have been negative. Today, because of the tremendous strides that our technologists have made in electronic data processing, it is decidedly affirmative. The required mathematical computations and sophisticated statistical analysis are well within the present state of the computer art.

Molecules and People

Where we lag is not in processing technology, but in the behavioral science “laboratories,” where only the faintest of beginnings have been made in the application of physical science techniques to the study of societies. We are doubt-
less years away from the knowledge of causes and effects that will permit us to predict mass human behavior with real confidence. Yet there is rising optimism among scholars that we will some day be able to foretell the behavior of large groups of people within reasonable limits, given accurate and timely measurements of certain telltale factors. A single person, they submit, follows an erratic course, just as a single gas molecule does. But when you put enough people together many of the individual erratic actions will cancel each other out and there will emerge a collective behavior that can be formulized. To be sure, what comes out is not likely to be so simple and aesthetically satisfying as Boyle’s law for the isothermal pressure-volume relation of an ideal body of gas. Mass cause-and-effect relationships are more elusive for people than for molecules. But they must be there, somewhere, and scholars are looking for them.

The impact of new breakthroughs in this area upon the intelligence business is interesting to contemplate. Possibly some American discoveries in mass human behavior patterns could be kept secret for long periods to permit our unilateral exploitation of them. Let’s imagine, for example, that we discover an extremely high correlation between Tito’s popularity among the Yugoslavs and the consumption of slivovitz in that country: when per capita absorption goes up, his stock goes down. As long as we are aware of this and he is not, we will find it profitable to collect precise data on boozing among the Yugoslavs. To keep our interest undetected, we resort to clandestine collection techniques, because once he learns of it and knows the reason why, he can adopt countermeasures, for instance doctored consumption figures. The variations in this game are endless.

What Makes Sukarno Run?

While one group of researchers, largely sociologists and political scientists, pursues the gas molecule analogy, a more visionary one will be exploring possibilities with certain individual molecules. Can scientists ever simulate the behavior pattern of a Mao Tse-tung or a Sekou Touré? Theoretically, if a man’s importance warrants it, they should be able to reduce to mathematical terms and store in an electronic mem-
ory most of his salient experiences and observed reactions to varying situations. Subjecting this stand-in brain to a hypothetical set of circumstances, they could then read out his probable reaction to the event hypothesized. Here the storage problem alone would be tremendous. Even greater would be the task of teaching the computer to ignore certain stimuli while responding to others. As you read this article, you are able to disregard the noise of the air conditioner nearby. It will be some time before a machine can be taught to distinguish between the relevant and the irrelevant in even this elementary fashion. Still, by say the year 2000, I wouldn't bet against it.

On another level, at any rate, much can be learned through comparisons of what national leaders say in their public pronouncements and what they subsequently do. The more sophisticated our techniques for content analysis become, the more we will be obliged to turn to electronic data processing for help in correlating statements with actions. This could be made an operationally practical method pending the hoped-for development of a stand-in brain; virtually all of the research data for content analysis can be obtained with relative ease, and the fact that content analysis deals with objective observations obviates the monumental task of synthesizing someone's subjective thought processes.

Your Move

Another application of computers to the intelligence business lies in the field of gaming. The Air Force has been experimenting for years with a mock-up of the strategic air battle, using a computer to simulate the clash between a surprise intercontinental air and space assault force and the defensive and counter-strike resources of this country. Not only are the planned aspects of both contending operations simulated; so are the unexpected or accidental factors such as weather, faulty intelligence, weapons and guidance imperfections. While these games are of great value as instructional aids, they are far more than that. With the computer alternate strategies are subjected to realistic tests, and aerospace doctrine emerges. And the time is not too remote when fresh intelligence on a potential enemy's capabilities and or-
der of battle, fed into a computer as it is received, will turn out constantly changing designs for an optimum counter-strategy.

Still pretty-much in the concept stage are similar gaming ideas for students and formulaters of foreign policy. Whereas military games involve factors readily susceptible of quantitative measurement, international political games by and large do not. Thus a great deal of quantifying needs to be done to instill sufficient realism into foreign policy games. Among those who have suggested an approach to the problem are the husband-and-wife team of George and Charlotte Dyer, who proposed a foreign policy game in which batteries of colored lights would represent the actual and potential strengths of the nations under study and foreign policy measures taken would be scored, by changes in the light pattern, according to whether judges ruled them beneficial or harmful. Photo-electric cells measuring light intensities would provide constant readings on the progress of the game.

Two aspects of the Dyers' game are especially interesting. First, it makes a beginning toward quantification by breaking down the factors affecting foreign policy; and the diversity of these factors immediately suggests that nothing less than a high-speed computer could keep simultaneous track of all of them and their interrelationships. For example, each nation's resources, in order to be rated on a numerical scale, are broken into ten broad areas—geography, sociology, politics, foreign affairs, economy, industry, transportation, science, armed forces, and history. Then each one of these ten is resolved into its components, with sociology, for example, embracing race, population, language, temperament of people, education, health and welfare, recreation and amusements, institutions and national culture, religion and philosophy. Then each of these is sub-divided, population, for instance, into eighteen groups and sub-groups.

Second, it would score moves in the ten major areas separately rather than keep a single comprehensive score. Thus if the United States and Communist China were the combatants, no effort would be made to compare a Chinese gain in industry with a U.S. gain in science, but ten different running scores would be kept, so that comparisons could be
made at any moment of the relative positions of the contending powers in any of the ten areas. To assign meaningful numerical quantities to the starting positions of the competitors and to each of their subsequent moves, the Dyers suggest that an operational research team be employed. (This and other gainful intelligence employment for operations research might be a good subject for a future issue of this journal.)

From air battle and foreign policy games to intelligence games with computers does not appear to be a very broad jump. Intelligence operations certainly have diplomatic and military parallels. With the beginnings made in these fields we could take it from there. Intelligence games, like the others, might vastly assist not only in training but in testing operational proposals and in developing doctrine.

All A is Not B and So Forth

There will arise problems, or parts of problems, that cannot be solved by arithmetic operations, no matter how ingenious the quantifiers and their systems or how swift the computers. There will be points at which a “yes” or “no” is what the user needs from the machine. But here again, the people who construct computers have made a good start on the task of attacking non-mathematical—i.e., logical—problems. Logic machines date back, in fact, to the thirteenth century, when a Spanish theologian and visionary named Ramon Lull was the first to embark on such gadgetry. Others after him invented improved devices to prove whether a certain major premise and a certain minor premise led to a certain conclusion and to solve other more complex problems. It was not until the advent of electronic computers in the twentieth century, however, that a really spectacular advance in logic machine principles could be made. If life is a lot more complicated these days than it was in Lull’s, at least we have some pretty sophisticated hardware to help in simplifying it.

The principles involved in translating into machine language such ideas as “A is either B or not B” are, after all, much like those of translating numbers from the decimal system to the computer’s binary system, wherein all numbers are expressed as a series of ones and zeros. Computers can
therefore tackle either arithmetic or logic problems by making use of the basic fact of electronic life that any part of a circuit has to be in one of two states—on or off. This characteristic permits comparisons and tests which essentially guide the computer through the logical decision-making process.

What the limitations on computer capabilities really are is anybody’s guess. The late John Von Neumann speculated on this question from a novel angle a few years back. He set out, in preparation for a lecture series at Yale, to draw comparisons between the most advanced computers of the day and the human brain, but drew them not on the basis of relative problem-solving capabilities or memories or any other aspect of performance but rather on the basis of structure as complexes of divisible parts. He looked at how these parts were assembled, how large they were, what their circuitry was, how fast they operated. Despite having worked at maximum capacity right up until his death in 1956, Von Neumann was unable to finish his study, and mankind was the loser. It may be surmised from what he did complete, though, that he might in the end have reached the conclusion that there were no significant qualitative differences between the computer and the brain and that scientific advances would inevitably narrow the quantitative gaps.

What and Whom Do You Know?

Backing away for a moment from what computers will some day be able to do, let’s concern ourselves with their well-known current capabilities for storing and indexing information.

One day recently, some months after a certain operation involving a piece of real estate in a remote area, a case officer unconnected with the operation commented to a colleague, “I probably know that area better than anyone in the government; I’ve been duck-hunting there many times.” Could this officer’s knowledge of the area have been of use to those planning the operation? Very probably. Would they have had any rapid way of finding out except by sheer accident whether anyone in the organization had such knowledge? No, they would not. Until the past few years, there has been
no practical way to index all of the experience and talents of all of our personnel.

We have made a start, it is true, using IBM cards. It is possible to learn through machine runs how many married, German-speaking men between 33 and 35 years old with civil engineering degrees and naval service there are in the Central Intelligence Agency. But to record even this basic data taxes the capacities of the card systems in current use. Should we decide to do so, we could, over a span of a few years, index personnel knowledge and skills to a degree never before dreamed of, using more advanced forms of electronic data processing.

In a television drama a few months back, a private organization was supposed to have compiled just such data on millions of U.S. citizens. The story concerned the search by a federal agency for a man who (1) was a barber, (2) knew a lot about stamp-collecting, and (3) could pick locks. The company found the man, the agency put his talents to use, and by the end of the program Yankee ingenuity had triumphed over a slick international narcotics ring. The real hero of the story was the computer—they must have used one—that pinpointed the right man for the job. It may be less than reckless to suggest that a comparable capability to match backgrounds to job requirements might be helpful in intelligence operations.

Or take the matter of acquaintances. It is our suspicion that in many cases where someone in an intelligence organization has an interest in someone outside of it, American or foreign, there may well be sitting down the hall and two floors up from him someone who knows the object of his interest personally. If he doesn’t know him directly, he knows someone who is directly acquainted with him. Let’s just consider American citizens. Suppose that each employee of an organization knows 1000 Americans outside of the organization. Then for every 1000 employees there are 1,000,000 Americans who are known directly. Allowing for a 50% duplication rate, there remain 500,000 Americans who are known to at least one employee of the organization. These half million in turn know 1000 each, or a total of 500,000,000 people. Cutting again for duplications we are left with 250,000,000 people.
Maybe these figures are high, but they at least suggest that very few of our 180,000,000 American citizens are more than one step removed from direct acquaintance with someone in an organization of several thousand people.

Some interesting conclusions could be drawn from a similar approach to the question of what foreign citizens have ties of acquaintance, direct or indirect, to the staff of an intelligence organization. Would it be worth the expense to collect such information and keep it current? That is not for us to decide, but we can say that without the vast and infallible memory of a computer such an undertaking would be unthinkable.

Political Weather Forecasts

Among the many publications issued in the intelligence community is the rather recent "Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations." Among other kinds of crisis, it calls the attention of its readers to those countries of the world where things seem to be going not too well for the governments in power. The judgments on which countries belong where on the weekly list are made by competent, seasoned political analysts. Without for a moment questioning their qualifications for the job, we wonder if their work could not be effectively improved, say by around 1975, with electronic data processing.

More specifically, there might first be established a numerical scale called the "stability index" or something similar. Each country around the globe would initially be given a rating along this scale. A number near the maximum would describe a highly stable government, e.g., Switzerland's, while one near zero would denote a tottering regime. Once this rating had been assigned, every intelligence report affecting that country thereafter would be assigned a number, plus or minus or zero, reflecting the impact of the events reported upon the country's stability. These figures would be fed into a computer as fast as they were received. As often as necessary, the net result of the input could be recovered, perhaps printed out in the form of a "daily world political weather map."
Would this form of automation sell short the political wisdom of the analyst? No, it would not. In the first place, the index could not replace the written analysis but only supplement it. In the second place, any such system would acknowledgedly have plenty of bugs in it which the experts would take months or years to work out. And in the third place, the assignment of numerical values to the reports would be an exacting job, involving several levels of rechecking by highly knowledgeable people.

