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The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence: The First 10 Years

The Potsdam Archive: Sorting Through 19 Linear Miles of German Records

Reviewed

Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11

Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World

Red Sparrow

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
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CONTENTS

Document Exploitation After WW II
The Potsdam Archive: Sorting Through 19 Linear Miles of German Records
Gerhardt B. Thamm

Leading the Defense Intelligence Community
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence: The First 10 Years
Dr. Janet A. McDonnell

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Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11
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Vol. 58, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2014)
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE ANNUAL AWARDS, 2013

Awards were presented in February 2014 to four authors for especially noteworthy unclassified work in 2013. Recognized were:

Anonymous, who was awarded the Walter Pforzheimer Award for Best Student Essay of 2013 for “Iraqi Human Intelligence Collection on Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1980–2003” (Studies 57, No. 4 (Winter 2013))

Michael Aaron Dennis for his essay “Tacit Knowledge as a Factor in the Proliferation of WMD — the Example of Nuclear Weapons” (Studies 57, No. 3 (September 2013))

John Ehrman for his review of The Zimmerman Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry Into World War I by Thomas Boghardt (Studies 57, No. 2 (June 2013))

David Robarge for his review of Operation Argo in book and film (Studies 57, No. 1 (March 2013))
German military and civilian authorities have always documented their activities in great detail. Despite the challenges of war, they continued to do so throughout WW II. We are familiar, for example, with the meticulous documentation employed by the Nazis to track their “final solution”—the mass killing of Europe’s Jewish population—but detailed German recordkeeping extended into every sphere of the war effort. As the war turned against Germany, these archives became vulnerable, first to bombing and then to Allied ground troops in the final months of the war.

During the occupation of Germany in spring 1945, Soviet, British, and American forces overran and captured not only large numbers of German soldiers and war materiel such as aircraft, vehicles, factories, replacement parts, and oil supplies, but also document archives. One such archive in Potsdam, southwest of but very close to Berlin, held “19 linear miles” of German military intelligence and German army personnel files. One of the US soldiers who exploited these files, Gerhardt Thamm, tells his personal story here.

While the US benefited from captured German files, the Soviets, too, found their share of information in newly-occupied Germany. Soviet forces took custody, for example, of German Army corps and division level records that had been maintained in Zossen.

We know little of Soviet investigations into the records they captured, but among US and British forces, 120 different organizations exploited German military and civilian files. The US Army focused on German military organization, strategy, and tactics and produced 20 studies during 1945–46 alone, mostly on German WW II military operations. The Army exploited only the cream of the enormous crop of records, and was prepared by 1950 to deliver the entire collection to the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

The newly-created CIA agreed that the collection could be transferred to NARA as long as CIA retained access to what it might need. At the same time, the new nation of West Germany had begun agitating in 1949 for the WW II allies to return seized records, arguing that West Germany could not be a true nation if it could not house and examine its own records and its own past.
Exploiting the Potsdam Archive

The exploitation of captured documents taken from POWs and collected from enemy combatants killed in action has not always been a task fully appreciated by frontline riflemen.

US Army intelligence, composed of up to a half dozen separate agencies, controlled US intelligence activities in Germany before, and for several years after, the establishment of CIA in 1947. Thomas Boghardt reviewed these activities in “America’s Secret Vanguard: US Army Intelligence Operations in Germany, 1944–47,” in Studies in Intelligence 57, No. 2 (June 2013).

The start of the Korean War in 1950 was reason enough for the Army to postpone its plans to move the Potsdam archive to NARA. Instead, the Army began exploiting the German documents for intelligence on what the Germans had learned in WW II about Soviet military strategy and tactics. During 1951–52, and in support of operations in Korea, the Army completed 46 studies that addressed Soviet military doctrine and capabilities. People like Gerhardt Thamm made those studies possible, and we welcome his first-hand look at what it was like to work with the records seized at Potsdam.

The exploitation of captured documents taken from POWs and collected from enemy combatants killed in action has not always been a task fully appreciated by frontline riflemen. Most of the combatants never realized that these documents helped interrogators in extracting information from recalcitrant POWs. The extracted information assisted commanders in planning current and future operations.

Little has ever been revealed of an operation launched by a US Army G-2 who had taken (the Soviets said “snatched”) the entire Potsdam Archives from under the noses of the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye), the foreign military intelligence directorate of the Red Army, and brought it to the United States.

A few days later, my first sergeant ordered me to report to the Mall entrance of the Pentagon where a sergeant would escort me to my duty station, the GMDS (German Military Document Section). It was another one of those beautiful days in the middle of June. Dressed in a heavily starched and well-pressed khaki uniform, my brass shined, wearing spit-shined low quarter shoes, I walked through the tunnel that led under a Virginia highway to the Pentagon. I walked through the huge brass doors of the Mall entrance and came into a reception area richly decorated in dark wood. There, Staff Sergeant Walter Wende awaited me. To my utter surprise, he greeted me in fluent German.

He saw my surprise and laughed, “Wait till you get to the office.” We walked along a wide corridor toward the center ring. For me, barely four months out of war-torn Europe, it was surreal. I glanced in wonderment at both sides of the corridor; they were decorated with large oil paintings of battle scenes and what I assumed to be famous generals and
War Department civilians. We arrived at A-Ring, and through large, almost floor-to-ceiling windows, I saw a five-cornered park with a gazebo in its center.

1. Onward we walked to the tenth corridor. There we made a slight left turn and entered staircase #10. Walking down two flights of stairs we arrived on the Mezzanine floor. At room MB-I026, Sergeant Wende stopped at a steel vault door. Then we walked into a large, windowless, office where Sergeant Wende introduced me to Sergeant Major Ignaz Ernst and to Mr. Brower, a civilian, the boss of GMDS.

The sergeant major, a jovial giant of a man, had come to America from Westphalia long before WW II. He crushed my hand and welcomed me to his unit, again in fluent German. To me the entire scene was surreal. Here I was, in the center of the United States War Department, and everyone conversed in German. Sergeant Major Ernst (everyone called him “Iggy”) introduced me to everyone. There were some 20 men in the office, with few exceptions, all veterans of the last war. All but one spoke fluent German. The one who did not, Mike Halyshin, was a cheerful master sergeant who specialized in Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian.

Sergeant Wende had me properly documented with a photo identification badge, a rarity in those days—only the very few had a military

photo identification. The sergeant major assigned me to work with Staff Sgt. Alois Himsl. Sergeant Himsl was a fourth- or fifth-generation American from Minnesota, whose family had come from Austria during the 1880s. He spoke German with the soft inflection of the Austrians. From him I learned that we would be exploiting German military and Nazi Party documents captured at the end of World War II.

The records had arrived in railroad boxcars at the US Army Cameron Station warehouse complex on Duke Street, which in those days was outside the western city line of Alexandria, Virginia. Long before my arrival, our German-speaking crew had already selected some of these records and stored them in Room MB 1026 of the Pentagon. The greater part was still in original wooden crates at Cameron Station awaiting exploitation for military intelligence information. Around the middle of 1948, the Army had amassed a sufficient number of expert linguists who could recognize valuable information and could separate the treasure from the trash.

A week or so after my arrival, Sergeant Himsl and a small crew—including this new Pfc.—rode in a small truck from the Pentagon Motor Pool to the Cameron Station warehouse. I stood in amazement inside the cavernous repository. I saw rows upon rows of wooden crates, each about three feet high and four by four feet wide, stacked on wooden pallets, about 10 to 15 feet high. I learned to operate a heavy forklift and pulled heavy wooden crates filled with all sorts of papers from the stacks.

Sergeant Himsl broke open the crates, and he and his helpers sorted through piles of every conceivable thing that the Army G-2’s helpers had loaded into these wooden boxes. We could tell that they had hurriedly shoveled these documents into the boxes with pitchforks; we saw dirty pitchforks marks on the folders. Obviously, they had hurried to get them away before the Soviets realized what a vast source of information they’d had in the Potsdam Archives.

**The Gold Mine**

We had a gold mine. The Army G-2 in the Pentagon told us that the files of Reinhard Gehlen’s *Fremde Heere Ost* were of primary interest to Army intelligence, closely followed by the espionage activities of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of *Ausland/Abwehr*. Every day was like Christmas. One of the first tasks was to unload the crates and find the index files for all documents. We spent some weeks searching for

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* Foreign Armies, East, the intelligence branch that dealt with the Soviet Army. After the war, Gehlen directed the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the intelligence service of the German Federal Republic.

b Wilhelm Canaris, head of German Armed Forces Intelligence, a longtime naval career officer, entered the Navy in 1905 as a cadet; he was involved in the attempt to kill the Führer and was executed by the Nazis on 9 April 1945—less than one month before Germany capitulated.

c German Armed Forces Intelligence.
We found long, heavy, narrow crates filled with photographic glass plates; they were from Heinrich Hoffmann, the official Nazi Party photographer.

We discovered the entire German Army Officer Personnel file collection. In other crates were combat situation reports, combat capability assessments, intelligence files for all fronts—including the “Eastern Territories.” We found enemy combat assessments of troops and equipment from the Afrika Korps—Field Marshal Rommel’s unit, evaluations of US Army and Royal Army units on the Western Front, the situations in Norway and the Balkans, and geographic/demographic studies of the Soviet Union.

We found battle plans and combat intelligence reports from the Eastern Front. We had thousands of military situation maps from every German front: east, west, north, south, Africa, the Mediterranean, and southeast Europe. We had three maps of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht’s morning, midday, and evening reports of the military situation for every day of the war and for every front. We also had specialty maps for the Mediterranean theater of operation and for Crete, Yugoslavia, Norway, Normandy, and more.

We never knew what morsels we would find when we cracked open a new crate. We opened a set of wooden crates containing neat folders, akin to personnel jackets—all indexed. They were the interrogation records of the Luftwaffe’s Auswertestelle West, although everyone called it Dulag Luft West. All American and British airmen shot down over German territory first came to this POW interrogation center at Oberursel, north of Frankfurt-on-Main, for debriefing. With German efficiency, each folder had a letter and a number. The letter identified the type of aircraft, e.g., B-17, B-26, P-51, etc., filed in sequence by date the shoot-down was recorded.

We found several thousand folders. Each jacket contained everything collected from a particular aircraft—the tail number, description of items and equipment found, and whatever else survived in the crash. Then followed a report of items found on the POWs—whatever the crew carried on them that was of intelligence value, including the usual photos of girlfriends, newspaper clippings, good luck charms including the occasional rabbit’s foot, communications books, paper, messages found in the aircraft—items the crews were warned not to take on the mission. If the crew member had a USAAF watch, it was taken for examination.

The Luftwaffe recorded crew members’ complaints, but crews were told their watches were government issued property, not personal items. The captured interrogation reports revealed exactly how much

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a Leitz, a trade name for a gray-black hardcover archive folder with a label at the back and a metal-framed hole at the bottom to facilitate pulling the folder from the shelf.
b German Armed Forces High Command.
c Evaluation Site West.
d The Luftwaffe’s Transient Camp, Air, West.
each of the men in the aircrew talked. Most often, it seemed as if the higher the rank of the flyer, the more he talked. Some entries read, “Young, arrogant second lieutenant, will not say anything except name, rank, and serial number.” Others had page upon page of information. It was a rather curious mixture.

After the recently established US Air Force became aware of the existence of these files, it tried to court-martial some members for talking too much. They brought the chief Luftwaffe interrogator, Hans Joachim Scharff—the airmen called him “Pokerface Scharff”—to the United States. He testified, but for the defense: he accused high officials in the Army Air Corps of being more at fault than the crew members.

The USAF decided to skip the court-martial idea. I heard the USAF convicted only one officer, who had defected to Germany. Later the USAF asked, “What was the magic spell or formula used by Pokerface Scharff that made the prisoners drop their guard and converse with him even though they are conditioned to remain silent?” Pokerface Scharff broke down barriers so effectively that the USAF invited him to make speeches about his method to military audiences in the United States.

Creating an Index

We had everything that was stored at the Potsdam Archives, except that the index cards were in a different building. There was much scratching of heads. Without the index files, properly sorting this many documents was extremely difficult. We had no archivists in the organization to assist. No one had the solution to this momentous problem. Finally, Sergeant Himsl, a good old Minnesota farmer’s son, said, “We’ll sort all the Leitz folders by the markings on the labels. Sort out all the folders that have red diagonal lines from right to left on one pile, those with the red diagonal line from left to right on another, then those with blue lines, yellow lines...after we are finished with the Leitz we’ll get to the other stuff.”

After months of breaking crates and sorting the files, we had Leitz folders stretching in multiple rows on the floor of the huge warehouse from one end to the other. After completing the sorting and arranging, we had those 19 linear miles of documents, sorted by office of origin and office of responsibility, on the floor of the warehouse. It was pure genius: Sergeant Himsl, not an archivist, solved the problem in his own unique and efficient fashion.

Among these files we finally discovered the clandestine reports from Fremde Heere Ost, General Gehlen’s intelligence specialists deep inside Russia. Our G-2 was happy. With our first mission completed, we sorted the rest by color and symbol on the Leitz folder. Eventually, the rows of folders became the base for a new index file. Much later, after we had done the groundwork, the Department of the Army hired German-speaking civilian employees to recreate the indexes for the various German departments. In essence, they created a mirror image of the German archival system of indexes—except ours was in English.

