Rethinking Global Coverage in the US Intelligence Community

The National Security Community in Australia

Book Reviews
- Future Crimes
- Searching for Scientific Womanpower
- The Strategist
- John McConne as DCI
- The Roar of the Lion
- Colonel House

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
This publication is prepared primarily for the use of US government officials. The format, coverage, and content are designed to meet their requirements. To that end, complete issues of *Studies in Intelligence* may remain classified and are not circulated to the public. These printed unclassified extracts from a classified issue are provided as a courtesy to subscribers with professional or academic interest in the field of intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in *Studies in Intelligence* are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

*Studies in Intelligence* often contains material created by individuals other than US government employees and, accordingly, such works are appropriately attributed and protected by United States copyright law. Such items should not be reproduced or disseminated without the express permission of the copyright holder. Any potential liability associated with the unauthorized use of copyrighted material from *Studies in Intelligence* rests with the third party infringer.

*Studies in Intelligence* is available on the Internet at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html.

Requests for subscriptions should be sent to:

Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

ISSN 1527-0874
Mission

The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA’s History Staff, CIA’s Lessons Learned Program, and the CIA Museum. CSI also provides the curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection of Literature. In addition, it houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

Contributions

*Studies in Intelligence* welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

Editor  
Studies in Intelligence  
Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Awards

The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in *Studies*. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is available for other prizes.

Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies*’ purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

The Editorial Board welcomes readers’ nominations for awards.
**EDITORIAL POLICY**

Articles for *Studies in Intelligence* may be written on any historical, operational, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether, in the opinion of the board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

**EDITORIAL BOARD**

- Peter Usowski (Chairman)
- John Bennett
- Jason Manosevitz
- John McLaughlin
- Wayne M. Murphy
- LTG Theodore Nicholas, USA
- Stephen O. Maddalena
- Matthew J. Ouimet
- Valerie P.
- Cynthia Ryan
- Cathryn Thurston
- Jay R. Watkins
- Cindy Webb

Members are all active or former Intelligence Community officers. Two members are not listed for cover reasons.

**EDITORS**

- Andres Vaart (Managing Editor)
- Rebecca L. Fisher

---

### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keeping Watch on the World</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rethinking the Concept of Global Coverage in the US Intelligence Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John A. Kringen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Community Integration in Australia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation and Integration among Australia’s National Security Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Phillip Waddell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the Studies in Intelligence Archive</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covering Coups in Saigon in the Early 1960s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Allen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence in Public Literature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Crimes: Everything Is Connected, Everyone Is Vulnerable, and What We Can Do About It</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed by Jay R. Watkins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searching for Scientific Womanpower: Technocratic Feminism and the Politics of National Security, 1940-1980</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed by R. J. A., PhD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roar of the Lion: The Untold Story of Churchill’s World War II Speeches</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed by R.J.A., PhD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel House: A Biography of Woodrow Wilson’s Silent Partner</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed by Mark Benbow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Contributors**

**R.J.A** is an independent scholar. He holds a PhD in German from University of California in Berkeley and has a BA in physics from Princeton.

**Dr. Mark Benbow** is an assistant professor in the Department of History and Politics at Marymount University. He is the author of *Leading Them to the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant Theology and the Mexican Revolution: 1913–1915*.

**Thomas G. Coffey** is a former analyst and manager in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence.

**John A. Kringen** is an Adjunct Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). Before joining IDA in 2012, he served with the Central Intelligence Agency for thirty-three years and was Director of Intelligence during 2005–2008.

**Hayden Peake** has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” since December 2002.

**Aaron Waddell** is a long-serving Australian soldier with a Master of National Security Policy from the Australian National University. He is currently undertaking a Master of Philosophy focusing on security and the South China Sea at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

**Jay R. Watkins** serves in CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology. He is also a member of the Editorial Board of *Studies in Intelligence*.
Rethinking the Concept of Global Coverage in the US Intelligence Community

John A. Kringen

The United States is the only country in the world with a truly global intelligence enterprise, but even the significant resources the US government invests are not adequate to cover the world in the depth required to provide robust and reliable warning of events in every corner of the globe.

You want to make sure you have the coverage you think you have when something bad happens.

—Thomas A. Lawson, Executive Vice President, Factory Mutual Insurance Company

Introduction

The United States is the only country in the world with a truly global intelligence enterprise, but even the significant resources the US government invests are not adequate to cover the world in the depth required to provide robust and reliable warning of events in every corner of the globe. The most significant transnational threats—such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and the challenges posed by countries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia typically require disproportionate investments because of their policy priority and because they pose difficult intelligence and policy challenges.

Inevitably then, many issues and countries are addressed with much more limited Intelligence Community (IC) resources:

- As collection capabilities are focused on the highest priorities, signals and human intelligence collection capabilities are less available to target lower priorities. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) from space can collect globally from space but is still subject to prioritization, and imagery’s ability to contribute to a variety of economic and political topics is therefore limited.

- On the analytic side, while intellectual horsepower can partly offset limited collection, the explosion of information available to the analytic community means that these resources are also focused on the highest priorities.

The challenge of making the right investments is further complicated not only by unforeseen world developments, but also by fluctuations in US policy priorities over time. In the increasingly globalized and hypersonic information space that shapes policy decisions, issues and developments can arise with a rapidity that surprises even those directly involved. The events of the “Arab Spring” that began in the winter of 2010 provide a particularly compelling example, but they are hardly...
unique. Natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and low-level insurgencies can quickly move from background noise to center stage. Consequently, at any given point in time, the attention policymakers focus on an issue may reflect neither last month’s policy agenda nor long-term assessments of US strategic interests.

---

The Origins of the Concept of Global Coverage within the IC

In the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the IC was forced to come to grips with two unpleasant realities: in the absence of the single, looming Soviet threat, the challenge of allocating intelligence resources had become more fluid and complex, and the resources committed to the intelligence enterprise were being reduced. To address these two challenges, the Clinton administration in 1995 produced guidance for the IC in the form of Presidential Decision Directive 35, “Intelligence Priorities” (PDD-35). The document identified the following as the IC’s top intelligence priorities (labeled as tiers)—in descending order:

- Crisis situations, including support to US military operations.
- Countries that threaten regional stability or pose significant threats to US interests, including “rogue” states.
- Transnational threats, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

While PDD-35 provided a reasonable first-cut at a framework for prioritization, its application almost immediately raised questions about IC responsibilities for issues and countries not identified as priorities within the framework. To accommodate the need to prepare for and respond to requirements beyond those designated as the policymakers’ highest priorities, the PDD-35 framework was adjusted in October 1996 to include “global coverage.” As Acting Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Tenet stated in his 1997 Worldwide Threat briefing, “there will be no relief from the sort of crises that appear suddenly and do not fit the traditional role.” To deal with these sorts of circumstances, he stated, “We will be providing global coverage—including a capacity to surge during crises….”

Subsequent statements by IC leaders have reiterated this view. For example, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte in his 2007 Annual Threat Assessment noted, “it is not too much of a stretch to say that events anywhere can—and often do—affect our interests and the security of our nation and our people. As a result, the Intelligence Community must maintain global coverage.”

---

The Key Elements of the IC’s Approach to Global Coverage

The IC has handled the challenge of global coverage primarily as an issue of managing scarcity in collection and analytic resources. Lower priority challenges are allocated fewer—and a reduced range—of collection resources. Likewise, while some efforts are made to ensure a base level of analytic investment, even where clandestine collection is absent, the analytic level of effort against lower priority issues and countries is reduced. Given the diverse set of missions and departmental responsibilities that member agencies of the IC have, execution of global coverage tends to have a significant “coalition of the willing” aspect as individual intelligence components balance global coverage.
responsibilities against their other priorities. The danger of this approach is the intelligence equivalent of “the tragedy of the commons,” in which investment in developing a sufficient baseline of insight into future threats gets short shrift.

**Improved Prioritization of Resources**

Given the need to prioritize the use of intelligence resources, one prominent feature of the IC’s approach to global coverage has been the effort to improve the prioritization framework and interagency processes for making allocation decisions. The most prominent result of this effort has been the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was promulgated by the DCI in 2003 and later adopted by the DNI in 2005.4 The NIPF assigns priorities to intelligence targets, and the heads of IC elements are directed to ensure “that IC element planning, programming, and budgeting activities and the allocation of collection and analytic resources are informed by the NIPF.”

