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CIA’s Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960–1968:
Insights from Newly Declassified Documents

The Unresolved Tension between Warriors and Journalists during the Civil War

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FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXIII


David Robarge

A comprehensive set of primary sources about CIA activities in the Congo has not been available until now.

From 1960 to 1968, CIA conducted a series of fast-paced, multifaceted covert action (CA) operations in the newly independent Republic of the Congo (the Democratic Republic of the Congo today) to stabilize the government and minimize communist influence in a strategically vital, resource-rich location in central Africa. The overall program—the largest in the CIA’s history up until then—comprised activities dealing with regime change, political action, propaganda, air and marine operations, and arms interdiction, as well as support to a spectacular hostage rescue mission. By the time the operations ended, CIA had spent nearly $12 million (over $80 million today) in accomplishing the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations’ objective of establishing a pro-Western leadership in the Congo. President Joseph Mobutu, who became permanent head of state in 1965 after serving in that capacity de facto at various times, was a reliable and staunchly anticommunist ally of Washington’s until his overthrow in 1997.

Some elements of the program, particularly the notorious assassination plot against Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba that was extensively recounted in 1975 in one of the Church Committee’s reports, have been described in open sources. However, besides the documentary excerpts in that report, limited releases in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, and random items on the Internet and in other compilations, a comprehensive set of primary sources about CIA activities in the Congo has not been available until now. FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968 is the newest in a series of retrospective volumes from the State Department’s Office of the Historian (HO) to compensate for the lack of CA-related material in previously published collections about countries and time periods when CIA covert interventions were an indispensable, and often widely recognized, element of US foreign policy.

After scholars, the media, and some members of Congress pilloried HO for publishing a volume on Iran for 1951–54 that contained no documents about the CIA-engineered regime-change operation in 1953, Congress in October 1991 passed a statute mandating that FRUS was to


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Congo, 1960–1968 provides essential material for understanding how the United States and its Congolese allies prevented the “Bloc feast” from happening.

be “a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity” and ordering “other departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government…[to] cooperate with the Office of the Historian by providing full and complete access to the records pertinent to United States foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records” older than 25 years.¹

Notwithstanding the new law and DCI R. James Woolsey’s pledge in 1993 to seek declassification review of 11 covert actions, including in the Congo, the two FRUS volumes published in the early 1990s on that country for 1958 through 1963 contained very few documents about the Agency’s CA operations there—even on the Lumumba assassination plot.⁴ In the case of the first volume, the FRUS editors decided not to delay publication by seeking additional records under the access requirements of the just-enacted FRUS law. In the second, HO and CIA were still working out how to implement those requirements, taking into account the Agency’s concerns about protecting sources and methods and the fact that its records management practices were not designed to facilitate scholarly research. Serious interagency difficulties over HO access to and CIA review of CA-related documents arose over the next few years but were mostly resolved by the early 2000s in an interagency agreement.

The new procedures in that agreement facilitated the completion of the volume discussed here, which was held up after HO’s outside advisory committee in 1997 questioned the completeness and accuracy of the previous collections on the Congo. HO originally conceived Congo, 1960–1968 as a volume documenting US policy during the Johnson presidency, but, at the committee’s suggestion, it postponed publication to incorporate relevant CA material missing from previous compendia.

The collection is well worth the wait, and specialists are making use of it already.⁵ In no other single source will scholars find a richer compilation of intelligence and policy documents that, when used in conjunction with the two earlier volumes, helps underscore why the fate of the Congo, as well as the other newly independent nations in Africa, drew so much attention from US national security decisionmakers then. Before 1960, when, in British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s famous phrase, “the wind of change” began blowing over the continent, the Soviet Union, China, and their proxies had paid little attention to it.

By early 1965, however, communist countries had established over 100 diplomatic, consular, and trade missions; extended over $850 million in economic grants and credits; set up front organizations, cover entities, agents of influence, and clandestine assets; and provided assistance to anti-Western groups directly and through their allies. The Congo—formerly a Belgian colony, one-quarter the size of the United States, with immense natural wealth and strategically situated in a now-contested region—was a Cold War prize of the first order. “If Congo deteriorates and Western influence fades rapidly,” the chief of CIA’s Africa Division (AF) wrote in June 1960, 10 days before the Congo gained its independence, the “Bloc will have a feast and will not need to work very hard for it.”³

Congo, 1960–1968 provides essential material for understanding how the United States and its Congolese allies prevented the “feast” from happening. The volume contains 582 documents and editorial notes and is divided roughly into two sections. The first, covering 1960 to 1963, depicts the Congo’s political crisis and the extensive influence of CIA covert actions to remove Lumumba from power and then to encourage allegiance to the Leopoldville government—especially the pervasive use of money to buy loyalties within leadership circles. The second part, covering 1964 to 1968, describes the continuation of the political action programs and the expansion of paramilitary and air support to the Congolese government in its effort to quell provincial rebellions, some of them communist-aided.

Over one-third of the sources in the volume are from CIA, and over 40 percent pertain to CA (the rest are about diplomacy, policy, and military matters). A number of the editorial
notes usefully summarize heavily redacted documents or paraphrase intelligence information that otherwise might not have survived the review process in raw form. In both the documents and the notes, the editors helpfully have used bracketed insertions to indicate names, titles, or agencies in place of cryptonyms that were not declassified. Similarly, in cases when more than one individual whose name cannot be declassified is mentioned in a document, they have been designated as “[Identity 1],” “[Identity 2],” and so forth for clarity—a much better procedure than repetitively using “[less than one line declassified].”

**A More Nuanced View of the Situation**

The documents from early 1960 at the inception of the covert program show CIA’s nuanced view of the Congo’s unsettled internal situation and the Agency’s fashioning of sensible operational objectives to achieve the Eisenhower administration’s goal of regime change. President Dwight Eisenhower clearly expressed his disquiet over developments in postcolonial Africa at a meeting with senior advisers in August 1960:

*The President observed that in the last twelve months, the world has developed a kind of ferment greater than he could remember in recent times. The Communists are trying to take control of this, and have succeeded to the extent that... in many cases [people] are now saying that the Communists are thinking of the common man while the United States is dedicated to supporting outmoded regimes.*

CIA operations officers understood the challenges facing them as they dealt with a population of 14 million divided into over 200 ethnic groups and four major tribes, with fewer than 20 Congolese college graduates in the entire country, led by a government heavily dependent on the former Belgian colonialists to maintain infrastructure, services, and security, with an army that was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, and badly led, and a fractured political structure consisting of four semi-autonomous regions and a weak and factious “central” government in the capital of Leopoldville (Kinshasa today). The US ambassador in the early 1960s, Clare Timberlake, sympathized with the Agency officers he worked with: “Every time I look at this truly discouraging mess, I shudder over the painfully slow, frustrating and costly job ahead for the UN and US if the Congo is to really be helped. On the other hand, we can’t let go of this bull’s tail.”

One of the most valuable contributions *Congo, 1960–1968* is likely to make is moving scholarship past its prevailing fixation on Lumumba and toward an examination of CIA’s multiyear, multifarious covert program and the complexities of planning and implementing it. The volume provides additional detail about the assassination plot against Lumumba and his eventual death at the hands of tribal rivals abetted by their Belgian allies, substantiating the findings of a Belgian parliamentary inquiry in 2001. Beyond that, for students of intelligence operations, the collection demonstrates the wide range of “soft” and “hard” covert initiatives CIA undertook in an often rapidly changing operational environment.

CIA’s program initially focused on removing Lumumba, not only through assassination if necessary but also with an array of nonlethal undertakings that showed the Agency’s clear understanding of the Congo’s political dynamics. The activities included contacts with oppositionists who were working to oust Lumumba with parliamentary action; payments to army commander Mobutu to ensure the loyalty of key officers and the support of legislative leaders; street demonstrations; and “black” broadcasts from a radio station in nearby Brazzaville, across the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to encourage a revolt against Lumumba.

After Lumumba fled house arrest in the capital in late November 1960 and was tracked down and killed soon after, Agency CA concentrated on stabilizing and supporting the government of President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Ministers Cyrille Adoula and Moise Tshombe, with Mobutu as behind-the-scenes power broker. CIA used an extensive assortment of covert techniques to accomplish that objective:

*a. The inquiry concluded that Belgium wanted Lumumba arrested and, not being particularly concerned with his physical well-being, took no action to prevent his death even though it knew he probably would be killed. The report specifically denied that the Belgian government ordered Lumumba’s murder but that Belgian advisers to Lumumba’s enemies assisted in making it happen.*
• Advice and subsidies to political and tribal leaders.

• Funds to Mobutu to buy the allegiances of army officers through salary subsidies and purchases of ordnance and communications and transportation equipment.

• Payments to agents of influence in the Adoula administration and to sources in the leftist opposition.

• Parliamentary maneuvering aided by covert money.

• Contacts with labor unions and student associations.

• Newspaper subsidies, radio broadcasts, leaflet distributions, and street demonstrations.

• Efforts to influence delegations from the United Nations (UN) to adopt positions that favored the Congolese government.11

The CIA’s program persisted through several political crises in the Congo during 1962–63 and at least can be credited with helping the government survive them. As of mid-1964, however, the US strategic goal of bringing about a broad-based governing coalition with national appeal remained unaccomplished. The replacement of Adoula with Tshombe, who led a different faction, in July 1964 prompted a suspension of political action efforts while the new government established itself and soon became preoccupied with putting down rebel uprisings. By August, insurgents controlled over one-sixth of the country, and the Agency redirected most resources to reinforcing and rebuilding tribal allegiances in contested areas and indirectly assisting the Congolese army by funding mercenaries in its employ.

For the better part of a year, CIA opted to promote unity rather than division by declining Tshombe’s and other politicians’ approaches for individual subsidies. By mid-1965, when Tshombe and Kasavubu seemed nearly beyond reconciliation, the Agency tried to resume its previous political intriguing and buying of access and influence but became frustrated when the embassy resisted. US ability to affect Congolese leaders’ decisions “has never been lower since departure of Lumumba,” Leopoldville Station wrote in late October. A month later, Mobutu—“our only anchor to the windward” and “the best man… to act as a balance wheel between the contending political leaders,” asserted CIA—staged a bloodless coup and took over the government.12

Documents in the collection show that CIA’s political program was strategically coordinated with overt policies.13

Devlin’s quasi-ambassadorial dealings with Mobutu underscored that the army chief was indispensable to the Congo’s stability and, by extension, US policy in the Congo and sub-Saharan Africa. Devlin’s fascinating personal and professional interaction with Mobutu, so evocatively described in his memoir, comes through in the official record as well, as does his indirect influence on policy decisions in Washington. The chief of AF wrote in 1967 that Mobutu had

become accustomed and to some degree dependent on the informal channel to the U.S. Government thus provided...
[and] would interpret the termination of this relationship—particularly if termination were more or less coincident with Devlin’s [second] departure—as evidence of a desire on the part of the U.S. Government to disengage from the close and friendly relations that have characterized dealings between the governments for most of the period since 1960.

Godley’s successor, Robert McBride, whose posting coincided with Devlin’s reassignment, even more strongly disapproved of CIA’s private contacts with Mobutu and other Congolese leaders and quickly took steps to limit them. Starting from when he arrived at the embassy, the volume contains none of the COS-to-Headquarters cables of the kind Devlin used to send about his talks with Mobutu because such encounters were no longer allowed.14

When Mobutu assumed power officially, the political side of the CA program was effectively through, although it did not formally end until early 1966—“The objectives of promoting stability and moderation remain the same, but the means needed to pursue these objectives are now different,” the chief of AF wrote then—and a few Congolese politicians continued receiving individual payments well into 1968.15 Although Washington had preferred to achieve its goal of political order in the Congo through parliamentary means, with a military strongman now in power, it had what it wanted: a relatively stable, nationally based, politically moderate, pro-Western government in Leopoldville.416

Paramilitary Operations

The primary emphasis of the CIA’s program then shifted to suppressing rebellions in the eastern provinces through air and maritime paramilitary operations. Congo, 1960–1968 contains many documents that will help scholars appreciate the difficulties in planning and running such activities, especially in a vast territory with very limited communications and transportation infrastructures and proxies of questionable skill and reliability.

CIA’s air operations began modestly in 1962 as a propaganda tactic to raise the Congolese government’s prestige and demonstrate its military potential to its citizenry, provincial secessionist leaders, and rebel factions. They grew to provide tactical support to UN peacekeepers, Congolese forces, and mercenaries fighting the insurgents. Eventually the aviation component of the CA program provided aircraft, pilots, and maintenance personnel for the so-called Congolese Air Force (CAF), which existed only because of US assistance. Through the course of the program, the CAF had 11 T-6s, 13 T-28s, 7 B-26s, 2 C-45s, 3 C-46s, 3 Bell helicopters, and 1 Beech twin-engine in its inventory. In total, six CIA officers ran the operations in country, aided by 125 contract maintenance workers employed by the Congolese government and 79 foreign contract pilots, who flew the missions because the Congolese were not reliably trained. Difficulties with supplies, airfield and living conditions, communications, and main-tenance beset the operations, as did staffing issues: the State Department was reluctant to approve positions for Agency personnel, and CIA’s Congo program managers had to compete with counterparts in Southeast Asia trying to build their operations there as the war in Vietnam expanded.17

CIA launched the first significant CAF air operations in February 1964 against rebels in Kwilu, just north of Leopoldville. Missions against the eastern rebels followed in May. The toughest operations came during late 1965–early 1966, after Chinese- and Cuban-provided weapons and training had improved the rebels’ fighting ability. Some of the CAF sorties were supply airlifts, which the Agency coordinated with the State Department and the US Air Force. Besides helping suppress the insurgencies, CIA’s aviation program proved vital in the crackdown Mobutu ordered against army mutineers in Katanga in August 1966. In March 1966, the National Security Council (NSC) decided that the Congo should pay for its own air force, and the Agency phased out its involvement during the next 18 months, gradually melding activities with US Air Force operations.b 18 By late 1967, the CAF belonged to the Congolese, who continued, however, to receive assistance from foreign workers.

CIA also assisted Mobutu’s government in quashing the rebels by staging maritime operations on Lake Tanganyika along the Congo’s eastern border and Lake Albert in

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a. The US government showed its support for Mobutu very demonstratively in 1966 and 1967 by forewarning him of coup plots against him, which he quickly put down.

b. In late 1967, the Johnson administration authorized CIA to recruit and pay five pilots for 90 days (with a possible 30-day extension) to fly missions assisting the Congolese government in quelling an uprising of mercenaries on the eastern border.
DCI John McCones role in policymaking comes through clearly in a number of the documents in the volume.

the northeast. Rebels in the region were ferrying Chinese-supplied arms across the two lakes and using them in the ground fighting in the two regions, and the covert activities were intended to interdict the shipments. Lake Tanganyika especially was a difficult environment for Agency personnel. It is the longest and second-largest fresh-water lake in the world, stretching for over 400 miles but with an average width of only 30 miles. Monitoring such a lengthy coastline was hard when smugglers could cross the narrow water body relatively quickly. The first CIA team deployed to the area in March 1965 and conducted its first patrol in May. What came to be called the Agency’s “pocket navy” also staged a successful amphibious landing operation to deploy Congolese troops against a rebel enclave.19

To run the maritime activities, seven Agency operations officers and one communicator worked with a variety of (initially unreliable) foreign crewmen and a flotilla of six 21-foot Seacrafts, one 75-foot trawler, assorted small boats, and—after the lake’s unpredictable weather showed the need for larger, faster vessels—two 50-foot Swifts equipped with radar for night surveillance. The operations had a psychological impact at first, intimidating the rebels and inspiring the Congolese troops, but over time they largely disrupted the weapons shipments and, combined with the Agency’s aerial and other activities, helped tip the tactical balance on the ground in the government’s favor.

In addition to its air and maritime operations, CIA secured the allegiance of tribal chiefs in the northeast and got their assistance in cutting off the flow of arms from Sudan and across Lake Albert from Uganda by providing them with covert cash and other forms of aid. The Agency also assisted with paying foreign mercenaries if hard currency was not available locally. As with its support for the CAF, the Agency gradually reduced its level of engagement in maritime activities and in January 1967 turned over its ship inventory to the Congolese. Acting on NSC direction, CIA began phasing out its paramilitary programs in June 1967, withdrawing personnel from all fronts. After the activities ended in late 1968, US aid to the Congolese military only came through the Defense Department’s Military Assistance Program.20

In late 1964, CIA had to deploy some of its paramilitary capabilities in the Congo to support the rescue of nearly 2,000 Western hostages rebels had seized in Stanleyville (Kisangani today) in August.21 The two dozen Americans among them included three CIA and two State Department officers. For the next four months, the rebels tormented the hostages while the US government, African leaders, and the International Red Cross negotiated for their release.22

CIA and the Pentagon planned various rescue scenarios without a good feel for what was happening in the area. Among the ideas were dropping Belgian paratroopers into Stanleyville from US aircraft; dispatching an Agency commando team upriver; letting the Congolese army recapture the city; and inviting in a mixed force from several African nations.