Once Organized

A Trove of Maps

We alerted the G-2 that several crates contained hundreds of ingenious little booklets in the MilGeo Collection, the German Army’s military geography collection. All were uniformly reddish purple, of a size that would fit into the breast pocket of a German Army tunic—designed for company-level officers. There were booklets for every city, town, and village in Poland and Russia (up to the Ural mountains), which contained a description of the location, a little map of the fastest route through town, the town’s important features, the number of horses and troops that could be quartered in the town, important military intelligence information, bridges, river crossings, militarily important geographic features, and more.

We discovered a pile of engineering maps of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. German civil engineers had designed this railroad. We found construction plans for whole sections of track. (Years later, the Central Intelligence Agency picked up these plans and used them to cali-
We found convincing, undeniable, evidence, of Nazi crimes.

brate U-2 reconnaissance aircraft navigation and photography.)

These maps had their own importance because the Soviets, in their paranoia, had offset their map coordinates by several miles to prevent the world from knowing the exact locations of their “strategic” sites. They were not secret to us; we had the engineering surveys.

War Crimes Evidence

Other crates contained Gestapo files with indisputable evidence of wartime crimes committed by the Nazis; Nazi Party files; several photo collections, and much more. We also found files from civilian administrations, from the Gestapo, the Nazi Women’s organization, scientific research foundations, every imaginable type of printed and handwritten material, items from before WW I, through the growth of Nazi power, to the very last days of the war.

Years later, by that time we had outgrown the storage capability of Room MB-1026, we moved the entire collection to the old Torpedo Factory on Union Street, in Alexandria, Virginia. There, we stored these documents—still in their original Leitz folders—on 10-foot steel shelves.

For several years we concentrated our research on intelligence matters; later, we turned our attention to war crimes. All of us—young soldiers and old, alike—regarded as utterly disgusting what the Nazis had done to people and to nations and were unable to understand how they had besmirched the whole of Germany for their own shameless ideology. The documentation we had in this warehouse was proof beyond any doubt: evidence written and imaged by Germans who were proud of their despicable acts—acts which would haunt all Germans into eternity. It made us ashamed of our German roots, ashamed even to be members of the human race.

We found convincing, undeniable, evidence, of Nazi crimes. For some months, it was my task to work through the records of Nazi activity in the Baltic countries. We discovered that the SS had allowed locals, Latvian, Estonians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians to do much of the dirty work. These locals tried to outdo the Nazis in torturing and killing poor hapless men, women, and children.

Among the Gestapo files, I found a stack of green, linen-covered ledgers from concentration camps in the Baltic countries. Each had, on page after numbered page, in neat handwriting, the names of persons, thousands upon thousands, who had perished in these concentration camps. It listed first name, last name, date of death, and cause of death—Herzinfarkt—cardiac arrest—written after each prisoner's name. Some camps provided photos

Gerhardt Thamm in the Torpedo Factory file room and as a Sergeant First Class in 1952. Photos courtesy of Thamm.
of prisoners undressing before going into the “showers,” the euphemism for “gas chambers.” These inhuman creatures in fancy black uniforms sent a “show and tell” of these images to their beloved leader, Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Chief of the SS and Head of German Police, Heinrich Himmler, aka the “chicken farmer.”

With typical German efficiency, scientists tested various killing methods. They discarded death by shooting as inefficient, too costly, and too time consuming. These scientists determined that poisonous gases were the most efficient way of mass killing “undesirables.” They tested various chemical combinations on prisoners and finally settled on one that was easiest to administer. Gestapo headquarters then commissioned German architects to design the most efficient gas chambers possible. The architects drew detailed blueprints of gas chambers, and many of these blueprints were part of our depository. We submitted the evidence to the various war crimes commissions, which tried the guilty parties. They hung some Nazis, but far fewer than deserved execution. Most of them received long prison terms, later commuted to time served. Many of those executed for war crimes were low-level guards conscripted into the SS, often with prior criminal records.

At one point, my boss assigned me to work on “Kommando Dirlewanger,” the most despicable among countless despicable Nazis. The German Army had refused to accept Herr Dirlewanger for service: under an old German law, certain criminal acts precluded service in the Wehrmacht (the armed forces). By army regulations, dating back to the days of empire, those convicted of poaching received not only prison terms, but also “loss of honor” and loss of citizen rights, such as voting, holding public office, and serving in the armed forces. Yet those ineligible to serve in the Wehrmacht found homes—and fancy uniforms—in the Waffen-SS, the armed services of the regular SS: Hitler’s uniformed henchmen. This was where Dirlewanger found his home. Dirlewanger was “famous” for his short, descriptive reports, each a half a page long, with the subject, Juden- säuberung—“Jew cleanup.”

Heute hat Kommando Dirlewanger 234 Juden umgelegt.” “Today, Commander Dirlewanger has knocked off 234 Jews at [location].”

Many of these low-level concentration camp guards were indeed executed, but scores of high officials had carefully prepared their departure “just in case we lose” and escaped to foreign lands, South America being one of their favorite destinations. This seemed to confirm the truth of a German proverb, “They hang the little ones, but the big ones they let go.”

Working in GMDS I came to realize that we must never forget that there is but a thin line between the cultural elite and the mass murderers of yesterday, today, and tomorrow. In recognition for my work, I received one set of 42 volumes of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials; it is now the only German-language set in the Library of the US Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC.

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a So called, because of his occupation before becoming the Nazi’s top killer.
b “Sie hängen die Kleinen, sondern die Großen sie gehen zu lassen.”
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence: The First 10 Years

Dr. Janet A. McDonnell

The creation of the office of the under secretary of defense for intelligence (OUSD(I)) in March 2003 can now be marked as one of the most significant milestones in the history of defense intelligence. For decades, intelligence-related functions within the office of the secretary of defense had been performed by several different organizational structures and reporting channels, and the responsibility had at times been assigned to officers at several layers below the secretary or to a deputy assistant secretary of defense. Once, it was assigned to an assistant secretary of defense (ASD). The department’s command, control, and communications and its intelligence functions were at times consolidated and then separated. None of these structures gave intelligence sufficient priority or attention.¹

When Donald Rumsfeld became secretary of defense in 2001, the intelligence function was, in fact, handled by an assistant secretary of defense—for command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I). Also at the time eight DoD agencies had intelligence responsibilities. Four of them—the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (now National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)—reported directly to the secretary. The remainder, the four military service intelligence agencies, reported to their service chiefs.

Rumsfeld understood the critical importance of intelligence and the need for improved management of the function in his department. The 9/11 terrorist attacks added a sense of urgency. The secretary was also keenly aware of his responsibility for ensuring that the funds Congress allocated for intelligence were spent appropriately. The department’s intelligence activities had become so broad and complex that a leader with high stature in the Pentagon and the Intelligence Community (IC) was needed to effectively represent DoD interests. The secretary and his senior staff concluded that the scope of the responsibilities would best be handled by an under

¹ This essay is drawn from a recently published DIA History, Defense Intelligence Coming of Age: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 2002–2012. Additional, classified source material for this work is cited in the original work and held in the office of the DIA Historian along with sources cited in this article.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Milestones in the Evolution of the USD(I)

2002  
**December**  
FY2003 Defense Authorization Act passed; created the USD(I) position

2003  
**March**  
Stephen Cambone, first USD(I)

2003  
**December**  
FY2004 Defense Authorization Act signed; act contained language mandating a comprehensive ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) strategy

2004  
**January**  
Cambone launches RDI (remodeling defense intelligence) program

2004  
**December**  
IRTPA signed into law; created the ODNI position

2005  
**November**  
S/DoD Rumsfeld signs directive enhancing authority of USD(I)

2006  
**Introduction of JIOCs into combatant commands**  
JMIP & TIARA funding mechanisms folded into MIP (Military Intelligence Program)

2007  
**April**  
Clapper develops program between MIP and broader NIP to make defense intelligence planning more efficient & effective

2007  
S/DoD Gates and DNI McConnell agree on authorities of USD(I)

2008  
S/DoD Gates creates ISR Task Force

2010  
S/DoD Gates institutionalizes responsibilities of ISR Task Force

2011  
Michael Vickers becomes third USD(I)
secretary reporting directly to the secretary.

The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 included authorization for the position of under secretary of defense for intelligence (USD(I)), and nominated and installed the director of his program and analysis office, Dr. Stephen Cambone, to the position. Cambone would exercise authority, direction, and control over all intelligence and intelligence-related activities within the department and serve as the secretary’s single point of contact in DoD for other government agencies on intelligence matters. In November 2005 Rumsfeld signed a directive that served as the charter for the office, formally delegating authority over the defense intelligence agencies and field activities and giving Cambone the full authority that he required.

Meanwhile, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. Among other things the act created the office of the director of national intelligence (ODNI), which began operations in April 2005. Establishing an effective relationship with and supporting the ODNI added new challenges and responsibilities for the under secretary and his staff.a

With the departure of Rumsfeld and Cambone in late 2006, OUSD(I) underwent significant change. In May 2007, not long after the Senate confirmed Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF (Ret.), as USD(I), Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and DNI Michael McConnell formally agreed that the USD(I) would be dual-hatted as the director of defense intelligence within the ODNI, acting as the primary military intelligence adviser to the DNI and ensuring that defense intelligence was fully integrated into the IC.

In 2008 Clapper realigned his staff with the goal of strengthening warrior support, human intelligence (HUMINT), and counterintelligence integration, more effectively aligning core functions, and better ensuring that the office could meet the needs of DoD and the IC.b

Creating OUSD(I)

The concept that shaped the new position was primarily Secretary Rumsfeld’s, who saw it as a central element in a reform of defense intelligence. It would be implemented only after many months of effort by Pentagon officials. Rumsfeld and his staff were keenly aware that securing congressional support would be critical in the reform effort. He made a carefully considered decision to use the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) as his point of entry to Congress rather than the Senate and House intelligence committees.

Rumsfeld argued that his proposal was an internal DoD reorganization, not a reorganization of the Intelligence Community, and thus it was appropriate to send it to the armed services committees for action. Pentagon officials believed the other Senate committees would most likely not challenge the SASC over a DoD reorganization. Rumsfeld was also confident that his proposal would face little opposition in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11.c

By the end of 2001, Rumsfeld had formally asked SASC Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) and its ranking member Senator John Warner (R-VA) to include authorization for two new under secretary positions, one for homeland security and the other for intelligence, in the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Bill. This effort came too late in the FY 2002 legislative process, but the secretary had effectively planted a seed and made his intentions clear.d

Meanwhile, Pentagon officials continued to smooth over any tensions with the House and Senate intelligence committees, whose

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b Memorandum of Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, 21 May 2007; James R. Clapper, Jr., Memorandum for Director, Administration and Management, Subj: Reorganization, 3 June 2008.
Ten Years of the USD(I)

The plan did face stiff resistance from some defense intelligence agency leaders, although not DIA’s leaders.

members were indeed concerned that Rumsfeld was trying to circumvent their intelligence oversight responsibilities. Rumsfeld’s relationship with Congress had been strained at times, and some members regarded him with skepticism. Moreover, in the aftermath of 9/11, Congress was in the midst of debating the need for broad reforms within the IC and beginning to consider creation of a national intelligence director position. Some thought Rumsfeld’s initiative was an effort to impede this. Others most likely saw it as a distraction from the main goal of community reform.

Securing congressional support took political skill and months of concerted effort. Opposition from any one of the intelligence or defense committees could have derailed the proposal. During this process, Rumsfeld also realized the importance of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet’s support. Rumsfeld knew he needed Tenet not just to go along but to become a strong advocate. When first told of the USD(I) concept, Tenet and other CIA leaders were understandably concerned that the position and its implied elevation of defense intelligence might diminish the DCI’s authorities and prerogatives.\(^a\)

Senior CIA officers had grown used to reaching into DoD at any organizational level they deemed useful, and they wanted to be sure the DCI remained directly engaged with the secretary and not have to go through a lower ranking officer, even one as close to the secretary as the proposed USD(I).

For their part, Pentagon officials emphasized the benefits the USD(I) would provide the DCI: a single point of contact for defense intelligence, more effective implementation of DCI policy guidance, consolidated oversight of DoD programs and improved efficiencies, improved coordination between DoD and the DCI’s Community Management Staff (CMS), and a single DoD voice at CMS budget meetings.

The concepts appealed to Tenet, who was struggling with issues of intelligence performance and reform in the wake of 9/11 and US military operations in Afghanistan. More pragmatically, Tenet and other CIA senior officers no doubt also came to realize by this time that resistance would be futile. Tenet’s support for the USD(I) proposal ultimately helped weaken such resistance as there was in Congress.

The plan did face stiff resistance from some defense intelligence agency leaders, although not DIA’s leaders. Those who opposed it generally feared they would lose some authority and autonomy. These leaders had become accustomed to operating fairly independently and dealing directly with senior Pentagon officials and the DCI.

In response, Pentagon officials emphasized that the OUSD(I) would serve as an advocate for them inside the Pentagon and on the Hill.\(^b\) The secretary also faced resistance from inside the Pentagon. The then ASD (C3I), John Stenbit, strongly opposed the idea of setting up a new intelligence organization within the Pentagon. He contended that the command, control, communications, and computers (C4) functions he oversaw had a natural symbiosis with intelligence and should remain linked under his office.

Neither internal nor congressional opposition gained traction, and the secretary’s second attempt to secure congressional approval succeeded with the passage on 2 December 2002 of the FY 2003 authorization act, which included the position. On 11 March 2003, Stephen Cambone was sworn in as the first USD(I).

