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Modernizing the IC "Charter," Revising Executive Order 12333
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Book Reviews
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
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ISSN 1527-0874
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The 2008 Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities

Stephen B. Slick

Editor’s Note: During his final year in office, President George W. Bush approved significant amendments to the decades-old executive order that organized, directed, and imposed limits on US intelligence activities. The product of extensive debate and coordination within the executive branch, these amendments to Executive Order (EO) 12333 were intended to clarify ambiguous provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.

Passed in response to the 9/11 attacks, the IRTPA established the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and granted authorities the office would require to lead a more closely integrated Intelligence Community (IC) and to institutionalize relationships and practices intended to improve counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts.

Amendment of the order, which was originally issued in 1981, required the resolution, after intense debate within the Executive Branch, of complex substantive, bureaucratic, and legal issues. It also involved a process to build consensus for a final text within the “federated” US intelligence and national security communities.

This account, by the senior director for intelligence programs and reform on the National Security Council (NSC) staff at the time, is intended to offer insights for intelligence professionals who operate under the provisions of the order and for students of the efforts to restructure and reform US intelligence that have been underway almost continuously since the end of World War II.

A Brief History of Ronald Reagan’s EO 12333

Since passage of the 1947 National Security Act establishing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the post of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)—a single official responsible for leading CIA and providing limited management of other US intelligence agencies—presidents periodically provided written guidance to the DCI and other executive branch officials on intelligence matters. This guidance was conveyed in the early years through classified National Security Council Intelligence Directives and memorandums.

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Modernizing the IC “Charter”

and later by unclassified executive orders.2

The first executive order on intelligence, EO 11905, was issued by President Gerald Ford in 1976. It assigned specific roles to the NSC, the DCI, and various interagency panels for directing the US intelligence effort.3 Ford’s order also more clearly defined the missions of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, imposed restrictions on intelligence activities, and established mechanisms within the executive branch for overseeing the IC’s work.

Specific restrictions in Ford’s order concerning intelligence activities inside the United States, the collection and handling of information on US citizens, as well as prohibitions on political assassination and human experimentation responded directly to revelations during widely-publicized congressional hearings in the mid-1970s into alleged excesses by CIA and other agencies.4 Another aim of Ford’s order was to preempt efforts by the Congress to draft a “statutory charter” for US intelligence that the administration feared would infringe on a president’s broad constitutional prerogatives in the national security area.5 The administration of President Jimmy Carter spent more than a year discussing the same issues internally, as well as with congressional committees working on a statutory charter, before replacing EO 11905 with an intelligence directive of its own in 1978—EO 12036.6

Fulfilling a campaign promise to revitalize America’s intelligence capabilities, specifically in counterintelligence (CI) and technical collection required to assess more accurately the military strength of the Soviet Union, President Ronald Reagan revoked the Carter order and replaced it with EO 12333 in late 1981.7 The new order directly addressed the perception that Carter’s order was unduly restrictive and defensive in tone. Reagan declared in the Preamble to EO 12333 that “timely and accurate” information was essential to the nation’s security and that “all reasonable and lawful means” must be used to collect such intelligence.8 Part 1 of Reagan’s order set broad aspirational goals for the IC and defined specific duties and responsibilities for executive branch officials and organizations with intelligence functions while Part 2 described protections for civil liberties and extended the existing ban on assassination and limits on human experimentation.9

While it would have been difficult to foresee at the time, Reagan’s intelligence directive proved remarkably durable. Despite dramatic shifts in national security priorities, innumerable public controversies involving US intelligence, and multiple studies by government and private groups recommending reforms, no subsequent president made significant changes to EO 12333 during more than two decades. While it remained—and remains to this day—relatively obscure to the general public, EO 12333 hardened into a stable legal and policy foundation for the modern IC, with agencies issuing linear feet of regulations that interpret its provisions and organizations throughout the IC mandating annual refresher briefings on the order’s restrictions to employees deployed around the world.

9/11, IRTPA, and the DNI

Al Qaeda’s attacks on 11 September 2001 changed instantly the public’s perception and expecta-
tions of US intelligence. Charges of intelligence failure were leveled at the IC and its leaders precisely when CIA and other agencies were rapidly adapting to lead America’s global response to the attacks. A bipartisan commission cochaired by former governor Thomas Kean and ex-congressman Lee Hamilton was appointed in late 2002 to investigate the causes of the tragedy and recommend measures to improve the government’s ability to detect and prevent future terror attacks.

The commission report, released in July 2004, provided an authoritative account of the growth of al Qaeda and the execution of the plot. The report concluded with specific findings and recommendations for reform of the government’s national security structures. Among other recommendations, the 9/11 Commission proposed establishing a national counterterrorism center to monitor, assess, and coordinate responses to terror-threat reports, improving the sharing of intelligence within the government (particularly between organizations principally focused on either foreign or domestic collection), and creating a new post of national intelligence director to lead a more unified IC. Unlike the DCI, the national intelligence director proposed by the 9/11 Commission would not also serve as the head of the CIA.

In August 2004, the president issued four new executive orders intended to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations.

After intensive review and interagency deliberations in late summer 2004 and in a political climate charged by a close election campaign centered on national security, President Bush endorsed the 9/11 Commission’s principal recommendations, including the call for a more unified IC under the leadership of a “strong” national intelligence director. In August 2004, the president issued four new executive orders intended to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations regarding a national counterterrorism center, information sharing, protection of civil liberties, and strengthened central leadership of the IC.

One of those, EO 13355, implicitly acknowledged that legislative action would be required to create and empower a new national intelligence director. It amended provisions of Reagan’s EO 12333 to direct the DCI—then Acting DCI John McLaughlin—to exercise specific authorities to ensure an “enhanced joint, unified national intelligence effort.”

The NSC-led process to advise President Bush on intelligence reform also produced a draft bill that was conveyed informally to the administration’s congressional allies, who were by then deeply involved in the legislative process that led to the passage of the IRTPA on 17 December 2004. Significantly, neither the Bush administration nor the congressional sponsors of the IRTPA endorsed full centralization of US intelligence resources under a single leader or “secretary of intelligence.” Instead, the IC’s new head was expected to build a more integrated and effective intelligence enterprise using budgetary and limited directive authorities transferred from other cabinet officers and by unburdening him from daily management of the CIA. The IRTPA established the post of director of national intelligence (DNI) to lead an IC comprising 15 different elements housed within other cabinet departments and the CIA.

With passage of comprehensive intelligence legislation, the appointment and confirmation of Ambassador John Negroponte as the first DNI, and the establishment of the Office of the DNI (ODNI), major elements of Reagan’s EO 12333 had become obsolete by spring 2005.

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a. During a media background briefing, a senior administration official was more explicit on the need for legislative action to establish a national intelligence director and described the August 2004 executive orders as a “down payment” on future engagement with Congress regarding intelligence reform legislation. From “White House Conference Call on President’s Orders,” 27 August 2004 (see footnote 14).
b. A publicly released memorandum prepared for a meeting of the NSC’s Principal’s Committee discussed making the NID a de facto “Secretary of Intelligence.” It noted, “Principals agreed the approach, while certainly empowering the NID, would be too disruptive particularly during a time of war, undermine existing chains of command, and potentially weaken intelligence support to key government departments and missions.” (See footnote 15.)
c. In his book, Blinking Red (132), Michael Allen wrote that the title of national intelligence director or NID, which had been employed in the 9/11 Commission’s report, the administration’s proposed legislation, and many previous intelligence reform studies was abandoned by congressional leaders in favor of the more resonant director of national intelligence or DNI. (See footnote 15.)

With institutional roots in a still-fresh national tragedy, an incomplete set of authorities assembled through legislative compromise, and facing deep skepticism in more traditional quarters of the IC, the ODNI’s early performance was subjected to intense scrutiny. As DNI Negroponte set about forging new relationships and business practices, cataloging ODNI’s statutory and other responsibilities, and pursuing the resources to meet them, critics charged that the ODNI was little more than a “bloated bureaucracy” standing between policymakers and the important work of the intelligence agencies.17

To augment impressions from his daily interactions with the DNI and other IC leaders, President Bush solicited outside perspectives on intelligence reform, including from the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB). Board members would express concerns about what appeared to them to be a discrepancy between the IRTPA’s ambitious goal of building a unified intelligence enterprise and the weak management tools provided the DNI in the statute.18

In spring 2007, the NSC staff formally recommended to National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Homeland Security Advisor Fran Townsend that EO 12333 be amended to strengthen the DNI’s hand in managing the IC, synchronize executive branch guidance with the IRTPA as well as multiple other intelligence directives, and cement as a positive administration legacy the most significant changes to US intelligence undertaken since 1947.19 Broad goals for the proposed rewrite included:

- defining “national intelligence,” a term coined in the IRTPA to encompass both foreign and domestic intelligence and expand the DNI’s substantive reach beyond that of the DCI who, as CIA director, was largely proscribed from collection in the United States;
- removing persistent obstacles to information sharing; and
- reshaping the DNI’s relationship with the heads of executive branch departments.20

The NSC staff recommended against making changes to privacy rights and civil liberties protections in Part 2 of EO 12333 unless opportunities could be identified to strengthen them. Hadley approved the staff recommendation and ordered additional White House consultations (for example, with the Office of the Vice President and the White House counsel) to support a future presidential decision on the proposal.21

Ambassador Negroponte returned to the State Department in early 2007 and former National Security Agency (NSA) director and businessman Mike McConnell was appointed to serve as the second DNI. Shortly after taking office, McConnell asked his senior staff to explore the merit and feasibility of amending EO 12333.22 McConnell too recognized that EO 12333 was badly out-of-date after the IRTPA, and also that an amended order could prove a powerful vehicle for conveying presidential support for intelligence reforms that were, in McConnell’s view, being implemented too slowly.23

During a meeting with President Bush in fall 2007, PIAB Chairman Steve Friedman addressed intelligence reform and delivered formal
findings and recommendations. The PIAB found little merit in the criticism that the DNI’s staff was too large, but concluded that further progress toward the IRTPA’s objectives would require clarification and strengthening of the DNI’s authorities. The PIAB suggested the president approve and actively participate in a process to amend EO 12333 to allow the DNI to:

• “hire and fire” key IC leaders;
• set uniform personnel policies (including those requiring senior intelligence officers to serve “joint duty” assignments outside their home agency as a prerequisite to promotion);
• exercise milestone decision authority (MDA) over IC-funded acquisitions;
• designate functional and mission managers; and
• control access (including through classification and declassification) to intelligence information.

President Bush accepted the PIAB’s recommendation and agreed to set the tone for a “disciplined and accelerated” process to amend EO 12333. The decision to undertake a complex and foreseeable controversial project to enhance the DNI’s authorities in the last year of the president’s second term was not lightly taken. In late 2007, the Bush administration was generally disinclined to launch major new policy initiatives and, surprisingly, was focused on executing ongoing programs and cementing its accomplishments. In the national security area, the administration’s top priorities included completing the “troop surge” to stem violence in Iraq and preserving important counterterrorism tools like the statutory authority to conduct electronic surveillance under the amended Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

In addition to the PIAB’s persuasive appeal, President Bush’s decision to amend EO 12333 was also influenced by a high degree of confidence in the key participants in the process. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was a former DCI who had, in fact, previously declined an offer to serve as DNI because of his concerns about the sufficiency of the position’s authorities. Gates was supported and advised by Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD/I) James Clapper, a well respected intelligence leader who had previously headed both the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)—President Barack Obama would later appoint him the fourth DNI. CIA Director Michael Hayden had previously headed NSA and also served as the first principal deputy DNI under Ambassador Negroponte, while DNI McConnell enjoyed longstanding, constructive relationships with his counterparts.

There was a strong expectation that the cumulative intelligence experience and trust among these officials would improve prospects for overcoming entrenched bureaucratic interests and enable compromises that would improve the DNI’s ability to lead the IC within the IRTPA’s imperfect construct. It was also recognized that if the Bush administration failed to update EO 12333 or completed the amendment process too late in its final year, a new and inevitably less experienced national security team (of either party) would likely tackle the project and possibly even accept advice to pursue new intelligence legislation, with unpredictable results.

2008: A “Disciplined and Accelerated” Process

National Security Advisor Hadley convened the NSC Principals Committee (PC) in January 2008 to begin formal interagency coordination of proposed changes to EO 12333. Honoring his commitment to set the tone for these discussions and signal his interest in the process, President Bush opened the PC meeting to stress the need to improve US intelligence through better integration. Bush cited the ambiguous nature of the IRTPA’s provisions and fixed 1 May as his target date for approving revisions to EO 12333 that would reflect the new structures and accelerate needed
“cultural change” within the IC. The president asked principals personally to lead the process within their agencies, and to act in the best interests of the government as a whole rather than defend parochial interests of their respective departments.28

After the president’s instruction, DNI McConnell summarized a briefing he had given many of the same officials at a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) three days earlier. McConnell described his vision for a collaborative IC and listed major amendments he sought to EO 12333, stressing that he proposed no changes to the civil liberties protections in the existing order. Hadley reinforced the president’s intent that the entire amendment process should be “privacy neutral.”29

Secretary Gates, who was regarded as the department head with the most to lose in a more centralized IC and therefore the critical figure in the effort to update EO 12333, stressed that he proposed no changes to the civil liberties protections in the existing order. Hadley reinforced the president’s intent that the entire amendment process should be “privacy neutral.”29

Over the ensuing months, Hadley skillfully managed a process that delivered fully coordinated EO amendments to the president, albeit not before his 1 May deadline. After the January meeting, Hadley chaired five more PC meetings, directed two meetings of the NSC Deputies Committee on related media roll-out and communication issues, and spent dozens of hours in private meetings and conference calls with selected principals while keeping the PIAB, vice president, and president closely informed of progress or impediments to progress when they arose. To address dozens of more minor substantive, technical, and legal questions that surfaced between PC meetings and to craft language reflecting compromises reached by the principals, Hadley asked each department and agency head to designate a single “trusted agent” to participate in working-level meetings led by the NSC intelligence and legal staffs.

While the principals and their trusted agents argued forcefully for preferred outcomes on contentious issues, the character of the coordination process was uniformly civil, constructive, and consistent with the president’s guidance. A rare degree of personal chemistry and trust between senior officials, shared practical experiences gained over two years operating with the IRTPA model, and the specter of prompt dispute resolution by the president all contributed to an effective interagency process. At key junctures in the process, it was also apparent that certain principals, in particular, Secretary of Defense Gates and CIA Director Hayden, were pursuing creative compromises to achieve the president’s goals while simultaneously managing less conciliatory, even strident, forces within their respective buildings.31

Opening Salvos and Early Progress

McConnell secured Hadley’s concurrence for the ODNI staff to “take the pen” and prepare the initial draft of an amended EO 12333 consistent with the DNI’s goals, the discussion at the January PC meeting, and an appreciation for the main concerns of other agencies. In late February, McConnell transmitted draft amendments to the White House with a memo that described his strategic goal of a unified IC that would offer “decision advantage” to the president and other US policymakers.32

Substantive amendments were ultimately made to dozens of EO 12333’s provisions, but McConnell highlighted at the outset of the process his interest in 10 major changes:

- Interpret the IRTPA’s controversial Section 1018 in a manner that presumed actions taken by the DNI did not “abrogate” the statutory authority of department heads;
- Assign the DNI a larger role in selecting and removing the heads of IC elements, and the USD/I;
- Require shared MDA by the DNI and secretary of defense for major acquisitions funded principally
through the National Intelligence Program (NIP);

• Allow the DNI to determine when information was of interest to more than one agency and, as such, constituted “national intelligence” that must be shared under the IRTPA;

• Clarify the DNI’s authority to declassify intelligence information;

• Establish clear coordination mechanisms for foreign and domestic intelligence collection through the CIA and FBI, respectively, consistent with the DNI’s policies;

• Reinforce the DNI’s role in setting policies for foreign intelligence relationships, which CIA would coordinate;

• Confirm the DNI’s authority to designate functional and mission managers within the IC;

• Grant the DNI a role in the secretary of defense’s execution of his statutory authority as the “executive agent” for collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT); and

• Define a direct role for the DNI in CIA’s implementation of covert action programs.

Even before the DNI’s draft amendments were distributed for comment, agencies were already documenting objections to his proposals. For example, Secretary Gates submitted memos on behalf of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) arguing against increased DNI influence in “hire-fire” decisions regarding USD/I and other DoD intelligence officials, expanded DNI authority over major acquisi-

As the coordination process advanced, proposed amendments were discussed and debated in person by principals, through exchanges of written memos, and among staff members at meetings of the trusted-agents group.

As the coordination process advanced, proposed amendments were discussed and debated in person by principals, through exchanges of written memos, and among staff members at meetings of the trusted-agents group. A small number of issues ultimately emerged as principled disagreements that were resolved at senior levels through “win-lose” decisions (…always accompanied by the right of appeal to the president). But for most of the DNI-proposed changes, consensus was reached early on.

DNI Acquisition Authorities—“Shared MDA”

The IRTPA required the DNI and secretary of defense to exercise joint responsibility for major technical systems being developed by DoD’s intelligence elements when the program was wholly funded in the NIP and, therefore, subject to the DNI’s considerable budget authorities. DNI McConnell proposed amending EO 12333 to extend the same authority to the DNI when the majority of a program’s funds came from the NIP.

Consistent with Secretary Gates’s admonition to address only structural issues by presidential directive, he and McConnell negotiated a side agreement that extended this new acquisition authority to the DNI. McConnell, nonetheless, suggested memorializing the terms of their agreement in EO 12333 but Gates countered that the congressional armed services committees might focus closely on acquisition provisions in the amended EO and take
The IRTPA expressly granted CIA responsibility for coordinating intelligence relationships between US agencies and foreign security services, albeit under the overall direction of the DNI.

The final EO text generically directed the DNI to develop jointly with department heads procedures governing acquisitions wholly or partially funded by the NIP, and made no direct reference to the DoD-ODNI side agreement.40

Defining National Intelligence, Promoting Intelligence Sharing, and Declassification

To signal the need for greater sharing and integration of intelligence collected overseas and domestically, the IRTPA coined a new term, “national intelligence,” that it defined as information of interest to more than one US government agency—thereby excluding most “battlefield” or tactical military intelligence or routine law enforcement data.41 The IRTPA required the DNI to be given access to all national intelligence and be allowed to determine how it should be shared between agencies.42 The DNI proposed an amendment to EO 12333 that delegated to him the president’s authority to determine when information was of interest to multiple agencies and to issue guidelines for intelligence sharing.

DOJ, the FBI, and DHS noted that certain information in their holdings could not be shared with the DNI because of privacy or judicial considerations. Principals approved the DNI’s proposed amendments concerning national intelligence and intelligence sharing while imposing a requirement that any guidelines the DNI issued on sharing must be approved by the attorney general.43

No objection was posed at senior levels to an amendment clarifying the DNI’s authority to declassify intelligence information after he had consulted with the department or agency that had originally classified the material and any other affected department head.

Designation of Functional and Mission Managers and a DNI Role in Managing US SIGINT

DNI McConnell sought authority to designate functional (e.g., SIGINT, human intelligence or HUMINT) and mission (e.g., counterterrorism, counterproliferation, Iran) managers who would be responsible for integrating the IC’s effort within an intelligence discipline or on a given topic. Intelligence officials so designated by the DNI would report directly to him in their capacity as functional or mission managers.

At staff levels, DoD and other agencies argued that the DNI’s designation of a uniformed officer or non-ODNI staff member as a functional or mission manager would infringe upon the chain of command. These concerns, however, were never elevated to the level of principals, and the DNI’s proposed amendments were approved without PC discussion, including more specific provisions designating the NSA director as the national SIGINT manager, the CIA director as the national HUMINT manager, and NGA’s director as the national GEOINT manager.

CIA Director Hayden correctly observed that the CIA director had already been designated as the national HUMINT manager in statute as well as in a 2005 presidential directive implementing a recommendation by the WMD Commission that investigated the flawed intelligence assessments of Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war.44

As a former NSA director, McConnell was well acquainted with the statutory designation of the secretary of defense as the executive agent for US SIGINT. This designation was a valuable tool wielded by NSA over the years to protect its core mission from perceived encroachments by the CIA, FBI, and other agencies. McConnell proposed a new EO provision that would compel the secretary of defense to “coordinate” with the DNI in exercising the secretary’s authority over the US SIGINT enterprise. Secretary Gates originally agreed only to “consult” with the DNI on SIGINT matters, but ultimately acceded to McConnell’s request for a full coordination role.45

DNI’s Role in Foreign Intelligence Relationships

The IRTPA expressly granted CIA responsibility for coordinating intelligence relationships between US agencies and foreign security services, albeit under the overall direction of the DNI.46 Reagan’s EO 12333 had assigned the DCI the responsibility to formulate policies governing foreign relationships and also to coordinate all such activities undertaken by US agencies.47
The amended EO transferred to the DNI the former DCI’s policy-setting role regarding foreign liaison relationships and also authorized him to enter into formal agreements with foreign partners and international organizations.

McConnell’s views on jointness and cultural change were strongly shaped by his early career as a US Navy officer and later service as the J-2 during Operation Desert Storm. McConnell and others credited Goldwater-Nichols and related joint war-fighting doctrines for the overwhelming military victory in the first Gulf War. McConnell set as a priority for his tenure as DNI the promulgation of IC-wide personnel policies and strict enforcement of joint duty requirements. He frequently cited the year-long process of drafting and coordinating a relatively weak ICD on joint duty as evidence of the DNI’s inadequate authorities. The IRTPA’s Section 1018 was identified as the principal impediment to the DNI’s exercise of his personnel and other authorities within IC elements housed in other departments.

IRTPA Section 1018 requires the president to issue guidelines to ensure that the DNI, when exercising his authorities, “respects and does not abrogate” the statutory responsibilities of relevant department heads. This provision was added to the bill to address concerns raised by the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and to prevent the collapse of efforts by a House-Senate conference committee to craft legislation implementing the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. Precisely as its sponsors intended, Section 1018 proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of staff at all levels within DoD and other agencies to resist DNI directives that would have affected departmental intelligence elements.

Secretary Gates and the joint chiefs persistently objected to this proposed change, claiming that it violated not only the letter but also the spirit of the IRTPA and, moreover, that it would likely provoke a negative reaction in Congress. CIA Director Hayden, who fully supported the DNI’s proposal on non-abrogation, asked that this new EO provision also recognize the CIA director’s statutory authorities and grant him the same right as a department head.
McConnell proposed amendments to EO 12333 that would enhance the DNI’s role in selecting IC leaders and also grant him new rights to dismiss key IC figures.

Influenced by his experience in the private sector and encouraged by the PIAB, McConnell proposed amendments to EO 12333 that would enhance the DNI’s role in selecting IC leaders and also grant him new rights to dismiss key IC figures—including the USD/I. Unsurprisingly, principals other than the CIA director (whose appointment, and presumably dismissal, was already based on a DNI recommendation to the president under the IRTPA) objected strongly to the proposal, claiming it was possibly unlawful and, in any case, would infringe on departmental and military chains of command. In the case of USD/I, DoD argued that the undersecretary’s was merely a staff position within the Office of the Secretary of Defense notwithstanding that the USD/I had been formally delegated the secretary’s “authority, direction and control” over NSA, NGA, and NRO, “dual-hatted” as the Director of Defense Intelligence (D/DI) and regularly participated in meetings of the DNI’s Executive Committee.

Extensive discussion—combined with several concessions by the DNI on his proposed role in dismissing IC officials—resulted in an agreement that covered the IC element heads. However, agreement on appropriate roles for the secretary of defense and DNI in selecting and dismissing the USD/I remained elusive. A compromise regarding the USD/I was ultimately forged by Hadley in a private meeting with Gates and McConnell. The final order required the secretary of defense only to “consult” the DNI regarding the USD/I and stated clearly that the secretary alone would provide a recommendation to the president on the appointment and dismissal of a USD/I.

While the EO amendments regarding the DNI’s role in appointing and dismissing senior IC officials attracted notice in some quarters, participants in these often confusing discussions questioned the real significance of the changes because of the practical role played by a modern White House in selecting and vetting senior administration officials and the scant prospect that any cabinet officer would retain a senior intelligence official in whom the DNI did not have confidence, notwithstanding artfully-crafted provisions in an executive order.

The DNI’s Role in Covert Action—Limited by Design

By 2008, a discernible level of frustration had developed within the senior ranks at ODNI regarding the DNI’s constrained role in covert action. While the IRTPA, EO 12333 and all other executive branch guidance assigned the CIA responsibility for conducting covert action, the

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a. In Blinking Red (59–147), Michael Allen describes in suspenseful detail the development of language in the intelligence reform legislation designed to protect the military chain of command from interference by the head of the IC. The direct involvement of the president, vice-president, and their senior advisors on this provision was required to avoid the collapse of the conference committee’s effort to draft intelligence reform legislation.
statute also designated the DNI as the president’s principal intelligence advisor, stipulated that the CIA director “reported to” the DNI, and made the DNI responsible for the lawfulness of all activities undertaken by CIA. The ODNI staff argued that, in view of these significant statutory responsibilities, the DNI should be provided with more and more timely information from CIA regarding covert action operations and play a more active oversight role.