The system would have advantages beyond the instant production of concentrated political judgment: It would provide a basis for quantitative comparison of a given situation with other regions and other times that would be more revealing than verbal description. By drawing more people into the appraisal process, it would also reduce the effect that any single analyst’s biases, permanent or temporary, conscious or subconscious, might otherwise have on the final product. Finally, it would automatically insure that all of the available intelligence is taken into consideration and would guard against the inadvertent omission of pertinent data by a harried senior analyst under pressure.

*The Electronica Britannica*

IBM has developed for public use a computer-based system called the “Selective Disseminator of Information.” Intended for large organizations dealing with heterogeneous masses of information, it scans all incoming material and delivers those items that are of interest to specific officers in accordance with “profiles” of their needs which are continuously updated by a feed-back device. Any comment here on the potential of the SDI for an intelligence agency would be superfluous; Air Intelligence has in fact been experimenting with such a mechanized dissemination system for some years.

As a final thought, how about a machine that would send via closed-circuit television visual and oral information needed immediately at high-level conferences or briefings? Let’s say that a group of senior officers are contemplating a covert action program for Afghanistan. Things go well until someone asks, “Well, just how many schools are there in the country, and what is the literacy rate?” No one in the room knows.
(Remember, this is an imaginary situation.) So the junior member present dials a code number into a device at one end of the table. Thirty seconds later, on the screen overhead, a teletype printer begins to hammer out the required data. Before the meeting is over, the group has been given through the same method the names of countries that have airlines into Afghanistan, a biographical profile of the Soviet ambassador there, and the Pakistani order of battle along the Afghanistan frontier. Neat, no?

If and when computers begin to perform these and other functions, the effects will be felt fairly rapidly by every one of us, or, more likely, by the next generation of intelligence officers. Since all intelligence information will be processed by the computers, we (or they) will need to know the fundamentals of their construction and operation. Formats will change. So will collection requirements. Nearly everyone will have to go through new training. Many operational decisions formerly based on some research and a lot of educated guesswork will be reached only after consultation with the computer. A new language will be spoken; words like “digital,” “analog,” “programming,” “game theory,” “Boolean algebra,” “Monte Carlo method,” “stochastic process” will be commonplace. And “the monster” (as it is sure to be known) will provide a convenient target for almost all grievances, including many that no one has thought up yet.

Why do we need the computer? Partly, because of the staggering tasks and the shrinking time limits imposed on us by the space-age cold war, we need to delegate to it routine, repetitive arithmetical and logical calculations, thereby permitting fuller application of human skills to problems of judgment. But we also need it because it is available to us, because with it we can do jobs that we could never have done without it, “because,” as the inveterate Alpinist explained, “it’s there.”

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Intelligence in Public Literature

What’s Next? Recent Works on Improving Intelligence Analysis


Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

Improving intelligence analysis has become something of a cottage industry during the past decade. The three books reviewed here cover the range of work by scholars and former intelligence officers offering ideas about how to do analysis better. The key questions to ask as this flood of books crests are: what value does each new work add, and does it focus on the right issues?

Sarah Beebe and Randolph Pherson provide a welcome addition to the work on structured analytic techniques in *Cases in Intelligence Analysis*. Beebe and Pherson both had careers with CIA and have a good sense of intelligence analysis and the pitfalls new analysts are likely to encounter. *Cases* is aimed at new analysts and strives to teach tools for tackling different kinds of problems. Their book goes beyond similar works focused on structured analytic techniques (SATs) by providing case studies to demonstrate how and when to use different kinds of analytic methods for evaluating information and approaching intelligence problems.

Beebe and Pherson’s book is straightforward. Each case provides step-by-step instructions on how to execute one or more SATs relevant to each case. The authors also give an overview of each case’s policy context, hammering home the purpose of analysis. Their book will be of most value to those teaching new analysts and analysts wanting to brush up on methods used in the Intelligence Community (IC).

Each of the 12 case studies is self-contained, and the examples range across recent domestic and international events. This should appeal to analysts from across the IC, especially those working in agencies with substantial analytical components—specifically, CIA, DIA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI.

Some of the names the authors assign to the SATs are over the top, however. For example, “starbursting” is nothing more than asking basic questions such as who, what, when, where, how, and why. Beebe and Pherson provide a useful chart at the beginning of the book that lists the cases along with the applicable SATs so one can quickly focus on a specific technique. They also provide helpful cross-references to earlier work by Pherson and Richards Heuer, which provides additional information on the various SATs. Many of the chapters—e.g., “Who Poisoned Karinna Moskalenko?” “Is Wen Ho Lee a Spy?” “Who Murdered Jonathan Luna?” “The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto,” “The Atlanta Olympic Bombing,” and “The DC Sniper”—seem geared toward political analysts and have a bit of a whodunit feel. Techniques and case studies appealing to economic and leadership analysts would be a welcome addition.

At the opposite end of the spectrum from Beebe and Pherson’s how-to guide is *Intelligence Analysis*, the National Research Council’s (NRC) response to a request by the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence (ODNI) to leverage academic thinking about how social science disciplines can improve intelligence analysis. The book groups stand-alone chapters by leading academics addressing analytic methods, analysts and their mindsets, and organizations. It provides a handy reference to the range of social science work that could be useful for improving analysis. Most intelligence practitioners and policymakers probably will find the chapters overly theoretical, but scholars studying how to improve intelligence analysis will get a lot out of this volume because it represents the state of academic debate on the subject.

Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Analysis Thomas Fingar provides the volume’s introductory chapter. He surveys the IC and discusses its demographic problems, highlights difficulties intelligence analysts face, and describes a heady world in which intelligence analysts try to meet the demands of busy policymakers.

The authors of each of the remaining chapters cite the foundational literature in their fields and spur some debate among themselves about improving intelligence analysis. Chapters by Edward Kaplan, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Gary McClelland provide rich overviews of organizational research design, game theory, and signal detection, respectively. The main thrust here is to highlight analytic tools, without consideration of the analyst using them.

Bringing analysts and their work groups into the picture, Barbara Spellman, Hal Arkes, James Kajdasz, Reid Hastie, and Catherine Tinsley deliver chapters on cognitive processes and social dynamics. The authors draw heavily from psychology and sociology to address how information interpretation, the desire for more and more information, expertise, and social group dynamics affect analysis.

Baruch Fischhoff, Philip Tetlock, Barbara Mellers, Steve Kozlowski, and Amy Zegart conclude the volume by grappling with the IC from an organizational perspective. They address organizational communication, accountability, human resource management, macro learning behaviors, and difficulties with organizational change. As an example of the academic debates among the NRC’s contributors, Zegart squares off against Kozlowski to argue that studies of successful private sector companies should not be applied to public sector institutions (i.e., IC agencies) because those studies suffer from massive selection bias. In other words, studying “best practices” of certain successful companies may not be useful for improving intelligence because these studies show only what has worked, not why some practices have worked or why others failed.

Stephen Marrin’s book, *Improving Intelligence Analysis*, falls somewhere between the work of Beebe and Pherson and the NRC volume. Most students of intelligence analysis these days are familiar with Marrin’s work because he has published a number of articles and contributed to book chapters about improving analysis, and he has been an active leader in the intelligence section of the International Studies Association. Until recently, Marrin taught at Brunel University in the United Kingdom. He also worked at the CIA for about three years in the late 1990s.

*Improving Intelligence Analysis* is Marrin’s first book. It is a combination of previously published articles and new material. The book spans classic topics such as the gap between intelligence scholarship and practice, whether analysis is an art or a science, the training and education of analysts, and the debate about intelligence analysis as a craft or a profession. Marrin delivers an overarching and terse missive to both practitioners and academics: academic scholarship can improve analysis, but only if intelligence analysts know and understand the academic literature. To bring this argument forward, most of the book’s chapters read like literature reviews, with long citations from key articles about intelligence analysis written in the last 50 years, with little added value from Marrin.

Intelligence practitioners probably will scoff at much of what Marrin presents. His critiques of analysis focus almost exclusively on the CIA and, in many cases, he refers to dated intelligence products, technology, and processes. This rightfully raises questions about how well he understands how intelligence analysis is done. Academics might complain the book lacks a theoretical thread tying the chapters together. Despite these problems, Marrin’s book covers a wide swath of intelligence literature. Marrin also sprinkles throughout his book a key point that one wishes he had developed further. Indeed, it is something of shot across the bow to works like the others reviewed in this article. Marrin points out that no one really knows if the use of structured analytic techniques actually produces better intelligence analysis. He explains there is simply a paucity of data on and study of the results.
Having some method for doing analysis is better than having none, and striving to improve analysis is an important task. All three books add some value in this regard, though Beebe and Pherson’s book and the NCR’s volume probably provide more substance than Marrin’s work. Future research should concentrate on two key areas. Picking up on Marrin’s point—assessing whether social science methods, and SATs in particular, improve analysis—is essential. McClelland’s chapter in the NCR volume provides a good starting point with ideas about evaluating analytic performance and tradecraft. This will be a tough task for academics, since all but a small part of the IC’s work is classified and even those, like Pherson and Beebe, who teach these methods are unlikely to gain sufficient access to published products to make solid judgments.

Another potentially fruitful area for investigation is how intelligence analysts and analysis are managed. Intelligence managers have virtually no hand in applying SATs or initially drafting intelligence products, but they play a vital role in finalizing products and evaluating analysts. As a result, managerial influence in the analytic process bears examination, but it has been left out of nearly all the recent work.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence

I.C. Smith and Nigel West. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 359 pp., index.

Reviewed by Peter Mattis

Inasmuch as the best analytic books on Chinese intelligence were written more than a decade ago,1 and as concerns about Chinese intelligence activity aimed at the United States and other countries have grown with the exposure of a great many Chinese spies and the explosion of computer network exploitation attributed to the Chinese, any new, English-language production on the subject is of intense interest. Thus, the collaboration of former FBI counterintelligence specialist I.C. Smith and the prolific intelligence historian Nigel West in producing the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence would seem to be a welcome development. Unfortunately, the dictionary is incomplete, often misleading, and ultimately it provides a shaky foundation for building understanding of the challenge.

The book contains three parts: a chronology of Chinese intelligence, an analytic introduction to Chinese intelligence operations, and the lengthy dictionary, ostensibly of Chinese intelligence-related matters: countries, organizations, personalities, cyberintrusion sets, and events. The entries are usefully cross-referenced and, with few exceptions, well organized. On its technical merits, the book makes a lot of material readily accessible. The book’s strongest element is its comprehensive coverage of economic espionage cases, even if the authors mistakenly attribute many of them to the Chinese intelligence services.2 I.C. Smith’s background with the FBI helps in the way in which individual cases are followed and gives readers a sense of the breadth of Chinese efforts to acquire foreign technologies.

Regrettably, too many substantive mistakes make the entries difficult to take at face value. Without supporting citations, the book is merely an index rather than the authoritative source one might wish for.

This reviewer is also left without a clear sense of how Smith and West decided what to include in the dictionary. The lengthy chronology is emblematic of this. There one finds Puyi named emperor of China in 1908, (xxi) but there is no entry for the creation of the first Chinese communist intelligence service in 1927.3 Readers will be distracted by entries, among others, on Richard Sorge; (246–47) Uzbekistan; (278) a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force entry that does not mention its intelligence capabilities but has an extended blow-by-blow of cross-Strait dogfights; (209–13) and a “Chinese Naval Strength” entry—not listed as PLA Navy (60–62)—which counts ships but does not address the service’s intelligence department.

The PLA’s services do warrant coverage, given the Chinese effort to transform them into “informatized” forces,4 but the failure to include the Second Artillery (missile forces) is baffling. Many of China’s most important new weapons, e.g., the long-range DH-10 land attack cruise missile and the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, as well as its growing arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles, require high-fidelity intelligence for targeting and bomb damage assessment.