Major Reforms and Initiatives

In its first years, OUSD(I) initiated major reforms and reorganizations in defense intelligence, particularly in the areas of HUMINT, resource allocation and priorities, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). It also focused its effort on enhancing information


\(^b\) VADM Lowell E. Jacoby, USN (Ret), and Louis Andre interview with author, 5 March 2012, 6–7.
sharing and collaboration within and outside defense intelligence.

In January 2004, Cambone launched an innovative program called remodeling defense intelligence (RDI), which had the goals of promoting information sharing within DoD, strengthening all-source analysis, forcing greater integration of intelligence assets, and improving the various intelligence disciplines. Reforming Defense HUMINT was a key component of RDI and would remain a top priority for his successor in 2007, Lt. Gen. James Clapper.

A key component of RDI was the concept of joint intelligence operations centers (JIOCs). Various studies had identified the need for better integration of intelligence and better intelligence handling processes. In 2006, Rumsfeld directed that JIOCs be created in each of the combatant commands. The JIOC system was designed to eliminate traditional logjams caused by chains of command and to facilitate more direct communications between analysts and collectors in the field. At the same time, officials established a Defense JIOC at DIA. The DJIOC, as it was called, had representatives from DIA, NSA, NGA, and the ODNI. The DJIOC was to provide all-source intelligence support to the combatant command JIOCs. For the combatant commands it became a “one-stop shop” for intelligence operations and planning support at the national level.

The JIOCs proved to be one of DoD’s greatest assets in the effort to strengthen the links between operations and intelligence. The JIOCs proved to be one of DoD’s greatest assets in the effort to strengthen the links between operations and intelligence. Officials developed a standardized model for JIOCs, and some JIOC staffs now number in the thousands. Putting a multi-intelligence capability in the combatant commands supported by NGA, DIA, and other agencies made those commands stronger and more effective, and the JIOCs provided a foundation that officials could build on to support military operations.

That said, the JIOCs were conceived and implemented in the context of ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and questions remain about how they will fit in to today’s changing geopolitical environment, particularly as US forces pull out of Afghanistan. Some modification of the JIOCs might be needed as the global environment continues to change.

Another fundamental change came in the way the department budgeted for and funded intelligence. Rumsfeld, Cambone, and others concluded that they needed a more effective structure for managing and allocating intelligence resources and for the accounting process. In a relatively short period of time, defense intelligence moved from what some described as the disorganized or even chaotic Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) funding process to a new Military Intelligence Program (MIP) established by OUSD(I).

Officials folded the JMIP, which funded intelligence efforts that extended beyond military service boundaries, and TIARA, which funded items related to the intelligence missions of individual services and agencies that were not national, into the MIP. Consolidating resources under a single budget program enabled leaders to more effectively make exchanges between disparate parts of the budget.

As USD(I) Clapper went even further in exercising MIP authorities and developing an intelligence program between the MIP and the broader National Intelligence Program (NIP), making defense intelligence program planning more effective and efficient. Over time officials developed various rules-based approaches to how they jointly programmed initiatives. As a result, each year officials now publish the Consolidated Intelligence Guidance, detailing joint program planning between the NIP and MIP.

Over the years, OUSD(I) also played a major role in overseeing the department’s ISR enterprise. In 2004 Congress directed the office to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the development and integration of DoD ISR capabilities for the next 15 years. It called for the creation of the ISR Integration Council, which, along with the director of

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a Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Memorandum to the Secretaries of Military Departments et al., Subj: Establishment of the Military Intelligence Program, 1 Sep 2005.
Oversight had not kept pace with investment in ISR and allowed inefficiencies to arise in DoD’s ISR portfolio.

The department’s efforts to keep pace with these technological advances have had mixed results. A 2012 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report noted that DoD’s success with ISR in Iraq and Afghanistan had fueled an exponential growth in new and enhanced ISR capabilities over the past decade. The department had spent roughly $67 billion on ISR since the 9/11 attacks but had failed to strategically plan for how this investment related to future requirements.

Oversight had not kept pace with investment in ISR and allowed inefficiencies to arise in DoD’s ISR portfolio. In a time of fiscal constraint with operations winding down in Afghanistan, the report recommended that the DoD begin using cost-benefit analysis in its ISR acquisition decisions and reallocate existing ISR assets from Afghanistan to the combatant commands and that it disband the ISR Task Force at the end of its Afghanistan mission.

Three Under Secretaries

Although the themes of operationalizing intelligence and transforming technological advances remained constant, each under secretary had different priorities and goals. Much as with any organization, their tenures reflected what was needed at the time, as well as their individual strengths and priorities. Each came from a different background and brought unique expertise and experience to the job. Each held a different vision and view of the appropriate role for the OUSD(I) organization.

As the first USD(I), Cambone’s priority was to firmly establish the office and uphold the secretary’s authorities. He was determined to make his small organization strong and brought in senior officers with the right mix of experience and expertise required to ensure that it would not only survive, but thrive. He laid an effective foundation, making it clear that the under secretary had certain responsibilities and he was going to exercise them. Despite some resistance, Cambone began to shape the way OUSD(I) would provide program oversight of defense intelligence, something that had not been done previously.

Under Secretary Clapper brought to the job a career’s worth of intelligence experience and expertise. He spent much of his time completing the stand-up of OUSD(I) and focused on space programs, the ISR Task Force, HUMINT, and other issues. Finally, Clapper assumed a more active role within the national IC than his predecessor had and sought an expanded role for his organization within that community.

When Michael G. Vickers became the third under secretary in March 2011, OUSD(I) entered a new phase in its history. Vickers oversees

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b House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Performance Audit of Department of Defense Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” April 2012, ii.
defense intelligence at a strategic turning point after 10 years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. This includes dealing with budget limitations and developing a strategy for the future. The under secretary recognized the challenges ahead, particularly with the unprecedented pace of global operations, the need to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence environment, and the need to prevent strategic surprise while fully supporting on-going operations, all of this in a period of fiscal constraint.

While Vickers built on the initiatives of his predecessors, he brought his own vision, priorities, and strengths to the position. Under his leadership, OUSD(I) focused primarily on defeating al Qaeda, supporting operations in Afghanistan, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening oversight of the defense intelligence agencies, defending the nation against cyber threats, improving tradecraft, and professionalizing the workforce. Another major objective, strengthening Defense HUMINT at the national level, led to the recent establishment of the Defense Clandestine Service within DIA.

**Relationships with ODNI**

The under secretary’s role has clearly evolved and matured over time, as has his relationship with DNI. Determining the appropriate balance of authorities between the two organizations has been and continues to be a challenge. Early on, the ODNI took the position that it was responsible for national intelligence, which includes domestic intelligence, foreign intelligence, and military intelligence. DoD leaders countered that the secretary of defense, not the DNI, was responsible for military intelligence. However, it is a testament to leaders in the Pentagon and in ODNI that, over time, the DNI came not only to recognize the role and influence of the USD(I) but also to view him as a true partner.

Even with a solid partnership, the two organizations did not always agree on every issue. Sometimes the DNI exercised an authority or responsibility (under IRTPA) taking an action that DoD saw as conflicting with its own interests, which created some friction.

On balance, though, there has been more cooperation than conflict. Indeed, this level of cooperation has strengthened defense intelligence in terms of shared investment between the NIP and MIP for collection systems, analysis, and training and education that serve both DoD and national customers. This for the most part is now done jointly. By establishing a strong OUSD(I) organization, officials created the foundation of a good partnership.

**Looking Ahead**

Though leaders readily concede that more work remains, the original vision for OUSD(I) has, to a significant extent, been realized. The office has given the intelligence function greater attention and importance within DoD, and the influence of OUSD(I) has grown significantly both within defense intelligence and the larger intelligence community.

The challenges that remain include a new, constrained resource environment. After a decade of historically high expenditures on intelligence gathering operations, total spending began a steady decline. ODNI reported that total spending dropped from $54.6 billion in FY 2011 to $53.9 (-1.35 percent) in FY 2012. The MIP budget dropped from $24 billion to $21.5 billion (-10.5 percent) during the same period.

In a November 2011 interview with Bloomberg News, DNI Clapper warned, “We’re going to have less capability in 10 years than we have today.” The 16 departments, agencies, and offices that make up the US IC spent a combined $80 billion a year. The challenge now is to find ways to optimize the existing intelligence capability even in the face of reduced resources and ensure that the IC can still perform its essential function, using the available funds so as to get the best possible effects.²

That said, fiscal constraints can also provide opportunities for change. Officials might at times be able to manage and oversee large entities within the IC with smaller

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staffs, creating greater efficiencies. The current fiscal environment presents an opportunity to terminate programs that were marginal performers and invest the savings in the future.

In addition to fiscal constraints, there remains the more fundamental ongoing challenge of continuing to improve information sharing and collaboration. Cambone and his successors had some success in moving defense intelligence from “need to know” to “need to share,” prompting greater information sharing and collaboration. In commemorating the OUSD(I)’s 10th anniversary, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta pointed to change in the stove-piped nature of service intelligence and a revolution in intelligence sharing and collaboration in the past decade.

Despite some successes, however, the same critical questions remain: How rapidly can we share our information or can others access it? Do we have access to everything that we should legitimately have access to? Are we adequately connected technologically? The challenges, said one official, are ones of policy and a general reluctance to share everything with everyone. The standard shifted from “need to know” to “need to share” and then “need to have access,” making the challenge even greater.

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**In Sum**

A 2008 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that the need for an OUSD(I)-type organization had been “broadly recognized and accepted” within DoD. OUSD(I)’s main functions had remained consistent despite changes in its leadership and organization and it had “successfully advanced its top objective of enhancing intelligence support to the warfighter.”

The report pointed to the JIOCs as one of OUSD(I)’s primary achievements and noted that the office had been critical to the development of space policy and the advice of wide-area and joint-persistent surveillance programs. OUSD(I), the report added, in addition to its oversight and coordination responsibilities, continued to play an important role in articulating and advocating policy.

Finally, OUSD(I) had made progress in rationalizing and improving programming and budgeting through the MIP structure established in 2005. The creation of the USD(I), the report concluded, had “increased the unity and effectiveness” of the defense IC and its associated programs and helped improve the relationship between DoD and the national IC. More important, it had increased appreciation for and attention to the distinct requirements for intelligence support to the warfighter.²

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**Intelligence in Public Literature**

**Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11**

Reviewed by Roger George

The far reaching intelligence reforms of 2004—formally called the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)—are now a decade old, and a number of participants have recounted their own views of those reforms. Indeed, in 2012 *Studies* published an insightful personal account by Philip Zelikow, who served as executive secretary of the 9/11 Commission and had worked on earlier intelligence reform projects. The Zelikow account offered an explanation of how various institutional and organizational models were considered to deal with the twin failures of 9/11 and the 2002 Iraq/WMD estimate, as well as marry together traditional foreign intelligence processes with new homeland security concerns.

*Blinking Red* takes a different approach. Michael Allen’s very readable legislative history of the 2004 intelligence reforms focuses more on the personalities than the organizations per se. The title, taken from former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet’s reputed warning prior to the 2001 attacks, certainly captures the urgency that the process took on. However, later in the book Allen quotes another senior official that the “fix was in,” which more accurately describes the actual course of events. In sum, it was the personalities and the legislative process, more than simply the organizational tussles, that explain why those reforms proved to be less than many expected.

Allen, was in a position to watch the legislative struggle unfold. Moreover, he participated in the Bush administration’s internal debates on how much to embrace reforms it had initially hoped to avoid. In 2004 he served as the legislative affairs officer in the Homeland Security Council when the White House was formulating its response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations.

This put Allen in the Deputies Committee meetings as cabinet members argued over the extent of the new authorities of the Director of National Intelligence and the role of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Likewise, he represented the White House in many high-level congressional negotiating sessions, where the legislation was finalized. This eyewitness account also benefited from extensive interviews of the players, complete with citations—a practice that separates this work from many other journalistic and often unsourced narratives of the Bush years. Insights drawn from many senior officials starting with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and DCI Tenet and including key congressional and intelligence officials give the reader a 360-degree view of the executive-legislative process.

For CIA and other IC officers who lived through this critical period, Allen’s narrative explains why the result seemed predetermined to be less than many reformers had hoped. That explanation is told through chapters that follow the legislative process chronologically; however, he makes it far more personal and real by seeing the process through the eyes of the many executive and legislative branch players, starting with the president, his key cabinet and intelligence advisers, principal House anti-reformists like Duncan Hunter (R–CA) and James Sensenbrenner (R–WI), and Senate reformers like Susan Collins (R–ME) and Joseph Lieberman (I—CO). Added to this mix of

1 Philip Zelikow, “A Personal Perspective: The Evolution of Intelligence Reform, 2002–2004,” *Studies in Intelligence* 56, No. 3 (September 2012): 1-20. The article provides readers with a quick summary of prior reform efforts as a backdrop to the author’s own views on the various options which were considered and ultimately compromised to gain legislative approval.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
players were other key figures, 9/11 Commission cochairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, along with Zelikow. Indeed, the narrative is really a story of the clash of personal perspectives and less strictly an executive-legislative struggle.

Allen describes a number of informal opposing alliances that bridged the usual executive-legislative divide. For example, Duncan Hunter, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was deeply committed to preserving the Secretary of Defense’s budgetary control over defense intelligence agencies at the expense of a new DNI’s authorities. Knowing that his House members would be more persuaded by a Pentagon appeal, he maneuvered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard Myers into providing a letter backing his views; it came with the tacit support of Rumsfeld, who felt similarly but would not publicly disagree with the White House. In fact, Allen describes three factions within the executive branch – a White House interested in a strong DNI, a CIA interested in strengthening the DCI’s authorities and a Cheney-Rumsfeld view that there should be no DNI or NCTC. What this highlighted was the absence of executive branch consensus, which allowed the arguments to be fought out on Capitol Hill.

