50 Years Since Early Engagement in Southeast Asia

Counterintelligence in Counterguerrilla Operations

M. H. Schiattareggia

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Introduction. By the end of 1962, the administration of President John F. Kennedy had committed more than 11,000 US military advisors to train and assist the military and police forces of the Republic of South Vietnam in combating a growing communist insurgency. The Central Intelligence Agency, involved in Vietnam since 1954, had also committed several score field operators to raise and lead village militia units in antiguerrilla warfare in the countryside, most successfully in the Central Highlands.

A different type of conflict from anything seen earlier in the 20th century by US military forces accustomed to large-scale conventional conflicts such as World War I, World War II, and Korea, counterguerrilla warfare as developing in Southeast Asia was something relatively new. It was not until late 1961 and early 1962 that the US Army began developing a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine, encapsulated in FM 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, to inform their operations.

The CIA had more experience at waging such conflicts, which were seen as part of its core covert action mission—these actions were always covert and on much smaller scales than their armed forces colleagues had ever attempted. Americans in general, however, had a steep learning curve to overcome in becoming proficient at waging counterinsurgency warfare—then known as counterguerrilla warfare—and in understanding the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects involved.

This article by M. H. Schiattareggia, the penname of a CIA operations officer with military, counterguerrilla, and intelligence experience, first appeared as a classified article in Studies in Intelligence in the summer of 1962. (It was declassified in 1995.) The work delves into the history of past insurgencies as a means of educating intelligence officers of the day who could expect in the years ahead to find themselves serving in Southeast Asian war zones.

As one of the first articles on the topic to appear in Studies in Intelligence, it hints at operational concepts that would become a major part of the CIA’s efforts later in the decade when eradication of the Viet Cong infrastructure, the winning of peasant “hearts and minds,” and rural security became foremost US goals. Of special note, Schiattareggia surveyed the classics of guerrilla warfare literature produced by its most famous theorists to that time, those who would become household names to Americans during the later Vietnam War. Knowing how one’s adversaries think and operate, the author maintains, is the first step towards defeating them.

—Clayton Laurie, CIA Historian
Guerrilla intelligence, ways to combat it, and organizational roles in counter-guerrilla warfare.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

M. H. Schiattareggia

If one is to become proficient in counter-guerrilla operations, one must prepare by learning everything there is to know about guerrilla operations. It follows that if one is to become knowledgeable in the specialty of counterintelligence in counter-guerrilla operations, one must know the objectives, organizational patterns, and modus operandi of typical guerrilla intelligence. It will be comforting to the counter-guerrilla intelligence officer to know something also of the counterintelligence methods employed by guerrillas, to the extent that they have a methodical counterintelligence.

The Guerrillas’ Intelligence

How do guerrilla intelligence needs—their Essential Elements of Information—differ from those of conventional forces? For conventional forces it has long been U.S. Army doctrine that the division commander needs to know how many battalions of infantry, artillery, or armor are on his immediate front, how many are within reinforcing distance, and how long would it take for reinforcements to arrive in supporting positions. He wants also additional order-of-battle information such as the identities of units and commanders. He seeks answers to such questions as whether the enemy is going to attack, where, when, with how many battalions, and with what objectives, whether he will defend a position and in what strength, whether he will withdraw and when and

Note that this article is confined strictly to the counter-guerrilla aspect of the broader concept “counter insurgency” currently prominent in official communications.
whither. Such EEI stem from the objective of conventional warfare—to impose one's will on the enemy by whatever force is necessary.

This manifestly is not and cannot be the objective of guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas' objectives are to harass, weaken, demoralize, disrupt; they cannot hope to win wars against massive conventional forces. Their EEI stem from these objectives. They need to know about movements of small convoys and troop detachments, their timing and their routes. They must know intimately the terrain along such routes to select good points for ambush or attack. They must know the terrain offering approaches to these points and possible routes of withdrawal from them. They have to know how the convoys and detachments are armed and protected.

Moreover, the guerrillas must know in detail the complete layout of installations like fortified villages, supply dumps, and command posts which they are going to attack, their defensive structures and the strength, tactical practices, and weapons of the guards, what booty the installations offer, and approaches and withdrawal routes from them. They need intimate knowledge of rail lines and roads and of bridges and other critical points on them suitable for sabotage or attack from ambush. Their main concern with the kind of intelligence needed by conventional forces is for defensive purposes: they seek information on movements of major enemy forces to be forewarned of encirclements or sweeps of their base or bivouac areas.