Given that the diverse agencies of the IC have specific mission and departmental support responsibilities, execution of this guidance varies among individual agencies. Over time, first under the DCI and later under the DNI, a number of interagency mechanisms have been developed to facilitate transparency and coordination across agencies in implementing NIPF priorities. At a minimum, the goal has been to ensure that as agencies make their own prioritization decisions, they can do so with knowledge of the allocation decisions of other IC elements. At most, the intent is to enhance the return on investment on a limited portfolio of collection and analytic resources through improved coordination and some burden-sharing. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that at any given point in time the allocation of resources within the IC only imperfectly models the NIPF.

**Open-Source as Gap Filler**

Since the formulation of the global coverage concept, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has been identified within the IC and by external commentators as the principal collection resource for helping the IC meet its global coverage responsibilities. Among the cited virtues of OSINT are its low cost, ability to quickly turn to the developments of any given day, and potential as a cuing mechanism for more costly intelligence-collection assets.6

Within the IC, the Open Source Enterprise (OSE)—established by the DNI in 2005 as the Open Source Center and successor organization to CIA’s Foreign Broadcast and Information Service (FBIS)—has the lead role for OSINT within the community. It regards global coverage as an area in which it makes a particular contribution. While OSE is the premier player in the open-source arena, these sorts of capabilities are widespread throughout the IC and other elements of the US government.

In more recent years, with the rapid development of a variety of social media platforms, open-source collection has been broadened beyond traditional media sources (e.g., newspapers, television, and radio) and now gives particular attention to exploitation of various kinds of social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube—and their counterparts in other countries). In its FY12 Business Plan, the National Open Source Committee (an ODNI organization that brings together senior IC officers to guide Community-wide open-source collection) noted the importance of monitoring social media:

```
Social media is a “game changer” in gauging global societal and political developments, providing an unprecedented opportunity to gain insights into public sentiment, trends, and even leadership intentions. Monitoring the pulses of various populations via social media will increasingly provide the IC with a greater warning capability and a better sense of over-the-horizon issues.
```

**Tools for Improved Warning**

Over the years, interest in and attention to the application of formal analytic methods and approaches to warning by the analytic components of the IC have generally been limited. In the 1980s, for example, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI)b conducted quarterly assessments — based on judgments about a common set of indicators—of the prospects for instability in countries around the world. Since 1994, the directorate

---

a. The organization’s name was changed from Open Source Center in July 2015.

b. The directorate was renamed the Directorate of Analysis in the spring of 2015 in a CIA-wide reorganization.
Most intelligence agencies regard “outreach” programs that engage academics and other private sector experts as important tools.

has sponsored the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), which has developed models, based on open-source information, to forecast the long-term risk of political instability around the world.

But in the wake of the Arab Spring and amid the growing difficulties the analytic community has in making sense of ever-increasing volumes of information, interest in more formal approaches has increased. While development of such tools is not uniquely focused on global coverage, the IC is moving to improve its ability to provide warning under programs sponsored by the ODNI’s Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA) and at individual agencies. The 2014 ODNI National Intelligence Strategy notes, “continued IC vigilance will be required to maintain global coverage of conflicts as they arise and potentially threaten US interests.” The Strategy later pledges that “the IC will expand its use of quantitative analytic methods” and develop “capabilities for dynamic horizon-scanning and discovery to assess changing and emerging conditions.”

Two IARPA programs illustrate the kind of capabilities that the IC and outside researchers are seeking to develop:

• The Open Source Indicators (OSI) program, which was established in 2011, seeks to develop and test novel methods to help analysts anticipate such significant events as political crises, economic instability, mass violence, and various types of humanitarian crises through the application of innovative statistical methods to evaluate publicly available data. One research focus for this effort is the ability of social media to track and assess the evolution of social disorder.

• The Aggregative Contingent Estimation (ACE) program, which is based on the concept of “the wisdom of crowds,” seeks to improve the accuracy of judgment-based forecasts by aggregating many independent judgments. As part of this effort, IARPA has launched a large-scale forecasting tournament designed to monitor the accuracy of probabilistic forecasts about future developments around the world. The data from this tournament will be used to identify priority areas for research, including training, statistical approaches to improve the accuracy of expert forecasts, and identifying the attributes of those who have greater forecasting success.

Expanding the Pool of Expertise and Information

Despite more limited access to collection capabilities and a smaller personnel base, the analytic components of the IC responsible for global coverage topics have undertaken efforts to leverage external resources for information and insight. Most intelligence agencies regard “outreach” programs that engage academics and other private sector experts as important tools to augment internal expertise, solicit alternative views, and broaden the information base for their own research. Bringing private sector experts in for consultations, hosting conferences, and commissioning tailored research projects are typical ways of augmenting IC expertise. The DNI’s National Intelligence Council (NIC) and State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) are particularly active in outreach endeavors.

IC components responsible for global coverage also take maximum advantage of the broader pool of expertise and information that resides within the IC itself. In areas of the world where clandestine collection is limited, reporting from US embassies and consulates provides a baseline of information that the IC relies on. Beyond State Department reporting, global coverage is a periodic topic for dialogue between the IC and others, such as defense attaches, who have the ability to overtly collect information through their normal duties.

Finally, as it does with any intelligence requirement, the IC seeks to engage friendly foreign intelligence services that can assist—either through collection or analysis—in meeting US global coverage requirements. Such services are likely to have more robust interest in monitoring developments in their immediate neighborhoods and hence may be more willing and able to devote resources to an issue the United States regards as a lower priority. For some US agencies and their foreign partners, these relationships have been formalized into longstanding sharing agreements. For example, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has close working relationships with its counterparts in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada that allow the US Intelli-
gence Community to capitalize on these organizations’s capabilities to meet global coverage and other requirements.14

**Facilitating Global Agility**

An enduring concern regarding global coverage accounts is the IC’s ability to foresee and to respond rapidly to developments in countries allocated limited collection and analytic resources. Congressional concern about IC post-Cold War missions was already high before PDD-35 was issued in 1995, with two parallel congressional inquiries, one a bipartisan presidentially authorized commission composed of House and Senate members and one composed of staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Both would publish similarly titled reports addressing similar issues. The HPSCI staff study, *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century*, devoted a chapter to the subject of global agility, which examined the IC’s “surge” capability, noting:a. 15

> a. The bipartisan panel was called the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, and its report was entitled *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence—Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community.*

**But the risks remain: Surprise is more likely in areas in which fewer resources have been applied.**

“Surge” capability can be defined very broadly, including the ability to: move resources quickly to address immediate, usually ad hoc, needs; augment existing capabilities from outside the IC; and, improve responsiveness of resources by building more flexible options for collection.

A number of developments since the staff report have improved the IC’s agility in responding to global crises around the world. The IC now has in place much more robust and interconnected information networks than was the case in the late 1990s. Consequently, the ability to share information and collaborate analytically in a crisis is now significantly greater, and there are more incentives to do so. At the organizational level, the HPSCI staff’s concerns about the then-DCI’s authority to “surge” resources are less pertinent in the post-2005 IC world, with the institution of the DNI and a continuing series of initiatives to improve integration across the Community. Moreover, efforts have been made at individual agencies to improve the ability to respond to emerging global contingencies.

Nonetheless, progress is less clear with regard to other aspects of agility the HPSCI report raised. Whether the IC maintains an adequate global “base” of knowledge to facilitate an effective response to an unanticipated crisis is questionable; it is largely assumed that for the lowest priority topics, OSINT and diplomatic reporting will be sufficient. Likewise, despite the dramatic increases in contractor support to the IC since 11 September 2001, making use of knowledgeable external resources to augment IC capabilities on historically low-priority issues is still a budgetary challenge.

**IC’s Current Approach to Global Coverage: Necessary but Insufficient**

The five elements of the IC’s approach to global coverage noted above have merit and should be continued. Still, it is unlikely they will result in a systematic improvement in warning about significant developments in lower tier countries, particularly in a period when intelligence budgets are under pressure. Consequently, reliance on those elements alone poses significant risks both to US interests and to the IC’s reputation if failure to anticipate future developments on presumed low-priority issues forces policymakers and the IC to scramble for responses. At the same time, such failure inevitably will leave policymakers disappointed in the IC’s performance, notwithstanding their claims over the years that they understand the implications of the resource allocations the IC must make.