DNI McConnell proposed amending EO 12333 to require the DNI to “oversee all ongoing and proposed covert action programs and activities, including evaluating program effectiveness [and] responsiveness to the policy objectives of the president and NSC.”64 CIA Director Hayden resisted, arguing that the DNI would be usurping roles historically played by the NSC in overseeing and directing covert action and that the DNI and ODNI would be, or at least may appear to be, an added layer of bureaucracy and obstacle to agile covert action operations.65 Hayden acknowledged that the DNI was in any case entitled to full transparency into CIA’s covert action operations and timely information required to affirm their legality.66

The covert action issue was removed from a PC agenda in March and addressed separately by the DNI, the CIA director, and the national security advisor. In this instance, the final resolution was informed directly by presidential guidance. President Bush had on multiple occasions during his administration acted to preserve a direct chain of command for covert action—in particular, counterterrorism—operations running from him to the CIA director through the NSC. In the final, presidentially-approved EO 12333 text, language describing the responsibilities of the NSC and CIA in covert action was largely carried over from the 1981 order, while the DNI was assigned to “oversee and provide advice to the president and NSC with respect to all ongoing and proposed covert action programs” without further specification.67

Coordination of Intelligence Activities—a Preview of Future Conflict

The final outstanding issue in the process of updating EO 12333 concerned appropriate roles for the DNI and CIA director in coordinating overseas intelligence collection. The ODNI’s proposed order made the DNI responsible for setting policies and procedures for coordinating all intelligence activities, and assigned lead roles to the FBI domestically and to the CIA for collection undertaken outside the United States.

The IRTPA only partially addressed this issue. The new law authorized CIA to direct and coordinate collection through “human sources” outside the United States while Reagan’s EO 12333 had assigned the CIA to coordinate “the collection of information not otherwise obtainable” outside the United States by other IC agencies. The Reagan order authorized the FBI to conduct CI activities and also to coordinate the CI activities of other agencies within the United States.68

The FBI was anxious to ensure the amended EO recognized its expanded intelligence mission by assigning to the Bureau the coordination of clandestine collection of both CI and foreign intelligence information in the United States. The PC agreed, and expressed interest in creating to the extent possible symmetry between the coordination roles of the FBI inside the United States and the CIA overseas.

CIA Director Hayden argued that restricting CIA’s overseas coordination role to HUMINT and “human-enabled” collection, as reflected in both the law and draft EO, was a mistake that would invite confusion within the US IC as well as with foreign security services. Hayden explained that a single operational element must have cognizance of all intelligence activities underway in a foreign country in order to keep the chief of the US diplomatic mission appropriately informed and that CIA’s chiefs of station (COS) already served as the senior intelligence advisors to ambassadors worldwide.

Specifically, the CIA director proposed the COS should be “kept apprised of all intelligence and intelligence-related activities” underway in their country of assignment.69 DoD objected to granting such a broad coordination role to CIA because it might implicate service collection under DoD’s authorities or NSA’s operations. The DNI preferred to defer the issue, offering to clarify overseas coordination roles in subsequent policies that he would set.70

Implicit in the DNI’s position on overseas coordination was the belief that a DNI should have the prerogative of appointing an official other than a CIA station chief to represent

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The covert action issue was . . . addressed separately by the DNI, the DCIA, and the national security advisor.
him and the IC abroad and that this official would be informed of and coordinate all intelligence activities involving that state.

Hadley attempted to craft compromise language that would address the designation of a “DNI Representative” overseas, but the gulf between the CIA and ODNI positions proved too great to bridge and the effort was abandoned. In the final EO text, the DNI was assigned a role in setting coordination policies and procedures while the FBI and CIA were assigned roughly symmetrical roles in the United States and abroad coordinating intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means. The DNI was also required to secure the attorney general’s approval for any policies governing clandestine collection in the United States to avoid creating a perception that the nation’s chief intelligence officer enjoyed unconstrained freedom of action within the United States.

**Approval, Roll-out, and Reactions**

In late April, Hadley distributed a final draft order and invited principals to concur or identify issues they wished to address as a group or take up directly with the president.

In late April 2008, Hadley distributed a final draft order and invited principals to concur or identify issues they wished to address as a group or take up directly with the president. However, more time for discussion and coordination became available when White House political advisors elected to delay announcement of changes to EO 12333 until Congress passed legislation to amend FISA and renew the expired authorization to intercept electronic communications between foreigners that transited the United States and to immunize telephone companies from civil liability for cooperating in government surveillance programs.

DNI McConnell and the White House team involved directly in the effort to preserve this important counterterrorism tool believed releasing the amended EO, even without making substantive changes to the privacy rights and civil liberties protections in the existing order, might further complicate an already acrimonious legislative debate. The FISA Amendments Act was passed in early July, opening a window to roll-out the amendments to EO 12333 before the attorney general published new and potentially controversial guidelines for domestic investigations (including intelligence gathering) in early fall.

NSC principals and senior White House staff discussed different options for engaging key members and committees of Congress, with special attention on the armed services, judiciary, and intelligence oversight committees, which knew a process was underway to update EO 12333. It was decided that these committees would be provided “notice and explanation” of key provisions in the amended EO, but they would not be consulted more extensively out of concern that the committees would seek to modify provisions that already reflected delicate balances reached within the executive branch. Overview briefings were offered to committee staff and members in the week before the amended EO was formally approved, but requests for copies of the draft text were declined.

On 30 July, President Bush formally approved EO 13470, a nearly incomprehensible list of hundreds of substantive, technical, and conforming amendments to the original text of EO 12333. The president was asked to approve only amendments to the existing order to preserve the familiar format and shorthand for the IC’s principal organizing document.

The following day, the White House press secretary released a statement and fact sheet characterizing the amended order as a “lasting framework for United States Intelligence Activities.” During a background briefing, White House officials described to journalists the central provisions of the amended order, the “constructive and collaborative” coordination process and fielded questions, principally, on civil liberties protections and rumored disagreements between ODNI and CIA over their respective responsibilities in coordinating overseas intelligence collection and supervising covert action.

Media coverage of the amended EO was balanced and factual with most outlets highlighting, even exaggerating, the extent of new authorities provided to the DNI. The press also widely reported complaints by lawmakers that they had been wrongly excluded from the drafting process. The chairman of the House intelligence committee led fellow Republicans in walking out of a briefing
EXECUTIVE ORDER

FURTHER AMENDMENTS TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458), and in order to update and clarify Executive Order 13356 of August 27, 2004, Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended, is hereby further amended as follows:

Section 1. The Preamble to Executive Order 12333, as amended, is further amended by:

(a) Striking “and” and inserting in lieu thereof a comma before the word “accurate”, and inserting “, and insightful” after the word “accurate” in the first sentence;

(b) Striking “statutes” and inserting in lieu thereof “the laws” before “of the United States of America” in the third sentence; and

(c) Striking “the” before “United States intelligence activities” in the third sentence.

Sec. 2. Executive Order 12333, as amended, is further amended by striking Part 1 in its entirety and inserting in lieu thereof the following new part:

PART 1 Goals, Directions, Duties, and Responsibilities with Respect to United States Intelligence Efforts

1.1 Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.

(a) All means, consistent with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to obtain reliable intelligence information to protect the United States and its interests.

(b) The United States Government has a solemn obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law.

(c) Intelligence collection under this order should be guided by the need for information to respond to intelligence priorities set by the President.

(d) Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering:

(1) Espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests;

(2) Threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism; and

(3) Threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
It remains unclear whether future congressional actions, for example, to codify NSA’s mission or to impose new privacy and civil liberties protections, will result in changes to the IRTPA or EO 12333.

by DNI McConnell to protest the administration’s decision not to consult Congress on the EO amendments.77

Senator Barack Obama defeated his Republican opponent in November and was sworn into office as the 44th President on 20 January 2009. During the transition period, the president-elect was briefed extensively on the IC’s structure, activities, and assessment of threats. Notwithstanding a recommendation from his predecessor to retain DNI McConnell and CIA Director Hayden in their positions to ensure continuity in counterterrorism and other intelligence operations, both resigned and new leaders were appointed in the unsettled post-IRTPA community.78

Durability and Impact

The Obama administration has not, as of this writing, pursued significant legislative changes to the IRTPA or further amended EO 12333. Congress, despite its pique over not being fully consulted on updates to the order, has not taken action in response to provisions in the directive. Rather, in the FY 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act (the first such legislation passed since 2005) Congress attempted to further strengthen the DNI by directing him to assess personnel levels in IC agencies, perform vulnerability assessments, and track the costs for major technical systems as well as conduct accountability reviews of IC elements.79

The directive’s obscurity has been pierced intermittently by administration and media references to EO 12333 as a source of authority for controversial electronic surveillance programs disclosed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. It remains unclear whether future congressional actions, for example, to codify NSA’s mission or to impose new privacy rights and civil liberties protections, will result in changes to the IRTPA or EO 12333.

In view of the widely divergent institutional positions advanced by the ODNI and CIA during the process of drafting amendments on coordination of overseas intelligence activities and covert action, it was foreseeable, if not inevitable, that the third DNI, retired Admiral Dennis Blair, and Obama’s CIA Director Leon Panetta would disagree about their respective roles in these areas. While the carefully crafted terms of the amended EO do not offer a CIA director the right to appeal DNI decisions to the White House, their well-publicized disagreement on those issues nonetheless landed there for adjudication in spring 2009.80

Ultimately, Panetta’s approach to designating the CIA’s COS as the senior IC representative abroad and strictly limiting the DNI’s role in covert action was endorsed by the Obama administration. Media accounts cited the White House’s decisions on these disputes as a contributing factor in Blair’s subsequent decision to resign.81 These events, and the public manner in which they unfolded, were regarded by former officials and commentators as a setback for the DNI, ODNI, and a centrally-managed US intelligence enterprise.82

These events recalled the warning in the letter transmitting the WMD Commission’s final report to President Bush that the new DNI would require “powers and backing to match his responsibilities” and that headstrong IC agencies would “sooner or later…try to run around—or over—the DNI.” The WMD Commission wrote that only the president’s “determined backing will convince them that we cannot return to the old ways.”83

The process of amending EO 12333 to reflect the IRTPA structures and clarify authorities needed by the DNI to lead a more unified IC largely achieved its objectives, but the short-term impact of the updated order was limited. The change in administrations after the 2008 election brought into office new intelligence leaders with different backgrounds, priorities, and management styles. Momentum toward greater IC integration certainly slowed during this period but never fully stopped. DNI Clapper has reorganized the ODNI around teams led by national intelligence managers who are charged and empowered to integrate all facets of the US intelligence effort on a

a. In his memoir, Duty (294), Secretary Gates wrote that the administration’s decision to side with Panetta in his dispute with Blair “made clear to all that the CIA director had more clout in the White House than the DNI did.”
specific topic. The NCTC continues to play this integrating role in counterterrorism and increasing numbers of intelligence professionals at all grades are being exposed during joint duty assignments to the missions, cultures, and people of agencies other than their own.

A broad consensus has emerged among practitioners and commentators on post-9/11 intelligence reform:

- The IRTPA is a limited, imperfect vehicle for unifying US intelligence;
- the 2008 amendments to EO 12333 and other expressions of presidential support for the DNI added value at the margins but were insufficient to overcome flaws in the statutory model; and
- presuming there will be no fundamental shift away from the IC’s federated structure, the quality of personal relationships between the DNI and others who share power within the community will largely determine the extent and pace of future integration and the improved outcomes greater unity is expected to produce.

It is similarly acknowledged that protecting the United States and its global interests by timely warning against every external threat is a difficult, even unattainable, standard for US intelligence. Our intelligence system will inevitably underperform or simply fail some future test and attention will turn, as it always has in the past, to reexamining the IC’s structure, leadership, and performance.

This is the account of one recent effort to improve the functioning of that system by drafting what former National Security Advisor Hadley described as a “normative document” on US intelligence informed by the experiences and judgment of a uniquely qualified group of professionals who served together during a challenging period in our history.

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a. Secretary Gates summarized the process of amending EO 12333 and the leadership challenge confronting the DNI as follows: “[t]his was one of those rare instances where a unique set of personal relationships stretching back decades allowed us significantly to mitigate otherwise intractable bureaucratic hostility. And it is still another reminder that when it comes to government, whether it works or not often depends on personal relationships.” Duty (92).

The current DNI, James Clapper, confirmed that many of the 2008 amendments to EO 12333 strengthened the hand of the DNI and are helpful in efforts to integrate the community. Clapper credited Hadley with leading an effective interagency coordination process that serves as an example of good government. (Clapper interview)
Endnotes


3. EO 11905, United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, 18 February 1976.

4. EO 11905, Sec. 5(b),(d),(g). For a succinct explanation of the Senate investigation led by Senator Frank Church into alleged “intelligence excesses,” see “Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities” in *A History of Notable Senate Investigations* (U.S. Senate Historical Office, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Investigations.htm).


8. Original EO 12333, Preamble.

9. Ibid.


11. Ibid., 399–428.


13. EO 13353, Establishing the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties; EO 13354, National Counterterrorism Center; EO 13355, Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community; and EO 13356, Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans (all signed on 27 August 2004).

14. EO 13355, Section 1; “White House Conference Call on President’s Orders”, 27 August 2004; also cited in Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, *US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947*, (Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 2005) 38, fn. 27.


18. Stefanie Osburn interview by author, 14 January 2014, McLean, VA; and Jack Morrison (PIAB member) e-mail to author, 28 January 2014 and the author’s notes.

19. Author’s notes.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


23. Mike McConnell interview by author, 17 January 2014, Herndon, VA.

24. Author’s notes, Osburn interview, and Morrison e-mail.

25. Author’s notes.

26. Ibid.

27. Steve Hadley interview by author, 2 December 2013, Washington, DC.

28. Author’s notes.

29. Ibid.

30. James Clapper interview by author, 7 February 2014, McLean, VA; author’s notes.

31. Michael Hayden interview by author, 5 February 2014, McLean, VA, and Deborah Barger interview by author, 26 February 2014, McLean, VA.
33. Ibid.
35. US Department of Justice Memorandum for DNI, 13 February 2008 (unsigned).
36. Mike Hayden Memorandum to Steve Hadley, “The Nature of CIA Post-Intelligence Reform” (undated); Hayden interview; and author’s notes.
40. Amended EO 12333, 1.3 (b) 22.
41. IRTPA, Section 1012.
42. IRTPA, Section 1011.
43. Powell interview; author’s notes.
45. Amended EO 12333, 1.10(e).
46. IRTPA, Section 1011.
47. Original EO 12333, 1.5(e).
48. Amended EO 12333, 1.3(b)(4)
49. Amended EO 12333, 1.7(a)(5)(6).
50. McConnell interview.
52. McConnell interview.
53. IRTPA, Section 1018.
54. McConnell interview; and McConnell to Hadley memorandum.
55. OSD-Hadley and JCS-Hadley memorandums.
56. Hayden interview; and Hayden to Hadley memorandum.
57. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 14 April 2008.
58. Author’s notes.
59. Amended EO 12333, 1.3(d).
60. OSD to Hadley and JCS to Hadley memorandums.
61. OSD-Hadley memo. See also “Memorandum of Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence on the Director of Defense Intelligence” (May 21, 2007) for a description of the USD/I’s responsibilities as D/DI.
62. Author’s notes.
63. Amended EO 12333, 1.5(d) and (e)(2).
64. Hayden-Hadley memorandums.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Amended EO 12333, 1.3(b)(3).
68. Original EO 12333, 1.8(d) and 1.14(a).
70. Author’s notes.
71. Amended EO 12333, 1.3(b)(20).
73. Author’s notes.
Modernizing the IC “Charter”


77. Daniel W. Reilly, “House Republicans Walk out of Meeting with DNI McConnell,” *Politico*, 31 July 2008, quoted House intelligence committee chairman Peter Hoekstra on the protest: “[t]he president is within his authorities to sign an executive order, but his administration is wrong to suggest that Congress was in any way involved or consulted in this process.” McConnell and Hayden interviews.

78. McConnell and Hayden interviews.


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Recovery of the Last GAMBIT and HEXAGON Film Buckets from Space, August–October 1984

David W. Waltrop

A revolution in US intelligence quietly occurred on 19 August 1960, when a modified Air Force C-119 Flying Boxcar, commanded by Capt. Harold E. Mitchell, call sign Pelican 9, made the first successful mid-air recovery of a film capsule from a spy satellite codenamed CORONA. The capsule, ejected about 100 nautical miles over Kodiak, Alaska, on the satellite’s 17th pass, made a fiery reentry through Earth’s atmosphere before deploying a parachute that allowed it to descend slowly to within range of aircraft waiting in a recovery zone over the waters near Hawaii.

While the military kept the capsule’s connection to intelligence a secret, the fact that Mitchell made the first midair recovery of an object from orbit quickly made national headlines. The New York Times ran a front-page story the next day describing how the 35-year-old Mitchell snared the 84-pound object about 8,500 feet over the Pacific Ocean on his third pass with hooks suspended from poles hanging below and behind the aircraft. Other news outlets touted the mission as another success in the nation’s growing space program.

When Moscow announced the successful reentry of a Soviet capsule carrying two dogs, rats, and mice a few days later, Universal-International News broadcaster Ed Herlihy proclaimed that “dramatic strides by both sides in the space race give promise of major developments in man’s efforts to actually send human explorers into the far reaches of the solar system.”

Gen. Emmett O’Donnell, commander of the Pacific Air Force, on orders from Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas D. White, awarded Mitchell the Distinguished Flying Cross and the five other members of his crew Air Medals immediately upon their return to Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. After an impromptu press conference, Mitchell and his crew flew to Los Angeles the next day for meetings with Maj. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, commander of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division and the launch officer who sent the rocket carrying the capsule into orbit. The men then made additional press appearances and taped a segment on the Dave Garroway Show in New York before briefing Lt. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, commander of the Air Research and Development Command, in Washington, DC. Parades, hometown celebrations, and more media appearances followed. The entire unit eventually received the prestigious MacKay Trophy for the most meritorious flight of 1960.

Hidden from public view, under cover of a scientific space

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Catching the End of an Era

A research program called Discoverer, was knowledge that CORONA was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-managed satellite program intended to photograph “denied areas” in the Soviet Union, China, and other countries. CORONA, like many early US reconnaissance satellites, emerged from a pivotal Air Force project initiated in 1956, designated Weapon System 117L (WS-117L). A primary purpose of WS-117L was to transmit electronic images of the Earth to ground-based receiving stations, but it also included a secondary system, which would return the exposed film in capsules, called buckets, ejected from the satellite.

The direct transmission function initially received priority since it offered the possibility of timely reconnaissance. In 1958, however, with the electronic transmission effort struggling and the need for accurate intelligence on the Soviet Union’s strategic capabilities growing, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a plan reassigning the film-recovery system from the Air Force to a secret CIA/Air Force team led by CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell, Jr.³

After 13 consecutive failures, including Discoverer Zero, Discoverer 13 finally proved the reliability of the film-return concept. The satellite, launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, on 10 August 1960, carried diagnostic equipment and a hastily added American flag. Unfortunately the bucket landed in the water the next day owing to a navigation error by the recovery aircraft. Divers recovered the capsule before it sank.

A week later, Discoverer 14 (Mission 9009) achieved full success. The spacecraft entered a perfect orbit, the camera worked flawlessly, and a full 20-pound film load was exposed, placed into the recovery capsule, and successfully ejected from the satellite. Mitchell’s Pelican 9 aircraft

The above schematic shows the imaging paths of Mission 9009, the first CORONA satellite to return images from space. The new imaging satellites revolutionized strategic intelligence collection on the Soviet Union. On 18 August 1960, Mission 9009 conducted eight north-south passes over the USSR and small portions of China. It imaged numerous military installations, some of which had not previously been located. (Derived from a mission map contained in CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program.)
recovered Discoverer 14’s capsule on 19 August. (See image on facing page.)

The capsule Mitchell recovered that day contained the first photographs taken from space. Over the next two-and-a-half decades, first the CIA and then the covert National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would develop and operate several CORONA follow-on systems as well as more advanced film-return reconnaissance satellites: the ARGON and MURAL systems; QUILL, the first orbiting radar experiment; and the high-resolution GAMBIT and broad-area HEXAGON satellites.

By the end of 1984, eight years after the United States launched the first near real-time electro-optical satellite, the 6594th Test Group, the elite Air Force unit established to make these mid-air “catches,” would conduct about 300 operational recoveries from the nation’s film-return satellites and other systems. Without publicity, recovery aircraft commanders Capt. Randy Chang (on 11 August 1984) and Maj. Marshall Eto (on 11 October 1984) literally caught the end of an era as the aircraft they commanded made the last capsule catches from the last GAMBIT and HEXAGON missions, ending America’s 24-year era of film-return space reconnaissance.

_Eto and Chang Join the 6594th Test Group_

The 6594th Test Group traces its lineage to the 6594th Recovery Control Group. This Air Force organization, activated on 1 November 1959, had two subordinate commands: the 6593rd Test Squadron (Special) at Hickam Air Force Base, which actually made the aerial recoveries, and the 6593rd Instrumentation Squadron responsible for the acquisition, tracking, and command of the satellites. On 10 March 1966, the Air Force redesigned the 6594th Recovery Control Group as the 6594th Test Group, and on 1 July 1972, started a reorganization that removed the Instrumentation Squadron from the Test Group’s control. From that point until its deactivation in 1986, the 6594th Test Group would have the single mission to plan, direct, and execute the recovery of capsules ejected from space-orbiting satellites.4

Eto and Chang, both Air Force officers from Hawaii, came to the 6594th Test Group with similar experiences flying large transport aircraft. Eto joined the US Air Force after graduating from the University of Hawaii Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1964. He completed a Masters in Engineering and pilot training before starting active duty in 1966 and eventually saw service in Vietnam as a C-130 pilot.
Catching the End of an Era

Chang recalled an instance when a training chute that came too close to the airplane knocked the antenna off the bottom of the fuselage, forcing the crew to land at Hickam without radio assistance.

On Eto’s return to Hawaii two years later, he consulted a friend at Hickam Air Force Base about joining the base’s Air Rescue Squadron, but the friend suggested he apply to the Test Group. The unit screened most of its approximately 600 members before they received an assignment to the group. Most pilots had to be qualified aircraft commanders with more than 1,200 flying hours. To Eto’s delight, the highly secretive unit offered the young lieutenant a position. “[The Test Group was] hesitant to take a person like me at that time because I was very junior; I just made aircraft commander while I was in Vietnam,” Eto recalled.5

Eto soon began learning the fine art of making mid-air recoveries. Pilots normally flew morning and afternoon training missions every day (about six practice flights a week) to make the 100 successful catches needed to become a recovery aircraft commander. The modified Air Force C-130 Hercules (C-130 aircraft had replaced the underpowered C-119 by 1962) would rise to an altitude of about 18,000 feet, drop a training capsule filled with sand and gravel to simulate the necessary weight, descend to the falling capsule’s altitude, and attempt to “catch” the item. “You actually dropped the system [capsule] to yourself, take the airplane, circle around, and then make the catch and bring it on board,” explained Eto. The young pilot soon mastered the difficult high-speed runs, which required flying at maximum speed to reach the rapidly falling object, marking a capsule that had accidently landed in the water for helicopters with ParaRescue jumpers to recover, and flying search patterns looking for the object.

When not in training, Eto and the other less experienced pilots flew as copilots under veteran aircraft commanders. “If you were lucky you would maybe get your training done in three months,” said Eto. “Usually it took longer…Once you started the program you were usually checked out by six months at the latest.”6

After four years with the Test Group, and earning the coveted recovery aircraft commander designation, Eto left Hickam in 1972 on a routine reassignment to the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) at Onizuka Air Force Station in Sunnyvale, California. In that position he actually experienced operating the nation’s reconnaissance satellites. Eto began a second tour with the Test Group in 1976, before leaving again in 1980 for an assignment to an Air Rescue Squadron in Okinawa, Japan.7

While Eto was in Okinawa, Randy Chang was nearing the end of an assignment flying C-130 transports out of Yokota, Japan. The 1976 Air Force Academy graduate joined the service to see the world and quickly developed a love of flying. He heard about the 6594th while in Yokota. Although he believed his Hawaii residence gave him a good chance of receiving a posting to the exclusive unit, like Eto, he feared he might not qualify. “The group was an elite squadron where you had to have a lot of high time [many flight hours] and then someone usually had to ‘will it’ to you, or somebody had to die for you to get into that squadron,” said Chang.

Accepted into the 6594th in 1981, he began the same training as Eto to meet the unit’s rigorous flying standards. “We had to pay our dues, for over a year we were just sitting in the right [copilot] seat watching and learning about what was going on.” The unit filmed and graded every catch, which increased the already severe competition among pilots. “There was a pecking order in the lineup,” recalled Chang, “to stay in the line up and move up to the next catch required a 90-percent success rate…It could be your turn [to recover a bucket] but if you weren’t at 90 percent then you had to step out.”8

Pilots who experienced a mishap during training received a nasty, worn out, old piece of parachute called the Rag, which remained in the pilot’s office until another unit member had a problem. Since the 6594th used repaired training parachutes an average of six times, practice chutes tended to have torn panels or other defects that would cause the descending buckets to fly sideways or act unpredictably.9

Chang recalled an instance when a training chute that came too close to the airplane knocked the antenna off the bottom of the fuselage, forcing the crew to land at Hickam without radio assistance. On other occasions parachutes could become wrapped around the engine’s propellers, or buckets would hit the recovery rig trailing behind the aircraft, sending debris into the horizontal stabilizer and rudder. As Chang summarized, “Lots of things could go wrong.”10
Eto was still serving in Okinawa when Chang joined the Test Group, but he left Japan in 1983 for his final tour with the 6594th. At this point, he and Chang began serving together in the elite unit. Planning for the last GAMBIT and HEXAGON missions would begin about a year later.

