Studies in Intelligence
Vol. 59, No. 1 (Unclassified articles from March 2015)

Cranes with North Korea—1968 and 1969
The Fall of Lima Site 85 in Laos (March 1968)
Autonomous Systems: Possibilities and Challenges

Book Reviews
The Rise and Fall of Intelligence
Intelligence Elsewhere
The Wrong Enemy
A Spy Among Friends
Kim Philby: The Unknown Story

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

EC-121 takes off from Aisugi Naval Air Station on 13 April 1969 (ca. 1347 local time). Probable location of EC-121 during search for the SS Yongyang (ca. 1900 local time).
Mission

The mission of Studies in Intelligence is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA's History Staff, CIA's Lessons Learned Program, and the CIA Museum. CSI also provides the curator of the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection of Literature. In addition, it houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

Contributions

Studies in Intelligence welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

Editor
Studies in Intelligence
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Awards

The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in Studies. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is available for other prizes.

Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of Studies' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers’ nominations for awards.
EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for Studies in Intelligence may be written on any historical, operational, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether, in the opinion of the board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Peter Usowski (Chairman)
John Bennett
Jason Manosevitz
John McLaughlin
Wayne M. Murphy
LTG Theodore Nicholas, USA
James Noone
Matthew J. Ouimet
Valerie P.
Cynthia Ryan
Cathryn Thurston
Jay R. Watkins
Cindy Webb

Members are all active or former Intelligence Community officers. One member is not listed for cover reasons.

EDITOR

Andres Vaart

Contents

Historical Crises in North Korea
Lessons from the USS Pueblo and EC-121 Incidents—1968 and 1969 1
Richard A. Mobley

From the Studies Archive
The War in Laos: The Fall of Lima Site 85 in March 1968 11
James C. Linder

Intelligence of the Future?
Autonomous Systems in the Intelligence Community: Many Possibilities and Challenges 21
Jenny R. Holzer, PhD, and Franklin L. Moses, PhD

Intelligence in Public Literature

The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History 31
Reviewed by Hayden Peake

Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere 35
Reviewed by Charles Heard

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 39
Reviewed by John H. Kavanagh

A Spy Among Friends: Kim Philby and the Great Betrayal
and
Kim Philby: The Unknown Story of the KGB’s Master Spy 41
Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 45
Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake
Contributors

Thomasp G. Coffey is a former CIA Directorate of Intelligence analyst serving with the Lessons Learned Program of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Charles Heard is the penname of a CIA Directorate of Intelligence analyst.

Jenny Holzer is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) who has a PhD in Physics. A focus of her work is on autonomous systems. Franklin (Frank) Moses is an Adjunct Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). He has a PhD in Experimental Psychology. A focus of his work is on intelligence analysis and autonomous systems.

Paul Kavanagh is a retired CIA officer. His is a frequent reviewer.

James C. Linder was in the US Navy at the time he wrote his article in 1994.

Jason U. Manosevitz is an analyst in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. He is also a member of the Studies Editorial Board.

Richard A. Mobley is a former naval intelligence officer and the author of Flash Point Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises, which was published in 2003.

Hayden Peake has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” since December 2002.

2014 Studies in Intelligence Awards

The following book reviews and articles from the “Extracts” edition of Studies were recognized for their especially strong contributions to the literature of intelligence:

James Burridge and John Kavanagh for their review of the novel Red Sparrow in Studies 58, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2014)

Kevin Davies for his “Field Unit 12 Takes New Technology to War in the Southwest Pacific” in Studies 58, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2014)

Nicholas Dujmovic for his review of the book Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World in Studies 58, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2014)

Roger Zane George for the review of Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11 in Studies 58, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2014)


David W. Waltrop for “Catching the End of an Era: Recovery of the Last GAMBIT and HEXAGON Film Buckets from Space, August–October 1984” in Studies 58, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2014)
Lessons from the Capture of the USS *Pueblo* and the Shootdown of a US Navy EC-121—1968 and 1969

Richard A. Mobley

Since 2010, the National Security Agency (NSA) has released more than 200 documents that provide new evidence and reinforce lessons for intelligence from North Korea’s seizure in international waters of the USS *Pueblo* (AGER-2) in January 1968 and its subsequent shootdown in April 1969 of a Navy EC-121 signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft with 31 crewmen aboard.¹

The documents and associated information gained from NSA oral histories and interviews do not fundamentally alter the broad outlines of our understanding of either incident, but they advance the story by providing more evidence on *Pueblo*’s SIGINT capabilities and targets, warning, North Korea’s conduct of the attack, and the resulting damage assessment. In the case of the EC-121 shootdown, a newly released NSA history of the event provides previously unpublished details about how a single North Korean Air Force (NKAF) MiG-21 Fishbed fighter downed the EC-121 and about challenges in the aircraft warning process.¹ Although some of the documents have been modestly redacted, when pieced together they tell a consistent story about both crises.

The two incidents are best considered together because they reveal related systemic flaws in indications and warning, intelligence analysis, military planning, and command and control. Many of the same US national and theater decisionmakers and intelligence staffers participated in both incidents. Moreover, internal lessons-learned discussions and contemporary congressional testimony treated the incidents in parallel.²

Rather than reconstruct events that have been thoroughly discussed in a raft of books and articles, I will in this article address questions best answered by the new evidence.

**The View from Pyongyang**

The North Koreans had long been sensitive to ships and aircraft operating off their coasts, and since 1966 they had attempted to assassinate South Korean leaders and sharply increased their raids across the

---


² See the author’s *Flashpoint North Korea: the *Pueblo* and EC-121 Crises* (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2003) for a detailed treatment of linkages between the incidents.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Korean Peninsula: Pueblo and EC-121 Incidents, 1968 and 1969

23 January 1968 (starting ca. 1300 local)
Pueblo attacked and seized by North Korean Navy patrol boats.

15 April 1969 (ca. 1347 local)
Probable location of EC-121 downing.

15 April 1969 (0700 local)
EC-121 takes off from Atsugi.

Approximate location.

Pueblo (AGER-2)

US Navy EC-121

Images are official US Navy photos.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
Demilitarized Zone to a total of 435 violent incidents, causing 775 North Korean, South Korean, and UN casualties. The North Korean Navy (NKN) reacted to any South Korean naval unit or fishing vessel near its coasts, and in January 1967, North Korean artillery sank a South Korean naval vessel. The NKAf in April 1965 severely damaged a US Air Force RB-47 flying about 40 miles from the North Korean coast and had since been working on intercept techniques—including using air-to-air missiles—against US reconnaissance aircraft.

Pyongyang’s decisionmaking was so opaque that contemporary US intelligence assessments and policymakers could only speculate on the North’s motivations for seizing the Pueblo or shooting down the EC-121. The State Department in 1968 wrote, “North Korea is the most denied of denied areas and the most difficult of all intelligence targets. Estimates of North Korean strength, intentions, and capabilities, therefore, cannot be made with a high degree of confidence.”

Possible North Korean motivations included a desire to overthrow the South Korean government (and eventually create a unified Korea under Kim Il Sung) by fomenting crises on the peninsula; competition within the North Korean regime in which a hardline faction of generals was attempting to demonstrate that its heavy investments in advanced military equipment was paying off; the DPRK’s nationalist sensitivity to maintaining its territorial boundaries; and Pyongyang’s attempts to compete with growing South Korean military involvement in South Vietnam by demonstrating military prowess against the United States and South Korea.

The US military took sweeping steps—many unpublicized—to prepare for a war with Pyongyang but ultimately relented with a publicly repudiated written apology that freed the crew in December 1968. US retaliation was stayed by the primary motivation of securing the safe return of the Pueblo crew as well as a desire to avoid a second major war, particularly when the Vietnam War had intensified with the Tet Offensive in January 1968.

The State Department’s Korea Task Force in March 1968—after weeks of US military posturing and contingency planning—concluded that “available military action would be mere pin-pricks unlikely to move North Koreans, and would probably prejudice chances of getting men back.” Other factors included the growing antiwar sentiment in the United States and a lack of forces and plans immediately available to rescue the ship.

The lesser-known EC-121 shootdown—the Nixon administration’s first crisis outside the context of the war in Southeast Asia—occurred on 15 April 1969 when an NKAf Fishbed fighter downed a Navy aircraft belonging to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) while the plane was orbiting on a SIGINT mission in international airspace about 80 miles off North Korea. The theater commander was again caught with inadequate retaliatory plans and Seventh Fleet again marshaled forces in the Sea of Japan for potential contingency operations. Washington ultimately did not retaliate in either incident, however, and North Korean press today continues to trumpet both incidents as badges of national honor.

Pueblo: Inadequate Preparedness Undermined Capabilities

USS Pueblo’s seizure and loss of significant quantities of classified material are reminders that even the most advanced collection systems will not compensate for inadequately trained or prepared intelligence personnel. Members of the Naval Security Group Signals Intelligence Detachment aboard Pueblo were poorly prepared for aspects of their basic collection duties as well as for emergency destruction, shortfalls that denied Pueblo’s commanding officer even limited tactical warning, conspired with the meager midwinter SIGINT collection environment off the DPRK to contribute to limited SIGINT “take,” and allowed the NKN to seize over 500 highly classified intelligence documents and pieces of cryptographic equipment.

What were Pueblo’s SIGINT capabilities?

Pueblo was equipped with the latest and most sophisticated SIGINT collection equipment then in the US inventory, with a capability to intercept and record North Korean voice and other communications particularly in the ultra high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF) spectrums. It had the standard WLR-1 electronic intelligence intercept receiver used throughout the fleet and had positions set aside to intercept Soviet telemetry.

Unfortunately, the embarked Naval Security Group detachment was “not as well trained and ready as it
should have been,” according to the endorsement written by Adm. John Hyland (then commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet) in May 1969 on the report by the naval board of inquiry investigating the *Pueblo* incident.\(^2\) He added that the detachment was not primarily oriented toward North Korea\(^1\) (*Pueblo’s* first mission)—a factor that may have contributed to the detachment’s unpreparedness.

The ship would gain little insight or warning from monitoring the North’s clear-voice communications because the rusty language skills of two Korean linguists belatedly assigned to the ship’s SIGINT detachment were not up to the job of rapidly translating fast-moving tactical traffic. At a tactical level, NSA observed that had the linguists been qualified they would have understood a full 20 minutes before the first shots were fired at *Pueblo* that North Korean patrol boats were maneuvering to fire.\(^1^4\)

Despite *Pueblo*’s remarkable electronics suite, almost all communications intelligence (COMINT) insights into the incident were unavailable for hours or days after the seizure; instead collection acquired and analyzed by shore-based installations and airborne platforms had to be used.\(^1^5\) The Naval Security Group detachment at Kami Seya, Japan (USN-39) did the *Pueblo* a major disservice by failing to properly screen its personnel and consequently sending unqualified linguists on a sensitive collection mission. The Navy justifiably faulted personnel on board the ship for failure to plan and train for emergency destruction of their extensive holdings.

**What was *Pueblo* supposed to monitor?**

AGER-2 primarily was assigned to fulfill Navy collection requirements, but NSA also provided it secondary priority tasking. USS *Pueblo* usually would not be assigned to duplicate collection from shore-based sites, according to NSA’s internal memorandum.\(^1^6\) Rather, a ship with *Pueblo*’s capability would be particularly useful against communications in the VHF spectrum, which tended to be line-of-sight and best intercepted when the platform was close to the target. The DPRK used low-powered VHF transmitters, NSA noted, so a ship like *Pueblo* might be able to collect against them given the ship’s proximity to the coast.\(^1^7\)

*Pueblo* was to conduct a general search for NKN and North Korean Army (NKA) use of VHF communications by units along the east coast of Korea.\(^1^8\) *Pueblo* also was to investigate alternate North Korean communications pathways since North Korea’s use of the VHF spectrum had declined.\(^1^9\)\(^,\)\(^2^0\) *Pueblo* also afforded long-dwell capabilities against targets that SIGINT aircraft could monitor for only a few hours at a time.\(^2^1\)

NSA requested that *Pueblo* conduct a general collection effort against NKA, NKN, and NKAF communications to help create a database and determine the location of certain emitters. For example, the ship was supposed to intercept all NKA clear-voice coastal artillery activity. It was to monitor all NKN single-channel voice communications including ship-to-ship and ship-shore communications.\(^2^2\)

To put this in context, the Korean People’s Army (NKA) then used manual Morse, radiotelephone, and radio-printer communications. All echelons of the chain of command used manual Morse and radiotelephone for standby communications. The three major east coast NKN units used manual Morse and radiotelephone for ship-shore, shore-ship, and ship-ship communications.\(^2^3\)

NSA assigned electronic intelligence (ELINT) guidance in the following priority order: new/unaltered/unidentified signals, unconfirmed signals, and landbased/airborne/airborne radars. AGER-2 was to use its direction-finding capability to map the North’s electronic order of battle. Collection against more than seven emitters associated with anti-ship cruise missiles and Komar missile boats understandably enjoyed high priority.\(^2^4\)

**How much intelligence information was compromised by *Pueblo*’s seizure?**

Admiral Hyland wrote in June 1969 that the “tragedy of the *Pueblo*” was that the “compromise of sensitive information can very well be turned against the United States and ultimately cause the loss of untold lives in other confrontations.”\(^2^5\) The newly released material reveals part of the basis for his concerns, although at the time neither he nor the damage assessment team were aware of the potential that the cryptographic hardware captured aboard *Pueblo* might be married up with keying material being provided to the Soviet Union by the Walker spy ring starting in 1967.\(^2^6\)

The NSA histories and assessments provide stunning detail about the extent of compromise gained from exploiting the ship’s vast holding of SIGINT material, and
brutal, informed interrogation of crewmen with cryptologic expertise. NSA concluded that the majority of material aboard the AGER—perhaps as much as 80 percent of document holdings and 95 percent of cryptologic equipment—survived the ship’s hurried, chaotic emergency destruction effort.27

The ship had carried more than 500 documents or pieces of equipment, including 58 technical SIGINT instructions, 37 technical manuals, 33 COMINT technical reports and 126 collection requirements. Pueblo had copied about 8,000 messages containing SIGINT data transmitted over the fleet operational intelligence broadcast. The broadcast carried large amounts of information on Southeast Asia and China and thus collectively revealed the effectiveness of US collection efforts.28 The Pueblo also used four cryptographic systems, associated keying materials, maintenance manuals, operating instructions, and the general communications-security publications necessary to support a cryptographic operation.29

NSA reported that highly competent North Korean electronics experts intensively interrogated communications technicians (CTs) among the crew, focusing on technical principles of the cryptographic equipment, equipment operating procedures, and the relationship of the associated keying material to the equipment.30,31 The North interrogated some of the CTs as many as 20 times in sessions lasting hours, according to the Cheevers account.32 Some of the CTs explained in detail how to change codes for and operate KW-7 encrypted teletypes and drew schematics of the KWR-37 gear used to copy the enciphered fleet broadcast.33 The assistance saved the North three to six months of technical diagnostic analysis, according to NSA’s conclusion.34

NSA judged that the compromise revealed “the full extent of US SIGINT information on North Korean armed forces communications activities and US successes in the techniques of collection, exploitation, and reporting applied to this target.”35 The material detailed the full extent of the American SIGINT attack on North Korean communications, including call-sign system recoveries, net and communications system reconstruction and diagrams, and the association of communications systems with platforms and transmission systems.36

Ambiguous Warning Ineffective in Both Incidents

Military commanders before both incidents were aware of anomalous North Korean behavior but were not moved to cancel the missions. Theater commanders in Pueblo’s case assumed that the DPRK—like the Soviet Union—would respect international legal protections for operating in international waters and judged that they could manage the risk to reconnaissance aircraft posed by unusual NKAF activity by directing aircrews to remain 50 miles, rather than 40 miles, from the North Korean coast.37

NSA, internally conflicted over the degree of risk the Pueblo mission posed and the appropriateness of sharing its concerns with the military, ultimately released a “background” message to the military on 29 December 1967 chronicling North Korean provocations against ships and aircraft previously operating off its coasts. The word “warning,” however, never appeared in the message.

Moreover, NSA’s chain of command added language suggesting the message was only “informational” and restricted the message’s distribution.38 Had NSA packaged the same information differently, it probably would have provided enough to make the case for stopping Pueblo’s dangerous mission in its tracks, or at least forcing the military to reconsider the “minimal risk” assessment that was rapidly rubber-stamped on the mission proposal. Essentially, NSA’s message represented a warning opportunity missed.

NSA transmitted its message to the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center highlighting North Korea’s historical sensitivity to surveillance aircraft and ships operating off its coasts. It noted that the North was “extremely sensitive” to peripheral reconnaissance flights, did not recognize international boundaries in the air, and reacted to South Korean fishing vessels. In addition to not using the word “warning,” it said there was no evidence of provocative or harassing activities by North Korean vessels beyond 12 miles from the coast.39

The odd nature of the message, which was sent near the end of the risk-assessment process in Washington, reflected divisions within NSA over how to assess the threat, a reluctance to question the Navy’s deployment proposal, and a maladroit marketing of SIGINT product, according to NSA’s oral and written histories.
The Pueblo advisory message had a predecessor. NSA in early 1967 had sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a large number of Navy commands advising that the DPRK might act against the USS Banner (AGER-1), Pueblo’s sister ship, during an impending mission off the North. The Navy conducted the patrol despite the advisory, leading to “very high frustration” among the NSA analysts, since no one seemed to have “read our product.” In any event, the North did not react to Banner’s operations.

Eugene Sheck, then chief of NSA’s mobile collection organization (K17) and an NSA officer who had helped plan the Pueblo mission, said in a subsequent, declassified oral history that a junior analyst who felt Pueblo’s mission was too dangerous drafted a mission under Navy operational control, the message was watered down to avoid interfering in a collection area, the message was to be cancelled. Seeking to avoid interfering in a collection mission under Navy operational control, the message was watered down as it worked its way up NSA’s review chain, according to Sheck.

In fact, the final version of the conclusion of the message said, “The above is not intended to reflect adversely on CINCPACFLT deployment proposal,” a phrase added to make the message less obtrusive, according to NSA’s history of the incident. The message originally was to go to the same addressess who received the Banner advisory, but distribution was restricted during the coordination process. The NSA history concluded that NSA “could not have done anything more beyond this message and remain within the parameter of its mission without running the risk of being accused of meddling in Navy affairs.”

NSA analysts later judged that the Pueblo advisory failed to reach the right audience. According to an NSA official writing in 1992, the best lesson learned was that “we did not ‘market’ what we had at the right level. A skill that we now have in abundance just wasn’t there in time, viz. making sure our assessment of what we are producing finds the right level…. I believe another mistake we made was in not sanitizing the warning message.’ This would have given at least the senior officials a better sense of our concern.”

A sanitized message would have signalled the need to get the word—if not a formal warning—out to a broad audience.

**What kind of warning did the EC-121 crew receive?**

There is little evidence about how the EC-121 crew responded to warnings they received before and during their ill-starred flight, but evidence suggests they received warnings on the ground and in the air.

NSA concluded that the Air Force Security Service SIGINT site that played the major role during the showdown performed well in issuing advisory warnings to the aircraft, trying to determine the EC-121’s fate, and releasing a CRITIC stating the aircraft had probably been shot down. The evidence is insufficient, however, to prove that the EC-121 received the advisories or to ascertain the crew’s actions upon receiving them.

Lt.Cdr. James H. Overstreet, the EC-121 mission commander, briefed members of his crew before the mission about three messages warning of increased North Korean vitriol. He discussed a message from the commander of US Forces Korea, warning of unusually vehement and vicious language used by the North in recent Military Armistice Commission meetings in Panmunjon. VQ-1 aircraft were told to be alert and to abort at first indications of any serious North Korean reactions. Overstreet and his crew were unaware, however, of an unusual MiG-21 deployment to Hoemun discussed below.