Washington decided on the first and second options. The airborne assault, codenamed DRAGON ROUGE, began at dawn on 24 November. American C-130 transports dropped 340 Belgian paracommandos over Stanleyville and landed another 280 at the airport, with the CAF providing air cover. The CIA paramilitary team, which was supposed to be in the city at the same time, encountered resistance from the rebels and arrived a few hours late. The combined force routed the hostage-takers, freed their captives, and secured Stanleyville. The rescuers suffered only nine casualties, but the rebels killed or wounded several dozen hostages during the first phase of the mission. Two days later, the United States and Belgium cooperated in another operation, DRAGON NOIR, to rescue nearly 400 Western hostages held near Paulis, about 240 miles from Stanleyville (CIA was not involved). After hearing about the attack there, the rebels murdered nearly 30 detainees before the rescuers arrived. The Johnson administration then decided not to stage any more such operations (two others, DRAGON BLANC and DRAGON VERT, had been planned).23

The DCl’s Role

DCI John McCones role in policymaking comes through clearly in the volume. A California businessman with some background in intelligence from previous US government service and, more important, a reputation as a hard-nosed manager of large international enterprises, Mc-
Cone came to CIA in late 1961 with a White House mandate to carefully watch over covert operations and avoid another Bay of Pigs debacle. Beyond that, the new DCI believed he should not only be the president’s chief intelligence officer but, when allowed, should proffer advice on foreign policy as well.

Mc Cone was not at all reluctant to do so. He actively participated in the deliberations of the NSC’s covert action planning group, called the Special Group and the 303 Committee during the years of the Congo crisis, and occasionally met with policymakers (President Lyndon Johnson among them) separately. Besides presenting intelligence information, McCone argued for and against policy positions on many issues, including several related to the Congo. He doubted that negotiations with the rebels were feasible, opposed suspending air operations against them to signal a willingness to parley, and advocated increasing US aid to Tshombe after he became prime minister.

Mc Cone strongly believed that Washington should support Tshombe despite his use of South African mercenaries and reputation as a front man for Belgian economic interests. “I felt we had no choice except to insure victory for Tshombe,” he told Secretary of State Dean Rusk in early 1965. “I said we should not be deterred from this by the persuasion of do-gooders, by reactions from African states in the United Nations who didn’t like us anyway, or from the vote in the OAU [Organization of African Unity].”

Mc Cone also aggressively defended CIA’s covert activities, rebuffing State Department complaints about the Agency’s use of contract pilots and Ambassador Godley’s attempt to control the disbursement of covert funds to Congolese politicians. McCone had also argued in favor of launching all the hostage-rescue operations to show that the United States was engaged in humanitarian activities and not just propping up Tshombe and the Congolese army.24

The Congo covert action programs had an important organizational impact inside CIA by establishing the reputation and prominence of the new AF Division. McCone had also argued in favor of launching all the hostage-rescue operations to show that the United States was engaged in humanitarian activities and not just propping up Tshombe and the Congolese army.24

The Congo covert action programs had an important organizational impact inside CIA by establishing the reputation and prominence of the new AF Division in the Directorate of Plans. Formerly paired with the more important Near East area of operations, AF became a division in 1959 and was less than one year old when the Congo became a high-priority CA target. At the time, AF had few stations in sub-Saharan Africa. Most had opened during the previous five years and had very small staffs. As the State Department noted in 1965, “the Agency started from scratch in most [African] countries, laboring under the handicap of the visibility of the white man, few natural cover opportunities…and language and cultural differences.”

The undersized CIA complement at Leopoldville Station, which opened in 1951, had responsibility for covering most of equatorial Africa, an area as large as half of the United States. The station grew rapidly during the three months after the Congo became independent, and, as with the Agency’s other facilities on the continent, the expansion of covert activities over the next several years forced its growth. Leopoldville soon became one of CIA’s most important outposts in sub-Saharan Africa, which continued to attract significant attention from policymakers through the 1960s and after.25

Documents in the volume highlight the prominent role money played in the CIA’s program, not only during the politically unsettled years of the Adoula and Tshombe governments but also after Mobutu took over. If he and the United States agreed that he was the indispensable man, then money became the essential feature of their relationship. In 1965, the State Department observed: “A legitimate question is whether the wholesale buying of political…leaders is a sound basis for establishing a stable government,” and it answered that “in the Congo there appears to have been no feasible alternative.” CIA pointed out in early 1966 that

Mobutu has no political organization which, as an alternative to the U.S. covert funding program, can provide him with the funds needed to ensure his continuation in office. Nor is there any wealthy managerial or commercial class to whom he can turn to finance his political efforts.

Moreover, as Devlin wrote later that year,

Cutting off payments to [Mobutu] would almost certainly be interpreted by him as an indication that [USG] no longer supports him. Political repercussions resulting from terminating…payments would be almost as severe as if [USG]
Over the years, Mobutu proved to be the best geopolitical friend the United States had on the continent, but he also turned into one of the world’s most reviled kleptocrats.

were to cut off [international development] funds.

Although US policymakers wanted to move “away from slush funds and toward genuine development aid,” when Mobutu asked for more money in late 1968 with few strings attached, he got it because, according to the State Department,

He is the ultimate source of power in Congo...and ready access to him is vital if we hope to continue our long-standing policy of assisting the Congo to unity, stability and economic progress, with the eventual goal of seeing a stable, western-oriented government in the heart of Africa.... We do not wish to risk the impairment of access to him which if it occurred would very probably be carried over into contacts throughout the Congolese Government.

In mid-1968, Ambassador McBride warned of “the galloping onset of the gold bed syndrome...vaguely and perhaps deliberately reminiscent of a figure on the banks of a more northern river called the Seine.” He was referring to Mobutu’s plan to build three replicas of St. Peter’s Basilica and “five-million dollar Versailles-like parks” and his purchase of a luxury villa in Switzerland for 1 million Swiss francs and, for private use, a British aircraft “fitted with bar, salon etc.” and costing two million pounds.a

That Mobutu “has apparently risen in soufflé-like grandiloquence,” in McBride’s words,28 did not trouble Washington then or later. The goals of CIA’s program and US policy were mostly achieved, although not always as originally envisioned. Lumumba was removed from the scene but became a revolutionary martyr and an inspiration to anticolonial activists in Africa and elsewhere. Over the years, Mobutu proved to be the best geopolitical friend the United States had on the continent, but he also turned into one of the world’s most reviled kleptocrats and drove his country into economic ruin and, ultimately, political chaos.

The Soviet Union was kept out of the Congo but soon moved its anti-Western subversion elsewhere in the region. CIA’s covert activities in the Congo during the 1960s achieved success in the short and medium term but sometimes set in train developments that were not always consistent with democratic values. Those outcomes, which characterize some but by no means most of the Agency’s covert action programs, often result from the policy decisions that follow the completion of the operations and are not necessarily inherent in them. As the documents in Congo, 1960–1968 show so well, CIA’s activities during that time there exemplify that fact.

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a. The amounts mentioned in 2014 dollars are, respectively, $34.1 million, $1.6 million, and $32.6 million.
Endnotes


6. See, among others, documents 4 and 5.


8. Ibid., document 254.


10. Documents 60, 62, 68, 70, 72, and 75.

11. Documents 8–10, 16, 37, 40, 55, 57, 73, 82, 87, 90, 94, 100, 109, 123, 138, 142, 143, 146, 155, 167, and 170; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”


15. Documents 466 and 573.


17. Documents 71, 123, 124, 127, 168, 171, 219, 237, 272, 427, 440, 462, 483, 544, 546, and 564; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”

18. Documents 415, 440, 472, 478, 486, 492, 497, and 500; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.” Footnote cite: Documents 544, 546, and 564.

19. “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”


21. Many documents on the hostage-takings and rescue operations are between pages 338 and 526 of the collection.


25. “Review of 1964 Operations in the AF Area”; “CIA during the Congo Crisis.”


27. Documents 577, 579, and 581.


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From 1943 to 1945 a small unit of Australian soldiers—Australian Military Force Detachment, Field Unit 12, Section 22, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area—deployed into the field to provide electronics intelligence (ELINT), in its infancy then, to the Southwest Pacific Area of the Pacific Theatre of Operations against the Japanese. Over time the detachment evolved into a commando unit and provided valuable support, including combat support, to US and Australian forces fighting in the theatre.

Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), as defined by Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms is “technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating for other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.” One of the most common sources of ELINT comes from the collection and analysis of radar signatures. By analysing the characteristics of pulses emitted by a radar (frequency, pulse repetition interval/frequency, beamwidth, scan rate etc.), it is possible to identify radar types, functions, and locations. With that information, countermeasures can be developed.

ELINT and electronic warfare (EW) evolved with the technological advances throughout World War II in Europe. From the Battle of Britain to the strategic bombing campaign over Germany, a constantly evolving electronic arms race took place as the Western Allies and the Germans developed new ways to detect, deceive, or destroy the fleets of enemy bombers heading toward each other’s cities. In both the European and Pacific Theatres of Operation, ELINT and EW provided vital support to Allied forces by detecting enemy aircraft, ships, and submarines long before the enemy could detect them.

Much of this development, especially for the Pacific Theatre, involved aerial reconnaissance using long range aircraft. But the great expanses of the Pacific and the limited loitering times of aircraft left the need for ground-based ELINT teams that could be deployed near island battlefields and remain in place and operate 24 hours per day to guard against approaching Japanese ships and aircraft.

During 1943–45 a small unit of soldiers from the Australian Army was trained to provide ELINT/EW support in the field, sometimes very close to enemy lines, in order to collect Japanese radar signatures, radar, and radio sets and to warn Allied units of approaching enemy air and sea units. With time and experience, Field Unit 12 evolved into a
commando unit capable of providing combat support when needed.

Field Unit 12 (along with a counterpart, Field Unit 14) would play an important role in the retaking of the southern Philippines and demonstrated a remarkable ability to work closely with Allied fighting forces, both professional and irregular. The unit’s history may not contain acts of epic bravery, cataclysmic battles, or tremendous sacrifice, but it is a story of a small group of soldiers who did their duty to the best of their ability and who, in their own small way, paved the way towards victory. And, by making an emerging technology work to good effect, the men of Field Unit 12 contributed to the evolution of electronics intelligence in modern warfare.

Section 22

Field Unit 12 was one of at least two ELINT collection units (the other was Field Unit 14) subordinate to Section 22, a cover name for the Radio Countermeasures Division intended to conceal the highly sensitive and classified nature of the division’s work.a3 Established in Brisbane in July 1943, Section 22 was “responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, S.W.P.A., for radio counter measures, its chief duty being to advise all Force Commanders on action taken to interfere with and evade enemy Radar.” Section 22 consisted of personnel from Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States.4

Part of the Directorate of Radio direction-finding, Section 22 reported to Brigadier-General Spencer B. Akin, Chief Signals Officer in Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s GHQ SWPA. The first assistant director was LtCmdr Joel Mace, Royal Australian Navy Volunteer Reserve (a minute by the Director of Naval Intelligence in May 1944 described his leadership style as ‘hard, tactless…had built up a sound organisation’).5 Following his departure in January 1944, Col. Paul W. Albert, US Army (called an ‘ineffective “play-boy”’ in the same minute), replaced him.6 Records of Section 22’s field organisation could not be found, but reports of the US Army Signal Corps and the Royal Australian Air Force establish the existence of Units 12 and 14 and contain suggestions that strongly indicate Section 22 controlled other subordinate units, though they are not identified.7

Establishment of Field Unit 12

Secret Message 25945 established Field Unit 12 on 12 November 1943 with positions for two captains, two lieutenants, one warrant officer, four sergeants, eight corporals and 19 privates. The unit never reached its complement of 36, however, and at no point had more than 20 men.8

According to Field Unit 12 post-war summary of activities, personnel selection was based on “general intelligence and infantry training. Technical ability not required,” with potential candidates interviewed at training schools.9 By 8 January 1944, the detachment was operational.10 Beyond the numbers, dates, and a few names, no organisational table for the unit has been found. Capt. Donald Tier, a New Yorker who had emigrated to Australia, served as the detachment’s first commanding officer and liaison to SWPA headquarters. A warrant officer, Ralph Wilson, was the statistics officer, presumably responsible for maintaining the quality of the technical data on Japanese radars and radios the unit collected.11

Operations

The detachment’s first deployment was to an island off the north coast of Papua New Guinea between January and April 1944. This was an experimental and operational activity undertaken to provide a real-world test of the new unit’s capabilities. Its mission was to detect Japanese land radars in the area surrounding the Bismarck Sea above New Guinea and to gauge the level of Japanese...
shipping activity in the region while Allied forces were engaged in the long-running fight to dislodge Japanese forces from the land mass. The detachment deployed—by plane and sailboat—to Long Island off the north coast of New Guinea with two officers and 13 enlisted men. They took with them an SN-2 receiver and other Australian-made pulse analysing equipment.

Its experiences on this assignment would lead to significant improvements in its equipment and organization. First, finding a suitable operational site proved to be more difficult than anyone seemed to have expected. The plan called for locating a base camp near a village whose residents were expected to help carry the gear from sea-level to an altitude of 3,000 feet. Unfortunately, according to the detachment’s Summary of Activities, “Since the natives were unwilling to part from their village the choice [of sites] was limited and no suitable site was found.” Only on a third reconnaissance patrol was the team able to locate a suitable site, although there was insufficient water for the whole detachment.

Despite this shortcoming, development of the site began in earnest. Construction of a platform took six days, and when it was completed, equipment began to arrive and testing began. After two days of successful testing, the remaining equipment was brought so collection operations could commence. Because of the lack of water, only technical operators stayed at the site. The remainder stayed at the base camp, conducting patrols to protect the site from enemy attack, although no enemy troops were encountered.

Bad weather delayed the gear’s arrival by three days, and two more days were lost as water and moisture from the heavy rain seeped into the delicate electronic equipment. Despite the initial setbacks, the detachment collected signals for five weeks. In that time, the unit detected two land-based radars near New Britain, one in the Admiralty Islands, and it collected the radar signatures of several Japanese ships. Counting the mission a success, the detachment returned to Australia.

**Lessons Learned and Refit**

Despite its success, the problems the unit encountered led to a major restructuring. According to the war-end report:

> Upon return to the mainland the fundamental conception of the unit was altered, the personnel given additional training and the equipment completely changed. The detachment then consisted of specially trained personnel of the commando type capable of operating radar counter-measures equipment, of carrying all their own equipment themselves, living solely by their own resources whilst on duty and relying only on airborne supplies at periodical intervals.

For the next six months, the detachment trained in Queensland in order to become the “commando type.” Training included learning jungle and guerrilla tactics, assault landings, and river crossings.

In addition, the detachment trained in the art of attacking radars.
Australia’s ELINT “Commandos”

and radar stations. In order to prevent a repeat of the lack of support in New Britain, they spread the entire equipment load amongst the 15-strong detachment, with each man carrying between 76–92 lbs (34.5–42kg). The detachment acquired lightweight operating tents, special packs, and developed a collapsible aerial system. All equipment was weighed, and any component not considered essential removed. New collection equipment enhanced the detachment’s capabilities as the American-made AN/APR-1 receiver and AN/SPA-1 pulse analyser replaced Australian radar collection and analysis equipment.

Into Action in the Philippines

Mindoro

With new training and equipment, it was time for the detachment to go back into action. From 9–16 October 1944, the detachment, now consisting of three officers and 17 enlisted, left Brisbane for Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea (now Jayapura, Indonesia) to prepare its next mission, which it would later learn was to deploy to Mindoro, Philippines, and provide early warning of Japanese aircraft and ships heading for San Jose, Philippines, to attack the US forces based there.

The unit remained in Hollandia until 28 November 1944, when, with one less officer, it embarked on a small US amphibious landing ship for San Pedro Bay in Leyte, Philippines. They arrived on 6 December 1944. At San Pedro Bay, the detachment received its orders.

The detachment’s second in command and an enlisted man—a Lt. Rose and a Pvt. Marquette—left on 11 December 1944 for their destination in advance of the full detachment, presumably to scout locations. They arrived in San Agustin, Mindoro, four days later, as the Battle of Mindoro—Operation MUSKETEER III—raged. Rose and Marquette became the first Allied soldiers to enter San Jose.