Particularly in periods of budget stress, implementation of a systematic process like the NIPF to frame decisions about the allocation of scarce resources is clearly necessary. But the risks remain: Surprise is more likely
in areas in which fewer resources have been applied.

On the collection side, IC capabilities have always been tantamount to taking samplings of reality—some streams reporting on leadership and political situations, some on societal circumstances, some on military capabilities, and so on. Reducing the range of collection (and thus the amount of “sampling”) inevitably constrains understanding of developments in the place of interest.

On the analytic side, having a limited talent pool working on issues of lower concern to policymakers increases the likelihood analysts will stick to existing lines of analysis and reduces the likelihood that analytic judgments will be challenged and tested by peers and management. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect that for lower priority topics there will always be an experienced, fully trained and developed analytic workforce ready at a moment’s notice to take on a new crisis.

As noted above, OSINT has long been appreciated in the analytic community, and the increased volumes of publicly available information and the emergence of social media have added to its value. Nonetheless, OSINT has its limitations. As one study on the use of news reporting to track the “swine flu” pandemic noted, “News is not a mere representation of an external reality, but rather a social product; news volume frequently does not neatly parallel scientific risk assessments.” This observation is obviously not limited to either epidemiology or scientific risk assessments.

The social nature of open-source information suggests that significant investments need to be made in mapping these sources. The social nature of open-source information suggests that significant investments need to be made in mapping these sources. Illustrative in this regard is a study that examined the use of public media to track the outbreak of diseases. It highlighted two particular limitations. First, the level of reporting reflected resource decisions by news media organizations—coverage, for example, declined over weekends and holidays. Second, there were indications that reporting on one disease could “crowd out” reporting on other diseases, but those effects were disease-specific. Interpreting data suffering from such biases is a challenge. Likewise, a problem in the interpretation of social media is that only a limited amount of research has been conducted to develop approaches to sampling social media data sets. And there is the challenge of understanding how attitudes expressed online are translated into offline behavior.

Given these kinds of complexities, the development of quantitative tools to analyze social media and other sorts of open-source information is likely to take some time, and the insights that emerge may not be generalizable from one issue to another. As one study conducted under IARPA’s OSI program observed on the use of OSINT to forecast civil unrest, context matters.

Moreover, the application of big data analytics to intelligence questions raises a host of issues that are less important in the commercial world. Divining the intentions and actions of government actors is often key. Many governments and other political organizations have programs to manipulate what appears in the public domain, including social media, to shape opinion in their own and other countries. Russia, for example, has an aggressive information warfare program to misrepresent its activities and intentions and plant false rumors around the world. Consequently, there is a significant need for US government entities to develop and continuously improve upon capabilities to conduct credibility analysis of social and other media that report on issues of importance to intelligence, such as the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

Finally, the IC’s efforts to broaden the range of information and expertise on global coverage issues are on the mark, but the result is likely to resemble more a patchwork quilt than a reliable safety net because the partners the IC is engaging have their own priorities and capability limitations:

---

b. Indeed, some have argued that such metaphors as “horizon scanning” using big data imply that “finding faint evidence of possible futures is actually rather easy” when it is not. See Pierre Rossel, “Beyond the Obvious: Examining Ways of Consolidating Early Detection Schemes,” Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011): 375–85.
• With regard to outreach to academia, for example, the opportunities for significant expansion of such ties may be limited. A recent survey of what current and former national security decision-makers (including representatives from the IC) want from academic experts in international relations field found significant gaps between policymaker expectations and academic research interests and capabilities, both in terms of substantive areas of interest and research approaches. Perhaps as a consequence, US scholars’ engagement in nonacademic consulting is significantly below that of scholars in countries such as France and Israel.

While more can probably be done to elicit insights from non-IC colleagues in the US government, these organizations face their own resource challenges, and there is little reason to expect they will be more forward-leaning than the IC in reporting on lower priority topics.

With regard to foreign intelligence as sources of assistance for the global coverage mission, a variety of constraints exist. Most of these services are smaller and less resourced. Their willingness to assist in filling global coverage requirements can shift as their own priorities and resources change. In addition, their willingness to work with US agencies can also be buffeted by broader political dynamics. The result is that these and similar efforts, while certainly valuable in specific cases, are unlikely to provide more than a partial offset to limited US collection and analytic resources.

Adjusting the Current Paradigm

If the IC’s current approach to global coverage is necessary but insufficient, what else can the IC do? The core dilemma of global coverage is that it is unrealistic to expect the application of limited collection and analytic resources to yield levels of knowledge and insight comparable to what can be achieved for the highest priority intelligence targets. In this context, there is likely to be significant value to examining the risk-management aspects of global coverage.

Expectations Management

As DNI James Clapper has noted in a concept he labeled “immaculate collection,” public expectations about the IC’s performance tend to ignore risk, cost, and the potential for political embarrassment. In this respect, a major challenge for global coverage is expectations management. While IC leaders have used the term numerous times in public briefings and documents since the mid-1990s, articulation of its specific goals and expected standards of performance has been negligible, at least in public.

In what specific terms is the IC covering the globe? At the low end of the scale, the 1996 HPSCI Staff IC21 report suggested the goal might be the development of an adequate information base on all countries and issues as a platform on which the IC could surge when circumstances require. At the more ambitious end, the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy has the goal of improving the IC’s “ability to foresee, forecast, and alert the analytic community … and convey early warning to national security customers to provide them the best opportunity for action.”

What are reasonable standards of performance with regard to global coverage? Given the diversity of issues the IC is expected to follow and significant differences in the amount of information available on those issues, some challenges will be more difficult than others. For example, looking at the experience of Israeli intelligence with respect to Intifadas in Palestine, the victory of Hamas in
Given that a decision to allocate fewer resources is fundamentally a decision to accept risk, the IC needs to move beyond broad statements that simply acknowledge greater risk. There is no template for undertaking such assessments in the IC, but several approaches could be explored.

Focus Expert Judgment on Global Coverage Risks. The application of expert judgment is a standard technique in risk assessment. Fortunately, the IC has at its disposal a wealth of substantive expertise on global coverage topics among the analysts who have responsibility for lower tier countries and issues. One approach would be to systematically survey those analysts about the prospects for game-changing developments in their countries, regions, or topics that would require the IC to significantly increase attention and resources allocated to the targets. These assessments could then be used as a basis for IC contingency planning. There may also be benefit in benchmarking such assessments against those who conduct political risk assessments in the private sector.

Systematically Assess the Resiliency of Global Coverage. Recently, scholars from several international think tanks called attention to the possibility that actors operating far below the level of formal institutions or outside established governance structures could have destabilizing effects in today’s increasingly interdependent world—a phenomenon they labeled as “femtorisks.” These scholars argue that conventional risk-assessment approaches that rely on estimating the probability and consequences of future events, are inadequate to deal with these sorts of challenges. Rather, it is preferable to focus on the resiliency of the organizations charged with dealing with them.

Applying this approach to the problem of global coverage suggests the need to look more deeply and systematically into the IC’s ability to respond to crises in global coverage countries. Some of the relevant factors—for example, the number of analysts on an account or existing language expertise—are now scrutinized by the IC, but a meaningful assessment of resiliency would require that the net be cast much more broadly. Areas that would need to be assessed and integrated include the ability of different collection capabilities to respond in a crisis; the sufficiency of current databases (e.g., the Modernized Integrated Database); and the IC’s real ability to leverage external resources, such as expertise in the private sector.

A more complete mapping of the resources available in a crisis could provide insight into potential areas for investment. One relatively inexpensive means to examine the IC’s ability to respond to crises in global coverage countries would be to conduct table-top exercises with collectors, analysts, and decisionmakers (the military and policy communities) to examine the IC’s ability to respond effectively in different scenarios.

a. The researchers explained they derived the word “femtorisk” from the terms “femtocell” and “picocell,” in the field of cellular communications, where “femto-” describes a unit 15 orders of magnitude smaller than a pico unit. In short, a “femtorisk” is a seemingly very minute player on the global stage.
Such exercises are common on high priority areas, but they seldom occur with global coverage issues.