In their final few minutes, the EC-121 crew did not acknowledge the advisories that MiGs were rapidly closing on them. Unlike their USAF counterparts, Naval SIGINT aircraft did not carry communications gear that would automatically receive for messages, so investigators could not determine if they had received them. (A naval board of inquiry subsequently recommended that the Navy install communications datalinks aboard its reconnaissance aircraft because they were faster and automatically acknowledged warnings.)

If it did receive the warnings, the EC-121 probably would have begun diving for the sea to gain speed and to drop below enemy radar coverage being used to vector the MiG against it. At a minimum, the aircraft would have turned away from the North Korean coast because the Seventh Fleet had directed that reconnaissance aircraft eliciting reactions should avoid provocative action and turn away from hostile territory.

**Pyongyang Planned and Directed Both Attacks**

The North’s preparations for both attacks suggest that Intelligence Community (IC) analysts should not disregard the possibility of a
deliberate, nationally ordered attack as they search for confusion in the chain of command, the fog of war, or unintentional escalation as the sole or primary causes of major incidents. National leaders may undertake malevolent courses of action no matter how irrational the behavior might seem. In both of these cases, the incidents unfolded in ways that suggest orchestration by the national command authority rather than spontaneous initiatives by local base commanders. Pyongyang had a history of tight control, which would discourage local military initiatives, and the preparations and coordination described in the new material suggests central direction.

The SIGINT record also points to that conclusion in the Pueblo case. The joint service operations required to conduct the seizure also would have required national direction, at least in the Korean context. In the case of the EC-121 shootdown, the staging of MiG-21s to a base close to the EC-121 track 18 days before the shootdown; the calm deliberation, timing, and precision characterizing the shootdown; and the lack of subsequent confusion in North Korean command and control likewise suggest prior planning and national oversight.50

How did DPRK prepare for the Pueblo seizure?

North Korean leaders probably began considering a plan to seize a US surveillance ship after the USS Banner briefly patrolled off the North Korean coast in 1967. A North Korean officer interrogating Pueblo crew members told them he was familiar with the Banner and that the DPRK had been waiting for the chance to seize it.51 North Korean communications at the time of the Pueblo seizure reveal confusion among NKN units when they reported the ship’s hull number, probably because they were expecting to see Banner’s hull number, AGER-1 rather than Pueblo’s AGER-2.52

The newly released material, however, does suggest that two North Korean fishing vessels that shadowed Pueblo for several hours—approaching within 100 yards—starting at midday on 22 January probably alerted the Korean military.53 North Korean radar stations that afternoon began tracking a “target” operating in the same area as the USS Pueblo. An NKN radar station at Kalgoch’ I-Ri (3919N 12734E) at 1500 local time—when the Pueblo still was under surveillance by the two fishing vessels—began tracking an unidentified ship of unknown nationality in the same general area Pueblo was operating in as it moved south. Kukchi-Bong radar station (3842N 12817E) began tracking the same ship by 1700 local.54

The NKAF also may have monitored Pueblo on the 22nd when, during the 1800 hour local, as many as six Second Fighter Division MiG-17s flew over the bay in which the unidentified vessel was steaming. Communications from NKAF pilots, however, did not refer to surface vessels, search activity, or other efforts, suggesting they were reconnoitering the unidentified vessel.55

The DPRK continued to track the unidentified vessel through the night of 22/23 January.56 NKN communications by 1000 on 23 January began referring to the target as an “enemy ship” and “target four,” a term the NKN used as it was seizing Pueblo.57

Not surprisingly, the new evidence suggests that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) participated in the seizure. NSA judged that the MND might have been involved in the tracking and seizure, given references in NKN voice communications to “the comrade…from the top,” just prior to the seizure.58, 59 At 1408 on the 23rd, submarine chaser SC-35 also received “orders from the top” to go farther in toward Wonsan before boarding Pueblo, then still in international waters.60 MND planning and overwatch probably would have been required given the attendant risks of seizing a US ship and the need to orchestrate a joint service operation.

NKAF activity before and during the incident also suggests a degree of interservice coordination that the MND would have mandated. By all previous accounts, NKAF MiGs participated in the seizure and, according to a recent history of the event, the lead pilot of a MiG flying on a pass near Pueblo launched a missile that struck the water several miles away from the ship.61

Although not corroborating a missile launch, the new material reveals that MiG-17s conducted exercises near the Pueblo between 1000–1100 on the 23rd.62 Once the ship was engaged, four pairs of MiG-17s operating from two air bases flew consecutive protective patrols and reported on the movements of NKN patrol boats and Pueblo between 1205 and 1410 local.63, 64 Discussing the fighter activity between noon and 1330, the CRITIC warning message commented that no hostile intent was noted from the fighters.

After the Pueblo’s seizure (and the EC-121 shootdown), the NKAF as-
Historical Crises in North Korea

sumed a primarily defensive posture, with no indications that Pyongyang was preparing to attack.65 The NKAF deployed aircraft, including MiG 15/17 fighters, probably in anticipation of possible attack by Seventh Fleet units deployed in the Sea of Japan.66

CIA analysts writing at the time also wrote that Pueblo’s seizure most likely reflected a decision “at the highest levels” of the North Korean government.67 “The naval officers afloat and the controlling shore authority probably would not have made such a decision on their own, especially since the Pueblo had not actually violated North Korean territorial waters at the time and no on-the-spot decision was called for.”68

How did the NKAF shoot down the Navy EC-121?

NSA’s newly released history reveals that a single NKAF MiG-21 Fishbed-F shot down the EC-121 about 80 miles off DPRK’s extreme northern coast, and the joint US-AF-USN examination of the EC-121 wreckage concluded that the fighter fired an AA-2 Atoll air-to-air missile to down the aircraft. Although the shutdown itself was relatively simple, its timing and geometry suggest Pyongyang had carefully planned to exploit what it might have learned by monitoring other EC-121 missions off its coast.

Targeting a lumbering EC-121 also suggests prior planning because the NKAF probably would have found it easier to shoot down a propeller-driven EC-121 flying at 200 knots rather than one of the many jet-powered SIGINT aircraft routinely operating over the Sea of Japan. NKAF MiG-17s in fact had tried unsuccessfully to down a jet-powered RB-47 electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft some 80 miles off its coast in 1965.69

The NKAF plan required repositioning high-performance fighters to a base closer to the anticipated EC-121 flight path and timing an attack run to coincide with the EC-121’s closest approach to the base. The NKAF in an unusual move on 28 March deployed two Fishbeds—then their best fighter—to the Mig-15/17 training base at Hoemun. This base was the closest of all North Korean bases to the known flight path of the EC-121. Assessing the deployment, the SIGINT processing center in Okinawa on 30 March notified Far East military commands and SIGINT sites about this initial appearance of Fishbeds at Hoemun and suggested the move was related to pilot training, since a Mig-21 transition training unit was located at the east coast base from which the two fighters originated.70

The Fishbeds launched to intercept the EC-121 as it reached the extreme northern end of its orbit—the point at which it would reach its closest point of approach to Hoemun. Both MIG-21s launched from Hoemun around 1330 local. One Fishbed flew a defensive patrol and approached no closer than 65 miles from the EC-121. The second fighter raced to the EC-121, shot it down about 80 miles off the North Korean coast, and immediately returned to North Korean airspace. Simplicity itself.71

Closing Observations on Lessons

Both incidents suggest that it is unwise to count exclusively on defensive changes in an adversary’s force posture as signals of hostile intent. The incidents also demonstrate that the few forces required to conduct a provocative act may not offer much of a warning signature. Pyongyang in neither instance ordered changes in its own alert status that would have cued intelligence analysts to an impending attack. Despite having planned (or at least approved) the operation on short notice, the North evidently did not change the state of alert near Wonsan or raise general NKAF readiness posture before attacking Pueblo.72 Similarly, a North Korean military alert did not precede the EC-121 shutdown.

NSA’s declassification effort, in summary, fills in gaps about two controversial incidents and affords another opportunity to review lessons about conducting sensitive collection operations against hostile nations. The evidence warns us to apply greater rigor in risk-assessment and to avoid becoming slaves to tactical-pattern analysis. The Pueblo material also strongly demonstrates the need for clear warning language and the importance of not being overly cautious about crossing bureaucratic lines of responsibility—or “lanes in the road.”

Most important, however, the evidence reminds us that even under the best of conditions we may receive little or no warning before our collection efforts are challenged by the conventional forces of nation states or far more opaque terrorist organizations.

Ⅴ Ⅴ Ⅴ
Endnotes

2. Richard A. Mobley, Flashpoint North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises (Naval Institute Press, 2003), 47.
3. Ibid., 33, 99.
4. Ibid., 11.
5. Ibid., 1–30.
6. Ibid., 74.
11. NSA Director’s Talking Paper, 6 June 1968, Document 4092116.
13. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. NSA, “Statement re Pueblo, Followup Questions and Answers.”
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
22. NSA, “Secondary Mission (SIGINT) and Mission Objectives of USS Pueblo.”
23. Pueblo History.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p. 320.
35. Pueblo History.
36. Ibid.
37. EC-121 Shootdown History.
38. Pueblo History.
39. Pueblo History.
40. Ibid.
42. Cheevers, Act of War, 344.
43. Pueblo History, 27.
44. NSA memorandum to Dave Hatch, “Draft of Pueblo Papers.”
45. Pueblo History.
46. NSA memorandum to Dave Hatch, “Draft of Pueblo Papers.”
47. EC-121 Shootdown History.
48. Ibid.
Endnotes (cont.)

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid; Pueblo History.
51. Pueblo History.
53. Pueblo History.
55. NSA, “Actions Taken In Response to Pueblo Incident,” undated, Document 4121729.
56. Ibid.
57. Pueblo History.
59. Pueblo History.
60. Pueblo History.
61. Cheevers, Act of War, 68.
66. EC-121 Shootdown History.
68. Ibid.
69. EC-121 Shootdown History.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
The War in Laos: The Fall of Lima Site 85 in March 1968

James C. Linder

Published in an unclassified edition of Studies in Intelligence in 1995, this article is one of the earliest public accounts given of Lima Site 85 and the successful North Vietnamese attack against it on 10 and 11 March 1968. The most definitive account, based on more extensive interviews and documentation, appeared five years later in a book by former CIA and Intelligence Community historian Timothy Castle, One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam (Columbia University Press). This article is part of a forthcoming compendium of Studies articles related to the conflict in Southeast Asia that will be published in support of Defense Department efforts to mark the passage of 50 years since that conflict took place. —Editor

By 1965, US policy in Laos had evolved into a strategy of war against the Communist Pathet Lao (PL) to regain control of the remote and mountainous northern provinces, particularly Louang Phrabang, which included the strategic Plain of Jars, and the Communist stronghold of Samneua, where Phou Phathi, the Sacred Mountain, was located. Because of restrictions placed on military presence and operations in Laos by increasingly irrelevant international agreements, this war became the nearly exclusive responsibility of CIA.

Samneua was central to the strategy because it was the principal gateway between Laos and North Vietnam: the North Vietnamese used the region to infiltrate troops and supplies into Laos, and the United States used the area to conduct surveillance and support operations against North Vietnam. In August 1966, to support the escalating air war against the North, a Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) station was first constructed on the mountain above Lima Site (for landing site) 85.

The remote mountain in northeastern Laos known as Phou Phathi to the Laotians and “the Rock” to the Americans who served there is a dramatic 5,600-foot ridgeline that is just flat enough on top to support a few buildings built into the rock of the mountain and a small clearing that was used as a helicopter landing site. Located 100 miles south of Dien Bien Phu, 160 miles west of Hanoi, and just 25 miles from the PL capital of Samneua, Phou Phathi was a place of great religious significance to the local Hmong and Yao tribesmen. They believed the forbidding mountaintop was inhabited by great phi, or spirits, who exercised supernatural control over the lives and circumstances of the Hmong people. US Ambassador to Laos William Sullivan, however, believed the mountain was a poor choice for the location of secret Air Force navigational equipment because it was too close to Samneua and the PL.

A Sensitive Facility

Nevertheless, because of the geography of the area and the need for a site that would be within radio and radar range of North Vietnam—a difficult problem in the exceptionally rugged terrain of the Laos–North Vietnam border area, the Air Force in 1966 installed a TACAN transmitter on Phou Phathi. A TACAN station is a nearly autonomous radio transmitter that provides military aircraft with a bearing and distance in miles relative to the station location. To support operation of the station on Phou Phathi, the Air Force rotated several technicians to and from the Rock for maintenance and resupply of the transmitter and its associated generator. The Rock was supplied weekly by a secret Air Commando unit, codenamed PONY EXPRESS and based at Udorn Airbase in Thailand, via the 700-foot Lima Site (L.S.) 85 strip in the valley below.

In 1967 the facility was upgraded with a bombing-control radar to improve the control and accuracy of the bombing campaign in North Vietnam. This upgrade brought in more Air Force personnel, “sheep-dipped” to look like civilians, and (allegedly) genuine civilian technicians from Lockheed Aircraft. In reality, the men on Phou Phathi were all Air Force CIRCUIT RIDER teams from the 1st Mobile Communications Group in Udorn who rotated to the site every 24 hours. The PL and North Vietnamese watched developments at Phou Phathi with interest.
The CIA and Hmong Gen. Vang Pao, the joint commanders of the war against the PL in Military Region (MR) II, which included the provinces of Samneua and Xiangkhoang, realized the ultimately untenable position of these Americans on Phou Phathi and arranged for the mountain to be guarded by 300 Thai mercenaries reinforced by local Hmong troops led by CIA paramilitary officers.

In 1967 the military situation in MR II was starting to deteriorate under pressure from the PL, the North Vietnamese, and the Chinese, who were building a series of roads in northern Laos, delivering aid to the PL, and generally adding a wild card factor to the balance of power in the area. The Chinese had concerns about the intentions and loyalties of the Tai and Hmong peoples of northern Laos and southern Yunnan Province, and they apparently believed an active presence was the best policy to maintain control. Phou Phathi continued to receive more equipment and manpower, and it attracted increasing PL attention.

The Opium Factor

In addition to the American military and intelligence interest and Hmong religious beliefs surrounding Phou Phathi, there was another factor affecting the strategic value of the Rock: opium. Phou Phathi was in the center of a major Hmong poppy-growing region, making it a major financial interest. Opium poppies were and are the major cash crop of the highland tribes of Laos. Vang Pao, based at Longtiang, is suspected to have used the proceeds from opium production to help finance the war. There has been much controversy about possible CIA involvement in drug trafficking in Laos, but considerable research has not turned up any evidence of an Agency connection.

The Campaign

L.S. 85 was one of the most critical bases for the Hmong guerrilla army for some time before the US Air Force took interest in the site as a desirable location for a navigational aid. The airstrip and the helipad on top of the mountain resupplied a small command post, used by the Hmong officers and CIA paramilitary advisers, which in turn controlled harassing operations against the PL and North Vietnamese.

The mountain had been captured briefly by the PL in 1959, using Hmong guides who had defected. These guides were necessary because only the local tribesmen who had spent a lifetime in the immediate area were able to navigate the difficult terrain and sheer rock cliffs of the Phou Phathi ridgeline. The loyalist Hmong had not forgotten this incident, and they had vowed to prevent its reoccurrence. History, however, remained against them.

In the fall of 1967, CIA detected substantial activity associated with road construction along Route 19 leading to Nam Bac from Dien Bien Phu and along Route 6 which lead to Phou Phathi. Because the North Vietnamese totally depended on road transportation for heavy units, these developments were considered ominous. By November up to 19 North Vietnamese battalions were observed in the Samneua area, confirming the worst fears of the Embassy and 7th Air Force in South Vietnam that a substantial offensive, most likely against Phou Phathi, was in the offing.

Because of their dependence on roads and overland travel, the North Vietnamese and PL only began offensives during the dry season, which in Laos normally begins in mid-October and lasts through early June. The US Air Force had begun upgrading the TACAN site on Phou Phathi in June 1967 with a TSQ-81 COMBAT SKYSPOT radar bomb scoring and impact system. The TSQ-81, a modified air-mobile version of a SAC range-instrumentation radar, would significantly increase bombing capabilities in poor weather conditions (October through April in North Vietnam) in areas of North Vietnam and Laos. It became operational in early November 1967, almost exactly coincidental with the end of the rainy season in Laos.

The Communist offensive began in December, initially with small-scale skirmishes. But by 15 December Hmong reconnaissance patrols and CIA lookouts detected several battalions moving against Nam Bac, a crucial stronghold of the Royal Lao Army, and toward
Phou Phathi. Two PL companies took Phou Den Din, only 12 kilometers east of Site 85, on the 16th, although the Hmong recovered the position later in the day. The attacks focused serious attention on the security of Site 85 and the enemy’s determination to take the mountain.

The Air Force and CIA directed numerous airstrikes of F-4, F-105, and A-1 fighter-bombers from Thailand and Vietnam, many using the new radar at Site 85, against the massed columns of enemy appearing to encircle the site. The strikes were increased, even using Air Commando A-26 Invaders to attack at night, in an attempt to turn the twin advances on Routes 19 and 6. This air campaign peaked at 45 sorties on 3 January 1968, but it succeeded only in weakening the North Vietnamese and PL. The battle around Nam Bac intensified in early January, and on the 14th the base was taken by four NVA battalions. There were no survivors, and a massive amount of material and documents were captured.

The operations of the TSQ-81, nicknamed COMMANDO CLUB, were beginning to have real effect, with 23 percent of total strikes over North Vietnam in January coming under control of Site 85’s radar. Even in poor weather, the COMMANDO CLUB system was able to direct bombing accurately throughout the Hanoi–Haiphong complex as well as in the immediate area of Phou Phathi for its own defense. This capability seems to have given the Air Force and Ambassador Sullivan an exaggerated sense of the defensibility of the site using air power. Although CIA and Air Force analysts had warned of the vulnerability of the site and the Ambassador himself had serious reservations about its advisability, the strategy in early January called for its operation up to the last minute, with close air support to keeping attackers from reaching the summit until the technicians could be evacuated by helicopter. And, as so often is the case in warfare, the one contingency not considered proved fatal.

The situation at Site 85 in early January was pessimistic. The Air Force technicians on the site continued to be rotated from Udorn in teams of 12, but the COMMANDO CLUB nickname was becoming more apt by the day. Because of their sheep-dipped status as ostensible civilian employees of Lockheed Aerospace, the CIRCUIT RIDERS of the 1st Mobile Communications Group were prohibited from carrying small arms. According to Air Force accounts, this regulation was actually obeyed almost to the last days of the site. Radar vans and antennas had no identification and were rigged with explosives for demolition. Fearing sympathetic detonation of their own charges by artillery falling in the areas, however, the technicians dismantled the explosives and threw them over the cliff.

Because of the political sensitivity of the facility, no other US military personnel were permitted in the area to defend the site, so defense of Phou Phathi depended on the two CIA paramilitary officers in the area and the approximately 1,000 Hmong they advised. This situation was not reassuring; the enemy in the area knew of Americans on the mountain, knew who they were, and knew what they were doing. A notebook taken from an NVA officer killed in February described the site in detail and referred to the “TACAN” in English.