The battles on Capitol Hill are also well described, highlighting the roles of reformers like Collins and Lieberman, whom Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist selected principally because they were liked by the 9/11 families, supported intelligence reform, and worked well together. However, as Allen recounts, this decision was mocked since their newly formed Homeland Security Committee was considered full of “novices” on intelligence matters and would have to protect its new turf from the powerful Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, not to mention the strong opposition to reform among the key House committee chairmen.

From the beginning, the reform process seemed destined to fall short, as so many previous attempts since the creation of CIA in 1947. Allen describes how a perfect storm of the 9/11 attacks’ audaciousness, lobbying by the 9/11 Commission and victims’ families, and an approaching presidential election all conspired to force the Bush administration to accept potentially unworkable reforms. The White House and the Intelligence Community would have preferred making some practical changes via executive orders mandating better information-sharing or prioritization of counterterrorism operations, for example. Similarly, senior intelligence advisers at the time would have been content with strengthening the DCI’s budgetary role rather than creating a new bureaucracy.

But the “fix was in,” in the sense that the 9/11 Commission and the victims’ families wished to punish the CIA for a perceived intelligence failure. Decoupling a new DNI from the CIA would make the CIA less “central,” but it would also deprive the new DNI of the power that DCIs before him derived from leadership of a major IC component, the CIA. Without it, the DNI has less authority over the sprawling community.

Intelligence professionals like DDCI John McLaughlin and Director of NSA Michael Hayden believed at the time that a DCI with a bit more authority could have handled the job better than an untried DNI. Seeing the process unfold, McLaughlin and Hayden, joined by then National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Director James Clapper, believed that a DNI had to have more budgetary authority to compensate for the lack of a CIA leadership role. One of the most revealing exchanges described in the book took place when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called in Hayden and Clapper and over lunch berated them for holding a position that was diametrically opposed to his view and his department’s interests.

Allen presents no recommendations or explicit lessons learned. He appears to lean toward the conclusion that the legislators did not go far enough in providing the DNI more of the features of a Department of Intelligence or the proximity and power of being located in the White House, either of which might have advanced real reforms. The 2004 IRTPA now has been operating for nearly a decade under four DNIs who, with varying intelligence backgrounds and connections to their presidents, have performed unevenly. Allen does not comment explicitly on current DNI James Clapper’s stewardship, other than to say that five decades in the profession, probably

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2 The Zelikow account, in contrast, would seem to imply that the Homeland Security Committee was seen as the most appropriate as reforms needed to integrate new domestic and homeland security considerations as well as traditional military and foreign intelligence responsibilities.
makes him the most fully qualified DNI one could expect to have.

Nonetheless, this does raise questions for the future. First, the two wars that partly shaped the winning arguments against giving the DNI more authority over defense intelligence budgets, are now ending, so should there be a rebalancing of IC priorities away from military matters? Second, the era of easy money is over and reductions in intelligence budgets have begun. This may well confront the DNI with major budgetary battles within the IC. However, given his limited authorities, can a DNI gain control over defense intelligence dollars to reset priorities, or will DoD continue to dominate the budget process? Finally, has the effectiveness of the DNI already reached its zenith with the tenure of someone like Clapper, whose experience and good relations with IC leaders and secretaries of defense have made his office function as well as it can? At a minimum, the next DNI’s job is likely to be far harder unless some additional reforms are considered, at which time those considering them would be well advised to review Allen’s comprehensive history.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World
Evan Thomas (Little, Brown, 2012), 484pp., endnotes, index.

Reviewed by Nicholas Dujmovic

Historians are wary of history written by professional journalists because the result too often is substantively thin, badly researched, tendentious, and breathless. On the CIA History Staff, however, we recognize good work in the field of intelligence history regardless of its source. Among the journalists whose historical work we endorse is John Ranelagh, whose book The Agency (1986) remains one of the most reliable and balanced CIA histories ever published. Another favorite is Evan Thomas, now a former journalist who teaches journalism and writing at Princeton University.

Thomas is at his best when he describes one of two extremes of scope—the activities and psychology of Eisenhower in dealing with the Cold War on the one hand, and on the other, the activities and cultural mindset of American society during Ike’s presidency. The central thesis is that Eisenhower kept the Cold War cold and avoided nuclear war by credibly implying he might use nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union (a doctrine called “Massive Retaliation” or “Assured Destruction” before Soviet nuclear parity made it mutual). This is the “bluff” of the title, in Thomas’s words, “a bluff of epic proportions,” (17) though whether Ike was really bluffing remains unknown.

The book treats a fascinating, critical time in modern US history—the first decade or so of the Cold War, which Thomas rightly portrays as the most dangerous years (the overstated case for the Cuban Missile Crisis notwithstanding). He eloquently describes Americans’ fear of the unknown during this period, which we either have largely forgotten today or tend to dismiss as unfounded. He also helps put to rest the myth that President Dwight Eisenhower was a caretaker president uninvolved in policy. For example, Thomas details (216–34) Eisenhower’s handling of the “Dual Crises” of 1956—the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian uprising—and includes a surprising (at least to me) analysis of Eisenhower’s considerable health problems at the same time he was campaigning for reelection. Moreover, the author’s gift for compelling storytelling has not failed him, and he includes much juicy gossip.

1 See, for example, my taking exception to New York Times journalist Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes; “Elegy of Slashes,” Studies in Intelligence 51, No. 3 (September 2007): 33–43.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 58, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2014)
There are also some useful myth-busting vignettes here. Thomas shows as false the old proto-Marxist canard that CIA’s 1954 regime change operation in Guatemala was intended to benefit the United Fruit corporation (137–39); citing former CIA historian Nicholas Cullather’s history of PBSUCCESS as authoritative, Thomas demonstrates that, rightly or wrongly, the Eisenhower administration responded to what it saw as a communist threat in that country. Eisenhower, while approving various covert actions, nevertheless retained realistic expectations of what covert action could do. (238) Contrary to what some historians have written, Thomas finds that Eisen-hower did not try to hype the Soviet nuclear threat to the American public, though he did little to allay its fears of possible apocalypse. (359–61)

Positive aspects aside, there’s not a lot of original research (though we get often tedious details of Ike’s health gleaned from his doctor’s diary\(^2\)), nor are there major revelations in this book. The biggest problem is that Thomas cannot resist the journalist’s temptation to dismiss complex situations in a well phrased *bon mot*. For example, his characterization of notorious red-baiter Joseph McCarthy as someone who “drank his lunch and imagined his facts” (53) accurately captures the man’s alcoholism and hyperbole but fails to acknowledge the historical fact that there really were communists at the State Department and elsewhere in the US government.

Another example of tendentious storytelling occurs when Thomas, relying on declassified National Security Council (NSC) minutes, portrays “Operation Alert”—a 1960 relocation exercise for senior US leaders to a North Carolina secure facility—as a “dark comedy of errors” (374):

*CIA director Dulles’s car broke down; Defense Secretary Tom Gates forgot his ID and was barred at the gate by a marine; General Twinning, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not show up at all.*

Reading the actual NSC minutes, however, gives one a different impression.\(^3\) They record that Eisenhower thought positively about the drill and that the President’s national security advisor “felt the exercise indicated that a meeting of the [NSC] could be assembled [at a remote site] on rather short notice.” The CIA director’s car did break down, but only in the first 100 yards (allowing him to find another). The defense secretary was initially challenged—in Washington, before boarding the evacuation helicopter—but then was let through. The minutes acknowledge that the JCS chairman “had been left in Washington”—but is silent on whether that was by design. The episode is a passing vignette, to be sure, but Thomas’s slanted characterization of it makes me wonder where else he might have gone for the critical jab rather than a fair examination of events.

Regarding the CIA, moreover, significant caveats are warranted. The idea that Eisenhower “could not control” the CIA and its operations (17, 92) is belied by the reality that Ike pressed the CIA to undertake covert warfare as part of his “New Look” strategy of fighting the Cold War without either bankrupting the United States or precipitating nuclear war. Students of the Cold War will be surprised to learn that Voice of America was a “CIA radio.” (145) Thomas’s treatment of Allen Dulles (302–307) is unbalanced and overly harsh, emphasizing the man’s flaws but not the attributes that Eisenhower found so valuable.

Paradoxically for someone who has written insightfully on the 1950s-era CIA based on original research, in this book Thomas most misconstrues CIA history when he is relying on secondary sources—in particular, as it happens, on histories written by journalists.

Thomas provides a succinct account of the “bomber gap” issue but (citing Neil Sheehan’s *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War*) wrongly suggests CIA was clueless in 1955 that the Soviets were developing ICBMs. The CIA, he says, “had been worrying about the wrong gap” (182). In fact, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) in 1953 and 1954 had specifically warned of

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\(^1\) The reader is subjected to the same story—a stressed Eisenhower throwing his golf club at his doctor—no less than three times.

\(^2\) The reader is subjected to the same story—a stressed Eisenhower throwing his golf club at his doctor—no less than three times.

Soviet ICBM development: “We have many indications that the USSR is devoting great effort to its program of development of guided missiles.”

In covering the Soviets’ brutal suppression of revolution in Hungary in 1956, Thomas parrots Tim Weiner’s discredited assertion from *Legacy of Ashes* that CIA’s Radio Free Europe (RFE) encouraged Hungarian revolutionaries to fight Soviet tanks with Molotov cocktails. No RFE Hungarian broadcasts did so.

Even with the book’s shortcomings, Thomas has produced a valuable character study of Dwight Eisenhower and argues persuasively and eloquently that Ike was the indispensible man of his era. As an introduction to the high stakes and stresses of the Cold War in the 1950s, *Ike’s Bluff* would be a good choice for the general reader.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

Red Sparrow


Reviewed by James Burridge and Michael Bradford

There exists a long tradition of former CIA operations officers turning to fiction after they leave the agency. Their experiences range from 30-plus years, as in the case of senior executive Milt Bearden (Black Tulip), to a bare handful of years, as in the case of Joseph Weisberg, who resigned after assignments at the Farm and Langley (An Ordinary Spy). For most, it’s “one [book] and done.” CIA officer-turned-novelist Jason Matthews appears unlikely to become “a one-hit wonder,” however. He has a contract for a sequel and sold the movie rights to Red Sparrow for a seven-figure sum before the book was published. The movie, and to a lesser extent the books, will undoubtedly influence perceptions of the CIA for a wide swath of Americans, including among them future applicants.

The story takes place in the present in one familiar location—Langley—and four overseas ones—Moscow, Helsinki, Rome, and Athens. They host a classic confrontation, pitting the CIA against the Russian intelligence service, the SVR. At stake are both the hidden identities and thus the lives of each service’s highest ranking penetrations. The CIA’s is Maj.Gen. Vladimir Korchnoi, chief of the SVR’s Americas Department—his codename is MARBLE. The Russian’s is a senator on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SWAN. The main characters are Nate Nash, a first-tour case officer assigned to Moscow Station, and Dominika Egorova, a ballerina-manquée-turned SVR officer.

Nash’s first scheduled meeting with MARBLE goes awry, and he and the asset barely escape. Although he was blameless, Nash is now known and of no further use in Moscow. (Using a first-tour case officer to run a prize asset is plausible, but scheduling a face-to-face meeting with MARBLE, who’s well supplied with up-to-date covert communications, is a stretch).

Nash is then assigned to Helsinki Station; the SVR leadership believes that he was sent to Moscow to handle a highly placed penetration and that he will still be involved in the case in Finland. Dominika is sent to Helskinki to seduce Nash and learn the identity of the mole—and the game is on.

Most of the American characters are richly drawn. Nash is ambitious, smart, and eager to redeem himself by safely handling MARBLE in Helsinki if the opportunity arises. His immediate supervisors, the station chief, Tom Forsythe, and his deputy, Marty Gable, are cynical but protective of their young colleague and determined that he succeed. It is in the station’s bullpen badinage, as Nate absorbs his two mentors’ long experience, that this novel comes alive. This is how it sounds, this is how it is done.

CIA headquarters is represented by Simon Benford, a senior counterintelligence manager; Matthews wisely eschewed one of the genre’s most enduring cliché characters, the buffoon from headquarters who imperils the operation. All the Americans aren’t exemplary—the Moscow station chief unfairly blames Nash for the near disaster with MARBLE and all the FBI characters are clueless and referred to as “the FEEBS.” The director of CIA makes a cameo appearance as the ultimate headquarters buffoon.

The Russian characters are not as nuanced as their US counterparts. Except for MARBLE and Dominika, they are one-dimensional bureaucratic thugs. Their motivations are also thinly developed. MARBLE commits treason because his wife died falling victim to the inadequacies of the Soviet medical system (as did the Russian submarine commander in the Tom Clancy novel Hunt for Red October).

But forget character development and motivation—this story excels when the protagonists take to the streets. An alternative marketing approach might have been to give it a yellow cover and call it “Tradecraft for Dummies.” The amount of tradecraft, particularly
surveillance and countersurveillance, will make the inhouse reader wonder how he got all this past the Publications Review Board. Matthews himself said in a recent interview that he was “pleasantly surprised” by the small number of redactions and described the tradecraft as “old, classic stuff that’s been around since Biblical times.”¹ The scenes in which Nate and Dominika course through urban landscapes in intricate, hours-long surveillance detection routes in order to get clean before a clandestine operational act are accurate, richly detailed renderings of anxiety-filled tasks conducted daily by intelligence operatives around the world.