What are the sources for these kinds of information and what sort of intelligence organization is formed to procure it? In their early formative periods, at least, most guerrilla bands of the past have had no formal intelligence organization; many of their leaders have not had the sophistication even to harbor a conscious concept of intelligence. The Pathan tribesmen on the Northwest Frontier of old India, whose main sport and livelihood has for centuries been the ambushing of caravans in mountain passes and who make guerrilla-type attacks on their neighbors in the conduct of blood feuds, might be called natural experts at guerrilla warfare. They certainly don't sit down in council to organize intelligence collection forces or process collected information; but you can
imagine a tribesman skulking high up on a mountainside, camouflaged by natural coloration and his clothes, watching caravan routes below for great distances and then, by runner or signals, passing the word to his fellows that it is time to get into position for attack. Despite Jomo Kenyatta's education in London and Moscow and the sophistication of several other Kikuyu leaders in the Mau Mau guerrilla actions of the early 1950's, one finds little in the writings of British analysts concerning any Mau Mau organization for acquiring intelligence; but you do find reference to the advantage the "gangster" enjoyed in knowing the area better and his "added advantage of good observation points both on the forest fringe and on the moorland areas." 2

Regardless of its lack of formal organization, every guerrilla force of any size which enjoys any success has a ready-made intelligence collection agency—the people on the ground. If the guerrilla movement in fact springs from these people, if it represents a popular wave of feeling against the government or occupying power, the people on the ground—the peasant or coolie farmer, the laborer, man of whatever middle classes there are—will feed information to the guerrillas spontaneously. As the guerrilla leader becomes experienced, he will improve on this spontaneous flow by teaching the people accuracy in their reporting and by instructing the most intelligent, trustworthy, and courageous of them in what he particularly needs to know and in how to make observations and report them. He will also augment it with trained patrols and with clandestine agents, the latter particularly for penetrations. He will work to improve the speed, accuracy, and security of the communications by which this information gets to him, whether by runners, signals or electronic means.

In Communist practices, particularly, it not all the people in the area fully support the guerrilla effort, those who do not will be harassed by pressures and if necessary by terrorist methods, and at the same time indoctrination teams will exercise persuasion on the populace. Ultimately, as the movement grows, the Communist guerrillas will develop rather

sophisticated intelligence requirements, organization, and production. Intelligence documents captured by the French from the Ho Chi Minh forces before the 1954 Geneva agreement to divide Viet Nam included remarkably accurate order-of-battle studies on the French units and other situation reports, summaries, and estimates of a high caliber.

The guerrillas’ primary source of intelligence is then the people of the area, the sea, as Mao Tse-tung characterized it, in which the guerrilla fish swims. The guerrilla intelligence effort may be anything from a primitive, instinctive activity in the casual hand of the leader to fully organized work under a true intelligence staff section at the main base or redoubt. Collection facilities can run the gamut from the spontaneous reporting of haphazard information to a system of patrols, observation posts, surveillance teams, sentries, clandestine networks, penetration agents, prisoner interrogations, and technical intelligence. Communist-directed guerrillas will tend toward the sophisticated, the more so the longer they operate successfully.

This, then, is the intelligence target, the problem confronting the counterintelligence organization of any counterguerrilla force. How does that organization go about its task of stopping, disrupting, manipulating, or negating the intelligence operations of the guerrillas?

Keeping the Fish from their Sea

Certainly it appears from this analysis that the greatest single problem is that of stopping the flow of information from the people on the ground to the guerrillas. There is a choice of two approaches to this problem. The first is to move the people from the guerrilla area—particularly the peasant or coolie farmers, but also all the population of small villages—to relocation centers where they have neither access to infor-

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2 A survey of source materials on guerrilla intelligence is included as an appendix to this paper.
3 Some current areas of confusion in delimiting the task of counterintelligence with respect to that of positive intelligence and that of counter-insurgent action are discussed in a note appended to this paper.
mation nor contact with the guerrillas. The second is a massive application of normal police/counterintelligence procedures—detecting and identifying the people that supply information to guerrillas, their guerrilla contacts, and their couriers, courier routes, letter drops, or other means of communication, and then taking either the defensive steps of apprehending, interrogating, and imprisoning these people or the offensive one of turning them around for double agent operations. Outlining these two choices is easy enough, but it must be obvious that carrying either one out is an absolutely staggering job.

The relocation method is not an innovation; it has been demonstrated that it can be effective. The Russians, for example, have proved the harsh effectiveness of mass deportations of population in the Baltic states and elsewhere. In Malaya the British-Malayan Security Forces carried out more humane and limited relocation operations, combining these with other forms of action to cut off the Communist Terrorists from contacts with the people, not only for counterintelligence purposes but to prevent their getting from them food, supplies, and other kinds of support. The French undertook rather massive relocation efforts in Algeria, where whole new towns, with schools, medical facilities, shops, water supplies, and all requirements for living were created, administered, and guarded by the French Army. At present relocation operations are being carried out in South Viet Nam along the Laotian border.

*The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, official manual of the British (later Malayan) forces (3rd edition, 1958, classification “confidential”), chapter III, sections 3 (Main Tasks of the Security Forces) and 4 (The Briggs Plan). This is beyond question the best counter-guerrilla operations manual extant. It is argued by some students of CGW that the peculiar conditions existing in Malaya—the Chinese “minority” (almost as numerous as the Malayans) being the element supporting the CT’s rather than the whole population, and the organization of civil government, police forces, and military forces being so uniquely British—make it not valid for application elsewhere; but it distills from many years of experience a great amount of practical guidance on modus operandi which is clearly applicable any place in the world where guerrilla movements might develop.*
There will undoubtedly continue to be situations when relocation is an essential step in counter-guerrilla action. Some of its aspects are completely outside the competence of counterintelligence forces—the construction of housing for the people, the provision of food and water, sanitation and medical care, and schools, the mounting of indoctrination programs to change the loyalties of the people, the stationing of guard or combat troops, the training of village self-defense forces. Other aspects, however, are wholly counterintelligence responsibilities.