First Attacks

Two-hundred Hmong guarded the ridgeline, and the other 800 were in the valley below. They were fierce and courageous fighters who were strongly motivated to defend the mountain. Although the Hmong were effective at guerrilla-style hit-and-run actions, they were ill prepared to conduct a static defense against overwhelming odds. The Air Force and the US Embassy in Vientiane knew this, but they accepted the odds based on the confidence that the CIRCUIT RIDERS could be evacuated in the last minute by helicopters of the US Air Force and of Air America (CIA’s proprietary airline) supported by fighter bombers. Ambassador Sullivan had sole authority for ordering the evacuation, a circumstance that was to prove costly.

In the first week of January, the enemy continued to shell and probe other sites in the vicinity of Phou Phathi to clear the roads leading from Sanmeua to positions surrounding the mountain. On 10 January the Hmong engaged and dispersed a five-man PL patrol at the base of the ridge.
On 12 January, CIA lookouts reported a four-plane formation heading in the direction of Site 85. Two aircraft split off, but the other two continued to Phou Phathi, where they bombed, strafed, and fired rockets at the ridgeline. Several local Hmong were killed. The CIA officers and the local Air Force forward air controller (FAC) fired on the slow-moving Antonov-2 Colt biplanes and called in an Air America helicopter in the area to assist. The helicopter, a Bell 212, the civilian version of the Huey, proved faster than the Colts. The Air America pilot flew alongside the Soviet-made biplanes and fired a submachinegun at them through the door. Both aircraft were shot down, and the rudder from one was taken to Longtiang, an Air America base, as a souvenir.

The Embassy believed the air attack was an attempt to eliminate the radar without resorting to a costly ground attack. It also considered, rightly, that the attack was highly unusual and was unlikely to be repeated. The North Vietnamese did not have the air assets to squander.

After the air attack, ground activity abruptly increased. On 19 January an informant at Samneua reported that a five-battalion group of NVA and PL had moved west and divided into two groups. Three battalions with a 105-mm howitzer moved into position to attack Phou Den Din, a key position in control of the Phou Phathi area. The other two battalions moved southeast of the mountain in an encircling maneuver. The American and Hmong forces at the Site 85 command post, a ramshackle structure next to the helicopter landing area, recognized another major assault in the making. They realized that, if the enemy were willing to accept heavy losses, the ridgeline could not be held.

Defensive Vulnerabilities

At this point, the Air Force personnel manning the radar at the summit were still unarmed and dependent upon orders from the Ambassador to evacuate in the event of a major attack. The officers who were in charge of the detachment that continued to rotate in and out of the site had no authority to defend their troops or to order a retreat if the ridge was overrun. Communications with Vientiane were maintained from the command post at the helipad, a 20-minute walk down the ridge from the radar vans on the peak. The Air Force personnel realized their predicament, but they continued to direct large numbers of airstrikes daily both in Vietnam and Laos. They also began looking for an escape route.

On 25 January the site conducted an autonomous self-defense exercise that apparently consisted of diverting fighters to suspected enemy positions around Phou Phathi. This exercise seems to have indicated that the plan for COMmando CLUB self-defense using close air support was unlikely to succeed. This test also angered the 7th Air Force because it violated procedures and caused embarrassment. The CIRCUIT RIDERS and CIA officers, however, felt that they were risking more than embarrassment. After the exercise, the Air Force technicians developed a plan to descend down the sheer rock face of Phou Phathi on ropes if the major attack came.

After the fall of Phou Den Din on 22 January, the North Vietnamese temporarily halted offensive operations to regroup and resupply. The COMmando CLUB radar operators continued to direct airstrikes on weakened enemy positions, and FACs from Longtiang directed other available missions and Royal Laotian Air Force aircraft to every potential enemy target in range of Site 85. The enemy apparently was delaying the next offensive until more artillery could be brought up.

A Lull

On 30 January enemy troops detonated some of the defensive mines planted on the approaches of the American compound and brought the ridgeline under mortar fire. A friendly patrol sent to investigate did not meet serious resistance, and the commander of the COMmando CLUB reported that only a minor testing of the defenses had taken place and no further action was required.

Following the skirmish on 30 January, the North Vietnamese settled into a containment perimeter approximately 12 kilometers in diameter around Phou Phathi. Engagements between the Hmong and the North...
Vietnamese became infrequent, but those few encounters that did occur involved enemy formations of at least company strength. Through 14 February airstrikes in defense of the COMMANDO CLUB were scarce and a sense of confidence infected the US Embassy in Vientiane and the 7th Air Force in Vietnam regarding the safety of Site 85.

Casual Attitude

During this period, there was ample intelligence indicating that the enemy was gradually encircling Phou Phathi and massing for a major attack. This information, however, did not materially affect US strategy toward the operation or defense of the site. The PL were not hiding their intentions: numerous informers and spies reported the enemy planned to take Site 85 in late February. CIA reported in an estimate on 25 February that it was extremely unlikely that the site could be held beyond 10 March. Still, no significant changes were made to the strategy for defense of Phou Phathi, and Vientiane retained control of the evacuation plan.

This casual approach probably was the result of the constant air communications with the site and the continuing practice of rotating men out of it every day or every other day. The planners in the Embassy evidently believed that, in the event that the COMMANDO CLUB radar bunkers were seriously threatened, the team would be airtlifted out and not replaced. They may not have realized that the situation could deteriorate rapidly or that a communications breakdown could leave the COMMANDO CLUB team stranded.

In any case, responsibility for the fate of Site 85 was maintained at the Embassy and 7th Air Force level. The local commander was never given the authority to order an evacuation or to supervise his own defense.

In late February, CIA and the Air Force FACs knew the ridgeline was in peril, but they believed it could be defended for the present. On 18 February an NVA officer was killed in an ambush. His captured notebook confirmed a major assault on the summit was planned, gave the strength of the attacking force, and described the timing for the attack.

The Air Force and the Embassy responded by ordering more airstrikes near the mountain, believing that bombing could deter or dissuade the enemy. Bombing, however, was ineffective against troops in deep jungle.

On 21 February the Ambassador authorized the Local Area Defense Commander (alternately the senior CIA officer or the FAC) to use the TSQ radar to direct any and all strikes within 12 kilometers of the summit. Starting on the 20th and continuing until the fall of Site 85 on 11 March (and beyond, as the Air Force tried to destroy the captured radar system), the area was saturated with airstrikes of increasing intensity. Between the 20th and 29th, 242 sorties hit within 30 kilometers of Phou Phathi.

By 26 February, Ambassador Sullivan was pessimistic about the site’s survival. Citing a CIA report that predicted the site’s fall by 10 March, the Ambassador wrote to the Air Force Chief of Staff,

... in the final analysis, it seems doubtful that the site can be held in the face of consistent enemy determination. Therefore, we are in touch with USAF authorities on evacuation and destruction plans. We are fairly certain these can be carried out in an orderly fashion.

Why, then, was this not done?

Evacuation Planning

At the end of February, the airstrikes had caused the enemy to pull back temporarily to regroup, and the evacuation plans were completed. Three Air Force HH-1 “Jolly Green Giant” helicopters and two Air America Bell 212 Huey helicopters with a combined capacity of 155 people were to be used. The plan also called for the evacuation of the Hmong guerrillas defending the immediate area of the summit. To provide immediate response in case of surprise attack, the two Air America choppers were to remain on alert at nearby Lima Site 98. The Air Force aircraft were to fly from Thailand. The wild card in the plan was weather.
Low ceilings and visibility, common in northern Laos in March, could keep any aircraft from landing on the tiny mountaintop clearing.

In early March the Air Force reinforced the TSQ facility with five more technicians from Udorn to provide for 24-hour operation of the radar in the site's own defense. At this point, the CIRCUIT RIDERS also began to arm themselves with rifles, grenades, and other light weapons. A series of slings or ropes were lowered down the front face of the mountain to allow the technicians to lower themselves down the sheer rock face and hide in the crags of the 1,400-foot cliff. There was no place to go from this position, but it also was difficult to reach. The senior CIA advisor's comment later was, “The technique of personnel hanging over the cliff by straps was not discussed as a serious escape or evasion plan.”

Closing In

By 9 March the enemy had the mountain surrounded, skirmishes were almost constant at the lower elevations, and the authority to evacuate still depended on the order from Ambassador Sullivan, who in turn depended on the radio link at the CIA command bunker near the helipad. The rules for airstrikes in the area had been gradually liberalized until the radar operators at the site could do nearly anything they liked except communicate directly with the attack aircraft. There were now four full battalions of the NVA 766th Regiment, including one PL battalion, within striking range of the COMMANDO CLUB.

Shortly after 1800 on 10 March an artillery barrage commenced against the summit. The 105-mm howitzer being used by the Hmong received a direct hit, and the living quarters for the TSQ personnel were also damaged. The technicians sought shelter in a bunker just outside immediately after notifying Udorn that they were under attack and were abandoning the radio in the TSQ building. The attack had begun near nightfall because the enemy knew the Americans would not bomb so close to friendly troops at night.

The Hmong, possibly reinforced by a battalion of the Thai Army operating clandestinely as “mercenaries,” were dug in on the southeast face of Phou Phathi. They believed they were in a good position to repel a frontal assault. The Communists, however, believed they were strong enough to try it.

Commencing the attack with three battalions, the NVA fought up the southeast slope of the mountain. On the north side, 20 heavily armed local Hmong who had defected to the PL began to scale the cliff with the intention of surprising the Americans in their undefended rear. (This strategy was identical to the successful attack on Phou Phathi in 1959, even including the use of Hmong sappers.)

The Air Force at Udorn began urgently preparing night airstrikes, which required flare ships and specially configured night-attack A-26 Invaders from the 506th Special Operations Wing. Evacuation of the personnel still was not contemplated.

At 1945 the artillery barrage ceased, and the Air Force technicians returned to the TSQ facility. The aircraft flying to the site's defense were diverted to other targets. There was only minor damage to the TACAN antenna and no casualties. Some of the F-4s and A-26s continued to Site 85 and hit targets in the area until 0320 on 11 March. At 2020 on 10 March, the Ambassador considered the situation critical enough to permit direct TSQ control of airstrikes on the lower slope of the mountain. The approaching enemy was alleged to be using flashlights, while the Hmong sappers were at this point scaling the northeast face.

Deferring a Decision

An entry in the 7th Air Force log indicates that at 2115 the Ambassador was considering evacuating personnel from Site 85 at first light. The deputy commander of 7/13 Air Force contacted the Embassy in Vientiane and indicated that evacuation should be commenced only as a last resort if the situation became untenable. These
interactions indicate that the Ambassador, the 7th Air Force, and the men at the site did not believe as late as 2100 that the situation had become perilous. The danger appeared manageable, and the security of the ridgeline was believed intact. All concerned had good intelligence about the disposition and intentions of the enemy, so there must have been inordinate faith in the remoteness and defensibility of the mountain. When the shelling resumed at 2121, the Ambassador, still in close communication with the site, ordered that nine of the 16 CIRCUIT RIDER technicians be evacuated at 0815 the next morning.

**Sapper Attack**

The situation remained comparatively stable until 0300 on 11 March. One five-man TSQ crew had continued to operate the equipment while another had descended the slings to sleep in a grotto on the northwest face. At this point, the Hmong sappers reached the summit. They infiltrated silently past its defenders, seemed familiar with the site, and began methodically destroying the buildings with grenades.

Hearing the noise of the battle, the TSQ technicians ran out the front door of the operations building into small-arms fire. Three were killed instantly, including the TSQ commander, while the rest scrambled over the side of the cliff. The invaders then began throwing grenades toward the grotto where the off-duty crew had been sleeping, waking them and killing two.

The CIA commander at the helipad, described as a former Green Beret named Huey Marlow, observed an explosion that destroyed the TACAN antenna. He began advancing on the summit, armed with an automatic shotgun and several grenades and accompanied by a few Hmong. After engaging in hand-to-hand combat between the helipad and the TSQ compound, Marlow reached the summit only to encounter an emplaced machinegun position. He killed the crew and rescued the FAC who had been hiding behind one of the TSQ buildings.

The technicians who had gone over the cliff were hanging in slings among the rocks below, still under fire from the mysterious attackers. Their return fire forced the enemy to pull back momentarily from the precipice. Marlow and his Hmong, with the FAC from Vientiane, who were still under fire from the opposite direction, fought their way back to the helipad. Marlow was later awarded the Intelligence Cross.

**Evacuation Attempt**

At the Embassy in Vientiane, the Ambassador lost touch with the situation after 0300, and radio contact was not re-established at the helipad until about 0500. He then ordered full evacuation at 0715, an hour ahead of schedule. The Air America helicopters were standing by and immediately tried to reach the site, as incoming fire had apparently ceased just before 0700. Approaching the summit, however, they drew fire from the sappers.

Marlow, observing this, estimated that the TSQ area was in enemy hands and called in A-1E Sandys on the facility. This strike forced at least one enemy soldier to flee over the cliff where the surviving Air Force technicians were hiding. There was then a furious firefight on the side of the cliff, and the soldier was killed.

Following the airstrike by the Sandys, the Air America helicopters were able to approach the ridgeline and evacuate some of the Americans. The Air Force combat SAR Jolly Green Giants did not join in the rescue, perhaps because of their inability to land on the tiny clearing. The Air America Hueys went in repeatedly and extracted the two CIA officers, the FAC, and five of the technicians who had hidden in the craggy rocks on the cliff face. One technician was hit during the extraction, and he died on the way to Udorn.

Return flights were able to recover or account for eight of the 11 Americans killed on Phou Phathi, as well as some wounded Hmong defenders. The other three, who were among those who scrambled over the side of the cliff after abandoning the TSQ, were believed blown off the cliff by the constant artillery and mortar fire and airstrikes. Later in the morning a counterattack was contemplated at Udorn, but this plan was temporarily set aside in favor of continued search and rescue.
Destroying the Site

By midday hopes of recovering the missing Americans were discarded and attention turned to destroying the radar to prevent it from falling into the hands of the North Vietnamese, along with the documentation and operational information that was left in the COMMANDO CLUB operations building. The North Vietnamese evidently did not realize what they had captured, or, if they did, did not care. No effort to remove or exploit the TSQ was detected in the hours immediately following capture of the site. The Air Force, however, was not going to give the enemy a chance to think about it. Beginning in late morning on 11 March, air-strikes were directed against the summit every day for a week to obliterate all traces of the COMMANDO CLUB on Phou Phathi. Between the 12th and 18th, 95 sorties were directed to destroy the radar; and on the 19th, two A-1 Sandys leveled every building on the ridge. This aerial barrage had the collateral effect of probably obliterating the remains of any Americans who were left on the mountain.

Why did the COMMANDO CLUB technicians go over the cliff? That action seems to have caused most of the casualties.

The answer probably lies in the training of the Air Force personnel. The sheep-dipped technicians, unarmed and posing as civilians, were not really combatants, yet they were in a position where close combat was almost inevitable. As is often the case in war, things did not go according to Plan A and the COMMANDO CLUB did not have a Plan B. The Air Force did not train the CIRCUIT RIDERS to fight as infantry to defend themselves. This was the real tragedy of Phou Phathi. If the technicians had organized their own defense, with armed sentries manning a defensive perimeter around their facility, possibly even incorporating the Hmong guerrilla troops in their effort, their chances of survival would have been much greater. The tactic of climbing over the side of the mountain, rather than maintaining a defensible position, was not militarily sound. The CIA advisers and the Ambassador apparently realized this.

Postmortem

After the situation became clearer in the days following the battle, Ambassador Sullivan and 7th Air Force ordered a postmortem on the fiasco. The Ambassador recorded his comments in a PERSONAL FOR message to General Momyer at Tan Son Nhat:

... In hindsight, it seems to me we should have pulled all technicians out morning of 10 March even if this means losing the last few hours of the installation’s capabilities.

What concerns me most is not the defensive action, but the disruption of the preplanned evacuation procedure. It is still not clear why technical personnel went over cliff to narrow ledge rather than down trail to chopper pad. CAS [euphemism for CIA] personnel subsequently went up same trail to installation, so we know trail was traversable, even under artillery fire. It is also not clear to me how small Vietnamese suicide squad got to the installation site, although it seems they must have scaled the cliff...
US Air Force continued to strike hard at these forces. Although there were fearsome losses among the enemy units, the Vietnamese and Lao Communists accepted the losses with no change in strategy.

Vang Pao continued to insist on retaking Phou Phathi, even though the Embassy in Vientiane did not believe this was necessary or wise. At one point, Ambassador Sullivan told Vang Pao he would not provide air support for an offensive against the Sacred Mountain in the wet season, so Vang Pao said he would walk there by himself. The Ambassador relented, and the offensive went forward, but it ended in deadlock near Muong Son in late July.

Finally, with heavy support from CIA and Air Force resources, the Hmong reached the base on Phou Phathi. On 18 July a few Hmong commandos managed to reach the destroyed helipad and TSQ facility, but they were unable to hold the ridgeline. The 148th NVA Regiment sent Vang Pao’s troops reeling, while taking heavy casualties. Phou Phathi was never recaptured.

Afterword

The unnamed technician noted as having been wounded and dying en route to Udorn was Air Force Chief Master Sergeant Richard L. Etchberger. He was wounded after having just brought aboard three other airmen trying to escape the North Vietnamese assault. As his story came to light over the following decades, momentum built to award him the Medal of Honor, which President Obama did on 10 September 2010 in the White House. (See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/21/awarding-chief-etchberger-medal-honor and Karen Parrish, “Medal of Honor Recipient Joins Hall of Heroes” in DOD News (American Forces Press Service) at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60970

Readers wishing to study declassified material related to the conflict of 50 years ago, may visit the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room at www.cia.gov. The site features several related collections, including the four book-length histories of CIA activity in Vietnam and Laos written by CIA contract historian Thomas Ahern between 1998 and 2005; a collection of national intelligence estimates and estimative products written on Vietnam before and during the war; and document releases on Air America and its predecessor, Civil Air Transport.
**Introduction**

The Intelligence Community (IC) has a central mission to help the nation avoid strategic national security surprise. Strategic surprise may come in the form of deliberate actions by adversaries of the United States, or it may emerge as the result of unanticipated consequences of technological, economic, demographic, political, or natural forces. It falls to intelligence practitioners to find the indicators or informal signs of change, to organize knowledge about them, and to identify factors influencing their evolution. Practitioners use the information to support accurate predictions of future situations and their effects and to provide the basis for appropriate decisions.

From its earliest days, the IC has constantly sought new technologies for intelligence gathering, for counterintelligence activities, and for improvements in analyzing and interpreting large amounts of diverse data. These new technologies ideally would be capable of a number of things:

- gathering information from adversaries in inaccessible areas;
- overcoming efforts of adversaries to deny US and allied access to sources of critical information;
- protecting IC systems and networks that contain sensitive information;
- deterring the efforts of others to acquire US information; and
- providing the bases for effective and timely security decision- and policymaking.

This article discusses “autonomous technologies” that promise to make humans more proficient in addressing such needs. Although literature in the field is inconsistent in defining the technology and its components, autonomous systems generally are those that take actions automatically under certain conditions. Put another way, they can be thought of as self-governing systems capable of acting on their own within programmed boundaries.

An autonomous system may be platform based—a machine or a device such as a robot—or it may reside and act entirely in the cyberworld. Depending on a system’s purposes and required actions, autonomy may occur at different scales and degrees of sophistication. In addition, autonomous capabilities must be understood and developed within the ecology of specific mission needs, operating environments, users, and, in the case of platform-based systems, the vehicle.¹

Today’s autonomous systems are in their infancy, however, capable only
of performing well-defined tasks in predictable environments. Advances in technologies enabling autonomy are needed for these systems to respond to new situations in complex, dynamic environments of the sort that most interest the IC.

Autonomy’s Potential in IC Activities

The key advantages that autonomous devices could provide for intelligence purposes include movement through varied terrain and environments, stealth, persistent surveillance, and data processing.