Tradecraft descriptions aside, how plausible is the book for the reader with guilty knowledge? On a scale from the deliberately low-key realism of Le Carré to the fantasies of Robert Ludlum, it’s definitely on the Le Carré end of the spectrum, with a few notable exceptions. Those interested in public perceptions of the intelligence business, particularly as it is practiced by CIA officers, should read this book.

A couple of final observations: Matthews ends every chapter with a recipe for a dish associated with that chapter’s locale. Some reviewers have found this to be a distraction, but they’re easily skipped. Finally, this novel has the most explicit sex scenes we’ve encountered in the espionage genre. Beware.

¹ Jason Matthews interview on the Diane Rehm Show, 22 August 2013.
Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake (except as noted)

Current Topics


Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and Bin Laden’s Final Plot Against America, by Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman

Fixing Leaks: Assessing the Department of Defense’s Approach to Preventing and Deterring Unauthorized Disclosures, by James B. Bruce and W. George Jameson


Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, by Matthew Levitt

This Machine Kills Secrets: How Wikileaks, Cypherpunks, and Hacktivists Aim to Free the World’s Information, by Andy Greenberg

Under Fire: The Untold Story of the Attack in Benghazi, by Fred Burton and Samuel M. Katz

Historical

The Atom Spy and MI5: The Story of Alan Nunn May, by John H. Smith

The Cuckoos’ Nest: Five Hundred Years of Cambridge Spies, by Christopher Catherwood

The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power, by John Prados

Hog’s Exit: Jerry Daniels, the Hmong, and the CIA, by Gayle L. Morrison

Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East, by Scott Anderson

MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 (revised and updated), by Keith Jeffery

Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, by Raffaele Laudani (ed.)

The Secret Rescue: An Untold Story of American Nurses and Medics Behind Nazi Lines, by Cate Lineberry

Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA, by Randall Woods—Reviewed by Thomas Coffey

Spy and Counterspy: A History of Secret Agents and Double Agents From the Second World War to the Cold War, by Ian Dear

Useful Enemies: John Demjanjuk and America’s Open-Door Policy for Nazi War Criminals, by Richard Rashke

Memoir

Against All Enemies: An American’s Cold War Journey, by Jeffrey M. Carney

Spymaster: Startling Cold War Revelations of a Soviet KGB Chief, by Tennent H. Bagley

Intelligence Abroad

Intelligence Tradecraft: An Art of Trapping the Enemy, by Uday Kumar

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Current


In his 1987 memoir Red Horizons¹ former Lt. Gen. Ion Pacepa described his rapid advance and high-level service in the Romanian secret police, the Securitate, until his defection in 1978. Pacepa’s second book, Programmed To Kill (2007), applied his experience and analytic skills to arguing the proposition that the KGB had recruited and trained Lee Harvey Oswald to assassinate president Kennedy. In Disinformation, he returns to both themes as he reviews the Soviet variant of political deception, which he suggests remains a constant in today’s Russian foreign policy. For much of the book he relies on his extensive and high-level contacts with the KGB and the Soviet government. But since Soviet disinformation practices included persistent attacks on religion, Pacepa enlisted the help of his coauthor, Ronald J. Rychlak, professor of law and history at the University of Mississippi and author of Hitler, the War, and the Pope² to add depth to that story.

Early on, Pacepa makes clear that one should not confuse disinformation with misinformation, “an official government tool.” Disinformation, on the other hand, “is a secret intelligence tool, intended to bestow a Western nongovernment cachet on government lies” contained in planted stories with no obvious links to the real source, in this case, Moscow. (35) Examples he cites include Gorbachev’s glasnost, “one of the most secret secrets of the Kremlin,” (13) the activities of the World Council of Churches, and “the creation of the image of a ‘new Ceaușescu.’” (15) While discussing Khrushchev’s contribution to disinformation, Pacepa offers a new firsthand account of how Khrushchev’s secret speech was leaked to the Israelis—the KGB asked the Romanian service to do it. (184) The conventional Polish link is not mentioned.

Pacepa suggests that the common thread in these and other examples is that such efforts create a popular conception that disguises real Russian objectives. But most of the book is devoted to three topics. The first deals with how disinformation was used—mainly through the media—in the creation of “Hitler’s Pope” (59) after WW II to minimize church influence. The second concerns “framing the US government as a pack of assassins.” Here Pacepa revisits his undocumented speculations about Oswald’s recruitment by the KGB and role as a KGB assassin. (207) Claims of “new hard proof of the KGB’s hand” are not convincing. (241) The third topic is Russian disinformation in the age of terrorism.

The final chapters of Disinformation examine the legacy of Yuri Andropov, “the father of the new disinformation era.” (259) Pacepa attributes to Andropov the view that “the Islamic world was a Petri dish in which the KGB could nurture a virulent strain of anti-American hatred” that could be inflamed by convincing the West “the Jews wanted to take over the world” and from which Muslim “terrorism would flow naturally.” (261)

Looking to today’s Russia, Pacepa sees the current government in a “war against Zionist America,” and he provides a few examples of “European America-bashing” and the antiwar movement subtly provoked by Russian disinformation. (296–97) He even sees signs that current US political leaders are becoming “a kind of Ceaușescu-style nomenklatura…with unchecked powers” responsive to Russian disinformation operations. (316)

Disinformation is a provocative book that presents the dangers of officially manipulated information and urges that measures be taken to prevent its use in America.

¹ Ion Pacepa, Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief (Regnery Gateway, 1987).
² Ronald J. Rychlak, Hitler, the War, and the Pope (Our Sunday Visitor, 2010).
Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and Bin Laden’s Final Plot Against America, by Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman (Touchstone, 2013), 321 pp., endnotes, index.

Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman are investigative reporters for the Associated Press. The title of their book has a double meaning. The first refers to the central character of the story they tell, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant who planned to blow up New York subways with the help of friends in the United States and Afghanistan. The second meaning concerns the internal bureaucratic battles that erupted between the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)—run by the FBI and staffed by NYPD detectives and representatives from the CIA, NSA, and DHS—and the special counterterrorism intelligence unit of the NYPD. The unit was headed by David Cohen, a former top CIA officer. His unit was well funded and focused on spotting homegrown terrorists. Although the elements were supposed to cooperate, Cohen operated independently, and that caused friction, which the authors deal with at length.

Enemies Within begins with Zazi’s bomb-making attempts in Colorado. It then tells how his intercepted e-mails alerted the FBI to his plans, details the near constant surveillance of his activities, and describes his travel to New York and then to Pakistan for training with colleagues. He was arrested before he could carry out his act of jihad and finally confessed to the FBI. The details of how the JTTF ran its investigation are described with emphasis on the limitations imposed by the rules of evidence collection and privacy requirements.

The authors are critical of the parallel operations of Cohen’s unit. For example, they conclude his “mosque crawlers”—paid informants visiting mosques to pick up indications of terrorist plots (186–87)—were ineffective, and his demographics unit, which concentrated on men from Middle Eastern countries, practically illegal. (79) Moreover, the key point of contention in the Zazi case occurred when he was tipped off that he was under suspicion by a source linked to the Cohen’s people. Everyone admitted that it should not have happened.

Despite these difficulties, Zazi was eventually arrested and interrogated by the FBI with help from the JTTF. The contribution from the counterterrorism intelligence unit, the authors suggest, was minimal: “When it mattered most [its] programs failed.” (278) But to their obvious irritation, they note that the unit claimed credit for the success and got away with it. (280)

Enemies Within tells a fascinating story and illuminates the complicated operations that comprise post 9/11 counterterrorism in the United States.


After the Department of Defense (DoD) concluded that “the inadequacy of extant law and policy to address the causes [of] and remedies” (ix) for unauthorized disclosures, it developed a strategic plan that it hoped would correct the problem. To oversee the plan’s execution, it created the Unauthorized Disclosure Program Implementation Team (UD PIT). Then it hired the RAND Corporation to provide outside experts—in security analysis, not leaking—to make an independent assessment of the “potential effectiveness” of the program. (x) Fixing Leaks reports their findings.

In general, the authors concluded that the UD PIT had identified the three main issues that required attention. The first two are not unexpected: “Media leaks have many causes but few feasible and effective solutions; To be fully effective, remedies must address the full range of security, classification, and particularly UD-related behavior,” from initial detection to imposition of effective penalties. The third issue is surprising: “[There exists a] longstanding organizational culture in DoD that treats leaking classified information to the media as nearly risk-free, which suggests to some that the behavior is acceptable.” (xi)

The monograph goes on to discuss these issues in somewhat more depth but shuns specific correctives, providing instead, general, even self-evident solutions. For example, the authors note that because leaks result from the “culture of acceptance and permissibility,
changing that culture to one that will prevent and deter UDs requires both declaratory policy and demonstrable actions that result in real consequences for violating security and nondisclosure rules…and breaking the law.” (16) They go on to suggest additional training on each of these points, with an emphasis on accountability, while acknowledging the current statutory framework complicates matters. Other issues treated include the obligation to report UDs, the need for metrics—though just what form they might take is not discussed—improved personnel vetting, better management, and increased outreach. The vetting topic is illustrated with a discussion of the Edward Snowden and Bradley Manning cases. (23–24)

The concluding chapter contains summary recommendations that focus on what should be done, leaving the “how” to management. One of the recommendations is typical: “Study ways to improve the ability to implement sanction when leakers are identified.” There are two appendices. One discusses legal issues such as degree of damage and intent. The other looks at the perception that senior officials get away with leaking and subordinates do not.

Fixing Leaks is a primer on what DoD is trying to do about leaks. If the detailed answers are classified, the authors can be confident they are not guilty of leaking.


On 13 September 2011, Haqqani network terrorists staged a 20-hour attack on foreign embassies in Kabul, Afghanistan—the longest to date. It gained them worldwide attention. The following week, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified to the US Senate that the group was a “veritable arm of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency.” (1) Authors Vahid Brown, a Princeton PhD student specializing in Islamic militancy, and Don Rassler, a director at the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, argue that Mullen’s assessment was an understatement. The Fountainhead of Jihad makes their case.

Under its founder and leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, the network has existed for nearly 40 years. It initially established control in a crucial strategic area that straddles the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. From this base it supported Pakistan against the Afghans in the 1970s and again in the 1980s after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And it was there that al-Qaeda established its training camps. At this time also, its power was enhanced by “hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military aid provided by the ISI and CIA.” (59) And it was during the 1980s that it began publishing its brand-defining magazine and video productions titled, Manbá al-Jihad—Fountainhead of Jihad—from which the book title is taken.

The authors consider violent jihad as one of two themes key to understanding the network’s ever increasing influence and power. In fact, as they point out, Jalaluddin Haqqani advocated the idea of jihad as a universal obligation binding on all Muslims before al-Qaeda popularized it. (7) The other theme is the nexus of pragmatic relationships the Haqqani network developed with other organizations with different, sometimes conflicting objectives. For example, al-Qaeda, the Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistani Taliban) and elements of the ISI, while battling each other, all work with the Haqqani network. Attempts by the United States to reach an agreement with the network further complicated matters. (122) Nevertheless, the Haqqani network cooperated with each one, gradually expanding its influence and power as it worked to become a player among global terrorist organizations. (184)

Fountainhead of Jihad shows how the Haqqani network evolved and manipulated various political and religious factions to improve its position as an essential global power broker. The book is less certain about the future, though it offers some interesting possibilities.

Former CIA operations officer Robert Baer wrote in his memoir that by 1997, he had concluded that the April 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Beirut—an attack that killed more than 60 people, including several CIA officers—was the work of Hezbollah terrorist Imad Mughniyah. Matthew Levitt, a former FBI analyst and assistant secretary of the treasury for intelligence analysis, writes in his new study, *Hezbollah*, that the terrorist group denied Mughniyah’s very existence until it erected a memorial to him after his assassination in 2008. Levitt goes on to affirm Baer’s judgment and to document Mughniyah’s role in the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983, noting the Mughniyah watched the explosion from a nearby rooftop. (3, 28)

In this first comprehensive examination of Hezbollah (Party of God) from its beginning to the present, Levitt uses the Mughniyah story to explain the group’s origins in the early 1980s as an Iranian Shiite surrogate in Lebanon. He shows how Hezbollah developed multiple identities as it became the dominant political faction in Lebanon and successfully expanded its social and religious programs. Hezbollah’s paramilitary units also began operating in Lebanon, carrying out bombings and frequent airplane hijackings.

Then, with Iranian support, Hezbollah gradually expanded its terrorist activities to other parts of the Middle East, as well as Europe, Central and South America, South Asia, and Africa. Special units were created for suicide attacks in Israel and Iraq, often in support of Hamas and the PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad). While the main purpose of the attacks was to harm those perceived as anti-Shi’a or pro-Israeli, they often had additional goals, including freeing captured militants.

Hezbollah provided personnel and most of the financial and logistical support for its operations. Levitt describes Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises—mainly narcotics trafficking and money laundering—conducted in Africa and the United States to meet these goals. Still, its dependence on Iran was substantial and its operations were reduced as sanctions on Iran began to bite.

Levitt devotes considerable attention to one of Hezbollah’s principal objectives, the extension of its global reach. The likelihood of future successful Hezbollah terrorist operations, Levitt suggests, may have been reduced because of a series of costly failures “in places like Azerbaijan, Egypt and Turkey,” (360) the increasingly effective opposition of Western and Sunni governments, and Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime in Syria. But Levitt concludes that Hezbollah’s international terrorist activities must be taken seriously lest it find ways to export its operations to Western countries, particularly the United States.