The remainder of the detachment arrived in San Agustin a week later. Repeated air attacks, including two near misses from kamikazes, made the landing ship’s voyage an eventful one. During the attacks, the detachment helped gun crews fight off the Japanese, gaining valuable experience operating under fire and praise from the ship’s gun crew.

On 23 December 1944, the detachment moved to Ilin Island, south of Mindoro, where it appears to have begun a string of hops from one Philippine island to another. On Ilin Island, the detachment set up its equipment, was somehow involved in the capture of a Japanese pilot, and enjoyed “a Christmas repast comprised chiefly of native foods.” Even so, it took only two days to complete the setup and begin operations.

The unit’s first test came quickly in the form of enemy warships approaching San Jose on Boxing Day. The unit detected the ships in time to provide two hours warning before San Jose was subjected to a 90-minute bombardment. Because of the
warning, little damage was done, and Allied aircraft and patrol boats were able to counterattack before the Japanese warships were able to get into good firing positions. In addition, the Japanese lost two ships.\textsuperscript{28}

Two days later, two members of the detachment were evacuated to Australia for medical treatment; whether put out of action by the “native” food or Japanese bombardment was left unclear.\textsuperscript{29}

On 14 Jan 1945 the detachment left Ilin Island, having recorded no further enemy contacts, and returned to Mindoro, sleeping on San Agustin beach that night.\textsuperscript{30}

**Luzon**

Three days later the detachment deployed to Marinduque on Luzon with a new mission “to locate enemy land based radar on southern Luzon, to determine the amount and type of enemy shipping in that area and to intercept and locate if possible enemy radio engaged in lower echelon traffic preparatory to the landing on Luzon.”\textsuperscript{31}

Having selected a site with an altitude of 1,400 feet, the detachment was able to detect targets 110 miles (176km) away and was able to collect and identify 180 enemy radio stations and five radar sites. The detachment also established secondary sites to use direction-finding techniques to locate enemy locations.\textsuperscript{31}

Members of the group appear to have gone to Luzon Island to retrieve destroyed Japanese radar equipment found on Grande Island in Subic Bay and take it to Leyte.\textsuperscript{33} On 7 February 1945 the detachment, and one Japanese civilian prisoner, departed Marinduque, headed for Mindoro, where, its missions accomplished, it would rest for five days.\textsuperscript{34}

**Tawi Tawi**

As it rested, the detachment was warned to prepare for its next mission, which would prove to be its greatest test—and greatest validation.\textsuperscript{35} On 21 February 1945 Captain Tier and five enlisted from Field Unit 12 were joined by an officer and five enlisted from Field Unit 14. They boarded two Catalina flying boats for Tawi Tawi, an island province separating the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea between Sabah, Malaysia and Zamboanga, Philippines.\textsuperscript{36}

The mission was essentially the same type as that performed at Marinduque but more significant. It was to provide ELINT support to the US Sixth and Eighth Armies as they prepared to retake the southern Philippines. This was part of a combined assault against the southern Philippines, by the US and Australian Armies, on the Dutch East Indies, in Operation MONTCLAIR III. The attack on the southern Philippines was designated Victor, while the Dutch East Indies attack was designated Oboe.\textsuperscript{37}

After arriving on Tawi Tawi, an advanced party spent the day pouring over maps to find a suitable collection site. After a reconnaissance the following day, the party selected Balimbing Hill, in Balimbing (now known as Panglima Sugala) as a suitably elevated location for collection coverage of known enemy positions.
on the chain of islands between Tawi Tawi and Mindanao.\textsuperscript{39}

The detachment brought its gear to the site on 24 February 1945, and all the equipment was up and running by the following day.\textsuperscript{40} From its position on Balimbang Hill, the detachment observed enemy activity for five days.\textsuperscript{41} Determined to force the Japanese to leave Bato Bato, the detachment launched a deception operation—turning on lights in and around the site—to convince the enemy that a large Allied force was on Balimbang.

The effort apparently worked. On 4 March 1945, a patrol lead from Field Unit 14 discovered that the Japanese had indeed vacated Bato Bato.\textsuperscript{42} Throughout the mission, the detachment applied its commando training, continuously patrolling the many islands in the province in either native canoes or US PT boats.

On 17 March 1945, the detachment moved its collection site from Balimbang to another location, where it would remain for the rest of the mission.\textsuperscript{43} The site was operational within 24 hours, although Capt. Tier, forced to display the range of his training, was delayed by 24 hours to defuse a Japanese booby-trap made out of depth charges containing 400 lbs (181 kg) of TNT Philippine guerrilla fighters had found.\textsuperscript{44}

One week after arriving in its new location, Capt. Tier briefed American PT boat captains based at Basilan Island about defences around Bongao Island in preparation for a combined air and sea attack the next day. The Japanese fought back with characteristic ferocity, all PT boats suffered battle damage, and one caught fire. In the end, the boats had to deploy a smokescreen to escape. Despite the heavy fire, there was only one, ultimately fatal, casualty.\textsuperscript{45}

US F-4U Corsairs arrived on 27 March to conduct air raids on Japanese positions\textsuperscript{46} and by 2 April, the detachment was directly involved in the fight, firing mortars at enemy barges at Bongao Point—the detachment destroyed two barges and one seaplane. The attack ceased when Japanese 37mm cannon fired on the mortar site, wounding three Philippine guerrillas assisting the detachment.\textsuperscript{47}

The next day members of the detachment participated in the successful capture of the airstrip on Sanga Sanga Island. Unfortunately the message notifying the Eighth Army of the success was not received, with the result, as rather dryly put in the \textit{Summary of Activities, August 1945}, that “a very trying day was spent by the patrol and guerrillas in the area dodging American bombs and bullets.” Six guerrillas were wounded by the “friendly” fire.\textsuperscript{48}

The final stage of the battle began on 2 April when a battalion of US soldiers from the 163rd Regimental Combat Team, aided by intelligence provided by the detachment, made an unopposed landing on Sanga Sanga Island.\textsuperscript{49} The detachment continued its aggressive patrolling of Sanga Sanga Island until hostilities ceased on 6 April 1945. During this time, the detachment captured seven radios, two dismantled radars, and several completed code and logbooks.\textsuperscript{50} With the mission complete, evacuations took place during 6-13 April. The whole detachment eventually reunited on Mindoro Island, having earned a commendation from GHQ for its performance, according to Lieutenant Rose.\textsuperscript{51}

The detachment’s final mission was to support the 7th Australian Division in its assault on Balikpapan, Indonesia, on 1 July. Lt Rose and three enlisted went in with the initial landing forces. Their mission was to capture Japanese radar and radio equipment. The team succeeded in retrieving three partial radar sets.\textsuperscript{52}

The Japanese surrender the next month led to the cancellation of a proposed expansion of the detachment to 47 and any further missions.\textsuperscript{53} GHQ approved the detachment’s disbandment on 13 August 1945 and its personnel were made available to other units. Thus the story of the Australian Military Force Detachment, Field Unit 12, Section 22, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area ended.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The soldiers of Field Unit 12 and 14 performed extremely well in all the missions they undertook. They provided vital ELINT support to American and Philippine forces in...
the southern Philippines. In doing so, they demonstrated the renowned ability of Australian soldiers to support Allied fighting forces whenever or wherever missions take them.

By undertaking commando training, the men of Field Unit 12 were able to expand the support provided in the southern Philippines to areas well outside the detachment’s original conception. Detachment Deputy Commander Rose provided the best summary of its work when he wrote, “Altogether the show pulled extremely well together with the bearing of genuine ambassadors for Australia in a theatre of war where the slouch hat is so infrequently observed.”

Perhaps by the end of the year Rose had come to take for granted and did not bother to remark on or perceive what is evident between the lines of the historical record, that Field Units 12 and 14 were at the cutting edge of a form of technological warfare that was developed and tested under the most extreme combat conditions.

Together with similar efforts in Europe and in US forces in the Pacific, the Australian effort would advance a form of technological warfare that would continue to be waged throughout the Cold War and beyond.

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The “Unfettered Press”

The Unresolved Tension between Warriors and Journalists during the Civil War

Randy D. Ferryman

At stake was the definition of the right balance between the competing constitutional principles of protecting lives and safeguarding individual liberty.

By 18 February 1863, Union Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman was fed up with unauthorized press disclosures of his operations, writing in a letter to his brother, US Senator John Sherman, that “with the press, unfettered as now, we are defeated until the end of time.” General Sherman wanted enforcement of federal instructions to newspapers not to disclose sensitive military information, which the press firmly believed was in its interest and the nation’s to print. From the beginning of the war until its conclusion, the US government and the northern press were unable to resolve several disputes over press disclosures and news controls. At stake was the definition of the right balance between the competing constitutional principles of protecting lives while safeguarding individual liberty.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Throughout the Civil War, the northern press, which fiercely opposed censorship, was responsible for several serious disclosures.

From the outset, the booming American newspaper industry expensively covered Civil War political, societal, and military developments, in the process providing a sweeping and unprecedented survey of a nation at war. With unparalleled capabilities, the press dispatched more correspondents to the field than during any other American war. Utilizing the largest railroad system in the world and 50,000 miles of telegraph lines, newspapers would cast a wide net for war-related news, wherever it was emerging, and quickly circulate it across the country, often within just hours after an event unfolded. Even during the war, broadsheets were commonly exchanged across north–south boundaries, and contraband or intelligence delivery networks were used if normal channels were closed.

An already large American readership expanded during the war as readers thirsted for news about the war and their loved ones fighting it. Most publishers quenched this thirst, but too often they lured readers by deliberately printing sensitive military information or barring their sources from collecting sensitive information and relaying it to their editors. Like today, during the Civil War the First Amendment firmly protected the freedom of the press, and federal prosecutors had few legal options. No US statute existed that explicitly prohibited the press from publishing sensitive national security information or punished it for doing so. The Lincoln administration also recognized, as have subsequent administrations, that to gain voter support for policies, building and sustaining cooperative relationships with the press are necessary to receive fair, albeit not always objective, coverage.

Major Military Operations and Campaigns Exposed

Throughout the Civil War, the northern press, which fiercely opposed censorship and had among its core more than 100 bureaus printing stories expressing strong opposition to the war, was responsible for several serious disclosures. In late May 1862, not long before the opening of the Seven Days Campaign of late June and early July, the Union commander of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan, believed he had been victimized by press disclosures of sensitive military information after his forces had come within a few miles of Richmond. He wrote Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to complain about

frequently published letters from their [newspaper] correspondents with the army, giving important information concerning our movements, positions of troops, etc., in violation of your orders.

McClellan subsequently wrote to Stanton:

My order of the 25th May [1862], directing the order of march from the Chickahominy [river] and the disposition to be made of the trains and baggage, is published in full in the Baltimore American of the 2nd instant. If any statement could afford more important information to the enemy I am unable to perceive it.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker similarly was beset by disclosures during his rocky five-month stint from February to June 1863 as one of McClellan’s successors. As he was about to contest Robert E. Lee’s Gettysburg campaign—which the Richmond Examiner had hinted at if not exposed on 10 June—Hooker on the 18th sent a confidential letter to editors asking them to exercise discretion in preparing their reports. But he was too late. On that same day, the New York Herald revealed the location of Hooker’s entire army—its seven corps and cavalry units, about 90,000 men altogether.

Union commanders in the western theater, generally defined as west of...
of the single object of getting news, and getting it first, too, would astonish people, were even only the half truth told. Probably in no business in existence is the competition so hard as between the leading newspapers of New York and their representatives in the field.\textsuperscript{10} (emphasis in original)

Reporters witnessed most major Civil War battles, often showing a great deal of courage, if not recklessness, to get a first hand look at the fighting. Several were wounded, captured, and a few, killed. Fifty specials attempted to cover the first major battle of the war near Manassas, Virginia, along Bull Run Creek in July of 1861.\textsuperscript{11}

The effort of George Smalley, the chief war correspondence of the New York Tribune, during the September 1862 Antietam campaign in Maryland is one of the most remarkable. Although correspondents were barred from covering the campaign, Smalley was invited to be a volunteer aide-de-camp to Union division commander Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick. During heavy fighting on the 17th, Smalley was under fire in the battle zone, riding ahead of then I Corps commander Joseph Hooker and his staff. Hooker would say about Smalley after the battle:

\begin{quote}
In all the experience which I have had of war, I never saw the most experienced and veteran soldier exhibit more tranquil fortitude and unshaken valor than was exhibited by that young man.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

a. The range in the estimate is probably due to different interpretations of what constituted a newspaper.
Specials relentlessly pursued stories for their papers, using spying techniques when necessary to gain access to information and to get their copy to editors.

But Smalley wasn’t only getting information for a story. During the deadly fighting at the “Cornfield” on the morning of the main battle, Hooker employed him as a staff officer to carry orders to his troops. According to Smalley’s “Chapters in Journalism,” he became so embedded in operations that one of McClellan’s staff officers asked Smalley to carry a message to an injured Hooker, asking him to “unseat” McClellan, who some officers perceived as mismanaging the battle. Smalley met with Hooker about his health but did not relay the staff officer’s message.

Deploying tools of espionage...

Specials relentlessly pursued stories for their papers, using spying techniques when necessary to gain access to information and to get their copy to editors. When prohibited from covering campaigns or camp operations, specials masqueraded as soldiers, medical aides, or some other military functionary. Some used coded language to deceive censors, while others placed reports into dead drops for couriers who would retrieve and forward them to editors.

Also used were bribes meant to skirt government news controls. Henry Villard, the chief field correspondent for the Tribune after Smalley, breached the army-imposed news blackout about the federal defeat at Fredericksburg, Virginia, on 13 December 1863 by essentially bribing his way the next day onto a boat on the Potomac River. When Villard reached the vessel, which was steaming for Washington, he was confronted by the skipper, who was under orders not to transport anyone who did not display a proper pass. Villard displayed a general pass and insisted that he would help the skipper avoid trouble for allowing him to board. He gave the skipper $50, a large sum of money at the time, as he disembarked in Washington that evening. Not long after his arrival, Villard was summoned to the White House to present the first in-depth account of the defeat to be received by the president.

...to produce uneven results

The quality of newspaper reporting and publishing varied dramatically, leaving readers then just as likely to peruse poor-quality copy of war developments as they were to find exceptional journalism. No reporting standards of objectivity existed in the industry. Military commanders, already infuriated by disclosures, were further enraged by press accounts that frequently misrepresented their actions and battle outcomes.

In April 1862 at the Battle of Shiloh, near the Mississippi-Tennessee border, several members of the press corps fabricated news of the battle on a large scale. Many specials who filed reports never witnessed the fighting, with some being as far away as Cairo, Illinois, more than 150 miles away. Several northern press reports of the Seven Days Campaign were marred by numerous errors. The Boston Journal released a correction to its report that the Union suffered only 300 casualties during two days of fighting after learning that McClellan’s official report stated that there had been 5,737 casualties.

Front-page space was crowded with editorials as well as news because editors, looking to advance their political agendas and press their attacks against political parties, government entities, and public figures, routinely reshaped news and facts from the battlefront to toss poisonous editorial darts at important individuals or lavish praise on them.

US Government Unprepared to Prevent Disclosures

When the war started, neither the Lincoln administration nor the US military had a blueprint for controlling news. The task fell to them because the US Congress, during the antebellum or war period, did not play a major role in managing or controlling secret government information. No federal statute existed, nor would Congress pass one, during the war to expressly bar publishers from printing sensitive information or to punish them for doing so. An unwillingness to abridge the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights protecting freedom of the press was a key factor, but Congress also seemed willing to defer to the president’s wartime powers. After decades with few disputes over controlling secret government information, Congress was willing to let the executive branch take the lead.

Congress did act to strengthen the president’s power to prevent sensitive information from reaching publishers by passing legislation on 2 February 1862 that gave Lincoln the authority...
to take control of the railroad and telegraph networks when necessary to ensure public safety. Railroad and telegraph companies would continue to operate their networks but Congress warned them that company officials faced penalties—even the death penalty—for failing to cooperate.19

The Supreme Court was essentially silent on issues related to protecting sensitive information and freedom of the press during the war and like Congress, deferred to the administration by not interfering with Lincoln’s interpretation of his war powers.20 Without statutes making it illegal for publishers to print sensitive military information, federal authorities could do little to prosecute publishers and newsmen for disclosures. On 17 July 1862, Congress passed the “Treason Act,” which aimed to deter individuals from aiding the enemy, but it appears that no editor or reporter was ever convicted under this statute, or even brought to trial.21 The same held true for prosecutions under the Articles of War, article 57, which Congress approved in 1806 to punish an individual for giving intelligence to the enemy.22

Lincoln did occasionally bend the Constitution his way to manage the emergency, for example, by suspending the writ of habeas corpus, but overall there was only limited and mostly unsystematic government interference with the freedom of expression in America during the war. Lincoln strove to root his actions in the Constitution, insisting that the Constitution mattered, and at no time did he suspend it.24 He did not want the political and potential legal troubles that arresting editors could spark and did not want his military commanders to interfere with the free expression of newspapers unless such expression would result in palpable injury to the military.25

With Lincoln and Grant pursuing a tolerant approach, guardianship of sensitive military information by the administration fell to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, who embraced the role. A tough, intelligent attorney by trade, Stanton moved aggressively with the few advantages that he had and focused his effort on suppressing the operations of field correspondents.