First is the painstaking process of checking the bona fides of the people moved to the relocation site, determining that they are not guerrilla espionage agents, active members of the Communist Party, or working for any other subversive organization. This entails a requirement basic to all counterintelligence operations—effective records. The vetting and name-tracing task is a very large one. To approach it practically, one must begin with personnel who have been given any official position or responsibility, with especial emphasis on the center’s security forces—the police and self-defense forces, then the civil officials. When these have been vetted, the job of checking the population at large can be attacked.

Counterintelligence personnel must draft or be consulted in the drafting of plans for control of the population—identity cards, travel permits and controls, curfew, neighborhood or block registration and control systems, the selection and training of personnel for these, etc. The development of an informant net is an essential step in counterintelligence control; it forms part of what Eric Lambert, British MI-6 police assistance staff officer, speaking from the British experience in Malaya and Kenya Colony, calls the “police intelligence net at the village level.” Together, the block registration system and the informant network form one of the most effective means of defensive counterintelligence, detecting the presence of subversive or espionage agents and identifying them and their contacts.

In the alternative method used to shut off contact between the guerrillas and the people in the area, the counterintelligence task is probably even more difficult than in relocation. This was the method used by the Filipinos in the Communist-
controlled area known as “Huklandia,” and it worked. Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, the officer of the Philippine Army who was primarily responsible for developing the “Battalion Combat Team” and “Hunter-Killer Team” techniques employed so successfully in destroying the Hukbalahaps on Luzon, describes elements of the counterintelligence aspect of the operation in this way:

Four teams (combined MIS & C Company) with radio sets were organized, consisting of six to eight men, with the ranking NCO in charge. Later six more teams of the same composition were added. Assigned missions were varied, but essentially the teams were required to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report all observations on the inhabitants by radio. Contact frequency was once every other hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family to occupy the house as cover for MIS operatives. The latter group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and the town chief of police, already held suspect by S-2.

Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Huklandia since 1950, it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely. On the theory that the populace are subjected to deep-covered “terrorism,” it was recommended that several individuals be “snatched” and brought to 7th BCT HQ for interrogation, hoping that these individuals, after being convinced of the protective motives of the government under skillful handling, will be made to tell the truth about Pandi. The recommendations were approved and appropriate orders were issued.

The teams were able to snatch no less than 60 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions grew more about hidden power of the HUKs in Pandi, as in no single case did the mayor or the chief of police report the disappearances to the PC or to the 7th BCT.

With good treatment and frequent appeals to the detainees (the Secretary of National Defense participating) [ed. note: This was Sr. Magsaysay, later President of the Philippines] to cooperate with the government and promises of monetary rewards, the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainees-affiliates were relayed back to field teams covering Pandi for verification or confirmation. These informations were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with
past intelligence files as far back as 1948. Out of this painstaking effort, S-2 was able to establish the following intelligence pattern:

1. Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity to the city of Manila, the center of underground apparatus of the Communist Party of the country.

2. Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not catch the attention of the AFP or PC; so as not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC, the area must be kept a “quiet” sector, prohibiting the staging of raids, ambushes, or any Huk activity that will draw troops.

3. It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited in the area. The area, as a matter of fact, is supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging will be done through supply agents specifically appointed by the municipal mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants is punishable by death.

4. Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter in Pandi must first get proper permission from their superiors, who in turn will make proper arrangements with Pandi authorities.

5. Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila receive briefings from Pandi Huk intelligence officers on current situations of their destinations, are given pass words, and exercised on new counter-signs.

6. Pandi inhabitants that had been judged “reactionary” or recalcitrants are not disciplined within the municipal area, but are by long practice secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chief conspired in the kidnap-murder of individuals that were ordered punished by the Huk high command.

7. During the past years, several PC garrisons were off and on maintained in Pandi that because of their small size and poor security could easily have been wiped out by local Hiks. These garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals on the area.

8. Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting off with the mayor’s name, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.

With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating with others, criminal actions were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.

The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, which in a large way hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city and their liaison and control
lines with their active field units in Central Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers and VIP's to and from Manila became more difficult.

This kind of counterintelligence effort resembles in many respects the criminal investigation methods employed by the police against powerful criminal gangs who have the support of large numbers of people, and for this reason and others the police are likely in most countries to be the most effective agency for carrying it out. The method calls for informants in every village, surveillance personnel, patrols disguised as guerrillas, combat squads with great mobility and advanced communications capable of reacting at once to flash reports, skillful interrogators, extensive records carefully built up and cross indexed, and counterintelligence analysts to study the guerrilla intelligence organization, define its modus operandi, and identify its personalities.

Other Counterintelligence Tasks

Aside from its major special problem deriving from support of the guerrillas by people on the ground, counterintelligence has tasks in counter-guerrilla action relating directly to the guerrilla forces and their organic intelligence capabilities which manifest the usual twin aspects, defensive and offensive.