This weakness becomes even more apparent in the way Smith and West handle China’s intelligence personalities. Only two of the four ministers of state security are listed—Xu Yongyue, (1998–2007, pp. 296–97) and Geng Huichang (2007–present, p. 100)—and these entries are incomplete even by the standards of English-language sources.5 Omitted are the first minister of state security, Ling Yun (1983–85), whose only references are misspelled, (38, 301), and the long-serving Jia Chunwang (1985–1998), who oversaw the Ministry of State Security (MSS) expansion to nationwide coverage but is only mentioned as Xu’s predecessor. (296)
The personalities of the Second Department of the PLA General Staff Department (2PLA), the principal military intelligence service, receive even less coverage—for example, current PLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Ma Xiaotian (recently promoted to command of the PLA Air Force); recent 2PLA directors Yang Hui and Chen Youyi; and former 2PLA director Chen Xiaogong, who advised President Hu Jintao, all go unmentioned. Probably the most important figure in Chinese intelligence in the last two decades, Xiong Guangkai, gets only an out-of-date mention as head of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). Smith and West’s choices on historical figures in Chinese intelligence have some curious omissions (e.g., Chen Geng, Qian Zhuangfei, and Wang Dongxing) and give short shrift to others who played important roles from the 1920s on, e.g., Li Kenong; however, they add useful entries on important figures less well-known outside China, such as Xiong Xianghui, who was a senior intelligence officer and diplomat.

While it would be unfair to criticize those without Chinese-language skills for failing to draw on the growing number of Chinese publications on the subject, the authors do not use the rich sinology literature in English where it would inform their analysis. The accounting of the research institutes connected to the intelligence service is error-prone and incomplete, for example, connecting the MSS bureau, known as the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), to the 2PLA (229). 2PLA, however, controls CIISS and probably the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies. The former received short treatment, while the latter was omitted entirely. Moreover, the authors call CICIR a cover organization—its analysts will admit their affiliation and CICIR is as it presents itself—and imply it serves as the analytic bureau for all mainland intelligence, not just the MSS (56). These mistakes could easily have been avoided by consulting either a special issue of The China Quarterly published in 2002 or a RAND study from 1998 on the military’s role in the making of Chinese foreign policy.

Where it is fair to criticize Smith and West for their lack of Chinese-language research is their sweeping assertion of Chinese concepts of intelligence: “In the Chinese language, there is no real distinction between ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ in common usage.” (220). This may be technically true in the narrowest sense; however, in Chinese, “intelligence” implies action-related information. Qian Xuesen, another well-covered historical figure, described intelligence as “activating knowledge” (jihuo de zhishi). But it goes much further than that. China’s equivalent of the Oxford English Dictionary, Cihai, carried an entry for “intelligence” as early as 1915: “wartime reports on the adversary’s condition” (zhanshi guanyu diqing zhi baogao). More recently, the Academy of Military Science—the PLA’s highest-level research organization that supports senior policymaking—most authoritatively stated all forms of intelligence “are to satisfy the needs of a particular domain, using various means to obtain and disseminate the knowledge.” “Particular domain” means decision making in competitive situations, like war or defense planning, requiring intelligence to be targeted, timely, and accurate as well as continuously adjusting to circumstances while trying to get out ahead of events. The word “intelligence” in Chinese clearly is more distinct from “information” than the authors assert. This mistaken assertion, however, underpins Smith and West’s belief that Chinese intelligence operates in a fundamentally different way than do their Western and Russian counterparts. Intelligence, whether in China or the United States, is about filling in knowledge gaps for better decision making. More than 30 years ago, China had few interests abroad and less need for the advantage classified or protected information confers, but that has changed—as has the role of the Chinese party-state. The changing scope of Beijing’s foreign policy and national interests is likely to be driving a comparable shift in Chinese intelligence operations. Historical research should provide a reliable baseline for analysts to assess this evolution. The Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence simply declares they exist and does not attempt to make Smith and West’s case for the perspective or explaining possible differences.

Intelligence, whether in China or the United States, is about filling in knowledge gaps for better decision making. More than 30 years ago, China had few interests abroad and less need for the advantage classified or protected information confers, but that has changed—as has the role of the Chinese party-state. Today, the changing scope of Beijing’s foreign policy and national interests is likely to be driving a comparable shift in Chinese intelligence operations. Historical research should provide a reliable baseline for analysts to assess this evolution. The Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence might have filled this need. Instead, it ignores these changes and preserves mistaken impressions of China as monolithic and its intelligence services as omnipresent.
Readings:

1. Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994); Howard DeVore, China's Intelligence and Internal Security Forces (Coulson, UK: Jane's Information Group, 1999).

2. China’s theft of foreign technologies takes many forms, ranging from the intelligence services to research institutes to companies and criminal entrepreneurs. The most systematic research to come to grips with China’s economic espionage, the Cox Committee, concluded, “Those unfamiliar with Chinese intelligence practices often conclude that, because intelligence services conduct clandestine operations, all clandestine operations are directed by intelligence agencies. In the case of [China], this is not always the rule.” See, The Cox Report: The Unanimous and Bipartisan Report of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), 52–53.

3. This fact could have been found in several of the books listed in the bibliography, including John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng-the Evil Genius Behind Mao and His Legacy of Terror in People’s China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 93–94; Yu Maochun, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 33–35.


7. Choi Chi-yuk, “Central Asia Expert to Head PLA Intelligence—Well-Educated Specialist is Familiar with Region Next to Xinjiang and Is Not a Known Princeling,” South China Morning Post, 12 January 2012.


11. 2PLA has three or four of its own analytic bureaus, depending on which source is used. See, Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, 78–84, 86; Kan Zhongguo, “Intelligence Agencies Exist in Great Numbers, Spies Are Present Everywhere; China’s Major Intelligence Departments Fully Exposed;” Chien Shao (Hong Kong), 1 January 2006; DeVore, China’s Intelligence and Internal Security Forces, Section 4-2.

12. China Quarterly 171 (September 2002) special issue includes essays covering the entirety of China’s think tank landscape, including those belonging to the military and intelligence apparatus. The relevant articles were authored by leading analysts of China’s national security and foreign policymaking: Bates Gill, Bonnie Glaser, James Mulvenon, Phillip Saunders, David Shambaugh, and Murray Scot Tanner. See, also, Michael Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998); Tai Ming Cheung, “The Impact


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The Emergency State: America’s Pursuit of Absolute Security at All Costs


Reviewed by Samuel Cooper-Wall

“Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been at war with Eastasia,” the government of Big Brother assured its subjects. In truth, its allies and enemies were in a constant state of flux, but the dazed, gullible, and insufficiently educated public was incapable of knowing the difference.¹

The United States government as described by New York Times editorialist David Unger doesn’t compare to the regime in George Orwell’s 1984. Nevertheless, Unger does paint a rather disturbing picture in The Emergency State. He argues that for the past 70 years, the imperial presidency and the nation’s security apparatus, anchored by the CIA, Defense Department, and National Security Council, have sustained the aura of a permanent state of emergency in America. These agencies have undertaken a “desperate search” for enemies in order to justify their large budgets while slighting constitutional protections. Enemies have changed; institutions and policies have not.

Even worse, each president, regardless of party affiliation, has wittingly sustained this culture, thanks in part to a public that has become so accustomed to this arrangement that few can imagine the US government not at war, not staring down an enemy. The irony, Unger postulates, is that the presidents and the nation’s security organizations have simultaneously been ineffective in satisfying their mission to make the country more secure.

Unger’s solutions revolve around a grassroots movement to instigate a fresh debate about America’s place in the world for the 21st century. He projects that this debate will dismantle the emergency state, empower Congress toward more effective oversight, compel the president to abide by constraints like the War Powers Act, limit the classification system only to select information including sources and methods, and establish national security policies that won’t hinder the country’s economic progress.

Some of Unger’s recommendations are strong, others problematic yet interesting. In the aggregate they offer relevant arguments and food for thought, making this book a worthwhile read for those involved in intelligence and national security. The thrust of his arguments, however, are far more complex and require special scrutiny.

Unger’s narrative walks readers through the slow but steady growth of the emergency state, president by president, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt “tap dancing around the neutrality acts” to provide support to Great Britain, enlisting J. Edgar Hoover for domestic surveillance, and authorizing the Japanese internment. Most importantly, Unger accuses Roosevelt of fueling what will become the military industrial complex by providing tax breaks to companies involved in war production.

Having been isolated from foreign policy decision making before succeeding Roosevelt, Harry Truman feared his Fair Deal domestic program would stall in an unresponsive Congress if he didn’t show firm resolve in dealing with Joseph Stalin. Senator Joe McCarthy’s “red scare” in the early 1950s only reinforced Truman’s fears. Therefore, he backed away

¹ George Orwell, 1984 (Fairfield, IA: 1st World Library Literary Society, 2004), 44, 228.
from collective security with the Soviets and instead bought into George Kennan’s theory of containment.

What followed Truman was an array of successors whose unique approaches to the national security apparatus ultimately met the same end: sustaining or expanding the emergency state. Taken collectively, these presidents all laid the groundwork for George W. Bush, whose administration took executive power to a new level with two wars, the Patriot Act, and detainee controversies at Abu-Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.

Unger’s book has excellent points and serious flaws, several of which deserve special attention, including his argument that the United States has struggled with identifying and managing global threats. He correctly reminds readers that dictators such as Saddam Hussein and Manuel Noriega did not pose as serious a threat to the United States as originally thought. Yet his analysis of the Cold War gives the Soviet Union too much credit. That Nikita Khrushchev’s reforms, for example, signaled a Soviet interest in reducing Cold War tensions that the Eisenhower administration failed to exploit is half true. Yet it is unclear how Unger reconciles the Khrushchev seeking a détente with the Khrushchev who spat vitriol at the United States, crushed the 1956 revolt in Hungary, and issued the Berlin ultimatum just two years later.

Unger also repeatedly claims that the war on terrorism is being fought with an outdated mentality and is not strengthening the nation’s security. However, while national security programs and policy can surely be reformed to improve effectiveness, Unger largely ignores the government’s track record against al-Qa’ida and other entities since 9/11. In fact, the DNI’s Threat Report to Congress earlier this year argues that al-Qa’ida, while still posing danger, has had its leadership decimated, its cohesiveness cracked, and its ability to coordinate with other movements in the global jihad severely curtailed. In his haste to rein in the executive branch, Unger is willing to throw the baby out with the bathwater. In the depths of the Cold War, Allen Dulles wrote, “It is not our intelligence organization [and by extension, our national security apparatus] which threatens our liberties. The threat is rather that we will not be adequately informed of the perils which face us and that we will fail to act in time.” The impact of the war on terrorism has demonstrated a redeeming value of the national security realm that Unger would rather neglect for the sake of his argument.

Also of concern is the role of the CIA in Unger’s book. Despite calling the Agency out as a culprit of the emergency state, his emphasis lies far more with military spending and how the US maintains its controversial global interests. The OSS, Oleg Penkovsky, intelligence reports to Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War, and other highlights in intelligence history are neglected or barely mentioned. While Unger’s favored subjects—the ramifications of covert action, the Bay of Pigs, MKULTRA, and Iran-Contra—are failures or grave errors that must be articulated, the bias with which he paints the Agency is obvious.

Unger’s partiality can perhaps best be rebutted by the conclusion of another former DCI, Stansfield Turner: “Those who criticize our intelligence as a threat to our society’s values and those who would condone any kind of intrusion into our personal privacy for the sake of the nation’s security are both wrong.” What Turner alludes to is a middle ground in national security, both in its contemporary policymaking and in its history. A fair treatment of this subject matter—the effectiveness, structure, and future of the CIA and national security collectively—might provoke exactly the kind of national discussion Unger would like to start. His book will not be the one to achieve this, however, as he too often dissolves into one-sided commentary that answers too few questions in an effort to win new converts.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

The Tourist Trilogy: The New Genre?