**Planning for the last GAMBIT and HEXAGON missions started long before the spacecraft took off into space.**

A secondary objective was to obtain imagery in the southern latitudes not normally associated with activities in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia. He requested that NRO launch the spacecraft into a 70 to 75 nautical-mile orbit at position 45 to 60 degrees north latitude. He listed ballistic missile submarine forces, intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles, bio-warfare, and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty monitoring in the Soviet Union and other denied areas as standing intelligence problems. He identified film requirements for the detection of narcotic and grain cultivation, camouflage, concealment, and deception activities. He provided a prioritized list of the types of targets for photographing and at what resolutions on 30-day, 15-day, or daily bases.11

After verifying the requirements, NRO forwarded COMIREX’s guidance to the AFSCF, which used it to create an executable mission plan, telling the satellite what to photograph and when.12 The AFSCF, part of the Space Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, was the hub of a far-flung network of command, control, tracking, data acquisition, and space recovery activities. It included tracking stations from California to New Hampshire, north to Alaska and Greenland, and west to Hawaii; the national launch ranges supporting Cape Canaveral Air Station, Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and US Navy telemetry ships at sea.

AFSCF operators actually “flew” the satellites from banks of consoles inside a large, blue building known as the Blue Cube. The consoles faced enormous screens, which permitted the controllers to call up visual presentations of maps, weather conditions, orbit traces, telemetry, and other data.13 To maximize their ability to fulfill COMIREX’s guidance, the controllers would upload commands to the satellite each day to account for changes in weather and spacecraft performance.

With preparations complete, the last GAMBIT satellite containing two recovery capsules took off from Vandenberg Air Force Base at 10:54 AM Pacific Standard Time on 17 April 1984 for a 120-day mission, and entered its planned 75-nautical mile orbit with extra fuel due to a “hot booster.” Despite minor problems with the vehicle’s film take-up mechanism, viewport door, and nine-inch camera, good weather at the target areas enabled imagery operations to proceed ahead of schedule.

The mission proceeded so smoothly that on 14 May, NRO lowered the satellite’s orbit to 73 nautical miles to increase image quality. The higher drag owing to the denser atmosphere at the lower orbit increased the number of orbital adjustments the satellite had to make, but the extra fuel onboard was sufficient to complete the mission. A 1 June status report on mission day 45 reported no long-term effects from the anomalies, noting only that the last frame of film might have some trailing edge distortions because the viewport door was
On 11 June, on its 897th orbit, the GAMBIT ejected its first bucket about a week earlier than planned. Pilots from the 6594th Test Group caught it in mid-air.14

That same month, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) issued mapping, charting, and geodesy requirements for the upcoming HEXAGON mission. Those requirements called for 90-percent or better cloud-free coverage over 14.1 million square nautical miles (MSNM), plus 0.8 MSNM for the US Geological Survey. Exceptions to the 90-percent cloud-free constraint were data for the maintenance of hydrographic coastal charts and the positioning of islands, which only required 80-and 50-percent cloud-free imagery, respectively.

Areas in the Soviet Union and several denied regions topped DMA’s priorities. One country experiencing economic and social turmoil particularly concerned the DMA, which noted a lack of adequate maps available for the evacuation of US citizens or for the evasive evacuation of downed pilots if the US intervened in that country. The DMA also required imagery over several US missile ranges to support weapons tests in those areas and outlined Geological Service needs along Alaska’s North Slope, Brooks Range, Alaska Range, Mackenzie Mountains, and the Alaskan/Canadian border.

Following the same process used in the last GAMBIT mission, Eisenbeiss sent DMA’s and other agency requirements to DNRO Aldridge on 12 June, explaining “The primary Intelligence Community objectives for this medium resolution search mission are to support worldwide intelligence search requirements, and mapping, charting, and geodesy production and mapping requirements.” He requested that NRO satisfy broad-area search needs in several denied areas and identified 19 special intelligence needs, which included nuclear proliferation, narcotics activities, missile developments, and order of battle monitoring. He also listed film requirements for the collection of imagery against various forms of camouflage, concealment, and deception activities.15

The NRO reviewed and forwarded COMIREX’s guidance to the AFSCF in the process of planning the next HEXAGON mission. With preparations complete, the satellite, with four recovery capsules, took off from Vandenberg on 25 June 1984 for a 302-day mission. Unlike the well-performing GAMBIT, however, the new HEXAGON developed mechanical problems shortly after launch.16

The first of the Block-IV series, it contained a new type of extended command system (ECS) to control the satellite.17 A software problem in the programmable memory began...
causing anomalies in one of the two sides of the ECS (each side provided redundant maneuvering thruster and camera control on the vehicle’s left or right side). Since the anomaly appeared similar to a problem corrected on a previous HEXAGON mission, the AFSCF applied a software fix on 30 June with mixed results.

Another memory error two days later triggered a complete emergency shutdown of the satellite, an automatic safety measure that points the satellite’s solar arrays towards the sun to preserve power before deactivating the entire spacecraft. Ground controllers were able to resume operations early on the evening of 2 July, but by 9 July, one side of the ECS—the B Side—was completely inoperable. Photographic operations were only being conducted with the remaining functioning A Side.

Since making orbital adjustments with a partially functioning ECS was unacceptably risky, on 11 July, Brig. Gen. Ralph H. Jacobson, director of the Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Projects, NRO’s Air Force (Program A) element, ordered the satellite placed into a higher, 115 nautical mile, elliptical orbit. The new orbit allowed the satellite’s trajectory to decay gradually to a more circular trajectory over a 30-day period. Instead of making orbital adjustments every three days as standard procedures called for, the new flight plan would essentially allow the spacecraft to coast in space.

Although the ECS A Side was experiencing minor anomalies affecting its maneuvering thrusters, at the time, this problem was not disrupting imagery operations, and ground controllers believed that carefully modifying the vehicle’s operations during the first 14 days of each orbital adjustment would still permit them to satisfy all mission requirements.

Despite the promising outlook, Jacobson accelerated photographic operations on the first recovery bucket “to include active requirements in good weather areas normally reserved for collection later in the mission.” This change increased the daily film usage rate and filled up the first bucket more quickly than the pre-mission plan had anticipated. In a 17 July message to DNRO Aldridge, Jacobson pledged to “continue to assess the command system anomalies to determine the extent of the problems and seek corrective action,” but explained, “At this point in time…I believe it prudent to increase the film use rate and effect an earlier RV-1 [film recovery vehicle one] recovery.”

DNRO Aldridge sounded positive when he reported the next day to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Jr. and Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey that the satellite “is fully operational and, with one exception, all systems are functioning normally. That exception is a hardware problem associated with the satellite vehicle command system’s programmable memory. Until this anomaly is resolved we are adjusting the system’s operation to insure that a recurrence does not unnecessarily jeopardize vehicle safety.”

Since the GAMBIT and HEXAGON buckets had different amounts of film and staggered deorbit times, the Test Group had to alternate between recovering the two types of buckets.

The Last Catches

Since the 250-pound Mark 5 GAMBIT bucket and the much larger 1,100-pound Mark 8 HEXAGON bucket had different amounts of film and staggered deorbit times, the 6594th Test Group had to alternate between recovering the two types of buckets. The Test Group had already recovered the first bucket from the last GAMBIT mission on 11 June 1984, leaving the second GAMBIT bucket and all four HEXAGON buckets to recover.

The first bucket on the last HEXAGON mission returned from space with a 97-percent film load at 6:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time on 5 August 1984, 24 days earlier than its planned 66 days, owing to the accelerated collection strategy Jacobson had ordered for that satellite’s first bucket. Pilots from the 6594th Test Group sent to recover the object reported a “gore” in the parachute during their first pass. On their second pass, the lead aircraft accidently tore through the parachute; it did not reinflate, causing the item to fall into the ocean.

Although divers retrieved the bucket before it sank, pressure to avoid a similar incident was intense when six days later, Chang and his copilot, 39-year-old Air Force Maj. Michael Frueh, prepared to recover the final bucket from the last GAMBIT satellite. “Everybody was looking toward us to not screw up,”
Chang joked, “It’s not supposed to go in the water.”19

All aspects of an operational recovery, from the time of crew briefings, to engine start, take off, and arrival on station depended on the estimated time of parachute deployment.20 The AFSCF would provide the Test Group with the parachute’s estimated time and location of deployment and alert the unit of pending recoveries.

Late on the evening of 10 August, members of the Test Group began calling a special coded phone number at Hickam Air Force Base. While the mysterious recorded message, “Status Forces Report for Duty,” would mean little to anyone who inadvertently called the number, for the Test Group the instructions were clear: mission a ‘GO!’?21

Stars filled the cloudless pre-dawn sky as aircrews and support personnel began arriving on base early the next morning. Each aircraft crew consisted of a pilot, copilot, navigator, flight engineer, electronic direction finder operator, telemetry operator and recorder, hydraulic winch operator, four recovery rig personnel, and an in-flight photographer. Each member had clearly identified jobs and, because they had to operate harmoniously as a team, would often spend months training as a single unit.

Chang, Frueh, and the other pilots assembled in the Hanger Two Operations Center to receive their aircraft assignments, file flight plans, and prepare for briefings. At the recovery section in Hangar 11, backend crews prepared poles, lines, and hooks for delivery to the appropriate aircraft. Meanwhile, on the normally busy flight line, now devoid of all but the Test Group aircraft, crews readied five specially configured JC-130 Hercules cargo planes, a C-130P refueling tanker, and two highly modified HH-53C Super Jolly Green Giant helicopters for the long overwater journey. About 6:00 AM, the aircrew met for a final preflight briefing before reporting to their aircraft and fitting a personal parachute for use during the recovery.

At around 8:00 AM, Chang took off. En route to the recovery zone, called the Ballpark by the Test Group, backend riggers installed a new nylon line on a massive hydraulic winch in the aircraft’s cargo area and readied a large dolly assembly housing two 34 foot long metal poles, tapered from four inches at the top to two inches at the bottom. They attached half-inch thick mountain climber rope between the poles to create a loop, and connected six four-prong brass aerial recovery hooks (brass prevented static electricity build up as the hooks dangled violently behind the aircraft) at places specially arranged to entangle the bucket’s parachute load lines. This trapezoid-like assembly, trailing behind the aircraft at about a 45-degree angle, allowed the parachute and film bucket to come in-trail behind the aircraft.

Communication between the pilots at the front of the aircraft and the riggers in the back was critical for making a successful catch. Once the bucket went under the aircraft, only those in the back watching from the open rear ramp could report the bucket’s location relative to the airplane, so the pilots could properly line up the aircraft to make the next recovery attempt. “It was very much a crew effort,” stated Chang.22

The squadron of recovery aircraft neared the Ballpark after about a 90-minute flight and assumed positions along a 100- by 600-mile pattern down the bucket’s projected reentry path as high above the last GAMBIT bucket was plummeting earthward. In the high atmosphere, it resembled a shooting star streaking across the Northern Pacific sky. The bucket’s parachute opened at an altitude of about 55,000 feet. The shock of the opening ejected the heat shield, and the ultra high frequency (UHF) telemetry and direction locating beacon beginning transmitting.

Chang’s aircraft, flying at the highest altitude in the prime recovery position, would have the first attempt to catch the bucket. If he failed or was out of position, the other JC-130s would attempt to make the recovery as the bucket descended into their lower altitudes. If all five aircrews missed the bucket or the parachute appeared severely damaged, helicopters would deploy ParaRescue jumpers into the water to attempt to retrieve the bucket before it sank.23

Chang and Frueh spotted the bucket at an altitude of around 40,000 or 45,000 feet. At 25,000 feet, Chang called out over the intercom, “Inbound pass,” signaling the crew he was beginning the initial “look see” run to establish a matching descent rate and determine if it was safe to make the recovery. When he inspected the condition of the parachute, shroud lines, and capsule, he saw a perfectly deployed orange-and-white chute above a golden bucket glistening in the sunlight.
Chang banked slowly left in a 20-second teardrop pattern, maneuvering around for a straight in approach. Forty-five minutes before the estimated time of parachute deployment, Chang and the other recovery crews began breathing pure oxygen to prevent bends when at 18,000 feet the backend crew depressurized the aircraft, opened the rear cargo ramp, and deployed the recovery rig into the streaming wind. Moments later, at 15,000 feet, the highest altitude he could make a recovery attempt, Chang called out, “Inbound hot,” alerting the crew to prepare for recovery.

After receiving a final “Ready” from the crew, Chang and Frueh started their first run. Bringing the top of the bucket’s parachute, which was approximately one to two miles away from the start of their run, to within about six feet of the bottom of their 97 foot long JC-130, while flying between 120 to 125 knots (138 to 144 mph) and matching the bucket’s 1,500 feet a minute descent rate, left little room for error. “You’re looking at an object that’s going about 200 feet a second, coming right at you,” said Frueh. “When you’re actually making an approach you only have a few seconds to get lined up. The actual final corrections are only about three seconds before the thing hits.”

As his aircraft approached the bucket, Chang called out a 10-second warning to the crew, which immediately braced for contact. “In the back, we don’t get to see very much,” explained former Test Group instructor rigger Frank Adams, “so we’re just playing over in our heads our checklist, our training, what do we do if [there is a problem].” The backend crew had to be ready in case there was a tear-through of the parachute, a line breakage, any other type of emergency. “You’re just in a ready state,” said Adams.

Perhaps the most alarming contingency was the last second pull off, which entailed tipping the aircraft’s nose down sharply in an effort to snap the recovery rig up and over the chute without making contact, a maneuver that would leave the backend crew momentarily weightless. As Adams explained, “Usually when we went inbound hot, we made ourselves part of the aircraft. We were holding onto something because we know if they had to do a pull-off, it was going to be a real violent maneuver, and if you weren’t hanging on, you were going to get hurt.” Frueh echoed the comment. “It’s a pretty abrupt maneuver if you have to pull off,” he said. “If you make a decision you’re going to be too close, you immediately stick power to the airplane and try to pull yourself across the top [of the parachute] and not catch something.”

There was, however, no need to pull off. On his first pass, at 2142 Zulu on 11 August 1984, at an altitude of about 13,000 feet, Chang’s JC-130 flew over the parachute.

The crew felt a soft bounce, similar to driving over a speed bump, caused by the disturbed air over the parachute. Chang instinctively applied engine power before feeling the distinctive backwards tug of a good catch as the recovery loop, entangled in the parachute, snapped clear of the poles.

“Contact!” the aft rigger yelled into the intercom over the scream of the winch line playing out into the sky behind the aircraft. After about three seconds, the winch slowed the line to a stop. The aft rigger reported “In trail,” indicating a solid catch and the winch operator began reeling the bucket into the aircraft: first, the recovery loop with the entangled parachute, followed by the shroud lines, and finally the gold foil skinned bucket. Once it was on board, either the navigator or electronic direction finding operator walked back to connect a plug into the bucket to turn off the UHF homing beacon. Chang too walked back, leaving Frueh to fly the airplane, and with satisfaction, touched what would be his only recovered bucket. Touching the bucket was a small break in protocol, but as Chang explained, “I just had to touch it.”

When Chang’s aircraft returned to Hickam Air Force Base, crews quickly placed the bucket with its precious film onboard a heavily guarded Starlifter cargo airplane for transport to film processing facilities in the United States. “They just opened the back of [our aircraft] and whisked [the bucket] away,” Chang said. “We never saw it again.”

A routine message later that day reported, “The end of an era! GAMBIT 54 is the last film-based high-resolution photoreconnaissance mission.” The next day, the AFSCF placed the satellite, now devoid of film, into an unstable orbit designed to destroy the spacecraft. Any pieces that might have survived their fiery plummet through the atmosphere would fall into the deep ocean, beyond the reach of undersea salvage. The Test Group later cut up the recovered bucket into small pieces as mementos for its members.
Catching the End of an Era

Emergency orders quickly went out to the Test Group on 11 October 1984 to undertake an unscheduled recovery of the last HEXAGON bucket.

Chang’s textbook catch was a fitting conclusion to a near flawless mission. In a 27 August memo to DNRO Aldridge, Eisenbeiss congratulated those involved in the mission calling them “essential to the successful acquisition and satisfaction of various Intelligence Community collection problems.” Their never-failing spirit, flexibility, and high satisfaction record resulted in the “appreciation of the entire Intelligence Community for their efforts... the team deserves special recognition from all who benefited from their professionalism and expertise.”

Two months later, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) also issued a report praising the last GAMBIT mission. NPIC rated the quality of cloud and haze-free black-and-white imagery from the second bucket as fair to excellent, with the majority of the frames judged to be in the good to very good category. The color imagery was very good and camera operations were anomaly free.

As Chang was making the last GAMBIT bucket recovery, conditions on the ailing HEXAGON spacecraft were deteriorating rapidly. On 17 August, six days after Chang’s historic mission, Jacobson reported to DNRO Aldridge, “We are continuing to analyze the command system anomalies and develop possible corrective actions. However, the situation is serious.” He continued the accelerated collection strategy on HEXAGON’s second bucket to include “active requirements in good weather areas worldwide.”

Events would soon prove his caution warranted.

Eighteen days later, a mechanical problem in the take-up brake—needed to keep tension on the film from the aft looking camera as it entered the second bucket—caused an emergency shutdown of the aft looking camera. With only the forward-looking camera operational, the AFSCF began signal camera operations on 6 September, which prevented the satellite from obtaining the all-important stereoscopic imagery capable of detecting elevations on the ground from flat photographs. Single camera operations continued until 8 September when another command system anomaly again shutdown all satellite functions. Single camera operations resumed a day later, but it quickly became clear that the malfunctioning camera brake was not repairable: the spacecraft received commands to apply the brake, but it would not engage. Since the failure appeared limited to the second bucket, Jacobson ordered single camera operations to continue until the second bucket returned from space, at which time, he hoped, the satellite could resume dual camera operations. The plan worked: two camera operations resumed after the Test Group recovered the second bucket at 5:45 PM Eastern Daylight Time on 24 September.

Despite the good news, the larger problem of HEXAGON’s ailing command system with one side inoperable and the other side only partially functioning, was a serious concern. On 1 October, Jacobson reported that the nonfunctioning ECS side was unrecoverable, explaining, “There are no further risk-free tests which we can pursue” to fix the problem. Convinced he had “taken every reasonable precaution to maximize the mission success under the existing ECS conditions,” he ordered the satellite returned to its normal orbital position.

The installation of commands to protect the partially functioning ECS side from the inoperable side’s ailments and the presence of the Minimal Control System, which provided backup control, were adequate safeguards in his estimation.

However, nine days later Jacobson suddenly reported to DNRO Aldridge that the partially functioning ECS side had experienced further anomalies and was no longer usable. “[Previous] anomalies were benign or workarounds were possible,” he explained, “the most recent problems were fatal.” With the Minimal Control System providing the only link to the satellite, he determined that the safest course was to recover the third bucket and deorbit the satellite as soon as possible.

Emergency orders quickly went out to the Test Group to undertake the unscheduled recovery. As Chang had done on the last GAMBIT mission, Major Eto would fly in the prime recovery position. With few exceptions, the mechanics of recovering a HEXAGON and GAMBIT bucket were identical. Instead of installing the half-inch thick mountain climber rope used to snare the 250-pound GAMBIT bucket, riggers readied a stronger plastic coated half-inch thick steel cable capable of recovering HEXAGON’s 1,100-pound bucket, and used eight instead of six.
recovery hooks, each of which was about 70-percent larger and heavier than the MK-5 GAMBIT hooks. The backend crew also placed transparent, bulletproof Lexan protectors, called Doghouses, over the cable along the rails in the floor of the aircraft’s cargo area to prevent the line from ripping through people and the aircraft if the high tensile strength cable snapped.39

Eto’s aircraft rendezvoused with the descending object about 17 miles from its predicted impact point, possibly owing to the difficulties of controlling the satellite with only the Minimum Control System. Unbeknownst to Eto at the time, the bucket contained just a 36-percent film load because of the mission’s early termination, but he immediately knew something was different. “The descent rate was slower,” Eto recalled. “I remember I had to carry more power than I normally would to actually make the recovery. When it hit, it didn’t have the same jerk that you normally would get. Even a number of the backend group said something about it was a little different…This is just a perception, but I kept thinking, maybe this thing wasn’t really full.”40

Despite the lighter-than-normal-bucket, Eto made a successful mid-air recovery on his first pass at 6:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time on 11 October 1984 at an altitude of 12,800 feet.

Less than an hour later, the AFSCF deorbited the satellite, along with its fourth unused bucket, into the Pacific Ocean.41 Unlike Chang, who knew he had recovered the last GAMBIT bucket, NRO still had one more HEXAGON mission scheduled. That mission, however, ended spectacularly when the Titan rocket carrying it into orbit exploded nine seconds after liftoff on 18 April 1986. The event left Eto with the distinction of commanding the aircraft that recovered the last bucket from the last ever American film-return photoreconnaissance satellite.42 “It is nice to know that you did the last one, but at the time I didn’t realize it was the last one; that never dawned on me until the next one blew up,” said Eto.43

While most applauded the effort that went into nursing the ailing HEXAGON spacecraft along, evidence as to the damage the mission’s early termination caused varies. On 11 October, the same day he ordered the third bucket’s early recovery, Jacobsen reported that while the three buckets returned 57 percent of the spacecraft’s total film load, the mission satisfied 70 percent of COMIREX’s collection plan.44

NPIC, however, was less generous in a memo about six weeks later. They reported that the satellite’s early termination “impacted heavily on NPIC’s abilities to address worldwide search responsibilities and national-level intelligence issues.” Only 25 percent of collection over Moscow and Eastern Europe was usable. The satellite failed to image 40 to 50 percent of one critical denied area, provided little useful imagery of SS-11 deactivation targets, and

The last capture, on 11 October 1984, of a HEXAGON bucket went especially smoothly. It was less than half full owing to problems with the satellite’s control system. Within an hour of the recovery the troubled satellite was deorbited into the Pacific Ocean. (Undated photo courtesy of Randy Chang.)
left 50 percent of bomber dispersal airfields unimaged. NPIC criticized the limited imagery against SS-20 base construction, found collection of one nation during the restructuring of its ground forces wanting, predicted a two-year hiatus against another denied area, and concluded that the satellite only imaged 12 percent of missile search areas in another country.45

A preliminary damage assessment issued by the Defense Mapping Agency around the same time also concluded that the last HEXAGON’s premature end negatively affected the agency’s ability to fulfill mapping, charting, and geodesy needs. Since the planned operations in December and February, historically the best weather times to image certain areas, did not occur, DMA reported it lacked the accurate geodetic positioning for many products, including those used for targeting cruise missiles.

Eisenbeiss, on the other hand, struck a positive note in a 14 January 1985 letter to DNRO Aldridge. He praised the HEXAGON team for “planning, operating, managing, and nursing the ailing” satellite. “Community requirements for the mission were demanding,” he wrote, “over 21.2 million square nautical miles for intelligence search and 14.1 million square nautical miles to support mapping.” Modifying the collection strategy to image active targets in good weather areas at an accelerated rate called for the “dynamic interaction on a revolution-by-revolution basis to focus on a myriad of decisions impacting daily imaging operations.” This collection substantially satisfied COMIREX requirements “despite the hardware problems encountered and the shortened mission length.” The 57-percent film load, he concluded, “produced approximately 14.1 million square nautical miles of unique cloud free imagery, which resulted in the satisfaction of 53 percent of the total search requirements, 54 percent of the total ad hoc requirements, and 29 percent of the total mapping requirements.”46

DNRO Aldridge, too, offered his own tribute in a 6 February 1985 note to Jacobson. “The command system anomalies experienced at the beginning of the mission were regrettable,” he wrote. “However, without the superb efforts of the HEXAGON team, the impact on the nation’s intelligence collection would have been far more severe. Due to the extraordinary dedication of this team, significant intelligence collection accomplishments were achieved.”47

**Epilogue**

On 18 July 1986, 22 months after Eto’s last HEXAGON catch, current and former Test Group members gathered in Hawaii to attend the unit’s formal deactivation ceremony. During its years of operation, the unit made exactly 40,000 mid-air recov-
Since electro-optical technology offered timely reconnaissance without the weeks needed to deorbit and develop film from space, satellite imagery increasingly was able to support rapidly changing tactical operations.

...and flew commercially. Randy Chang retired from the Air Force in 1996 as a lieutenant colonel, but he continues to fly charter aircraft today.

At 7:34 AM Eastern Standard Time on 25 September 2009, nearly 23 years to the day after the Test Group’s official deactivation, NRO produced the last hardcopy film, completing the final transition to digital imagery. In a ceremony intended to symbolize the path that more than 140,000 miles of film had followed on its way from NRO to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), a grandfather, father, and son team from NRO’s Photography Production Facility inspected and certified the last roll of film. The ceremonial roll then made its way to the NRO and NGA. After the transfer, DNRO Bruce Carlson remarked in a recorded congratulatory message, “A picture may be worth a thousand words, but the pictures you processed saved lives and changed the course of the world.”

The evolution from film-return to near-real-time space-based imagery, which began with the launch of the first electro-optical satellite in 1976, dramatically expanded the users of imagery systems managed by the NRO. Since electro-optical technology offered timely reconnaissance without the weeks needed to deorbit and develop film from space, satellite imagery, traditionally a provider of strategic intelligence for the president and senior policymakers, increasingly was able to support rapidly changing tactical operations.

In 1977, Congress funded the creation of the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program within the Department of Defense to exploit and distribute for military use products from NRO systems originally created to meet strategic needs. “This was a very useful step, but not a game changer,” said Robert J. Herman, who served as DNRO from 1979 to 1981.49

Three years later, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown established the Defense Reconnaisance Support Program as a single office to meet the unique needs of both the director of central intelligence and secretary of defense with NRO systems. The difficulty of supporting the increasing amount of military and other non-traditional users of NRO systems from a covert organization led to the appointment of the first NRO Deputy Director for Military Support in 1990, followed two years later by the declassification of NRO’s existence. “The open secret of the NRO made it corrosive to our real security needs by trying to maintain this fiction [that the NRO did not exist],” explained Martin C. Faga who served as the DNRO during the declassification.