**This Machine Kills Secrets: How Wikileaks, Cypherpunks, and Hacktivists Aim to Free the World’s Information**, by Andy Greenberg (Dutton, 2012) 370 pp., endnotes, index.

The little sign on folk singer Woody Guthrie’s guitar read: “This Machine Kills Fascists.” Journalist Andy Greenberg’s variant on that idea is a machine whose only purpose is to expose information others want to keep secret. Unlike a guitar, it has no physical reality. It is an unofficial system of very clever, talented, eccentric programmers and cryptographers who have found their calling in hacking, anonymity, and making secrets public. While they acknowledge that some secrets should not be revealed, they reserve to themselves the right to make that decision. *This Machine Kills Secrets* looks at the origins of this subculture, its super competitive inhabitants, their internal power struggles, their battles with the law, and how they gain cooperation from those with access to secrets.

The machine Greenberg examines is a long way from the xeroxed Pentagon Papers. Today’s disclosures are digital, travel over and live on the Internet, and have the essential anonymity provided by encryption. Greenberg provides short biographies explaining what stimulated the participation of the principal contributors—he calls them cypherpunks. WikiLeaks gets considerable attention, both for its groundbreaking exploits and the internal personnel conflicts that developed when its founder, Julian Assange, didn’t get his way. He also describes

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the many WikiLeaks competitors—OpenLeaks, Cryptome, GlobalLeaks to name just three—and various attempts by governments to shut them down.

*This Machine Kills Secrets* ends with a reference to the Architect, the anonymous network engineer Greenberg met at the secret Chaos Communication Camp (272) of Cypherpunks and hacktivists planning new methods of secure leaking. Somewhere, he writes, the Architect is “building, testing, and tweaking a new, sleeker, more powerful version of the machine that kills secrets.” (322) This battle has only begun.


Fred Burton is a former deputy chief of the Counterterrorism Division in the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DS). Samuel Katz is a writer specializing in Middle East security issues. They have combined their knowledge and skills to tell the now controversial story of the 11 September 2012 attack on the Special Mission Compound (SMC) and its annex in Benghazi, Libya. While true names are used for the four who lost their lives pseudonyms protect those who survived.

The authors begin with background material on the Benghazi situation, the DS, and the personnel in Benghazi. They also review DS training, weapons, and the grossly inadequate security arrangements in Benghazi. Also included are descriptions of the physical layout of the SMC and the actions taken to inform the State Department of the dangerous situation.

The authors describe the attack on the SMC from the viewpoint of those under attack, those they asked for help, and the security forces who deserted at the first shot fired instead of preventing the terrorists from entering the compound. The authors are able to reconstruct what happened to the ambassador and the two security men with him because one of them didn’t die until after he spoke to his rescuers. When the terrorists ceased firing on the SMC, the survivors were able to escape to the Annex, though without the ambassador. His body was later taken to a local hospital by some Libyans who used his cell phone to inform the DS of his whereabouts.

Two more men were killed during the subsequent attack on the Annex. The terrorists stopped shooting shortly after the rescue team from Tripoli arrived. The survivors were flown to Tripoli and then to the United States.

As the authors recount the fast-moving events, they include digressions to explain what was going on at the embassy in Tripoli, CIA headquarters, the State Department, and various military commands.

*Under Fire* tells the story well, but leaves many questions unanswered. And curiously, although they give some administrative reasons, the authors never explain why the ambassador went to Benghazi on 11 September. This is not the last word on the attack.

**Historical**


The subject of this biography may appear familiar to those who follow intelligence literature. Alan Nunn May was one of the spies discussed in Paul Broda’s 2011 book, *Scientist Spies*. In this book, John Smith, a biochemist, covers some of the same ground as Broda, especially Nunn May’s communist days at Cambridge, his spying for the Soviets before and during WW II, his exposure by GRU Lt. Igor Gouzenko in 1945, and his arrest and imprisonment in 1946.

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But most of The Atom Spy and MI5 concerns Nunn May’s relationship with MI5, his family, and his life after his release in 1952. Smith uses Nunn May’s letters to show how he adapted to prison life, maintained contact with his brother, and dealt with various legal problems. For example, MI5 wrote Nunn May requesting interviews. They wanted to know whether he would reveal how he was recruited and identify others who might have been involved in espionage. He never did either. Smith also found new material in the UK’s National Archives, and this presumably explains how he learned that MI5 maintained physical and communications surveillance on Nunn May for some time after his release to determine whether he was in contact with his former communist colleagues. Smith does not cite any of the sources, however. Letters also revealed that MI5 tried to help Nunn May gain employment and that the government refused his request for a passport until 1959. In 1962, Nunn May went to Ghana, where he became a research professor of physics at the University of Ghana. He retired in 1978 and returned to Cambridge, where he died in 2003. Throughout, Nunn May remained unrepentant and never expressed regret for what he had done.

Smith ends his account with the revelation that Nunn May made “one further act of disclosure…a prepared statement which was made public after his death.” In it, Nunn May noted he had passed “large quantities of information” to the “Russians” since 1941. He added that he had pleaded guilty at his trial to avoid mentioning how long he had been an agent and to “avoid incriminating others, in particular the Russian spy network in the United Kingdom.” (192–93)

The Atom Spy and MI5 adds background material to what we know about the life of the first atom spy to go to prison.


The short title of this book, The Cuckoo’s Nest, is nowhere mentioned in the narrative, so readers must infer its meaning. The secondary title, on the other hand, is clear enough, but here, British historian Christopher Catherwood is somewhat misleading. After discussing two 16th-century Elizabethan spies—Christopher Marlowe and Sir Francis Walsingham—he leaps three centuries for his next entry, Anthony Blunt. Thus, The Cuckoo’s Nest is not all the title implies. Another problem is that the author uses only secondary sources because, he writes, “most of the primary sources are by their very nature, not available.”(ix) This bizarre assertion neglects the publication of two primary source histories of the principle British intelligence services, as well as the two volumes of the Guy Liddell Diaries and the recently released MI5 files available at the British National Archives. A selection of errors centering on Anthony Blunt are worth noting among the many available. Blunt was not turned down by army intelligence in 1939 and then accepted by MI5. (62–63) He was accepted by the army, served in France, and joined MI5 in 1940 after France surrendered to Hitler. His first MI5 job was not opening correspondence from various London based embassies. (63) He was Liddell’s assistant. Blunt did not expose John Cairncross in 1964 (127); Cairncross confessed in the United States when interviewed by Arthur Martin in 1963.

Catherwood’s treatment of the other Cambridge spies is equally careless. One example is his incorrect claim that Maclean was suspected of being an NKVD agent codenamed HOMER when he was promoted to the Foreign Office’s American Department in 1950. Maclean was not identified as HOMER until May 1951. And Burgess was not, as claimed, on the MI5 wartime staff.


Studies in Intelligence Vol. 58, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2014)
A final yet curious example of Catherwood carelessness is his statement that “there were no Oxford spies to match those recruited at Cambridge.” As Anthony Glees and others have pointed out, Dr. Christopher Hill, a Marxist Oxford academic and wartime Intelligence Corps officer attached to the Foreign Office, was a self-confessed Soviet spy. Moreover, he had been Master at Balliol College, Oxford, when Catherwood was an undergraduate there. Other Oxford spies exposed long ago include Jennifer Hart, Bernard Floud, Tom Driberg, Phoebe Pool and Iris Murdoch.

The book contains an intriguing curiosity. There is no chapter on Kim Philby, the most famous Soviet spy from Cambridge, although he is mentioned from time to time throughout. The book contains chapters on virtually all of the others. Oddly, Catherwood’s remark on page 86, “As we saw in the Philby chapter,” suggests that one did exist. And indeed one does, in the British Kindle version of the book. For reasons not explained the printed version reviewed here, without the chapter and absent a table of contents, looks incomplete. A publishing error? A decision to save paper? Presumably the publisher has an explanation.

In sum, with respect to the substance of the work, The Cuckoo’s Nest discusses many familiar spy stories, but not very carefully.


During Daniel Ellsberg’s Pentagon Papers trial in May 1973, Bill Colby, then the CIA’s director of operations, was unhappily surprised by a newspaper article that linked the CIA to a break-in at Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office in 1971. Colby’s new boss, Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger, was more than distressed by the news and promptly directed all CIA employees to report any incidents they were aware of that fell outside the Agency’s charter. Former employees were also encouraged to contribute.

When indications surfaced that the White House was “pinning the blame for Watergate on the Agency,” a second directive was issued demanding details about the involvement of any CIA employee (or former employee). The result was a 693-page classified compilation, including an annex dealing with Watergate, that itemized dubious activities. It was quickly dubbed the “family jewels.” Although Colby informed the attorney general and Congress of their existence, he inexplicably failed to tell the White House, a decision he would later regret.

In The Family Jewels, historian John Prados has gone beyond the activities described in the “family jewels” report to list what he terms “the broad range of questionable or abusive CIA activities” that have followed the “precedent” from the Watergate era. To set the stage, he reviews the original offenses. Separate chapters discuss domestic surveillance, mail opening, questionable detentions, and assassination operations that received public attention during the Church Committee hearings of 1975. Then, in an extended, intense discussion, Prados addresses the “much more sinister…issue of what the CIA did to influence the ways in which it, itself, is portrayed” by the media. This includes spin-doctoring, press releases, “attempts to secure the dismissal of journalists,” and “suppressing the works of CIA’s own employees.” (192) He is particularly exercised about what he deems the CIA’s dilatory declassification practices and the selective treatment of authors “given privileged access to intelligence case files.” (226)

In a chapter devoted to CIA attempts to establish a “cloak of secrecy” around its operations, Prados returns to the subject of CIA authors. He challenges CIA’s han-

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8 Its full title was the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The committee’s final report was issued in 1976. See http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/churchcommittee.html.
dling of several well-known, controversial cases. These include Victor Marchetti (The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence), Frank Snepp (Decent Interval), and Philip Agee (Inside the Company). Prados’s judgments are open to alternative interpretations, especially the one that questions former KGB general Oleg Kalugin’s well-documented assessment that Agee was a Cuban agent. Prados asserts that “it is more likely the Cubans regarded Philip Agee as a friend.” (246)

A common theme Prados pushes in dealing with these issues is the influence of the CIA’s Publication Review Board (PRB) which, Prados argues, subjects even books favorable to CIA to unjustified scrutiny. Prados sees the PRB not as protecting security, but as attempting “to avoid accountability.” The result is a “fractured history” that obscures “known facts, embarrassing incidents, and outright illegalities.” (273) This excessive secrecy has obscured more recent putative examples of “family jewels,” the use of “kidnappers and torturers—and with the drone war—executioners.” (274)

The final chapters of The Family Jewels deal with the role of successive administrations in managing intelligence scandals and their investigation. Prados provides suggestions for preventing such problems in the future and puts reform of secrecy and accountability rules at the head of his list of needed changes: the number of secrets created should be reduced and accountability increased. At one point he hints at the need for a “truth commission” that would have total access to all intelligence operations and would work independent of the other branches of government. If Prados recognizes the bureaucratic and legal implications of such an entity, he doesn’t discuss them.

Prados begins his conclusion with the observation that “it is time to dispense with the fiction that the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and their confederates run around like ‘rogue elephants.’” (318) Conceding that intelligence agencies operate under presidential control, he concludes that this control is too often inadequate. Thus, he suggests, unless “the Central Intelligence Agency’s fortress of secrecy” is reformed, the discovery of more family jewels is likely. (330)

The Family Jewels is a critical examination of disturbing historical and contemporary events. Whether Prados’s extension of the original meaning of the phrase is justified remains to be seen. The patterns he develops are subjectively, not objectively linked. Likewise, his suggestion that more openness as “a tool of accountability” contributes to a solution without diminished operational effectiveness is not persuasive. Obeying the law and not repeating past mistakes are more promising alternatives.

Hog’s Exit: Jerry Daniels, the Hmong, and the CIA, by Gayle L. Morrison (Texas Tech University Press, 2013), 431 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, maps, index.

Gayle Morrison is an oral historian specializing in the Hmong people of Laos. Her first book, Sky Is Falling: An Oral History of the CIA’s Evacuation of the Hmong from Laos, presents firsthand accounts from Hmong soldiers and their families of their resettlement after Laos fell. In Hog’s Exit, her focus is on the postwar activities and death of Jerry Daniels, nicknamed “Hog” by the admiring Hmong with whom he served. The interviews she recorded are attributed to family, former smokejumper buddies, an Air America cargo “kicker” in Laos, and various State Department, military and civilian colleagues. One, a former loadmaster in Laos, tells how Daniel’s mother showed him Daniels’s CIA Distinguished Intelligence Medal, awarded posthumously, and the accompanying citation, which Morrison quotes in an endnote. (342) The balance of the book dwells on the close relationships Daniels developed with the Hmong and the ceremonial honors they bestowed on him after his death in a Thai hotel room, a death that some consider to have occurred under suspicious circumstances.

Morrison’s style, however, detracts from this extraordinary tribute to a gallant officer. While she considers her interviews primary source material, most are not dated or adequately identified, and she doesn’t provide any connecting, contextual detail between interviews. Nor is there any transitional material from chapter to chapter.
chapter. Each one discusses some aspect of Daniels’s life and death, but there is no apparent reason why any chapter appears when it does. The result is an oral mosaic that leaves the reader trying to make sense of disjointed, sometimes imprecise data on an unfamiliar subject. For example, one entry reads, “Do you remember all those years reading the local papers—The Bangkok Post, the World…?” The “you” is never identified. (11)

Hog’s Exit will bring back some memories for those who served in Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, and it may serve as a source for scholars of Hmong culture. But as a public tribute, another format would have been more effective.

Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East, by Scott Anderson (Doubleday, 2013), 578 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Enter “Lawrence” in Google, and the first option presented is Lawrence of Arabia. Thomas Edward Lawrence remains one of the few WW I heroes with wide name recognition today. The reasons include the 1962 movie, starring 6’ 2” Peter O’Toole as the 5’ 5” Lawrence, his memoir Seven Pillars of Wisdom (still in print), and writings by and about him that fill a 1,000-page bibliography. Lawrence in Arabia is the latest contribution.

Author and war correspondent Scott Anderson is mainly concerned with Lawrence’s contribution to the Arab Revolt in the Arabian peninsula during WW I. But he includes important biographical data to help the reader understand the man and his eccentricities. The book begins with Lawrence appearing before King George V and Queen Mary to be invested as Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire, an achievement Lawrence had dreamed of as a boy. But when it was time to kneel, Lawrence remained standing, informed the King he was declining the honor and walked away. (2) The book ends with Lawrence’s death on 19 May 1935 after a motorcycle accident. Winston Churchill travelled more than 200 miles to attend the funeral. His eulogy called Lawrence “one of the greatest beings alive in our time.” (505)

Much has been written about Lawrence, but Anderson has taken a different approach. He found three other amateur intelligence officers who worked in the Middle East during the war whose work affected Lawrence in different ways. One was William Yale—of the founding family of Yale University—who worked initially prospecting for Standard Oil and later was hired by the State Department to keep the US government informed. His performance may have helped Standard Oil but did little else. The second was Jewish agronomist Aaron Aaronsohn, who with his sister established an effective anti-Turkish espionage network in Palestine, which was poorly utilized by the British. The third was Curt Prüfer, a German mapmaker and later head of the German intelligence bureau in Constantinople. He worked hard to support the Turks trying to destroy the Arab Revolt and, with it, the British Empire. As Anderson weaves their stories into the Arab struggle for independence, the complex nature of Middle East culture and politics becomes clear.

But it was Lawrence, also an amateur, who made a real difference in the war effort. An archeologist with years of experience in Syria before the war, he enlisted in London and served first as a mapmaker and briefer. This knowledge and his fluency in Arabic led to an assignment as an analyst—when he was a lieutenant—to what became the Arab Bureau in Cairo. His eventual posting as the British contact for leaders of the Arab Revolt and the deceptive means he employed to become its effective leader make for exciting reading. His greatest contribution, as Anderson makes clear, was his intuitive realization that to deal with the Arabs, one had to understand their culture and then live and act like them. The practical consequence of this was Lawrence’s successful adaptation of guerrilla warfare techniques—about which he had only read—to fight the Turks.

A critical factor in the Arab acceptance of Lawrence as their unofficial leader was the political promise—sincerely made—that if successful in their operations,

10 Philip M. O’Brien, T. E. Lawrence: A Bibliography (Oak Knoll Press, 2000), 2nd edition. A supplement was published in 2008, and many items have been published since that date.
Arab independence in the non-Palestine areas would be their prize. When he learned the British and French had no intention of keeping the promise, he made Herculean but unsuccessful efforts to reverse the policy. His final attempt failed after he led the Arabs into Damascus. By then a colonel, he left the army. Further attempts to hold the Allies to their original promises in the Paris Peace Conference had no effect. He did manage some concessions for the Arabs while working on Churchill’s Middle East Commission, which created the Middle Eastern states that exist today.

Lawrence became a world famous hero after the war, thanks to American Lowell Thomas’s book, *With Lawrence in Arabia*. For the remainder of his life he endured the paradox created by his desire to make his memoirs a major work while seeking at the same time to be inconspicuous. To escape attention, he joined the RAF as an enlisted man, had a tour in tanks, and then tested high-speed rescue boats. All the while he was sought out by the press and movie makers.

In this mix, Anderson discusses wartime psychological scars that Lawrence battled to the end. *Lawrence in Arabia* is a fine story, thoroughly documented, beautifully told.

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In his foreword to *MI6*, the then chief of service (“C”), Sir John Sawers, writes that the book “is a landmark in the history of the service.” And indeed it is, by any measure. Although the service was officially recognized in 1994, only Alan Judd’s 1999 biography of Sir Mansfield Cumming was based on official MI6 files. This is not to say that prior to 1994 the existence of MI6 was a well-kept secret. In 1992, publication of *The Spy Who Saved The World* revealed MI6’s contribution to the work of Oleg Penkovsky in great detail while identifying the principle officers involved. The following year, British intelligence historian Nigel West unofficially surveyed the many MI6 officers who had published their memoirs. What distinguishes Keith Jeffery’s book from these earlier works is its more broad timeframe and his unrestricted access to MI6 archives. *MI6* confirms and corrects the record, although not the entire record.

As Jeffery makes clear in his preface, while his access was unlimited, what he could write about was not. The primary restrictions were the timeframe, 1909–1949, and the prohibition against identifying certain agents, officer, and operations. By stopping at 1949, the book could mention Kim Philby of the Cambridge Five only in connection with the Gouzenko case. Likewise, Venona had to be excluded. With respect to naming individuals, Jeffery could not use names unless they had been officially released, even if the names appear in the public domain. Jeffery explains the reasoning with the comment that unofficial sources were often “unsubstantiated assertions in sensational and evanescent publications” or what he more colorfully terms the “sub-prime intelligence literature.” (xii)

These limitations aside, *MI6* is an astonishing work of scholarship. It reveals the development of the service from its one-man origins, through WW I, the interwar period, and WW II. The latter brought great challenges, first with the abolition of the Z Organization—which controlled nonofficial cover officers—under Claude Dansey. Then came the formation of the SOE (Special Operations Executive), the work of the codebreakers at Bletchley Park, and the initial loss and subsequent rebuilding of British worldwide espionage capabilities. *MI6* concludes with the transition from a wartime structure to its Cold War organization. About one third of the book concerns administration, and the balance covers operations.

Along the way some colorful Brits make an appearance. Examples include Sir Paul Dukes, who operated under the noses of the Bolsheviks in Russia, and Wilfred “Biffy” Dunderdale—fond of fast cars and a friend

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11 Lowell Thomas, *With Lawrence in Arabia* (Hutchinson, 1932).


13 Nigel West, *The Faber Book of Espionage* (Faber and Faber, 1993).
of Ian Fleming—in France, whose fluent Russian aided in the debriefing of the first Soviet defector, Boris Ba-
janov. Then there was Haline Szymańska, the wife of a
Polish military attaché and “friend” of Admiral Wil-
helm Canaris, the German Abwehr chief. She served as
an agent for the Poles and MI6, and Canaris arranged
for her escape to Switzerland, though Jeffery does not
mention the rumor that she was also his mistress. She
also had links to Allen Dulles. When she informed him
that the Germans were reading his cipher, he continued
to use it until Claude Dansey, then the assistant to “C,”
told the MI6 head of station to remind “the fool [Dull-
es]” of the fact. Subsequent communications were
passed through British channels. (511)

This is just a minute sampling of the hundreds of sto-
ries Jefferies tells in MI6. In this revised edition he has
added details to the adventures of Sir Paul Dukes, SIS’s
role in the Rudolf Hess defection, and on the agent
NANNYGOAT’s links to a Romanian network. Finally,
he describes in detail a case omitted entirely from the
first edition—the Volkov case, which threatened to ex-
pose Philby and other Soviet penetrations of British in-
telligence.

MI6 is a most valuable addition to the literature of in-
telligence.

Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, Raffaele Laudani (ed.)

The Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) was the
first element formed by William Donovan when he be-
came the President Roosevelt’s Coordinator of Infor-
mation in 1942. His staffing policy was to recruit first-
class minds “without any special concern for particular
political commitments,” (ix) expert in subjects that
would be needed to inform the president during the up-
coming war. By 1943, R&A had grown to some “1,200
employees.” (2) Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, and
Otto Kirchheimer were leading members of the Central
European Section (CES). They were also Marxists—or
communists, as some would later have it—and advoca-
te of the Frankfurt School of thought formulated
during their prewar association with the Institute of So-
Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany. Each had written
widely on the evils of Nazi Germany, and in the OSS
they applied their knowledge to explaining that political
movement and later to discussing social alternatives in
the postwar era. Secret Reports On Nazi Germany con-
tains 31 of the studies they produced during and after
the war.

When written, the studies were unsigned and circulat-
ed for comment within R&A before publication. The
volume’s editor, history professor Raffaele Laudani of
the University of Bologna, has determined the principal
author of each study based on content and other records.
In his informative introduction, Laudani provides bio-

graphical entries on the three authors, with summaries
of their principal writings. He also notes the prejudice
they encountered within OSS due to their German ac-
cents. Neumann was the most senior and well known.
He had been vetted by the FBI and had served else-
where in the US government before joining R&A as
deputy chief of CES. He was also the only one later
identified in Venona decrypts—cryptonym RUFF—to
have simultaneously served Soviet intelligence.14

The topics covered in this volume range from anti-
Semitism, changes in the Nazi government, psycholog-
ical warfare, Nazi morale and the possibility of col-
lapse, the effects of Allied air raids, the German
Communist Party, the economic situation, the Nazi
Master Plan, and the postwar treatment of Germany and
its leaders. Laudani makes a point of emphasizing the
OSS policy of “scientific objectivity” and the avoid-
ance of “personal opinions” in the analysts’ work. He
concludes the policy was rigorously followed. (7) He
also discusses the degree of acceptance of the work, es-
pecially its contribution to the Nuremberg trials, which
proved controversial. Nevertheless, it is not possible
even today to assess its impact completely.

For those wondering what R&A did during the war
and after it was assigned to the State Department, Secret

14 For details on the materials Neumann passed, see John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (Yale University Press, 2009), 317–20.

On a hot day in August 1943, a group of 90 doctors, medics, and nurses assigned to the 807th Medical Air Evacuation Transport Squadron left Louisville, Kentucky by train. Though they didn’t know it at the time, the nurses and medics were headed for a new military base in Bari, Italy. After a sea voyage and stops in Tunisia and Sicily, they boarded a “Gooney Bird,” C-47 on 8 November for the flight to Bari. They crash landed in Albania, linked up with friendly communist partisans, and were attacked by Germans while trying to escape on foot over rugged, snow-covered mountains. After several months, they finally arrived in Bari by boat. *The Secret Rescue* tells their story.

The loss of the plane didn’t go unnoticed by the Germans or the press. Reports that there were “13 nurses aboard” made headlines in the States. (115) Public attention soon shifted to other wartime events, but the nurses and medics were not forgotten. The friendly partisans notified their contacts in the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Albania, who subsequently informed the newly established OSS base in Bari. Officers from both organizations cooperated. Major Anthony Quayle, an actor in civilian life, volunteered with the partisans to aid in the rescue, provide food and winter clothing, and arrange communications with the Americans.

Secrecy was imposed in an attempt to prevent the Germans from determining locations and rescue plans. For two months, the medics and nurses were moved from village to village. They narrowly escaped an German attack, when three of the nurses were separated from the rest. Their clothes became infected with lice and gradually deteriorated so that frostbite became a problem. After a failed rescue attempt by air, all but the missing nurses were rescued and evacuated by boat on a moonlight night.

Shortly after the rescue of the main group, General Donovan arrived at Bari to discuss operations. When he learned of the missing nurses, he sent OSS Captain Lloyd Smith, who had accompanied the original group, back to Albania for the remainder of the party. He found them, and they made it out by boat on 21 March.

Author Cate Lineberry interviewed some of the survivors and some of the Albanians who risked their lives in the endeavor. In her epilogue, she describes what happened to them after the war. *The Secret Rescue* is a well-told story of wartime cooperation and heroism.


—Review contributed by Thomas Coffey

Randall Woods is a professor of American history at the University of Arkansas, who has specialized in the history of the Vietnam War period. After publishing writings about the war and a biography of Lyndon Johnson, Woods has turned to the business of intelligence during the period through this biography of an operations officer who played key roles in Southeast Asian operations, in particular the controversial Phoenix Program, and was director of central intelligence when the South Vietnamese government fell to the communists in 1975.

That Woods begins his widely acclaimed biography with Colby’s death is in some way appropriate, given the puzzle he was to many in CIA when he worked there. Many still regard his death as mysterious, and although the coroner judged that Colby died of natural causes, others have speculated that it was murder or suicide. Despite being a man of action, Colby never belonged to the brotherhood of Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, Frank Wisner, and James Angleton—in fact, two of them would become his bitter enemies. As inconspicuous as Colby appeared (“I could never catch a waiter’s attention”), he became a target of Vietnam protesters, and the clinical expression on his face, along
with his eyeglass frames, an iconic image for posters. As one of the heads of the Phoenix Program, he managed one of the most controversial programs in CIA history, a program opponents of the war claimed was an assassination operation.

Colby’s delivery in 1974 of the “family jewels” report to Congress (see the above review of The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power by John Prados) did not endear him to many CIA professionals. On his retirement in 1976, he famously slipped out of the CIA campus in a car as nondescript as he himself had been before the controversies of the Vietnam War era.