Reviewed by John Ehrman

A wise critic once observed that the worst thing that could happen to a rising rock musician was to be hailed as the next Bob Dylan. Almost invariably, the subjects of such praise soon fade into obscurity and the publicists begin hunting for the next prodigy/victim. So it is, too, in the world of espionage novels. Since the end of the Cold War, reviewers have searched for a new writer to inherit the mantles of Graham Greene, Len Deighton, and John le Carré as the new master of the espionage genre, and all have fallen short. (Has it been only four years since a Washington Post reviewer told us that Joseph Weisberg’s now-forgotten An Ordinary Spy “recalls Graham Greene”?) Now the critics have settled on a new candidate, Olen Steinhauer, who has completed three novels focusing on the next ostensible spy for our times, Milo Weaver. “Not since John Le Carré,” the New York Times declares, “has a writer so vividly evoked the multilayered, multifaceted, deeply paranoid world of espionage.” Great praise, indeed.

At the same time, however, this praise has a definite backward-looking tone. The classic Cold War espionage novels appeared in a comparatively brief period, starting in the early 1960s and petering out, roughly, in the mid-1980s. This era stretched from Deighton’s The Ipcress File (1962) and le Carré’s The Spy Who Came In From the Cold (1963), through le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1973) and Greene’s The Human Factor (1978), and then ended with Deighton’s Game, Set, and Match trilogy (1983–85). The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the definite end of that period. Deighton published espionage fiction in the 1990s and le Carré still soldiers on, but no espionage writer today—not even David Ignatius or Alan Furst—has matched the combination of literary quality, wit, and political sophistication that came from working when the Cold War seemed destined to go on forever. Indeed, one could easily conclude that it has been almost 30 years since an espionage novel has reached classic status.

The Cold War espionage novel did not appear out of nowhere, fully formed, in 1962. As we know it, the genre comes from England, where it took form in the early 1900s. This was a period of political anxiety and war, and it produced such pioneering works as Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907) and John Buchan’s The Thirty-Nine Steps (1915). The spy novel continued to develop in the interwar period, led by the work of another British writer, Eric Ambler. The hallmark of these novels is their focus on the innocent amateur, usually someone caught up in events or a plot that he does not understand. This, in turn, reflects the pre-World War II intelligence world—one of small services that were bureaucratically and professionally much less developed than

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c For a discussion of such works in the United Kingdom see Dr. Christopher R. Moran and Dr. Robert Johnson “In the Service of Empire: Imperialism and the British Spy Thriller, 1901–1914” in Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 2 (June 2010).

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
they would be after the war. Even as the amateur hero gave way in the popular imagination to James Bond, however, the older framework lived on in film. Two of Alfred Hitchcock’s best movies, *The Man Who Knew Too Much* (1956) and *North by Northwest* (1958), carried on the theme of the innocent swept up in events.

Then, suddenly, the genre changed dramatically. The major authors continued to be exclusively British, but overnight, the amateurs and the fantasies of Bond disappeared, replaced by a completely different protagonist. Deighton’s nameless hero (later given the name Harry Palmer in the movie versions of his books) and Bernard Samson, le Carré’s George Smiley and Control, and Adam Hall’s Quiller were professional intelligence officers with experience going back to the war or earlier. They now worked for modern, faceless bureaucracies—Palmer’s W.O.O.C. (P), Smiley’s Circus, Samson’s Department—which are, in turn, enmeshed in larger political games. At the same time, the heroes are alienated from these organizations and their politics. Rather than promote their own careers and play the games necessary to advance in rank, they focus on seeing through the dangerous assignments they are given. Thus, says le Carré about Alec Leamas, in *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold*: “You might as well have asked a jockey to become a betting clerk as expect Leamas to abandon operational life for the tendentious theorizing and clandestine self-interest of Whitehall.” Their alienation, of course, is reinforced by the knowledge that, even as they go about their work, they have not been told the entire story or plan. They are pawns to be manipulated and betrayal is routine, as Leamas learns at the end—“Suddenly, with the terrible clarity of a man too long deceived, Leamas understood the whole ghastly trick.”

Even as British authors continued to dominate the espionage genre, however, a distinctly American influence crept in. Anyone reading about Palmer, Smiley, Quiller, or Samson can recognize their predecessors in the American hard-boiled detectives of the 1920s and onward—Dashiell Hammett’s Sam Spade and Continental Op, Raymond Chandler’s Philip Marlowe, and Ross Macdonald’s Lew Archer. These were tough and honest men, relentless in their hunt for the truth amidst corruption, and unable to accept higher authority. The plots, too, are the same. The lone operative, given a puzzling assignment, perseveres despite betrayals and orders to back off. He could be Marlowe in *The Big Sleep* (1939) or Palmer in *Ipcress*.

Where the American idiom goes, sex and violence are sure to follow. Women either have secondary roles in the male environment of the hard-boiled detective, like Spade’s loyal secretary, Effie Perine, or are cast as lying and manipulative schemers, like Marlowe’s clients, the Sternwood sisters. So it is when the setting shifts across the Atlantic. Palmer has his secretary and girlfriend Jean, but Smiley suffers through his marriage to the serially unfaithful Lady Anne, with whom the traitor Bill Haydon carries on an affair to throw him off track. The threat of violence, too, is omnipresent, though the detectives never seek it out or become willing killers. Instead, they prefer to bring down the villains by applying intelligence to outmaneuver them—for example, Sam Spade sets out to avenge his partner’s death, but he kills no one. The same goes for the spies. Smiley tracks down the traitor and eventually turns Karla, the chief of Soviet counterintelligence, without violence; Palmer kills, but reluctantly and in self-defense.

The American influence also brought a new sense of self-awareness to the spy novel. The detectives had seen themselves as men of honor, able to live in a corrupt world only because they followed a stern code. “When a man’s partner is killed, he’s supposed to do something about it,” Spade famously tells Brigid O’Shaughnessy. “It doesn’t make any difference what you thought of him. He was your partner and you’re supposed to do something about it.” Transplanted to the Cold War, the individual code survived but was joined by an ambivalent political and ideological consciousness. Le Carré developed this to the highest level, and his novels are well noted for their atmospherics of decline and decay, reflecting England’s postwar deterioration. “The political posture of the United Kingdom is without relevance or moral viability in world affairs,” the traitor Haydon tells Smiley at the end of *Tinker, Tailor*. “Smiley might, in other circumstances, have agreed: it was the tone, rather than the music, that alienated him.” Nonetheless, Smiley stands out as the last “illusionless man,” in Haydon’s words and, having caught the traitor, gives up his retirement to return to the Circus and rebuild it. Two books later, in *Smiley’s People* (1979), he deals a decisive blow against Soviet counterintelligence by forcing Karla to defect, and one can almost hear Sam Spade applauding Smiley for having done something about Haydon’s treason.

For ideological commentary, it is hard to top Greene. As Maurice Castle, the English intelligence
The Tourist Trilogy

officer who is a Soviet mole, prepares to flee to Moscow, he is assisted by an English communist, Halliday. Castle, who spied for personal reasons, not ideology, knows that his life in Moscow will be lonely and dreary, and he is unenthusiastic about his defection, but Halliday, who never has been to Moscow, stands firmly by the vision of it as a paradise. “Oh, well, I tell myself when I’m feeling low, Marx never knew Moscow either.” Halliday is a man of illusions, but in Greene’s telling, both he and Castle are tragic characters.

This is what it means to inherit the legacy of Deighton, le Carré, or Greene. Their works are marked by irony and a sense of tragedy, but their characters have enough depth so they never veer into self-pity, nihilism, or other forms of self-destruction. This combination allows the authors to have something worthwhile to say about politics, society, and the human condition without sounding preachy or obvious. To be their heir is a large burden to bear, for the ambitious espionage writer cannot be simply a storyteller, content to entertain, but will be called on to do much more. This, then, brings us to the core question: does Steinhauer measure up?

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Steinhauer’s trilogy tells us that there exists a supersecret CIA component, the Department of Tourism. Based in an office building in Manhattan, the Department oversees some three dozen officers—so-called Tourists, of whom Milo Weaver is one—who roam the world, using advanced tradecraft and ever-changing identities to carry out their orders, which usually involve assassinations and other mayhem, rather than anything resembling actual intelligence collection. Tourists are expected to carry out their orders without question, regardless of how brutal or seemingly pointless they might be, and the plot of the three books revolves around the unintended consequences of one of their missions. As part of a plan to reduce Chinese influence in the Sudan, a Tourist assassinates a local leader and, in the riots that follow, a young Chinese man is killed. He turns out to be the son of Xin Zhu, a Chinese master spy, and in the second book, Zhu takes his revenge by penetrating the Tourists’ communications and sending them on missions to kill one another. Only a few, including Weaver, survive. The third volume revolves around a complex game of revenge-seeking by the surviving Tourists while Zhu searches for a CIA mole in Beijing.

All of this, of course, is far more complicated than a brief summary can suggest. As pure entertainment, these three books are terrific reads. Steinhauer certainly knows how to tell a tale, the action moves along quickly, and the twists keep the reader wondering what’s next and how it all will work out. None of these books is easy to put down. They are all great vacation reading.

Much of the reason the books succeed is that they fit comfortably into the framework of the Cold War espionage novel. Steinhauer is not out to reinvent the genre or challenge his readers but, instead, to give them exactly what they are used to and enjoy. Corrupt politicians, bureaucratic snakes, and treachery from within are all present, as expected. With Zhu, we get an up-to-the-minute adversary, playing to current anxieties just as vengeful Nazis did in The Quiller Memorandum (1965). Steinhauer gives us his comments on the world, and Milo—disillusioned and exhausted—wants to leave the brutality of Tourism so he can spend time with his family but is manipulated back into the battle against Zhu. The reader is on familiar and comfortable ground.

As enjoyable as the books are, however, once we start looking at them closely, their flaws become all too apparent. The stories are improbably and needlessly elaborate, with the main plots surrounded by a web of subplots that come and go. Sometimes these are resolved and sometimes not, and they bring with them a large supporting cast of minor characters who also drop in and out of the story. Much of this is just complication for its own sake, and many of the characters are little more than stock figures. Women, except for Milo’s wife, are cardboard figures that seem to come from the central casting office of spy novels—the brilliant but eccentric, obese, and alcoholic Erika from German counterintelligence, a Chinese seductress, or the brilliant, beautiful, and flashy Tourist, Leticia. None of them is like Lady Anne, who exercised a profound influence on Smiley even though she was always off-stage. The atmospherics, too, are superficial. Except for the details of Budapest, where Steinhauer lives, the descriptions of cities are perfunctory, as if he had dropped into each just long enough to be able to say what street the side entrance of a hotel is on. Steinhauer fails to evoke the types of settings that le Carré, Hall, and Deighton mastered, or to match their ability to give the flavor of a country in just a couple of sentences.
Nonetheless, Steinhauer tries, from time to time, to force his readers to question their conception of America. He shows no benevolence toward the United States, its power, or its policies. Instead, Steinhauer tells us, the United States is aggressive and resorts to overwhelming violence the instant it is challenged. “We’ve been marking our territory like an imperial dog since the end of the last big war,” says Milo’s boss in The Tourist. “Since 9/11, we no longer have to go about it sweetly. We can bomb and maim and torture to our heart’s content, because only the terrorists are willing to stand up to us, and their opinion doesn’t matter.” (273) Steinhauer amplifies this point in An American Spy. “Americans still think it’s possible to have a society in which a level of civility is constant, where a perfect balance of control and freedom can be maintained. It’s quaint,” says Milo’s father. But, he continues, “When a small band of desert lunatics brings down two enormous buildings…the country lashes out. It snaps…God help anyone standing in its path.” (183) This point of view explains the behavior of the Tourists, for they and their relentless killing are but one tool that Washington uses in its never-ceasing quest for world domination. Steinhauer wants us to believe that Milo and his colleagues are typical Americans, shooting first and not bothering to ask questions later.