“How are you going to operate with people in the field from a covert organization?”50

Retrieval of the last buckets from the final GAMBIT and HEXAGON missions was a critical point in the nation’s transition to near-real time imagery from space. The Test Group was part of complex system that...
included the building, launching, tasking, and control of the satellite; and the retrieval, dissemination, assessment, and exploitation of the imagery product. Today the unit’s historical significance parallels that of the Wright Brother’s first flight or Chuck Yeager’s breaking the sound barrier. A plaque honoring the unit rests near the flagpole in Atterbury Circle on Hickam Air Force Base, placed there on the 50th anniversary of Harold Mitchell’s historic first mid-air catch.

Col. Sam Barrett, commander of the 15th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, praised the unit’s unique mission during the plaque-laying ceremony: “What a mission you had—catching free-falling objects from outer space is no small feat, in your day. The Test Group was the only organization in the free world to accomplish such a mission. The stakes were high; our national security depended on it.” DNRO Carlson, also speaking at the ceremony, echoed the Test Group’s intelligence contribution to the United States. “What you did was give us an incredible advantage, an asymmetric advantage, over our enemy,” he said. “Your pioneering work in overhead reconnaissance gave us the confidence we needed.”

* * *

Catching the End of an Era
Endnotes

3. For declassified documentation on the program see Kevin C. Ruffner (ed.), CIA Cold War Records: CORONA: America's First Satellite Program (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1995).
4. For histories of the Test Group during the CORONA program see Robert Mulcahy, Jr. (ed.) CORONA Star Catchers: Interviews with the Air Force Aerial Recovery Flight Crews of the 6593d Test Squadron (Special), 1958–1972 (National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, June 2012) and Ingard Clausen, Edward Miller, Robert McDonald, Courtney Hastings (eds.), Intelligence Revolution 1960: Retrieving the CORONA Imagery that Helped Win the Cold War (NRO, Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, April 2012).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Randy Chang and Michael Frueh discussion with author, 16 September 2011.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
16. For information on the problems with the ECS see Memorandum, SUBJ: Vehicle 1219 Programmable Memory Unit (PMU) Anomaly/ System ESD; Message 7985, 10 July 1984; Message 46692, 16 July 1984; Message 8174, 17 July 1984.
18. DNRO Aldridge memorandum to Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence, SUBJ: HEXAGON 1219 Status, 18 July 1984.
22. Chang and Frueh discussion.
24. Chang and Frueh discussion.
25. Adams discussion.
26. Ibid.
27. Chang and Frueh discussion.
29. Chang and Frueh discussion.
30. Ibid.
33. Chang and Frueh discussion.
42. The Hexagon Story, 116, 118.
43. Eto discussion.
44. Message 6824, 10 October 1984.
45. Memorandum, NPIC OPSCOM Representative to OPSCOM Chair, SUBJ: KH-9 Shortfalls, 20 November 1984.
47. DNRO Aldridge memorandum to Director Program A, SUBJ: HEXAGON Mission 1219 Commendation, 6 February 1985.
48. 6594th Test Group Deactivation Video.
50. Ibid.
The intricate enterprise of recruiting and operating an enemy’s clandestine agents—working with double agents—is a difficult counterintelligence tool for an intelligence service to harness. The complexity, uncertainty, and risk associated with these operations suggest that such activities would be undertaken only by well-established and experienced intelligence services. Yet during World War II, from 1944 to 1945, the United States’ upstart intelligence agency—the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—conducted its own double agent operations in France, Germany, and Italy.

Formed in 1943, the OSS counterintelligence division—known as X-2—was responsible for identifying and neutralizing German intelligence activity abroad. X-2 endeavored to penetrate the German military intelligence service, Abwehr, using double agents as a means of infiltration. From 1944 to 1945, X-2 officers accompanied Allied invasion forces in France and Italy to recruit German “stay-behind” agents in Allied-controlled areas. X-2’s double agents—referred to as Controlled Enemy Agents (CEAs), or Wireless Telegraphy (W/T) or radio agents—operated from behind Allied lines and transmitted false reports to the Abwehr via radio.¹

This article examines OSS counterintelligence during World War II, and addresses the question concerning how the OSS handled double agents and the subsequent intelligence impact. The paper traces X-2’s development from 1943 to 1944 as it built the apparatus to manage double agents; discusses X-2 double-agent operations in France, Germany, and Italy; and evaluates the performance of X-2’s double-agent operations in counterintelligence and deception.

The article argues that X-2’s double agent operations provided significant counterintelligence value by enabling the Allies to understand and ultimately control Abwehr espionage activities in France after the invasion. Secondarily, the double agents also offered tactical contributions to several deception operations.

X-2’s Development, 1943–1944

The history of OSS counterintelligence—and its double-agent capabilities—traces back to the British double-cross program launched after the outbreak of WWII, when British intelligence undertook a sophisticated double-agent effort that neutralized German intelligence operations in Great Britain. “We actively ran and controlled the German espionage system in this country,” proclaimed
A Pioneering Experiment

Distribution of X-2 and French CEAs, 1 April - 8 May, 1945
The British machinations succeeded and, on 1 March 1943, Donovan created the Counter Intelligence Division. Three months later, Donovan rescinded his order and created instead a separate Counter-Espionage branch within OSS known as X-2.5,6

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In order to expedite the development of X-2’s counterintelligence capacity, MI-5 and Section V of MI-6 shared their counterintelligence records and expertise. A declassified US government history of counterintelligence notes the significance of this collaboration in building X-2’s capability: “The United States was given the opportunity of acquiring, within a short period, extensive counterintelligence records representing the fruits of many decades of counterintelligence experience. The British offered also to train American personnel in properly using such records and in conducting counterintelligence operations.”7

As MI-6 (V) provided training to their new American counterparts, the X-2 office in London became the center of American counterintelligence operations. This arrangement also served British interests as it allowed British intelligence to maintain tight control over the ULTRA traffic shared with the United States and to develop relationships with its American counterparts.8

British authorities indoctrinated X-2 into the double-cross program and provided training for handling double agents in preparation for the invasion of Europe. In the fall of 1943, British intelligence helped X-2 create Special Counter-Intelligence (SCI) detachments that would accompany the Allied invading forces in continental Europe and perform counterintelligence operations using ULTRA intercepts. In these early stages of preparation in 1943, MI-6 remained reluctant to grant X-2 responsibility for managing CEAs. An internal X-2 history of CEA operations in France and Germany written after the war described this ambivalence during fall of 1943: “Certainly it was felt, more or less vaguely, that X-2 should logically have a hand in the [CEA] business; but CEA work was seldom, if ever, discussed by the officers of MI-6 (V) who were helping to establish their American counterpart.”9

The mission of the OSS SCI units, however, included the operation of double agents and, in September 1943, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a directive authorizing OSS activities in the European Theater, to include “the control, in collaboration with British Deception Service, of action of double agents.”10 Additionally,
a charter for the SCI units approved in December 1943 declared that one of the functions of these detachments was “to assist and advise in the local deception of the enemy through the control of enemy agents.” In February 1944, British intelligence finally acceded to OSS involvement in CEA operations, and agreed for MI-5 and X-2 to administer CEAs on the continent.

In March 1944, X-2 established Special Case Units, as subunits of SCI, to conduct CEA activities. Lieutenant Edward R. Weismiller (US Marine Corps) and radio technician Alton Adams reported to MI-5 for training in British W/T CEA technique in early March, and Captain John B. Oakes (US Army) soon joined them. Weismiller—a Rhodes Scholar with degrees from Cornell and Harvard—and Oakes—a Princeton valedictorian and Rhodes Scholar—offered this description of their training period with MI-5:

The first formal step in the education of case officers was the giving of a verbal introduction to the art of running CEAs by Lt. Col. T. A. Robertson and Mr. J. C. Masterman, two of the principal officers of that section of MI-5 which had been dealing throughout the war with CEAs on British territory. The American newcomers were welcomed into the inner recesses of MI-5 with utmost cordiality, and were given completely free access to the voluminous files.

In preparation for the D-Day landing, X-2 requested additional personnel to augment the Special Case Unit. It was felt that the Americans should familiarize themselves with as many of the leading British cases as possible, in order that they might realize what unforeseen problems and unimaginable complexities might—and normally did—arise in virtually every case. Officers of MI-5, some of whom were running cases in the UK at the moment, were available for questioning; and the Americans were, on occasion, even permitted to visit the actual locus of some of the British operations. Obviously, conditions on the Continent were going to be vastly different from those in England; yet this reading period was of great value as an introduction to the enormous human and administrative as well as technical problems that have to be faced by every case officer.

In preparation for the D-Day landing, X-2 requested additional personnel to augment the Special Case Unit; however, by the time of the D-Day invasion, the CEA team included three officers and four enlisted men.

Double Agent Operations

DRAGOMAN

The first American CEA case in France was that of Juan Frutos, also known as DRAGOMAN; the Frutos case was also X-2’s most substantial and best-documented double-agent case, and it illustrates X-2’s experience with CEAs in France. A Spanish national living in Cherbourg, Frutos had served as an Abwehr agent since 1935, reporting via radio on naval activity in Cherbourg. By late 1943, Abwehr suspected an Allied invasion was imminent and instructed Frutos to maintain his position in Cherbourg.

In May 1944, the Abwehr provided Frutos with two radio sets and instructed him to report on “the arrival of ships or commandos, the number of soldiers who disembarked, their arms and the units to which they belonged, and the number of tanks and artillery that were landed.” Following the Allied landing at Normandy on 6 June, Frutos issued 10 transmissions from 6 June to 20 June 1944, apprising the Germans of “vague tactical information” related to the Allied forces. Frutos determined that it was too dangerous to conduct transmissions after 20 June and hid his radio sets in the attic.

X-2 learned of Frutos’s presence in Cherbourg through ULTRA traffic and the recruitment of his former Abwehr handler, Karl Eitel, in Portugal. Eitel switched allegiances in November 1943, meeting with an X-2 officer and revealing that he knew of at least three German stay-behind agents in the Brest-Cherbourg area. ULTRA intercepts corroborated Eitel’s claim, including that one of the agents probably was Frutos. The X-2 station conveyed this information to the SCI detachment in Cherbourg, which located Frutos and arrested him on 8 July 1944. Frutos quickly confessed and agreed to work for X-2.

X-2’s CEA personnel arrived in France shortly after Frutos’s arrest.
Oakes traveled to Cherbourg on 14 July after learning of the case, and Weismiller and Adams followed on 25 July.24 Oakes and Major Christopher Harmer of the British 104th SCI Unit interrogated Frutos to determine if his CEA status could be blown by his mistress or by two other Abwehr agents believed to be in the area. Though officials in London wanted to send Frutos to England for further interrogation, Oakes and Harmer concluded that Frutos would be worthwhile as a double agent and unlikely to work against them.25 Moreover, the need for expediency overrode London’s concerns; Frutos had been off the air since 20 June, and further delay would arouse suspicion. On 25 July 1944, Frutos resumed contact with the Abwehr, this time as an American CEA assigned the cryptonym DRAGOMAN.26

Frutos’s position as a trusted German agent stabilized in August 1944. He retained a job at the Army Real Estate and Labor Office, a position that demonstrated to neighbors in Cherbourg how he earned his living and that was closely related to the fake job of interpreter at an American port office that he presented to the Abwehr.27 Weismiller and Adams also located a secure house from which Frutos could broadcast his radio transmissions to the Abwehr.28

In late August, Frutos was contacted by Alfred Gabas, a German agent in the Cherbourg area for whom X-2 had been searching.29 X-2 arrested Gabas, who then led them to a German agent in nearby Granville named Jean Senouque; X-2 later recruited Senouque as a CEA. The other supposed German agent in the area fled Cherbourg for Paris after the invasion and was arrested in December 1944.30 Frutos was no longer at risk of being exposed by other German agents in the area.

Through the fall of 1944, Frutos’s X-2 handlers worked to build his credibility and status with his Abwehr handlers. Frutos had previously sent terse messages and not more than one at a time. Consequently, X-2 increased volume and detail of his reporting slowly to avoid suspicion.31 In addition, the X-2 case officers had to gain approval from the so-called “212 Committee” for all the intelligence (known as “foodstuff”) that Frutos relayed to the Germans.

Formed in August 1944, the 212 Committee was a coordinating body for authorities from X-2 and the 21st and 12th Army Groups to approve deception information for American CEA’s in France and Germany. Not only was this a slow process, but the 212 Committee prohibited X-2 from using Frutos for deception and denied foodstuff that could endanger Allied operations. As a result, the case officers complained that Frutos was “forced into equivocation, circumlocution, inference, explanation, avoidance to such an extent that his messages became longer and longer and throughout the month of October we faced with helpless alarm the fact that, for all the reasons enumerated above, Frutos’s outgoing traffic was reaching almost unmanageable proportions.”32

Frutos struggled to explain to the Abwehr why he could not provide details on activities in plain sight such as troop movements through Cherbourg harbor and blamed his deficient reporting constraints on his mobility, his subsources, and the local security.33 Nonetheless, Frutos received accolades from his German handlers, and he was rewarded with more in-depth questionnaires on Allied naval activities.34

Frutos’s role in Cherbourg increased in significance in December as the German offensive in the Ardennes and the Battle of the Bulge prompted new waves of Allied troops to arrive there, and X-2 finally elected to use Frutos for deception. At the end of November, the Abwehr sent Frutos a questionnaire requesting information about the anti-torpedo nets that merchant ships used to protect against German submarine attacks. British intelligence was already feeding deceptive statistics on anti-torpedo nets to the Germans through their own CEAs, and so the 212 Committee approved Frutos to participate in the deception. He delivered the false information on the anti-torpedo nets to the Germans on 27 and 28 December 1944, citing a fictional subsource on an American cargo vessel, and continued to disseminate the deceptive naval information through the winter. After the war, X-2 praised Frutos’s role—passing false reports from the fictional subagent—in the naval deception operation:

He [the fictional subagent] had passed a considerable amount of important naval deception, and all the data he had notionally supplied, on the anti-torpedo nets, convoy routes and protection, Antwerp traffic, V-bomb damage, etc., had been carefully contrived and edited at the highest level to dovetail perfectly with information the Germans were already known to have, to support information supplied by other accepted agents, and to fill out and con-
trol the picture which the Allied Naval Command wished the Germans to have of its methods and dispositions along the Atlantic coast of Europe.

At a more crucial period of the war the second mate might have had a decisive influence on the whole German U-boat campaign in American and British waters; as it was, he was as useful as the war situation permitted, and his employment came near to being a model of what high-level interservice cooperation in a deception campaign can be.  

Frutos’s role in the deception operation ended in March 1945, but he remained a trusted German intelligence source through the end of the war.

**CEA Network in France and Germany**

In addition to Frutos, X-2 developed a stable of 15 CEAs in France and Germany by the spring of 1945. In conjunction with CEAs operated by French intelligence, a CEA network the Americans were able to establish provided geographic coverage across France. American and French CEAs were positioned all along the French coast in every major city from the Mediterranean to the western and northern coasts. In the interior, X-2 operated several agents in Paris and a cadre of agents in northeast France.

X-2 also maintained two CEAs in Germany near the French border. X-2 established a CEA office in Paris led by John Oakes, who managed this agent network in consultation with X-2 in London, and liaised with French double-agent authorities. The geographic distribution of CEAs convinced German intelligence it had achieved a saturation of agents behind enemy lines. German intelligence thus focused on servicing a network that was, in fact, controlled by the United States, and when it did attempt to insert new agents, X-2 was able to identify and capture them through CEA traffic and ULTRA intercepts.

The CEA case of Jean Senouque demonstrates the counterintelligence value of this CEA network. Prior to the Allied invasion of France, an Abwehr officer named Friederich Kaulen recruited a network of agents along the French coast to spy for the Abwehr’s naval division, I-Marine. One of these agents was Senouque, who was assigned to report on “the port of Granville and the surrounding area at the western base of the of the Normandy peninsula.” After the invasion, Allied forces uncovered Kaulen’s network—in part through Frutos—and arrested Senouque and the other agents. Senouque agreed to work for the Americans, and by December he was joined by four other CEAs, all from Kaulen’s I-Marine network. X-2 used Senouque to glean information on the Abwehr’s handling of Frutos and the I-Marine CEAs, as well as to obtain clues about the existence of other German agents. In March 1945, Kaulen traveled to Boudreaux for meetings with Senouque and two other CEAs, which prompted American, French, and British authorities to devise an operation to capture Kaulen.

Allied intelligence hoped Kaulen could provide insight on German intelligence plans for France, details of the stay-behind network along the North Sea coast of Germany and Holland, and designs for the post-war. On the night of 6 April 1945, Senouque rendezvoused with Kaulen on the banks of the Gironde River, but Kaulen was killed as French and American soldiers attempted to capture him. Though denied the opportunity to interrogate Kaulen, American authorities did find Kaulen’s written instructions for Senouque. These documents demonstrated to the X-2 officers that “[Kaulen’s] entire network in France is clearly under our control and always has been.”

The American CEA network in France also performed deception operations, including an effort to mislead German authorities about the Allied troop presence in southern France in the spring of 1945. Paul Jeannin, a CEA in the I-Marine network in Marseille in southern France, and a CEA in Draguignan—cryptonymed FOREST—participated in Plan Jessica, a deception operation designed to “retain as many German troops as possible on the Franco-Italian border, but to discourage them from crossing into France.”

The Germans were interested in Allied troop arrivals at Marseille, and Allied deception authorities requested the nearby CEAs exaggerate the number of troops in Southern France to indicate a likely Allied offensive at the Italian border. FOREST provided false reports on troop movements, while Jeannin—
who was not positioned to report credibly on troop movements—delivered complementary reports that supported FOREST’s accounts of troop landings and preparations for an offensive on the Italian front simply by not refuting them. The overall deception effort was successful, according to an assessment by the US 6th Army Group: “It is at least certain that two German divisions, badly needed elsewhere, were held with the Italian divisions guarding the Franco-Italian front all winter long, and that the Germans are now known to have been continually worried about this front.” Jeannin and FOREST contributed to the success of this deception, though they were only one small component of the operation.

X-2 also used CEAs for tactical deception along the front in Eastern France. After the invasion at Normandy, the 12th Army Group progressed through Paris to the Eastern border of France where it engaged German forces through the winter of 1944–45. The X-2 SCI unit attached to the 12th Army Group captured a small network of German agents in the fall of 1944 and operated them as CEAs.

In December, at the direction of Allied military leadership, X-2 used two of the CEAs to deceive the Germans about the movement of Patton’s 3rd Army to the Ardennes during a critical point in the Battle of the Bulge. The two CEAs reported to the Germans that the 3rd Army was moving to the Ardennes in segments instead of all at once, as it actually did—reinforcing the German assumption that an entire Army would not be able to travel “so far and so fast under adverse conditions of road and weather.” Not only did the Germans fail to uncover either agent’s relationship with X-2, but they valued one of them—Henri Giallard—so highly that he was awarded the Iron Cross on 10 February 1945.

**X-2 achieved a remarkable counterintelligence feat by capturing and controlling the German network of stay-behind agents in France.**

X-2 undertook its first true CEA operation in June 1944 when the Allied forces arrived in Rome. Though surprised by timing of the final Allied offensive in Rome, German intelligence had prepared a network of stay-behind agents in Italy. An X-2 unit led by Berding entered Rome on 5 June 1944 and soon found one of the stay-behind agents: Cesare D’Onofrio. After Berding’s interrogation, X-2 elected to operate D’Onofrio as a CEA—cryptonymed ARBITER—in conjunction with four other German radio agents run by the British and French. The Section V report on CEAs in Italy notes that, “ARBITER ran well for three months, but was closed down in September when a courier with money visited him and was arrested.”

The report then concludes with a general assessment of the six Allied double agent operations in Italy: “Overall, double agents in Italy have paid good dividends…Most of them have made some CE [counterespionage] contribution during their DA careers and all the Abwehr agents have played a large part in the implementation of strategic deception to the success of which Field Marshall Alexander paid tribute.”
A Pioneering Experiment

British intelligence was...wary that the American novices would expose the British double-cross system or, worse, expose the ULTRA secret.

Evaluating X-2’s Performance

X-2 achieved a remarkable counterintelligence feat by capturing and controlling the German network of stay-behind agents in France. Writing after the war, X-2 double-agent case officers John Oakes, Edward Weis- miller, and Eugene Waith noted that the CEA operations in France and Germany were “conducted in the nature of a pioneer experiment.” None of the X-2 personnel had experience running double agents, and yet just one year after X-2’s creation they performed these complex operations without German detection.

X-2’s rapid development and ultimate success was in large part enabled by British training and guidance throughout the process, ULTRA intercepts to identify German agents and monitor operations, and the Abwehr’s diminishing intelligence capabilities and inability to uncover the recruits. Additionally, X-2 personnel from the case officers to the leadership displayed the competence, creativity, and bravado necessary for such a difficult undertaking.

The most significant intelligence contribution of X-2’s CEA operations was to allow the Allies to understand and ultimately control German espionage activities in France. The X-2 history of CEA’s in France and Germany concludes: “From the evidence of MSS [ULTRA] and of the interrogations of a number of leading personalities of the GIS [German Intelligence Service] it is certain that not more than two or three W/T agents succeeded in carrying on espionage for any length of time without falling under our control.”

Interrogations of German intelligence officials after the war further revealed that the Abwehr did not suspect that its stay-behind agents had been doubled, although it viewed the information provided by these agents as low quality. Not only did this CEA network prevent German intelligence from gleaning accurate intelligence about the Allied forces in France in 1944–45, but it also caused the Germans to waste time and resources maintaining a network controlled by their enemy.

X-2 did use its double agents for deception on several occasions, although it did not use the network in a cohesive fashion for any large-scale or strategic deception. X-2 utilized several agents in France for deception operations, including to deliver false naval information regarding anti-torpedo nets, to exaggerate the numbers of Allied troops in southern France, and to obfuscate the movement of Patton’s 3rd Army to the Ardennes.

In Italy, X-2 also used its CEA to support British deception operations. These operations succeeded in delivering false or misleading information that German intelligence accepted as credible and reinforced broader Allied deception operations against the Germans. X-2 did not, however, use the agents for deception on a consistent basis beyond these few cases, nor did it apply the French CEA network to an overarching deception mission.

 Allied authorities opted not to use X-2’s CEAs on a larger scale because the Allies did not have broad deception plan for France at this time. After the invasion, the campaign moved so quickly that there was not time to develop and implement strategic deception operations.

Historian Michael Howard explains that in the latter months of the war, “Allied strategy itself was so opportunistic, so lacking in long-term plans for developing enemy points of weakness and then exploiting them, that no serious cover plans could be made... the Allies were so strong that they effectively dispensed with strategy altogether and simply attacked all along the line, much as they had in the closing months of 1918.” In addition, a double agent must generally build up his credibility over a period of time before he can deliver deception material. X-2 had neither the benefit of time nor high-quality foodstuff material as it attempted to build its agents’ credibility.

X-2 acquired its CEAs in France in the late summer and fall of 1944; by the spring of 1945, Abwehr disbanded and the war ended. Furthermore, deception operations would risk exposing the CEA network, and Allied officials did not want to lose the counterintelligence value of this network. British intelligence was also wary that the American novices would expose the British double-cross system or, worse, expose the ULTRA secret.

Thus, despite X-2’s success in developing and implementing the CEA program, the operations did not have a significant strategic impact on the overall campaign in Europe. With the invasion at Normandy in June 1944,
the Allies achieved a decisive victory and began their conquest of Germany on the continent. Though X-2’s capture and control of the German stay-behind network weakened the Abwehr’s intelligence capabilities in Allied-controlled areas of France and concealed information about Allied troop landings and movements, it was hardly a decisive feature of the campaign.

The Allies almost certainly would have defeated the Germans in Europe even without X-2’s double agent network. Moreover, X-2 could likely have achieved a satisfactory counterintelligence situation even without doubling the enemy agents, simply by using ULTRA to capture the German agents and glean further information through interrogation. This analysis is not to discount the contribution of the X-2 CEA operations, but instead to recognize that at this stage in the war, Allied forces had gained the momentum against the retreating German armies and victory was close at hand.

**X-2’s Legacy**

X-2 was disbanded in 1946 as President Truman reorganized the national security bureaucracy. The organization’s legacy nonetheless persisted, and X-2’s development during the war formed the basis for centralized counterintelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Many X-2 veterans went on to serve in prominent roles in the CIA, establishing counterintelligence practices and operations in the new organization.

Most notably, James Angleton personally guided CIA counterintelligence for much of the Cold War, serving as chief of the CIA’s counterintelligence staff from 1954 through 1974. Historian Timothy Naftali observes that Angleton’s X-2 experience working with double agents shaped his hypervigilant approach to countering Soviet Union deception during the Cold War because he realized that, if Britain and the Allies could undertake large-scale deception using double agents during World War II, so too could the Soviet Union.

X-2’s training from British intelligence in double-agent tradecraft and operations during World War II also provided a doctrinal foundation for future CIA double-agent operations. Cases, as well as the theory and tradecraft taught by the British and lessons learned from these cases for future practitioners to use. For example, the study advocated the use of high-quality “foodstuff” to develop a double agent’s bona fides based on X-2’s observations that a lack of viable foodstuff in some cases prevented them from convincing Abwehr of the CEA’s utility. X-2’s close collaboration with British intelligence in double agent endeavors also helped establish a mutually beneficial counterintelligence relationship that endured with the CIA.