Terrain. The types of terrain and environments encountered on IC missions vary dramatically. They could involve desert landscapes, canopied forests, crowded urban settings, potentially toxic chemical facilities, and more. These environments may be dynamic, changing minute to minute. While humans may not be able to navigate safely or undetected to and through such areas, robots would be able to do so without endangering individuals, and they could be built to linger in areas of interest for long periods of time.

Robots could take several forms and might include swimmers, resembling dolphins, or equipment carriers that might look like mules. To be truly effective, however, these kinds of robots would have to include autonomous systems to automatically control “fins” or “legs” in response to changing water or terrain features.

Stealth. Systems are made less detectable by the use of materials applied to an object’s surface, by physical properties, and by electronics.

These characteristics are typically adjusted to avoid specific types of surveillance systems such as human vision or radar. Autonomy can permit a system, a surveillance device, for example, to quickly and automatically alter its characteristics when it detects changes in its environment that might permit an adversary to detect it.

Persistent surveillance. A high degree of autonomy would be required for long-term surveillance activity, which would require a surveillance vehicle to detect changes in target areas, including spotting and identifying vehicles in motion. The vehicle would have to be able to manage its power and fuel consumption and communicate with an intelligence center and its computers. For example, an airborne surveillance system might employ an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with autonomy to handle flight controls, radar systems, surveillance equipment, fuel stores, and communications. If a swarm of UAVs were used, then an autonomous system could control flight patterns and reconfigure the swarm if members are lost. A passive border-monitoring system would use autonomy for change detection, motion detection, communications, power management, and possibly stealth.

Data processing. Use of autonomous systems for data processing and distributed computing would present clear advantages for the IC, allowing for rapid, timely analysis of large amounts of data and their incorporation into decisionmaking. Autonomous systems can help humans by doing data analysis at greater speed to fit into a decision cycle. Note well that autonomy is a resource multipli-
In the Hands of Adversaries

The possibility that enemies of the United States would take advantage of autonomous systems technology for their own purposes is high. We must understand what countermeasures would be needed to combat autonomous systems used against the United States and its allies. Possibilities to consider include the following:

- Surprising US and allied forces by using stealth to hide weapons or intelligence projects targeted against friendly autonomous systems. For example, sensors can be fooled by changing target objects or the environment itself (e.g., by increasing turbulence, adding irregular structures, applying different paint coatings, using different surface materials, or changing audible signatures).

- Identifying passwords or pathways to gain access into sensitive US systems and networks. Autonomous systems can be used to combine human intelligence from Internet social engineering with distributed processing to identify passwords and other obstacles to logging into classified systems. An autonomous system might take the form of a well-written computer virus or malicious code capable of modifying itself to move undetected through a network and cause system failure.

- Spoofing current sensor networks or creating alternative networks to follow individuals. For example, homemade submarines or aircraft may become unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) or UAVs with autonomous capabilities for tracking friendly individuals or platforms.

- Exploiting technological limitations of sensors against them. For example, our sensors may have gaps in their electromagnetic (EM) spectrums in which data do not register. False or malicious code may be introduced into the processing centers to cause systems to fail. An autonomous system’s own failure modes (i.e., stop transmissions or return to origin) could be used for an enemies’ purposes.

Enabling Technologies for Autonomous Systems

An autonomous system is an integration of enabling technologies that allows it to understand its designed goals, sense and understand its environment, and make decisions on actions that it must execute to complete its goals. However, a variety of technologies must still be developed (or invented) before the potential of autonomous systems is realized. The most easily observed advances in these enabling technologies are the robotic platforms that allow autonomous systems to perform physical actions or move through their environment.

Researchers are studying biological systems to create robots ideally suited to perform in particular environments. (See examples in the graphic on the next page.) Advances in biomimetics have allowed the creation of new classes of robotic platforms designed to perform in complex and dynamic assignments and environments, such as entering and navigating through buildings, moving underwater, or in environments in which there is no access to the global positioning system (GPS) and where direct, remote control is not possible. Operational capabilities, however, will require more sophisticated software than is currently available. State-of-the-art autonomous capabilities exist at the subsystem level (e.g., obstacle avoidance for ground robots and capabilities to maintain controlled flight for air platforms).

Less well developed is the ability to understand and freely navigate an environment. Sensors (hardware) provide the input, but software provides the understanding. Simultaneous location and mapping (SLAM) is an example of a technique that robotic platforms can use to explore their environment and build up a three-dimensional (3D) map to determine their location and navigate.^4

However, we must supplement mapping capabilities with software capable of planning courses of action and making decisions to achieve them. Such autonomous systems would lessen the burden on IC controllers, who would otherwise have to make extensive manual inputs such as GPS way points, sensor tasking, or power management.5

Evolution of Autonomous Systems

Needed Advances in Enabling Technologies

The technologies that make autonomous systems function must continue to mature and evolve in order to deal with the complexities and
A. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-funded BigDog robot uses four animal-like legs to traverse terrain too rough or slippery for conventional vehicles. It is also capable of recovering its “balance” if it slips. The current iteration of the program, the Legged Squad Support System (LS3) (above) seeks to demonstrate that a highly mobile, semiautonomous legged robot can carry 400 lbs. of load through rugged terrain.

B. A Canadian research group addressed the challenge of climbing walls by designing a dry adhesive that mimicked the structures of a gecko’s foot pad. The platform, called the Tailless Timing Belt Climbing Platform (TBCP-II), can move from horizontal to vertical surfaces and over both inside and outside corners, as can other gecko-inspired climbing robots.

C. Scientists also are studying the way birds and insects fly to better understand aerodynamics and low-noise systems. The Nano Hummingbird (above) demonstrated controlled, precision hovering and fast-forward flight of a two-wing, flapping-wing aircraft that carries its own energy source and uses only its wings for propulsion and control.

D. Harvard researchers are pushing the technology on an even smaller scale with their RoboBees project (above), which emulates a colony of honeybees containing insect-sized flapping-wing robotic platforms. These biomimetic platforms have the added advantage of stealth.
uncertainties of the IC’s real-world environments and tasks.

Current technologies may have the potential to permit greater autonomy, but they primarily now work with well-defined rules and exhibit only limited autonomy in initiating and carrying out innovative tasks intelligently. Surveys done by the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) Statistical Department show that there have been worldwide increases of industrial robots and greater use of service robots. Industrial functions include tending of machines (metal work and plastic molding), palletizing and inventory, and dispensing (painting, sealing, gluing). Service robots work on tasks ranging from household chores (cleaning, lawn mowing) to dirty, dull, distant, dangerous, or repetitive tasks.10

Autonomous system technologies must be proficient at operating in a variety of complex, dynamic environments, all of which present challenges. For example:

- In space: zero-gravity, airless, extremes of cold and heat;
- Air: variable pressures, winds, extreme and sudden weather shifts;
- Land: variable gradients or slopes, multitudes of obstacles, man-made and natural;
- Sea: high seas, sharply variable currents, changing weather conditions;
- Undersea: changing pressures of depth, variable terrain near sea bottom, changing currents, and changing temperatures.

In all conditions they must exhibit endurance while maintaining stable operations, despite attacks and challenges to propulsion, sensors, and communications. Speed, agility, and stealth are essential parts of the IC mission and are ambitious requirements when combined with autonomy.

Ideally, an autonomous system should be able to make informed decisions with human guidance. Current systems require programmers to understand mission parameters and translate them into well-formed rules based on the end user’s understanding of the problem.

This approach allows the autonomous system to make decisions but only in the context of how the programmer described the problem. Truly autonomous systems must be able to do complex tasks and perform missions in situations that require modifications to rules. This capability either will come from expanding rule sets or giving systems the ability to learn from their environments. Such advances will require much more research.

Humans Are Part of the System

A human-autonomous technology interface may seem like an oxymoron. Today, however, it is an essential ingredient of semiautonomous systems under direct or indirect human control. In the future, autonomous systems must respond even more to human needs and give meaningful feedback. For example, a user may guide a sensor that is capable of doing surveillance of all data within its frequency and range limitations to focus on certain target characteristics. The sensor system’s download capabilities should send relevant data in formats that satisfy the user’s needs. At some level, however abstract, a human-machine interface will be necessary, even when autonomous, humanlike decisionmaking may be more sophisticated than it is today.

Analysis and Decisionmaking

Today’s user-system interfaces place the burden on humans to acquire relevant data. As described in Psychology of Intelligence Analysis—a frequently cited document despite its age—IC analysts use formal and less formal methods to identify data, draw inferences, and find answers.11 In more formal analysis, inferences are made through procedures that collectively represent the scientific method, including statistical analysis of data on the phenomenon in question. To make analytic arguments, assumptions, or intelligence gaps more transparent, a variety of diagnostic techniques supplement these methods.

The goal of autonomous systems in the realm of intelligence analysis is to provide, in combination with other data sources, an extensive, complex database to assist with analytic techniques. How will analysts quickly extract information relevant to their decisions and narrow the possibilities to significant or actionable items?

A critical foundation for this next generation of decision support is to develop methods that automatically respond to a decisionmaker’s needs. One vision is a system that would provide decisionmakers alternative courses of action by selecting, collecting, and formatting data relevant to a problem. The purpose would be to give decisionmakers information-rich environments in which choices are clearly laid out and from
which they can rapidly take action specifically suited for the problem. ("agile" and "adaptive" in current business jargon). In this realm, much more research must be done before the IC can gain the benefits of autonomous analytical methods.

**The Potential of Biotechnology**

Future decisionmaking interfaces will probably integrate advances in biotechnology into autonomous systems. In a concept known as “augmented cognition,” real-time measurements of chemical changes that take place during human cognitive processes may be used to provide information to platforms so they can sense a human’s thinking and act accordingly. For example, orexin is a neurotransmitter that regulates arousal, wakefulness, and appetite.12 In the past, orexin could be measured only with a spinal tap. Now, we can get the same data using measurements in saliva.13 Some interfaces might leverage noninvasive brain-machine interface methods such as electroencephalography, which records the small electric field generated by groups of neurons firing, and near-infrared spectroscopy, which uses scattered light to detect changes in the brain.14

**Analysis of Current Autonomous Systems**

Many examples exist of autonomous systems being developed by the military, industry, academia, companies, and hobbyists. None has the level of autonomy needed to handle the missions that most interest the IC. To complete complex tasks, a system needs to do many things, such as interact with its environments, process information, and suggest decisions. Most examples shown so far only tackle one component, such as locomotion, at a time and only in laboratory conditions.

The graphic below illustrates this point. Along the bottom is a measure of task/environmental complexity. On one end are very simple tasks such as sensing and moving along the ground in an open area. Laboratory environments are also at this end. Tasks such as flying, swimming, and pattern recognition are more complex. IC mission-level tasks such as “monitor this 10-mile stretch of border for vehicles or people” or “patrol this area underwater and record all communications” are complex tasks that involve multiple system components, integrated and working together.

The left side of the graphic is a measure of technology maturity and integration for autonomous systems. Maturity and integration are different aspects of system complexity that have to be addressed. Maturity is based on the length of time the technology has been developed and used and relates to solving issues dealing with the use of the technology. For example, GPS location services is a mature technology, but automatic identification of objects is much less mature. Integration has to do with the connection, communication, and interaction of components to work together and function properly. Integration differentiates between simple systems, such as geolocation, and a complex system, such as goal-directed surveillance linked to multiple response options.

These definitions help to differentiate autonomous systems. While a simple system can be capable of complex actions, a level of increased
maturity and integration can improve the robustness and range of system capabilities. Integration also informs the number of independent components that a system has. For the examples mentioned in the previous sections, the levels of maturity are low. In some cases, the level of integration is not there because the technology is a component that would have to be integrated into a larger system to complete an IC task. The graphic points to the amount of development needed to take today’s systems and demonstration systems to the appropriate levels of maturity and integration required to complete IC tasks successfully.

The Known State of Development Abroad

Several countries are known to be investing in technologies to advance autonomous systems, but publicly available information suggests the United States is the most advanced in the field. Its systems are capable of working in more complex environments and at more complex tasks than systems being developed in Japan, Korea, China, and Israel. All three countries have made significant investments in industrial robots to improve manufacturing processes and in service robots to help meet the needs of aging populations. Assessments of work in the European Union and Turkey place their efforts behind China and Japan’s.

The following are snapshots based on open sources of autonomous system research in other countries.

China seems poised for a vigorous and continuing investment in autonomous systems, but it is considered to be in the early stages of competing with robot pioneers in other countries, including Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. China’s 15-year science and technology plan published in 2008 identifies 22 specific technologies on which work is planned. Among these are “intelligent perception technology” in the information sciences and “intelligent service robots” in the area of advanced manufacturing.

The focus on industrial and service robots is supplemented by other developments such as a robot dolphin that swims through water to measure its quality and robots that exhibit capabilities for more complex tasks such as assisting with surgical procedures. Two leading robotics laboratories in China have computer science research including pure artificial intelligence (AI) that specializes in natural language, machine translation, and reinforcement learning, with related AI work in multimedia, distributed computing, and pervasive computing.

European Union. A European Commission report, Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) Projects Compendium for 2007–2012, presents research under an information and communications technology program, including autonomy initiatives such as adaptive autonomy and autonomy of collectives such as robot swarms.

Japan and Korea embrace the power and potential of robots and autonomy, particularly as applied to the industrial and service industries. Industrial robotics already supports export-driven manufacturing industries and is, as in China, looking past that to using service robotics as a solution for looming societal and demographic problems.

Humanoid robots are a particular area of new development and include auditory analysis and speech communication, sensory integration, and brainlike information processing. However, its near-term relevance to the IC is difficult to derive other than as interesting technology developments in sensing, deciding, and acting.

Israel. An American Technion Society (ATS) web article describes the scope of Israel’s interests in autonomous systems as shown in a program of the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology.

The program is described as a “multi-pronged” approach to surveillance, including the use of swarms of UAVs and/or satellites with the capability to cooperate with one another while operating under extreme conditions on the ground and in the sea. The program even includes experimentation, the article claims, on “bio-inspired” snake robots that propel themselves segment by segment as a snake does.

Turkey has begun to produce its own surveillance and attack capabilities as a move away from depending on other countries for such technology. Its procurement authorities are preparing to field a semi-autonomous surveillance aircraft capable of munitions delivery. The Turkish government announced in March 2013 that it plans to sign a contract for the acquisition of 10 locally made drone systems, dubbed the ANKA. One version will be armed. Turkish officials often look pleased portraying the ANKA as a “fully Turkish, nation-
al, purely indigenous aircraft,” but the drone’s imported parts include the engine, automatic take-off and landing system, landing gear, and radio.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Conclusions}

Autonomous systems are tools intended to increase the proficiency of key capabilities. In the case of intelligence, they would help gather, analyze, and protect vital information, but current systems are not close to the levels of maturity and systems integration that would allow them to autonomously undertake complex IC missions.

Advances in technologies will be needed to achieve such capabilities, especially in the fields of perception, planning, learning, human-robot interaction, natural language understanding, and multiagent coordination. And even with developments in these areas, fully autonomous systems will only be achieved through the integration of these and other technologies—some still to be invented (including hardware and software). These developments will have to come from at least three sources, none of which is likely to alone provide all the needed innovation, invention, and applications:

\begin{itemize}
  \item academia (journals, university projects);
  \item inventions (toys, hobby kits, social intelligence devices); and
  \item independent technology investments.
\end{itemize}

Academia always has been a source of innovation and new development. It tests innovative directions by building on theories and principles. For example, flying nanorobots like the RoboBees pictured earlier are inspired by biological research and build on the known behavior of insects. Inventions are often the products of young adults with fertile minds or are creations designed to meet special human needs.\textsuperscript{22} They can be inspired by commercial technologies (e.g., toys, hobby kits, and computers) and vivid imaginations. Independent investment of resources is the engine of change when the innovation or invention shows promise.

Today, except in the field of industrial robotics, autonomous systems exist at the level of innovation and invention. Even the semiautonomous robots already developed for military and security purposes (e.g., iRobot; L3 CyTerra) for surveillance and aerial and ground delivery of supplies and equipment are limited production items.
Endnotes:


21. Turkish UAV market may boom after development Burak BEKDİLHürriyet Daily News, August 27 2013

Intelligence in Public Literature

The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History
Michael Warner. (Georgetown University Press, 2014), 406 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Reviewed by Hayden Peake

...all attempts to develop ambitious theories of intelligence have failed.

—Walter Laqueur

In a business as old as recorded history, one would expect to find a sophisticated understanding of just what that business is, what it does, and how it works. If the business is “intelligence,” however, we search in vain. As historian Walter Laqueur warned us, so far no one has succeeded in crafting a theory of intelligence.

—Michael Warner

Warner describes the rise of intelligence from pre-Sumerian times to its highpoint in the Cold War and then its “fall” with the onset of the digital age. His focus is not, however, on the details of espionage or covert action operations, though some are mentioned. Rather, he argues that, historically, utilization of “secret functions… appear to follow certain patterns. Knowledge of the factors behind these patterns gives us a basis for defining and comparing intelligence systems” as effected by “changes in technology and ideology [that] revolutionize espionage and ultimately transform it into intelligence.” (4-5) The organizations resulting from this transformation are a function of “three factors—strategy, technology, and regime type—that vary with each sovereign state.” He argues that the intelligence produced has “marginal but real effects” (6) that shape intelligence organizations, and inform policymakers and military planners.

Each of Warner’s eight chapters dwells on well-known events and the roles they played in the evolution of the business, with a common theme being the collection and processing of information for those in power. While his subjects are primarily the best-known East-West nations, with some attention to the Third World and China, the first chapter begins with a discussion of espionage in ancient times, beginning with Sun Tzu and Kautilya—the Indian author of the Arthashastra, a treatise on statecraft. After a summary of its evolution as influenced by the industrial revolution and military theorists like George Furse and Clausewitz, it ends in the turbulent world of 1914.

Along the way, Warner considers how intelligence as a process or system has been influenced by political turmoil; enlightenment thinkers John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau; and the revolutionary Vladimir Lenin. By the early 1900s, Warner writes, the seeds of an “international surveillance system had taken shape.” (29) This system was supported by new espionage agencies that arose as a result of increasing public awareness and the demands of revolutionary governments. “The needs of governments and militaries to gather and concentrate information by all available means were beginning to transform spycraft into intelligence.” (35)

Chapter 2 examines the dramatic expansion of intelligence services among the major participants during the First World War. It was a time, writes Warner, when “espionage morphed into intelligence” (62)—a phrase he uses to indicate that “the days when national leaders like Napoleon and Washington “ran [their] own networks” were over. (39) New agencies and techniques were created to meet the demands of new organizations, civilian and military.

As Warner does throughout the book, he describes the functions the new organizations performed—aerial reconnaissance, cryptologic, military, internal security, communications—and their impact on international relations. He

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
spends little time on specific intelligence operations. He mentions a number of espionage and covert action cases, but he does not elaborate, leaving the details for readers to seek out. In short, his is a top-down view of how intelligence influences geopolitical and economic maneuvering among the major powers.