This is hardly an original or convincing argument. Casting the United States as a malign influence with a cowboy mentality is cliché, not insight, and Steinhauer makes the point with such certainty and simplicity that it sounds like something written by an undergraduate who has just learned that the world is a complex, unhappy place rather than the rational arena he had expected. Some evil influence must be causing this, and the United States’s prominence in world affairs means that it must be to blame.

Another problem is Milo himself, who is too implausible a character on which to build a sophisticated analysis of anything. Milo’s father, we are told, was a KGB officer who took up with an American 1960s radical who had fled to West Germany and later committed suicide. Raised until his teens in the USSR, Milo speaks perfect Russian, and his father, now running a secret intelligence agency within the United Nations, is essentially on call to come to his son’s rescue, even as Milo debates the conflicts within their relationship. It’s a good thing that Milo has a guardian angel, however, for in the course of the trilogy, he is beaten, tortured, and shot (twice). Through it all, he soldiers on, trying to get through his missions so he can return to his wife (a brainy Columbia University librarian), her daughter (don’t ask, it’s complicated), and their quiet domestic life in Park Slope. No cliché is too great for Steinhauer to drape over Milo’s shoulders, and by the middle of the second book it is hard to take Milo, or anything Steinhauer says through him, seriously.

One aspect of Milo has to be considered carefully, however, and that is his identity as a Tourist. He is a cold-blooded professional killer, and only once does he go against his orders—told to kidnap and kill a young girl, he kidnaps her and hands her over to others for hiding. Someone else eventually kills her, but Milo convinces himself that his hands are clean. This is only one example of how Milo adroitly manages to compartmentalize his life, separating the killer from the good family man. In giving Milo this skill, Steinhauer is trying to present him as a complex character, but the effort fails because Milo himself is not very reflective and has little to say. Except for wondering how the rather uninteresting Milo will escape from various dangers, it is hard for the reader to care about such a vicious man or his fate.

In one sense, however, the idea of the Tourist gives Steinhauer something new to say. The novels of Deighton, le Carré, and the other masters certainly had their share of evil characters, but the good guy was never one of them. Steinhauer’s contribution to the genre seems to be to push the intelligence officer over that line by turning him into a serial killer, while still casting him as the hero of the tale. Perhaps because of Milo’s conflicted nature and love for his family, we are supposed to look past that. Or, alternatively, perhaps we are supposed to believe that intelligence officers, despite their civilized veneers, are just psychotic killers in the service of imperialism. Whatever the intended point, there is nothing multilayered or multifaceted here. It’s just silliness.

Maybe all is not lost for spy novelists, however. It took about 15 years from the start of the Cold War for the genre to shift to its classic mode, and it’s only been a little more than a decade since 9/11 upended our world. Writers are still adjusting to the new era and will at some point find a voice that resonates, one that will speak through a new Palmer or Smiley, but Steinhauer’s books thus far suggest that voice will not be Milo Weaver’s.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics

Deception: The Untold Story of East-West Espionage Today, by Edward Lucas.

Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida Since 9/11, by Seth G. Jones.

Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad, by Peter Bergen.

Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World, by Anthony Olcott.

General

Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, Volumes 1 and 2, by Philip H. J. Davies.

Historical

Alger Hiss: Why He Chose Treason, by Christina Shelton.

The CIA’s Greatest Covert Operation: Inside the Daring Mission to Recover a Nuclear-Armed Soviet Sub, by David H. Sharp


Ian Fleming’s Commandos: The Story of the Legendary 30 Assault Unit, by Nicholas Rankin.

On the Edge of the Cold War: American Diplomats and Spies in Postwar Prague, by Igor Lukes.


Memoir

Black Man in the CIA: An Autobiography, by Leutrell M. Osborne, Sr.

Intelligence Abroad

Locating India’s Intelligence Agencies in a Democratic Framework, by Danish Sheikh.

Strategic Intelligence in the Wider Black Sea Area, George Cristian Maior and Sergei Konoplyov (eds.).


Secret Intelligence Service — MI6: Codename MNL DCVR, by Heinz Duthel.

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Spies intrigued author Edward Lucas “as a student, activist and journalist.” (5) After graduating from the London School of Economics, he served with the Economist since 1986 in locations that included East Europe, Germany, and Russia, where he was the journal’s Moscow Bureau chief. During those years he “rubbed shoulders and clinked glasses with spooks on both sides.” (5) Deception is his disquieting tale of post-Soviet-era espionage, security, corruption, and their historical antecedents.

The central theme of the book is that Russian espionage and domestic control have been successful since the Bolshevik revolution. Lucas writes that the practices did not end “with Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika (reform) and glasnost (openness)” but, in fact, expanded with former KGB officers in key national positions. (15) Using a topical approach, Lucas discusses several cases to illustrate the seriousness of the situation.

Lucas’s first example concerns William Browder, an American-born British subject—the grandson of the late Earl Browder, onetime head of the Communist Party USA—who in 2005 was a successful financier in Russia. In that year, Browder hired a tax attorney, Sergei Magnitsky, to investigate apparent irregularities in government activity that affected Browder’s interests. Magnitsky uncovered state fraud, forged contracts, and unlawful acts committed by the FSB—the domestic intelligence service—all of which Lucas details. In the end, Magnitsky was arrested and died—some allege that he was tortured—in jail. Browder fled to London.

A second case, not previously reported in detail, illustrates how the SVR continued espionage operations in Europe after the Cold War. Herman Simm, an Estonian recruited by the KGB in 1967 and later by the German foreign intelligence service, the BND, had become a senior officer in the Estonian Interior Ministry after Estonia achieved independence in 1991. By 1995, he had moved to the Defense Ministry with NATO-related responsibilities that gave him access to NATO documents, including war plans and records, which he shared with the SVR. Lucas doesn’t explain just how Simm was identified, but he describes how Estonian authorities arrested and interrogated him. Lucas takes NATO security to task for failing to vet Simm properly and criticizes, unpersuasively, the West for post-Cold War complacency.

A third case, Operation Ghost Stories, concerns the 10 illegals the FBI arrested in 2010 after they had been operating in the United States for as many as 10 years. Lucas divides them into two groups, those using false documentation—“traditional illegals”—and those using their true names—“legal illegals.” (164) The latter term hasn’t appeared in the literature before and makes a useful distinction.

Lucas spends considerable effort analyzing the backgrounds of the illegals, their modus operandi, and their tradecraft. He also compares the weaknesses of false identities and the strengths of true names—Anna Chapman is his principal example of an illegal in true name. Lucas is critical of the mistakes they made, but he doesn’t point out that their errors did not result in their exposure.

Deception is generally well documented from open sources, but not in all instances. For example, Lucas notes that when Chapman suspected something was amiss, “She phoned her father in Moscow, to be told that a senior SVR officer dealing with illegals had disappeared. This was oddly sloppy tradecraft.” (171) If it happened this way, it was poor tradecraft indeed, but Lucas does not provide a source, and no such claim has been made elsewhere.

To emphasize his contention that “Russian spymasters…frequently run rings around their Western counterparts,” (214) Lucas devotes a chapter to successful Soviet deception operations against the West, starting during the Bolshevik revolution and extending through Operation Jungle, the disastrous British attempt to send penetration agents into the Baltic states after WW II. He even tracked down a survivor of the operation living near London, who provided a firsthand account. There is nothing new in these narratives; they only stress the point that the Russians have a history of espionage and deception against the West.
Deception is a well-written, journalistic account that seeks to alert readers to the undiminished Russian espionage threat and to security conditions within Russia that are not conducive to Western business.


Author Seth Jones is a senior political analyst at the RAND Corporation, where he specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. His RAND biography points out that he focuses on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al-Qaeda, and that he has served as the representative of the commander of the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to the assistant secretary of defense for special operations. He has also been an adviser to the US military on special operations in Afghanistan. Hunting in the Shadows treats the US and UK reactions to 9/11.

The first chapter is important for two reasons. First, it tells the story of Operation Overt, a successful joint US-UK effort to prevent a terrorist group based in England from blowing up multiple civilian aircraft over the Atlantic in 2006. This served as “a harbinger of things to come.” (22) And what was to come included a surprising number of terrorist acts, planned and attempted but seldom heard about. Jones describes very well the disciplined and complex efforts of counterterrorist and intelligence authorities to deal with these dangers. Second, the chapter introduces the concept of “al-Qa‘ida waves and reverse waves,” which Jones uses to explain surges and reductions in levels of terrorist activity since al-Qa‘ida was created in 1988.

The remainder of the book is separated into four parts, each dealing with one of the four waves he discusses and the principal terrorists involved. Part I describes the first wave, which peaked with the 9/11 attacks. It introduces the major Islamic players and tells how, despite differing goals and views on how to implement jihad against the West, they developed and implemented attacks to kill Americans. It also includes a description of JAWBREAKER, CIA’s entry into Afghanistan after 9/11, the domestic terrorist threat (including the unrepentant shoe bomber, Richard Reid), other responses to 9/11, and the reactions of Pakistan to US activities. Part I ends as al-Qa‘ida regroups—surprised by the American response to 9/11—and makes new plans.

Part II deals with al-Qa‘ida in Iraq and Pakistan, the Madrid and London attacks, and the attempts of its allies to counterattack in Afghanistan. There is also an interesting section on radicalization in the West, illustrated by the story of Adam Gadahn (Azzam the American). Part II ends as al-Qa‘ida’s popularity in the Muslim world fell to a low point in 2004, due mainly to its decision to kill civilians in Iraq.

Part III covers the third wave, including al-Qa‘ida’s struggle to reestablish its leadership, the rise of competition in Yemen and Africa, the curious case of David Headley and his links to the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and a brief summary of the operation that ended with the death of Osama bin Laden.

Discussion of the fourth wave takes only a few pages. It is a wave that hasn’t yet occurred, but Jones thinks it will. He writes that the “West’s record of learning from past success and failures has been mixed, and policymakers have tended to be unsympathetic in their analysis and shortsighted in their strategies.” (437) He suggests “three steps” that he thinks will help prevent this fourth wave.

Jones’s style makes for an easy read, and he does more than just provide facts. He adds background—geographic, societal, and political—in each case and explains the often complicated personal relationships among many players. Thus the reader gets a sense of the reality the terrorists create for themselves—a reality that does not necessarily make sense by Western standards.

This is a fine, well-documented book, with essential background for anyone trying to get a better grasp on the terrorist age.


The measure of a great book is when a reader knows the ending and still enjoys the reading. Manhunt is a fine example, and it’s no surprise that Peter Bergen wrote it. He is one of the few journalists to have met...
Osama bin Laden and has written three other books about him and al-Qaeda.