Finally, X-2’s legacy was not confined to the intelligence realm: X-2 CEA case officers Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith went on to distinguished civilian careers after the war: Oakes, as a longtime New York Times editorial writer and editor, as a poet and English professor at George Washington University; and Waith, as a scholar of Shakespeare and English renaissance drama at Yale University. Though short in duration, X-2’s pioneering experiment with double agent operations over just two years during World War II left behind a lasting legacy.
Endnotes

4. Ibid., 13, 80.
6. Ibid., 37-38.
7. Ibid., 34.
12. Ibid., 62.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 66.
17. Ibid., i.
20. Ibid., 95.
27. Ibid., 104.
28. Ibid., 105-106.
31. Ibid., 115-116.
32. Ibid., 117.
33. Ibid., 118.
36. Ibid., 73-74.
37. Ibid., 344–348.
38. Ibid., 330.
39. Ibid., 158–159.
40. Ibid., 160.
41. Ibid., 178.
46. Ibid., 227.
47. Ibid., 251.
48. Ibid., 258.
49. Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers, 661.
51. “CEAs in Italy in 1944,” (Unsigned British document, but Timothy Naftali assesses it as MI-6, Section V). 226/119/23 NACP.
52. Naftali, “X-2”, 627-628, and “CEAs in Italy in 1944,” 226/119/23 NACP.
53. “CEAs in Italy in 1944,” 226/119/23 NACP.
54. “CEAs in Italy in 1944,” 226/119/23 NACP.
56. Ibid., 327.
57. Ibid., 331.
This year marks the 200th anniversary of the British capture of Washington, DC, on 24 August 1814. After a landing at Benedict, Maryland, on the Patuxent River, a British force of some 4,500 men marched to Bladensburg, where they quickly defeated a much larger force of American soldiers, sailors, and militiamen. The British then marched unimpeded to Washington, where they burned the Capitol and the President’s Mansion.¹

Historians have repeatedly revisited this iconic event: Charles C. Muller’s *The Darkest Hour* (1963), Walter Lord’s *The Dawn’s Early Light* (1973), Anthony Pitch’s *The Burning of Washington* (1998), and Steve Vogel’s recent *Through the Perilous Fight: Six Weeks That Saved the Nation* (2013) are among the most prominent accounts. They detail the flawed political and military judgments that led to the “Bladensburg Races”—the epithet pinned to the rapid American retreat that preceded the unopposed British march into the Nation’s capital.¹

Seldom, however, has this story been told or remembered as a critical intelligence failure. Several years ago, historian John Lewis Gaddis briefly addressed this question:

“So why doesn’t August 24th [1814] have a place in our memories similar to December 7th . . . or now September 11th?”

This raises the question: Did an intelligence failure contribute to the British “surprise” attack of 1814 that Gaddis equates to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the 2001 al Qa’ida attacks on New York City and Washington, DC? Analyzing the causes and consequences of the American failure to anticipate, perceive, and prepare for the British attack provides both a useful analytic exercise and a deeper appreciation

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¹ The building was commonly referred to as President’s House or Mansion, although “White House” was also used as early as 1811. The name “Executive Mansion” was used officially until President Theodore Roosevelt established the formal name by having “White House–Washington” engraved on the stationery in 1901.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
of this event during the bicentennial anniversary of the War of 1812.³

To be sure, intelligence in 1814 was far less developed than in 1941 and 2001.

- Both sides gathered intelligence from newspapers and civilians—particularly those who crossed largely unguarded borders—merchants, prisoners, deserters, and spies.
- Intelligence coups were rare. Exceptional was the British seizure of the Cuyahoga, a ship that carried all of General William Hull’s papers and correspondence, which alerted them to a large American force moving toward Detroit.⁵

In the run up to the war, the US suffered a major intelligence failure and a political fiasco followed when, in March 1809, President Madison made public letters purchased for $50,000—the government’s entire espionage budget—from a purported British agent, John Henry, who promptly left the country. The letters revealed that Henry had been sent by the governor of Lower Canada in 1808 to assess the possibility of the New England states seceding from the young union. The administration anticipated that the letter would prove British subversion, discredit his Federalist opponents, and spark a declaration of war. However, they proved to be little more than commonplace gossip, bringing ridicule on the administration.⁶

A Surprise Attack

The British attack in 1814, like the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the 11 September attacks, was not a bolt out of the blue. Madison’s administration, like Roosevelt’s and Bush’s, expected a surprise attack but did not know where or when it would take place. In the case of Pearl Harbor, Navy and Army commanders in Washington sent out on 27 November separate alerts to all US commanders in the Pacific, but this did not prompt those at Pearl Harbor to put their forces on high alert and order active patrolling. Ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote in his diary, [Roosevelt] brought up the event that we are likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.⁷

The day before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt noted after reading an intercepted Japanese diplomatic message instructing its embassy to break off relations, “This means war.”⁸

Similarly, three weeks before the 9/11 attacks, an article in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,” provided a general warning but lacked specifics on the time, place, and methods of attack:

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. . . . We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [—] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Shaykh” `Umar Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists. Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.⁹

Madison, unlike his successors in 1941 and 2001, was aware of both the size and direction of the enemy force approaching the United States. News of the allied armies’ capture of Paris on 30 March arrived in Boston on 12 May and was reported in Washington newspapers on 18 May. Madison wrote to Virginia Governor James Barbour of the impending threat in mid-June:

That the late events in Europe will put it in the power of Great Britain to direct a much greater force against the United States cannot be doubted. How far she may be restrained from so doing by an estimate of her interest in making peace, or by respect for the sentiments of her allies, if these should urge it, cannot yet be known. It is incumbent upon us to suppose that she may be restrained by neither, and to prepare as well we can to meet the augmented force which may invade us.¹⁰

Yet, his government was divided over what to do and, consequently, unprepared and poorly organized.
The cabinet did not meet to discuss the changed strategic situation until 1 July 1814, when Madison called for the creation of a separate military district responsible for defending the District of Columbia, Maryland, and part of northern Virginia. The new Tenth Military District was carved out of the Fifth Military District, commanded by Brig. Gen. Moses Porter, a veteran of the Revolutionary War.

As with Pearl Harbor and 9/11, the intelligence failure was intertwined with a policy failure. British efforts to mask their intentions exacerbated disagreements within Madison’s cabinet.

Porter, who had improved the defenses of Norfolk, Virginia, and served along the Canadian frontier, was an ideal choice for the new district. Secretary of War Armstrong nominated him, but Madison chose Colonel William Winder and promoted him to the rank of brigadier general. Winder, captured at the Battle of Stoney Creek in Upper Canada in 1813, had recently been exchanged. He had almost no military experience, but he was the nephew of Maryland Governor Levin Winder, whose state militia was critical to the defense of Washington.

Armstrong, disappointed that Madison had not endorsed his recommendation, refused to call up units of the DC, Maryland, and Virginia militia before a British force posed a definite threat, preventing them from preparing defenses or training. This suggests that he thought such a contingency was unlikely and not worth the federal government’s limited resources to activate the militia until they were absolutely needed.
It is also likely that his miserliness disguised his pique over Madison’s refusal to appoint Porter to defend the city.

Secretary of State Monroe, however, supported Winder, possibly because he expected Madison to put him in charge of Washington’s defenses if the British actually threatened the city. Monroe, often referred to as “Colonel,” his Revolutionary War rank, had aspired to lead the western campaign to regain Detroit, which had been captured by the British in the summer of 1812, but Madison endorsed the appointment of William Henry Harrison.

Against this bureaucratic and political rivalry, the American government suffered from the “Barriers to Perception” listed in the framework of surprise attacks on the facing page:

• Effective use of denial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an improvising, adaptive foe;
• Mirror imaging, fallacious rational actor assumptions;
• Underestimation of actor’s commitment, risk tolerance, or bias toward action;
• Failure of imagination.

All four factors masked the danger posed by the British, whose intentions remained unclear and whose movements confused the Americans. On 2 June 1814, British troops under Maj. Gen. Robert Ross boarded ships in France’s Garonne River for Bermuda. His sealed orders instructed him “to effect a diversion on the coasts of the United States of America in favour of the army employed in the defense of Upper and Lower Canada.” He was also proscribed from “any extended operation” that would take him far from the fleet. Ross’s forces included three infantry regiments, a brigade of artillery, a detachment of sappers and miners, and other support elements totaling some 2,500 men. They arrived in Bermuda on 24 July, and five days later the Twenty-First Royal Scots Fusiliers, numbering 800 troops, joined them. Departing on 3 August, they entered the Chesapeake Bay on 15 August.11

Concurrently, in early June, Governor General Prévost suggested that British Vice Adm. Alexander Cochrane conduct amphibious raids along the Eastern Seaboard and retaliate for American attacks on Canadian towns, most recently Dover on 14 May. Cochrane endorsed the idea and explained to Secretary of State for War and the Colonies Earl Bathurst in a message dated 14 July, “If [British] troops arrive soon and the point of attack is directed toward Baltimore, I have every prospect of success and Washington will be equally accessible. They may be destroyed or laid under contribution as the occasion may require. . . .”12

British Rear Admiral George Cockburn, who had led raids in the Chesapeake Bay in 1813, refined Cochrane’s concept of operations and proposed landing on the Patuxent River at Benedict, a 50-mile march to Washington. He wrote to Cochrane on 17 July, “I therefore most firmly believe that within forty-eight hours after arrival in the Patuxent of such a force as you expect, the city of Washington might be possessed without difficulty or opposition of any kind.”13

Cockburn designed an elaborate deception to mask the British attack by landing southeast of the capital at Benedict from where Annapolis, Baltimore, and Washington were only a few days’ march away. He also ordered one squadron in the Patuxent to conduct the usual raids on farms and settlements while keeping Commodore Joshua Barney’s flotilla bottled up. These US gunboats had harassed British warships in the Chesapeake Bay before being forced to retreat up the Patuxent earlier that summer. “After making a flourish or two there, sacking Leonard’s Town [on the Potomac’s Maryland shore] . . . I shall again move elsewhere, so as to distract Jonathan, do him all the mischief I can and yet not allow him to suspect that a serious and permanent landing is intended anywhere,” Cockburn wrote on 16 July.14

The British also planned two operations disguising their invasion’s ultimate objective. A squadron led by Captain James Gordon would create a diversion up the Potomac, attacking any fortifications along the river and threatening Alexandria, Virginia, and Washington from the south. A second feint up the Chesapeake Bay under Captain Peter Parker hoped to draw troops away from Washington by conducting raids and threatening to disrupt communications between Baltimore and Philadelphia.15

These movements had the intended effect of confusing the perceptions and thinking of American officials and observers. Francis Scott Key, a member of the DC militia, wrote a reassuring note to his mother on 23 June, telling her the British “have now gone down the river—and nobody seems to think there is any chance of their coming back again,
Strategic Surprise

Anticipating Sudden Hostile Action

Abrupt, deliberate action by an adversary (such as a state, armed force, or terrorist cell) against an unprepared target

| Archetypes | • Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 |
| • Egypt’s attack on Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war |
| • The attacks of 11 September 2001 |

| Essence | • Abrupt, deliberate, hostile deed by a unified actor (such as a state, armed force, terrorist cell, revolutionary vanguard party) aimed at disorienting, defeating, or destroying an unprepared opponent |

| Subtypes | • Surprise attack |
| • Abrupt power play, such as the Soviet Union’s blockade of Berlin from land communications in 1948 or its emplacement of offensive weapons in Cuba in 1962 |
| • Coups |
| • Diplomatic surprise, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s ouster of Soviet military advisers in 1972 or his visit to Israel in 1977 |
| • Political assassination |
| • Initiation, escalation of mass human rights abuses |

| Barriers to Perception | • Effective use of denial (secrecy, security, stealth) and deception by an improvising, adaptive foe |
| • Mirror-imaging; fallacious rational actor assumptions |
| • Underestimation of actor’s commitment, risk-tolerance, or bias toward action |
| • Failure of imagination |

| Analytic Concepts/Analogies | • Monitor and reassess warning indicators on regular basis |
| • Conduct red team/forensic assessments of actor’s means, motives, and opportunities to commit a sudden hostile act |
| • Defensive casing and premortems of imaginable surprise: assess weaknesses, vulnerabilities in systems that may invite opportunistic attacks |
| • Measure actor’s level of political commitment, especially an all-out effort to bolster capabilities; assess strategic red lines |
| • Do regular strategic stability audits |

Thus, when the British invasion force returned to the Patuxent River in August, senior officials offered a variety of opinions about British intentions. Secretary of the Navy William Jones wrote, “The enemy has entered the Patuxent [River] with a very large force indicating design upon this place [Washington] which may be real, or it may serve to mask his design on Baltimore.” Three days later, he noted that another British flotilla was sailing up the Potomac, but he was unsure of its intentions. “What the nature of his force is, or whether it is accompanied with transports or troops is quite uncertain.”

Armstrong, however, doubted an attack on Washington would take place. “Why the devil would they come here?” he declared, pointing to Baltimore as a more lucrative target. Winder, meanwhile, mused that the British would march to capture Annapolis, whose harbor would serve as a base for attacking Baltimore or Washington. He also insisted that the British army had “no object” other
than Barney’s flotilla, and in the unlikely event they moved on Washington, the invading force was so weak it would accomplish nothing more than “a mere Cossack hurrah.”\(^{18}\)

After Ross’s army landed at Benedict on 19 August, Madison received a report from Monroe, who had taken charge of a cavalry unit to locate and report on the movements of the British forces. Noting that some two dozen enemy vessels were near the town, he inferred that

> the British had moved up the river, either against Com[modore] Barney’s flotilla at Nottingham, confining their views to that object, or taking that in their way & aiming at the city, in combination with the force on the Potowmac.\(^{19}\)

Based on this information, Madison considered why the British would not or would advance on the capital.

> If the force of the Enemy be not greater than yet appears, & he be without Cavalry, it seems extraordinary that he should venture on an enterprise to this distance [meaning to Washington] from his shipping. He may however, count on the effect of boldness & celerity on his side, and the want of precaution on ours. He may be bound also to do something & therefore risk everything.\(^{20}\)

British movements after landing subsequently clouded US perceptions of their intentions. The initial march from Benedict via Nottingham and Upper Marlboro to Pigs Point gave the Americans reason to hope that the British objective was only to destroy Barney’s gunboats. Barney scuttled his vessels just as the British came into view on the morning of 22 August. When Cockburn met with Ross on the morning of 23 August, they agreed to press on to Washington.

The British forces then made their way to Wood Yard after a brief skirmish with the Americans, but shortly after midnight received a message from Vice Admiral Cochrane recalling them to Benedict. Having achieved their principal objective, Cochrane saw no need to risk engagements that might endanger the prospects for capturing his more important strategic objectives, Baltimore and New Orleans. Ross initially wanted to return to the fleet, but Cockburn convinced him otherwise. Ross had his troops moving a few hours later, and ignored a second message from Cochrane ordering him to return. He feinted south toward the bridge crossing the lower Potomac—keeping the Americans from discerning his true objective—before reversing direction toward Bladensburg, where another bridge spanned the river at a fordable crossing point.

Even as the British approached Bladensburg, senior American officials had decidedly different assessments of the outcome of the battle. Jones wrote on 23 August, “Our force is fast accumulating and we shall now retard and ultimately repel if not destroy the forces of the enemy whose numbers are various estimated but I believe does not exceed at most 5,000.” In a memorandum written the next day, Monroe recorded Armstrong’s assessment, “that as the battle would be between militia and regular troops, the former would be beaten.”\(^{21}\)

Armstrong’s forecast proved accurate. Militia from Maryland arrived first on 24 August and deployed near the bridge, only to have Monroe rearrange their dispositions without permission from their commanding officer. Most were quickly pushed back by British infantry supported by Congreve rockets which, while inaccurate, terrified the militia. The British took longer driving off the small number of US Army regulars, Barney’s sailors, and Marines. While they were doing so, Winder ordered a general retreat that included the DC militia who had not fired a shot.

The battle lasted a little more than three hours. The British arrived in Washington later that night and proceeded to burn prominent public buildings. The Americans set fire to the Navy Yard to prevent the British from capturing it intact. The following evening, British retraced their steps after taking heavy casualties when an American munitions dump exploded and after they were buffeted by a violent thunderstorm. As they made their way back to Benedict, the British Potomac flotilla arrived in Alexandria, which promptly surrendered.

**Warning and Postmortem**

Although no formal intelligence apparatus for collection or analysis existed in 1814, it is worth considering what type of warning might have been written for President Madison in August, 1814. As was true with regard to Pearl Harbor in 1941 and 11 September 2001, the threat was imminent, but the intentions of the enemy and the specific targets remained unknown. The exchange of
letters between Monroe and Madison just after the British landed suggest the issues and uncertainties that might be addressed in a warning article like those published in current intelligence today (see right). The article would have addressed the capabilities of the British forces and their possible intentions.

Such a warning piece would have been quickly overtaken by events. Dolly Madson’s letter to her sister on 22 August indicates how quickly the American view of the British threat had evolved into a worst case scenario.

Dear Sister, My husband left me yesterday morning to join General Winder... I have since received two dispatches from him, written with a pencil. The last is alarming, because he desires that I should be ready at a moment’s warning to enter my carriage, and leave the city; that the enemy seemed stronger than had at first been reported, and it might happen that they would reach the city with the intention of destroying it.

The devastating attack on Washington lowered public confidence in Madison’s administration and prompted London to present new demands for a punitive peace at the negotiations in Ghent, Belgium. As noted above, however, the British soon reversed themselves after the US victories at Baltimore and Lake Champlain. The Congress held a perfunctory hearing on the administration’s handling of the British attack on Washington, and briefly considered moving the nation’s capital to Philadelphia or New York. Winder’s conduct at the Battle of Bladensburg was also exonerated by a military court. Copies of the British-signed Treaty of Ghent arrived in the United States in February; it was immediately signed by the president and ratified by the Senate. No commission was convened to study the intelligence failures surrounding the British capture of Washington.

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**British Probably Have Multiple Objectives for Force in Maryland**

The British force now at Benedict is large enough to operate for several days, and possibly weeks, against a range of targets, including Commodore Barney’s gunboat flotilla, nearby towns, and possibly Annapolis, Baltimore, or Washington. Attacks on any of these objectives would be consistent with London’s strategy of drawing our forces away from Canada and conducting punitive raids to weaken public support for the war.

- Two-dozen Royal Navy ships and smaller craft almost certainly landed 2,000–4,000 troops, although apparently without cavalry or artillery, according to reports from our scouts in the area.

- We also have reports that another British flotilla is moving up the Potomac River.

We lack reporting on the goals of the British force, but the absence of a cavalry force and artillery suggests the British want to avoid major engagements and limit their objectives to less well-defended targets. The force, however, is sufficient to attempt the destruction of Barney’s flotilla, trapped upriver at Pigs Point.

- The British are also in position to attack and plunder towns between Benedict and Bladensburg to gather supplies and terrorize the populace.

- If they reach Bladensburg, they would be in position to ford the Potomac and take the National Road to attack Washington in concert with the flotilla sailing up the Potomac.

Alternative objectives may be the port of Annapolis and Baltimore. Annapolis could serve as a base for sustained operations in the Chesapeake Bay. From there, British troops could also reembark and sail north to attempt to take Baltimore, a still more lucrative prize.

- The Secretary of War and the Commander of the Tenth Military District judge the British will attack these cities and not Washington.

Our militia in the Blandensburg region outnumber the British troops and could use defensible terrain to delay or stop the more experienced and better trained British force. The Secretary of War, however, judges that British regulars would prevail against our militia. ☃
Endnotes

1. For a summary and analysis of these accounts, see William Weber, “Could Washington Have Been Saved?” Chapter Six in Neither Victor Nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 (Potomac Press, 2013).
3. Gaddis’ shorthand explanation leaves out several crucial facts. First, the capture of Washington prompted the resignation of Secretary of War, and Revolutionary War General John Armstrong, whose counterparts in 1941 and 2001 remained in office. Second, the American victory at the Battle of Lake Champlain on 11 September 1814 had a far greater impact on British thinking than Jackson’s defense of New Orleans that occurred after the treaty was signed. After losing this naval engagement, the governor-general of Canada, Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost, ordered his army—to retreat to Quebec.

Prevost’s army was the principal British offensive against the United States in 1814, attempting to succeed where General John Burgoyne’s campaign had failed in 1777 at the battle of Saratoga. Success at Plattsburgh was intended to compel Washington to accede to London’s maximalist terms at the peace talks in Ghent, Belgium. Indeed, when news of Prevost’s retreat reached London—triggering his court martial—Prime Minister Liverpool ordered British negotiators to come to terms with the US delegation as quickly as possible. Finally, by the time Jackson won at Bayou Bienvenue outside New Orleans, the signatures were dry on the treaty that was being carried across the Atlantic and was ratified days after it reached Washington in February 1815.

4. Such resignations during war have frequently occurred in US history. Armstrong’s predecessor, William Eustis, resigned after three US invasions of Canada failed in 1812. Simon Cameron, Lincoln’s first secretary of war, resigned in early 1862 over corruption charges. His reputation for corruption was so notorious that Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, when discussing Cameron's honesty with Lincoln, told Lincoln “I don't think that he would steal a red hot stove.” When Cameron demanded Stevens retract this statement, Stevens told Lincoln, "I believe I told you he would not steal a red-hot stove. I will now take that back.” Russell A. Alger resigned at President McKinley’s request during the Spanish American War after “Algerism” became an epithet to describe incompetence regarding the overall performance of the Army, Alger’s poor choice of field commanders, and his inept administration of the department. President Truman asked for Louis A. Johnson’s resignation in 1950 after the administration’s defense economization policies contributed to disaster in Korea. Robert McNamara resigned in 1968 over disagreements with President Johnson over the Vietnam War. Finally, Donald Rumsfeld left office in 2006 after eight retired generals and admirals called for his resignation in what was called the “Generals Revolt,” accusing him of “abysmal” military planning and lack of strategic competence. [http://en.wikipedia.org]

12. Ibid., Chapter 13.
13. Ibid., Chapter 11.
15. Ibid., Chapter 3.
16. Ibid., Chapter 2.
18. Vogel, Chapter 5.
20. Ibid., 291; Monroe 290.

 strawberries
CIA officers seek to understand the complicated workings of foreign governments, but the machinations of the US government are often beyond their ken or interest. I remember as a young analyst being confused by an administration’s decisions but thinking that I wasn’t paid to try to figure out my own government—I had enough to do following the politics of the country I was paid to follow. Of course, as I matured as an analyst, I came to appreciate that understanding the US political environment did help me do my job better.

Robert Gates’s new book, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, will help analysts with the task of understanding the internal factors that affect US security policies. This, his second memoir, covers the period he served as secretary of defense in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations during 2006–2011. His earlier memoir, *From the Shadows*, provided a similar service by explicating the Cold War policies of five US presidents (Nixon through George H.W. Bush) from his perspective as a CIA officer who held policy-related positions with each of those administrations.

In a section devoted to his 2006 Senate confirmation hearings for his appointment as secretary of defense, Gates reflected on his three previous such experiences—for CIA deputy director in 1986 (“a walk in the park”); for CIA director in 1987 (he withdrew because of the Iran-Contra controversy); and for CIA director in 1991 (“protracted and rough”—an understatement in my view). His 2006 confirmation, by a vote of 95-2, was more the “walk in the park” variety not so much because of his experience but because of who he was not (his unpopular predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld). Even as a former director of central intelligence (DCI) with access to the “crown jewels” of US secrets, Gates was amused that he still had to fill out the Standard Form 86 (National Security Questionnaire) for his background check and was obliged to provide a urine sample.

Gates makes a telling remark early on, saying “one of the best decisions” he made was to walk into the Pentagon by himself, with no accompanying staff or even a single personal assistant. “I had often seen,” he relates, “the immensely negative impact on organizations and morale when a new boss showed up with a personal retinue. It always had the earmarks of a hostile takeover and created resentment.” In raising the subject, Gates implicitly is referring to periods in CIA’s history when a new director did just that—Gates had been an executive assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner, President Carter’s DCI, who famously brought in with him a group of Navy officers in 1977. DCI John Deutch and Porter Goss also used this counterproductive approach.

As secretary of defense, Gates found often found that he had less freedom of action than he did as DCI. Massively frustrated by the posturing of certain members of Congress, he seems to have resorted to the therapy of snide thought balloons while never—or hardly ever—voicing what he was really thinking. Of those who criticized certain intelligence methods in the war...
on terror—namely CIA’s rendition and interrogation programs—Gates suggests that they forgot the “fear and urgency” of the immediate post-9/11 environment. At the same time, he is critical of the Bush administration for not conducting a “top to bottom review” of CIA’s methods once the security situation stabilized because such methods, he says, “were most at odds with our traditions, culture, and history.” (93–94).