With Shadow Warrior, Woods has attempted to make sense of Colby’s life and times. Indeed, he gives readers lots, perhaps too much, about Colby’s time and, like other works published about the man, not enough about his life. These other books play a huge role in the biography, for Woods relies heavily on secondary sources—including the spreading bad habit among spy historians of quoting Tim Weiner’s dubious Legacy of Ashes.

Shadow Warriors comes across at times as a more readable translation of some of the denser texts that have been published about Colby and his spy career. The book is relentless in its retelling of history, and this starts to grate after a while. A reader could not be faulted for wondering if Woods periodically used Colby’s life to give his take on the times. However, when Colby is actually a participant in the history, the man and, to a more limited extent, the book, start to grow on you. By the end, the reader can better understand and admire Colby’s conviction and perhaps be convinced that he was more right than wrong in the way he handled some tough issues of the time.

Regrettably, Woods’s work needed fact-checking; it contained some 30 factual errors, a number of them of the easy-to-know variety. For example, the Guatemala coup took place in 1954, not 1953; the CIA top brass works out of the seventh floor, not the fourth; it was the National Intelligence Daily, not the Daily Intelligencer; and Alexander Butterfield, not John Dean, revealed the existence of Nixon’s taping system. Other errors required some digging but are more consequential. The Voice of America was not a CIA-funded front organization; CIA officers had no contact with Yuri Nosenko between 1962 and 1964 and so received no intelligence from him; Operation Mongoose was not, as is too commonly claimed, an assassination program; and, as any Bond fan knows, the gadget maker is Q, not M.

Spy and Counterspy: A History of Secret Agents and Double Agents From the Second World War to the Cold War, by Ian Dear (History Press, 2013), 256 pp., photos, index.

In the mid-1990s, historian Ian Dear began a trilogy on clandestine warfare. Spy and Counterspy is the final volume. While it is not a comprehensive treatment of wartime espionage, the seven cases the book summarizes illustrate the full range of problems the Allies encountered. And although the cases have been the subject of other writings, Dear has added additional material to each from Western and Russian sources. Where cases began before or continued after the war, they are included.

Five of the seven studies will be familiar to those who follow espionage history. In the first group, he includes the Sorge case, the Cicero story, the Cambridge Five, the Double Cross program, and Venona. The first of the lesser known cases is Operation SALAM, mounted by the Abwehr to place agents in Cairo for Rommel. The movie The English Patient was based in part on one the SALAM agents, László Almássy. Once the agents were in place, their reporting on the British military was codenamed CONDOR. The final and least known of the case

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15 Colby died during an evening paddle in his canoe on the Chesapeake Bay in 1996. Some suspect his death was the result of foul play. In a documentary film, The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster William Colby, one of his sons, Carl, hinted at the possibility that his father, wracked by guilt over the Phoenix Program, might have committed suicide. Woods dismissed the idea that Colby felt guilt over Phoenix as “absurd” in his review of the movie, which appeared in Studies in Intelligence 57, No. 2 (June 2013).

summaries concerns Major Mieczysław Słowikowski’s, Agency Africa, a Polish spy ring cooperating with the French resistance. Słowikowski passed data on the Germans to the OSS for use in planning Operation TORCH, the Allied landings in Africa in 1942.

Spy and Counterspy is well documented and will serve as a good starting point for those interested in WW II espionage.


Richard Rashke’s book, Escape from Sobibor, told the story of a revolt by brave prisoners in that Nazi death camp. Useful Enemies takes a broader look at the collaborating captors who served in many death camps in Eastern Europe and who found their way to America after the war. His principal theme is that “the FBI and the CIA welcomed and protected these Nazi collaborators,” using them as agents, informants, and anticommunist leaders in their émigré communities. (19) The central narrative of the book is the story of John Demjanjuk, a former camp guard who lived quietly in the United States until his name came to the attention of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1975. Rashke explains the unusual circumstances that led to Demjanjuk’s name being added to the INS list (based on Nazi hunter Otto Karbach’s list) of collaborators living in the United States. Rashke also describes Demjanjuk’s eventual trials and deportations. (He was extradited to Israel in 1986, convicted, and later acquitted. He returned to the United States, in 1993. The United States deported him again in 2009, this time to Germany, where he was convicted in 2011 of being an accessory to murder. He died in Germany in 2012 while waiting for his appeal to be heard.)

The origin and use of the list is an equally compelling subtheme. Rashke shows how postwar anti-Jewish immigration laws played a disturbing role in protecting collaborators. Then he documents the actions of bureaucratically corrupt INS officials who implemented policies instigated by the FBI, the CIA, the Army Criminal Investigation Corps, and the Air Force to protect Nazi collaborators from prosecution despite their known records of wartime atrocities.

The story of how the collaborators were exposed involves freshman member of Congress Elizabeth Holtzman, who was chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration. In 1973 she received an anonymous phone call from an INS worker, who said the “INS had a list of Nazi war criminals living in America, and it was doing nothing about them.” (51) The whistle-blower’s information was supported by an article in the New York Times by two former INS officers whose investigations of Nazi war criminals had been blocked by superiors. Holtzman’s efforts to produce the Karbach list were ultimately successful, and Demjanjuk’s name was found on it.

Rashke gives many examples of the cases Holtzman uncovered. One collaborator “responsible for the murder of thousands of Romanian Jews had become a Ukrainian Orthodox bishop” in America. (62) Another with an equally bad record was living quietly in California with his family. He was an FBI informer. Then there was Operation Paperclip that arranged the immigration of German scientists. Rashke describes some of their wartime records, Wernher von Braun being an unsettling example. Rashke also includes a chapter on former German intelligence officers and the Gehlen Organization, in which CIA’s role is discussed. Holtzman’s efforts led to new organizations in the Department of Justice, new federal laws, and new immigration regulations, many coming into play before any on the Karbach list were brought to justice. Some on the list still have not been held accountable.

Rashke finds it hard to understand how Nazi war criminals could be recruited as agents to work against the Soviet Union. He leaves the impression that the Soviet threat was not so serious as some had argued and that it could have been dealt with through other means. But that is not how the situation was viewed by those on the ground at the time. Useful Enemies is a detailed, well-documented account that clarifies some issues and leaves others to history.
In April 1983, US Air Force Specialist Jeffrey Carney walked through Check Point Charlie in Berlin and offered his services as a spy to the Stasi. His SIGINT duties with the 6912th Marienfelde Field site in West Berlin made him a valuable asset for the East Germans. After training by the Stasi’s foreign intelligence element, the HVA, Carney provided his handlers classified documents, the amount of each delivery limited only by what he could conveniently carry over the border. (276–77) Carney denied receiving payment; it was the respect for his homosexual lifestyle and his devotion to communism and the GDR that made it worthwhile.

After he was transferred to Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas in 1984, Carney initially continued to cooperate. But he missed the HVA’s comradeship, and in 1985 deserted the Air Force and returned to the GDR via Mexico and Cuba. He was given work and for a while also served the HVA as a spotter of others in the military who might be willing to follow in his footsteps. In 1987 he was granted GDR citizenship as Jens Karney, but he did not formally renounce his US citizenship, a decision that would come back to haunt him. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) had not forgotten him, and after the collapse of the GDR, Carney’s former HVA handler told OSI where he could be found. Carney was arrested in 1991—he calls the arrest a kidnapping—and returned to the United States. A plea agreement was eventually negotiated, and Carney served nearly 12 years in the Ft. Leavenworth federal prison. His attempt to regain German citizenship after release was denied.

The 700 pages of Against All Enemies are devoted to describing how he committed espionage and to explaining his reasons. As to the former, he is critical of Markus Wolf’s treatment of his contribution. (566–67) Carney covers his unhappy home life, his decision to defect, his life with his partner in the GDR, his view of his illegal arrest, and his treatment in prison. He doesn’t regret his decision to defect and still views the GDR as representing “the collective hopes and dreams of millions of its citizens. Today…it lives on inside of those us who knew it, filling us with good memories as well as memories that are not so pleasant. The German Democratic Republic will only cease to exist when the last person who knew her is placed in his grave. Until then it lives on.” (4)

While Against All Enemies gives no hint of Carney’s current status, a short afterword describes a visit to Berlin with his 13-year-old son, whom he quotes as being proud of what his father did. Most readers will reach a different conclusion.

17 For more on these maxims see as they apply to intelligence, see R.V. Jones, Reflections On Intelligence (Heinemann, 1989), 88.
Kondrashev would soon coauthor *Battleground Berlin* with David Murphy, a colleague of Bagley’s at CIA. Encouraged by the television experience, Kondrashev decided to write his memoir. To profit from its publication, he wanted to publish an English edition and asked Bagley for help. *Spymaster* is the result.

Kondrashev’s initial draft was approved during the late Yeltsin era, but permission was revoked after Putin came to power. Bagley retained a copy of the manuscript and asked Kondrashev about publishing independently in the West. Fearing doing so would compromise his continuing links to the new Russian intelligence service (the SVR), yet wanting to have his story told, Kondrashev asked Bagley to wait until after his death. (Kondrashev died in 2007.)

Even before their agreement to collaborate, it became clear to Bagley in their conversations that Kondrashev had been involved in espionage operations that Bagley had worked on from the CIA side. One illustration is Kondrashev’s description of a penetration of the US embassy code room in Moscow. Bagley had suspected a penetration at the time, and Kondrashev’s memoir confirmed it. (Kondrashev never named the traitor.) The book also contains interesting side stories about how Kondrashev survived the Stalinist purges and, later, KGB bureaucratic turmoil.

In this work, Bagley reveals the source of his knowledge of two big cases in which he had been involved: Yuri Nosenko, who defected to the CIA in 1964, and Gen. Dmitry Polyakov, a longtime CIA agent. Bagley contends that the KGB had dispatched both to the United States as part of a grand long-range—internally controversial—deception operation. Bagley also acknowledges, however, that Polyakov was regarded as one of the best Soviet intelligence agents ever to work for the CIA. Bagley resolves the apparent contradiction—here Occam’s Razor applies—by concluding that Polyakov changed his mind at some point and began passing truly important secrets to the CIA, thus justifying agency confidence in him and explaining his eventual execution in the Soviet Union.

The Nosenko case is more complicated for several reasons. First, Bagley had been involved in it from the beginning. Second, he had long ago accepted the argument that Nosenko had been dispatched as a KGB provocation. In this book, he uses details supplied by Kondrashev—who was assigned at various times to the KGB elements responsible for the plan’s implementation—to support his contention that the KGB had a long-range deception program that included dispatched agents. Third, many CIA officers disagreed with Bagley and would argue that Crabtree’s Bludgeon had affected his analysis. After the long discussion of the Nosenko case, for example, Bagley quotes Kondrashev saying, “How could your service ever believe that man?” (210) In the end, the Nosenko saga remains the most controversial defector CIA case in CIA history. Curiously, Bagley does not consider the possibility that, like Polyakov, Nosenko might have changed his mind after being dispatched.

Three additional items in *Spymaster* are worth noting here. First, Bagley weaves a number of other well-known cases into the KGB deception program. The most familiar is Col. Oleg Penkovsky, and Bagley explains how Penkovsky was exposed. He discounts the traditional KGB explanation of blanket surveillance and argues it was due to an unknown KGB penetration in the CIA—a theory Bagley has long argued. He also writes that Penkovsky’s exposure occurred much earlier than previously thought and that Penkovsky was allowed to operate while under surveillance to protect the source that revealed him. The second item concerns Kondrashev’s career—an appendix reviews Kondrashev’s early life—and his views of the KGB’s role in the 1956 Hungarian crisis and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The third item is Kondrashev’s clarification of the strange case of Gregory Douglas—an author who claims US intelligence was responsible for the assassination of John F. Kennedy and that the never-captured Nazi Gestapo leader Heinrich Müller had been brought to the United States by the US Army and became a close friend of President Truman. Bagley reports that Kondrashev exposes Douglas as a “Soviet connected journalist” feeding conspiracy theories intended to discredit Western countries and leaders. (151)

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18 Tennent Bagley and Peter Deriabin, *KGB: Masters of the Soviet Union* (Hippocrene Books, 1990); Sergei Kondrashev and David Murphy, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* (Yale University Press, 1997).
But has Bagley gotten it right? To answer in the affirmative, one must accept the contribution of a career KGB general experienced in deception, as well as Bagley’s analysis. Not everyone will. Still, *Spymaster* actually provides some new material on Cold War espionage about which many books have been written. It has raised the bar, but not ended the debate.

**Intelligence Abroad**

*Intelligence Tradecraft: An Art of Trapping the Enemy*, by Uday Kumar (Lucky International, 2013), 214 pp., bibliography, photos, no index.

Uday Kumar is an officer in India’s Central Armed Paramilitary Force. He is also the author of several books dealing with the Naxalite-Mao insurgency in Eastern India. Intel *Intelligence Tradecraft* is a primer on a topic seldom written about in India. Kumar’s use of the word “tradecraft” is somewhat broader than the Western definition. In addition to the expected topics—agent handling, cover, elicitation, and surveillance techniques—he includes chapters on terminology, intelligence in general, the intelligence cycle, counterintelligence and counterespionage, subversion, propaganda, and report writing.

Overall, Kumar provides an elementary introduction to basics, but the topic of agent recruitment is notable for its absence. The only new material is in the short chapter entitled “Surveillance in Militancy and Naxalism,” in which he discusses the application of various techniques to the counterinsurgency problem.

Kumar does not provide sources notes, and his bibliography contains mainly Western references, some very outdated. And while *Intelligence Tradecraft* is in need of a good copy editor, it nevertheless gives a look at how intelligence is taught to India’s paramilitary forces.

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