Manhunt begins with a review of the CIA’s efforts to monitor al-Qaeda and bin Laden, which began in the mid-1990s, and then focuses on the work of Intelligence Community analysts to “track him down.” (75) This is one of the few operations in which the role of analysts receives much-deserved prominence. After many dead ends, CIA analysts took the lead and developed what Bergen terms “the four pillars of the hunt”: bin Laden’s family, his communication with other leaders in his organization, his media statements, and his courier network. (93) The first three came to naught, so the analysts decided to focus on the courier network. Bergen relates how information obtained from captured terrorists led to the identification of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as the man to watch. After he was put under various types of surveillance, the compound at Abbottabad became the prime target. By January 2011, one analyst said she was 90 percent sure that bin Laden was there. When CIA Director Leon Panetta asked another, she said 70 percent. (135)

When the president asked for options and courses of action, they were quickly developed. It soon came down to two: bomb the compound or send in the SEALs. Bergen recounts the sometimes heated discussions that followed before the president decided on employing the SEALs—without giving Pakistan prior notice. The chapter on the raid, Operation Neptune’s Spear, and how it was monitored in the United States is perhaps the most exhilarating in the book. Bergen describes the planning, rehearsals, and execution in detail. His version of bin Laden’s death differs somewhat from other accounts. (He did not have access to the only first-hand account published.) Bergen visited the compound shortly before it was destroyed, so his descriptions of the layout have added veracity.

A number of events complicated decision making while planning of the operation was under way, and Bergen devotes attention to each. These included the attack on the CIA base at Khowst, the Christmas bomber’s attempt to bring down an airliner, revelations of plans to attack the New York City subway system, and the shooting of two Pakistanis by a US contractor working in Lahore. Bergen also includes a chapter on bin Laden’s last years, offering conjecture on his life in the compound and how he tried to manage al-Qaeda and communicate with his followers. (136ff)

The death of bin Laden and the impressive intelligence take that resulted from the raid will not, Bergen points out, end al-Qaeda’s attempts to pursue its goals. He concludes that Yemen is the most likely place from which operations will continue. (260) But there is no doubt al-Qaeda has suffered a serious blow, and Peter Bergen has told that story very well indeed.


After a teaching career in the Russian Department of Colgate University, Anthony Olcott in 2000 joined the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which became the DNI Open Source Center in 2005. He served there as director of Analytic Assessment and Academic Outreach. In 2009, he joined the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. Until this year, he also served in the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, which produces this journal. Throughout his career, Olcott has studied the information revolution and its impact on the use of open sources in intelligence. Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World is the result of his research.

US intelligence organizations have made use of open source information since WW II, when the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS, using material in the Library of Congress, prepared reports on the North African beaches for Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of that region. The use of open source material continued after the war, when the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service—created even before the OSS—became part of the CIA as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and provided the Agency and other government organizations with daily media translations from numerous countries. Olcott reviews this history, citing theoretical foundations, bureaucratic battles, and various commission reports. He stresses that past fail-

ure to pay attention to open sources has resulted in unnecessary surprise. For example, he characterizes the Intelligence Community’s failure to perceive the onset of the Iranian revolution during 1978 and 1979 as an “open source blunder.” (59) He goes on to note that even in 1998, the CIA’s preference for secret over open source information caused the Agency to be surprised when India resumed nuclear testing, even though Indian leaders had publicly stated their intentions to do so. (89)

As the Community worked to prevent similar incidents, he suggests, it was simultaneously striving to deal with what became known as the information explosion. Most of Olcott’s book addresses this multifaceted problem and its implications. For example, the nature of open-source information has evolved to include more than the traditional base of media and government reports. One must now take into account resources on the Internet, including Google, social networks, blogs and microblogs, and Wikipedia. So while the volume of data and rapid access have always been problems, they are compounded in today’s world. Olcott describes technology solutions to solve intelligence problems as well as the importance of asking the right questions. (146) Chapters such as “So What? Addressing the Signal-to-Noise Problem” and “Improving Information ‘Food Searches’” consider these issues in detail.

The new information age also presents new analytical challenges, and Olcott devotes substantial attention to them. Here he considers the “power of heuristics,” or the tendency to use familiar structures or models. He notes the traditional compliance with Sherman Kent’s guidance that an intelligence organization should have the combined characteristics of “a large university faculty, our greatest metropolitan newspapers, and an organization engaged in manufacture of a product.” But in today’s world, he adds, “each of these forms of enterprise is in profound trouble” due to the transformation of the information environment. (252) New models and approaches will be necessary to satisfy demand for quick and accurate information.

Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World is a thoughtful, well-documented, if at times ponderous treatment of a very practical and important problem. Open source intelligence has finally received the careful analysis it has long deserved.

General

_intelligence and government in britain and the united states: a comparative perspective_, by philip h. j. davies (santa barbara, ca: praeger, 2012), volume 1: evolution of the u.s. intelligence community, 441 pp., end-of-chapter notes, index, and volume 2: evolution of the u.k. intelligence community, 385 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, glossary, index.

Dr. Philip Davies is the director of the Brunel University Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies in London. He obtained his PhD in sociology in 1997 from Reading University, where he wrote his dissertation, “Organisational Development of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1979.” Since then he has published widely on the intelligence profession. This two-volume comparative treatise is his latest contribution.

The goal of the study “is to try to understand the two systems, and how they have developed, in a comparative context, seeking to comprehend each better by juxtaposing it with the other.” More specifically, Davies asks, since the two systems seek to answer similar problems, “why do they choose almost diametrically opposed solutions to the task…and why is the coordination and management of national intelligence in the United States so much more fraught than in the United Kingdom?” (ix) Davies’s formulation of these questions risks a predetermined outcome as the result of confirmation bias, and readers should keep this in mind.

The 24 chapters and more than 800 pages provide a top-down, chronological examination, through the eyes of a political scientist—there are no spy stories here. Davies compares organizational structure and integration, product timeliness and quality, physical separation, size, budget, political systems, staff subordination and qualifications, security requirements, management, and operational culture—a massive task. In the end, one of his many general conclusions—there are specific ones too—is that a principal difference in the two systems is “the apparent long-term stability and relatively consistently high coordination and integration of the
UK intelligence community and the discontinuous, fractious, and contentious experience of the American system.” (V2-314)

This judgment raises the question of whether Davies fully understands the US system. Given the much larger size of the country and its Intelligence Community, there is perhaps more frequent turbulence at the top in the United States, but Davies presents no evidence that this results in operational dysfunction. Davies clarifies his concept of the US Intelligence Community by noting that “not only is analysis particularly central to U.S. intelligence, it stands in sharp contrast with approaches to intelligence in the U.K., which typically focus on covert collection as the defining feature of intelligence.” (14) He does not explain why he concludes collection is less important to the Americans, and his own treatment of the Casey years at CIA suggests the opposite. (286ff). In any case, his concept will certainly be challenged by US intelligence professionals.

Davies returns to this point in volume 2, where he writes, “The three principal players in the U. S. intelligence community are the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Defense Department’s Defense Intelligence Agency.” (V2-5) He may be right if he is referring only to these organizations as sources of intelligence analysis, but if he means the Intelligence Community writ large, it is a surprising statement and raises questions about the other major components of the US community. A final example suggesting he pay more attention to the US community is Davies’ comment that, after 9/11, “if the jihadist threat would ultimately intensify the friction between [US] agencies, it was serving to push the UK’s agencies closer together in an ever more intense and thorough going collegiality.” (V2-266) This view too is likely to spark cries for evidence from US readers.

The comparisons that are the basic ingredients of this study of intelligence systems, though thoroughly sourced, do not make for easy reading—this work is not a primer. Frequently terminology is hard to follow. For example, nonsociologists may be perplexed by the comment “That which is ‘distinctive’ about U. S. intelligence culture clearly embodies the optical illusion of the common appearing singular.” (14) On the other hand, Davies’s use of culture as a comparative metric is a useful contribution.

For those seeking to better understand the complexities and differences of both systems, these volumes will serve as a challenging basis for discussion. They are most worthwhile contributions to the intelligence literature.

Historical


Author Christina Shelton, a retired DIA analyst, begins her study of Alger Hiss with an anecdote that actually adds something new to what she terms “the unending Hiss saga.” (1) In November 1979, she attended Hiss’s 75th birthday party in New York. In a conversation with Hiss, she reports, he claimed he had never read Whittaker Chambers’s book, Witness. Astonished, since Hiss was a principal subject in the book, she asked, “How is that possible?” Hiss never responded. Thirty years later, in a memoir by Hiss’s son, she read that Hiss had read the version serialized in the Saturday Evening Post. (6–7)

Carefully constructed responses to questions were characteristic of Alger Hiss. He maintained throughout his life that he was innocent of charges that he was a communist and a Soviet agent; he was just a victim of anticommunist hysteria. Shelton reviews the contrary evidence and raises the never-satisfactorily-resolved mystery that Shelton maintains has contemporary relevance, Why He Chose Treason.

In one sense, the book is a well-documented biography of Alger Hiss. Shelton writes of his early years, his time at Harvard Law School, his enthusiastic participation in Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal politics, his activities as a committed communist, and the espionage activities that led to his trial and conviction. She goes on to include a description of Hiss’s time in prison and his subsequent campaign to vindicate himself, an effort
that only ended with his death. Shelton ends the book with a review of the overwhelming evidence against Hiss, which many still refuse to accept. But all this has been said in the many other books on the Hiss case. For readers new to the topic, Shelton’s work provides a good summary. But those searching for a resolution of the mystery—as promised in the book’s title—will not find an answer here. It may just be that even Alger Hiss didn’t know.


The Azorian program was a clandestine CIA operation to recover a Soviet Golf II-class nuclear submarine (K-129) that sank in early March 1968 more than 16,000 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean. David Sharp was a member of the team that performed what turned out to be a partial recovery. His book, The CIA’s Greatest Covert Operation, is the most recent account of the mission. Several books and many articles have been written about the operation since it was exposed by the Los Angeles Times on 7 February 1975.2

With the exception of the works that called the project “Jennifer”—that was the name for the security system used—they have gotten the basic facts right. The 2010 book Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129, by Norman Polmar and Michael White, used Russian sources to add a Soviet perspective and is the most technically detailed.3

Also in 2010, the CIA released its own report.4 What, then, does Sharp have to offer?

Sharp provides a firsthand view of Azorian—supplemented by input from other team members—that he argues is the most accurate and complete account available, although he admits it is not the whole story. Some details have been withheld for security reasons.

Sharp begins by telling how the project originated, the difficulties getting approval, and the formation of the team with wideranging skills that did the work. He was hired by the program leader, John Parangosky, whom he knew from his work on the U-2 and Corona programs. Sharp also describes how the Navy found K-129—he cannot confirm the submarine’s name, although others have identified it—and then determined how it was positioned on the ocean floor. Once that was established, a recovery vehicle had to be identified, contractors selected, and operating offices set up on both coasts.

Sharp eventually became the head of the West Coast program office and, after some expressing some reservations, director of recovery systems at sea. (128) From then on, he commuted frequently from CIA headquarters to Los Angeles, where he worked undercover.

The recovery vehicle was called the Hughes Glomar Explorer, and Sharp explains how the cover story—deep-sea mining exploration—was developed to explain what the huge vessel was doing. He goes on to describe the actual recovery, the continual monitoring by Soviet ships, the many problems that were overcome, and others that were not. Besides his personal viewpoint, from time to time he adds a detail not recounted elsewhere. For example, he describes the back-and-forth in planning meetings he attended, and he explains how secure communications were established to encode messages. (67)

Whether Azorian was the CIA’s greatest covert operation may be a matter for debate, but Sharp’s firsthand, well-documented account is valuable in any case.

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3 CIA historian David Robarge reviewed the Polmar and White work in “The Glomar Explorer in Film and Print,” Studies in Intelligence 56, no. 1 (March 2012).


Richard Trahair is a social research adviser and consulting psychologist at La Trobe University in Australia. His coauthor is the senior editor and publisher of Enigma Books. The first and second editions of Trahair’s *Encyclopedia* were reviewed in Studies in 2005 and given poor marks for the number of errors they contained, especially since they were “intended as a useful tool to support espionage studies.” This updated and revised edition extends that objective to include “the study of specific circumstances that gave so much importance to espionage during the Cold War period.”