The interwar period and WW II itself are treated in the next chapter. Here Warner tells how, after enduring cutbacks that followed the peace, the nation states gradually built up their intelligence capabilities to meet the ideological threats of communism and national socialism. He stresses that during the war, intelligence—in particular ULTRA and MAGIC—“allowed the Western allies to pick their battles.” (122) This flexibility, coupled with nuclear weapons, he argues, prevented protracted land engagements. The legacy of WW II intelligence in the postwar era, Warner concludes, was both the perpetuation of national intelligence organizations and multinational alliances created on both sides of the Iran Curtain “capable of functioning on a global basis.” (131)

The next three chapters cover the Cold War and depict intelligence at its apex, notwithstanding occasional blunders and the congressional investigations they provoked. Here Warner describes the formation of the CIA and efforts to integrate intelligence operations with policymaking to address strategic issues in cooperation with our allies. At the same time, operations were undertaken to counter Soviet espionage during the war that were only recognized and dealt with afterward, thanks mainly to the Venona Program and some Soviet key defectors. Brief examples include the Fuchs atomic espionage case, the Hiss case, and the Rosenbren network. (157)

Turning to foreign intelligence capabilities, Warner discusses the impact of the Korean War, the arms race, various other international crises, and the rapport with policymakers. On the counterintelligence front, there is a reference to several important Soviet agents—Nosenko, Penkovsky, Popov, and Polyakov—and some important defectors. Likewise, Warner mentions the ubiquitous KGB and “highly proficient Stasi and HVA,” (251) that dominated Cold War relations with the West and justified expensive—though successful—technological programs such as the U-2 and satellite systems. Overall, he concludes, “intelligence helped to stabilize” the Cold War (164) and “by the early 1970s the United States had become the undisputed world intelligence leader.” (165)

Despite the impressive US technological achievements, the ever-present Soviet (and to some extent Chinese) ideological threat caused persistent problems for Western intelligence that came to a head in congressional hearings in the 1970s. Warner views this situation as a consequence of White House-approved CIA covert action programs of mixed quality in Cuba, Iran, Africa, South America, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. An added complication was the 1971 burglary of an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, that confirmed that the Bureau had been keeping files on anti-war dissidents. In addition, there began a seemingly endless series of exposés in books and articles by former CIA employees following the “prototype established by Kim Philby’s My Silent War.” (210)

All of the above climaxed in the Church Senate Committee and Pike House Committee hearings on intelligence that Warner identifies as a pivotal point in the way Western intelligence would function thereafter. The investigative process and resulting precedents were “watched with fascination and horror by other intelligence services around the world.” (216) As an aside, Warner notes, the investigations increased “openness” and stimulated the academic interest in intelligence that has continued to grow to the present. (213) A crucial point Warner emphasizes is that despite the multi-year investigations, the “changes in American intelligence in the 1970s did not improve it.” (215) Failures persisted as the Soviet Union expanded its attempts to influence Third World nations and the Iranian hostage-taking caught the West by surprise.

For much of the 1980s, US covert actions in Latin America, counterintelligence problems in the CIA, and the Iran-Contra affair would dominate the headlines. But the Soviet Union was having problems, too, with rapid changes in leadership, the end of the war in Afghanistan, and the instability brought on by Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika. Warner analyzes these issues under the heading of “The End of History.” (248) He never explains precisely what that terms means, but his discussion covers the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, “The Liberal Triumph,” and its effect on the Western and Russian intelligence services as a transition to “The World Online” began. (265)

The Rise and Fall of Intelligence concludes with discussion of the digital revolution and an analysis of post-9/11 and cyber-related events as they influenced and were
The exposure of Stuxnet, Flame, and GhostNet by German, Russian and Canadian researchers spoke volumes about the state of intelligence in the twenty-first century.” (309) Regrettably, Warner does not elaborate, but he does discuss some problems resulting from “big-data” collection, excessive government surveillance and the risks to privacy, non-state actors—corporate and terrorist—developing their own capable intelligence systems. While he never says so directly, Warner implies that the confluence of these factors has led to the fall of intelligence, though from his perspective that does not mean the collapse of the profession, but rather its dispersion among many players, state and non-state, thus multiplying the number of creators of “intelligence” and the number of counterintelligence targets government intelligence services will have to cover. Warner ends by speculating on the future of intelligence and whether it will “be a force for good as well as ill?” (338)

Extensively documented, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence will challenge students while giving the interested reader important context about the role of intelligence in international relations.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere
Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (eds.). (Georgetown University Press, 2013), 313 pp., bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Charles Heard

Academics in intelligence studies are, it would seem, a somewhat diffident sort. They spend what appears to the outsider an excessive amount of time outlining (or railing against) the tangency of their area of interest, admitting that the formal study of intelligence lacks one or another quality, and discussing the pros and cons of their field’s recency. It is small wonder then that readers, practitioners especially, often take them at their word and decline to spend a great deal of time on the work that intelligence-focused academics have produced.

For that reason alone, there is a certain satisfaction to be taken in Intelligence Elsewhere, a remarkably ambitious, edited collection of essays on the intelligence activities and organizations of a dozen countries or regions of the world. Intelligence Elsewhere opens with the now seemingly mandatory description of intelligence as “the missing dimension of history,” dispenses with the discipline’s alleged flaws on page 1, and leaves any further abjection behind.

The resulting pages span four millennia and as many continents to leave readers with a long look at what moves organizations to seek secret information, and how they go about it, in parts of the world rarely scrutinized in the field’s Anglo-American mainstream. A book containing assessments both of ancient China and contemporary Ghana between its covers is not exactly the work of the self-effacing.

Editors Davies and Gustafson set out Intelligence Elsewhere’s remit in an introductory chapter: to examine the comparative role of culture in intelligence, whose common requirements make the field “especially well suited” for comparative assessment (7). The book then divides into two larger sections. The first contains four studies of what might be called the “deep history” of intelligence in ancient China, India, the Byzantine Empire (here a stalking horse for Russia), and the Islamic world. The book’s second section has chapters on contemporary intelligence issues in Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Japan, Ghana, Argentina, Sweden, and Finland. A brief concluding chapter notes the power of tradition—in the long sense of national or civilizational history, and in the narrower sense of organizational norms—as a factor in decisionmaking and innovation.

It is not hyperbole to say that books like Intelligence Elsewhere represent the future of intelligence studies as an academic discipline—and as importantly from this journal’s perspective, the promise of an intelligence studies literature that can provide insight to practitioners. Intelligence Elsewhere wears its social science lightly, in a short chapter by Stephen Welch that covers the competing definitions of political culture. It is explicitly comparative, avoiding the all-too-common problem of drawing conclusions about “unique” or “universal” factors from the single case or the single intelligence service. And most of the essays make use of vernacular source material, some to great effect—Lauri Holmstrom’s look at Finland’s Security Police, one of few works on Finnish intelligence in English and one of even fewer, if any, to use Supo’s own official history, stands out in this regard (265–284).

The best part of the book is its second section, which examines the cultural and political contexts in which sev-

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
eral nations grapple with what kind of intelligence each needs and how each nation’s institutions of intelligence should be set up and overseen to increase (or decrease) their chances of success—whether in operations, in influencing decisionmaking, or in adapting to changing national priorities. Finland’s Supo and Sweden’s technical service FRA are both described as reevaluating their orientation and mission priorities in the post-Cold War world, but each moves in a slightly different direction, for reasons of history, economic and security interest, and—yes, probably—strategic culture (239–263). Chapters on Iran and Japan both show how a predetermined political orientation—privileging ideological Shi’ism, in the first case, and privileging political consensus over intelligence-informed decisionmaking, in the second—affect what intelligence services focus on and how well (141–156 and 181–198). The three chapters on security sector reform in Ghana, Argentina, and Indonesia all serve in their own ways to bolster the case that the main model of reform probably is too tightly tied to the East European experience on which it is based (157–180, 199–218, and 219–238). The only part of this section that seems derivative is the chapter on Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), best described as a rather cursory look at the public controversies over that organization’s activities, disappointingly studded with citations from British and American newspapers and current-affairs magazines (115–140).

Like any edited volume, Elsewhere has its highs and lows, and not everything makes good on the project. The first section, with its look at intelligence activities and traditions, in some cases thousands of years old, is more suggestive than it is persuasive. Even in the better chapters the analytic linkages to contemporary concerns are gossamer-thin. The chapter on Byzantine intelligence structures draws plausible but loose parallels between the attitude of the Byzantine emperor—perpetually ensnared in schemes and overseeing the resulting constant stream of investigation and counterinvestigation—and that of his historical descendants ruling Imperial, Soviet, and modern-day Russia (67–88). The chapter on Arab and Islamic intelligence practice shows that clandestinity and intelligence collection are deeply rooted in Arab and Islamic history as Muhammad and his followers fought to survive their new religion’s earliest days (89–112).

Other chapters do not even suggest connections to the present. The discussion of historical Chinese military texts makes no effort at all to draw or even hint at a link to contemporary Chinese practice or lingering influences (29–48). It does show quite convincingly that military leaders there for centuries believed intelligence and subversion were key to warfighting—though it is hard to imagine a competent general, Chinese or armchair, who would believe otherwise. And the chapter on India recites approvingly and at length the intelligence advice in Kautilya’s 4th century BCE work Arthashastra, before admitting, almost sheepishly, on the final page that the text was lost for a millennium until the early 20th century, and that the author does not know the literature (a portion of which has been reviewed in this journal in recent years) on contemporary Indian intelligence institutions well enough to draw any possible cultural reflections (49–66).b

Truly comparative work on the role of intelligence in governance has generally proved elusive—no doubt for lack of information, not disinterest—but this volume shows that the proliferation of official histories, study groups, and other source material may make it a fertile time to set aside the (always somewhat false) inferiority complex and push the discipline’s boundaries. Whatever its blemishes, Intelligence Elsewhere is a book to welcome for readers of intelligence literature, and hopefully one that spawns imitators of all stripes in coming years.

---


b. The more appropriate cultural linkage in the subcontinent probably is British imperial structures, which Davies notes in the book’s concluding chapter. See Philip Murphy, “Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa 1945–1965,” Intelligence and National Security 17/3 (Summer 2002): 131–162, and in the Indian context, Christopher Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Military and strategic analysts routinely grapple with the complex problem of force generation, which all agree is more than simply putting guns into the hands of soldiers. Addressing this problem is of even greater concern and urgency in the aftermath of military defeat, such as that suffered by Iraq against the forces of ISIL last year. Analysts can gain insight into force generation issues by reviewing case studies and teasing out the key questions, such as what underlies the tactical, operational, and strategic choices military leaders face and what value do they place on internal reform and foreign military aid to accomplish those goals?


The book is worth the read, but readers will have to work for insights because the individual essays do not quite add up to a coherent book, and occasionally it is difficult to distinguish between translated portions of Fawzi’s memoirs, Aboul-Enein’s commentary, and other material. The parts of Fawzi’s memoir that Aboul-Enein does translate show a deeply reflective, determined military mind wrestling with immediate combat needs while also striving to regenerate and transform a defeated military into an effective fighting force.

Fawzi scopes the macro problem he faced by tracing the sources of Cairo’s stunning loss to Tel Aviv to the military itself. He trenchantly assesses the “symptoms for the crippling defeat of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war began not with the mass retreat of the Egyptian Army or the decimation of the Egyptian air force within an hour but years before.” (9–10) Fawzi fingers Egypt’s military institutions and leaders for creating a mal-formed culture that could not possibly achieve any of the military goals with which it was tasked, let alone achieve national strategic objectives.

Fawzi chastises President Gamel Nasser’s then War Minister Abdel-Hakim Amer for having focused on gaining political power and leading “military leaders to became inward looking” and failing to “plan and train for projecting offensive power outside Egypt’s borders.” In Fawzi’s view, Cairo’s military leaders failed to cultivate useful counterinsurgency tactics during Egypt’s five-year war in Yemen and neglected combined arms training. Instead they created a military culture in which artillery fire was meant to reassure troops rather than hit enemy targets and promotions were given to boost morale rather than to reward action. (9, 21-25)

Fawzi’s views on rebuilding Egypt’s military, in part, stem from his distaste for Minister Amer. This is evident in his description of the chaos in Egypt’s command during its hasty retreat on 6 June 1967 and the ridiculousness of Amer’s order to Fawzi to draft a plan for retreat in 20 minutes. (50) Amer’s lack of attention to Fawzi’s reform attempts before the war also shaped his view of the minister. Fawzi, as army chief of staff in 1966, was already thinking about endemic problems in the force and had endorsed reports asserted that defense against Israel was “becoming compromised.” The fact that Fawzi found one such report collecting dust in Amer’s safe in the Defense Ministry surely added to Fawzi’s determination to reform Egypt’s military. (21)

Fawzi paints himself as a reformer redefining civil-military relations, boosting training, and managing foreign assistance as the foundations for reconstructing...
the Egyptian military—essentially reversing institutional failings he believed had led to Egypt’s defeat. His reflections also convey an emphasis on quickly rebuilding military intangibles, such as troop morale. For example, to Fawzi, the creation of a defensive line along the west side of Suez in the immediate aftermath of Egypt’s retreat was not only tactically important but psychologically key, because he believed it helped show Egyptian troops that the Israelis were not invincible.

Subordinating the military to civilian authority and reorienting the military to external, vice internal, threats were also fundamental to Fawzi. (70.) Egypt’s military most needed training, however, and Fawzi judged education and repeated exercises to be critical. With this focus, he showed himself to be an acute student of defense economics. For example, Fawzi judged it would “take six months to bring the Egyptian air force into quantitative balance with Israel’s, but two and half years to plan, train, and rehearse the force.” (77)

Aboul-Enein notes that Fawzi wrote of the need to align acquisition, training, and proficiency with advanced weapons (90). For example, Fawzi transferred an entire Egyptian air wing to Russia for advanced training to realize his objective of graduating 300 to 400 pilots a year. (107). How Fawzi arrived at this calculation is unclear, but training schedules, weapons procurement, and battle preparation were central to his thinking. Fawzi’s memoir also sheds light on his view of Russian military assistance. Nasser wanted greater access to Russia’s most advanced arms and trainers and sought to persuade Moscow that an Egyptian military defeat would be damaging to the prestige of Soviet weaponry. He also ordered Egypt’s forces placed under the command of Russian trainers.

Also wanting to advance Russian arms aid, Fawzi initially opposed placement Egyptian forces under Russian advisers, but he ultimately accepted a large Russian military mission, which permeated Egypt’s forces, including a senior adviser who worked with him. It is unclear what operational concerns Fawzi might have had with these arrangements, but the excerpts show he was pleased with Russia’s aid, which led to gradual improvements in the operational proficiency of Egypt’s air defenses and the Egyptian General Staff’s growing understanding of how to employ Russian SA-6 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems. (69, 156)

Aboul-Enein, has had a distinguished military career and currently serves as an adjunct military professor and chair of Islamic Studies at the National Defense University. He has authored two books on the region and coauthored one. In Reconstructing, Aboul-Enein demonstrates the value of foreign language skills and the insights analysts can gain from memoirs such as Fawzi’s.

The book suffers from two drawbacks, however. The first is that Aboul-Enein never rigorously questions Fawzi’s perspectives or accounts. Fawzi’s differences with Amer and his 1971 removal by President Sadat for an alleged role in an attempted coup leaves ample reason to believe Fawzi’s memoir would include interpretations of events that would cast him in the most positive light possible. Indeed, in the passages Aboul-Enein recites, Fawzi seems to have made no mistakes.

The second weakness is that the essays were essentially left as they were originally published in Military Affairs and Infantry. These include introductory passages written by different people, which become tedious after awhile. Moreover, some repetition between chapters slips in, and there are some blurred lines between what are direct quotations from Fawzi’s memoir, summations of his thoughts, and Aboul-Enein’s commentary.

Despite the flaws, military analysts will benefit from this quick read because it offers a case study for identifying key analytic issues around the complex problem of force generation, particularly following military defeat. Reconstructing A Shattered Egyptian Army also provides strategic analysts with food for thought about military reform and the limitations of foreign military support. For all of Fawzi’s attention to planning and training, Egypt’s military ultimately failed again during the 1973 October War against Israel in spite of Russian military support and operational military ties. At that point Cairo chose to break with Russia and engage Washington.
The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014

Reviewed by John H. Kavanagh

“We may be fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country.”

—Richard C. Holbrooke, former US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan

New York Times reporter Carlotta Gall arrived in Afghanistan in November 2001, two months after the 9/11 attacks and one month after the onset of the US bombing and ground campaigns that quickly displaced the Taliban regime and decimated its ranks. Gall remained in-country for 10 years and was recently back in Kabul, reporting on the country’s recent presidential election. Given her nearly continuous presence, Gall serves as a valuable witness to the problematic, seemingly endless drama of America’s efforts to facilitate normalcy and promote democratic rule in Afghanistan.

Gall’s book, The Wrong Enemy, emphasizes the influence of a third player in the drama, Pakistan, arguing that since shortly after the Taliban’s 2001 rout, US attempts to bring order to Afghanistan’s political structure have been purposefully stymied by the machinations of Pakistan’s two most powerful entities, the army and ISI, the army’s Inter-services Intelligence Directorate, primarily by their reinvention of and relentless support to a resurgent Taliban. Gall offers two explanations for America’s frustration in Afghanistan: the difficulty of bringing to modernity an ethnically fractured society traditionally resistant to unity and the malignant subversion of that goal by a determined neighboring state.

Regarding the first issue, Gall wastes little time reviewing familiar ground. She does briefly note the “graveyard of empires” theme of various foreign powers serially failing to impose order or maintaining influence over the people of Afghanistan. Usually these efforts were based on attempts to dislodge the politically dominant Pashtun tribal sect of southern Afghanistan by sponsoring cooperation by the rival Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tajik ethnic factions, a strategy that has never worked for long.

But Gall goes on to detail the post-9/11 search for a leader whose personal standing could earn the trust of each group and who could lead organized resistance to the expected renewed Taliban aggression. The Americans first reached back to Mujahedin commanders who had received CIA assistance in their successful 1980s guerrilla war against occupying Soviet forces. One commander brought into play with CIA support was Abdul Haq, a legendary anti-communist warrior determined to organize a Pashtun alliance with northerners that would have led to a coalition government in Kabul.

Captured by a Taliban force near Kabul, Abdul Haq was executed on the orders of the Taliban’s Interior Minister, Mullah Abdul Razzak. One month earlier two al-Qa’ida operatives had assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the fabled Lion of Panjshir, who effectively battled Russian forces for a decade. Gall notes, “Afghanistan had lost its best military commander in Massoud and its strongest advocate for national peace and reconciliation in Haq. The United States had lost its two best potential allies.”

The American search continued. It soon centered on Hamid Karzai, scion of a powerful Pashtun clan, educated, well-travelled, ambitious, and in Gall’s estimation much to his credit, willing to spend months in hiding from Taliban death squads, moving at night from village to village building support from tribal elders for the formation of the nascent coalition government he would lead into Kabul, arriving by American helicopter on 13 December 2001.

Gall encapsulates the subsequent and ongoing dysfunction of the Afghan government in terms of Karzai’s and his coterie’s personal shortcomings—corruption, nepotism, chronic short-sightedness, failure to exploit the opportunity to establish an appropriate consensus-based
Gall opens her argument by making the case that Pakistan’s leaders since 9/11 have held to the illusory, ultimately self-destructive, hope that via ISI’s management of the Taliban, a fragmented, violence-ridden Afghanistan would devolve into a malleable puppet, a strategic counterweight to archrival India’s regional designs.

She then chronicles Pakistan’s persistent intrusions into Afghan affairs, a program managed by senior ISI officers native to Pakistan’s northwestern tribal agencies. There they are given to serving local agendas, defying Punjabi army commanders and government officials, and failing to prevent, if not giving rise, to the Taliban’s spiraling, senseless violence against Pakistani villages and army units—a violence that has cast large swaths of northern Pakistan into chaos.