The specter of intelligence failures clearly shaped Gates’s thinking as secretary of defense. It was “a significant failure on the part of US intelligence agencies” that North Korea’s construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria was something the United States learned from the Israelis in 2007—so much so that Gates is surprised neither the White House nor the Congress made an issue of it. (171) He distrusted as mere “gut instinct” the high “confidence levels” CIA analysts expressed about the presence of Bin Ladin at the Abbottabad compound and initially opposed the raid option in part because of the failure of the 1980 hostage rescue mission in Iran. (538–46)

Regarding present-day policy on Iran, Gates recalls that the Iran-Contra affair had scuttled his first nomination for DCI: “I had learned to be very cautious in dealing with Iran.” (179) He has particularly harsh words for the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that said Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program. At the time it was published, the Bush administration was trying to get other countries to take the issue seriously. This was, Gates says, “a self-inflicted, grievous blow” to the US policy of trying to restrain Iran’s nuclear program: “In my entire career in intelligence, I believe no single estimate did more harm to US security efforts and diplomatic efforts.” (185–86)

Many reviewers of this book have highlighted Gates’s candid observations about senior White House officials. What has gone without remark, however, are Gates’s contrasting views about two very senior intelligence officials. Despite his lack of experience in intelligence, Leon Panetta was a welcome appointment to head the CIA, Gates says, because Panetta had run large government organizations, was politically savvy, respected the intelligence professionals at CIA, displayed “wisdom and common sense,” and above all knew Congress—“a perennial deficiency at CIA.” (293) Gates thought so highly of Panetta that he recommended him as his successor at the Pentagon. (431)

Gates describes retired Admiral Dennis Blair, by contrast, as unsuited for the position of Director of National Intelligence even though he had been a Rhodes scholar and a major combatant commander: “[Blair] actually believed that he was the boss of the US intelligence community [even though] the DNI still did not have the statutory basis or political clout to assert complete authority over others in the intelligence community.” The DNI position requires persuasive skills, Gates says, and “Denny wasn’t much into persuasion.” Blair was “crazy” for making a “frontal assault” on CIA’s prerogatives in choosing senior intelligence representatives abroad, a battle he lost to the more influential (and better liked) Panetta; moreover, Blair’s style in meetings was too forceful and imperious to win allies at the White House. Eventually, Blair was forced out as DNI, with the final straw, in Gates’s opinion, being his unilateral attempt to forge a “no-spy” agreement with France, an idea that had no administration support and “frankly was considered kind of bizarre.” (293–94, 429)

If there is a shortcoming in this book, at least for intelligence officers, it is Gates’s failure to explain how intelligence informed him (or failed him) on a day-to-day basis. He notes the “deep dives” CIA analysts provided President Bush, (94) and he gives full credit to “the extraordinary analysts at CIA” whose “painstaking” work found Bin Ladin—though at the time he thought the entire case was circumstantial and “we were risking the war in Afghanistan on a crapshoot.” (538–40). Gates singles out US intelligence on Afghanistan as inadequate, (478) and at one point he expresses frustration that Washington-based analysis diverged from field assessments—though he thinks the analysis in Washington was probably better. Mostly, he believes that intelligence analysts are typically pessimistic and too ready to offer analysis that undermines policy. (208)

Other than offering a few complaints and kudos, Gates does not treat intelligence as part of his routine as a senior policymaker, which is a little odd, given his background as an analyst and intelligence officer supporting senior policymakers. Gates always writes eloquently and with deep knowledge about every foreign defense and security situation he confronts—how did he get so smart on so many topics? He may well be his own best teacher, but even so, I expected to hear something about how he kept himself up-to-date with intelligence and how well it served him.
As with his earlier memoir, Gates reveals much about himself in this present work. He admits to failures, frequently wonders whether he should have quit (his devotion to the troops kept him at it), and often expresses doubts about his own judgment and decisions. In explaining to Congress why he wanted gradual implementation of a major personnel policy change at Defense, Gates recounts that he had experience leading three large organizations: CIA, Texas A&M (he was university president), and DoD, and he had learned something:

_I had managed change before. I had done it smart, and I had done it stupid. I had done it stupid, early in my career at CIA, by trying to impose significant change by edict from the top._

At one time at CIA, Gates was considered a profoundly controversial, even polarizing figure. Many old-timers may still dislike him for past perceived sins; for some younger CIA officers, he might be a statesman or even a hero; and for others, he was very bright and very fortunate. On one of his final trips abroad as secretary of defense, Gates visited Russia in March 2011 and reflected:

_I thought about the remarkable path I had followed during the forty-three years since I began work as a junior Soviet analyst at CIA two days before the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia._

All might agree that Robert Gates has written a lively, detailed, heartfelt, engaging book that describes the last chapter of an extraordinary career that began with intelligence and ends with his identification with and devotion to America’s uniformed protectors. He has even charted his final journey in the book’s final paragraph:

_I am eligible to be buried at Arlington National Cemetery. I have asked to be buried in Section 60, where so many of the fallen from Iraq and Afghanistan have been laid to rest. The greatest honor possible would be to rest among my heroes for all eternity._

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Intelligence in Public Literature

The Last Warlord: The Life and Legend of Dostum, the Afghan Warlord Who Led US Special Forces to Topple the Taliban Regime


Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

The past 40 plus years of conflict in Afghanistan have given us a number of charismatic characters fit for future biographies. But to date, the lives of only four of these individuals have been captured in books in the English language: Hamid Karzai, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and the subject of this review, Abdul Rashid Dostum. Of the four, Dostum perhaps has been the least well known but consistently the most maligned player in the conflict. Brian Williams’s insightful book into Dostum and his life and times is therefore a welcome addition to our understanding of this larger-than-life character, who has been, and continues to be, so much a part of the history and politics of Afghanistan. Written in a clear and entertaining style, The Last Warlord will appeal to intelligence specialists as well as readers with a more casual interest in Afghanistan or non-Western military leadership.

After hours of extensive interviews, Williams has worked hard to match Dostum’s descriptions of his life and times with what few records are available. He has used surviving documents from the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) that corroborate Dostum’s description of his life in the 1980s as the head of the DRA Uzbek militia forces as well as press and other unclassified sources. These materials tend to focus heavily on the dread the Uzbeks inspired in the resistance—the Uzbeks were referred to at the time as the gilamjam (literally, carpet thieves or plunderers).

There is little more in the unclassified literature covering Dostum’s life after the DRA, as his activities in the north were eclipsed by those of Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Taliban’s religious and ethnic cleansing efforts throughout Afghanistan and particularly in the north. After 9/11, once US forces linked up with Dostum that fall, US official reports and journalistic accounts match most, if not all, of Dostum’s descriptions of events.

The arc of Dostum’s multiple careers in the military and in government could easily be viewed as the model of leadership survival through decades of conflict, when Afghan leaders often changed sides to live and fight another day, used their charisma to hold their followers, and courted luck to succeed. Dostum grew up in a rural village of Jowzjan and only found his professional calling after he was drafted into national military service. He progressed from private to commander of the Uzbek militia through charisma, practical military skills, and ambition. His progressively more prominent successes brought him to the attention of the last leader of the DRA, Mohammad Najibullah.

Before he assumed national leadership, Najibullah had led the Afghan security service and come to understand the value of using Uzbek militias in Pashtun-dominated southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Uzbeks had no love for Pashtuns, and they were especially hostile to the Afghan resistance, which was increasingly influenced by Islamic fundamentalist dogma openly hostile to the Hanafi/Sufi doctrines of northern Afghan Islam. Dostum and his militia were successful in virtually every battle they fought, and even when they were not, DRA propagandists disguised their failures in order to preserve the Uzbek’s reputation as invincible raiders.

Once the Soviets left Afghanistan, Najibullah was forced for his own preservation to seek reconciliation with the resistance, and Dostum and the Uzbeks became liabilities. After a short-lived alliance with Massoud, Dostum withdrew to the north, where he controlled his home.
province until the Taliban took control. After suffering a defeat to the Taliban, Dostum escaped at the last minute to Uzbekistan and went into a brief exile in Turkey. He returned to Afghanistan in early 2001, with the help of his former adversary, ally, and rival, Massoud.

Dostum’s descriptions of his guerrilla operations in the mountains in Samangan as provided to Williams are rich in detail. Dostum is an excellent raconteur and has a memory for military detail. His descriptions of how his militia conducted ambush and raiding operations for more than 40 years provide a wealth of tactical and technical information that make Williams’s book worthwhile reading for any professional in the intelligence or special operations communities interested in unconventional warfare.

Dostum’s description of events after after 9/11 can be matched against declassified Special Forces dispatches and other published material. This part of the story has been described in Doug Stanton’s The Horse Soldiers, Gary Schroen’s First In, Gary Bernsten’s Jawbreaker, and the dispatches of multiple journalists, including Robert Pelton, who lived with Dostum for several weeks after the Taliban recaptured Mazar-e-Sharif. Williams makes good use of this material in corroborating and enhancing Dostum’s recollections and analysis and summarizing unclassified descriptions. The result is a page-turning story of resistance fighters with US counterparts on horseback.

Williams hints at, but does not address, the longstanding links that Dostum has had with both the Hazara Shia of Central Afghanistan and the Ismaili Shia of Samangan provinces, links that involved military alliances during the entire 40 years of conflict. Dostum’s ability to engage and build military alliances with other ethnic minorities is one of his key leadership qualities and one that has been essential to his success in unconventional warfare.

The last chapters of the book offer a balanced discussion of the post-Taliban problems among the various military figures in the North. Both Dostum and his Tajik counterpart and rival, Mohammed Atta, faced a bul-centric national government run by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader more comfortable with the intricacies of tribal politics of the area South of the Hindu Kush than with the multiethnic challenges of the North. The Tajiks who became part of the central government, all from the Panjshir Valley, were hostile to Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras of Central Afghanistan and even Tajiks from the far west such as Ismail Khan. They were barely supportive of Tajiks like Atta, who eventually became a successful governor of Balkh Province.

Unlike most of the figures from the region who worked hard to come to some accommodation with the central government, Dostum and his entourage were more aggressive, demanding some degree of recognition of the Uzbek minority. The central government under Karzai responded, reinforcing the ethnic prejudices and exaggerations of Dostum’s character and pressing Dostum to once again live in exile.

The book ends with Dostum’s return from exile in 2009 and his reinstatement in a nominal position in the government in 2009. In the aftermath of political machinations, and as the 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan approach, Dostum is now a candidate for vice president, allied with the Pashtun presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, the former minister of finance, and Hazara Shia Sarwar Danish, candidate for second vice president.

A challenge Williams faced in writing this biography was how to address accusations that Dostum not only is a warlord but a “war criminal.” Williams alludes to this in the first few pages of the book when he expresses concern over his personal safety at his first meeting with Dostum in 2003. Williams knew he was about to meet a man who had been accused of atrocities for nearly 40 years. Williams points out that most of those stories were (and continue to be) told as “absolutely true” even though no one in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the West can find any eyewitness reporting. While Williams had no doubt that Dostum was a man of violence, he simply could not accept stories that Dostum “crushed men’s skulls with his bare hands or had a laugh that frightened men to death.” (12–13) Throughout the book, Williams points to the consistent conflict between the exaggerations about Dostum and the gilijam and the data provided by eyewitness accounts he collected himself or obtained from other sources.

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Dostum’s Jowzjani militia established a reputation over 40 years of war as the most lethal fighting force in Afghanistan. As a military leader Dostum perpetuated this reputation to erode his enemies’ will to fight as he built his credibility as a regional and national political figure, and at times he has been willing to expand this image almost to absurdity. At the same time, Dostum’s adversaries use some of the same stories to undermine him.

Given the mix of fact and fiction and the benefits to all sides of perpetuating different parts of Dostum fiction, it is likely no one will ever be able to come to a balanced understanding of his place in Afghan history. Williams does his best to undermine some of the more egregious claims and offers a more nuanced view of the realities of the vicious 40-year civil war and one of its chief actors.

*The Last Warlord* captures a larger than life character who has been on nearly every side of the Afghan conflict in the last 40 years. Williams has not only superbly portrayed Dostum as a hero to his Uzbek people but also as a real person whose personal and professional flaws in part explain his relegation to a regional rather than a national role in Afghanistan. For this reason alone, I strongly recommend this work to readers who want to understand an important Afghan figure as a human being living in a country in seemingly perpetual conflict.

Finally, I think it is worth observing that “war stories” are usually the memories of adrenaline-filled observers living through violence. For this reason, until the US government declassifies all the material collected by the Special Forces and CIA personnel on the ground in the fall of 2001, it is unlikely that any single book or article will capture fully what really happened in Northern Afghanistan during September–December 2001. This book gives readers the rare perspective of an Afghan leader who lived through 40 years of conflict before the defeat of the Taliban.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House

Peter Baker. (Doubleday, 2013), 816 pp., index.

Reviewed by Thomas Coffey

Days of Fire is more a breezy and well-written walk down memory lane than an original take on the George W. Bush presidency. The narrative is skin deep, and the book comes across at times as handy crib notes on the Bush, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, and Rove memoirs. Peter Baker, chief White House correspondent for the New York Times, talked with many former officials, but these interviews only underscore how little new there is to say. The Bush administration has been an open secret since the Bob Woodward books gave readers an inside look.a Except for the new and absorbing treatment of the differences between Bush and Cheney about a pardon for Cheney’s aide Scooter Libby, the book is surprisingly short on interactions between the two men. But there is something to be said about retelling an important story, especially when it comes to the president and vice president’s interactions with the national security team and the Intelligence Community.

The book starts by rebutting the commonplace impression that Vice President Cheney was the real power behind the Oval Office. Baker underscores that President Bush was very much his own man and that Cheney was an unequal and silent partner giving counsel. Bush controlled meetings of the National Security Council and briefings with intelligence officers. The circumstances surrounding one of these briefings regarding the August 2001 PDB item, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,” is suitably raised. The same cannot be said about the book’s treatment of the voluminous threat reporting passed on to the White House every morning after the 9/11 attack. The author quotes Cheney’s description of the threat matrix as a “cover-your-ass kind of bureaucratic procedure.” This recognition did not stop the seemingly incessant reporting from giving the impression the nation was under siege. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said the reporting “had a huge impact on our psyches.”

On the controversial decision to invade Iraq, the book points out that policymaker consideration of that move started well before intelligence became a major factor in the decision. Baker quotes the president’s speaking of “taking Saddam out” before 9/11, and he notes Bush asked Rumsfeld to develop a plan for an invasion in late September 2001. CIA and Intelligence Community officers walked into a highly-charged policy atmosphere—hardly a first for intelligence—when they were asked to assess the relationship between Saddam Hussein and al Qa’ida and for specifics of WMD stockpiling and production.

At the same time, Baker regurgitates the worn line suggesting there was something insidious about high-level White House interaction with the CIA about intelligence on Iraq’s WMD and its relationship with Al Qa’ida. After noting investigations found no evidence that Cheney had applied pressure during his many visits to CIA headquarters for Iraq briefings, Baker goes on to quote an unnamed CIA officer saying, “analysts felt more politicized and pushed than any of them could remember.” The author would have been better off sticking with insights from Deputy Director John McLaughlin and Associate Deputy Director for Operations Michael Sulick, which suggested the White House had encouraged, intentionally or not, confirmation bias in CIA officers and that analysts were instructed to give firmer, more sweeping judgments, possibly in response to not connecting the dots prior to 9/11.

The visit of Director Tenet and DDCI John McLaughlin to the White House in late December 2002 to brief the president and vice president on Iraq gets blurrier with each retelling. Was it an intelligence briefing to assess the state of the case against Saddam Hussein? Or was that matter settled and the meeting more about convincing the public the Iraq leader possessed WMD? Tenet saw

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 58, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2014)
the briefing as the latter, helping to explain the bravado behind his “slam dunk” assurance the argument could be strengthened. Baker views the distinction as a subtle one.

The book is a constant reminder of the difficulties that arise when intelligence is used to advocate a major government policy, whether it is a speech in Cincinnati, an interview on Meet the Press, or a UN presentation. The more integral intelligence on Iraq became to Bush administration policy formulation and outreach, the more CIA officials risked giving tacit approval to the implications of their support. When they stepped back, however, policy officials sometimes mischaracterized the intelligence. Calling them on it created its own set of problems. This all seemed to come to a head when Secretary of State Powell did what the occasion demanded during his UN presentation: he made a case for action against Saddam through clear and powerful language describing the intelligence. Baker tells us Powell had Tenet sit behind him to demonstrate CIA’s endorsement of the evidence.

The truth, of course, is more complicated. Analysts and spies working the issue operated under a compelling backdrop: Saddam Hussein had WMD; he did not account for their destruction; therefore, he must still have WMD. That alone was quite an indictment. The Iraqis also appeared to be giving UN inspectors the runaround. By adding the possibility of deception to the equation, the Iraqis had placed on themselves the burden of proof to show Iraq did not have weapons. The CIA arms inspector David Kay may have captured it best when he blamed the wrong analysis not on politicization but on the Iraqis, who acted guilty—as though they had weapons.

Although Baker mentions David Kay’s insights, Days of Fire reads like a book in a hurry, with little time to dig deeper or reflect on events. So it falls to the telling quote to jar the reader: “Are you going to take care of this guy or not,” an impatien Cheney asks the president about toppling Saddam by military force. “We’ll see who is right,” Bush defiantly tells the CIA briefer passing on the agency’s pessimism about Iraq’s first national elections. “It sounded like amateur hour at the CIA,” Cheney concludes upon learning Tenet was not told about a CIA-sponsored mission to Niger to inquire about Iraqi purchases of uranium. The aftermath of the Niger mission—including a special prosecutor investigation into whether the administration purposely blew a CIA officer’s cover—provides the book’s most striking quote. Upon learning his chief of staff would not be pardoned after being found guilty of perjury, Cheney takes the president to task for “leaving a good man wounded on the field of battle.”

The two men were waging “War on Terror,” after all. Together they remade the CIA and military into organizations fixated on targeting—the capturing or killing of terrorists—and fighting weapons proliferation. But whereas Cheney wanted to continue fighting the war in an aggressive way, Baker tells us Bush by his second term wanted to rely more on diplomacy and the promotion of democracy. They were already growing apart as Bush learned from experience and needed less of Cheney’s veteran advice. And now their policy differences were on display in front of the national security team. The book’s account of how Cheney was the lone voice supporting a US bombing raid on a nuclear power reactor in Syria drove home how much things had changed. Instead of the usual talk behind closed doors, Bush called out Cheney to get his isolated view for all to see.

It had changed for intelligence officers, as well. No longer would a measured brief on such an issue—high confidence the facility is a nuclear reactor, low confidence it is part of a weapons program—be overlooked. Bush refused to authorize a strike given the latter judgment, even though Director Michael Hayden recounts telling the president that, despite the lack of evidence, he found it hard to imagine that the plant was part of anything else. IC comfort with uncertainty may have gone on board with the 2007 Iran NIE. While the 2002 estimate on Iraq WMD was misleading in its certainty, the Iran NIE was misleading in its ambiguity. Downplaying the key issue of uranium enrichment, the estimate focused on how the weaponization program was halted in 2003, but the analysts were only “moderately confident” it had not been restarted. The drafters also stressed they did not know whether Iran intended to develop nuclear weapons. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley is quoted as calling the estimate a “disaster” for garnering international support for tougher sanctions.

The Iran NIE’s summary is one of the relatively few documentary sources in Days of Fire. And now that most former officials have had their say about the Bush presidency, it turns to the George W. Bush Presidential Library—where the two men made their only post-administration appearance together—to give a richer, more documented take on the relationship.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Covert Capital: Landscapes of Denial and the Making of US Empire in the Suburbs of Northern Virginia
Reviewed by John Ehrman

Social and cultural approaches have a lot of potential for expanding our understanding of intelligence history. In general, intelligence histories are written from the top down, focusing on organizational development, the relationships of political leaders with their services, biographies of service chiefs and other significant figures, or major cases and episodes. These can give some idea of what it is like to work in intelligence, but even the best of these books provide only a limited sense of the experience, leaving unexamined the inner life of a service and its relationship—both at the personal and institutional levels—with surrounding environments. Looking at this would be especially interesting for the CIA, given its sometimes uncomfortable place in American society. Haverford College historian Andrew Friedman seeks to accomplish precisely this in his unusual contribution to the study of intelligence culture, Covert Capital.

Anyone planning to read Covert Capital should be aware of two points, however. The first is that Friedman’s work is overtly political, descending from revisionist histories of US expansionism and imperialism; he sees US behavior abroad, especially since 1945, not only as imperialist, but as resting on a foundation of racism, state criminality, and repression and violence on a global scale. Unfortunately, this is a simple view, with no subtleties or sense of the deeply-rooted contradictions in American foreign policy, let alone an appreciation for the difficulties of real-world diplomacy. Instead, Friedman inhabits a simple, black-and-white moral universe, where the CIA is the US government’s main tool for carrying out its oppressive policies. How much a reader agrees or disagrees with this point of view will do much to shape their reaction to Covert Capital.

Potential readers also need to be prepared to wade through three hundred pages of horrendous writing. Friedman is one of those authors who believe that any point worth making is worth repeating three or four times. In doing so, moreover, he employs tedious postmodern academic jargon to find and explain profound significance in the most mundane aspects of life. This leads him to build complex paragraphs out of long, convoluted sentences, and one can open the book to virtually any page to find something like this:

Turning toward rather than away from these complexities can narrate anti-racist social histories of suburban and imperial migration and movement that do not merely recast suburbia as the implicit and natural ground for an apolitical, everyday middle-class life, and do not merely recast empire as something that always happens somewhere else, inflicted by system onto no one, and, as such, having no insistent and tortured echoes in the cul-de-sacs of everyday spatial and domestic American life at the lived scale. (219)

One wonders, to put it in postmodern terms, if Friedman intentionally set out to subvert his text by making it unreadable.

Nonetheless, anyone willing (and able) to go the distance will find Covert Capital an interesting experience. It is an uneven book, at once captivating, informative, and thought provoking, but also infuriating, simplistic, and disappointing. Most surprising, given Friedman’s terrible prose, it is rarely dull.

The core of Friedman’s argument is that, while Washington is the overt capital of the United States, the Dulles corridor west of the city is the “covert capital of the U.S. empire.” (19) It is in this area, stretching from Alexan-
itself to the secrecy beneficial to both the U.S. government and suburban life,” making Northern Virginia the “central management point and habitat for U.S. imperial planning and residence for more than half a century.” (3)

The CIA, Friedman believes, provides the best vehicle for examining the covert capital. The agency took the leading role implementing US imperial policy abroad while, in Northern Virginia, its “culture seeped from its headquarters” to shape the Dulles corridor’s political, physical, and socio-economic development. (9)

Friedman is at his best as a storyteller, narrating the physical development of Northern Virginia. The first chapter, in which he recounts the decision to build the CIA’s headquarters in McLean, is the high point of the book. CIA Director Allen Dulles chose McLean, Friedman tells us, in large part because his sister, Eleanor, already had moved the social life of Washington’s foreign policy elite to her home on Spring Hill Rd. There, her parties offered senior intelligence officials and policymakers opportunities to mingle informally and enabled Allen, in a socially comfortable environment, to influence policy away from the openness of traditional Washington.

Placing the CIA headquarters nearby served several purposes. Most important, it not only enabled Dulles to locate the Agency in a familiar place but, as an imposing physical presence, the new headquarters made a clear statement that the CIA would be a permanent part of the US government. Moreover, because the headquarters compound was known to the public, the building symbolized the open, nonthreatening role of intelligence in a democracy. At the same time, however, the building was hidden in the woods behind Virginia Route 123, shrouded in a “veil of…secrecy” that hid what was going on inside. (47) Therefore, it also was a “powerful model for the disavowal of U.S. imperialism,” which Friedman says makes the complex a “landscape of denial.” (47)

Subsequent chapters have equally interesting accounts of how other aspects of Northern Virginia’s development are connected to the CIA. Most of us driving down Route 193 have noticed Saigon Road but do not know that the wooded acreage around it was developed by Mark Merrell, one of the first US officials to serve in Vietnam. It then became a popular neighborhood for CIA officers returning from tours in Southeast Asia. Friedman also provides brief accounts of the private lives of CIA officers and their families as they populated the new suburbs of Northern Virginia. In so doing, he reminds us that CIA staff played a role not only in developing McLean, but also new towns like Reston, and they became leaders in local politics and culture.

Similarly, few of us remember, or ever knew, that the noted science fiction author James Tiptree, Jr., actually was Alice Sheldon, herself both a CIA employee and the wife of senior agency officer. Her turn to writing, Friedman notes, was a reaction to the strict male-dominated hierarchies of the 1950s that limited opportunities for women in the CIA, as well as in society in general. In her books, “oppressed people, often women,” meet powerful aliens who “express [their] power through violence.” (119, 121) This, according to Friedman, elevated Tiptree/Sheldon’s works above the usual level of stories that CIA families normally tell about themselves, making them “crucial covert capital texts.” (118)

Friedman also has a lot to say about connections between the Agency, Vietnam, and Northern Virginia. As CIA officers traveled back and forth between Saigon and their homes in McLean, says Friedman, they developed a sense of “twinned transnational domesticity, forged through U.S. empire,” that created an “intimacy between Vietnam and Virginia.” (158, 160) This led some CIA officers to try to shape Northern Virginia politics as they had South Vietnam’s, and also to engage in real estate speculation and development in both places as a single, continuous part of US imperialism.

Nor did this process stop, Friedman points out, with the end of the US involvement in Vietnam in 1975. He tells of the development of Eden Center at Seven Corners, and how it became central to the Vietnamese refugee community in Virginia, many of whose members had worked with the CIA before the collapse of the Saigon government. American and South Vietnamese flags fly at the entrance, and “Vietnamese intimates of U.S. empire in Vietnam crafted in the controlled space of the strip mall a testament to the intimacy and lost geography of Saigon right on the front lawn of their former collaborators.” (193–94)

The CIA’s shaping of Northern Virginia is not just an artifact of the agency’s arrival in McLean and the Vietnam years, however. Friedman describes a second phase, in the
1980s, driven by the arrival of the CIA’s Iranian partners fleeing the revolution and the rise of private contractors. It was then, he notes, that CIA contractors—both well-known corporations, such as MITRE and BDM, and small companies started by agency veterans—shaped the landscape around the area as they put up buildings “defined by their repetitious bands of opaque glass” and secure vaults, especially at Tysons. (220) Reagan-era covert action was run from there, with a “businesslike corporate veneer” that went “hand in hand with a new longing for the masculine thrill” of cowboy-like adventures in Central America that recreated the excitement of the Vietnam years but, ultimately, led to the Iran-Contra debacle. (235–36)

Unfortunately, Friedman’s storytelling is better than his analysis. Because his version of the history of the growth of Northern Virginia focuses almost exclusively on CIA, he falls victim to tunnel vision, investing small details with great significance. As a result, Friedman’s stories form only a weak foundation for the analytic edifice he tries to build. The biblical quote carved into the lobby of the Original Headquarters Building, Friedman tells us, “incorporated the promise of truth into the lobby and suggest[ed] that going deeper into the complex would fulfill that truth…the quote and the lobby instilled a longing to access that truth.” (69) Aside from the pretentiousness of this statement, one wonders how many Agency employees know what the quote is or, given the lobby’s inconvenient location relative to parking and most destinations in the building, even see it more than once in a great while. As for the office buildings around Tysons, their architecture—regrettably, to be sure—is no different than what may be found in any suburban office park elsewhere in the country. They seem to be less a reflection of aggressive imperialism than of corporate architects’ lack of imagination.