In February 1862, after Congress had given Lincoln powers to control the rail and telegraph networks, Stanton’s War Department quickly established the US Military Telegraph Corps with the hub for traffic at the War Department.26 Telegraph operations deployed with the armies in the field or located in nearby towns were also under corps direction.27

War Department and the Military Patch Together Protections

President Lincoln, recognizing the constitutional protections afforded to the press and that he needed favorable headlines to help him sustain public support for the war, maintained good relations with the media throughout the war, as did Gen. Ulysses S. Grant when he became the Union army’s overall commander. Despite being occasionally angered by unauthorized press disclosures, neither Lincoln nor Grant ordered a crackdown on press operations, even though Grant early in the war nearly resigned when the press backed claims against him submitted by his rivals.23

Secretary of War Stanton in the foreground greeting General McClellan at a reception at the War Department on 20 January 1862. This drawing by Arthur Lumley appeared in the New York Illustrated News on 8 February 1862.
The orders to the corps were clear: “All telegraphic dispatches from Washington intended for publication that related to the civil or military operations of the government, were henceforth prohibited.”28 For newspapers, the government’s intent was equally clear: newspapers that published unauthorized military information, however obtained, and by whatever medium received, were to be cut off from the telegraph and forbidden to ship their product by railroad.29 By the end of March 1862, the Post Office Department joined the censorship ranks when Postmaster Montgomery Blair instructed postmasters:

You will, therefore, notify publishers not to publish any fact which has been excluded from the telegraph, and that a disregard of this order will subject the paper to be excluded from the mails.30

The heaviest burden for preventing disclosures fell to Union field commanders, who typically sought to protect their operations by restricting the access of specials in areas under their control and by insisting on approving reports by correspondents before reports were sent to their editors. Commanders used their martial law authorities to deter reporters from breaking a commander’s rules of engagement or to prosecute reporters if they did.

Following an unauthorized disclosure by the Philadelphia Inquirer during the early stages of the Peninsula Campaign, the War Department, with Stanton’s approval, on 12 April temporarily replaced local telegraph censorship with a “parole” system. In effect, the parole required each special wanting authorized access and reporting privileges to cover the campaign to sign a large document containing terms that would strictly curb their reporting and establish grounds for legal actions against violators.31

Sherman, motivated in part by newspaper coverage that persistently alleged he suffered from insanity, bitterly opposed newspaper intrusions into his operations. Early in the Vicksburg campaign, on 18 December 1862, Sherman issued General Order 8, forbidding reporters from accompanying his troops in the field:

The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military character...no citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it unless employed as part of a crew or as servants to the transports...any person whatever, whether in the service of the United States, or transports, found making reports for publication, which might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid, and comfort, will be arrested, and treated as spies.32

Due in part to General Order 8, in February 1863, a furious Sherman, exercised his authority under martial law to try by court martial the New York Herald’s Tom Knox as a spy. Knox had traveled with Sherman’s army aboard a transport—with Grant’s permission—and his account

of the fighting at Chickasaw Bayou in Mississippi in late December, which appeared in the Herald a month later slammed Sherman for losing the battle. After fighting off several counts, Knox was still found guilty of violating transport restrictions, but he was merely barred from covering the Union Army of the Tennessee.33

Few reporters during the war were found guilty in court martial trials for disobeying executive or military orders against disclosing military information. Some were arrested, but usually quickly released. Apparently neither the War Department nor the military brought charges against government or military officials who were leaking sensitive information to the press. There is no known case of a leaker being tried for revealing sensitive military information to the press.

A Resilient Press Cannot Be Suppressed

Despite multiple and often determined efforts to control the news, the Lincoln administration struggled to prevent the press from disclosing sensitive military information. With freedom of the press protections holding firm, a critical administration need for favorable press coverage, an ineffective news-control regime, and American’s craving for war news, Lincoln’s lieutenants never reached their goal of suppressing unauthorized disclosures to a level that they had hoped.

Newspaper owners and editors firmly believed they were obligated—and afforded protections guaranteed by the Constitution—to reveal
government mismanagement and excesses and to inform the public and shape their views. Moreover, major newspapers had grown profitable and powerful enough by 1861 to withstand government pressure to suppress them. After federal censorship of news led to his paper’s errant headline of a Union victory at First Manassas on 21 July 1861, the New York Times editor railed that citizens had the right to know the truth and that under no circumstances did the federal government have the right to deliberately suppress what it knows to be true. Editors rejected prior restraints or filtering out sensitive information coming from the field, spitefully claiming censorship removed their responsibility to further screen the information.

The rise of the journalism business was a major development in US society. Prior to the Civil War, few reporters had covered wars in Europe or the Americas, and news bureaus passively collected war news from a few official reports, letters, or observations collected in major towns closest to battlefronts.

President Lincoln and lawmakers, having ties at one time or another with the newspapers or having been endorsed by them, recognized this new power center and realized there would be negative consequences if they overregulated it. Newspapers were positioned to heavily influence voter turnout and ballots at every level and to vault or savage careers and reputations. According to the 1860 census, 80 percent of all American newspapers, including the 373 dailies, were classified as decidedly “political” in content, and many newspapers were essentially funded by political office holders or seekers, or subsidized by a local government.

In balancing his responsibilities to protect press freedoms and government secrets, Lincoln at times would be at odds with Stanton and send the wrong message to his commanders. By occasionally waiving restrictions on reporters or extending them assistance when he sought from them the latest battlefront news, Lincoln set a tone of tolerance that some in his officer corps probably emulated. Anxious for an update on the Battle of the Wilderness in early May 1862, Lincoln sought information from a New York Tribune reporter, Henry E. Wing, who had been at the battle and was just 20 miles from Washington. Stanton had just ordered Wing shot as a spy, but Lincoln intervened, wanting Wing in Washington to inform him and his cabinet. Within hours a special train brought Wing to Washington, and the president rewarded him for his report by ordering up a special train with a protective escort so Wing could retrieve his horse in Warrenton, Virginia.

Even the chief protector of military secrets, Stanton, was not immune to pressure from the press. Stanton’s task was plagued not only because he did not have the full support of political leaders and commanders, but also because most newspapermen despised him and stubbornly resisted his attempts to restrict them. In late April 1862, a furious Stanton shut down publication of the Harper’s Weekly after it published a drawing of General McClellan’s headquarters, which was shelled by Confederates two days after the edition became available in the area. He soon lifted the prohibition after he met with owner Fletcher Harper, who reminded Stanton of his paper’s overwhelming and unabashed coverage of the war extensively, with many dramatic images like the one above, showing Sherman’s army’s march through Atlanta, Georgia, in November 1864. The wood engraving appeared in the journal in January 1865.
Generals and their officers understood the press could enhance or tarnish reputations, and this prompted many officers at all levels to frequently ignore restrictions.

support for the Union war effort and the Lincoln administration.40

Political connections of officers also put brakes on news controls. In the Knox case (page 26), Sherman pursued the source of the leak and demanded to know from one of his commanders, Gen. Francis Preston Blair Jr., if he was the guilty party. Blair confessed that against Sherman’s orders he had allowed Knox aboard his vessel and had informed him about military operations, but he had not given him the information Knox had submitted to the Herald. Sherman’s accusatory tone insulted Blair, who was the brother of Montgomery Blair, a Lincoln cabinet member, and son of Francis Preston Blair, an important Lincoln adviser. General Blair, who had just completed a second term in the House of Representatives, shot back at Sherman:

I confess myself greatly mortified and annoyed in being called on to answer such interrogations under such circumstances… I hope to receive no more letters of the same character from you and shall not answer them if I do.41

Generals and their officers understood the press could enhance or tarnish reputations, and this prompted many officers at all levels to frequently ignore restrictions on reporters and tolerate their activities. Senior officers were keenly aware that victories on the battlefield could launch a successful political career, with Generals George Washington, Andrew Jackson, and Zachery Taylor before them having become commanders-in-chief. Indeed, after the Civil War, the next four presidents elected to office—Grant (twice), Rutherford B. Hayes, and James A. Garfield—had been Union generals.

Correspondents were often courted by commanders, or operated with fewer restrictions. Union Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans, the Army of the Cumberland commander who maneuvered the major Confederate western army out of Tennessee and captured the vital rail-hub city of Chattanooga by early September 1863, openly courted the press for his personal advancement. According to New York Tribune reporter, Henry Villard, he and other reporters would receive a warm reception at army headquarters from Rosecrans and his chief of staff, Gen. James A. Garfield, and listen to repeated claims by Rosecrans that the general was to play a preeminent role in the war:

[Rosecrans] freely offered his confidence to me… he criticized [overall Union army commander] General Halleck and [Secretary] Stanton with such freedom… that it really embarrassed me to listen… nor did he hesitate to expiate upon his plan for future operations… he evidently believed he was destined to reach the greatest distinction among all Union generals.... I could not help concluding that he was anxious to impress me with his greatness and have that impression reflected in the Tribune.42

Commanders often granted reporters passes to travel freely, the use of government horses and wagons, transportation on vessels, and other assistance. In May 1864, a group of reporters appealed to Grant to have his quartermaster sell forage to them so that they could feed their horses, which they needed to cover his campaign. He agreed to sell them forage until the end of the war at government prices, which were below the market price.43

Commanders were also aware that if they excessively punished specials for violating restrictions, reporters would retaliate by writing stories discrediting them or by refusing to cover them. Normally offenders were simply banished from camp, but in May 1864, Army of the Potomac commander General George Meade humiliated Edward Crapsey of the Philadelphia Inquirer. Before evicting Crapsey, Meade mounted him, facing backwards on a mule, and hung placards on his front and back labeling him the “Libeler of the Press,” and then had ride among the troops while a band played “Rogue’s March.”44 Crapsey got his revenge when later in Washington he organized several journalists who were infuriated by his treatment to publish only negative press about Meade and refrain from crediting him with any success, an embargo that lasted about six months.45

With senior field commanders pursuing different strategies to control the news through access and report dissemination privileges, the troops implementing controls rarely had standards to guide them, which made it easier for correspondents to evade controls. Correspondents without privileges regularly gained
access through army lines by slipping past sentries guarding camps, depots, railroad stations, and other lines of communication. Without protocols establishing what information was permitted or prohibited for release, censors in field telegraph posts or telegraph stations performed their duties unevenly, in some cases transmitting complete summary correspondence, in others sending only bits of information, or refusing to transmit any information.

The Government-Media Standoff: Then and Today

The gravest crisis in US history, the Civil War, placed unprecedented pressure on all the major actors to push for a resolution as soon as possible to stop a conflict that would in four years take the lives of approximately 625,000 Americans. The greatest burden for ending the war fell on President Lincoln who, as commander-in-chief, had to balance conflicting constitutional responsibilities to protect freedom of expression and the lives of individuals while he attempted to persuade citizens that war was necessary to reunite the country. Lincoln had to heavily rely on the press to reach voters. Thus, he allowed news bureaus to publish sensitive material and did not seriously punish them for doing so as the price to pay for media access.

Newsmen were motivated to publish for several reasons, with profits topping the list, but not far behind was the desire to express opinions about how the country should move forward and who should lead it. Protecting liberty, informing the public, and holding government account-

able also was central to their aims. Perhaps Samuel Bowles, editor-publisher of the antislavery Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican in 1851, best captured the purpose of journalism:

The brilliant mission of the newspaper is...to be, the high priest of history, the vitalizer of society, the world’s great informer, the earth’s high censor, the medium of public thought and opinion, and the circulating life blood of the whole human mind. It is the great enemy of tyrants and the right arm of liberty, and is destined, more than any other agency, to melt and mold the jarring and contending nations of the world into...one great brotherhood.

In many ways the newspaper industry capably served the public’s interests but several times it did so while damaging the national cause by revealing military secrets.

Sensitive government information by punishing government employees for unauthorized disclosures and nongovernment individuals if the intent of the violator is to do harm to the United States or to aid a foreign nation. These provisions are aimed at the source of a leak, and violators—including most recently Edward Snowden—have faced federal charges or prosecutions under these provisions.

Still, only a patchwork of statutes exists today to protect sensitive government information, and there is no single statute that criminalizes unauthorized disclosures of secret information. While sources are held accountable for disclosures, the media, which receive and publish the leaks, face minimal legal restraints—no publisher over the last half-century has faced prosecution in a US federal court for disclosing or possessing leaked government information. Courts and prosecutors have favored journalists over leakers, probably because of the First Amendment, even though it is through journalists that the sensitive information is divulged to the public and foreign adversaries.

When the media come before the court on charges of disclosing sensitive or secret information not authorized by the government, judges hold a high bar for the government in proving that leaked information poses, or has the potential to pose, grave or immediate dangers. It is difficult for the government to meet the standard, in part because by doing so it risks confirming the validity of disclosed information or disclosing...
more secrets to prove its case. The Supreme Court decision in the 1973 Pentagon Papers case remains a key legal opinion for adjudicating cases against the media. The court held that the government had not met its heavy burden of justifying prior restraints on the New York Times and Washington Post for publishing the secret study on US decisionmaking during the Vietnam War provided to them by defense contractor Daniel Ellsberg.51

The Pentagon Papers case also highlighted the role that leaks play in the symbiotic relationship among government leaders and the mainstream press, which many observers believe contributes to a government hesitance to prosecute the media. New York Times publisher Max Frankel in his affidavit in the Pentagon Papers case stated his view of the relationship:

[There is an] “informal but customary traffic in secret information” that characterized the interactions of a small and specialized corps of reporters and a few hundred American officials...[within which] high-level leaks of classified information are “the coin of [the] business”...their [the media] power to dictate outcomes is substantial.52

The Pentagon Papers case also brought to the forefront what many believed to be the unwarranted increase in state secrets. A leading constitutional scholar of the 20th century, Alexander Bickel, who represented the New York Times during the trial, stated that the case had demonstrated that the press provided the “countervailing power” against undue secrecy, because the First Amendment’s disapproval of prior restraint meant that while the government was permitted to “guard mightily” against leaks, it had little choice but to “suffer leaks if they occurred.” He said that while the resulting cat-and-mouse “game” might be “disorderly,” it was nonetheless “effective.”53

Democracies, loathing any form of political censorship, have shown a tolerance for censorship of military information during times of war but jealously guard against extending censorship beyond its intended purpose.54 As our forebears discovered during the Civil War, deciding where to draw the line without compromising competing constitutional values is a difficult and recurring debate, but it is a crucial and necessary one to safeguard the lives and liberties of individuals in a democracy.
Endnotes

1. The Sherman Letters: Correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, ed. Rachel Sherman Thorndike. (Sampson, Low, Marston, & Company, 1894), 192 (18 February 1863). (Available online)
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Brayton Harris, War News Blue & Gray in Black & White (Brassey’s, 1999), 258.
9. Harris, War News, 9, Risley, Civil War Journalism, xiii.
15. Ibid., 179.
18. Ibid.
19. Harris, War News, 141.
20. Jeffrey A. Smith, War and Press Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1999), 120.
23. Ibid., 308.
24. Ibid., 133–34.
27. Harris, War News, 141.
28. Wheeler, Mr. Lincoln’s T-Mails, 97.
29. Harris, War News, 141.
30. Ibid., 142.
33. Ibid., 244-49.
34. Risley, Civil War Journalism, 86.
35. Harris, War News, 150.
37. Harris, War News, 15.
39. Ibid., 56.
40. Harris, War News, 156.
41. Ibid., 245; Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War, 379.
42. Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War, 438.
43. Ibid., 541.
44. Harris, War News, 284.
45. Ibid., 285.
46. Ibid., 3.
48. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 515–16.
51. Ibid., 525.
52. Ibid., 531.
53. Sagar, Secrets and Leaks, 45.
54. Mathews, Reporting the Wars, 197.
Here is a harsh reality: We need secrecy to ensure our national security, but the clandestine nature of intelligence programs leaves them vulnerable to abuse and unauthorized disclosures. The result is damage to the very security we seek. As we have seen with Edward Snowden’s leaks about National Security Agency programs, it is hard for those without inside knowledge to know whether the revelations truly serve national security objectives or conceal wrongdoing. How then can even an informed public know whether or not to support such programs in the interest of national security. We can be sure that sensationalized media coverage will make difficult any careful thinking or discussion about the subject.