And while the United States depends on cooperation from Pakistan in joint counterterrorist efforts, ISI provides safehavens in the north for both the Taliban and al-Qa’ida units that launch cross-border raids in Afghanistan. And the program has been no less dangerous to its political sponsors. Nawaz Sharif was twice deposed from office by the army; Pervez Musharraf was deposed and upon return from exile, incarcerated; Benezir Bhutto, a critic of the army’s untoward political meddling, was assassinated. Responsibility for her death is often ascribed to Musharraf, then chief of Army Staff who was at the time openly hostile toward Bhutto. The ISI effort has indeed effectively weakened Afghanistan, but it has done the same for Pakistan.

Gall’s book provides a fast-paced, consistently readable take on Afghan developments from 9/11 to today. She plays a role in many of the story’s telling anecdotes. Her condemnation of the army, ISI, and their works is heartfelt. A number of her friends and colleagues suffered, in some cases losing lives, from ISI-orchestrated violence. In 2006 Gall herself was seized in her Quetta hotel room by four plainclothes ISI officers, who detained and roughed her up and threatened worse if she continued to try to interview Taliban members.

Still, immersed in the region’s troubled past and present, Gall remains hopeful for both countries’ futures. The book closes with Gall’s hope that Pakistan will accept its responsibility as a modern nuclear power and take up a supportive role in its neighbors’ affairs and that the United States and other NATO governments will rededicate their efforts to leveraging Pakistan’s proximity and stature into cooperative steps to help the Afghan people. Gall believes that must happen.

She isn’t the only one. On 14 August 2014, former CIA Deputy Director of Operations Jack Devine addressed a meeting of the Association of Former American Intelligence Officers. He noted that, although Afghanistan was seemingly on the verge of tearing itself apart, the US effort against terrorism in South Asia could not succeed without a continued close relationship with Pakistan.
Of all Soviet spies during the Cold War, Harold (Kim) Philby is the one authors seem to most like writing about. (Well over a dozen books about him, including his autobiography and his widow’s memoir, have appeared in print in multiple versions and languages.) He was not creepy like the FBI’s Robert Hansen. Nor had he topped out like CIA’s Aldrich Ames. He was no screw up like British Foreign Service officer Guy Burgess or defense contractor TRW’s Christopher Boyce and his partner Daulton Lee. He was not dastardly to those around him like the US Navy’s John Walker. Rather, Philby was charming, smart, quite likeable, and a professional success. While many of his MI6 colleagues felt deeply betrayed by his spying, a few expressed no hard feelings.

Philby’s life had all the elements of a gripping novel. Two of his British intelligence colleagues based their fiction on him. Graham Greene was a pen pal and visitor after Philby defected to Moscow, and his book The Human Factor (not The Third Man) was written with Philby in mind. The same goes for John Le Carré’s classic about high-level betrayal at MI6, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. And so it is only fitting that a terrific storyteller and documentary, Ben Macintyre, would provide a novel’s touch to a factual account of Philby’s espionage. And if Macintyre’s narrative comes across at times as too interesting to be true, a fellow MI6 officer and close friend of Philby, Tim Milne, provides a sanity check while putting Philby’s spying in context.

Macintyre rehashes much of Philby’s history (see the textbox on the right) but gives it a fresh look by telling the story through the prism of Philby’s friendship with his MI6 friend and colleague Nicholas Elliot, who ultimately confronted Philby with the truth in Beirut in 1962. True to form, Macintyre’s book is well told and juicy. For

---

**Philby in Brief**

Born in 1912 to a strong-willed and independent-minded Middle East scholar, Kim continued the intellectual tradition as a student at Cambridge. He joined the communist cause in 1933 and was recruited by the Soviets in London in 1934. In the spring of 1936, Philby was working for an Anglo-German trade journal, using the position to report to the Soviets about the Nazi regime. He then got a job as a freelance journalist in Spain in early 1937 during the civil war and ended up as the London Times correspondent to Loyalist leader General Franco.

In July 1940, Philby joined the British foreign intelligence service, MI6, and within a year was assigned to the counterespionage section dealing with the Iberian Peninsula. In June 1944, he was selected to run the newly created Soviet counterintelligence unit, Section IX. He headed the Istanbul station from February 1947 to September 1949, when he was posted to Washington to act as a liaison with the CIA and FBI.

In May 1951, Philby sent fellow Soviet spy Guy Burgess to London to arrange the defection of another spy in the Foreign Service, Donald Maclean. Despite Philby’s appeal, “don’t you go too,” Burgess defected as well and suspicion fell squarely on Philby as the “third man” in the conspiracy. In mid-July 1951, Philby was forced to leave MI6 under a cloud of suspicion. His loyalty was called into question in Parliament in the fall of 1955, but he was cleared when Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister Macmillan spoke in Philby’s defense.

In May 1951, Philby sent fellow Soviet spy Guy Burgess to London to arrange the defection of another spy in the Foreign Service, Donald Maclean. Despite Philby’s appeal, “don’t you go too,” Burgess defected as well and suspicion fell squarely on Philby as the “third man” in the conspiracy. In mid-July 1951, Philby was forced to leave MI6 under a cloud of suspicion. His loyalty was called into question in Parliament in the fall of 1955, but he was cleared when Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister Macmillan spoke in Philby’s defense.

In August 1956, Philby got a job as a stringer for The Economist and the Beirut Observer, jobs arranged by his MI6 colleagues. He also served as an agent for MI6. In late 1962, new and damning information surfaced against Philby. A former colleague confronted him and got a signed confession. Philby managed to defect days later. He lived the remaining 25 years of his life in Moscow, working periodically with the KGB to train officers.
starters, there are so many references to tours abroad, drinking, wild parties, passing out on the sofa, trashed apartments, ripped panties, and womanizing that you’d think this was a biography of the Rolling Stones and not a spy. Macintyre peppers the narrative with marvelous turns of phrase and characterizations of Elliot, OSS officer and later CIA counterintelligence officer James Angleton, and Philby. He describes Elliot as “a distinctly English combination of the staid and unconventional, conservatism and oddity.” Angleton, who interacted frequently with Philby, is depicted as haunted by the spy case, known to ascribe new signs of treachery well after Philby defected as being “all Kim’s work.”

Macintyre quotes MI6 officer and later historian Hugh Trevor-Roper as looking around the office spotting “part-time stockbrokers, retired Indian policemen, epicureans from the bars…robust adventurers from the bucket shop (shady trades)…and I looked at Philby. He alone was real. I was convinced he was destined to head the service.” Philby’s destiny took a markedly different turn in 1951 and later when Elliot urged him to own up to his spying, sign a confession, and tell British authorities all he knew in return for immunity. The transcript from this encounter is Macintyre’s contribution to the Philby literature and it makes *A Spy Among Friends* a riveting read.

Milne throws some cold water on Macintyre’s portrayal of Philby. He was not a big drinker, in the sense of being an alcoholic, at least in front of Milne, until he came under suspicion. He did have a complex about his father, as Macintyre suggests. The prep school he attended was not typical of public school life—a key theme of Macintyre’s is that Philby was “one of them,” from the ruling class, with the same upbringing, schools, and acquaintances and this protected him from suspicion. Milne sees little psychological explanation to Philby’s spying, no attraction discernible in the double life spying forced on him. Like Macintyre, he notes Philby took the path of many others who joined the Communist Party in the 1930s, when capitalism was collapsing and fascism was on the rise. However, he never lost faith in the cause upon discovering the extent of Stalin’s monstrous rule.

For this reviewer, Macintyre’s discussion of Angleton is a bit exaggerated—as he believes are many accounts of Angleton—and does not add up in some cases. He asserts Philby’s betrayal motivated Angleton to be increasingly suspicious—which it no doubt did—and illegally spy on US antiwar protesters and dissidents. The real culprit here is President Lyndon Johnson, who ordered the CIA to undertake these operations against domestic opponents.a

Macintyre contends little is known about what exactly Angleton told Philby during their martini-filled lunches because Angleton destroyed memos he supposedly dictated right after the sessions. It is hard to believe Angleton would give away the store to Philby because he was drunk and then return sober enough to dictate a comprehensive memo detailing his possible violation of the need-to-know principle—in itself an act of astounding stupidity.

The relationship between the Brits and their American cousins was not nearly as chummy as Macintyre suggests. Philby himself in his memoir *My Silent War* cites many instances of CIA officers’ and their British counterparts’ sparring over who should lead insurgent groups behind the East Bloc. Milne does not discuss Angleton in much detail.

The Angleton memos begin to provide insight into the damage caused by Philby’s spying and to put it in context. Milne carries this further quite well. From 1941 to 1944, Philby’s informing the Soviets of what the British—and to a lesser extent—the Allies were doing counterintelligence wise in the Iberian Peninsula during WWII did little damage. Some of Philby’s reporting during this period should have actually benefited the Allied cause. Information that the British were not actively spying on the Soviet Union during the war should have eased Soviet suspicions and built trust. It did not. The Kremlin simply could not believe its luck. His information seemed so good that they came to wonder if Philby was a double agent. His reporting did apparently help convince the Kremlin that London and Washington had no intention of selling out the Soviets to coup plotters against Hitler or allying with a successor German government against them.

The real damage began in 1944, when the British and Americans set their counterintelligence sights against the Soviet Union. Philby gave up one Soviet defector just before the defector could name Philby as a spy. The Soviet consular official in Istanbul had promised to turn over the names of hundreds of Soviet agents in Turkey and Britain. Philby shared with the Soviets the names of leading Catholics in Germany who could play a role in government

---

after the war. The Kremlin had many of them killed or imprisoned. This was a particularly cruel act.

Philby appears to have acted slavishly without any reflection, given the Soviets almost certainly would have gained hegemony over parts of Germany without this kill list. He gave away plans of the United States and Britain to infiltrate insurgents into Albania, thus ensuring these raiding parties were all rolled up. Philby mentioned in his memoir a similar failed foray into Ukraine, of which he most likely warned the Kremlin. However, it is very possible these operations would have ended badly anyway, given their difficult nature. Similar operations during the Cold War behind other parts of the Iron Curtain, China, and North Vietnam failed miserably. Indeed, Philby’s spying backfired in one case, depriving the Soviets of his services for many years. The end of his time as an MI6 officer started with Philby’s telling his handler that MI5, the British equivalent of the FBI, was planning to arrest Maclean based on intelligence indicating he was a spy.

The takeaways for an intelligence officer from these books are few and simple. As the above rundown suggests, the impact of spying is hard to discern and there are often unintended consequences. Another lesson, unfortunately, is that crime sometimes does pay. Philby escaped to Moscow—some believe MI6 looked the other way to avoid the embarrassment of a public trial—and lived a relatively content 25 years there. It undoubtedly stung that the Soviet authorities received him as an agent and not a KGB officer, in part because his easy escape from Beirut invited suspicion he was still working for the British government. For his first five years in Moscow, Philby had little to do and attempted suicide. Eventually the KGB came to trust him and had him lecture and train new intelligence officers. He had an affair with Maclean’s wife, remarried, wrote a memoir, lived comfortably by Soviet standards, and traveled within the Communist bloc. He seemed himself again.

The Philby case drives home the need to be wary of liaison relationships, even with the closest of allies. Macintyre notes the deal MI6 offered had Philby confess to spying until 1949, even though they undoubtedly knew Philby spied afterwards, when stationed in Washington. Macintyre makes plain that the early end date for Philby’s spying allowed MI6 to cut Washington out of the deal and offer Philby immunity. (257–58) MI6 was also slow to acknowledge Philby was a spy despite growing evidence against him. (173) Director Bedell Smith let his British counterpart know what his Agency had concluded about Philby:

. . . a letter had arrived from CIA chief Walter Bedell Smith, drafted by Bill Harvey with his indictment attached. Aggressive in tone and addressed to C in person, it stated under no circumstances would Philby be permitted to return to Washington. The underlying message was blunt: Fire Philby or we break off the intelligence relationship. (163–64)

Finally, one can be too close to an issue to think objectively. Elliot and Milne believed Philby was innocent until his defection. Elliot fought to clear Philby’s name and even used him as an agent when Elliot served as chief of station in Beirut. Milne continued to receive Philby warmly after he was forced out of MI6. Macintyre sees this disbelief as part of the British elite’s refusing to believe the worst about one of their own. Angleton also kept faith, writing a memo in Philby’s defense to Director Smith. It was outsiders in MI5, officers who traveled in different circles with different upbringings, as well as former FBI officer and then colleague of Angleton’s Bill Harvey, who were convinced of Philby’s guilt.

Whether one is hunting for intelligence lessons, life lessons, or no lessons at all, the two books are worthy reads as historical literature: informative, thought-provoking, and even entertaining.
CURRENT TOPICS

The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century, by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben de Jong and Joop van Reijn (eds.).
Interrogation in War and Conflict: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Analysis, Christopher Andrew and Simona Tobia (eds.).
What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989, by Bruce Riedel.

GENERAL

The Art of Intelligence: Simulation, Exercises, and Games, by William J. Lahneman and Rubén Arcos (eds.).
Routledge Companion To Intelligence Studies, by Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman and Claudia Hil-lebrand (eds.).
Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, by Mark Phythian (ed.).

HISTORICAL

Act of War: Lyndon Johnson, North Korea, and the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo, by Jack Cheevers.
Code Name Pauline: Memoirs of a WWII Special Agent, by Pearl Witherington Cornioley.
Fighting To Lose: How The German Secret Intelligence Service Helped the Allies Win the Second World War, by John Bryden.
The Spy Who Changed the World: Klaus Fuchs and the Secrets of the Nuclear Bomb, by Mike Rossiter.
Spymaster: The Secret Life of Kendrick, by Helen Fry.
Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond, by Jefferson Adams.
Uphill Battle: Reflections on Viet Nam Counterinsurgency, by Frank Scotton.

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics, by Xuezhi Guo.
Dear Leader: Poet, Spy, Escapee—A Look Inside North Korea, by Jang Jin-Sung.
Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America, by Reg Whita-ker, Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
**Current Topics**

*The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century,* Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben de Jong and Joop van Reijn (eds.) (Routledge, 2014), 165 pp., end-of-chapter notes, index.

The Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association was formed in 1991 “to provide informed debate on intelligence and security issues in the widest possible sense: to support historical research in this field; and to promote and contribute to academic education.” In 2011, it hosted an international conference on the future of intelligence. Eleven thought-provoking papers from that conference comprise this book.

The contributors are a rather high-powered mix of academics and intelligence practitioners. Most familiar to US professionals will be the four American contributors—Mark Lowenthal (former assistant director of central intelligence for analysis and production), Greg Treverton (current chairman of the National Intelligence Council, who was with RAND at the time of the conference), Jennifer Sims (then a highly respected professor at Georgetown University), and Art Hulnick (former senior CIA officer teaching at Boston University). The British contributor is Sir David Omand (former head of GCHQ and a former senior coordinator for intelligence organizations of the British government). All of the remaining contributors—four Dutch and two Swedish—likewise have exceptional records of publication and research.

In his introduction, Utrecht University professor Bob de Graaff notes the tendency of the other contributors to “devote attention to current trends and their extrapolation rather than to threats that cannot yet be discerned.” (3) This is a fundamental problem when considering the future; still, there is plenty to consider in the extrapolations. Readers will find authors addressing the potential for the information revolution to transform the work of intelligence agencies in ways that will heighten already high concerns about the intrusion of intelligence operations in the private sector. Another author addresses issues in the operational sphere brought on by biometrics, geolocation, social networks, and cellular telephones. Another focuses on the increased risk of moles, leaks, and “insider spies” created by today’s (and tomorrow’s) ubiquitous digital connectivity. (76) Still another considers the influence of future global cooperation—private and governmental—on intelligence agencies as they face the prospect of serving nontraditional, international decision centers or “nodal governance of security.” (82) The future of organizational structures also received attention. Will more horizontal configurations or “flat hierarchies” (8) be required as social media “blur distinctions that have been used to organize intelligence?” (37)

In his summary article, Lund University professor Wilhelm Agrell talks about the importance of thinking about the future with awareness of the past. “If twentieth-century [intelligence] had some great moments and failures, “so will most likely twenty-first [century] intelligence have all those as well.” (135) Agrell also discusses “six fundamental processes of change” that should be considered when thinking about the future.

*The Future of Intelligence* raises important issues that deserve serious attention as intelligence becomes an ever greater part of every citizen’s daily experience.

*Interrogation in War and Conflict: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Analysis,* Christopher Andrew and Simona Tobia (eds.) (Routledge, 2014), 304 pp., end-of-chapter notes, index.

Christopher Andrew writes in his introduction to this book that despite the frequent mention of interrogation in the contemporary media, the subject “has long been understudied in history.” (2) The 14 case studies in *Interrogation in War and Conflict* are an attempt to remedy that deficiency.
All the contributors are academics: 15 are from UK universities, and one is from the United States. Their essays begin with a discussion of interrogation techniques developed in WW I. There follows a study of the interrogations of suspects in the 1935 “Kremlin Case,” which preceded the great terror in the Soviet Union. (36) The study contains some surprising revelations. The methods employed by Stalin’s henchmen in dealing with former political prisoners who opposed the Soviets in postwar Czechoslovakia are examined, without any surprises. Three chapters are devoted to WW II, with attention given to the “myths and realities” of Gestapo methods, approaches in the UK, and ways German war criminals were interrogated. The final five case studies assess interrogations during colonial insurgencies in Malaya, Cyprus, Algeria, Rhodesia, and Ireland.

The legal aspects of coercive interrogation authorized or performed on defendants before international tribunals are weighed in a separate chapter that reviews the difficulties of prosecution. While the focus of the book is on the twentieth-century, there is a short discussion of the topic as applied in the post 9/11 era. (284ff)

Interrogation in War and Conflict expresses a wide range of views on the use of torture during interrogation. Former MI5 Director General Baroness Manningham-Buller bookmarks one end: “Nothing, not even saving lives, justified torture.” (16) At the other extreme, the use of torture in “the most difficult cases” in the Algerian insurrection was explicitly allowed, though by the end it had been prohibited. Examples in between include the harsh methods, termed the “five techniques” used in Northern Ireland on interned prisoners, which were deemed a “success.”

Interrogation in War and Conflict makes a strong historical case for minimum coercion during interrogation because it is more effective. Whether the 21st-century, filled with circumstances seemingly never encountered before, will support that conclusion remains to be seen.


Bruce Riedel’s 30-year career at the CIA included assignments as special assistant for Near East affairs to both Presidents Bush and to President Clinton; deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near East and South Asian affairs; national intelligence officer on the National Intelligence Council; and special adviser to NATO. In 2009, President Obama appointed him to chair a strategic review of US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Now a senior fellow for Middle East policy at the Brookings Institution, he writes on the major events in South Asian affairs in which he participated. *What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989* is his most recent contribution.

Riedel’s story begins after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when, he writes, President Carter instructed the CIA to turn Afghanistan into a “Russian Vietnam.” President Reagan “upped the ante…when the goal became defeating the Soviet Army and driving it out of Afghanistan for good,” an event President Vladimir Putin later called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” (x) *What We Won* examines the secret intelligence alliance that got the job done and its consequences.

“It wasn’t Charlie Wilson’s War,” or even the CIA’s war. “It was Zia’s war,” says Riedel who makes Pakistani General Zia ul-Haq out to be the most important figure in “the epic battle with the Soviet Army.” (xii) But there are other important players—nations and individuals. In the first part of this two part book, Riedel focuses both on their history and their contributions to the Soviet defeat.

The history follows key Afghan participants and their struggle for power while battling outside influences before and during the Cold War. The communist coup d’état in Kabul in the late 1970s, although supported by Moscow, did not result in a Soviet client state. The communist regime had its own agenda. “The sexes were declared equal, and a minimum age was set for marriage…and dowries were restricted to encourage girls to have more choices. (27) But this resulted
only in more internal turmoil and violent changes at the top until the Soviet “strategic surprise” in 1979.