Among the defensive aspects is first the normal job of maintaining the security of the police or military forces engaged in the counter-guerrilla operations. Counterintelligence personnel must conduct training, or must prepare training plans and material and train instructors, to indoctrinate the forces in problems of security. The importance of this responsibility is highlighted in the Malaya manual referred to above. Its chapter XIV, section 5, "Military Security and Counter Intelligence," makes the following observations:

As the MCP [Malayan Communist Party] does not possess the normal organization of a first class enemy, it must exploit every resource of intelligence to redress the balance of inferior force. Thus, in addition to the direct screen of the Minh Yuen, the MCP has established a network of agents and informants throughout
the Federation whose task is to gather information and pass it quickly to the CT [Communist Terrorists].

The G(Int) (b) staffs [counterintelligence staff sections in military headquarters] are responsible for the application of:

(a) Preventive measures to deny the CT all opportunity of gaining knowledge of our intentions.
(b) Detective measures concerned with the investigation of breaches of security or covert activities detrimental to the security of the Armed Forces.

Military Security.—There is clear evidence that:

(a) Many successful ambushes against SF [Security Forces] have been the direct result of lack of security.
(b) CT movement out of an area due to be the scene of impending operations has taken place because of bad security, particularly careless talk.

In operational areas contractors and their employees, who are all vulnerable to CT pressure, quickly become aware of ration strengths, the units engaged, the names and personalities of senior officers and, unless great care is exercised in ordering rations, can forecast with some accuracy future unit changes of locations.

Security is many sided and the CT do not rely on one source only for information. All ranks are prone to careless talk, usually through vanity, thoughtlessness or ignorance. To counter innumerable instances of insecurity of material, loose methods of safeguarding secret papers, inefficient guards, unauthorized entry to WD premises and other breaches of security there is only one remedy: proper security training. The supervision of this training is the task of the Unit Security Officer, assisted by the G(Int) (b) staff, and the security agencies, to ensure that all ranks become security minded.

Counterintelligence.—It is unfortunately only too true of the G(Int) (b) staff and security, as it is with the police and crime, that most of its time is taken up in the investigation of breaches of security that have already occurred.

The G(Int) (b) staff sets up certain standing controls, organizes a system of passes and permits, and arranges with the help of Special Branch for thorough vetting and verification of all employees, but these merely limit the problem. They may make it difficult for an informer or agent to gain access to military establishments or, having got in, to be able to do much harm, but
they cannot exclude the agent or nullify the work of those already inside.

The object of standing controls is, by a process of elimination, to throw into relief incidents or persons that seem to be suspicious and to make them the subject of investigation.

Properly trained, security minded personnel will not only prevent information from getting to the CT but, in adhering to standing security controls, will be quicker to observe any suspicious departures from them and assist the counterintelligence effort.

Since the foregoing is the only section in this manual devoted to the subject of counterintelligence, its writers evidently considered counterintelligence a purely defensive matter. This would in all probability not have been the case if either the Special Branch of the Malay CID or MI-6 counterespionage people had written it. The offensive counterintelligence operations which can be employed against guerrillas include penetrations, provocations, double agents, and defections in place—all of the classic devices of counterespionage. Of these, the most effective is undoubtedly penetrations. Even Communist guerrilla forces, who are probably more security-minded than most others, are always under pressure to build up their strength; they always are looking for additional men. It is extremely difficult for guerrillas, with their requirement for the highest degree of mobility, to build up counterintelligence records and maintain them, and they are therefore hampered in making the normal security check on new recruits who show up or are brought in by old members.

Penetrations were used by both the Abwehr and the Gestapo of the Nazi forces in Europe during World War II with varying degrees of success, depending in part on the country where they were employed. Their success was especially great in France against the “Free French” or Gaullist resistance forces, which were colossally lacking in security consciousness, but also against the compartmented sabotage groups organ-
ized and led by the much better trained and security-conscious officers of the British SOE.7

The classical double agent operation would presumably retain in counterintelligence activity against guerrillas all the hazards and problems so well described in a recent article in the Studies.8 Yet a distinct form of double agent operation seems to have worked very well in counter-guerrilla action in a primitive area like Kenya Colony. What other term than double agent really applies to the astonishing operations car-

1One corps of penetration agents introduced into the SOE and other groups was led by a Frenchman, thought to have been an Aisatian, known by the code name of “Grand Clément.” Recruited into an early SOE group in France, he was recognized to have qualities of leadership and so was flown to England for training and brought back as an officer in the group. Not long afterward Nazi counterintelligence forces arrested nearly all members of the group. Grand Clément “escaped” and got into contact with another group. This in turn was soon rolled up, and Grand Clément “escaped” again. After this suspicious recurrence it was impossible for him to operate personally again as a penetrator, but he set up a training school for the Germans in which he developed a whole corps of penetration agents, a fairly large number of whom were successful in getting into Maquis, SOE sabotage, or other resistance groups, with the inevitable results.