Examining “Lessons Learned” From Past Global Coverage Crises

While the risk of failure in forecasting adverse developments overseas is a known part of the global coverage challenge, less appreciated is the difficulty the IC sometimes has in knowing the thresholds at which these developments are likely to engage policymakers. Africa, for example, has over the years seen a variety of developments (e.g.,
government repression, humanitarian crises) that sometimes elicit dramatic policy responses and sometimes do not. The world’s increasingly globalized and hypersonic information space appears to have introduced a significant element of uncertainty and volatility in policy responses to such developments. While research along this line would not fit easily into the IC’s mission set, a historical examination of thresholds for policy intervention could help inform IC risk assessments and planning processes related to global coverage. Table-top exercises involving policy people as noted above might be one avenue for exploring such questions.

Adjustments in Global Coverage Investment

Beyond improving the IC’s ability to understand and communicate more precisely about the risks the US government is accepting, improvements in risk assessments should make it possible for the IC to make more fine-grained adjustments in allocating resources to global coverage accounts. The often thin base of external global-coverage-related expertise the IC can call upon in a crisis may be something that can be tackled at modest cost:

• At a minimum, it would be worthwhile to do some surveys of external expertise in lower priority topic areas and begin preliminary engagements with those experts to establish a foundation for collaboration when it may be required.

• Along this line, it would also be worthwhile to explore the feasibility of taking better advantage of government capabilities outside the National Intelligence Program through targeted investments. Possibilities to be examined include military components, such as the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers, and the law enforcement community.

• More ambitiously, consideration should be given to establishing dedicated “knowledge broker” units outside the IC to facilitate the building of more permanent relationships between private sector researchers and experts within the IC. One of the recommendations of the WMD Commission that was not implemented was “the establishment of at least one not-for-profit research institute to serve as a critical window into outside expertise for the Intelligence Community.”

IC whose principal mission was to serve as a vehicle to reach out to private sector experts, including those from academia, business, and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers. Given the more limited IC resources focused on lower priority countries and issues, global coverage would be a particularly useful focus for such an entity.

It may also be worthwhile to re-examine the analytic business practices for global coverage countries and issues. Currently, these accounts are largely handled as more thinly staffed versions of higher priority accounts. Given the more limited policy demand for reporting and analysis on global coverage issues, it may make sense to shift the focus of the analytic effort toward warning about game-changing developments and preparation for future contingencies.
Endnotes

9. Ibid., 7.
19. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 235.

Keeping Watch on the World
Cooperation and Integration among Australia’s National Security Community

Aaron Phillip Waddell

“...the Australian government implemented several institutional transformations to ensure effective coordination and integration within the National Security Community.”

Introduction

The Australian National Security Community (NSC) encompasses Australia’s intelligence, diplomatic, defence, law enforcement, infrastructure development, and border protection agencies. These agencies play a vital role in keeping Australian society secure and free from attack or the threat of attack¹—often in the background—in an effort to maintain the Australian lifestyle.²

Australia’s 21st century national security challenges were once fairly predictable but are now broader, more dynamic, and more complex.³ Consequently, Australia has to exercise a comprehensive whole-of-government and -society approach to national security in a period of extreme fiscal constraint that requires agencies to conduct business in a more prudent and smarter manner than ever before.⁴ Thus, the Australian NSC has now generally interconnected across government, non-government, and private industry in pursuit of a well-rounded, fully-enabled Australian security platform.

Subsequently, it has been argued that coordination and integration with agencies and businesses that have distinct cultures, embedded prejudices, and highly compartmentalised business practices is not easy.⁵ The siege at Martin Place in Sydney on 15 December 2014—amidst many warning signs that the gunman, Man Haron Monis, had previously been identified by law enforcement and intelligence agencies as a potential domestic threat—proved the difficulty implicit in such coordination and integration.

Historically, Australian national security organisations were structured around the four pillars of diplomacy, defence, domestic security, and intelligence. As circumstances have changed, the Australian government implemented several institutional transformations to ensure effective coordination and integration within the NSC.

The end of the Cold War heralded changes in the general nature of intelligence work and refocused intelligence organisations’ roles, but more aggressive changes commenced after the September 11th attacks on America, refocusing efforts on the growing terrorism threat. The election of the Labor Government in 2008 saw regional security concerns gain further momentum with Kevin Rudd’s seeking a more exacting approach to Australian security. These changes in approach can be grouped into three domains: centralising decisionmaking...
The Australian security concept now encompasses both internal and external threats, with a very strong focus on terrorism.

This article focuses on the coordination and cohesion of the Australian National Security Community with an aim of reviewing whether the roles, responsibilities, and cultures of each agency were sufficiently articulated as overarching improvements to the community were implemented. The article commences with an overview of the NSC structure and the whole-of-government approach within the present environment. It then seeks to analyse decision centralisation, policy coordination, and funding in the NSC before highlighting achievements as well as remaining challenges in the quest for a seamless and interconnected national security structure. Finally, the article will offer some suggestions to better connect the NSC.

Australia’s National Security Community

In 2008, the Rudd government adopted a new national security concept designed to move toward a whole-of-government approach, which would replace the longstanding Department of Defence-centric system. This shift was marked by the creation of the role of national security advisor within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (a position formally known as the PM&C Associate Secretary) and by the release in 2008 of The First National Security Statement, Australia’s then-newly articulated national security policy, which described for the first time “the scope of national security; [Australia’s] national security interests, principles and priorities; and . . . the government’s vision for a reformed national security structure.” The Australian perception of threat has also significantly changed from traditional, conventional state-based threats to include the asymmetric threat posed by non-state and rogue state actors such as al-Qa’ida and ISIS and issues such as international crime networks, climate change, health pandemics, and natural disasters. The Australian security concept now encompasses both internal and external threats, with a very strong focus on terrorism. Additionally, complicating factors such as regional economic power and influence shifts and advancements.
in communications and technology have opened up new pathways for transnational crimes, making Australia’s national security environment increasingly fluid and fraught with a complex and dynamic mix of continuing and emerging challenges and opportunities.9, 10, 11, 12 This new range of international risks and pressures means that one agency or single tier of government acting unilaterally cannot address all the issues: creating a whole-of-government approach was therefore vital.13, 14

Facing a host of new security challenges, both external and “home-grown,” Australia’s implementa-

tion of a coherent national security framework was designed to establish a comprehensive approach to respond to those challenges. The NSC was restructured to ensure collaboration and interoperability among the agencies responsible for national and domestic security. The diagram below details the organisations that comprise the present Australian NSC and the national security concerns they are resourced to address.

As illustrated by the diagram on the facing page, the distinguishing feature of the whole-of-government approach is the incorporation of a much broader policy agenda whilst maximising existing resources. In this schema, individual National Intelligence Community (NIC) agencies perform overlapping and complementary functions; for instance, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) operates in eight of the 13 national security areas, including threat detection, identification and monitoring, intelligence collection, knowledge sharing and dissemination, and policy, national governance, and capability development, whereas Australian Federal Police (AFP), Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and the Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT) operate in all 13 areas.15

Although interconnected at the strategic level, individual NIC agencies are also expected to perform specific roles to minimise duplication and operational costs; therefore, within the larger NIC, all six Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) agencies—i.e., Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Office of National Assessments (ONA), and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) perform a specific intelligence function and conduct intelligence assessments.16

Mindfulness of NIC and AIC agencies’ capabilities at the highest levels of government leadership level is important in order to avoid duplication of roles and to ensure effective cooperation across the broader NSC. Additionally, there must be consideration of agencies’ cultures to ensure flexibility and adaptability in the whole-of-government and -society capability approach.

The networked and multifaceted threat environment has challenged government departments such that they can no longer continue to operate in cultures that preserve compartmentalised ways, and based on divisions of labour originally designed to respond to traditional threats. Consequently, the government has distributed key instruments of the national security strategy across multiple agencies and, as such, whilst our broad national security interests remain unchanged, the institutional framework of the NSC is evolving to manage the complexity of threats.17

This whole-of-government approach has forced NIC agencies to take new steps to create effective policy and intelligence outcomes and encompassed a much wider range of traditional and non-traditional security concerns. Concurrent with the implementation of a more connected government effort, Australia has seen an increase in public sector involvement in security policy, which has complicated the broad national security agenda, making a holistic approach to management more convoluted and complex.18 Such complexity is evidenced by the large number of policy reviews and commissions of inquiry into various aspects of national security written or convened since 2008.