Thankfully, Rahul Sagar’s book *Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy* provides a thoughtful and well-researched analysis of the regulation of intelligence activities. Sagar, currently teaching at the National University of Singapore following a stint as an assistant professor at Princeton, starts by accurately stating that the “contemporary debate…is not about the legitimacy of state secrecy per se, but rather about ensuring that state secrecy is used only to further national security,” putting to rest notions that intelligence activities go against democracy. (3) Given this, Sagar sees a “dilemma” in designing an effective regulatory framework that keeps pace with the “dramatic transformation in scope and scale of the president’s national security powers” while still ensuring that the state can conduct the covert actions it needs. (5)

Sagar then walks readers through the problems of judicial review, congressional oversight, media watchdogs, and the role of whistleblowers and leakers in checking the executive’s power to direct secret activity. At the heart of the problem is the executive’s control over information about intelligence programs. Sagar sees whistleblowers and leakers, helped by the press, as more effective than the courts or Congress in discovering questionable intelligence activities, bitingly describing the mismatch between those who *should* (Congress) and those who *do* (whistleblowers and leakers) serve as regulators of secret state action. (51)

This is Sagar’s first book, and he takes care to address the vast literature dealing with US intelligence programs. He makes extensive use of rhetorical questions in each chapter, a device that allows him to address previous academic work and point out his perspectives on that work. The chapters read like short, self-contained lectures, and he strives to bring readers along by summarizing his arguments throughout the book. Sagar’s wide use of key court cases and exposures of intelligence activities to back up his arguments also makes his work a handy guide for further reading.

In setting up his analysis, Sagar is dead-on in observing that problems with state secrecy in the United States have grown more complex as our national interests have expanded. He argues that before the creation of a permanent US Intelligence Community (IC), “Covert activities did not emerge from or stay within the recesses of a security apparatus shrouded in deep secrecy.” Rather, secret state action was tightly defined, of limited duration, and unavoidably made public after a short time. (34–35)

Undoubtedly, combating terrorism adds yet more complexity, because it blurs the lines between foreign and domestic intelligence activities, though Sagar does not mention this himself. He does, however, point out that several institutional developments have fostered the executive’s ability to exercise greater secrecy privileges, beginning with Executive Order 10290, which addresses the president’s implied powers.

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a. Harry Truman signed the order in September 1951. Its imposing full title is “Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by...
Having identified the problem in his first chapter, Sagar begins the next by asking if the judiciary can regulate secrecy. He reviews key court cases dealing with intelligence issues and finds, as others have, that the courts often side with the executive in favor of protecting state secrets. For example, he cites *US v. Reynolds* (1955), which reaffirmed the state’s right to withhold evidence on the grounds that its revelation in court might harm national security. (41)

However, Sagar argues, judges are poorly positioned to assess the damage exposure of intelligence programs might cause. He warns that pressuring the courts to make cost/benefit calculations about disclosures will merely “encourage the politicization of the relevant benches and thereby defeat the whole point of turning to the courts” for impartial adjudication. (74) Sagar also rightly puts little stock in arguments that the courts could help promote transparency by requiring intelligence officials to explain why acknowledging the existence of a secret program would itself harm national security. However, making such explanations in public without compromising details would be nearly impossible and defeat the purpose of the approach. (73–74, 76)

Sagar forcefully argues Congress is unable to proactively regulate the president’s intelligence activities because it has to rely on the executive branch for information. Congress does do well, however, in investigating cases whistleblowers and unauthorized leaks reveal. In assessing Congress’s role, Sagar points out that select members of Congress are routinely briefed on the executive’s intelligence activities, but, absent some other catalyst, these members cannot lawfully disclose the activities or conduct public investigations of them. For precisely this reason, Sagar is skeptical that members of Congress do not leak secrets, although he admits there is no proof that they do. (90–91)

Whistleblowers, anonymous leakers, and the press—the most proactive in exposing secret activities—all receive close attention. Sagar deems these actors to be the most effective in keeping the executive in check because they galvanize the judiciary and Congress into action. Sagar hits the most important problems with these disclosures for our democracy, writing that the “parties involved in disclosing, reporting, and publishing classified information are neither elected by the people nor appointed by their representatives.” (114) As a result, they are not necessarily acting in the public interest.

Sagar calls for closely examining the motivations of those revealing secrets and warns against encouraging greater protections for them because, like the judiciary and Congress, they are poorly positioned to assess what should or should not be disclosed in the name of national security. Whistleblowers and leakers, Sagar argues, pose a serious problem because they expose intelligence activities out their own sense of right and wrong, without regard to legal stipulations or considerations of national security.

Sagar’s book has been criticized—unfairly I think—for containing few ideas about how to address the dilemma of state secrecy. Sagar is simply realistic about the obvious—the executive branch governs information about secret programs, and in our political system, an inquiring free press will constantly challenge the executive to reveal its secrets. Moreover, Sagar makes clear that most ideas for refining regulation of intelligence activities merely worsen oversight or create more layers of it.

Finally, in setting out the dilemma, Sager implicitly underscores the tangible damage unauthorized disclosures cause in dollars and lives lost. To fully calculate the costs, however, we must also recognize the less visible effect of the loss of vital information streams national security leaders and organizations rely on to inform decisions and protect the nation from those who would do it harm.

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Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the Interest of the Security of the United States.” It was revoked and replaced in 1953, and multiple versions have appeared in the years since.
Rory Cormac examines British intelligence responses to insurgencies after the Second World War and explores how strategic intelligence shaped British foreign, defense, and colonial policies. The study provides important insight into the Joint Intelligence Committee’s (JIC) activities of assessing intelligence, making recommendations, and reforming local intelligence operations to meet shifting Cold War and postcolonial demands. Cormac draws from an impressive review of declassified reports and explains how the JIC climbed the Whitehall hierarchy and gained influence in counterinsurgency efforts.

Rather than focus broadly on a range of events, Cormac selects four case studies with insurgencies in Malaya, Cyprus, Aden, and the Dhofar region of Oman from 1948 to 1972. He describes the locales as representative of a coherent analytical field for the study of the JIC and British counterinsurgency and illustrative of the committee’s evolving functions and managerial role of strategic intelligence. (11) The book contains analyses of JIC operations in the context of postwar challenges, but it also highlights how the “JIC product reflects two characteristics that are central to the British ‘way’ in intelligence: all-source assessment and consensus.” (19)

Cormac begins his case studies with an exploration of the Malayan Emergency during the years 1948 to 1951. He examines these early years of the conflict because they shaped policies and marked new efforts in imperial management. Moving away from conventional war concerns of WW II, the JIC had to adapt to the Cold War and broaden its assessments. After initially failing to predict violence in Malaya, the JIC developed a warning capability, widened its focus, and collaborated with different departments. Cormac finds that the Malaya events marked “the beginnings of the need for coordinated intelligence assessment bringing together all relevant actors, to ensure that all sources were exploited and balanced against competing interpretations, and that all implications were considered.” (64)

The book then turns to Cyprus, with the Ethniki Orgonosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) battling to unite the country with Greece from 1955 until 1959. Cormac argues that the conflict “changed the nature of the JIC forever and significantly impacted upon its ability to assess insurgencies.” (69) The committee was concerned about conventional warfare from Cold War antagonists and linked Cyprus to the Suez Crisis via arms trafficking from Egypt. By the mid-1950s there was progress in the JIC’s efforts against insurgencies and threats. The committee took on managerial functions by giving advice and guiding reform in local intelligence agencies. Cormac concludes that this era showed how “[t]he British intelligence model theoretically added value to local or tactical judgments by placing them in the broader strategic context.” (101)

In the case of Aden and the Federation of South Arabia, the JIC became a Cabinet Office committee and had direct access to ranking policymakers. Compared to Cyprus, the local Adeni intelligence community lacked the ability to deal with the insurgency. Cormac explores the insurgency from 1962 to 1967. In contrast to Malaya and Cyprus, in Aden, “the JIC was more dismissive of the role of communism” and “preferred to propagate the idea that Nasser’s fiery brand of pan-Arab nationalism was more influential.” (133) The author argues that the committee underestimated ideology and local agency in the insurgency. Nevertheless, all-source intelligence helped interdepartmental covert action, which reduced potential negative outcomes from the covert intervention. During the conflict, the JIC gained “an increased confidence and status within the Whitehall hierarchy” but still lacked authority in foreign intelligence management. (151)
In the last case study, Cormac explores the Dhofar rebellion in Oman and examines counterinsurgency efforts from 1968 to 1975. Oman’s close relationship to Britain, despite never becoming a British colony, demonstrates the shift in recent British efforts against insurgencies. Cormac argues 1968 was a significant year in British intelligence with several reforms that centralized all-source intelligence assessment and created “a more holistic approach to strategic intelligence.” (161) The JIC was divided in two, with one section working on political and security intelligence, and the other analyzing economic and scientific intelligence. Cormac argues that the reforms “strengthened the committee” and illustrate the evolution of the JIC’s focus from only counterinsurgencies to broader strategic issues. (191)

Confronting the Colonies offers readers an important understanding of the issues British intelligence faced as Britain lost imperial power and the Soviet Union sought to expand its sphere of influence. While scholars such as Richard Aldrich and Keith Jeffery have explored MI6’s activities during decolonization, this book provides a groundbreaking assessment of the JIC and its vital role in counterinsurgency. As Cormac notes in his conclusion, his study has contemporary relevance because the JIC still faces issues with weak states and insurgencies, and in the same parts of the world. In showing how the JIC expanded its focus and “found a role in countering insurgencies,” he demonstrates why it continues to be a significant body. (221)

However, the book heavily examines the bureaucratic aspects of intelligence and the particular sites of insurgencies. It would have been interesting to learn more about the JIC’s role in shaping counterinsurgency efforts with examples from actual covert operations or political reforms responding to insurgent demands. In addition, a comparative approach, using the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, would have accentuated Cormac’s arguments that the case studies reflect a unique British approach.
As World War II ended, the race was on with the Soviet Union to seize as many German scientists as possible in anticipation of the Cold War. The full story has remained elusive until now. Operation Paperclip, by Annie Jacobsen, provides perhaps the most comprehensive, up-to-date narrative available to the general public. Her book is a detailed and highly readable account of the program. Jacobsen compiled extensive primary and secondary sources, duly annotated in over 100 pages of notes and bibliography. In it are many new sources, among them US government records (President Clinton’s “Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act”), German archival records, first-person accounts, memoirs, and letters. The book also contains a useful index and biographies of the principal players.

Jacobsen offers a detailed chronology of events related to Operation Paperclip. Because of its scope and the introduction of so many characters, the narrative could have been improved if the author had focused on a shorter list than the 89 individuals profiled and maintained more topical continuity. Nevertheless, the book is a compelling work with interesting historical and personal revelations, for example:

• One of the most notorious cases of WMD proliferation occurred on 15 May 1945, when the German U-234 submarine, bound for Japan, was captured off Newfoundland by the USS Sutton. The U-boat carried Dr. Heinz Schlicke, Director of Naval Test Fields at Kiel, and the cargo included plans for the HS293 glider bomb, V-1 glide bomb (forerunner to cruise missiles), V-2 rocket (forerunner to the SCUD missile), Me262 fighter aircraft (the first combat jet fighter), low observable submarine designs, and lead-lined boxes filled with 1,200 lbs. of uranium oxide, a key ingredient of atomic bombs. Schlicke, who claimed to be an electronic warfare expert, became a prisoner at Ft. Meade, MD.

• Sarin was produced at Dyhernfurth (Dyhernfurth later fell into Russian hands). Its name derives from the initials of its developers: Gerhard Schrader and Otto Ambros from the infamous IG Farben chemical company—maker of the killing gases used at concentration camps—and from the names of two German Army officers.

• Schrader tells the story of inventing “tabun,” a nerve agent named after the English word “taboo.” The Germans called it 9/91 and, after their defeat at Stalingrad, seriously considered using it on the Russians.

Henry Wallace, former vice president and secretary of commerce, believed the scientists’ ideas could launch new civilian industries and produce jobs. Indeed, German scientists developed synthetic rubber (used in automobile tires), non-running hosiery, the ear thermometer, electromagnetic tape, and miniaturized electrical components, to name a few.

Werner von Braun is well known to those who remember the Apollo moon landing. During the Ford administration, von Braun was almost awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom—until one of Ford’s senior advisors, David Gergen, objected to his Nazi past.

Less well known is that another 120 fellow German scientists, engineers, and technicians developed the Saturn V launch vehicle, or that the Launch Operations Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, was headed by Kurt Debus, an ardent Nazi. The Vertical Assembly Building—bigger in volume than the Pentagon and almost as tall as the Washington Monument—was designed by Bernhard Tessmann, former facilities designer at the German missile launch facility at Peenemuende.

Other prominent Nazis hired under Operation Paperclip included:
• Dr. Hubertus Strughold, who played an important role in space medicine by developing space suits and other life-support systems. In June 1948, he put a rhesus monkey named Albert in the pressurized nosecone of a V-2 rocket in a pressurized nose cone, the first step in the effort to send humans to space.

• General Reinhard Gehlen, former head of Nazi intelligence operations against the Soviets, was hired by the US Army and later by the CIA to operate 600 ex-Nazi agents in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany. In 1948, CIA Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter assumed control of the so-called Gehlen Organization.

• German biologist Dr. Kurt Blome was hired to develop offensive and defensive capabilities to counter Soviet biological warfare activities.

In 1949, the CIA created the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Its first director, Dr. Willard Machle, traveled to Germany to set up a special program to interrogate Soviet spies. The CIA believed the Russians had developed mind-control programs and wanted to know how US spies would hold up against this capability if caught. He also aimed to explore the feasibility of creating a “Manchurian candidate” through behavioral modification. Thus, Operation Bluebird was born. Bluebird, later called MKULTRA, was a research activity experimenting in behavioral engineering of humans. The Nuremberg Code prohibits experimentation with humans without their consent. During this program, Dr. Frank Olson, a US Army biological weapons researcher, was given the drug LSD without his knowledge, leading to his death by leaping from a building. DCI Richard Helms ordered much of the documentation destroyed, and the circumstances of his demise remain controversial to this day.

Although she understandably questions the morality of the decision to hire Nazi SS scientists, Jacobsen balances her judgment with an understanding of the perceived threat of the Soviet Union under Stalin and the communists’ dialectical determination to prepare for total war with the West. The Soviets similarly captured and used German scientists for their own defense programs. That side of the story is not covered in this book.

Jacobsen provides insights on joint intelligence coordination and cooperation among US services and Allies; operational deconfliction; document and foreign materiel acquisition and exploitation; interrogation techniques; active tracking; production of foreign intelligence; surveillance and countersurveillance methods; and negotiating the sometimes conflicting objectives of the judiciary and the Intelligence Community (i.e., “hang them” vs. “hire them!”).
Cold War Southeast Asia

Reviewed by Timothy Castle, PhD

Singapore continues to be a thriving center for academics and other professionals who seek a greater understanding of the region’s important past, present, and future place in international affairs. Those in the hunt for the lessons of history will find this collection of 12 wide-ranging Cold War-related essays most rewarding. Editor Malcolm Murfett is associate professor in the Department of History of the National University of Singapore. He declares, “Apart from the mountains of literature on the Vietnam War and innumerable references to the ‘domino theory’ that Eisenhower and others were so concerned about in the 1950s, the role of the Cold War in Southeast Asia has not been subject to much scrutiny.”

Murfett’s selection of essayists includes scholars from universities and research centers in Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, Malaysia, and the United States. In developing their submissions, the authors consulted archival resources from across the globe, including national repositories in Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Specialty collections, including materials held by the US military, were also consulted.

Far from offering dry recitations of well-established facts, the authors bring forth new information and thoughtfully crafted insights on the Cold War’s impact on the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the establishment of Singapore. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is examined, as is neutralism in Cambodia and Laos. Essays also treat British defense obligations in Singapore and Malaysia, as well as Southeast Asia and the US Army “before the quagmire.”

Of particular note to this reviewer, the volume includes an in-depth recounting of the origins of Thai-US involvement in the Laotian “secret war.” Written by Sutayut Osornprasop, who holds a PhD from Cambridge University, the essay reveals in detail the full cooperation between the Thai government and the United States in carrying out what became a key component of the CIA’s project there. Osornprasop cast a wide net to gather his material, which includes interviews with key Thai military and CIA participants. Specifically, he details the work of Headquarters 333, the Thai police and military conduit for manpower into Laos. In his earlier dissertation work, Osornprasop established that, while most experts of the period recognize the 1968 deployment of regular Thai military forces to South Vietnam reached 12,000 men, most do not know that by 1972, twice as many Thais were on the ground in Laos. Indeed, some of Osornprasop’s most important data comes from Thai veterans who established an advocacy group called the “Unknown Warriors Association (UWA) – 333.”