After the liberation of Paris, the present writer, then a counterintelligence officer in the joint U.S.-British-French Special Forces, joined with officers of the SOE Security Section in trying to track down and apprehend Grand Clément, but he was never found. It was never even determined whether he had been a German agent at the time of his first recruitment into SOE—a true agent provocateur—or was recruited by the Germans later. Two other Aisatians who had followed a pattern much like that of Grand Clément, however, were arrested in Paris after the liberation, given a short, fair trial, and shot. They had been recruited into an SOE sabotage group operating near the Swiss border and had shown such ability that they were flown to England for training and returned to the group as lieutenant and radio operator respectively. During the several months thereafter before the area was liberated, the Abwehr rolled up a number of neighboring groups which, in violation of good compartmentation practice, had had contact with this one, but left it strictly alone. This immunity led to an investigation and the post-liberation arrests. The confessions of the two men established that they had been agents provocateurs, but it could not be determined whether they were trainees of Grand Clément’s.

ried out by Inspector Ian Henderson when he turned the captured Mau Mau around and sent them out to track down their fellows.\(^9\) The preconditions for these operations seem to have been the primitive minds of the targets, subject to intense superstitions, loyalties which appear strange indeed to the occidental white man, and an operations officer who knew these characteristics and the people so well that he could grasp what went on in their minds. Such preconditions are not generally to be found, to be sure but there is a large part of one whole black continent, ripe today for Communist exploitation, where they may obtain, and such operations may be desirable among other tribes than the Kikuyu. How many Hendersons do we have?

Military or Civilian Counterintelligence?

What agency should undertake the counterintelligence effort for the counter-guerrilla forces? Every country has some kind of police force, as well as its military forces, in some state of being; and it cannot be doubted that in most countries the police, whatever their type or organization, will be closer to the people, will know local conditions, will more easily be able to organize, normally in fact will already have organized, informant nets, and will therefore prove more efficacious in the collection of counterintelligence information for this type of warfare than agencies of the armed forces would.

The opinion that police will always be superior to armed forces in counter-insurgency operations was recently expressed by Slavko N. Bjelajac, chief of staff to General Mihailovic in Yugoslavia during World War II.\(^10\) They can produce intelligence better than the armed forces, he said, because they get it from the people everywhere; the armed forces cannot get intelligence from the front because there is no front. He referred to the experience in Malaya, where the police were always kept on top in the operations, and the


\(^{2}\) In a speech before the Joint Military Reserves units of CIA. Colonel Bjelajac is now a civilian official in the office of the U.S. Army’s Special Warfare Directorate.
army supported them with strikes against concentrations of the rebels when a concentration could be located. He pointed out the greater flexibility and mobility the police have for instant blows or counterblows against guerrillas and their usually better communications for such actions.

There is much of interest along this line in the Malaya manual previously cited. The opening paragraph on “Own Forces” (Chapter III, Section 1), reads:

The responsibility for conducting the campaign in Malaya rests with the Civil Government. The Police Force is the Government’s normal instrument for the maintenance of Civil Authority but, in the current Emergency, the Armed Forces have been called in to support the Civil Power in its task of seeking out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a Home Guard has been formed.

The main elements of the operational plan for Malaya, which had been developed by a General Briggs, are discussed as follows:

1. The Briggs Plan, which came into effect on 1st June, 1950, aimed at bringing proper administrative control to a population which had never been controlled before. The main aspects of the Plan were:—

(a) The rapid resettlement of squatters under the surveillance of Police and auxiliary police

(b) ...

(c) The recruitment and training of CID and Special Branch Police personnel.

(d) The Army to provide a minimum framework of troops throughout the country to support the Police, and at the same time to provide a concentration of forces for the clearing of priority areas.

(e) The Police and Army to operate in complete accord. To assist in this, joint Police/Army operational control is established at all levels and there is a close integration of Police and Military intelligence.

The chain of command established by the Briggs Plan ensured that “there was always complete integration of Emergency effort,” and that the Security Forces “have always been acting in support of the Civil Power.”
The final paragraph on this plan is worth repeating here, for it states objectives which appear likely to be valid in every counter-insurgency situation in which the United States may participate:

The Plan was essentially a thorough but long term proposition and it would be unrealistic to look for speedy and decisive results. It envisaged a logical clearing of the country from South to North, leaving behind a strong police force and civil administration once an area or State had been cleared. It also aimed to isolate the MRLA [the Malayan Races Liberation Army, or Communist guerrilla force] from the rest of the rural population, thus enabling the latter to feel safe to come forward with information, whilst at the same time depriving the MRLA of their means of support and so forcing them into the open where they could better be dealt with by the SF.

The roles of police and military forces as described elsewhere in Chapter III arc worth study as a model of the ideal organization wherever counter-insurgency or counter-guerrilla operations have to be carried out. The philosophy on which these roles were based is summed up in the second paragraph of the chapter (XIV) on “Intelligence”:

Since there is no state of war in Malaya, the basic responsibility for maintaining law and order is still that of the Police. In the same way the responsibility for producing intelligence still rests with the Special Branch of the Police. In view of the size and importance of the problem, however, a special intelligence organization has been built up.

What the size of the problem required was joint intelligence operations centers manned by Special Branch and military intelligence personnel. One aspect of their division of labor is particularly interesting: “All members of the public who have information to give should be passed on to the Police, who alone will handle agents and informers. On no account will military units run their own agents or informers.”

The situation in Malaya, of course, with its almost ideally developed security forces organization, is one which United States forces will rarely if ever find in a country they are invited to assist in a counter-guerrilla effort. It might be well, however, to hold up this kind of organization as the goal toward which to work, not only because the police can normally be expected to do a far better intelligence and counterintelli-
gence job than the local military forces, but also because when the emergency situation is over the Americans will have left behind the foundations of a better governmental and internal security structure.