The anticommunist Afghan forces reacted as they had in the 19th century—guerrilla warfare. And what became known as the “Mujahedin, an army of illiterate peasants…defeated the Soviets.” (40). But they clearly couldn’t have done it alone, and Riedel describes at some length the role of each major contributor—Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States.

In part two, Riedel lays out the sequence of events in the Carter and Reagan administrations that led to the decision to provide Stinger missiles to the Mujahedin to use against the Red Army. It wasn’t the CIA’s idea alone. After General Zia sent raiding units into the Soviet Union and tried other unsuccessful measures to defeat the Soviets, he made the critical decision to allow their use. Riedel reviews the obstacles the CIA had to overcome—setting up training and supply lines, arranging funding, gaining congressional cooperation, establishing rules of engagement, and managing alliances—to achieve its greatest covert-action success.

What We Won concludes with a discussion of lessons that in many cases “were never envisioned” at the outset and should be considered when future covert actions of this kind are considered. (141ff) This is an important book.

**GENERAL**


In the first edition of Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (2007), former senior CIA analysts Roger George and James Bruce presented 19 contributions from experts that reviewed the history of intelligence analysis, discussed its current status as a profession, and assessed promising analytic techniques. The second edition has 20 articles, arranged in six parts. Eight of the articles are new, and those retained have been updated. All reflect progress in training, analytic rigor, and professional certification compelled by developments since the previous edition.

The six parts are entitled: “The Analytic Tradition,” “The Policymaker-Analyst Relationship,” “Diagnosis and Prescription,” “Enduring Challenges,” “Analysis for Twenty-First-Century Issues,” and “Leading Analytic Change.” The specific subjects cover a range of issues: essential knowledge, reliability, dealing with uncertainty, developing relationships among analysts and collectors in different organizations (civilian and military), and new analytic techniques. The occupational hazards inherent in intelligence analysis—methodological, psychological and bureaucratic—are spelled out by CIA analyst emeritus Jack Davis, a protégé of Sherman Kent, in his article, “Why Bad Things Happen To Good Analysts.” In contrast, “Building a Community of Analysts” and “Analytic Outreach” consider the impact of IC-wide changes, their effect on collaboration, and the importance of “getting it right.” (288)

The idea of analysis as a profession is a common theme throughout the book. Just what does it mean to be a professional intelligence analyst? Does the term impart the same cachet and prestige as “lawyer” or “doctor”? Most authors say, “not yet,” and go on to suggest what needs to be done to achieve that goal. One article, “Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?” suggests that achieving a status comparable to “law, medicine and library science” (57) requires that analysis have the specific standards and certifications associated with a professional discipline. It also involves acknowledgement of the “risk mitigation” factor—a recognition that analytic results often put human lives at risk. Requirements for professional standing would include mastery of standardized critical analytical methods, development of analytic tradecraft, interaction...
with academia, and—unique to intelligence analysis—protection of sources, which is treated in the final chapter. Analyzing Intelligence is an important, thoroughly documented book that clarifies the vital importance of analysis to the intelligence profession. It should be carefully read by students and practitioners alike.

The Art of Intelligence: Simulation, Exercises, and Games, William J. Lahneman and Rubén Arcos (eds.) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 282 pp., end-of-chapter notes and references, index.

The Art of Intelligence presents a study of analysis and the various methods the contributors use when teaching students about how “to think and perform analysis” and training them in the profession. (xi) And while the lecture is the most common technique for imparting this knowledge, when it comes to acquiring “analytic tradecraft,” the editors contend that students learn best through experimental simulations and games. To that end, the 15 chapters in The Art of Intelligence explain three types of simulations the authors have used to improve student analytic skills.

The first type is simulation involving one or two class sessions. There are five examples for this type, and the authors devote a chapter to each. Each stresses a different form of analysis. The components are the same, however: background data, objectives, number of players, raw data supplied, time allowed for various events, and debriefing guidance to assess whether objectives were met. The subjects include Iraqi WMD, competing hypotheses, analysis ethics, and cognitive strategies.

The second type—one-to-two-week exercises—brings in issues of cybersecurity, “need to share,” competitor and Big Data analysis. The third category—multiweek simulations—is intended for graduate courses and is the most ambitious. The first of the four chapters on this final category has “analysts seeking to locate a biological weapons research facility.” (185) Techniques intended for use in that exercise include Bayesian analysis and probabilities deployed in the context of competing hypotheses. The second and third chapters describe analytical simulation conducted at Brunel and Lund Universities. A final example deals with multimedia intelligence products and simulates all of the steps an analyst might face in writing assessments.

The Art of Intelligence does not cite studies to support its argument that these types of simulations will produce better intelligence analysts. Nor does it discuss the other important courses of study—languages, computers, international relations, etc. Still, it does document the sophisticated level of courses currently offered in European and American institutions.


This latest edition of the Johnson and Wirtz anthology has 40 articles, six of which are new. The volume is intended for reading in courses on US intelligence and as an introduction for the general public. The contributors are a mix of academics and serving and former intelligence officers, mostly American. There are also selections from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the Aldrich Ames espionage case.

The anthology is organized into 10 parts. The first is an introduction to the subject of intelligence, followed by sections on collection, analysis, intelligence and the policymaker, the dangers of politicization, covert action, counterintelligence, the dangers of politicization, and accountability and civil liberties. The ninth part, which is on intelligence in the aftermath
of 9/11, presents some thought-provoking analysis on failures said to be associated with that event.

The final part looks at intelligence systems in the Soviet Union, Britain, Egypt, and France and how they compare with the United States. The authors are natives of the countries being compared, with the exception of the American specialist analyzing Egyptian intelligence.

The anthology has two disappointing shortcomings worth noting. The first is that only three foreign services are compared to their US counterparts; more would be helpful. The second is the absence of any indication in the bibliography of which intelligence texts best served the authors.

The epilogue is a useful look at the future of intelligence and the challenges of the information revolution. *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies* is a good introduction to the topic and a valuable contribution.\(^a\)

---


In the early 1980s, Georgetown University professor Roy Godson edited a series of books on the principal fields of intelligence—collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence—with contributions by retired intelligence officers with firsthand experience. Around that same time, historians Wilhelm Agrell and Bo Huldt edited a volume published devoted to the history of intelligence, with contributions from historians in Sweden, the United States, Germany, and Denmark. Since then, similar works have appeared with increasing frequency. The *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies* is a recent example.

Editors Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand have assembled articles by 35 authors from universities and government and private organizations from eight different countries. The lead article, by Loch Johnson, summarizes the development of intelligence studies from his point of view as the editor of one of the several journals devoted to the subject. He considers, for example, how treatment of the subject has evolved in scholarly articles, books, and the media. He suggests critical questions that deserve attention but can only be answered by decisionmakers and perhaps by academics after long study, for example, how do we know “whether or not intelligence plays a significant role in the making of government decisions?” (19)

There are also articles on what can be learned from historical studies, the importance of theory and culture, and new ways of viewing old concepts like the intelligence cycle. Of particular interest is the discussion of intelligence systems in 12 countries—the United States, UK, Canada, Australia, France, India, China, Japan, Israel, Germany, Russia, and Spain. The final and perhaps most stimulating section of the book has nine articles on challenges for the future. They cover a range of topics including counterterrorism, cybersecurity, WMD, energy and food security, privacy, accountability, and organized crime.

The *Routledge Companion* gives a good idea of the progress of intelligence studies over the past 30 years, the important questions that have yet to be answered, and the areas that will dominate the field for the foreseeable future.

---

\(^a\) Readers interested in reading about non-Western intelligence may wish to read Charles Heard’s review of *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere* on page 69 of this issue.
**Understanding the Intelligence Cycle**, edited by Mark Phythian (Routledge, 2013), 167 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, index.

The intelligence cycle is a basic theoretical model often used to show how the principal parts of the intelligence process—requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination—are related. There are many variants with more and different functions included, as a simple Google search will show. For example, planning and management, implicitly part of the cycle, are only sometimes included explicitly. But the idea that these steps are always involved in accomplishing an intelligence mission is generally accepted.

What is not accepted by anyone who works in the business is that the parts of the process always—or even ever—occur in the commonly described sequence. The model is often challenged because it does not depict the interrelationships and interactions that routinely occur during each phase. Changes due to modified requirements, updated information, conflicts among analysts, changed assumptions, and management decisions are the norm, and they are nonlinear, many occurring at the same time. *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle* deals with each of these issues and suggests alternative models that better reflect reality.

Each of the contributions to this book suggests variations of the basic model. None presents a system that will work in all circumstances. While most look at the production of national security intelligence, one chapter considers policing intelligence, and another looks at the corporate world. Several include covert action and counterintelligence explicitly while others look at the influence of “cyber-specific espionage” (86) and other technological variables.

Whether a single model of the intelligence-producing system is even possible remains in doubt. But *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle* provides a better understanding of the problem and should help professionals at all levels.

**HISTORICAL**


On 23 January 1968, the USS *Pueblo* was conducting a SIGINT mission in international waters off the coast of North Korea when it was attacked by North Korean naval gunboats. After one member of his crew had been killed, the ship’s captain, US Navy Commander Lloyd Bucher, surrendered the out-gunned *Pueblo* without firing a shot. Bucher and his crew spent the next 11 months imprisoned under awful conditions. They were released on 23 December 1968. Although welcomed home sympathetically by the US public, a naval court of inquiry recommended that Bucher be court-martialed for surrendering his ship without a fight. The secretary of the navy overruled the court and returned Bucher to active duty.

In *Act of War*, former Los Angeles Times journalist Jack Cheevers tells the *Pueblo’s* story from several angles. The first concerns the crew—its selection, its personal relationships, its overall admirable behavior in captivity, and the impact of the stress its members endured. The second deals with senior naval officers responsible for the mission and addresses the many shortcomings in planning and training (especially in emergency destruction procedures for the top-secret communications equipment) and the inadequate refurbishing of the *Pueblo*, which left it incapable of effective combat. The third examines the US government at policymaking levels, which were dealing with a particularly stressful period on the Korean Peninsula—the
North Koreans had just made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the South Korean president on 21 January 1968, and in Vietnam, the Tet Offensive was about to erupt. Cheevers describes how North Korea’s demands for an apology and President Johnson’s refusal were finally satisfied by a “diplomatic legerdemain.” (229)

Finally, Cheevers reviews the damage caused by the loss of the top-secret NSA communications equipment. Drawing on a recently released NSA history of the incident, he shows that attempts to destroy the gear before capture were not totally effective. The North Koreans were able to recover and make serviceable some of the crypto gear thrown overboard and to reassemble much of what had been smashed. They shared the results with the Soviet Union. The NSA assumed that possession of the equipment itself did not endanger security since the encryption keys were not compromised. Thus the NSA did not replace its other communications equipment that was in use throughout the military. Only when the espionage of John Walker was discovered in 1985—he supplied the keys—was it realized how vulnerable the Navy had been.

*Act of War* follows commander Bucher’s post-*Pueblo* naval career and his retirement years. Despite the lasting admiration of his crew, Bucher would never overcome the stigma in navy circles of having surrendered his ship without a fight.

**Code Name Pauline: Memoirs of a WWII Special Agent,** by Pearl Witherington Cornioley (Chicago Review Press, 2013). 208 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

**She Landed by Moonlight: The Story of Secret Agent Pearl Witherington; ‘the real Charlotte Gray,’** by Carole Seymour-Jones (Hodder & Stoughton, 2013), 421 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was the British paramilitary organization formed to support resistance movements in Nazi- and Japanese-occupied countries during WWII. “F” section was responsible for France, to which some 400 officers had been dispatched. Of the 39 women sent, 13 didn’t come back. Pearl Witherington was one who did. Recommended for the Military Cross, she was declared ineligible, as it was for men only. When awarded a civilian Member of the Order of the British Empire, she returned it with the comment that “she had done nothing civil.” *Code Name Pauline* is her story as originally told to French historian Hervé Larroque in 1984, when she was 70 years old.

Witherington was born in Paris, the daughter of British parents. Her father was a ne’er-do-well traveling salesman who neglected his family. As a young adult, Witherington found a job with the air attaché in the British embassy to help support her mother and three sisters. When WW II started, the family escaped to England via Portugal. In London, she found work as a secretary with the Air Ministry. Not content to serve out the war typing memos, she sought some way to return to France and help the resistance. The SOE was the answer.

She describes her training and her parachute drop into occupied France, where she was to serve as a courier for the STATIONER circuit. When the circuit commander was arrested by the Gestapo, STATIONER was disbanded, and Witherington was given command of the new WRESTLER circuit, which would eventually grow to some 2,900 strong. After D-Day, her circuit went into action destroying communications lines and otherwise impeding the German advance. She was working with Jedburgh team JULIAN, when it brought a German panzer division to a near standstill.

After the war, Witherington returned to London, married her pre-war sweetheart and resistance comrade, Henri Cornioley, and eventually settled in France. She lived to 93 years of age.

---

**She Landed by Moonlight** covers the same general story, but in much greater detail. The book’s subtitle refers to a novel by Sebastian Faulks that was based in part on Witherington’s resistance experiences.\(^a\)

Author Carole Seymour-Jones includes much more about Witherington’s personal life and bureaucratic battles within the SOE and with de Gaulle’s resistance elements. She also expands on the logistical and organizational problems Witherington encountered in the field, and the reluctance—French and English—to accept women in command roles. In this connection, Seymour-Jones clarifies the issues surrounding Witherington’s initial refusal to accept a civilian award in lieu of the Military Cross and the successful battle she waged to have the regulations changed. (352–56) Seymour-Jones also adds a great deal about Witherington’s operational life in the resistance, including several close calls with the Gestapo and problems dealing with the French communists. Finally, there is more context on the conduct of the war as it affected the resistance. **She Landed by Moonlight** provides the documentation lacking in *Code Name Pauline* and leaves no doubt as to the quality and uniqueness of Pearl Witherington’s wartime service.

**Fighting to Lose: How the German Secret Intelligence Service Helped the Allies Win the Second World War**, by John Bryden (Dundurn, 014), 415 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In *Fighting to Lose*, John Bryden, a journalist and former member of the Canadian Parliament, attempts to rewrite the history of WW II intelligence. He speculates that the Germans intentionally worked to secure Allied victory by sending poorly qualified agents to operate in Britain, that British intelligence was inept, and that much of the intelligence history written about the events covered is wrong.

Among his conclusions is that the British Double-Cross System was “a flop,” (308) despite all the evidence—which he ignores—of its value in deceiving the Germans on D-Day. Then there is his assertion that SNOW, the first double-cross agent, was a really a German agent and British traitor—who revealed to his German masters the existence of radar and how it worked. Bryden never acknowledges that the report SNOW furnished was an MI5 fabrication that succeeded in misinforming the Germans and caused them to redesign their own radar equipment so it would not function properly.

Equally dodgy thinking surfaces when Bryden claims that the MI5 registry files destroyed by fire at Wormwood Scrubs during an air raid were actually lost due to sabotage and that Guy Liddell, a senior MI5 officer, was somehow involved. (297) Bryden is more direct but equally inaccurate when he charges Liddell with allowing enemy agents to penetrate MI5. He writes, “Indeed the evidence against Liddell is huge. In addition to opening the doors for Burgess, Blunt and Philby to enter MI5 and MI6, and the access he gave Blunt to his office documents, it is not an innocent coincidence the MI5 totally failed to detect Soviet recruitment of young intellectuals at Oxford and Cambridge.” (287) But as is well established in Christopher Andrew’s authorized history of MI5, among other sources, Liddell did not know these Soviet agents before they joined British intelligence, and he can hardly be blamed for not detecting their recruitment.

And then there is Bryden’s novel claim that while supervising the interception of diplomatic bags—Operation TRIPLEX—Anthony Blunt “could freely put into them whatever he wanted, enabling the ever-suspicious Stalin to see for himself what Blunt stole.” A difficult task since Blunt never touched a diplomatic bag; he merely managed the operation.\(^b\)


\(^b\) Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, *TRIPLEX Secrets from the Cambridge Spies* (Yale University Press, 2009).
The most egregious speculation—in fact and in tone—is that at their August 1941 meeting at sea, Churchill showed Roosevelt the “Popov’s Pearl Harbor questionnaire…it would have been on ‘onion skin’…one can picture it hanging limp—tissue like—in Roosevelt’s hands. Churchill would have watched as he read, the president’s expression fading from polite interest to grim realization as he absorbed what it was that the Germans wanted.” (205) Bryden provides no evidence that this event occurred, and he is the only one to suggest it did.

Regrettably, the few examples given above are illustrative of the entire book. Fighting to Lose is appalling history.


In *Kidnapping the Enemy*, Washington, DC lawyer-historian Christian McBurney tells the story of two major generals in the Revolutionary War. One, Charles Lee, joined the British army at age 14. He saw combat in America during the French and Indian War and later served in several European armies. While demonstrating admirable military abilities, he also earned a reputation as an outspoken critic of his superiors, referring to one as “our booby-in-chief.” (4) After several courts martials that diminished his chances for high rank in the British Army, Lee left for New York in 1773 to seek his fortune. By April 1775, he was major general in the Revolutionary Army and would soon become Washington’s second in command. True to his reputation, it wasn’t long before Lee was scheming to replace Washington, whom he characterized in a letter as “most damably deficient.” (32)

On the night of 12 December 12, 1776, Lee’s career took an unanticipated turn: he was captured by a British patrol. Prisoner Lee expected to be exchanged, as was the custom in America. However, the British considered him a deserter and wanted him hanged, as was the custom in Britain. When Washington offered to exchange a British lieutenant colonel for Lee, British General Howe demanded an officer of rank equal to Lee’s, a condition he knew the Americans couldn’t meet. While the stalemate continued, Lee became more and more sympathetic to the British cause.

In July 1777, the second major general entered the picture when American LtCol. William Barton learned where the much detested British MajGen. Richard Prescott—he chained and beat prisoners—was spending his nights. Using intelligence from British deserters and a slave, Quako Honeyman, Barton and his volunteers executed a daring night time raid and captured Prescott—an episode McBurney details.

After lengthy negotiations an exchange occurred on 5 April 1778, and Lee was returned to duty. But when he performed badly in a battle at Monmouth Court House in New Jersey, Washington had him court martialed for “making an unnecessary retreat.” (178) He was later dismissed from the army. Unrepentant, Lee continued his diatribes against Washington—some of which, McBurney writes, historians later supported (179)—but Lee was largely ignored and died in Philadelphia in 1782, aged 51.

Kidnapping the Enemy is a little known story of the War for Independence, beautifully told, wonderfully documented, and a pleasure to read.

**The Spy Who Changed the World: Klaus Fuchs and the Secrets of the Nuclear Bomb**, by Mike Rossiter (Headline Publishing Group, 2014), 344 pp., bibliography, photos, index.

In mid-September 1949, FBI special agent Robert Lamphere “found a startling bit of information in a newly deciphered 1944 KGB message…that seemed to have come from inside the Manhattan Project.” The investiga-
tion he conducted pointed directly at British atomic physicist Klaus Fuchs as the KGB source. MI5 was informed, and it began an inquiry. “Over a period of several weeks in December 1949,” Lamphere wrote, MI5 interrogator Jim “Skardon met with Fuchs and started to gain his confidence.” On 24 January 1950, Fuchs confessed. What Skardon said in those meetings remained secret within MI5 for the next 60 years. In The Spy Who Changed the World, military historian Mike Rossiter draws on recently released MI5 files, which revealed details of Skardon’s approach and much more about the Fuchs case.