An Analysis of Decision Centralisation, Policy Coordination, and Funding in the National Security Community

The National Security Community since 2008 has strengthened its coordination and integration using decision centralisation, policy coordination, and funding strategies. Decision centralisation saw the renewal of the appointment of the PM&C Associate Secretary. The PM&C Associate Secretary, acting as the prime minis-
In terms of prioritizing funding, there is still no formal agreement regarding which agency or agencies should be afforded higher priority and why.

Policy coordination was one of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s key priorities and the NSC responded by reducing its complicated and conflicting regulations using policy coordination. Thus, the National Security Policy Coordination Group (NSPCG) was established as the Commonwealth coordination agent.

The NSPCG, chaired by the PM&C Deputy Secretary National Security and International Policy, was envisaged to assist in the whole-of-government national security approach. Members of the NSPCG included the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS), Australian Crime Commission (ACC), Australian Federal Police (AFP), Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), ASIO, DFAT, Defence, Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT), and PM&C—all with enduring, central interests in national security issues. In this context, ASIO provided policy coordination of critical infrastructure protection and cyber security, including technical inputs from the private sector.

Policy coordination is achieved through consultation among all members of the NSPCG and relevant stakeholders at different state and territorial levels determine the national response required for a given security issue. For instance, for a terrorism threat assessment, ASIO prepares assessments on the likelihood and nature of acts of terrorism against Australia at home and abroad, using its own and other agency outputs. Based on ASIO’s threat assessment, state and territory police then manage ongoing threat information at the tactical and operational levels. Additionally, state and territory analysts produce tactical risk assessments to support their operations.

Making funding commensurate with agency roles and responsibilities is another effort that requires greater cohesion in the NSC. The number of agencies encompassed in the NSC has increased and their allocated budgets have increased accordingly; for example, ASIO’s budget increased from $69 million in 2001 to $430 million in 2010, a rise in keeping with the increasing level of complex threat. By 2010, the annual funding for national security agencies, excluding Defence, had reached more than $4 billion.

In terms of prioritizing funding, there is still no formal agreement regarding which agency or agencies should be afforded higher priority and why. This may be caused by the rise in emerging and mostly non-military issues, such as transnationally-organised or -motivated crime, pandemics, cyber-attacks, natural resource reduction, climate change, and unregulated population movements—all of which come to bear on the whole-of-government approach to security.

As a result, the once-dominant influence of Department of Defence has diminished as other departments and agencies now push for their share of the national security budget, which

---

a. In the PM&C organizational chart, the deputy secretary for national security and international policy reports to the secretary of the prime minister and cabinet through the associate secretary for national security and international policy, also known as the national security advisor.
rats eight percent of the overall Commonwealth budget. Thus, some in government and society question the still sizable funding of the Department of Defence in the overall national security budget. Detractors of the current Defence funding model claim that non-military agencies are seriously under-resourced, thus limiting their capabilities to meet demanding national security roles in a democratic state where police have primacy over the military. Some point out that DFAT has a proportionately small public diplomacy budget of $5 million, compared with the Defence budget of $25.4 billion, despite the tendency of many in government and society to regard diplomacy as primary—the cornerstone of good relations, and therefore of Australia’s national security.

Regardless of the criticism, there are not many insights into the rationale behind the way Defence allocates it funding. The argument for preserving its generous share of the budget includes the importance of acquiring national security assets, such as EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, new antisubmarine helicopters, and long-range anti-aircraft naval missiles—all key in international threat detection and deterrence. Additionally, the signals intelligence Defence entity, AGO, collects information enabled by satellite networks, again incurring high establishment and maintenance costs, but nonetheless providing all agencies, both federal and state, with geospatial intelligence in events such as the G20 Summit and Commonwealth Games. The argument continues that, if the prioritised budget—with investments as highlighted above—is not implemented, Australia’s exposure to security threats will be unacceptably high.

Achievements and Remaining Challenges

The whole-of-government approach and efforts to improve cohesion in the National Security Community and cultures have led to smoother coordination and integration—and thus, to a better security outcome for Australia. An example of a successful change in roles, responsibilities, and cultures is the Border Protection Command (BPC), a multi-agency task force comprising Commonwealth, state and territory agencies, and the private sector: the BPC consists of personnel from ACBPC, Australian Defence Force (ADF), and embedded liaison officers from the Australian Fisheries Management Authority and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service. These are two of the many encouraging cases of successful coordination and integration within Australia’s security community.

Another sound example of clear consideration of agencies’ existing capabilities, roles, and responsibilities is seen in Australia’s intelligence collection agencies. AGO and ASD have been working in collaboration since 2004 to create fused signals and imagery intelligence products. Thus each agency still provides government with tailored single-discipline intelligence product, as well as fused intelligence outputs—with little overlap in roles and responsibilities. These are two of the many encouraging cases of successful coordination and integration within Australia’s security community.

Most recently, in the context of new terrorism threats, ASIO raised the threat level in Australia to “high”. Consequently, legal departments issued new laws indicating that Australian travel to terrorism hotspots can attract prison terms and the new laws will enable law enforcement organisations to act faster when they
An example of the need for greater cohesion is the handling of the Sydney hostage siege of December 2014. . .

identify a threat. This is yet another example of leadership collaboration and policy coordination among agencies. As such, the evidence suggests that, in general, there has been adequate coordination and integration in the NSC. But despite these successes, there remains a need to improve; for instance, many security agencies possess identical collection capabilities. ASIO, AFP, and state police individually maintain collection, surveillance, and analysis capabilities. Thus, a broad estimate means there are 10 domestic collection and surveillance capabilities, all feeding into 10 databases that—due to connectivity problems, source protection, and compartmentalisation—do not effectively disseminate information into the security community.

Additionally, some argue that there are fragmentation and clash-of-culture issues that further prevent smooth interagency cooperation, yet this is likely a by-product of organisational structures that foster collaborative leadership, insofar as they rarely grant supreme authority to one agency head.36

In a joint response to an issue, each agency head retains sole authority for his or her organisation’s output but has to manage collaboratively within a new team setting. The likely obstacles for smooth integration include entrenched practices, organisational structures, and the particular cultures of each agency.37 It has also been observed that efforts to synchronize goals, improve information sharing, and align computer systems tend to be isolated events; however, efforts have been made with some success.

Despite the current whole-of-government approach, some argue there is still a hierarchy of power and responsibility within the NSC.38 The NSC agencies that have had a traditional connection to national security policy vis-à-vis their roles as advisers to the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC)—such as the AIC agencies and the AFP—have more power in the relationship than newly incorporated agencies like the Department of Health and Ageing (DOHA) and ACC.

The hierarchy that exists between the former and the latter and the ongoing barriers among these agencies include information classification systems, obstacles to information technology connectivity, and the embedded cultures of each agency.39 As such, bureaucratic bottlenecks and unnecessary stovepiping still exist in some agencies, and the NSC is not as totally cohesive as many would like it to be.

An example of the need for greater cohesion is the handling of the Sydney hostage siege of December 2014. At the time of the siege, the general terrorism threat level in Australia had been raised to “high” due to increasing numbers of Australians connected with, or inspired by, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq, Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qa’ida—all determined to attack Western countries, including Australia.

The gunman, Man Haron Monis, had been well known to Australian intelligence agencies, including ASIO, AFP, New South Wales (NSW) State Police, and the Department of Immigration since the late 2000s, due to his extremist behaviour and domestic criminal history. Monis became notoriously known to national security agencies due to his public declaration of support for ISIL and the offensive letters he sent to the families of fallen Australian soldiers. Monis also came into contact with a broad range of government agencies—social support services, courts, and corrective services—over many years.

It is possible that such intelligence information about the gunman could have been shared among national security agencies and among Commonwealth, state, and territory agencies. However, the extent to which information held by one government agency may be shared with other government agencies is guided by the legislation and relevant privacy acts under which each agency operates. With regard to health-related information, a state government agency or health organisation can pass information they hold directly to ASIO only if they believe that passing this information is necessary to lessen the severity of or to prevent a serious and imminent threat to life or to public health and safety.