(xiv) It is also intended to be a tool for authors and “the facts have been checked once again as thoroughly as possible.” (xxx) But while many corrections have indeed been made, some errors remain. For example, Oleg Kalugin was never a defector, and he did not expose the Koechers, the Czechoslovakian couple acting as KGB surrogate agents in the CIA in the 1980s. (259) CIA officer Martha Peterson was not “the chance victim of a simple KGB active measure” (413) nor were tradecraft errors the reasons the KGB was able to capture her, but it was the Koechers who had exposed her, a topic she discusses in her memoir. Wrong, too, is the assertion that “while at Cambridge,” Kim Philby approached Donald Maclean, and asked him to work for the NKVD. (418) Philby gave Maclean’s name to his handler a year after he had graduated. Finally, Harry Gold never converted to communism (157)—ironically, he was the only member of the Fuchs atom network who was not a communist and who told the truth at his trial.

The book, however, still has many positive features. The number of entries has been increased. An entry on China was among the additions. Other entries have been revised, and the valuable review of intelligence literature, the biographical data, the chronology, and the sources cited after each entry have likewise been updated.

The authors deserve credit for an improved edition, though readers are cautioned to check the facts against the sources provided rather than assume their accuracy.

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The 30 Commando Information Exploitation Group at the Royal Marine Barracks, Stonehouse, Plymouth, has a history beginning in 1942, when it was formed as an “Intelligence Assault Unit.” It subsequently was called 30 Commando and, in 1943, was designated as the 30 Assault Unit, or 30AU. (330) The idea for the unit appeared in a Most Secret memo titled “Proposal for Naval Intelligence Commando Unit” and signed by Ian Fleming. (131) By the time of its creation in July 1942, it had become a joint service element, though it was headquartered within the Admiralty. (222) The IAU first saw action in the disastrous raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. *Ian Fleming’s Commandos* tells how Fleming conceived the idea and describes some of the unit’s operations.

Before the war, Ian Fleming had been a journalist and completed an assignment for the *Times* in Moscow. In May 1939, he was invited to lunch with Adm. John Godfrey, the director of naval intelligence, who was seeking to augment his staff with bright young men. Godfrey liked what he saw in Fleming—who was fluent in German and French and spoke some Russian—and offered him a spot on his staff. Thus began Fleming’s six-year tour in naval intelligence and the adventures that laid the groundwork for the James Bond books.

Author Nicholas Rankin provides historical background to the creation of 30AU, reviews the formation of Britain’s intelligence assault units, and discusses

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5 “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 4 (December 2005). This article may be found at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/Bookshelf_11.htm.


7 For more on this point see the transcript of Philby’s 1977 speech to the KGB in Rufina Philby’s memoir, *The Private Life of Kim Philby: The Moscow Years* (Fromm, 1999).
the bureaucratic conflicts that Fleming learned to navigate so well. He also tells of Fleming’s contacts with Bletchley Park and his trips to France, Spain, countries in Africa, and the United States. It soon became clear to Fleming, Rankin argues, that much-needed intelligence could be acquired if units were specially designed for the purpose. The concept was to have those units land with invading troops and go directly to the nearest captured German headquarters and communication elements and confiscate records. One of the first attempts at such a mission occurred during Operation TORCH in North Africa. There, 30AU had mixed results. Its participation in the Sicily landings was more successful, as were its operations in Italy. 30AU was a part of Operation OVERLORD, and Rankin describes the difficulties the unit experienced going after a radar control station in France. He also discusses the difficulties 30AU faced in targeting V-1 sites as part of Operation CROSSBOW.

Rankin provides glimpses into how some 30AU personnel felt about Fleming. In one case, a colleague is quoted as saying Fleming “always loved hearing about things—sex, war, personalities, danger—from other people, but shied away from experiencing it himself.” (223) In a second example, Lt. Cmdr. Tony Hugill wrote in his 1946 book—citing an episode in which Fleming had arrived in France in July 1945, wearing his dress uniform, to see how the force was doing—that “none of us liked him very much. He was one of those very superior professional RNVRs [Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve] who got their claws into Their Lordships early in the war.”

Throughout Ian Fleming’s Commandos, there are references to incidents and names that later appeared in the Bond books. Enthusiasts of 007 should enjoy these bits of Bond trivia, and fans of WW II special operations will find it most interesting for the groundwork 30AU laid for postwar special operations units.


In 1955 during a meeting of the National Security Council Operations Coordinating Board, DCI Allen Dulles commented that he “for one believed that Czechoslovakia would never have been lost if someone had been there doing something about it.” Dulles’s reference was to the 1948 Soviet takeover that ended Czechoslovakia’s postwar democratic government. Boston University history professor Igor Lukes has investigated the question of who was there at the time and whether anyone in fact attempted to deter the Soviets. **On the Edge of the Cold War** reports the results of his investigation.

Lukes begins with a review of the events from the Munich appeasement in 1938 to the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army in May 1945 and the return of President Edvard Beneš. This includes an analysis of the American decision to halt Patton’s 3rd Army west of Prague and a failed attempt by an OSS team to reverse the ruling. That team had penetrated German lines and joined a British Special Operations Executive team (PLATINUM) already in Prague. (49) The first permanent OSS team arrived on 10 May 1945 and began setting up an embassy in preparation for the arrival of the ambassador, Laurence Steinhardt.

The next several chapters compare the relatively relaxed way the embassy functioned—the ambassador didn’t even arrive in Prague for another six months—to the more determined activities of the Soviet delegation. These involved the persistent political machinations of the Soviets during first free elections in May 1946, when the communists won the most seats, to the takeover by a Soviet-backed communist government in 1948.

As these events unfolded, the intelligence and security elements of both sides played a role, and **On the Edge of the Cold War** does a fine job of telling their story, much of it for the first time. The American intelligence staff, headed by Col. Charles Katek—initially of the OSS, then SSU, CIG, and finally CIA—remained relatively unchanged through the period. Its mission was long term: “to help the Czechs guard their independence and to promote Western democracy.” (157) When the 1948 crisis came, however, Lukes concludes, “US intelligence did next to nothing.” (200) He attri-

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butes this to the effectiveness—not to mention ruthlessness—of the Soviet-dominated Czech security service (StB) and the inexperience of the Americans.

The problem wasn’t that Katek and his officers hadn’t recruited agents or attempted to establish agent networks. (222ff) Katek’s men, often with the help of embassy staff, even learned how to help agents and Czechs escape arrest. Lukes describes the effectively run BLACKWOOD operation that fooled the StB as one example. The exfiltration of an agent’s fiance—on the ambassador’s plane—is another. The difficulty, however, was that the StB’s round-the-clock surveillance identified all of the recruited agents and had them arrested when necessary. Furthermore, at least one of Katek’s men, Kurt Taub—who had grown up in Prague and was serving Katek’s deputy—had had prewar contact with the Soviet intelligence services. Lukes makes a strong case that Taub continued that relationship after his return to Prague.

On the Edge of the Cold War is a superbly documented, well-written story of US intelligence operations in early postwar Czechoslovakia, not told before in such detail.


The fall of Iraq’s government in April 2003 led to the “liberation” of government files by looters, who quickly “noted the addresses and began selling them door to door,” (14) presumably to those who had been named in the documents. Among the most popular were those from the security services. But millions of other documents and audiotapes found their way to various organizations in the United States. They include records of “the Ba’th Party, the intelligence services—mainly the Special Security Organization (SSO)—the Ministry of Information, and the Revolutionary Command Council.” (1) Georgetown Adjunct Professor Joseph Sassoon has used them to describe how the Iraqi government functioned before and after Saddam Hussein took power.

The first three chapters deal with Ba’th Party’s history, organization, and development into an authoritarian regime. Chapter 4 describes the four principal security organizations in detail—General Security, established in 1921; General Military Intelligence, established in 1932; the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), an element of the Ba’th Party, established in 1963; and the Special Security Organization (SSO) established by Saddam after he became president in 1979. Sassoon explains the organizations’ overlapping, competitive functions and how each gathered information, recruited informers, and carried out surveillance of society.

The final four chapters examine the Ba’th Party and the army; Saddam’s personality cult; population control and resistance, including security aspects and political incentives; and the Ba’th Party bureaucracy and social life under Saddam.

Similarities between Saddam-era Iraq and Soviet Union are inescapable. They include the practice of “fighting the enemy” with “surveillance, instilling fear into the population, and using torture and violence to extract information or destroy the alleged enemies of the people.” (195) Sassoon makes the distinction, however, that Saddam’s government was authoritarian, not totalitarian, since Stalin’s control over the military won wars, and Saddam’s did not.

Sassoon concludes that for those “who were not direct victims of repression, daily life was generally more normal than the image we may have of such systems.” (281) But for the others, “based on the regime’s own archives, we now know that a comprehensive system of repression and surveillance existed, and that many thousands paid a heavy price for refusing to bend to the will of the Ba’th Party.” (284) Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party is a very valuable and thoroughly documented contribution to the literature.

10 For an account of a deception operation used against Czechoslovakian dissidents, see Igor Lukes, “KAMEN: A Cold War Dangle Operation with an American Dimension, 1948–1952” in Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 1 (March 2011). This article is available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/cen-
ter-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-1/kamen-a-cold-war-dangle-operation-with-an-american-dimension-

In Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes,12 his benchmark history about intelligence in the Revolutionary War, historian John Bakeless included one chapter on spies in the “Quaker City,” wherein he cautioned the reader that there was scant evidence to support some of the tales handed down. Aware of the problem, author John Nagy was able to write an entire book on the subject, Spies in the Continental Capital, after he found overlooked clues and previously undiscovered sources.

Spies in the colonies were nothing new by the start of the Revolution, and Nagy begins with a review of French espionage in Pennsylvania during the French and Indian War (1754–63). This is followed by a discussion of British efforts to obtain military secrets and to penetrate the Continental Congress, and American actions to prevent success. The stories of James Molesworth (a spy for British Admiral Howe) and Simon Girty (the loyalist spy who couldn’t read or write) are examples not reported fully elsewhere. Lydia Darragh’s story as a spy who crossed the lines for General Washington—an account often doubted by historians—is reinforced by the new documentary evidence Nagy uncovered. Some of the cases discussed are well known, for example Major John Clark’s spy network in Philadelphia, but Nagy has added new details. Coverage of others, such as Benedict Arnold, contributes nothing new but is included for completeness.

Nagy keeps the emphasis on spies on both sides, and sometimes the narrative is a bit choppy for lack of historical context. The book’s documentation is extensive, and Nagy is careful to label spies as “possible” when the evidence warrants. (193) For those unaware of the extent of espionage in Pennsylvania during the Revolutionary War, Spies in the Continental Capital will be an eye-opener and a source for further research.


After the invasion of North Africa in November 1942, a photointerpreter (PI) in the US Air Force’s 3rd Reconnaissance Group commanded by Col. Elliott Roosevelt reported sighting a column of German tanks in the desert. When a British PI checked the same imagery, he sent an immediate corrective: “For tanks read camels.”13 The more experienced Brit had been trained by the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU) at RAF Medmenham.

British historian Taylor Downing begins his account with a review of the origins of photointerpretation during WW I, after which the RAF lost interest in the technique.14 In the interwar period, some progress was made when the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) sponsored secret reconnaissance flights flown by Sidney Cotton, a civilian. But by the start of WW II, the RAF had only seven trained PIs, and, when they couldn’t satisfy the demands for coverage of German military and industrial targets, Cotton was hired to establish a top secret, unofficial RAF unit to meet their needs. Soon after, the RAF formed an official photointerpretation organization that served all military branches, and on 1 April 1941, RAF Medmenham began operations.