It is unlikely that U.S. forces will themselves ever be doing the counter-guerrilla job in any country; their role will be to assist local forces to do it competently. And presumably there will have been no declaration of war. Probably an emergency situation will have been declared, perhaps martial law, but no true belligerent situation as recognized in international law. Under these circumstances it would be desirable, in pursuit of the long-range goal of establishing a sound civil government responsive to the wishes of the governed, to keep the civil authority in control at all times.

There should certainly, in any case, be no contending between different elements of the U.S. contingent sent to support the indigenous forces as to whether the police and civil forces or the military should have primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation. This question should be settled as a matter of national policy before any U.S. elements are engaged, and it should be settled in the way which will lead most surely toward a sound, strong, democratic government when the operation is finished.

APPENDIX: Survey of Sources on Guerrilla Intelligence

It is a puzzling anomaly that one of the poorest sources of information concerning the intelligence methods developed and used by guerrillas is the writings of the great and alleged great guerrilla leaders. Mao Tse-tung’s Yu Chi Chuan, a comprehensive manual on the organization, training, equipment, and tactics of guerrilla forces, makes only one explicit reference even to a need for information about the enemy; at page 80 it assigns the “anti-Japanese self-defense units,” among other responsibilities, that of “securing information of the enemy.” Intelligence, not to mention counterintelligence, is otherwise completely ignored.

Ernesto “Che” Guevara, newly touted as a guerrilla authority, does include in his recent book a section on intelligence, as follows:

“Know yourself and your enemy and you will be able to win a hundred battles.” Nothing helps the combat forces more than accurate intelligence. But be sure to sort fact from fiction. As soon as post offices and mail deliveries can be set up within the guerrilla zone, try to get intelligence about the enemy. Use women to infiltrate the enemy camp. Use trained men and women to spread rumors and sow confusion and fear among the enemy.

This paragraph, with its remarkable instruction on the subject of intelligence communications, is the amazing totality of what Guevara has to say on the subject of positive intelligence. In the field of counterintelligence, however, he apparently had some afterthoughts. In Appendix 4, pages 66 to 68, he writes:

Almost all recent popular movements have suffered from inadequate preparation. Frequently, the secret service of the governing rulers learns about planned conspiracies. Absolute secrecy is crucial. The human material must be chosen with care. At times, this selection is easy; at others, extremely difficult. One has to make do with those who are available—exiles and volunteers eager to join in the fight for liberation. There is no adequate investigative apparatus. Yet there is no excuse for intelligence reaching the enemy, even if the guerrilla organization has been infiltrated by spies, for no more than one or two persons should be familiar with preparatory plans. Keep new volunteers away from key places.

Absolutely nobody must learn anything beyond his immediate concern. Never discuss plans with anyone. Check incoming and outgoing mail. Know what contacts each member has. Work and live in teams, never individually. Trust no one beyond the nucleus, especially not women. The enemy will undoubtedly try to use women for espionage. The revolutionary secretly preparing for war must be an ascetic and perfectly disciplined. Anyone who repeatedly defies the orders of his superiors and makes contact with women and other outsiders, however innocuous, must be expelled immediately for violation of revolutionary discipline.

... Of course, there is no reason why you cannot have a nucleus of 500 men, but these 500 must be split up, because (a) so large a group is bound to attract attention, and (b) in case of betrayal, the entire force could be liquidated.

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1Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. Translation by Major Harris-Clichy Peterson, USMCR (Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).
The location of headquarters may be revealed to most of the group and serve as the meeting place for the volunteers, but the leaders of the conspiracy should appear there only rarely and no compromising documents are to be kept there. The leaders should stay in dispersed, secret hiding places. Locations of arsenals should not be known to more than one or two persons. Arms are not to be distributed until the operation is ready to start, so as not to endanger those involved and to avoid possible loss of costly equipment.

The military leader of the Viet Minh forces, General Vo Nguyen Giap, has written extensively about guerrilla warfare. His essays, collected in a book published in 1961, combine a monotonous reiteration of the theme of close relationship between the people and the Communist armed forces with historical treatises on the liberation of North Viet Nam. There is much repetitive material on the manner in which guerrillas developed and were organized and some discussion of guerrilla tactics, but nothing whatever on the part played by intelligence.

General Vo's forces, however, as they have developed into a conventional army, have not so neglected their intelligence needs. The following passage from one of their training documents begins to reflect the military intelligence interests of conventional forces but applies also to guerrilla operations:

Military Intelligence

1. Individuals selected for service as intelligence agents must be active, courageous, perspicacious, realistic and calm in the face of danger.

2. Intelligence targets: Before mounting any attack, you must learn exactly the number of enemy troops and their armament, as our own forces must be at least equal. Learn all you can about the commander of the enemy troops. You should also study the morale of the enemy soldiers, the location of their strong points, such as blockhouses and heavy weapons emplacements, and how many men there are in a squad, a section or a company; identify enemy units by number or name. Find out the equipment of each unit, the firepower of which it is capable and the political and military training received by the enemy troops.