In the case of Monis, ASIO had access to law enforcement intelligence about him but did not have access to his mental health records. In other words, some further information on Monis held by Australian government agencies was not considered by those agencies to be relevant to the national security interest and was therefore not shared with ASIO or police. ASIO did not seek to access Monis’s information from other agencies because there seemed no reason to do so.40
Strict legislation governing information sharing among Australian national security agencies prevented smooth cooperation among them and, as a result, the Sydney siege went unforeseen when it might have been prevented. Further improvements are needed to ensure coordination and cooperation among all security and intelligence agencies—including the police and judiciary, which are charged with protecting Australia—both domestically and internationally.

**Lessons Learned: How to Better Connect the National Security Community**

Improving cohesion and integration in the National Security Community can be accomplished by better considering the roles and culture in each agency. This will entail re-organising the community around concepts of functional responsibility and accountability, as unintended stovepiping can occur as a result of incompatible objectives among individual agencies. Reorganisation may create common objectives and further improve interagency integration.41

Additionally, the role of the PM&C Associate Secretary may need to be elevated to that of an authoritative and directive figure, such that the relationship between the PM&C Associate Secretary and the directors of AIC collection and analytical agencies is streamlined and made hierarchical. This would ensure that no personal relationships or animosities would interfere in the cooperation and integration of agencies, in addition to ensuring clear, authoritative direction.

As highlighted previously, there appears to be a disconnection between the coordination functions of the PM&C Associate Secretary and the operational agencies, most of which are under the auspices of the Attorney-General’s Department or the Department of Defence, or fall under state control.

The linkages among policy, budgets, and outcomes would also be improved if the government were to create a single department with responsibility for both the national security strategy and the operational capabilities in intelligence, policing, emergency management, border protection, and counterterrorism. In light of existing powers and what appears to be the intention of the 2008 reforms, I would suggest the single department would best be headed by the PM&C Associate Secretary.

The staff function of the PM&C Associate Secretary would also utilise the current role of the ONA by continuing efforts to meet Government National Intelligence Priorities [cite] via the National Intelligence Collection Management Committee (NICMC). The collection agencies of the NIC and AIC would receive the National Intelligence Collection Requirements (NICR) as formal direction. In other words, the NICR would become a directive from the PM&C Associate Secretary to each NIC and AIC collection agency head.

The function and membership of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC) would also become a formal and primary responsibility of the PM&C Associate Secretary and staff, using permanent embedded liaison officers from the non-NIC and -AIC intelligence and security organisations such as the AFP, ACC, customs, and state police. All reports formulated from the NICR directions by the agencies would then be analysed by the ONA to create the strategic intelligence for government.

The creation of an authoritative department would formalise relationships and provide authoritative power to the PM&C Associate Secretary...
Further reforms are needed for a more cooperative and integrated NSC.

Secretary to direct events and operations but would not undermine the whole-of-government and -society approach. It would, however, significantly shift the existing power paradigm of the NIC and AIC agencies such that they would have a clear, authoritative figure to report to—a departure from the present, fragmented situation of reporting to the relevant minister through a particular department secretary. This change would increase the efficiency and productivity with which intelligence relevant to Australian national security is generated.

Conclusion

Since 2008, the National Security Community has notably increased in both size and capability to meet the rapid changes of the modern security environment. The networked and multi-faceted threat environment has moved the Australian government to dissolve its traditional, compartmentalised structure in order to adopt a whole-of-government approach that encourages cohesion and integration across agencies.

To make the whole-of-government approach effective, security agencies should develop a supportive culture and skilled-based institutional structure and introduce appropriate governance, budget, and accountability frameworks. Information sharing and communication would be maximised, government’s engagement with individuals and communities would be improved, and the capacity to respond quickly and more effectively to security threats would be executed more cooperatively.

In general, cooperation and integration in the NSC is sound; the Australian NSC has achieved notable advancements and integration as a result of improvements implemented since 2008 and has now become a robust organisation that protects and promotes Australia and its interests. However, the roles, responsibilities, and cultures of individual agencies have not been fully reconsidered and some stovepiped practices remain. As a result, fully effective NSC integration is still better in theory than in practice.

Further reforms are needed for a more cooperative and integrated NSC. These reforms could begin by establishing a single department, headed by the PM&C Associate Secretary, who would have overall responsibility for both the national security strategy and the operational capabilities of the various agencies in the NSC.
Endnotes

17. Ungerer, *Reform and Renewal*.
18. Ungerer, *Connecting the Docs*.
27. Ungerer, *Reform and Renewal*.
29. Ibid.
31. Sheridan, “For Defence, Diplomacy and Attitude.”
36. Coates, Collaborative Leadership.
38. Ungerer, Reform and Renewal.
39. Ibid.
Covering Coups in Saigon in the Early 1960s

George W. Allen

This article, originally classified, appeared in Studies in Intelligence Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter 1989). It appears here now as a prelude to the publication of two forthcoming compendiums of declassified or unclassified Studies articles marking the five decades that have passed since the full military engagement of the United States in the conflicts in Southeast Asia. Its author had been analyzing Vietnam since the 1950s and was a central figure in CIA’s analysis of the situation in Vietnam throughout the conflict. He also served as director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence late in his career. He retired in 1979.

The early 1960s were a tumultuous period for the CIA Station in Saigon. At a time when US policymakers yearned for a modicum of internal stability in South Vietnam, they were faced instead with a deteriorating political environment punctuated by successive changes in government. Beginning with the aborted coup by paratroop elements in November 1960, there were no less than a dozen different coups, minicoups, leadership shuffles, and rebellions in a five-year period. Through it all, the Saigon Station evolved rather effective means for covering these crises, rapidly and systematically getting on top of the often hectic developments and relaying timely and informative accounts to Washington.

Covering the rapidly shifting dynamic of a politically unstable situation can challenge even the largest and most sophisticated “news” organizations. CIA field stations are not in business, of course, to compete with or duplicate the flow of reports by the media. They are tasked rather to pull together an accurate and comprehensive picture of ongoing developments from knowledgeable, “inside” sources whose insights might help US policymakers understand the forces at play and to anticipate, if not influence, the outcome.

To do this, field stations have to be in a position to tap a wide variety of agents, informants, and other potential sources having access to leadership elements in all key political groups. They have to be able to track accurately the movements and actions of government security forces and potential rebel forces. They need to be able to organize and manage their collection activities in order to be able to follow up rapidly on leads that can—or should—be cross-checked with other sources. And they need the means to assemble this information rapidly at a central point, evaluate and collate it, and prepare it for transmittal to Washington in the form of spot reports or periodic situation summaries.

From the vantage point of one who was “in the loop” on most of these crises, either contributing to the Station’s efforts in Saigon or conveying its products to policymakers and operating officials in the US, I believe the Saigon Station merits high marks for its coverage of these events during those years.

Abundant Assets

The breadth of the Station’s contacts with key elements on the Saigon political scene was at the core of its success. In the Nho Dinh Diem era, it had close relationships with just about everyone of importance in the presidential palace and in the military and security services. Despite the rapid “platooning” of generals into the palace with successive coups after Diem’s demise, the Station developed useful new assets with alacrity. When Buddhist dissidence became an issue in the spring of 1963, it acquired valuable assets in the rebellious temples. Flexibility, along with the dedication and hard work of a number of experienced and savvy case officers, paid off at crucial times.

Station contacts were sometimes embarrassingly extensive. In 1960, when paratroop battalions were laying siege to Diem’s presidential palace in an attempted coup, a young and
enthusiastic Agency officer who had worked with some of them in covert operations was sent to establish contact and report to the Station on their activities. Using the two-way radio in his jeep, which he parked at the paratroops’ command post near the palace, he became a conspicuous go-between in Embassy efforts to restrain the paratroopers, whose delay in pressing their initial advantage allowed Diem to rally loyal divisions from neighboring provinces to put down the coup. Some observers believed that the young officer had been “directing” the coup forces, and he and his family had to depart quickly from Vietnam when the Diem government officials suggested they could “no longer guarantee his safety.” Nonetheless, his efforts had enabled the Station to know in detail what the paratroopers were up to.

Flexible Communications

Radio-equipped jeeps were an invaluable supplement to the two-way radios permanently located by the Station at key sites in the Saigon area. It was this combination of fixed and mobile radio facilities that made possible both the rapid transmission of information to the Station and the management of many collection assets.