In many ways, RAF Medmenham was analogous to Bletchley Park, where the Enigma codebreakers worked. Danesfield House, a large Victorian country mansion—now a luxury hotel—was requisitioned for the PIs, and soon its grounds were covered with temporary huts to accommodate the staff. Photography taken by RAF reconnaissance units was interpreted by a staff recruited from universities and the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) and trained as PIs. Downing calls them “boffins at war.” (112ff) They included Sarah Oliver (daughter of Winston Churchill), actor Dirk Bogarde, and Constance Babington Smith, who led the team that found the V-1 weapons at Peenemünde. By 1943, American and allied PIs were part of the CIU.

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14 For a history of Allied aerial reconnaissance during WW I, see Terrence J. Finnegan, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2006)
While Downing describes the PI tasks of targeting, damage assessment, and photogrammetry, he also recounts the adventures of the pilots who risked their lives in unarmed aircraft to collect the imagery. The legend of Wing Commander Adrian Warburton, a favorite of Elliott Roosevelt, is a fascinating example. (157ff) Less glamorous but more persistent were the challenges faced by managers who battled logistical problems and incessant service rivalries. A prominent example involved Roosevelt, who lost a dispute over who should command the PIs after the Americans at RAF Medmenham outnumbered their allies. (232ff).

*Spies in the Sky* is an inspiring chronicle of the vital contribution of PIs to the major operations in WW II and to the postwar profession for which they paved the way.

**Memoir**


Leutrell Osborne began his CIA career as a still photographer, paygrade G-3, in October 1957. (19, 23) He left the Agency in 1984 as a GS-12 operations officer. (140) *Black Man in the CIA* tells the story of his upbringing and his adventures in the Agency.

Osborne describes himself as “a light-skinned black man” (31) and the illegitimate son of a mother who worked for the CIA at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). He writes that he had wanted to be a “spy manager” since he was 12. (1) Osborne got married and joined the Agency right out of high school. By 1963 he was working in the European Branch mail room and had decided he wanted to become a case officer. With the support of several supervisors, he completed operations training in 1969, (72) before he graduated from college. After refusing a tour in Vietnam (91) and declining to have anything to do with covert action (85–8), Osborne was assigned overseas, where he describes recruiting agents. He also had various assignments at Headquarters, including counterintelligence, counterterrorism, the Office of Equal Opportunity, and Communications Security (COMSEC). He returned to the Directorate of Operations for his final tour working on Libyan matters.

In *Black Man in the CIA*, Osborne views the Agency through an African-American’s eyes and is candid in describing what his race meant to his career. For example, during his first assignment as a case officer, he “encountered some serious discrimination from… the Chief of Station…[who] had a profound impact on [his] career… making [him] stay in grade for eleven years.” (99–102) But in spite of this atmosphere, he says he “achieved significant accomplishments as a Case Officer in Latin America.” (110) Yet these problems persisted, as he notes, when he was assigned to COMSEC duties and his “superior, Red Neck, was determined to cast aspersions on [his] work.” With regard to his final assignment, he writes that “there were some serious mistakes made by the Division. It seemed clear I was being set up to take the fall….” (134) Despite all of these difficulties, Osborne concludes that in 26 years with the CIA, “I achieved my dream as a CIA spy manager.” (142)

During the 25 years since he left the Agency, Osborne writes, “I have increased my core competency talents, knowing I can lead both the Central Intelligence and the National Security Agencies… toward better solutions.” (144) *Black Man in the CIA* might serve as an inspiration to others with childhood dreams of intelligence service.
Intelligence Abroad

Locating India’s Intelligence Agencies in a Democratic Framework, by Danish Sheikh. (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2011), 60 pp., endnotes, bibliography, no index.

India has three intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is responsible for domestic security and reports to the home minister. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) carries out the foreign intelligence mission and reports to the prime minister. The National Technical Research Organization (NTRO) conducts SIGINT operations and reports to the national security advisor. At present, the agencies function without a statutory charter. Danish Sheikh, a lawyer with the Alternative Law Forum, argues in this short monograph that there have been “lapses of efficiency, of security, of privacy” (3) that justify establishing parliamentary oversight.

Sheikh supports his argument, in part, with a lengthy discussion of a wiretapping exposé. (7–11) He later asserts that “India has witnessed considerable misuse of intelligence service apparatus.” (42) On a related issue, he recommends “some form of whistle-blower protection.” (9–11) He also suggests that a charter would help the agencies with budgetary issues. In all instances, however, he is short on specifics. After some warnings about the hazards of politicization, he compares the oversight systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to make his case for parliamentary oversight. (34ff) In the end, while he has defined the problem well enough, he presents little evidence that the current system is in need of the major overhaul he recommends, though in principle the need for oversight of intelligence is generally accepted.

Strategic Intelligence in the Wider Black Sea Area, George Cristian Maior and Sergei Konoplyov (eds.). (Bucharest: Editura RAO, 2011), 255 pp., footnotes, no index.

For nearly 15 years, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University has conducted the Harvard Black Sea Security Program. Its goal is “to enhance regional security through cooperation and integration.” Its method is to bring together policymakers and security managers from the various countries in the region for an annual seminar with “very frank dialogue.” (13) In 2011, the event was a two-week affair hosted with the Romanian Intelligence Service. The first week was spent in Bucharest and Vienna, and the second week at the Kennedy School. Strategic Intelligence in the Wider Black Sea Area contains summaries of the principal presentations made.

Each of the four sections in the book deals with an aspect of security in the wider Black Sea area (WBSA). The first section discusses strategic goals, security policy, and aspects of cooperation and confrontation. One paper, by the director of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service, examines managing uncertainty in the WBSA. Another by George Cristian Maior, coeditor of the book and director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI)—the country’s domestic intelligence agency—looks at intelligence policy and strategic knowledge as related to Black Sea security.

The second section has four papers by experts dealing with security issues related to the environment and demography. Section three has five papers. One, by the head of Romanian military intelligence, discusses security challenges in the WBSA. The others look at changing patterns in regional security, with emphasis on conflict prevention, violence, and radicalization. The fourth and final section has three contributions. One examines the security services’ contribution to a secure environment, another touches on the implications of Romania’s NATO membership for intelligence, and one discusses the relationship between decisionmakers and intelligence services. In his concluding remarks for the book, Ion Grosu, the deputy director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, argues that finding solutions to the problems identified in the book will require cooperative efforts by the governments, the intelligence services, and academia. This includes what he calls, “soft security issues” such as the rule of law and a priority of human rights. (232)

For the most part, the contributions are normative think pieces typical of high-level bureaucrats; i.e., a statement of the issues and some suggestions on what should be done to accomplish regional security. Specific solutions are not addressed; only their nature and the need for them are identified. The endnotes cite both
western and Romanian sources—one mentions a paper by former CIA historian Michael Warner. Strategic Intelligence in the Wider Black Sea Area is an interesting indicator of regional progress made and planned—with cooperation from the West—since 1989.


Amazon books provides a means for self-publishing called CreateSpace. Among the several options available, an author can obtain editorial support and cover design help, or the manuscript can be printed just as submitted. Author Hans Duthel has apparently chosen the latter option. The result sets new lows in intelligence books. These disappointments include a title that is never explained and a table of contents with titles but no page numbers. Topics follow one after another, often beginning on the same page on which the previous topic ended, with no separation. (142) Some topics end with bibliographies, others with references, and to find either, one must go through page by page.

As to content, Secret Intelligence Service is an unedited, loosely formatted collection of notes and extracts on intelligence issues that mention many intelligence organizations. This book contains absolutely nothing not already in the public domain and that is not easier to find through Google and Wikipedia. Global Secret Service and Intelligence Service I (the ‘I’ is never explained), is similar in approach. There is no list of topics covered. There is an alphabetical “partial list of current intelligence agencies” shown at the beginning without page numbers or any indication where the agencies may be found in the text (they begin on page 129). The narrative just begins on page 9 with no introductory comments. Some paragraphs are numbered, but most are not. Some are written in French with no translation.

In short, neither volume is worth the price. Caveat lector!

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Books Reviewed in
Studies in Intelligence
2012

Current Topics

Most reviews can be reached at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html

Abuse of Power: How Cold War Surveillance and Secrecy Policy Shaped the Response to 9/11 by Athan G. Theoharis (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

America The Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare by Joel Brenner (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Deception: The Untold Story of East-West Espionage Today by Edward Lucas (56 4 [December], Bookshelf)

The Emergency State: America’s Pursuit of Absolute Security at all Costs by David C. Unger (56 4 [December], Samuel Cooper-Wall

Hunting in The Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida Since 9/11 by Seth G. Jones (56 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Acquisitions, Policies and Defense Oversight by Johanna A. Montgomery (ed.) (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

General

The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis by Julian Richards (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action by Sarah Beebe and Randolph Pherson (56 4 [December 2012], Jason Manosevitz

The CIA on Campus: Essays on Academic Freedom and the National Security State by Philip Zwerling (ed.) (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Collaborative Intelligence: Using Teams to Solve Hard Problems by J. Richard Hackman (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the Studies in Intelligence issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.
The Dictionary of Espionage: Spyspeak into English by Joseph C. Goulden (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community by Amy B. Zegart (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence by Joshua Rovner (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Scholarship and Practice by Stephen Marin (564 [December 2012], Jason Manosevitz)

Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations by National Research Council (56 4 [December 2012], Jason Manosevitz)

Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, Volumes 1 and 2, by Philip H. J. Davies (56 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis by Patrick F. Walsh (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Fifth Edition) by Mark M. Lowenthal (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies; An Anthology (3rd edition) by Loch Johnson and James J. Wirtz (eds.) (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence by Hamilton Bean (56 1 [March], Anthony Olcott)

Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security by Thomas Fingar (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Secret Book of CIA Humor by Ed Mickolus (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Secrets of the FBI by Ronald Kessler (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman (56 2 [June], Frank Babetski)

Words of Intelligence: An Intelligence Professional’s Lexicon for Domestic and Foreign Threats (2nd edition) by Jan Goldman (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Historical

Alger Hiss: Why He Chose Treason by Christina Shelton (56 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG by Robert M. Gillespie (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Castles Made of Sand: A Century of Anglo-American Espionage and Intervention in the Middle East by André Gerolymatos (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Castro’s Secrets: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine by Brian Latell (56 3 [September], Thomas Coffey)

The CIA’s Greatest Covert Operation: Inside the Daring Mission to Recover a Nuclear-Armed Soviet Sub by David H. Sharp (56 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Classical Spies: American Archaeologists with the OSS in World War II Greece by Susan Heuck Allen (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Dealing With the Devil: Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During the Second World War by Dónal O’Sullivan (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies by Ben Macintyre (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama Bin Laden by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations by Richard C.S. Trahair and Robert L. Miller (56 4 [December], Bookshelf)
Enemies: A History of the FBI by Tim Weiner (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Fear Within: Spies, Commies, and American Democracy on Trial by Scott Martelle (56 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Franco’s Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco To Power In Spain by Peter Day (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Gentleman Spymaster: How Lt. Col. Tommy ‘Tar’ Robertson Double-crossed the Nazis by Geoffrey Elliott (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of Atomic Espionage by Glenmore Trenear-Harvey (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Horse that Leaps Through Clouds: A Tale of Espionage, the Silk Road and the Rise of Modern China by Eric Enno Tamm (56 1 [March], Bookshelf)

The Ideal Man: The Tragedy of Jim Thompson and the American Way of War by Joshua Kurlantzick (56 3 [September], Bookshelf)

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*Bloodmoney* by David Ignatius (56 1 [March], Michael Bradford)

*The Orphan Master’s Son: A Novel* by Adam Johnson (56 2 [June], John Ehrman)

*Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, by John LeCarre, the movie (56 3 [September], Michael Bradford and James Burridge)

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