Dedicated to informing the Thai public and others about their efforts, the UWA has an office, holds education events in schools and other forums, and regularly publishes material in English and Thai related to their efforts during the “secret war.” That participation in the Laos war ranged from the deployment of regular Royal Thai Army artillery batteries and Police Aerial Reinforcement Units (PARU) during the Eisenhower years to the employment of thousands of irregulars drawn from the Thai military through the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Dr. Osornprasop observes that these actions in Laos would, in the early 1970s, “culminate…in the largest expeditionary mission in Thailand’s contemporary history.” Not surprisingly, stories detailing the efforts of CIA Laos veterans like Bill Lair and Pat Landry—complete with wartime photos—routinely appear in UWA publications. As a demonstration of the open nature of their efforts, UWA members have also traveled to communist Laos to meet and talk about the war with their former enemies.

Cold War Southeast Asia is easily and inexpensively available electronically via Kindle and is highly recommended for intelligence professionals, regional experts, and others looking for new thoughts on the Cold War.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. © T. Castle
The Dreyfus Affair has all the ingredients of a great novel. The case of a Jewish army captain, Alfred Dreyfus, who had been wrongly convicted of espionage in a rigged trial, consumed French political and intellectual life in the late 1890s. One of the central figures in the case was another army officer, Col. Georges Picquart, who found the evidence that exonerated Dreyfus and pointed to the true traitor. His sense of honor trumping his personal anti-Semitism, Picquart joined the fight to clear Dreyfus, only to be framed, jailed, and cashiered from the French army. In the end, however, Dreyfus was cleared and Picquart was reinstated as a brigadier general and later appointed minister of war.

An Officer and a Spy is Robert Harris’s fictionalization of the Dreyfus Affair from Picquart’s vantage point. In his previous books, Harris, a British journalist turned thriller writer, has shown a talent for using clever plotting, interesting characters, and meticulous research to produce historical novels that are hard to put down. Here, Harris starts with Picquart and then works in appearances by other figures from the Affair, ranging from future French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau to the informants and minor spies employed by French military counterintelligence, and vividly evokes the sights, sounds, and smells of belle epoque Paris. His Picquart is a multidimensional man, intelligent and cultured, and in love with all that Paris has to offer, including his mistress, Pauline, the wife of a French diplomat. The result is a textured, nuanced book that brings a vanished world to life.

Unfortunately, however, An Officer and a Spy does not succeed as an espionage thriller. Part of the problem is that the story has little tension. Harris takes his time developing the plot, but most readers already know how it turns out. As a result, the pacing seems slow and the reader finds himself impatiently urging Harris to get on with it. The sense that the book moves slowly is exacerbated by Harris’s commitment to authenticity—he does not compress the timeline, and the characters have to speak their true lines, even if doing so in the formal style of the times makes the dialog seem stilted to our ears.

The book’s other problem is that Picquart is not a strong enough character to carry the story. Picquart, both in real life and in Harris’s portrayal, was smart and driven by a strong sense of honor and duty. Otherwise, however, he was a colorless military bureaucrat who wanted to advance his career but had no grand ambitions for his service. “I have no wish to destroy my career,” Picquart says as he debates what to do with the mounting evidence of Dreyfus’s innocence. (201) His career is, of course, derailed but his suffering is minimal—several months in a military jail and then, after his discharge, a comfortable life with family, friends, and mistress—and evokes little sympathy.

Heroes in espionage novels are interesting when they are decisive, but Picquart always remains the ambivalent and cautious staff officer. Harris’s rendering of the man is accurate, but leaves an emptiness at the core of the book and makes it hard to care about him. In the last pages of An Officer and a Spy, Dreyfus asks Picquart for the promotions he would have received had he not been imprisoned. Picquart, despite having received his retroactive promotions, refuses: “It is politically impossible,” he tells Dreyfus, as he cannot afford to open old wounds. (424) This is the classic response of a gray man, not of one whose experiences have enhanced his self-awareness or given him a commitment to a cause greater than himself.

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b. In developing the character, Harris seems to have relied heavily on historian Ruth Harris’s account of the Affair and her portrait of Picquart. See Ruth Harris, Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century (Metropolitan Books, 2010).
Intelligence in Public Literature

The Man Who Loved Dogs

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Western readers are not the only ones with the taste for espionage thrillers. Soviet-bloc writers—and even North Koreans—have produced them, essentially reversing the formulas we are familiar with to tell of pure-hearted communists serving the people and rescuing them from dastardly Western plots. The Soviet novels have been forgotten, of course, disappearing with the regime for which they served as propaganda. Cuba, however, soldiers on as a socialist paradise, and it is from there that we have a surprising new spy novel, The Man Who Loved Dogs, by Leonardo Padura. This is not simply a fine thriller, but one that transcends the genre, rising to the level of true literature.

The Man Who Loved Dogs is an ambitious work, one that addresses the large and consequential question of why revolutions and revolutionaries fail. The central story is the relationship between Ivan Cardenas Maturell, a writer left to work as a proofreader at a Cuban veterinary journal after falling afoul of the literary authorities, and a mysterious man he meets on the beach near Havana in the mid-1970s. The man turns out to be Ramon Mercader, the NKVD agent who killed Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940, and who is living out his last days in Cuba. Padura combines the stories of Ivan, Mercader, and Trotsky, setting them against the backgrounds of the Stalinist terror, the Spanish Civil War, and Cuban life from the 1970s to the 2000s. In them, he explores the motivations of revolutionaries and their ultimate disillusionment.

Padura weaves the threads of these revolutionaries’ lives into a complex, sophisticated, and demanding novel. Readers versed in the history of Europe in the 1930s and the theoretical disputes among Marxists in the mid-20th century will have an advantage. Readers who do not remember Trotsky’s bureaucratic critique of Stalinism, why James Burnham and Max Shachtman broke with him, or what POUM was, might want to keep a biography of Trotsky and a history of the Spanish Civil War nearby.

Padura is a great stylist, and The Man Who Loved Dogs is a pleasure to read. The book checks in at just under 600 pages of dense type often unbroken by dialogue, but the prose, beautifully transalted by Anna Kushner, is mesmerizing and Padura brings events and characters to life in such a way that the pages fly by. This achievement is especially striking given that Padura covers topics ranging from Marxist theoretical arguments to NKVD training and tradecraft while still working within the framework of historical events, the true timeline, and recreations of actual conversations.

The Man Who Loved Dogs is at its best as Padura builds the psychological portraits of his characters, which he uses to explore the fate of the Soviet revolution. Shortly before his murder, for example, Padura’s Trotsky wonders if “all great dreams were condemned to perversion and failure.” (451) Padura believes the answer is yes, and to demonstrate that, he delves deeply into his characters, seeking to understand their motives and actions. Mercader, as the central figure, gets the most attention, and Padura meticulously chronicles how this dedicated communist was manipulated by the NKVD and his Stalinist mother—although a secondary character, Padura’s portrait of her alone makes the book is worth reading—to become an unquestioning assassin.

As for Trotsky, Padura shows him to be a kind and gentle man, tortured by Stalin’s gradual destruction of his family and friends, but, despite all his brilliance as a theoretician, foolishly unable to comprehend how his actions during the Russian Revolution helped create the foundations of the Stalinist state. Padura shows Trotsky twisting himself like a pretzel, trying to defend the Soviet...
Union as the homeland of socialism while blaming its obvious faults on others. “He needed to convince himself that it was still possible to show the difference between fascism and Stalinism...that the USSR still contained the essence of the revolution and that essence was what had to be defended and preserved.” (388, italics in original) Even Nikolay Bukharin makes an appearance, briefly sketched as he decides to return from France to Moscow and certain death because he knows he lacks Trotsky’s inner strength and ability to live abroad under the strain of being a hunted man.

Except for Trotsky, all of Padura’s characters end up stripped of their hopes and bitterly disappointed, but at least gaining insight from their experiences. In a series of conversations, echoing Arthur Koestler’s classic Darkness at Noon, Leonid Eitingon, Mercader’s NKVD handler, explains to Ramon in the 1960s why he had manipulated him into a plot from which he was not supposed to have emerged alive. Eitingon says he became a revolutionary because “I had faith, I wanted to change the world, and because I needed the pair of boots they gave to Chekist agents,” but he continued on because he was a coward. “We’ve always been afraid and what has motivated us is not faith, as we told ourselves every day, but rather fear. Out of fear, many kept their mouths shut: what else could they do? But we, Ramon, went beyond that, crushing people, even killing…because we believed, but also out of fear.” (530, 522) Thus does revolutionary faith descend into cynicism.

Padura, of course, is interested not merely in criticizing the Soviet experience, but using his critique to evaluate the Cuban revolution. Padura has done this before, writing a series of detective novels that describe in detail the seamy side and deprivations of Cuban life. In fact, these novels (which are also available in English) have made Padura one of the country’s most popular authors and, with so many of Cuba’s most talented writers either repressed or in exile, one of the few with a strong international reputation who are still working on the island.

In The Man Who Loved Dogs, however, Padura goes much further in his criticism than in his previous books, with long passages in which he describes explicitly how the Cuban revolution and its ideology have reached the same dead end as the Soviet model on which they are based. Speaking through Ivan, Padura talks of his early faith in the revolution—“I had cut sugarcane, planted coffee, and written a few stories pushed by the faith and the most solid confidence in the future”—and then of his gradual disillusion. (399) In the course of the story, Ivan goes beyond his own punishment to tell of the death of his brother trying to flee Cuba because his persecution as a homosexual made life unbearable; the stifling of independent intellectual life; the near starvation conditions of the 1990s; and the physical decay of the cities and towns. “We were the gullible generation,” says Ivan, looking back, “the one made up of those who romantically accept and justify everything with our sights on the future... Now [in the 1990s], with great difficulty, we managed to understand how and why all of that perfection had collapsed.” (487–88) Padura makes sure his readers get the point by killing Ivan near the end of the book—he dies in his bed when the roof and ceiling of his dilapidated house collapse on him.

Here, though, Padura reaches his personal limits. Cuba seems to be the passive victim of a series of misfortunes that, somehow, have just happened; nowhere does Padura say that the regime is responsible for Cuba’s problems, or that the Cuban system is doomed to collapse, just like the Soviet system it copied. Nor does Padura mention Fidel Castro or the Cuban Communist Party by name, and he does not subject Fidel’s ideology to the same relentless analysis he uses on Stalin’s and Trotsky’s. Perhaps, however, this is unsurprising. Padura’s prominence as a writer has brought him privileges, including the freedom to travel and publish abroad; the ability to collect hard currency royalties that make his life more comfortable than that of almost all Cubans; and the indulgence of the regime, as long as he does not go too far. He is unwilling to jeopardize this position, to take on the hardships that would come with following the examples of Havel or Solzhenitsyn.

It would be easy to judge Padura harshly for this, but also premature. True, he is careful not to go beyond the limits set by the regime, but the message and point of his criticism-by-analogy should be clear to any but the most obtuse reader. The members of Cuba’s small literary community each have to make their own decisions about how brave to be, and Padura apparently sees no point in going far enough to risk being silenced by going to jail.

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or losing his authenticity by accepting exile. Not until we have a post-Castro, postcommunist Cuba will we be able to evaluate fully the actions of writers under the regime and whether they compromised themselves too much. In the meantime, however, *The Man Who Loved Dogs* stands as an important literary achievement.

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Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current

No Place To Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State, by Glenn Greenwald.
The Snowden Operation: Inside the West’s Greatest Intelligence Disaster, by Edward Lucas.
The Terror Courts: Rough Justice at Guantanamo Bay, by Jess Bravin.

Historical

The Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover’s Secret FBI, by Betty Medsger.
Dark Invasion: 1915—Germany’s Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America, by Howard Blum.
Dr. Benjamin Church, Spy: A Case of Espionage on the Eve of the American Revolution, by John A. Nagy.
Fool’s Mate: A True Story of Espionage at the National Security Agency, by John W. Whiteside III.
Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelligence, by Nigel West.
Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence, by Nigel West.
James Jesus Angleton: Was He Right?, by Edward Jay Epstein.
Meeting the Challenge: The Hexagon KH-9 Reconnaissance Satellite, by Phil Pressel.
Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence, edited by Bruce Hoffman and Christian Ostermann.
Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case, by Allen Weinstein.
Prisoners, Lovers, & Spies: The Story of Invisible Ink from Herodotus to al-Qaeda, by Kristie Macrakis
SIGINT: The Secret History of Signals Intelligence 1914–45, by Peter Matthews.
TOP SECRET: Images from the Archives of the Stasi, by Simon Menner.

Memoir

How Long Till Dawn: Memoirs of one of the Charter Members and Original Founders of the Resistance Movement in Algiers and a Member of OSS during World War II, by Daphne Joan Fry (Tuyl) Knox.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

The Snowden Operation: Inside the West’s Greatest Intelligence Disaster, by Edward Lucas (Edward Lucas eBook, 2014), 76 pp., glossary, endnotes, no index.

No Place To Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State, by Glenn Greenwald (Metropolitan, 2014), 259 pp., photos, endnotes & index at www.glenngreenwald.net.

Each of these books about the Snowden affair covers the basics of Snowden’s broken family life, his half-finished education, his political beliefs, and his devotion to the Internet. The Snowden Files—published first—is based on interviews conducted by Guardian journalist Luke Harding, materials furnished the paper, and accounts appearing elsewhere. Harding clearly views Snowden as a noble, self-sacrificing whistle-blower. His major addition to the story is a chapter describing how Snowden, using the Internet name TheTrueHooha, attempted to learn how to set up a Web server. Later, writes Harding, Snowden, still as TheTrueHooha, engaged in Internet chats that complained about the New York Times publishing leaked information in violation of national security. He then criticized the “Obama administration for appointing a… politician to run the CIA.” (4) Harding also adds some minor details—not included in the other volumes—about British SIGINT facilities and British reaction to the Snowden disclosures. With these exceptions, the book offers nothing significant not found in the other two.

The Snowden Operation, published only as an e-book, takes a decidedly different approach. Economist-author Edward Lucas views Snowden as a “useful idiot,” (2) suggesting that his theft of government documents amounts to sabotage, not whistle-blowing. He recognizes that the charge of mass surveillance resonates with the public but warns against overreaction by the “Snowdenistas” that would destroy valuable capabilities and says they are naïve in arguing foreign intelligence services will not have access to or benefit from the stolen material. Noting that “Russian intelligence keeps a close eye on staff of adversary countries’ foreign missions,” (chapter 5) he concludes that it is likely that they would have been onto Snowden from his days as TheTrueHooha and suggests just how they would have monitored him.

On the topic of how a legitimate whistle-blower would have behaved, Lucas describes the options available and the procedures that would have achieved the practical goals Snowden espoused. But they would not have put Snowden in the media spotlight. In short, Lucas does not see Snowden as the product of heroic virtues, or Western intelligence as the perpetrator of persistent willful illegalities, though he suggests that unwarranted sloppiness contributed to the problem. After a few modest suggestions for improvements, Lucas concludes that Snowden has become a pawn in an information warfare operation that is no cause for comfort.

No Place To Hide is the most complete, though far from the most objective account of the Snowden affair to date. Lawyer-journalist Glenn Greenwald is the only one of the three authors to have met and interviewed Snowden. Four of the five chapters in his book deal directly with the details of their relationship. He begins with a story of their first contact—a cryptic e-mail signed Cincinnatus—a detail not included in the other books. He then explains how this eventually led to a quasi-clandestine meeting in Hong Kong after the intervention of Laura Poitras, a documentary filmmaker. Greenwald also includes a lengthy description of how they arranged for publication of the documents Snowden provided—some examples are included in the book—and the many difficulties they experienced once they did so.
But the core arguments in No Place to Hide are found in chapter three, “Collect It All.” Greenwald is appalled at the concept implied in the chapter’s title and analyzes it with the presumption of illegality while dismissing without comment the intelligence issues that led to its adoption. Throughout this chapter and the next, “The Harm of Surveillance,” Greenwald emphasizes the coincidence of his judgments and values with those of Snowden. He also links Snowden’s upbringing and checkered employment history as justification for his decision to proceed as he did rather than follow official whistle-blower procedures. Greenwald also ignores other interpretations regarding the legality of the NSA’s collection programs—for example, the views of retired admiral Michael McConnell, former director of the National Security Agency and national intelligence.¹

The fifth chapter is something of a surprise. Here Greenwald harshly attacks selected members of the media—including the New York Times—for their efforts to “discredit [the author] personally” (211) and for publishing classified information. He goes on to criticize the Bush and Obama administrations and various private individuals, including Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, who said Greenwald’s reporting “doesn’t border on criminality—it’s right in the heart of criminality.” (217) More generally, Greenwald insists that since journalists often consult with the government before publishing certain stories, “establishment media figures have accepted the role of dutiful spokespersons for political officials.” (232)

Greenwald sums up the common themes of these three books: Snowden’s acts were justified because he chose to seek “reform of the surveillance state,” (248) and journalists have the absolute right to be the final arbiters of what to publish. Greenwald’s often bitter ad hominem rationale for this is unlikely to be the last word on the subject.