When a crisis occurred, the “net control” radio in the Station activated the net, and the outstations functioned as observation posts, reporting what they could see and being tasked accordingly. A number of Station jeeps and cars had two-way radios, and officers assigned these vehicles, alerted via phone, were dispatched to contact their assets or to proceed to critical locations and report what was happening.

With these collection assets, those on duty at the “command post” in the Station were able to follow quite readily the movements of government and rebel forces in the city. If a fixed observer reported a convoy of rebel forces moving down a particular boulevard, another observer might pick it up as it approached a key intersection. A mobile observer could be dispatched to check on its further movement and perhaps determine whether it had taken up positions outside the Post and Telegraph Building. An attempt might then be made to identify these forces, to fill in the picture of the size and composition of the rebel elements. Meanwhile, discreetly—to determine their intended reaction.

An Efficient System

The Station’s command post was not rigidly structured. Operating under the general supervision of the Chief of Station and/or his deputy, it was manned principally by the Reports Section and augmented by whatever assortment of other analysts and case officers might be available. Maps of the Saigon-Cholon area and its environs were used to plot the locations and movements of opposing military and security forces, and order of battle lists were compiled to keep track of which side the various units were supporting. Information obtained by various sources and observers was funneled to the officers detailed to track the situation and to draft spot reports and situation summaries. Collection tasking was developed through an unstructured but generally smooth-flowing synergistic feedback process. New requirements were levied by radio or telephone to our collectors or led to visual reconnaissance missions by officers dispatched from the command post. There were always enough “veterans” of previous coup attempts on hand to provide stability and a leavening influence in the often exciting and stimulating atmosphere of a crisis. Through repeated practice, the process evolved into an efficient system for organizing the collection, collation, evaluation, and reporting of ongoing developments in what was often a rapidly moving situation.
Saigon

I had earned my first Vietnam coup “shoulder patch” as an analyst with Army Intelligence in the Pentagon during the insfighting in 1955 that the US-backed Prime Minister Diem used to defeat a united front of French-supported sectarian paramilitary forces who were trying to unseat him. The Saigon Station, which under Colonel Ed Lansdale was deeply involved in the crisis, covered the action well. I remember moving through the corridors of the Pentagon with my well-marked briefing map to fill in the Army’s top brass on the status of the machinegun at the “Y” bridge that was holding up Diem’s forces at one crucial juncture.

On the morning in February 1962 when dissident Vietnamese Air Force officers decided to assassinate Diem, I was in Saigon on an extended TDY from DIA. I was eating breakfast on the roof of the Brink BOQ, only a half-mile or so from the presidential palace. After watching the planes drop their napalm and 500-pound bombs on the palace, and then rocket and strafe it in repeated passes, I sped to the Embassy in a taxi to draft an eyewitness account and send it via the Army Special Security Officer to Washington. Fortunately, before sending the cable, I phoned the intelligence staff at the US Military Assistance Command to compare notes, and discovered—to my chagrin—that the “four” planes I had observed in the attack were, in fact, only “two.” Thus I reaffirmed that double-checking with others can usefully counteract the impact of adrenaline on the sensory systems of even experienced observers.

The Station’s crisis reporting system performed splendidly in covering the momentous generals’ coup that overthrew Diem in 1963. The generals had invited their designated Station liaison officer to join them at their command post at the outbreak of the coup. Information acquired because of his presence there, combined with that gleaned from the network of fixed and mobile observation posts and from Station contacts with other sources, enabled Saigon to keep Washington fully apprised of developments. We at Headquarters—which I had just moved to from DIA—were summoned in the early morning hours to follow the situation and prepare a briefing for DCI McCone to present at the White House at 0800. The ample flow of reporting from Saigon and the Station’s responsiveness to our queries made our work a “piece of cake.”

The minicoup following January, which saw General Nguyen Khanh displace the older generals who had ousted Diem, was not as easy to fathom. Unlike the Diem coup, it came as a surprise. There was no serious fighting, however, and after a day or two of tension the new regime was in control. This coup featured the playing of martial music on the local radio stations and announcements on the US Armed Forces Radio urging all Americans to stay off the streets. In Saigon on TDY, I went to the Station, where I was drafted into the reporting team, contributing my own accounts of coup activities seen while en route and helping to prepare the situation reports.

The next major government shuffle occurred in midsummer, shortly after I arrived on a two-year PCS tour as As I emerged from Sunday church services in the USIS auditorium shortly before noon, I was trying to decide whether it was too hot to walk to the Embassy, where I was expected to check through the overnight traffic. Spying a large convoy of trucks coming up the boulevard carrying troops in field equipment, fixed bayonets, and wearing red bandannas—the “trademark” of Saigon coup forces, I immediately decided it was indeed “too hot” to walk. I took a cab and arrived at the Embassy in time to find I had brought in one of the initial reports that another coup attempt was under way. Having learned the Station’s system and procedures, I was able to play a more useful role in “anchoring” the reporting process and in guiding collection for this and subsequent coups during the remainder of my tour.
Averting Other Coups

There could easily have been more coups than actually show in the historical record if disaffected Vietnamese military commanders had not sometimes been restrained by their American contacts. One coup was headed off when the disgruntled commander of the corps in the Delta south of Saigon was talked out of marching on the capital when he phoned his Station contact to determine whether the US would approve his taking over the government. A US military adviser performed a similar service on another occasion.

One “coup that wasn’t” led the Ambassador in August 1964 to order the departure of the legendary Lou Conein, the OSS veteran whose intimate relationships with most of the Vietnamese military hierarchy made him an invaluable resource during this period. Conein’s downfall in 1964 was precipitated by the unscheduled midnight move of a couple of US Army armored personnel carriers through the streets of Saigon, without the Vietnamese MP escort called for by standard practice. The APCs were unable to find their way to the pier where they were to be unloaded for movement north, and they pulled up outside the entrance of the Headquarter’s compound of the Vietnamese Navy, where Premier Khanh had secretly decided to spend the night. Khanh judged these vehicles to be precursors of a coup attempt; he alerted the US Ambassador, and he then fled by boat. The Ambassador alerted the Station Chief, who directed Conein to canvass his contacts to determine who might be “making the coup.” Conein called each of his friends, which included most of the members of the top military leadership council, inquiring whether they were mounting a coup. When the generals met the next morning and compared notes, they wrongly concluded that the CIA had been trying to stir up a change of government, leading the Ambassador to decide that Conein had outlived his usefulness to the Station.

Chasing the Ky-Thieu Coup

I received word of the June 1965 coup, which solidified Generals Ky and Thieu at the top of the government and thus halted the coup carousel, while on a visit to Pleiku. The Station Chief, reaching me by phone in the office of the II Corps C-2 Adviser, told me of the coup and asked that I get back to Saigon as soon as possible to help with the Station’s coverage of events. I was unable to reacquire my aircraft until mid-afternoon; by then, no aircraft were being cleared to land at Tan Son Nhut, the Saigon airport. We touched down briefly at Bien Hoa air base, but soon left when coup forces were reported preparing to attack that facility. We were finally able to land on the coast at Vung Tau, where I phoned the Station Chief to tell him I offered to take me by boat to Saigon. The Chief of Station told me to stay away from him and all other senior Vietnamese military officers, because the US did not want to be perceived as playing favorites in this coup. On arrival at the local hotel, however, my colleagues and I found ourselves in the command post of the countercoup forces, which had commandeered the main lounge.

After spending the night at Vung Tau and finding that Tan Son Nhut was still closed, we flew back to Bien Hoa, where we hired a taxi to drive a group of us, all Station officers, to Saigon. As we approached the main bridge connecting Saigon with areas to the north, we overtook and passed a halted column of trucks and armored vehicles whose troops were wearing the red bandannas. At the crest of the bridge, we discovered why Vietnamese fighter bombers were “buzzing” the site; at the center of the bridge, there was the head of a similar column with troops wearing blue, or “loyalist” bandannas, in a direct faceoff with the head of the “red” column. Working our way gingerly past this confrontation, we finally arrived at the house of one of our officers in a suburb of Saigon, where I phoned to advise the Station Chief
of my imminent arrival and described what we had seen at the bridge. He wearily replied that it was all over; an accommodation had just been reached between the opposing factions. He said that we should have lunch before checking in at the Embassy to assist with the wrap-up reporting on the coup.