3. The direct and indirect methods of obtaining intelligence: The direct method is to use your own personnel and to send them out as agents. When you send agents into villages or cities, they

must adopt a cover such as that of a peasant, a fisherman or a coolie. When you send your agents into the countryside, a special cover is not needed, but your men must be able to hide in the forest and must take care to stay away from well-known places, such as water holes or springs, where the enemy will be alert for them. Agents in the countryside must be careful to leave no trails or other traces of their presence.

The indirect method is to recruit your agents from among the populace. You should study the class structure of the people, the youth particularly, and the organization of the enemy’s informer nets. You should choose your agents from the groups thus studied, train them, and put them to work. Tell each one that he must submit reports at fixed intervals, and arrange for them to contact your own men using a system of signals.

4. Intelligence reporting: In obtaining a report from your agents on an enemy base, be sure that the following points are covered:

a. The location of the base and the name of the commander.
b. The positions of machine guns, blockhouses, trenches and all other strong or weak places in the base.
c. The relationship between the enemy soldiers and the civilian population at that base.
d. Communication facilities. Do they have radios or telephones?
e. The best routes of approach to or retreat from the base.

Other sections of the Viet Minh document also contain instruction in intelligence aspects of operations:

Ambushes

Before mounting an ambush operation, you must thoroughly study your agents’ reports on the situation among the people in the area. Especially study the routes by which and the hours at which enemy troops move through the area. How large are these enemy forces; how fast do they move; what weapons do they carry? Do they have machine guns? In obtaining this information, it is essential that the enemy be unaware of our interest. Only the commander and his agents should know that these things are being studied.

The discussion of ambushes which follows includes many items of intelligence import and puts emphasis on the effect of intelligence on plans and tactics. The same is true of the sections entitled “Raid on Enemy Bases,” “General Operating Principles,” and “Establishing Your Base.” In the last named, an indication is given of a somewhat more sophisticated understanding of the problem of communication with intelligence sources than that displayed by Sr. Guevara: “... or-
ganize your intelligence nets in the area, especially arranging for communications between your agents and yourself." The document concludes on a realistically grim note: "Intelligence agents and senior officers must study judo and all methods of hand-to-hand combat to assist them in avoiding capture. They must plan to take the most extreme measures to avoid capture. If capture seems inevitable, they should plan to die first."

Turning to non-Communist sources, we find a large number of good books written by officers who had experience in guerrilla operations during World War II. From these some kernels of wisdom can be extracted with effort, but they suffer as analytical or training texts because they were not intended for such purposes, being presented simply as exciting yarns for public consumption.

One of the few books making a deliberate attempt to bring together historical examples of guerrilla activities and to extract from them sound principles is a fairly recent one from a British source, *Guerrilla Warfare*, by C. N. M. Blair, an MI-6 officer. Chapter 7 of this book, "Summary of Guerrilla Warfare" consolidates the principles distilled from a century and a half of history. Its section on Intelligence begins on page 187:

Not only to give timely information of enemy activity against them, but also for the success of their own operations against the enemy, one of the first essentials for any guerilla force is to establish an efficient intelligence system. Until the movement has developed into a large and widespread guerilla organization their main need will be tactical intelligence on such matters as enemy movements, concentrations and intentions, with—from the counterintelligence aspect—warning of enemy attempts to penetrate the guerillas' own organization. To satisfy these requirements, guerillas must have their own tactical intelligence service but—like the occupying power they will also have to rely largely on the local populace, who in turn will have to penetrate the enemy's security services to obtain the necessary information.

Conversely, if the enemy are unable to obtain intelligence about the guerillas through the local population, they are themselves very greatly handicapped in their counter-resistance activities. It is, therefore, extremely important that the local population are

*Published by British Ministry of Defence (London, 1957), classified British Restricted (U.S. Confidential).*
in active sympathy with the guerrillas, and it is interesting to note that in every successful campaign reviewed in this book this local support has been forthcoming.

Later, as the guerilla force expands, it will require strategic intelligence not only for its operations and own security but also as a basis for internal propaganda. This type of information may be provided through national guerilla or clandestine sources (as happened in the case of the Jugoslavs receiving details of the plans for the German Fourth Offensive) but is more likely to have to come through Allied channels.

*Communications and control*

One of the difficulties in the past has been to disseminate this intelligence, when received, for communications within guerilla forces have always been elementary and slow, and as late as the end of World War II still relied to a very great extent on couriers and runners . . .

It seems noteworthy that even this more sophisticated effort to identify principles does not reach to concrete particulars on subjects like means of collecting information (except to stress reliance on the population), means of communicating collected information to guerrilla headquarters or intelligence sections, and the system for intelligence processing within the headquarters.

Brig. General Samuel B. Griffith, in his introduction to the translation of Mao Tse-tung, covers the subject somewhat more completely, both for positive intelligence and for counterintelligence:

**Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning guerilla operations.**
Where is the enemy? In what strength? What does he propose to do? What is the state of his equipment, his supply, his morale? Are his leaders intelligent, bold, and imaginative, or stupid and impetuous? Are his troops tough, efficient, and well disciplined, or poorly trained and soft? Guerrillas expect the members of their intelligence service to provide the answers to these and dozens more detailed questions.

**Guerrilla intelligence nets are tightly organized and pervasive.**
In a guerrilla area, every person without exception must be considered an agent—old men and women, boys driving ox carts, girls tending goats, farm laborers, storekeepers, school teachers, priests, boatmen, scavengers. The local cadres “put the heat” on everyone, without regard to age or sex, to produce all conceivable information. And produce it they do.