Fuchs was a committed communist when he arrived in England as a refugee from Nazi Germany in September 1933. Having studied physics at the University of Leipzig, he was accepted at the University of Bristol, where he earned his PhD. He then moved to the University of Edinburgh, where he worked until WW II started. Briefly interned in Canada, he returned to Britain in 1941, with the help of colleagues, and began work on the Tube Alloys project (Britain’s atomic research program). It was then that he started spying for the Soviet Union.

Among the many issues that have puzzled historians about Fuchs’s career is why he was made a British citizen and cleared by MI5 to work on the atomic bomb. According to Rossiter, Fuchs’s communist views and connections in England were well known among his friends and colleagues before the war. And some MI5 officers knew but were ignored. It is now clear from the released MI5 records that had a proper background investigation been conducted, Fuchs would never have been allowed to participate in Tube Alloys. The folly was compounded when Fuchs was assigned to work on the Manhattan Project and the British assured US Army counterintelligence that they had vetted him when they really had not.

While the book’s title, The Spy Who Changed the World, is probably an exaggeration of Fuchs’s contribution to the Soviet atom bomb program, Rossiter’s account of his role leaves little doubt that it was substantial. This view was echoed by the Russian atomic scientists that Rossiter interviewed, though few specifics are provided. The narrative also adds details of Fuchs’s walk-in recruitment, other communists he referred to the KGB, and how he met and worked with his handlers. Rossiter deals at some length with Fuchs’s relationship with his final KGB handler, Alexander Feklisov, the former Rosenberg case officer. Rossiter mistakenly writes that Feklisov once “worked under the name of Yuri Modin” (182); Modin was the KGB officer handling the Cambridge agents at the time.

Rossiter’s account of how Fuchs reluctantly identified Harry Gold as “Raymond,” his KGB contact in the United States, adds some new background details, but nothing that changes Gold’s story. Rossiter concludes his book with some new material about Fuchs’s life in Britain and East Germany after he was released from prison.

The one question that remains unanswered, Rossiter notes, is why Fuchs confessed. There was no evidence against him that could be used in court. And he could have retracted his confession at any time until sentencing; he didn’t do that, either. Rossiter puzzles over the situation and is forced to acknowledge it will remain a mystery at least until more files are released.

The Spy Who Changed the World is the most comprehensive account of the Fuchs case to date, but it suffers a major shortcoming. None of the many quotations and facts mentioned are specifically sourced. Thus it is not the last word.

---


For those wishing for a broad overview of the German intelligence services from WW I to the end of WW II, Spying for the Führer is a good place to start. Swedish military historian Christer Jörgensen provides an easy-reading summary of how the services were dismantled after WW I and how they struggled to rebuild after Hitler came to power. His principal focus is on the Abwehr (military intelligence) commanded by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who fought bureaucratic battles with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the Nazi party secret service that eventually took over the Abwehr. Jörgensen tells how Canaris, initially a follower of Hitler, decided Hitler was bad for Germany and worked to impede Nazi progress. At one point Canaris sent an emissary to meet with OSS in Istanbul to “discover what peace terms the Americans would be willing to offer a post-Hitler Germany.” (106) The effort was rebuffed.

Jörgensen also examines the quality of Abwehr espionage operations and mentions some of the double-cross agents turned and run by the British. Jörgensen rates them as amateurs, giving higher marks to the Abwehr and Gestapo for shutting down the Red Orchestra, and to Major Hermann Giskes, who successfully doubled all the SOE agents sent to Holland. Jörgensen also gives high praise to General Reinhard Gehlen for his apolitical approach to military intelligence and provides a short review of German code-breaking efforts, which were successful here and there, but overall a failure. The one new topic in the book is Sweden’s role in the war, including its secret attempts to broker peace.

Spying for the Führer is richly illustrated with photographs that enhance the telling. In the end, Jörgensen rates the overall German intelligence performance as poor, though he provides few details of operations. He concludes that by the time the war started, the Allied services were already ahead, and the Germans never caught up.

Spymaster: The Secret Life of Kendrick, by Helen Fry (Marranos Press, 2014), 528 pp., bibliography, photos, index.

Researcher Helen Fry first heard about Thomas Kendrick while interviewing German and Austrian refugees. He had commanded an intelligence unit that interrogated German prisoners and secretly recorded their private conversations in Britain during WW II. The refugees Fry interviewed had been Kendrick’s interpreters, but would add no further details. Intrigued, she interviewed his family members, located the proverbial “attic trunk” containing his memorabilia, and found more material in British archives. Spymaster tells his story.

Kendrick was born in South Africa. He served in the Boer War and with British Field Intelligence Security in WW I. Fluent in German, he interrogated POWs for MI1(c)/MI6 and became friends with Stewart Menzies, who later became “C” (head of the SIS). Kendrick joined MI6 in Cologne after the war. At the time, he worked against communist networks. In 1925, age 44 and married, he was posted to Vienna as head of station. From there, he handled agents throughout Europe. In August 1938, the Gestapo arrested him for espionage—one of Kendrick’s agents had betrayed him. Thanks to the British Foreign Office, he was released, but he was expelled from Germany. The Gestapo never learned that he had also helped many Jews escape the Nazis—Fry dubs him “Vienna’s Oskar Schindler.” (499) Throughout WW II, Kendrick commanded the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC).

Kendrick remained with MI6 until retiring in 1948, although his duties are not disclosed. He spent the rest of his years in the village of Oxshott, where his neighbor was former colleague Charles “Dick” Ellis. At this point in the narrative, Fry digresses a bit with a discus-
sion of whether Ellis was, as suspected, a former German and Soviet agent. Then she speculates on the possibility that Kim Philby, who had been in Vienna while Kendrick was there, was, in fact, a triple agent. (497)

Although Fry adds much detail to her story about Kendrick’s operational experiences in MI6 and about the various officers with whom he worked, she does not link the sources in her bibliography with any specific events. Thus it is difficult to evaluate her conclusions about the value of Kendrick’s operations. For example, she writes that CSDIC’s functions were really “as important for winning the war as Bletchley Park.” (9) And even more challenging is her claim that Kendrick “had been at the heart of the most important intelligence work in the history of SIS/MI6 over at least three decades.” (10) Spymaster leaves to historians the final decision on Thomas Kendrick’s career.

**Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond**, by Jefferson Adams (Routledge, 2015), 166 pp., end-of-chapter notes, bibliography, chronology, glossary, index.

Jefferson Adams is a professor of European history at Sarah Lawrence College. He has written many articles on intelligence history, and his recent book, the *Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence*, is among the best reference works on the subject. When teaching a course on the role of intelligence in the Cold War era, he found that there was no one volume that covered the subject. *Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond* is intended to fill that gap.

By way of introduction, Adams reviews the origins of the major principal intelligence services in each of the player nations—members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, plus Israel and China. Then he discusses the major early Cold War operations and confrontations, from the time GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko defected in Canada, to the development of US photo satellites. This is followed by a review of the strategic impact of intelligence in dealing with the Cuban regime, the Berlin crises, Vietnam, and the Prague Spring. Intermixed chronologically are discussions of periodic eruptions in the Middle East and of the Iranian hostage crisis. Then comes an examination of the KGB role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its aftermath. The latter includes several defector cases that influenced events before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

After looking at intelligence organizations and operations in the Cold War, Adams takes a step back to consider the motivations and actions of those in the field who made things happen. He presents three case studies toward that end. The first concerns Günter and Christel Guillaume, East German agents who spied on West Germany. The second discusses Robert Hanssen and what drove him to disloyalty. The third case reviews the contribution of Ryszard Kuklinski, the Polish army officer who informed the CIA about the Soviet threat to Poland and the Solidarity movement.

The end of the Cold War came suddenly, to the surprise of many, and the security services in the Warsaw Pact countries were powerless to prevent it. Adams looks at the reasons, including the role of the Vatican and the KGB and its satellite services, as they attempted to forestall it and discredit the United States.

Before considering the aftermath of these events, Adams digresses briefly to examine how Cold War espionage “entered the popular imagination through the medium of fiction, movies, and television.” (85) He includes precedent-setting pre-WW I examples and ends, of course, with James Bond.

The final chapter on the upshot of the Cold War summarizes what happened to the many intelligence services previously mentioned. He concludes that “probably the most enduring legacy left by the Cold War was the realization that intelligence organizations play an indispensable role in the structure of a modern state.” (141)
Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond is a valuable contribution to the intelligence literature.


Frank Scotton retired in 1998 as the assistant director for East Asia at the US Information Agency of the State Department. He began his overseas career more than 50 years ago in Vietnam. Between 1962 and 1975, he spent part of each year in Vietnam with the US Information Service and then took assignments with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)/Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and with the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUS-PAO), merged USIA, State Department, and Defense Department public affairs elements in Vietnam. Several books and studies of the war mention Scotton and his USIS colleagues. Neil Sheehan’s A Bright and Shining Lie (1988) was one and Douglas Valentine’s The Phoenix Program (1990) was another. Citing an interview with Scotton, Valentine describes him as “the USIS officer most deeply involved in Phoenix.” Valentine, again citing Scotton, returned to the subject, with a twist, in a 2003 CounterPunch article in which he wrote that in “1965 Scotton was ostensibly employed by the U.S. Information Service, though his undercover job as a CIA officer was forming assassination squads around Saigon in what was the prototype of the CIA’s infamous Phoenix Program.”

Uphill Battle does not deal with Valentine’s charges directly, but Scotton notes in the explanation of why he wrote the book that “much of what I read [about the Vietnam War] is mistaken… and one writer cited interviews with me when in fact we had not met.” (367-68) Uphill Battle presents a meticulously documented firsthand chronicle of Scotton’s experiences as a USIS officer in Vietnam.

Scotton’s initial assignment was to research life in the rural areas of Vietnam and compare it to the official line produced by the South Vietnamese government. His approach followed classic, but not always applied, advisor doctrine: learn the language, get to know the people and their culture, and report reality. He mostly travelled alone, visited places avoided by others, and survived a helicopter crash and a one-on-one encounter with an armed Viet Cong. Sometimes he drove, but he often walked with only a backpack and carbine.

Scotton gradually established contacts with South Vietnamese leaders and American military advisers as he developed techniques to report on and exploit the local political situation in the countryside. By 1964 he had organized local platoons to combat the VC propaganda. That experience led to his CORDS assignment where he worked under future Director of Central Intelligence William Colby. His duties included monitoring developments at the National Training Center and “maintaining the files on corruption and inept performance,” (255) which were based on reports from advisers in the field.

The latter function brought Scotton into contact with pacification operations and the Phoenix Program. (He refers to it by its Vietnamese name, Phung Hoang.) Scotton relates a conversation with Colby in which Scotton expressed his reservations about the program. He wrote that he was assured that others had been assigned “to
work toward assuring a legal basis for the arrest and de-
tention system.” (257) Before Colby returned to Washing-
ton in 1971, he arranged Scotton’s transfer to JUSPAO,
whose public affairs operations were beginning to be cut
back. It was to be Scotton’s final assignment in Vietnam.

Scotton’s account of these and many other events
in his Vietnam experience is detailed using Vietnamese
names and locations—one wishes maps had been
included. He tries his best to address the continually
changing political conditions that at one point he calls
a “spongy bureaucratic mess.” (258) He also describes
his personal and operational contacts with key Ameri-
cans in Vietnam. These include Daniel Ellsberg, Lucien
Conein, John Paul Vann, Edward Lansdale, and Frank
Snepp. Scotton’s observations on their roles are worth
attention. He also explains how his tours affected his
personal life and how he managed his State Depart-
ment career with short assignments in Washington, a
Chinese language course, and a tour in Kuala Lumpur.

The end of the Vietnam saga came as no surprise to
Scotton. He was in Taiwan in March 1975, on his way
to Saigon, when he received word that Ambassador
Martin had disapproved his return. He went anyway
to arrange for the extraction of the Vietnamese with
whom he had worked; in those times, few at Scotton’s
level paid much attention to Martin. Back in Washing-
ton by April 1975, he viewed the debacle from afar.

_In Uphill Battle_ adds a perspective on the Vietnam
War that armchair critics cannot hope to match.

---

**INTELLIGENCE ABROAD**

**China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics,** by Xuezhi Guo (Cambridge University Press, 2012),
486 pp., footnotes, bibliography, index.

In his article on the challenges of understanding Chi-
nese intelligence, China expert Peter Mattis concludes
that “China’s intelligence services have long been
underanalyzed as major bureaucratic organizations and
components of state power.” In China’s Security State,
Guilford College political science professor Xuezhi
Guo seeks to correct that deficiency in what he terms
“the first scholarly study of Chinese security and intel-
ligence organizations and their role in elite politics.”

Professor Guo’s initial approach is straightforward
though the narrative is dense and could do with an
occasional dash of bumper-sticker simplicity. First
he discusses the evolution of the security and intel-
ligence services and outlines their distinctive func-
tions. Then he examines how they function to protect
the regime and guarantee compliance with the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Next, he
analyzes the services’ organization and operations.

From then on, with one exception, nothing is straight-
forward in the Chinese system. The exception is that
the party is the boss. _China’s Security State_ is the story
of multiple organizations whose names change fre-
cently and whose missions overlap as they compete
to collect the intelligence used to control citizens and
officials and identify spies and dissidents, who often
spy on one another while protecting CCP leaders.

The first seven chapters discuss the evolution of the
Ministry of State Security, the Central Guards Regiment,
the People’s Armed Police and the Garrison Commands
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which are placed
in major cities, at defense installations, and at various
military sites. The succeeding two chapters examine the
foreign intelligence elements. These are followed by a
chapter on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—which
has its own intelligence and security mission—and its
relationship with the other security services and the political
leadership. The overlap of missions between the civil-

---

a. Peter Mattis, “The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services,” *Studies In Intelligence*, 56 No. 3 (Septem-
ber, 2012): 54. This article is available online at https://www.cia.
gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/
ian and “PLA intelligence services [is] encouraged” and “creates a competitive intelligence environment.” (422)

Despite the authoritarian character of the security state, Guo sees some future indications of “a democracy with Chinese characteristics, which would emphasize community welfare over individual rights and that is neither fully democratic nor completely repressive.” (444) Considering the complex bureaucratic relationships that dominate every aspect of society, this seems overly optimistic. One thing is evident, however: truly understanding China requires a thorough knowledge of its security and intelligence services. China’s Security State provides a necessary foundation toward that goal.


North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung liked books, especially those about himself. His son and successor, Kim Jong-il, continued that tradition, but given the severe paper shortage in the mid-1990s, he favored poetry. Jang Jin-sung was one of six poet laureates designated by the Workers’ Party to compose epics in honor of the “Dear Leader.” (5) When Kim Jong-il praised one of Jang’s poems, he was made one of the “Admitted,” the “tiny circle of elite whose presence Kim Jong-il had personally requested and who have spent more than twenty minutes with him behind closed doors.” (323)

But Jang had another distinction. He also worked for the United Front Department (UFD), “the section of the Workers’ Party, responsible for inter-Korean espionage, policy making and diplomacy.” (6) He was assigned to Division 19 (Poetry), a unit that “specialized in conducting psychological warfare operations against and about the South through the cultural media such as the press, literary arts, music and film.” (6) To accomplish his mission, Jang was given special travel privileges and access to South Korean literature and media publications. His job was to compose material favorable to the North, as if it had been written in the South, for consumption by citizens of the North. Dear Leader is the story of Jang’s awakening to the North Korean reality in the mid-1980s and his eventual defection.

Jang describes his youth in the small town of Sariwon in the 1950s and 60s as not unpleasant. His father was a party functionary, his mother a doctor. Their house was relatively spacious. The town had only one piano, but Jang still managed to become an accomplished pianist.

When, after ten years working for the party, he returned home as one of the Admitted, he was shocked by the pervasive poverty evident from the train window and then in Sariwon itself. Until then, he had casually ignored the repression of the masses, wanting to believe that all would eventually be well if one followed the Dear Leader.

His disillusionment did not lead to any plans to defect, however. That decision came when he lent his only close friend in Pyongyang a book from South Korea—classified top secret—that he had taken home to read. The friend lost the book and some handwritten notes, and someone found it and turned it over to the secret police. When Jang heard what had happened, he knew he was in real trouble. The police traced the book to him from his fingerprints. They identified his friend from the handwritten notes. Jang’s status as one of the Admitted meant he could not be arrested until Kim Jong-il approved, but his friend was in immediate danger. Jang avoided surveillance, contacted his friend, and bought travel permits on the black market. The two headed for the border with China.

Their escape was a mixture of luck, close calls with the police, and help from sympathetic contacts made between the border and Beijing, where Jang received help at the South Korean embassy. He now lives in Seoul and has become a successful writer. Dear Leader is exciting reading that reveals firsthand, little-known insights about the North Korean regime.
Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America, by Reg Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby (University of Toronto Press, 2012), 687 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

The three Canadian professors who published Secret Service in 2012 shared the 2013 Canada Prize in the Social Sciences for this comprehensive history of the Canadian security and intelligence services.

The central theme of the book is political policing, “usually against Canadian citizens.” And the authors argue that “Other countries do this as well—the FBI spies on Americans; MI5 and Special Branch spies on Britons; the French have…agencies…that spy on French citizens.” (7) In the US case, they invoke the preposterous metaphor of the early-1950s, “witch-hunts,” which they imply were in some respects illegal and unnecessarily repressive attempts to control subversion, a conclusion that may startle those who have read the work of Harvey Klehr and John Haynes.a Political repression in Canada, according to the authors, “has been confined to the legitimate auspices of the state.” (9) Thus, the authors candidly continue, “Canada has persistently spied on its own people, run undercover agents, and maintained secret sources of information [and] categorized people in terms of their personal beliefs…with serious consequences.” (10) Secret Service describes this Canadian-style “political policing” from 19th-century British colonial days to the present.

Colonial Canada faced social unrest from radicals in the Irish Fenian brotherhood and from Hindu groups advocating Indian self-rule. The authors write that “Violence was part and parcel…of both movements.” (57) The need to keep order led to “the creation of the secret service in the 1860s” (59) and in 1873, as labor unrest continued, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). (80) Security demands increased substantially with the onset of WW I. The enemy was no longer Irish or South Asian. Germans, Socialists and then the Bolsheviks assumed that role. After some initial postwar cutbacks in the security services, subversive activities increased as communism “replaced anti-imperialism as the source of the nation’s security anxieties,” and the RCMP was tasked with “surveillance and intelligence gathering operations.” (142)

The authors characterize WW II as a “good war for the Mounties,” (175) because they expanded security operations and responsibilities. They failed, however, to detect Soviet intelligence agents working in Canada until GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko defected in September 1945. The fallout from his revelations became the focus of RCMP operations until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The authors provide a lengthy, meticulous, and critical analysis of security service operations during the Cold War and the major organizational changes that occurred when questions of performance, accountability, and oversight arose.

In 1984, the Canadian Parliament authorized the creation of a new civilian security organization, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). At the same time, an independent, external review body—the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)—was created to provide parliamentary oversight of CSIS operations. This structure is in place today.

A shift to antiterrorism operations took place rapidly after 9/11. What had been a domestic security service suddenly assumed overseas responsibilities just as requirements for domestic threat assessments increased and procedures for handling suspected terrorists were being developed. Some political challenges with the United States followed, and the authors explain how the Canadian version of the US Patriot Act was passed to deal with these issues.

The final chapter in Secret Service is a useful summary of the book and, when read directly after the introduction, will give readers a good overview of Canadian intelligence history. Issues raised in those essays can then be examined in detail in the intervening chapters.

a. See, for example, John Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, SPIES: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (Yale University Press, 2009).
While the authors document their story well, they also impart a point of view that questions whether many of the operations described were acts of repression or proper measures any security service would undertake to counter subversion and espionage. In any case, the book is an impressive history of the Canadian intelligence services.