President George W. Bush’s November 2001 signing of the order creating military commissions to deal with prisoners at Guantanamo Bay came as a surprise to DCI George Tenet. The CIA preferred using the “federal prosecutors and judges in the Southern District of New York” since they were experienced in handling “the biggest terrorism cases” while protecting classified information “without a single leak.” (45) For reasons of their own, the State and Justice Departments were also not pleased with the decision. In The Terror Courts, journalist and lawyer Jess Bravin describes the bureaucratic battles that followed the decision, its impact on government attempts to prosecute suspected terrorists, and the less-than-career-enhancing consequences for the principal legal officers involved.

Bravin takes an interesting approach to a complicated legal situation. He uses several cases to illustrate the difficulties that have been encountered in bringing detainees to trial and the appeals that often followed. The story of Salim Hamden is a prime example. Bravin follows Hamden’s capture in Afghanistan in November 2001 and multiple interrogations in which his testimony often changed. When it was learned that he had been Osama bin Laden’s driver he was sent to Guantanamo. At Hamden’s trial by a military commission, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) was a key witness. When Hamden’s lawyers challenged the authority of the commission to try him, the case went to the Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor. Hamden was released in 2009 and returned to Yemen. (375) When the District of Colombia Circuit Court vacated his conviction, “the decision immediately placed in jeopardy every military conviction.” (377) Bravin examines the legal fallout.

The case of Mandouh Habib illustrates the difficulties prosecutors encountered when key evidence was withheld. In Habib’s case, it was a CIA record of an incriminating phone call he had made. (235) A further complication was that his admission to training terrorists and
planning to hijack a plane himself had been obtained after his rendition to an Egyptian prison. When the prosecutor of the case, Marine Lt. Col. Stuart Couch, realized he could not show Habib’s statements were not the result of torture, Habib was released. The claim that evidence was obtained under torture is a problem in many of the cases Bravin discusses, including that of KSM. (250)

Besides detailed case revelations, Bravin describes legal procedures employed at Guantanamo, the influence of politics on the disposition of prisoners, the seemingly endless pretrial maneuvering, and the conflicts that emerged among the defense and prosecution lawyers. The Terror Courts does not, however, suggest what should be done with the prisoners remaining at Guantanamo. He only shows that the military commission approach was not the appropriate legal solution.

**Historical**


Historian Whitney Bendeck teaches at Florida State University, where she is also director of undergraduate studies for the international affairs program. Her interest in deception was triggered by a visit to the Normandy Cemetery and Memorial, and “A” Force is the result. She provides several objectives for her study. One was “to explain why the British resorted to deception in the first place.” Another was to “synthesize military and deception histories into a single narrative.” Finally, she wanted “to build on [her] predecessors’ works and demonstrate beyond question that the deception operations in the Second World War began in the deserts of North and East Africa, not in London.” (12–13) She accomplishes the first two admirably. But “A” Force does little to achieve the third.

The reason is not because she omits any of the key players or operations or fails to document her account. Rather, it is because her treatment covers the same topics as other authors have and adds little to their record. For example, although broader in scope, Thaddeus Holt’s *The Deceivers* discusses the same operations and personnel, while leaving no doubt that British deception during the war originated during the Africa campaigns.

Although it does not meet all of its stated objectives, “A” Force is nevertheless a concise but thorough treatment of an important topic.


During the night of 8 March 1971, while the nation’s attention was on the long-anticipated boxing match between Joe Frazier and Muhammad Ali, antiwar activists calling themselves The Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the F.B.I. broke into an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania. Executing a carefully planned burglary, the perpetrators quickly stripped the office of its files and took them to a remote farmhouse in upstate Pennsylvania. While examining their haul, the burglars found a 1970 memorandum directing agents to increase their interviews of antiwar activists and other dissident groups in order to “enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and…further serve to get the point across there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.” They realized they had the information they had hoped to find. Other documents added support to their belief that the FBI sought to discredit the Black Panthers, Martin Luther King, and particular antiwar activists, among other targets. One
The burglars’ next step was to make the documents public in such a way that they could not be successfully dismissed as leftist propaganda. Washington Post reporter Betty Medsger was selected as a reliable avenue. A number of documents were sent to her anonymously. Later, others were sent to members of Congress and other journalists. The Washington Post’s executive editor, Ben Bradlee, directed publication of the documents as a matter of journalistic responsibility.

While there was an initial public outcry and outrage at the FBI spying on Americans, attention gradually faded as the Pentagon Papers and Watergate break-in grabbed headlines. Despite an intense and lengthy FBI investigation, which included an interview of a member of the group, none of the burglars were ever caught.

The story surfaced 30 years later when Medsger was visiting two old friends in Philadelphia, and they told her they had been part of the group that had committed the break-in and sent the files to her. They were by then free to talk since the statute of limitations had long since expired. After they put her in touch with fellow conspirators—seven of the eight agreed to be identified—Medsger decided to write *The Burglary*.

The book describes the burglary in great detail and also reviews, rather sympathetically, the lives of each of the burglars before and after the break-in. Medsger also uses the book to review the Church Committee investigation of the FBI and to criticize the Bureau’s recent behavior while arguing for reform. As for the Media burglars, she implicitly absolves them of the felony they committed. In the end, *The Burglary* does, indeed, reveal FBI wrongdoing, but some may be left wondering whether the ends justified the means in this case.

**Dark Invasion: 1915—Germany’s Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America**, by Howard Blum (HarperCollins, 2014), 473 pp., notes on sources, bibliography, maps, index.

Col. Walter Nicolai, the head of German military intelligence in WWI, surveyed its wartime performance in his book, *The German Secret Service*. Less than two pages were devoted to the United States, where, he noted, “it was all but impossible to send agents for espionage.” Dark Invasion validates Nicolai’s conclusion. Notwithstanding the book’s subtitle, the German agents in America before 1917 were engaged in old-fashioned sabotage, not terrorism, as the book makes clear.

Investigative journalist Howard Blum tells their story through the eyes of the participants. The key figure and book’s central focus is New York police captain Thomas Tunney, head of the Bomb Squad. Blum relates Tunney’s early experiences against anarchist groups, notably his successful operation to foil an attempt to blow up St. Patrick’s Cathedral. This is the closest the book comes to discussing terrorism.

Germany was aware that the nominally neutral United States was, in fact, supplying Germany’s enemies with munitions and other goods. Nicolai, acting under the Kaiser’s orders, charged Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, Germany’s ambassador in Washington, with the task of “keeping America out of the war and preventing the munitions and other goods… from reaching the enemy.” Nicolai explained that while money was no object, sending trained agents to America was not possible. Thus, to accomplish this mission, Bernstorff would have to recruit people from his staff to take the necessary actions. Blum shows that even though Bernstorff had no experience in any form of clandestine service, he did a rather good job.

Dark Invasion recounts the story of each man Bernstorff recruited and the missions they undertook. German-Americans were enlisted to plant so-called “cigar bombs” with delayed-action fuses to blow up ships at
sea. The munitions center at Black Tom, New Jersey, was bombed, destroying tons of shells destined for the allies. There was even a plot to infect horses headed for Europe with anthrax. Since the United States had no national intelligence service, the New York Police Department Bomb Squad was assigned the job of stopping the sabotage of ports and munitions plants.

Not all the German operatives involved were recruited by Bernstorff or his men. Harvard student Erich Muenter was a walk-in. After Muenter murdered his wife in Cambridge, changed his name to Frank Holt, and remarried, he contacted the German embassy with a plan. To demonstrate his sincerity and ability, he planted a bomb that exploded in the US Capitol and then conducted an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate J.P. Morgan, shooting him twice. Tunney caught him during the attack.

Blum tells how Tunney and his men, with help from the British Secret Intelligence Service, prevented some but not all of the German sabotage. By the time America entered the war, most of Bernstorff’s agents had been caught. Blum ends his story at that point, although Tunney’s job continued. *Dark Invasion* is a good summary of America’s initial attempts to deal with threats to the homeland.

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Dr. Benjamin Church was the physician who performed the autopsy on Crispus Attucks after the Boston Massacre. A prominent member of Boston society, he was a skilled orator, poet, and member of the Massachusetts provincial congress. His confidants included Samuel Adams, Paul Revere, and John Hancock. As a member of the Committee of Safety, he signed Benedict Arnold’s orders to take Fort Ticonderoga and later became surgeon general of the Continental Army. In short, Church was one of America’s founding fathers. He was also the British spy who informed General Gage, the royal governor of the colony, of the location of American ammunition stores at Lexington.

The story of Church’s treachery has been told in other histories of the War of Independence. In *Dr. Benjamin Church, Spy*, historian John Nagy presents a broader, more thoroughly documented study. While recounting Church’s spying, Nagy examines his motivations, the events that led to his discovery, and the few remaining doubts about the case.

The Church case is of historical significance for several reasons. Church was the first spy exposed during the revolution because his enciphered communications were decrypted by Washington’s staff. The case also exposed the fact that there was no law against espionage, leaving the Continental Congress with no basis to imprison Church. His motivations and the reasons for his exposure, on the other hand, were quite conventional. He was in need of money, and he wanted to end up on the winning side. He employed his unwitting mistress to transmit the encrypted letter to the British, but for reasons of her own, she did not follow his instructions, and this led to its discovery. (160)

Benjamin Church always proclaimed his innocence, but his court martial found him guilty. With no option for imprisonment, and after much maneuvering over alternatives, he was deported to Martinico—now Martinique—and died when the ship was lost at sea. *Dr. Benjamin Church, Spy* is a fine study of America’s first case of espionage and a positive contribution to the intelligence literature.
**Fool’s Mate: A True Story of Espionage at the National Security Agency**, by John W. Whiteside III (CreateSpace, 2013) 271 pp., bibliography, no index.

When KGB archivist Visili Mitrokhin defected in November 1992, Robert Lipka’s goose was cooked; he just didn’t know it. Mitrokhin had furnished Lipka’s name and said he was an Army communications specialist who had been an active KGB agent for the two years ending in August 1967, when he left the Army and went to Millersville College in Pennsylvania. The FBI was tasked with determining whether Mitrokhin was right. They had only the Russian’s claims; to make a case against Lipka, the FBI needed his confession. FBI special agent John Whiteside was assigned the case. *Fool’s Mate* describes the investigation and sting operation that led to Lipka’s arrest and conviction 30 years after his offense.

Whiteside tells his story chronologically. Employing a special watcher team, he put Lipka under surveillance and learned his daily routine—the man was gambler and a horseplayer. At the time, he weighed at least 300 pounds, so he was hard to miss. In 1993, after receiving evidence from Lipka’s first wife—who had accompanied him while he serviced dead drops—Whiteside mounted a false-flag operation with an FBI special agent posing as a Russian GRU officer attempting to reactivate Lipka with money as the bait. The details of how they accomplished this while dealing with a suspicious Lipka and Department of Justice lawyers and Bureau supervisors looking over every step make for great reading.

In the end, Lipka did go to jail (in 1997), but under circumstances hard to believe. He was sentenced to 18 years. Lipka was released in 2006 and passed away in 2013. An interesting case study!

**Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelligence**, by Nigel West (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 444 pp., bibliography, index.


These volumes mark the 10th and 11th contributions by military historian Nigel West to the Historical Dictionary intelligence series. In his introduction to *World War I Intelligence*, West explains the reasoning that kept details of most of these cases secret for so long. Promises by case officers were high on the list, and fear of reprisals to descendants was another factor. But time has lessened the risks, and newly released documents from the British National Archives have revealed new names and acts of espionage among all the major participants in WWI. Still, though many of the cases are well known, they have been included for completeness. One of the additions to public knowledge is the partial transcript of Mata Hari’s interrogation by Sir Basil Thomson. Curiously, Thomson himself does not have an entry. Another item published here for the first time is the complete Special War List (SWL). Compiled by MI5, it contains the names of “past and present” suspect enemy agents in Britain during the period. (296, 356ff.) WWI intelligence students and historians will find *World War I Intelligence* a useful reference.

The new edition of *British Intelligence* contains 74 pages of material that surfaced since the first edition was published in 2005. Some additions include personalities. Former MI5 officer Cathy Massiter is one example. Another is Anya Chapman, as she was known in London, who was arrested (under the name Anna Chapman) in New York as one of 10 Soviet illegals. New terms are also included, for example, “extraordinary rendition,” which West notes had one British involvement. (205) The description of MI5 surveillance operations, codenamed OVERT, is also new. Other entries have been expanded; the one for former MI5 Director-General Stephen Lander is typical.
Both volumes contain excellent bibliographic essays that summarize the British intelligence literature and comment on its quality. Neither volume contains sources for the entries, a publisher-imposed limitation that diminishes scholarly value. That deficiency aside, these reference works are a valuable starting point for those who want to know more about espionage history.


In 1976, while Edward Epstein was working on a book about Lee Harvey Oswald, he could find little information about Oswald’s two-year stint in the Soviet Union. When Epstein heard about Yuri Nosenko, a KGB defector who supposedly knew something about the subject, he obtained permission from the CIA to interview him. The interview left Epstein with more unanswered questions, and he was discouraged from pursuing the matter. When Seymour Hersh published his exposé about the CIA in December 1974, Epstein noticed a name he had not heard before—James Angleton. Going first to the Washington DC phone book, he found Angleton’s number, called, and got an interview. *Was He Right?* describes what followed.

First, Epstein writes, he learned Angleton’s theory and basic principles of counterintelligence and deception. Then came the details of the Nosenko case, the input from another KGB defector—Anatoly Golitsyn—whose story introduced counterintelligence complications, and the resulting molehunt. When DCI Colby would not accept Angleton’s judgment that Nosenko was a provocation, Angleton was forced to retire. In the telling Epstein mentions his interviews with various players in the controversy and he gradually broadens the issue. No longer is Epstein concerned just about Nosenko’s role, the primary issue of Angleton’s interest. The real question, Epstein suggests, was whether the CIA had ever been penetrated.

And it is this question that Epstein addresses in the final part of his monograph. To make his point, he summarizes known KGB penetration cases. Curiously, he includes examples that occurred before CIA existed, some that occurred in other intelligence agencies, and still others that took place long after Angleton had left—Howard Ames, Nicholson, and even Yurchenko, to name a few. Thus, his conclusion that “Angleton had been right” (65) is supported in part by cases of which Angleton had no knowledge.

*Was He Right?* should be viewed with caution, and not just because of its foregone conclusion. Epstein also makes a number of factual errors. For example, Angleton did not graduate from Yale “with high honors” (9); he was near the bottom of his class. Nor was he the head of the CI Staff “until Christmas Eve of 1095.” (10) The typo should have been caught; the correct date was 1974. Pete Bagley didn’t wait for George Kisevalter before interviewing Nosenko. (24) Epstein’s claim that in 1940, “French and Polish intelligence stole a German Enigma cipher machine,” is incorrect. Finally, Anatoly Golitsyn did not defect “at the American Embassy in Helsinki” but went directly to the chief of station’s home. (44)

In the end, Epstein presents an interesting view of his relationship with James Angleton. But his suggestion that Angleton’s contemporaries did not share his view of the potential for KGB penetrations of the CIA is incorrect.

**Meeting the Challenge: The Hexagon KH-9 Reconnaissance Satellite,** by Phil Pressel (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2013), 295 pp., photos, index.

The HEXAGON (KH-9) film-based photo satellite system, one of several systems that followed the first orbiting reconnaissance satellite, the Corona (the last in the series was the KH-4b), first launched in 1971. The KH-9 flew 19 successful missions before the 20th and last exploded shortly after launch on 18 April 1986. *Meeting the
Challenge tells the story of the HEXAGON’s origins and development and provides details of the system’s characteristics, which were tremendously more advanced than those of its predecessors, the CORONA and GAMBIT.  

Sixteen of the 19 chapters and six appendices of Meeting the Challenge are written in whole or in part by principal author Phil Pressel, a former HEXAGON project engineer. The balance of the book is authored by specialists in the technical topics covered. They all worked for Perkin-Elmer Corporation, the contractor that designed and produced the HEXAGON camera system under the guidance of the CIA.