As a corollary, guerrillas deny all information of themselves to their enemy, who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog. Total in-
ability to get information was a constant complaint of the Nationalists during the first four Suppression Campaigns, as it was later of the Japanese in China and of the French in both Indochina and Algeria. This is a characteristic feature of all guerrilla wars. The enemy stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around him thousands of unseen eyes intently study his every move, his every gesture. When he strikes out, he hits the air; his antagonists are insubstantial as intangible as fleeting shadows in the moonlight.

Because of superior information, guerrillas always engage under conditions of their own choosing; because of superior knowledge of terrain, they are able to use it to their advantage and the enemy's discomfiture ...

Within U.S. Government agencies there have been recent attempts to build up a body of doctrine on guerrilla forces, including their intelligence. In an early 1962 draft entitled “An Approach to Counterguerrilla Warfare” (Confidential) prepared at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Maryland, is this brief treatment:

A second requirement for successful guerrilla operations is intelligence. Knowledge of the enemy is the key to guerrilla success. The guerrilla leader cannot take the enemy by surprise unless he knows where the enemy is to be at a given time and in what strength. In addition to a civilian clandestine net, a guerrilla organization must have a small group of men trained in clandestine reconnaissance who can move in enemy territory, collect the required information, and return safely to report.

The Department of the Army Field Manual 31–21, “Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations” (September 1961) is authoritative with respect to the intelligence needs of the U.S. Army Special Forces, the units designed to create guerrillas. It covers the EEI for a Special Force team before it is launched into an area to organize guerrillas and also has a good list of EEI within the guerrilla area after arrival of the team. The reader is referred to Chapter 5, “Theater Support,” Section II, “Intelligence,” and Chapter 7, “Organization and Development of the Area Command,” Section IV, “Intelligence in Guerrilla Warfare Operational Areas.” The manual falls far short, however, with respect to instruction in the organization of collection means and in the modus operandi, organization, and operation of intelligence production facilities at guerrilla bases or headquarters. It also dis-
timguishes poorly between positive and counterintelligence matters.

The most complete and probably the soundest analysis of guerrilla warfare in general and its intelligence and counterintelligence aspects in particular which the writer has been able to find is the Guide to Guerrilla Warfare published by the Operations School of CIA's Office of Training under date of September 1961 (Confidential). Following up a short paragraph at page 3 on the "Role of Intelligence," a comprehensive and detailed discussion of intelligence matters is contained in a section beginning on page 28 covering "General Reconnaissance," "Operational Reconnaissance" (especially valuable), "Sources of Information Which Supplement Physical Reconnaissance"—enemy personnel, friendly and neutral persons in the area, enemy documents, enemy materiel, maps, weather forecasts, enemy radio broadcasts, and aerial photographs—and finally "Espionage." A whole chapter beginning on page 49 is devoted to the subject of "Security," the first two and a half pages of which are really concerned with the defensive aspects of counterintelligence.

NOTE: The Counterintelligence Function and Its Limitations

One area of semantic confusion with possible practical consequences derives from the definition of counterintelligence which, approved officially by the National Security Council and incorporated into NSCID 5, makes it include countersubversion as well as counterespionage and countersabotage. Many people in recent times, including journalists and even high government officials, have referred to guerrilla warfare as the equivalent of subversion. It would be unfortunate if it should therefore be concluded that counterintelligence personnel have the sole or even the major role in counter-guerrilla action; an instant's reflection should make clear how much this is beyond their capabilities.

On the other hand, it is particularly hard in counter-guerrilla operations to distinguish between what is properly positive intelligence and what is counterintelligence. Thus a U.S. Army officer writing about counter-guerrilla operations...
in South Korea, having emphasized as items of positive intelligence the need for complete order-of-battle information on each unit, to include each member of each unit, continued:

Personality files should include all local connections; frequently a mother can persuade her son to surrender, or a guerrilla leader can be captured while visiting his wife or girl friend. Special efforts must be made to kill or capture guerrilla leaders and seize their communications equipment. Aerial reconnaissance by trained units should also be employed.

This statement typifies the loose thinking in regard to intelligence and counterintelligence which pervades most writings about counter-guerrilla warfare. From a semantics standpoint the order-of-battle information, which in conventional warfare would be positive intelligence, must with respect to guerrilla activity, if that is the same as subversion, be counterintelligence. But this sophistry aside, the task of getting a mother to persuade a son to surrender, or of seizing communications equipment, or of getting at a guerrilla leader through his girl friend, is not positive intelligence but something that requires professional counterintelligence know-how.

The point to be emphasized is that, while it is manifestly impossible for counterintelligence forces to carry by themselves the whole responsibility for counter-guerrilla operations, their role in these operations is a critical one on which the success of the enterprise can very well hang. If anyone has any doubt about this statement, let him read Ian Henderson’s fascinating book, cited above, about the final tracking down of the most dangerous of all the Mau Mau guerrilla-terrorists, Kimathi, and try to imagine military positive intelligence personnel or even skilled clandestine espionage people not trained in counterintelligence or police-type work accomplishing what this Special Branch Inspector did.