Another problem with Covert Capital is that, in examining the CIA’s role in Northern Virginia, Friedman fails to consider what impact other players might have had. If the CIA played a large role in US imperialism, then so did many other actors, and they also had important parts in shaping Northern Virginia’s landscape and culture. The Defense Department, for example, was physically present at the Pentagon almost two decades before the CIA came to McLean, and the hundreds of thousands of DoD military and civilian employees who have passed through its doors likely have done more to shape the region, whether in war or peace, than the much smaller CIA. (The CIA may have been vital to the growth of Tysons, but would there be a Crystal City without the Pentagon?) Friedman’s examination of how the CIA shaped Northern Virginia further suggests that looking at how the National Security Agency—an organization with a headquarters complex at Ft. Meade, Maryland, far larger than the CIA’s—and its contractors have affected Columbia, Jessup, and the Baltimore-Washington corridor to the north of the city might also be a worthwhile exercise.

A final problem for Friedman is the dynamism of Northern Virginia. Even if we accept Friedman’s point that CIA had an outsized influence when it arrived in what was a rural, conservative, segregated area, Northern Virginia today is vastly different. By the 1980s, the latter part of the period Freidman considers, Northern Virginia had begun to transform into a center of high technology, international corporate headquarters, and higher education that reliably votes Democratic. In this context, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the CIA’s influence has vastly declined.

In sum, had Friedman not focused relentlessly on the CIA, he might have produced a more nuanced, richer work. Certainly, in the right hands, the cultural intersection of the CIA, other government agencies, and the development of Northern Virginia could be terrific history. Covert Capital is worth reading to see one possible way to look at this story, but it is far from the last word on the topic.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

With Friends Like These... The Soviet Bloc’s Clandestine War Against Romania (Volume I).
Larry L. Watts (Editura Militara/Military Publishing House, 2010), 733 pp., maps, appendices.

Extorting Peace: Romania, The Clash Within the Warsaw Pact and The End of the Cold War (Volume 2).

Reviewed by Christopher D. Jones

Since 1989, a very rich literature, including memoirs and histories by political figures turned historians, has emerged around the Cold War, a historical period like no other. To the best of my knowledge and in my view, no such study yet published matches the achievement of Larry Watts’s two-volume study of Romania’s relations with the major players of the Cold War. It is a fair, balanced, accurate, and compelling revisionist history of Soviet bloc policy based on a meticulous study of the creation and collapse of communist Romania, a saga whose full historical significance Watts has made visible.

Because Watts brings to light new documents and fresh interpretations, everything about it will be controversial. The evidence for these volumes comes from recently available archives from Western and Warsaw Pact intelligence and diplomatic bureaucracies. His carefully parsed interpretations of these documents rests on his encyclopedic familiarity with the fine details of Romanian history since the late 19th century — details he has presented in earlier publications in Romanian and English. Volume I covers the period from 1878 to 1978, and Volume II, the period from 1979 to 1989. Watts plans a third volume covering Romania’s reentry into Europe after 1989.

These volumes appear to have already proved their utility for intelligence professionals. During a conversation with Watts in the summer of 2013, I learned that he teaches a course in Romania on intelligence and the Cold War in a program jointly run by Romania’s intelligence service and Bucharest University. Like the two volumes reviewed here, parts of Watts’s course focus on problems and pitfalls of intelligence analysis—where it tends to go wrong, what analysts tend not to observe or understand, and why. In addition, his books are used as texts at Romania’s National Intelligence Institute and National Defense University as well as the major Romanian civilian universities.

The detailed case studies in both volumes are also used in denial and deception courses at the US National Intelligence University (NIU). Watts recently held a seminar with the NIU teaching staff at the Defense Intelligence Agency on Soviet denial and deception operations against Romania. In a fact-checking exchange with Watts, I also learned that NIU and DIA is involved in the training provided by NATO’s HUMINT Center of Excellence located in Romania.

Watts’s texts proceed along three parallel tracks. One is an analytical challenge to the prevailing conventional wisdom on Romanian foreign policy and security during the Cold War. These views of Romania are held by most officials in the American and European intelligence agencies and foreign ministries, and by most Western academic specialists. Watts argues that Romania, nominally a member of Soviet bloc institutions, in fact pursued independent domestic and international policies that were, from the standpoint of bloc cohesion, even more subversive than those of Yugoslavia and Albania. Yugoslavia stopped participating in bloc activity after 1948, and Albania ceased its participation in the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in the early 1960s. But Romania used its membership in these institutions to challenge specific Soviet policies and the Soviet claim to leadership within the bloc.

Demonstrating Romanian independence is more analytically difficult than the Yugoslav and Albanian cases because officials in Bucharest were eager to pose for photographs at Warsaw Pact diplomatic conclaves and,
like Yugoslavia, maintained carefully managed economic ties with COMECON. But after 1964, Romania did not attend or host joint Warsaw Pact exercises and stopped coordinating educational and political indoctrination programs with Moscow. Bucharest refused to participate in and publicly condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and even mobilized Romanian resistance to a possible Pact intervention against the Ceausescu regime. In the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, Romania refused to cooperate with the Soviet bloc’s anti-Israeli policies.

The second track is an argument based on Watts’s extensive—if not overwhelming—archival evidence that Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s Central Committee “Secret Department” (for liaison with ruling communist parties abroad) and the Soviet intelligence agencies achieved what could be the most remarkable maskirovka (deception) of the Cold War: convincing Western observers that the Soviets orchestrated for their own purposes the entire gamut of Romanian policies that diverged from Soviet bloc programs for the states of the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, and the international communist movement.

The third track is an effort to explain why and how various Western bureaucracies (including intelligence services) and academic experts used erroneous analytical frameworks in dealing with the challenges posed by Bucharest. The Watts volumes claim that Western observers, both inside and outside government, sometimes also dismissed defections and challenges to Soviet hegemony posed by the ruling parties in Belgrade and Tirana, just as they were slow to accept the split between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In a plot line related to the third track, Watts also addresses a perennial intelligence question: How much does intelligence analysis really drive White House behavior? Watts argues that Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter appeared to dismiss the views of intelligence and academic experts to engage in their own closely-held discussions with Romanian officials on a range of issues—especially China, the Warsaw Pact, the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In pursuing the three tracks identified above Watts opens every chapter with a series of striking citations from various archives. His citations prepare readers for extensive discussion of key sources and for his challenges to the prevailing wisdom. I offer two examples.

The first—perhaps Watts’s most significant and controversial contribution to Cold War historiography—is an account of the Soviet–Romanian struggle over the Warsaw Pact Statute proposed in 1978. In the end, Romania refused to sign. The six remaining members, led by the USSR, adopted the statute in 1980. In other words, for all practical purposes Ceausescu had withdrawn Romania from the Warsaw Pact at the dawn of the “New Cold War” of the early 1980s. And the West took as much notice as it did when Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968—none at all.

Watts also makes a well-documented and plausible argument that Ceausescu had long advocated programs of arms control and détente that anticipated the treaties signed around the end of the Cold War—INF, CFE, and START I. However, Watts does not claim that the Western states involved in those treaties paid any serious attention to the Ceausescu agenda, even as they moved along its trajectory. But he makes a case in chapters 11 and 12 of the second volume that Moscow drew on Romanian concepts to develop the Soviet arms control agenda, despite irritation at Bucharest’s effrontery. The argument is one of several instances in which Watts reveals a respect for Ceausescu’s diplomacy.

How readers assess and interpret the documents Watts uses will depend on where they stand on various issues. That is, perspectives will differ among agencies and experts in Washington, Moscow, Bucharest and other national capitals—e.g., Beijing, Pyongyang, and Hanoi—invested in affirming their own narratives of the Cold War.

If as Watts suggests, Soviet, Romanian, Warsaw Pact, Chinese, and Western actors were engaged in complex strategies of mutual deception, usually involving agents, double agents, and witting and unwitting agents of influence, all parties involved went to great lengths to lend credibility to their public positions and to establish plausible deniability for clandestine actions. Hence we are likely to witness endless arguments over who was deceiving whom.

Such arguments have already broken out in Romania, where the Watts books were published in English and Romanian. It will be intriguing to see if similar disputes play out in Russia, China, North Korea, and Vietnam. Perhaps the most interesting responses will come from survivors and successors of the KGB and other commanding heights of the Soviet era. Given the contemporary Impli-
cations of the Watts studies, perhaps they will default to a Russian mindset identified by David Satter in his 2013 study, It Was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past.a

If the analytical communities in Beijing, Hanoi and Pyongyang take note of Watts’s arguments, will complications arise in the delicate duets Beijing and Moscow are performing on the stages of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? What does Watts say about the fact that most of the people who lived under communist regimes in 1989 continue to live under ruling communist parties today? Can Watts offer insights into why the CCP prospered on its national road to socialism while Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania hit a dead end on theirs?

In my judgment as a teacher in this field, the three volumes will constitute a trilogy that should be required reading not only for historians of modern Romania but for any historian, political scientist, or intelligence analyst seeking to understand the internal Cold War dynamics of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. I leave it to Intelligence Community readers to judge the heuristic value of the Watts oeuvre to tradecraft and to consider why the intelligence and policy communities may have made the errors that Watts sees. For my part, I accept Watts’s overall conclusions.

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Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics

Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror, by Erik Prince.

Out of The Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, by David Kilcullen.

Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, by Kenneth M. Pollack.

Historical

America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, by Hugh Wilford.

Brave Genius: A Scientist, a Philosopher, and Their Daring Adventures from the French Resistance to the Nobel Prize, by Sean B. Carroll.

The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer.

George Washington’s Secret Six: The Spy Ring That Saved the American Revolution, by Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger.


Reflections of Honor: The Untold Story of a Nisei Spy, by Lorraine War and Katherine Erwin, with Yoshinobu Oshiro.

The Secret War for the Middle East: The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence Operations during World War II, by Youssef Aboul-Enein and Basil Aboul-Enein.


The Siege: 68 Hours Inside the Taj Hotel, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy.

Spy Chronicles: Adventures in Espionage from the American Revolution to the Cold War, by E. L. Sanders.


Tales From the Special Forces Club: The Untold Stories of Britain’s Elite WW II Warriors, by Sean Rayment.


Memoirs

Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA, by John Rizzo.

My CIA: Memories of a Secret Career, by Christopher David Costanzo.

Intelligence Abroad

Re-energising Indian Intelligence, by Manoj Shrivastava.
Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror, by Erik Prince. (Portfolio/Penguin, 2013) 404 pp., endnotes, photos, no index.

During the war in Iraq, private security firms were hired to protect civilian US government employees. By late 2007, Blackwater Security Consulting (BSC) had become the most well known and controversial of these companies. Former Blackwater CEO Erik Prince notes in his “set-the-record-straight” account, Civilian Warriors, “in the court of public opinion…we were mercenaries…cowboys…paid too much…beholden to no one—Bush’s private army, run by a Roman Catholic war profiteer.” (206) His book, which addresses the now widely discussed September 2007 incident in Nisour Square, Baghdad, offers a different interpretation.

The Nisour Square case, which continues in litigation to this day, involves the killing of civilians by a Blackwater security team as it was clearing a route for a diplomatic convoy. Civilian Warriors describes a Blackwater team in a high threat environment reacting to an approaching car which did not obey instructions and thus was assumed to be carrying a bomb. As it turned out it was only carrying a medical student and his mother. As the team reacted, it began taking AK-47 fire from insurgents. In the firefight that ensued, numerous innocent civilians were killed along with attackers. (207–220) The resulting controversy led to indictments in the United States and testy congressional appearances and became the tipping point for Blackwater’s departure from Iraq after its contract was terminated in 2009. Prince describes events that led up to that turning point and the changes the company underwent as a result.

The earlier chapters cover Prince’s home life, his education—the Naval Academy and Hillsdale College—and service as a Navy SEAL. It was his SEAL experience that led him to create Blackwater in 1997. It evolved into a major security firm under contract to the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA; created its own training facility; and provided highly skilled security teams with the latest weapons, armored vehicles, and helicopters, quickly and wherever needed. Prince claims Blackwater never lost a person it was tasked to protect.

As Prince relates, Blackwater gradually acquired a reputation as an elite security organization that could also perform special operations when tasked. In some eyes it competed or threatened to compete with elements in the government with similar responsibilities but without so many legal constraints. This fact, perhaps more than any other, contributed to Blackwater’s bureaucratic vulnerability, legal problems, and ultimate downfall.

Civilian Warriors deals with these issues in considerable detail. It explains why Blackwater changed its name—first to Xe Services and then to ACADEMI—and why Prince left the company to start a new security organization. In the end, he notes, “If I had it to do all over again, I’m not sure I would.” (310) He provides a detailed critique of government behavior that led him to that conclusion. It is an interesting book, with many lessons to be learned.


David Kilcullen is a former Australian Army officer who served as civilian adviser on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to US Army Gen. David Petraeus. An earlier book of Kilcullen’s, The Accidental Guerrilla, argued persuasively that to deal successfully with counterinsurgencies, nations must address the social conditions that lead to the creation of “accidental” guerrillas who would do the bidding of insurgents and terrorists. Concentrating on the terrorist groups and their leaders alone would not solve the problem. In Out of the Mountains, Kilcullen considers what may follow as “the Western military involvement in Afghanistan comes to an end,” leaving a new form of counterinsurgency in its wake. (16)
Kilcullen sees four drivers that will shape conflict in the future: “population growth, urbanization (the tendency for people to live in larger and larger cities), littoralization (the propensity for cities to cluster on coastlines), and connectedness (increasing connectivity among people no matter where they live).” (28) Out of the Mountains examines each driver and its historical precedents before discussing its likely effects on future conflicts. He is careful to stress that future problems will not have just military solutions. But, as his four drivers suggest, the military and intelligence challenges, as influenced by simultaneous “land, sea, airspace, and cyberspace overlap,” will “exponentially increase the difficulty… for understanding [the impact of] any maneuver through the littoral zones.” (169)

Kilcullen concludes by observing, “None of what I’ve written describing the future environment is a prediction.” At best this is something of a semantic dodge. True, he does not imply that any specific events and circumstances used as examples will occur. But when he writes, “It is time for the generation who fought the war [in Afghanistan] to take what they learned in the hills and valleys of a landlocked conflict [and] to think about the coming age of urban, networked, guerrilla war on megaslums and megacities of a coastal planet,” he is very close to a prediction that preparedness is needed. It should not be dismissed.

Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy, by Kenneth M. Pollack. (Simon & Schuster, 2013) 536 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

What policy should America adopt if sanctions and negotiations fail to convince Iran to end its nuclear weapons program? According to former CIA analyst and Middle East expert Kenneth Pollack, in September 2012, the US Senate and the president ruled out “any policy that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” (279) Pollack, now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, strongly disagrees with this decision. He would prefer “to see the United States opt for containment rather than war,” while acknowledging that few now support this alternative and many consider it unthinkable.

In this new book, Pollack recognizes his preference is the lesser of two bad choices only after three other options have failed. The first of these is the current “carrot and stick” approach. The second is implementation of a plan for regime change before “the current ruling leadership acquires a nuclear capability.” (104) Absent success in these efforts, the third option is an Israeli military strike, and even that, Pollack notes, would only delay Iran’s program. The first of the two bad options following the above three, he argues, would inevitably involve a US military operation that in all likelihood would lead to an invasion and a war that would make the latest Iraq War seem like a mere exercise. Containment is the second bad choice, but it has the advantage that it would rely on diplomatic isolation and economic pressure through sanctions, as much as the threat of military action.

Before analyzing each option and the likely Iranian response, in step by step detail, Pollack considers the Iranian threat and the potential for proliferation should Iran acquire nuclear weapons capability. Regarding threat, he argues “it is not the possession of nuclear weapons per se that creates a threat to American interests in the Middle East.” Rather, the point is that Iran “means us harm.” (65) As to proliferation, he sees less of a threat. He believes Iran, for reasons of self-interest, is unlikely to share its weapons with third parties, for example, Hezbollah.

With respect to containment, which he addresses fully in the final part of the book, he states, “A nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained.” (280) Other observers have suggested containment is a variation of deterrence that would require a US military presence in the region and risk war. Pollack elaborates his disagreement with both positions carefully and then suggests how he would combine them under conditions that take the risks into account.
Unthinkable offers credible reasons for choosing containment over war should Iran acquire a nuclear capability. It is an alternative worth serious thought.

Historical

America’s Great Game: The CIA’s Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East, by Hugh Wilford. (Basic Books, 2013) 342 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

In America’s Great Game, professor of history at California State University, Long Beach, Hugh Wilford, tells how a trio of American Arabists worked to shape and sometimes implement US policy in the Middle East for a decade beginning in the late 1950s. Two were grandsons of Theodore Roosevelt. For Kermit “Kim” Roosevelt, interest in the Middle East ran in the family. His aunt, Mary Willard—of Willard Hotel fame—was married to the 5th Earl of Carnarvon, one of the discoverers of King Tut’s tomb. Kim’s first cousin, Archie Roosevelt, grew up reading about the Orient in his grandfather’s library and pursued his interest at Groton Prep and Harvard, both of which Kim also attended. Both traveled in the Middle East before WW II and had a number of government assignments before they arrived in Egypt—Kim with OSS and Archie with the Army G2 in 1944. After the war, the two followed different paths to the CIA.

The third member of the trio, Miles Copeland, had a much different background. After dropping out of the University of Alabama, he became a professional trumpet player and served in Europe with the Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) during the war. Afterward he joined the Strategic Services Unit—the clandestine element that survived the dissolution of the OSS—in the War Department. He followed it to the CIA, where he met the Roosevelt brothers. Details about Copeland’s service are less firmly documented, as Wilford is careful to note. As Copeland acknowledged in his memoir, he was content to embellish where it made the story more interesting. But it is clear that he became an Arabist when he was posted to Damascus in September 1947 as chief of station (COS). He flew there on the same plane with Archie Roosevelt, who had been appointed COS Beirut; Kim Roosevelt arrived in Beirut two days later, in Wilford’s words, “passing through on another of his slightly mysterious regional tours.” (72–73)

In addition to following the careers of these three Arabists, America’s Great Game establishes the political context for their work. In 1947, the State Department had strongly anti-Zionist, pro-Arab nationalist elements. They were led by former OSS officer and experienced Arabist, William Eddy, who promoted pro-Arab policies with missionary zeal. Initially, the CIA subscribed to Eddy’s views, and Kim even established a lobbying group—the American Friends of the Middle East, later funded by the CIA—to develop public support. It did not succeed. In the field, Archie and Miles Copeland undertook operations aimed at building public support for the United States while implementing Cold War policies to block growing Soviet influence in the region.

Between 1949 and 1957, Copeland and Archie established agent networks in Syria, Beirut, and Cairo to stay on top of local political turbulence. When instability threatened, they turned to coup attempts, failing in Syria and infamously succeeding in Iran. Their goal was nonimperial, “disinterested benevolence” to further Arab nationalism in the American image. Wilford describes the byzantine conditions in the region, which were complicated by the administration’s policy toward Israel. Along the way, he stresses that agent reporting indicated that CIA efforts were pushing Middle Eastern regimes closer to Moscow. Despite the excellent contacts CIA developed with new Egyptian leaders—a process Copeland characterized as “cryptodiplomacy” (190)—they failed to sway
Nasser. And when the State Department could not accept Nasser’s nonaligned policies, he turned to the Soviets.

After his tour in Syria, Copeland returned to Headquarters before resuming his Middle East work. Kim resigned shortly after the successful Iranian coup. Only Archie made a career of it, serving in Madrid and London after his Arabist days, and retiring when he concluded that the CIA, after the Angleton mole hunt and the “family jewels” affair, “had lost its founding esprit de corps and was no longer a happy place to work.”

_America’s Great Game_ suggests the CIA’s “founding esprit de corps” was applied to misguided US policies, the results of which have hampered relations ever since.


During WW II, Jacques Monod (alias: Martel) was first a member of the French Communist resistance group Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) and later the Free French Forces of the Interior (FFI). In the fall of 1943, the FTP was in need of arms and support to prepare for the upcoming invasion of France. When promises from London were not kept, Monod turned to his brother, Philo, also a member of the resistance. Philo, an attorney who had worked for the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm in New York, had established contact with Allen Dulles in Bern. After a risky, surreptitious border crossing, the brothers met Dulles in Switzerland to arrange for the exchange of intelligence and supplies.

Meanwhile, in Paris, Albert Camus (alias: Albert Mathé, later simply Bauchard) was writing inspiring propaganda for an underground newspaper, _Combat_, that would make him famous after the war. Both Monod and Camus would receive Nobel Prizes—Monod for biology, Camus for literature. _Brave Genius_ tells the story of these remarkable men, who didn’t meet until after the war.

Author Sean Carroll, a professor of microbiology and genetics at the University of Wisconsin, has arranged his book in four parts. Part one deals with the lives of Monod and Camus until the German occupation of France. The second part is devoted to their actions with the resistance until liberation. Part three describes their postwar meeting, developing friendship, and common philosophical views. Both had joined and then rejected the communists, realizing the seriousness of the communist threat to the world and especially to literature and science. Both spoke out against it. Here, Carroll examines Camus’s postwar writings, Monod’s research and Monod’s outspoken attacks on Soviet science, especially the fraudulent geneticist Trofim Lysenko. Part four discusses their relationship in the post-Stalin era, how they dealt with the Soviet invasion of Hungary, their engagement with civil rights protests in France, and how they managed their work.

Camus received his Nobel Prize in 1957 and died in a car crash three years later. Monod received his in 1965 and went on to become director of the Pasteur Institute, dying in 1976. Carroll has used letters and recently released documents to tell this unusual story of war, science, and literature. A very interesting and worthwhile contribution.


Stephen Kinzer’s dual biography of John Foster and Allen Dulles will very likely be viewed differently by those whose world view was formed in the early Cold War era and those who came of age during the Vietnam War. The former group will tend to interpret Foster’s statecraft and Allen’s operations as
necessary responses to Soviet aggression. Many in the latter group will hold the brothers responsible for interventionist foreign policies that resulted in worldwide disdain for, if not hatred of the United States.

Although Kinzer belongs to the Vietnam-era group, he presents a solid, if unsympathetic, account of the brothers’ privileged, Christian upbringing and education, and he addresses the social and political forces that shaped their public and private lives. The Brothers calls attention to their similarities—graduates of Princeton and the George Washington University law school, partners at the powerful New York corporate law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, married with families, and increasingly anti-communist.

It also highlights their sharp differences. Kinzer characterizes Foster as monogamous and power-seeking, a brilliant lawyer and effective statesman, whose presence produced enduring boredom. Allen, on the other hand, appears as adventurous, a reluctant lawyer, and a serial womanizer with a passion for espionage and covert action.

Kinzer portrays their paths to power from their attendance at the WW I Paris Peace Conference to their WW II service—Foster as a civilian concerned with global cooperation and domestic politics, Allen as an OSS officer—to the Eisenhower administration. The Brothers deals at length with their Cold War government service, Foster as secretary of state, Allen as director of central intelligence.

The Dulles brothers, according to Kinzer, viewed their primary missions as the containment, if not the rolling back, of global Soviet-led communism “by any means no matter how distasteful.” (115) A secondary mission, necessary to the success of the first, was “defending the interests of multinational corporations.” (116) These objectives were supported by the president, but Kinzer questions them and attempts to show the fallacies in them through his analysis of now familiar interventions in Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cuba. Kinzer’s treatment of covert actions in Europe and Africa is driven by the same predispositions.

While the final chapter of The Brothers comments on other seemingly unjustified CIA and State Department operations, Kinzer also acknowledges that “the passage of time and the end of the Cold War, make it difficult to grasp the depth of the fear that gripped many Americans during the 1950s.” Moreover, Kinzer continues, “The narrative of permanent threat that Foster relentlessly promoted, was not fabricated.” But, he quickly adds, “Foster and Allen were the chief promoters of that fear,” and “they exaggerated the threat.” (312, 315) Kinzer leaves the impression that the brothers’ legacy, then, is a mix of short term successes and strategic failures that might have been avoided if the Dulles brothers had had a different world view.


The British defeat at Saratoga in October 1777 led to official French support and caused the British troops then occupying Philadelphia to return to New York to reinforce the king’s contingent there. General Washington and his army pursued the British all the way, and after the battle of Monmouth, he established his headquarters in Morris-town, New Jersey, to await the arrival of French troops. It was important to know what the British were doing in New York so that Washington could, if possible, prevent them from intercepting the French. Thus he needed intelligence about British movements and intentions. After several unsuccessful attempts to recruit agents in the city, he turned to Major Benjamin Tallmadge and tasked him with the mission. The Culper Ring was the result.

Working through a childhood friend, Abraham Woodhull (alias: Samuel Culper), five other agents were recruited: Robert Townsend (alias: Samuel Culper, Jr.), Caleb Brewster, Austin Roe, James Rivington,
and a woman known even today only as agent 355. *George Washington’s Secret Six* tells their stories.

Authors Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger recount the ring’s experiences and methods of operation, interspersed with background on the participants and their families. They also retell the story of Nathan Hale’s introduction to military espionage, presumably to give the readers perspective because he was long dead when the Culper Ring was created. While they often quote from letters, they also invoke literary license and present imaginary dialogue between principals, including imagined musings of George Washington (9), all without citing a single source or adding any new facts. The result is easy reading but troubling history.