Perkin-Elmer was not the only contractor competing to build the KH-9. The Itek Corporation, manufacturer of the KH-4b, was also a bidder, and Pressel discusses the competition. He also devotes a chapter to the organization of Perkin-Elmer and the staff that designed and built HEXAGON. But most of Meeting the Challenge is concerned with the technical aspects of the KH-9—its optical system, film path, testing, electronics—as well as in-flight problems and Perkin-Elmer’s coordination with the CIA.

Diagrams and photos of the camera configuration are included to illustrate how the system worked and showcase its complexity. There are two chapters that non-technical readers will appreciate. The first deals with salvaging a capsule that sank before it could be recovered. The second describes what happened when the film broke during a mission, and CIA’s program manager, Robert Kohler, worked to determine whether the camera or the ultrathin film produced by Eastman Kodak had caused the failure.

For many who worked on the once-secret HEXAGON program, Meeting the Challenge makes public a story that few thought would ever be written. A most valuable contribution to the intelligence literature and a nice supplement to the material released in 2012 by the National Reconnaissance Office.


On 29 March 2012, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars sponsored a seminar on James Angleton, his legacy, and his influence on counterintelligence. It was cochaired by the editors of this volume, which is a transcript of the proceedings. The 12 contributors were Tennent Bagley (CIA retired); Barry Royden (CIA retired); Carl Colby (Producer/Director and William Colby’s son); journalist/authors Edward Epstein, Ronald Kessler, David Martin and David Wise; historians Christopher Andrew (Cambridge), Loch Johnson (University of Georgia), John Prados (National Security Archive), and David Robarge (CIA); and Oleg Kalugin (KGB retired).

Each contributor made a presentation, and the overall result was an unusual summary view of Angleton and his CIA career. Only Bagley had had prolonged professional contact with Angleton. Johnson had interviewed him several times while on the Church Committee staff, and Epstein had interviewed him for 85 hours; both of these encounters occurred after Angleton had retired. The other journalists, authors, and historians had written books or articles about Angleton based on documents and interviews.

The varied views presented reflect the origins and functions of CIA counterintelligence as well as Angleton’s molehunt and other controversial elements of his career. There were brisk exchanges among the presenters and the audience. (36–37) Questions from the audience and the panelists’ answers are also included. This is the best assessment of James Angleton and his career ever produced.

When a book is judged after a period of time to have lasting benefit to a profession, it is said to be a classic. Perjury is such a work. Historian Allen Weinstein began what would become five years of research with the belief that the evidence he would find would show Hiss to have been innocent. After a precedent-setting FOIA legal battle that produced the FBI’s Hiss-Chambers files, it was clear that Weinstein was wrong. When Perjury originally appeared (in 1978), Weinstein drew severe criticism from Hiss supporters and many in the press. After the Venona decrypts were released in 1995, most scholars acknowledged Hiss’s guilt. In 1997, Weinstein published a second edition of Perjury that included additional details supporting that view. Nevertheless, some, including Hiss, battled on with often improbable theories of innocence.

This third edition has a new introduction that elaborates on the book’s origins. It also discusses Weinstein’s interviews with Hiss, Nixon, and others who played roles in the case. In addition, there are new details on Hiss’s fellow Soviet agent Noel Field, which emerged from Hungarian archives opened since the second edition appeared. Field stated, while in a Hungarian prison, that Hiss had indeed been a Soviet agent. There is also some new material from Alexander Vassiliev, with whom Weinstein collaborated in writing the book Haunted Wood. Finally, Weinstein discusses the furor that erupted when Soviet Army Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov proclaimed that the KGB had nothing on Hiss in its files.

Perjury is the essence of brilliant scholarship. It will stand as a benchmark for those working in the challenging field of counterespionage.

Prisoners, Lovers, & Spies: The Story of Invisible Ink from Herodotus to al-Qaeda, by Kristie Macrakis (Yale University Press, 2014), 377 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

Oxymorons are often accepted in everyday conversation. “Civil war,” “plastic glasses,” and “open secret” come to mind. In the intelligence vernacular, “defector-in-place” qualifies, and so does “invisible ink.” As Georgia Tech history professor Kristie Macrakis herself admits, “invisible secret writing or SW” is a more accurate description, because nobody has ever seen invisible ink. (xiii, xiv) And this is what she means in her latest book, Prisoners, Lovers, & Spies. In fact, she includes steganography under the SW rubric, though the term “invisible ink” still appears frequently throughout the book.

With that technical qualification aside, readers will find in Prisoners, Lovers, & Spies a thought-provoking history of SW and secret communications. Macrakis begins with the ancient Greeks and Romans, then tracks the operations of Elizabethan spymaster Sir Francis Walsingham, and moves on to the development of “sympathetic inks” in France. She goes on explain their later use in the American War of Independence. She devotes considerable effort to the explosion of SW in the 20th century and mentions some unusual applications in the 21st century. Along the way, she describes the chemicals used and the techniques involved, as well as digital methods used to prevent detection.

Macrakis offers numerous case studies. She provides details about the spies involved and discusses their tradecraft and the organizations they served. The case of Wolfgang Reif is a good, though atypical example. Reif ended up working for the CIA, the West German BND, and the East German HVA (foreign intelligence). How the Stasi exposed him and learned about his SW and microdot communications makes for fascinating reading. The HVA thought the case instructive and made a training film illustrating Reif’s equipment, communication techniques, and trial. (253)
The most bizarre case in the book is of terrorists hiding SW in pornographic websites. Macrakis tells how computer experts in the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) found al-Qaeda operations plans embedded in a file titled “Sexy Tanja.” No illustrations are included for this case.

In an epilogue, Macrakis blasts the CIA for its de-classification policies and pontificates a bit about the need for oversight when “we have the power to read everyone’s e-mail with one keystroke.” (301) Her personal views aside, Prisoners, Lovers, & Spies is a valuable contribution to the literature.


The Durand Line was created in 1893, when Sir Mortimer Durand and the Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan agreed to establish a rough border and regional spheres of influence between British India and Afghanistan. In late fall 1943, three Allied officers—US Navy Lt. Albert Zimmermann, British Maj. Sir Benjamin Bromhead, and US Army Maj. Gordon Enders—conducted a month long reconnaissance along the Durand Line to make clear “to the American Legation in Kabul the [British] frontier problems” and Britain’s policies for dealing with the Afghans. (xix) Proceed to Peshawar tells their story.

Author George Hill, Lt. Zimmermann’s son-in-law, reconstructs the journey using unpublished material made available by the Zimmermann and Enders families. In fact, Hill says, no official records have survived. He provides a map depicting the route the three observers traveled by jeep, as they made their way from Chital in the north to Quetta in the south of what is now Pakistan. Hill conveys Zimmermann’s and Enders’s observations about local tribes and customs and the difficult terrain, making it clear that little has changed in the region since 1943. Hill also provides detailed biographic data about the travelers and those with whom they worked before, during, and after the trip. In addition, he describes peripheral contacts in the United States with MI6 and the OSS, and various OSS missions underway in the area.

Hill characterizes the trip as part of “The Great Game” and “a seminal event, though long since forgotten, in American diplomatic history.” (175) But Proceed to Peshawar does not support that conclusion. It is a good record of a reconnaissance mission conducted under moderately adverse conditions and provides links to corresponding wartime events. But the book’s subtitle notwithstanding, Proceed to Peshawar is not about a Navy intelligence mission, and any intelligence benefit from the journey can only be imagined.

SIGINT: The Secret History of Signals Intelligence 1914–45, by Peter Matthews (The History Press, 2013), 256 pp., bibliography, appendix, photos, maps, index.

Author Peter Matthews joined the British army at the end of WWII. After signals warfare training, he was assigned to Berlin at the start of the Berlin airlift (1948). He worked alongside former Wehrmacht signals personnel as they intercepted Soviet military communications. His conversations with German SIGINT personnel revealed what they did during WWII. SIGINT tells some of those stories and adds historical detail about German WWI and interwar operations and practices.

The first seven chapters discuss SIGINT functions as they developed during WWI in each branch of the German services. After a chapter on the interwar years, Matthews devotes two chapters to WWII. He tells of German SIGINT operations against Allied air, sea, and ground forces. What is surprising in his account is that the German intercept operators had a very high opinion of their work, especially at the tactical level. They would
not learn until many years later of the Allied successes at Bletchley Park that nullified most of the German efforts.

Matthews draws on the reports of the Allied Target Intelligence Committee (TICOM) for some of his reporting. Officers from this group interviewed WWII German intercept operators and found they had total confidence in the security of the Enigma machine. The TICOM reports also revealed the Germans had broken Allied codes used during the battle of North Africa. Other sources, according to Matthews, revealed that German SIGINT was unable to keep track of Red Army operations and had a distorted picture of its order of battle. They had a better record against Soviet espionage activities in the Soviet Union and Germany, but in the end they had no practical impact on the war. (197)

SIGINT tells some interesting stories about intercept units and operations, but it has two serious drawbacks. It is not documented, leaving readers wondering about the sources of some of the book’s assertions. For example, in a brief discussion of Soviet radio and security techniques, Matthews notes that “Stalin gave impetus to the army’s improvements,” but there are no supporting details. The second drawback is that the book is poorly edited, and the narrative is often hard to follow. Even with these limitations, SIGINT offers an interesting account of German SIGINT operations not found elsewhere.

**TOP SECRET: Images from the Stasi Archive**, by Simon Menner (Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2013), 127 pp., bibliography, photos, no index.

While reviewing files in the Stasi archives, German researcher Simon Menner discovered photographs used in surveillance training classes. They included examples of disguises, secret signs, surveillance scenarios, self-defense maneuvers, arrest procedures, and various search techniques. He also found examples of what to look for when searching a juvenile’s bedroom, how to watch a mailbox, and even a confiscated poem about a cow that was considered subversive (the poem, not the cow). Among the book’s lighter moments is a photograph of an agent using a camera to take a “selfie.” (94) A final section is devoted to Stasi social activities and award ceremonies that give an eerie impression of life in the Ministry for State Security.

**TOP SECRET** is published in two columns, one German, the other, English. It provides an unusual glimpse into the functioning of a dedicated surveillance state.


From 1945 to 1976, the Army Security Agency (ASA) was the SIGINT element of the US Army. After 1952, it fell under the overall operational control of the National Security Agency, but tactical command was still exercised from ASA headquarters at Arlington, Virginia. In April 1961, the first ASA unit—made up of 92 men—was sent to Vietnam on a top secret mission. Given the cover designation, “3rd Radio Research Unit,” the group would target local North Vietnamese communications—mainly Morse intercepts—while training the South Vietnamese in COMINT (communications intelligence) duties. A secondary duty for all Army units is “to fight as infantry when required.” The 3rd Radio Research Unit and its successors were weapons-trained on the job. They used this training on many occasions. **Unlikely Warriors** tells the story of the ASA’s combat and operational roles in the Vietnam War from 1961 (when that first unit deployed) until 1975.

Both authors are experienced COMINT officers. Long served in Vietnam with the 3rd Radio Research Unit aviation section. Blackburn served in an Air Force Security Service unit in Okinawa and for the NSA in Taiwan.
The story they tell is a mix of political-military history, land and air operations, the constant threats to physical security, and an ever-expanding missions. Woven in are the personal recollections—often based on letters—of the authors and of those with whom they served.

Among the many units they describe, the ASA Special Operations Detachments (SODs) stand out. Both ASA- and Special Forces (SF)-qualified, they served with SF and South Vietnamese Army units. The authors describe their exploits, living conditions, battles fought, and losses incurred.

Equally compelling are the accounts of the ASA aerial missions. Flying in single-engine Otters, often with one pilot and an intercept operator, they targeted small, tactical North Vietnamese elements. One four-man ASA crew was shot down and captured. The story of their captivity and eventual rescue makes for gripping reading.

The last ASA units were closed down in early 1973, and Unlikely Warriors ends with the fall of Saigon. The authors offer their view of the circumstances that ended the war, including their view of the impact of a biased media. Their account is a significant tribute to the ASA’s little-known role in the war.

Memoirs


Harry Chapman Pincher began writing his memoir in 2012 when he was 98, finishing in time for its publication when he turned 100 in March 2014. He wanted to call the book My First Hundred Years, but his publisher decided otherwise—Pincher died on 5 August 2014. Dangerous To Know is the story of an army brat born in Ambala, India and educated at Darlington Grammar School and Kings College, London, where he studied botany. He began a career as a teacher, but his WWII service in the British army changed his plans and led to a position at the Daily Express, where he became a defense correspondent known for scoops often dealing with intelligence matters.

Pincher’s ability to get scoops involved common sense and leaks from government officials he cultivated during expensive lunches, pheasant hunts, and social occasions. He acquired a reputation for embarrassing governments while maintaining the confidence of his sources—though most are finally identified in Dangerous To Know—and never publishing information he was asked to withhold. MI5 bugged his phones and prime ministers found him to be a persistent irritation. Harold Macmillan once wrote to his defense minister, “Can nothing be done to suppress or even get rid of Mr. Chapman Pincher?” (43)

The variety of sources Pincher acquired and the famous people he met over the years is staggering. They include publishing magnates, Prince Charles, Lord Mountbatten, members of parliament, and MI6 officers Maurice Oldfield and Nicholas Elliott. Not to be overlooked is the lunch with the Queen Mother, giving advice to Margaret Thatcher, and fishing trips with the an Earl of Carnarvon, better known as the owner of Highclere Castle (the setting for the television series Downton Abbey) where Pincher and his wife, Billee, were often guests. Pincher includes anecdotes about them all. Despite his active professional and social life, he managed to write nine novels.

It was only after Pincher’s retirement from the Daily Express in 1980 that he began writing about intelligence. His first book on the topic was Inside Story, in which he discussed the Profumo Affair and briefly mentioned some of the Cambridge Five. The book for which he is best known among intelligence enthusiasts, the intensely controversial Their Trade is Treachery, was published in 1981. The brouhaha stemmed from its central theme that former MI5 Director General Roger Hollis had been a KGB agent and from Pincher’s refusal to name his sources. Few historians share this view,
but Pincher pursued it vigorously in his most recent book, the 700-page *Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups—Six Decades of Espionage,* summarizing and updating his investigations into the subject.

Dangerous To Know concludes with a reverie of a life begun in a time without indoor plumbing or telephones and moved into the marvels of the cell phone and the Internet, which have become integral parts of his daily routine. It is a delightful book both for its insights into society and the background it provides about Pincher’s intelligence writings, and is truly a unique contribution to the literature.

**How Long Till Dawn: Memoirs of One of the Charter Members and Original Founders of the Resistance Movement in Algiers and a Member of OSS during World War II**, by Daphne Joan Fry (Tuyl) Knox (Outskirts Press, 2014), 218 pp., index.

In his book, *FDR’s 12 Apostles*, journalist Hal Vaughan tells the story of diplomat Robert Murphy’s secret mission to North Africa in 1940 to assess the French situation there. Murphy quickly determined that he needed 12 men to provide the intelligence FDR required—they were designated vice-consuls and nicknamed the *Apostles*. One was a Harvard graduate, former French legionnaire and friend of Ernest Hemingway named John Crawford Knox. While working in Tunis, Knox met his future wife, Daphne Joan Fry Tuyl, a member of the British military mission who would later join the OSS. Vaughan based much of his story about Fry (Tuyl) Knox on her then-unpublished memoir. It has now been published as *How Long Till Dawn*.

Daphne Fry was born in Cairo to British parents. She was educated mainly in French schools in Algiers. May 1940 found her in Algiers with two small sons and living with her mother. Her Dutch husband had left to join the army in Holland, where he would be captured and executed by the Germans. It was about this time that a friend at the British military mission offered her a job as a receptionist. As circumstances in Europe worsened, she was asked to go among the French and determine their reactions to events. *How Long Till Dawn* tells of the gradual expansion of her duties. She would help a Polish intelligence element working in Africa and support the French resistance. In November 1942, she joined the OSS, which gave her “odd jobs for a time…and this did not amuse or interest [her].” (155) She preferred reporting on local politics, working with the resistance, and participating in the political battles between De Gaulle and his local opposition, topics that dominate the book.

By the time the war in North Africa was winding down, Fry had married Knox and, pregnant, left intelligence work. The couple was soon transferred to Paris. This is an interesting tale of a little-known aspect of the WWII intelligence story.

**Endnotes**

5. A book covering the post-war aftermath of these activities is by Chad Millan, *The Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America and an Epic Hunt for Justice* (Little, Brown, 2006). The book was reviewed by Thomas Boghardt in *Studies in Intelligence* 51 No. 1 (March 2007).

6. See, for example, Carl Van Doren, *Secret History of the American Revolution* (Viking, 1941).

7. The best source for system characteristics, which changed constantly, is the series of unclassified and declassified histories of US reconnaissance programs available at http://www.nro.gov/history/index.html. These contain original documents detailing the range of capabilities introduced with various missions.