This is not the first book about the Culper Ring. Alexander Rose’s *Washington’s Spies* covers the same material with less speculation, better insights, and source notes. *George Washington’s Secret Six* tends to overstate the Culper Ring’s results. It does not come close to demonstrating that it was the spy ring “that saved the revolution.” In short, this is Revolutionary War history lite. Read with care.


Zigzag was one of the Double Cross agents run by MI5 during WW II. He was known to his German handlers as FRITZCHEN. His true name was Arnold Edward Chapman. The story of his espionage career and personal life has been told in a movie, on the Tonight Show with Johnny Carson, in his autobiography, and in two recent books, one authorized (*Zigzag*, by Nicholas Booth) and one not (*Agent Zigzag*, by Ben Macintyre). And now his wife has written her memoir with a foreword by Nigel West that discusses how Chapman’s MI5 handler met him. The book itself reveals what it was like to be married to a safecracker, con man, and adulterer, who was also the father of her daughter and the most controversial double agent to work for the Germans and the British.

Since Mrs. Chapman cooperated with Booth for Zigzag, there is little new in *Mrs Zigzag*. She is convinced that Eddy, as he was known, was loyal only to the British, but she offers nothing new to put any doubts—of which there are many—to rest. She does add new details about their postwar life and their conflict with MI5 as they battled to publish his memoir and turn it into a movie. She tells of meetings with Compton Mackenzie and Alfred Hitchcock and lunch with Richard Burton—once considered for the leading role—and Elizabeth Taylor, as the couple worked to get MI5’s approval to make the movie, initially for naught. They finally filmed in France, with Christopher Plummer as Eddy—Betty said he was miscast (115)—and Yul Brynner as his German handler, Baron von Gröning. Titled *Triple Cross*, the movie was not an Oscar contender.

Betty is candid about their life together, with all its financial problems—she was the estate manager when they had one to manage—and Eddy’s infidelities. She defends him to the end, still furious that MI5 never gave him a pension or an award.

*Mrs Zigzag* is the only book to describe life with a WW II double agent. It is by no means typical, and it fills a gap.


The internment of Japanese civilian residents and Nisei—second generation Japanese born in the United States—during WW II is a well-known, appalling, fact. Not so well known is that there were two Nisei NCOs
serving in the US Army Counter Intelligence Police (CIP) before Pearl Harbor. They were not interned and served throughout the war. One of these men, Richard Saka-
kida, spent much of the war as a POW, and his story is highlighted in America’s Secret War: The Untold Story of the Counterintelligence Corps.5 Reflections of Honor is a brief biography of the other NCO, Arthur Komori.

After training in Hawaii, both NCOs were sent to the Philippines in April, 1941. Their assignment was to penetrate the Japanese community in Manila and identify those involved in espionage against the United States and the Philippines. After the Pearl Harbor attack, the Army arrested Japanese loyal to Tokyo, and, to protect their cover, Sakakida and Komori were jailed as well. Their Counterintelligence Corps—the new name for the CIP—handlers rescued them before the Japanese invaded the Philippines, and they escaped with MacArthur to Corregidor, where they served as interpreters. Sakakida would eventually be captured by the Japanese, but Komori made it to Australia after a harrowing trip by air.

Komori was given further intelligence training in Australia and then served on MacArthur’s G2 staff and subsequently again in the Philippines. After the Japanese surrender, he was assigned to Tokyo, where he was the personal interpreter for the chief of the CIC. Komori remained in the CIC after the war and served first as a security agent during the Eniwetok Atoll atom bomb tests. He later taught in the CIC School at Ft. Holabird, MD, before accepting a commission as a captain in the Air Force. After completing his military career, he went to law school and retired to Hawaii.

Reflections of Honor is a powerful tale of loyalty and professionalism under precedent-setting conditions.


In his history of the United States from its founding until the end of the War of Independence, historian George Bancroft wrote, “I think I might say that my materials in their completeness are unique.” It follows, then, that the absence of any mention of strategic intelligence reflects the author’s belief that it played no significant role. Cambridge historians Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach note that this interpretation of the role of intelligence persisted well into the 20th century. Before then, orthodox historians treated secret intelligence in international relations with “sniffy indifference.” (2)

But as more materials became public and existing ones were given serious attention, historians like David Kahn, Ernest May, Roy Godson, Christopher Andrew, and Sir Harry Hinsley demolished the old orthodoxy. The contributions to Secret Intelligence in the European States System build on their precedents by assessing the impact of strategic intelligence on seven topics, while setting out the scholarly prerequisites for future historians.

Haslam begins with an analysis of Stalin’s unique use of human intelligence and the resultant tragic impact its findings had on his subordinates and the nation’s strategic decisions. Stanford historian David Holloway follows with a fascinating study of Soviet atomic espionage and Stalin’s influence on the Soviet atom bomb program. Then there are two accounts of how French decisionmakers applied—or misapplied—intelligence. The first, by University of Virginia historian Stephen Schuker, considers the interwar period, when French leaders ignored facts. The second, by French historian Georges-Henri Soutou, looks at French intelligence in East Asia after the war, when new leaders again ignored the facts. University of Warwick historian, Richard Aldrich, contributes a study of British intelligence during the Cold War that examines the difference intelligence made by analyzing “arguments over money.” (150)

The final two articles deal with the East and West German intelligence services respectively. Oliver Bange, who teaches at the German Army Military
Research Council, analyzes the contributions of East German intelligence (the Stasi) to the political illusions of GDR leaders. Holger Afflerbach, professor of Central European history at the University of Leeds, reviews the influence of the West German intelligence services during the Cold War, with emphasis on military espionage and its political importance.

Secret Intelligence in the European States System confirms two important principles. First, to be valuable, intelligence must take into account the social, political, economic, and technological issues related to the questions addressed. And second, consumers must interpret the results properly. These are age-old, but important, lessons.

The Secret War for the Middle East: The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence Operations during World War II, by Youssef Aboul-Enein and Basil Aboul-Enein. (Naval Institute Press, 2013) 263 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

A disillusioned T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia) left the Middle East in October 1918, after Britain refused to honor a previous commitment to recognize Arab sovereignty over Syria and instead created new British and French mandates. He made one partially successful attempt to correct the situation. At the request of Winston Churchill, then head of the Colonial Office, he participated in the 1921 Cairo Conference, where the present Middle Eastern nations were created, each with a Western-sponsored head of state. Lawrence foresaw that the arrangement was a recipe for instability. The Secret War for the Middle East affirms and expands on that view, with emphasis on competing Axis and Allied intelligence operations during WW II, which sought to influence, if not control, the military and economic forces in the region.

US Navy Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, currently the chair of Islamic studies at NDU, and his younger brother Basil begin their book on this seldom-discussed topic with a review of prewar political intrigues and intelligence and propaganda operations during that volatile period. They go on to examine the effects on operations of anticolonialism and Arab nationalism, which were expediently pro-Nazi, even as wartime conditions required nominal cooperation with the Allies. As policies were applied differently by different players, there is a chapter devoted to each country or mandate—Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Egypt. In the end, the authors set the stage for tumultuous postwar events that have yet to be resolved.

Aspects of The Secret War for the Middle East worth highlighting include the authors’ use of Arabic sources, but just what these sources contributed is difficult to determine. For example, they cite al Qa’ida manuals discussing WW II intelligence and deception operations, but they do not discuss how this interesting topic fits in. (189)

Unfortunately, the book is chronologically choppy and semantically awkward—badly in need of a good editor. The Aboul-Enein brothers have analyzed a crucial topic, one that intelligence officers should take the time to study.


Ten young terrorists left Pakistan in a small boat with their handlers on 22 November 2008. They had been indoctrinated and trained for a year by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist organization based in Pakistan. Two days out they hijacked a trawler and forced the captain to head for Mumbai. The handlers returned to Pakistan but kept in continuous contact by satellite telephone. GPS devices were used to navigate. On 26 November, they slit the captain’s throat, sank the trawler, and then rowed a dinghy into Mumbai harbor. Operation Bombay was beginning its final phase. Their mission was to “create maximum chaos” (121) by killing Jews.
and tourists—American and British if possible—while avoiding harm to Muslims. One team of two attacked the Chabad House, a Jewish welfare center. Another sprayed automatic weapons fire into the crowd at the main railway terminal. A third made stops at a restaurant, a cinema, and a hospital, leaving victims at each scene. Two teams attacked and set fire to the iconic five-star Raj Hotel. Four days later, 166 people had died—including nine of the terrorists—and more than 300 were injured. The remaining terrorist was captured. The Siege recounts the entire operation in often disturbing detail.

British journalists Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy devote most attention to the attack on the Raj. Based on interviews with survivors and various government officials, they describe the room-by-room havoc wreaked by the attack team in the hotel. The authors are critical of the often muddled Indian police reactions, which only prolonged the violence. Of at least equal interest are their accounts of LeT recruitment, indoctrination, planning, and training. The actions of the Pakistani and Indian security and intelligence services involved are also examined, especially their dismissal of American and British warnings of the Mumbai attack.

Complicating these events is the role of David Headley—born Daood Saleem Gilani—the son of a Pakistani father and American mother. Headley, a drug smuggler, was arrested and turned by the DEA into a valued source. He was also an LeT agent—he reconnoitered the Mumbai targets—and, the authors suggest, was also working much of the time for other elements of “the US Intelligence Community.” (xiv)

There are no source notes in The Siege. The impressive detail is the result of hundreds of interviews with participants on all sides—even the families of the terrorists—and court documents. It is a troubling tale of what twisted ideology can produce, and it offers no prospect that the results of such ideologies will end any time soon.

Spy Chronicles: Adventures in Espionage from the American Revolution to the Cold War, by E. L. Sanders. (E. L. Sanders, 2013) 180 pp., bibliography, no index. (Kindle ebook only.)

The 15 stories in Spy Chronicles begin with Nathan Hale and end with Robert Hanssen. In between, author E. L. Sanders includes John Andre, the Civil War male impersonator Sarah Emma Edmonds; Sir Robert Baden-Powell (not really a spy); Mata Hari (not a very successful one); and Fritz Duquesne, who ran a Nazi spy ring in New York City. These are followed by “Ace of Spies” Sidney Reilly; Richard Sorge, curiously listed as a “Playboy Spy”; Sir William Stephenson, head of the British station in New York during WW II; double agent Juan Pujol (GARBO); and Stephanie von Hohenlohe, “the Nazi Princess Spy” and later an OSS source. The final stories discuss the Cambridge Five; the Rosenbergs; and the Vietnamese intelligence officer who fooled the Americans, Pham Xuan An.

The book’s casual, easy style suggests the author is genuinely familiar with the subjects, but this appears not entirely to be the case. Unhampered by scholarship, Sanders relies entirely on secondary sources—unattributed quotes are frequent—with the predictable results: well-known errors are perpetuated.

A few examples establish the point. Contrary to Sanders’s claims, there is no evidence that Sarah Edmonds was a spy for General McClelland or anyone else; that fairy tale grew out of her memoir.7 A more depressing error occurs when William Melville is identified as the “first head of MI6”; Mansfield Smith-Cumming held that honor. The chapter on Stephenson states he was friends with Winston Churchill; no evidence has yet been found that they ever met. Further to this dodgy chapter, neither was Stephenson’s codename “INTREP-ID” nor did he have anything to do with Enigma.

The Cambridge Five chapter makes a generous contribution to their mythical legend; Anthony Blunt was neither a man without a country nor the first to be re-
cruited—he was the fourth. And John Cairncross was hardly the “most minor” of the five, as his service at Bletchley suggests. Philby, Burgess, and Donald Maclean did not serve in Washington together, and Maclean was never a member of the Apostles (a secret society at Cambridge). One last error—though regrettably many others could be mentioned—is the suggestion that the material the Rosenbergs passed to the Soviets was unimportant misses the point; they did not know the value of the atomic secrets they passed. Spy Chronicles should have been fact-checked. Caveat lector!


In July 1948, the Chilean government had passed the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy, which banned the communist party. What became known as “the Dammed Law,” was blamed on a secret deal arranged by President Harry Truman. As a result, many party leaders were placed in the Pisagua concentration camp. When Senator Salvador Allende attempted to visit colleagues at Pisagua, he was stopped by the camp director, Lt. Augusto Pinochet. (63–65) Books would eventually be written about both men, _Story of a Death Foretold_ is Allende’s story, with Pinochet in a disturbing role.

Author Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, a teacher at the University of London, has written a political biography that dwells forcefully on Allende’s strengths and gently on his flaws. A lifetime Marxist, Allende is characterized as an advocate of “revolution from below,” (116) a theme that resonated with many voters. Guardiola-Rivera recounts Allende’s jerky path to power and devotes considerable attention to the people, party relationships, and circumstances that made it possible. He includes a disturbing, longtime pattern of persistent self-serving interference in Chilean and Latin American affairs by the United States. The attempts by the Nixon administration and CIA to prevent emergence of another Cuban-style regime are prominent, though now it is an old story, and nothing new has been added here.

Allende’s performance in power is covered in detail, but whether he was aware of the impact of his actions on the United States and Britain or the risk of their reaction, Guardiola-Rivera does not say. He does stress Allende’s commitment to “democracy” and his opposition to the use of force. And in the end, he shows it was Allende’s inability to make the economy work that led to opposition plans to topple his government. At a final meeting with Pinochet—by then head of the army—on 9 September 1973, Allende made his intention to compromise clear and convinced himself of Pinochet’s continued support. (258) On 11 September 1973, by then under attack, Allende still refused to call out the army to defend the presidential palace and committed suicide instead. Although not a member of the original plot, Pinochet quickly took over. Guardiola-Rivera documents the cultural destruction and human disappearances that followed all over the world.

One thing Guardiola-Rivera does not document or even mention is the evidence supplied by Vasili Mitrokhin that claims Allende took money from the Soviets, had a KGB adviser, and was considered a “confidential contact,” though not an agent. Another question not addressed is whether the CIA was aware of this at the time.8 _Story of a Death Foretold_ adds a practical human dimension to the Allende story and his failed ideology, but it offers little hope for his world view, only that it should have been allowed to fail.
**Tales From the Special Forces Club**, by Sean Rayment. (Collins, 2013) 309 pp., photos, no index.

The Special Forces Club (SFC) was established in 1945 by the last head of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, as a place for former SOE members—men and women—to reminisce about wartime experiences, most of which were still classified. Eligibility for membership was later extended to Britain’s Special Forces and intelligence services and those of her wartime allies. The pictures on the club’s walls commemorate WWII service members and include OSS veterans William Donovan, Bill Colby, and Sully de Fontaine.

Sean Rayment, a former British army officer and now journalist, had long wondered what motivated SOE officers. When he visited the SFC in 2011, he learned that a few SOE members were still alive, and he decided to seek an answer firsthand. *Tales From the Special Forces Club* tells the stories of 10 veterans whose service ranged from training in Britain to leading the resistance behind enemy lines to operations in the desert, in the jungle, in the air, and at sea.

Rayment interviewed 86-year-old Noreen Riols at the club. She had joined the SOE to satisfy a sense of adventure, though her duties weren’t specified until she was sworn in; they made her a secretary. It wasn’t long, however, before her talents for instruction showed through and she was assigned to Beaulieu, where she trained agents for deployment. Philby had served there before her—“everyone spoke of him as being very charming, pleasant and efficient.” (24)

Other chapters deal with Jedburgh team operations in France and Burma as told by Fred Bailey and John Sharp; Popski’s Private Army in Italy, where John Campbell served; and Leonard Ratcliff’s 71 missions flying SOE agents behind German lines in France. Rayment notes almost casually that in each case, those he interviewed returned to civilian life after the war, to very different and successful careers—meeting from time to time at the SFC.

For much of its early existence, the SFC was known only to its members. Rayment comments that “the club is as anonymous today as it was when it was opened… its address only known to a select few.” (11) But alas, the Internet age has caught up with the SFC; its address is available to all on the Web, and more information may be found on its Web page.

*Tales from the Special Forces Club* has some great stories and is a solid contribution to the Special Forces traditions.

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In his fine history of the OSS, former CIA analyst R. Harris Smith mentioned that “in 1948, FBI informant Elizabeth Bentley made the absurd charge that [Duncan] Lee was a Soviet spy who had passed OSS information to the Russians.” The FBI had investigated the charge, but no legal action resulted, and Lee denied the accusation under oath in a congressional hearing. He would maintain his innocence, supported by his family and his OSS superior William Donovan, for the rest of his life.

At first glance it is easy to understand why many believed him. A proud descendant of Robert E. Lee, Duncan Chaplin Lee was born in China, the son of missionary parents. After graduating from Yale, he won a Rhodes scholarship and studied jurisprudence at Oxford. After marrying his Scottish sweetheart and returning home, he joined the Wall Street firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton and Lumbard in 1939. In spring 1942, with a favorable recommendation from Allen Dulles, Lee signed on with Donovan’s office of the coordinator of information in Washington. He served in OSS, mainly on Donovan’s executive
staff, throughout the war, leaving as a lieutenant colonel. After the war, Lee worked in various law firms and continued to “portray himself as a casualty of Bentley’s mental instability” until his death in April 1988. (260)

The truth was otherwise. The FBI had known the truth even as Lee testified before Congress, but it could not use the Venona decrypts in court. The public learned of Lee’s treachery in 1995, when the Venona evidence was declassified. But still, questions remained. Was he a communist, and if so, when did he join the party? How was he recruited? Was he part of a network? Who were his handlers? What information did he furnish to the NKVD? And, perhaps most important, why had he done it?

In *A Very Principled Boy*, former CIA analyst and currently Department of Justice lawyer Mark Bradley answers the above and many other questions about Lee. His thorough scholarship is based on recently released OSS and FBI files, letters Lee and his wife wrote while at Yale and Oxford, materials supplied by Lee’s children, and interviews with family and others who knew him. Much of what Bradley found is revealed here for the first time. We learn, for example, that the FBI was warned in August 1940 that Lee and his wife, Ishbel, were active in the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), though no action was taken. Bradley also provides details of Lee’s recruitment and handling, which included the violation of nearly every rule of tradecraft, including intimate relations with female contacts. He also provides material on what information Lee supplied. Bradley notes that toward the end of the war, Lee became less cooperative when he thought he might have fallen under suspicion.

*A Very Principled Boy* explains Duncan Lee in the context of his time and closes the file on one of Donovan’s most trusted officers. It is a major contribution to counterintelligence literature, with lessons for all intelligence officers.

**Memoirs**

*Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy in the CIA,* by John Rizzo. (Scribner, 2014) 336 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

It is unlikely that John Rizzo joined the CIA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) in 1976 intending someday to follow in Allen Dulles’s literary footsteps and write a memoir. While many others have done so, most have come from the clandestine services. A notable exception is Robert Gates, a career CIA analyst. The first CIA general counsel, Larry Houston, said he would leave his story to the historians. In breaking with precedent, *Company Man* benefits readers and historians alike with a new perspective on the CIA.

After graduating from Brown University in 1969, Rizzo earned a law degree from George Washington University—unwittingly following in Dulles’s academic footsteps—and after a brief encounter with private practice, joined the US Customs Service in 1972. Soon bored with its bureaucratic tedium, he sent a résumé to the CIA. Months later, in June 1976, he entered on duty, just before George H. W. Bush became director of central intelligence. Before retiring, Rizzo would serve 34 years under 10 other directors and during some of CIA’s most turbulent years.

What do lawyers do at CIA? Why are they even needed? *Company Man* answers these questions and at the same time conveys a personal image of Rizzo. While well known for his unusual, less than Ivy League dress code—some old-timers considered it a sartorial misdemeanor—Rizzo provides a forthright account of his career’s progress and along the way makes clear the contributions lawyers make. In a matter-of-fact writing style that shuns self-promotion, Rizzo describes one challenging episode after another that raised unprecedented legal issues.
An early assignment to help KGB defector Yuri Nosenko with some resettlement details elicited a discussion on his harsh treatment during a three-year confinement by the CIA. Nosenko added that “Your colleagues didn’t torture me. They don’t know what real torture is.” (59)

Then came matters in the aftermath of the Church Committee hearings (1975–76), followed by the Iran-Contra scandal, which gave Rizzo his first real visibility and legal excitement, or as he put it, “Lord help me for saying this, but the Iran-Contra experience was fun as hell for me.” (130) On the other hand, the Aldrich Ames case and then the problems associated with handling “dirty assets”—agents with less-than-priestly backgrounds, but with valuable knowledge—while stimulating, were no fun at all.

But the challenges posed by terrorism and events after 9/11 grew to dominate Rizzo’s career. He gives a detailed account of his role in the origins and implementation of the interrogation program. With his characteristic candor, Rizzo adds, “I was confident that I could squelch at least the more aggressive proposed techniques.” (186) He then explains why he didn’t and how, despite “demonstrable intelligence benefits the program was providing,” (233) his decision—together with the destruction of video recordings of interrogations—led to a congressional and media furor that eventually kept him from being confirmed as the CIA general counsel.

Throughout Company Man, Rizzo adds personal anecdotes—for example, his impeccable, Tom Wolfe-like dressing habits were well known; as he put it, “my usual causal attire [was] Ralph Lauren polo shirts in a rainbow coalition of colors.” (219)—and insights gained from his contacts with the directors and the many intriguing colleagues he supported. In one case that involved sharing classified data with Congress, he notes that DCI Porter Goss “didn’t trust the staffers not to leak.” (21) In another instance, Rizzo tells about “the most egregious and unforgettable leak I witnessed… that indisputably caused the death of a CIA source.” (148) A final example concerns the White House decision to declassify the Justice Department memos justifying the interrogation program and what happened when then-CIA director Panetta didn’t learn about it from his acting general counsel—Rizzo himself. Panetta’s colorful language expressing his opposition to the release is illuminating, as are the comments of DNI Blair.

Company Man is a major contribution to the intelligence literature, not only for the original story it tells, but even more for the way it is told. As Rizzo establishes the importance of the OGC in intelligence operations, it becomes clear why Rizzo acquired a reputation for competence and intellectual honesty.


Christopher Costanzo retired in 1991, after 25 years in the CIA’s clandestine service. The first 412 pages of his memoir leave an impression of an agency entombed by neglect, whose senior leaders are counseled by sycophants and supported by a bureaucracy of dangerously incompetent, disgruntled careerists. Then on page 413, reflecting on today’s clandestine service, he adds, “I have every reason to hope that it is much better and more effective than it was in my day.”

Costanzo is a Harvard-educated former Marine and the son of a Foreign Service officer. He once applied to follow in his father’s footsteps, notwithstanding that he found the Foreign Service had become “blatantly self-satisfied and elitist.” It didn’t work out. His application to the CIA went more smoothly, and he describes his intelligence 101 training and his early assignments. From time to time he departs from the career chronology to comment on “poorly understood” (by the public) intelligence terms and ideas. The often muddled meaning of the term “agent” is one example. (28)
As he recounts his various assignments, Costanzo adds examples of the career guidance he received from more experienced professionals who set a tone for the book. For instance, “Don’t trust a word they tell you,” and “Get it in writing.” He suggests these realistic admonitions didn’t always make any difference with a bureaucracy that “was immune to outside scrutiny.” (61) He did find some he could trust and who helped his career, however.

Costanzo stresses that his memoir should be viewed as a working-level perspective. He justifies that approach with comments on his service as desk officer, agent handler, station chief and the general duties of station staff. Of equal concern is the unceasing conflict between family and career. He is also free with his views on administrative procedures such as promotion board guidance. And he concludes that the quality of entry-level operations officer candidates in the mid-1960s was declining. He admits “many of [his] old colleagues will react angrily” (178) to such observations. Many will also be upset by his persistent attack on Richard Helms, though less by his reactions to DCI Schlesinger, and by his grim assessment of some support services, the Office of Technical Service in particular.

The CIA is not the only recipient of his critical analysis; the State Department earns his close attention as well. In several cases he highlights the disruption caused by a power-hungry ambassador. (398–400) But in all his criticisms, Costanzo presents his specific reasons and avoids ad hominem whining.

My CIA is at once frustrating and curiously interesting. Readers will wonder why he stayed, but he never addresses the question directly. Perhaps he just wants to show what it took to survive in a profession to which he is still devoted and for which he still has hope.

Intelligence Abroad


According to Lt. Gen. Kamal Davar (Ret), former director general of the Indian Defense Intelligence Agency, the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008 led to the “streamlining of our intelligence set-ups.” (viii) His introductory remarks go on to argue the need for books by professionals that describe the current situation, and he sees Re-energising Indian Intelligence as a step toward that end.

The approach taken by author Shrivastava—an Indian army officer—is to review Indian intelligence from a historical perspective and then summarize India’s existing organizations at the national level. He then focuses on the performance of the various agencies and identifies the challenges exposed by the Mumbai attacks. These include questionable analysis, failure of coordination, turf battles, and database issues. He then devotes a chapter to the major intelligence agencies in the world, stressing their organization, functions, responsibilities, and oversight mechanisms.

Returning to Indian intelligence, Shrivastava describes areas that require the acquisition of new capabilities—cyberintelligence, and the impact of social networking are two examples. His final chapter recommends a series of organizational and operational changes that he suggests will achieve the necessary modernization. Prominent among these is a new overall authority, the National Intelligence Assessment and Coordination Center (NIACC) and improvements in the recently established National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).

Re-energising Indian Intelligence concludes with seven appendices that cover basic topics: the intelligence cycle, definitions, more detail on the Indian services, and instances of “intelligence lapses.” (219) The appendix on
intelligence successes includes a section titled “Operation SHAKTI,” the program that kept the Indian atomic bomb program secret. Its success was “a matter of great pride for India’s intelligence community.” (235) Unfortunately, the comments that follow say nothing about the operation itself and only summarize reactions in the United States.

Manoj Shrivastava presents a useful analysis of contemporary Indian intelligence organizations with sensible suggestions for meeting the demands of a rapidly changing international and technological environment.

Endnotes