Peace and Quiet

Aside from renewed Buddhist unrest and demonstrations, which led to little more than occasional whiffs of tear gas, there were no further coup attempts in Saigon for almost 10 years. The only major crisis of political instability took place in the northern provinces in early 1966, when the Saigon government had to suppress a rebellious corps commander who was involved in the Buddhist dissidence.

The Station’s machinery for covering coups was finely tuned by the mid-1960s. Covering coups had become routine, and the Station took them in stride. By late 1964, Saigon veterans had devised a “coup-qualified” shoulder patch, and one wag wrote lyrics to a song titled “I Feel a Coup Comin’ On.” These efforts at black humor reflected a certain degree of frustration and exasperation at the fragility of the political foundation underlying the American effort in Vietnam. But these frustrations did not deter the Station from fulfilling its responsibility for collecting and reporting on the situation, with aplomb.

This article is classified-SECRET.
Intelligence in Public Media

Future Crimes: Everything Is Connected, Everyone Is Vulnerable, and What We Can Do About It
Marc Goodman (Doubleday, 2015), 392 pp., index

Reviewed by Jay R. Watkins

The digital tidal wave is revolutionizing our lifestyles in many positive ways. Yet are we as aware as we should be of the perils that lurk beneath? Future Crimes, by Marc Goodman, presents a dystopian world in which our daily activities are monitored, monetized, and stolen or sold to advertisers, criminals, and governments alike. We become junkies, tempted by enticing apps and data clouds that open an amazing new universe of information to us. While availing ourselves of these accesses, we also click “accept” to a Faustian deal in which we surrender our identity and anonymity in perpetuity.

The author, Marc Goodman, is a senior technology futurist in residence with the FBI, senior adviser to Interpol, and consultant to the Los Angeles Police Department and the US Secret Service. He founded the Future Crimes Institute and chairs the Policy, Law, and Ethics track at Silicon Valley’s Singularity University, an institution that bills itself as a “benefit corporation” hosting graduate and executive learning programs and incubators for new business.

Future Crimes, which has been on the New York Times best seller list, reads like science fiction but is based on hard facts. In a single comprehensive volume, Goodman provides a tour d’horizon of the cyber ecosystem and presciently describes trends in telecommunications, robotics, nanotechnology, digital manufacturing, artificial intelligence, wearable computers, and synthetic biology and how they will affect us.

This book has as much to do with the intelligence business as it does with law enforcement. It exposes how vulnerable we are as individuals and society to the technologies we have created. It has profound implications for intelligence tradecraft. Those engaged in the technical offensive and defensive worlds of cyber and counterintelligence may already know of many of these threats; however this book brings them all together in a compelling narrative. Goodman’s prose is conversational, straightforward, and technical terms are simply explained. The reader will gain new vocabulary by reading about “botnets,” “rootkits,” “crowdsourcing,” and “baseband” and “man-in-the-middle” attacks, to name a few. The author cites many relevant case studies and compelling real-life examples of cyber vulnerabilities and penetrations. He also address terrorists’ extensive exploitation of cyber for targeting, recruitment, operational planning and support. He cites, for example, the use social media Lashkar-e-Taiba to verify targets in their Mumbai attacks in 2008. Goodman’s posit a litany of other worries:

- State-sponsored cyber espionage is ubiquitous, with more than 100 countries actively hacking the systems of other countries and businesses. China alone has developed an army of 180,000 cyber spies and warriors, he claims, mounting an “incredible ninety thousand computer attacks per year” against US Defense Department networks alone. (31)

- Foreign government hackers have compromised information on vital US defense and government systems, including the F-35 strike fighter, Patriot missile system, and AEGIS ballistic missile defense system. Top secret plans for the US president’s Marine One helicopter were found online in 2002, listed on a peer-to-peer (P2P) network in Iran. These P2P networks allow for easy decentralized file sharing and are often associated with distribution of pirated films and music. (119)

- Foreign spy services regularly use social media (Linkedln, Facebook, and Twitter) to identify and target employees to recruit as spies for commercial and government espionage. The resulting losses to intellectual property rights and development costs have been hundreds of billions. (102–104)

- A wake-up call for analysts of the world scene in understanding the potential of social media data aggregation came in January 2011 with the spontaneous

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Tunisian “Arab Uprising.” Meanwhile, repressive governments like deposed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014 used cell phone data to monitor street demonstrators. His security service intimidated demonstrators by sending them text messages accusing them of unlawful behavior and threatening them with imminent arrest. (122)

- Encryption protocols can be compromised, as evidenced by the Heartbleed security bug in early 2014. Sites affected included: Instagram, Pinterest, Facebook, Tumblr, Google, Yahoo!, Etsy, GoDaddy, Foursquare, TurboTax, Flickr, Netflix, YouTube, USAA, and Dropbox. The base operating systems of mobile devices (e.g., SSL) have been compromised. Developers assume because they are so embedded in the phone that no one will be able to figure them out. As the author points out, criminals and foreign intelligence services are often steps ahead of consumers in exploiting technology for their gain. (166–167)

- We are overreliant on GPS devices. They can be disrupted easily with devastating consequences to air, sea, and land transportation. North Korea routinely jams GPS signals in South Korea. The largest attack occurred in 2012 and ran for 16 days, disrupting 1,106 aircraft and 254 ships. (152)

- And what about those Google cars plying the streets taking pictures at street view for Google Maps? They are also collecting IP addresses from mobile devices as they pass by. (107)

- And there is much more: the “Internet of Things,” the risks of wireless networks, drones, and devices to collect metrics about human behavior and bodily functions. (224–225; 248–252)

This book has no shortage of evidence to illustrate the pernicious ways in which users of computers and devices can be compromised. Short of unplugging from the global grid, Goodman offers practical advice on how to mitigate the chances of succumbing to the “IEDs” on the Internet and foreshadows the connected world we face.
In this crisp, well-written history, Laura Micheletti Puaca coins the term “technocratic feminism” to describe the strategy that feminist activists have used since the early 1940s—and adapted over the years—to realize goals of greater female representation in technical and scientific higher education and employment. The author begins by recounting how the mobilization of men and the militarization of science during the Second World War created unprecedented opportunities for women to contribute to US national security. In June 1941, for example, President Roosevelt established the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). Vigorously funded, the OSRD had entered into more than 2,000 contracts with 465 institutions by the end of 1945. To meet the precipitous demand for manpower, the federal government, private industry, and academia had little choice but to recruit women.

Sensing the moment, reformers like industrial engineer Lillian Moller Gilbreth and Barnard College Dean Virginia Gildersleeve worked to expand education for women in science, engineering, and mathematics.8 Other colleges and universities modified their curricula to offer “women-only” classes in physics, chemistry, and mathematics. Though more women than ever before graduated with technical degrees, Puaca also chronicles the tentative nature of their advances. Often, both government and industry relegated female wartime graduates to positions as aides and assistants, allowing men to advance to ones of greater prestige and responsibility. And once male veterans returned and invoked their rights under the GI Bill, women found themselves demoted, displaced, and dismissed.

In the second chapter, Puaca notes how the Soviet Union’s detonation of a nuclear device in August 1949 underscored the seemingly perpetual need for the United States to maintain scientific and technological supremacy. Several federal agencies arose and research and development budgets again increased, this time in response to the Red Scare. But while anticommunism as an activating principle spread, so too did suspicion of feminism, which questioned traditional gender roles. Thus, seasoned activists, male fellow travelers, and younger members of the National Society of Women Engineers (SWE, established May 1950) emphasized the importance of scientifically trained women for national security, a strategy that unified them in rhetoric and purpose. Still, the SWE did continue efforts to reshape public perceptions about female engineers, publishing Women in Engineering (1955), a widely disseminated report that included lists of women’s scholarships, accredited engineering curricula, prerequisites for engineering programs, and statistics on female engineers.

Puaca turns to scientific womanpower during the Sputnik era in the third chapter. The Soviet Union stunned the world on 4 October 1957 by being the first nation to launch a satellite into terrestrial orbit. A month later, the USSR repeated the feat with a dog wired for medical monitoring. Both achievements implied that a human or a nuclear device might be next, shattering American confidence. Contemporary statistics suggested a better use of female scientific talent in the Soviet Union, which graduated 13,000 women engineers annually.

Although the Sputnik scare and the concomitant growth of the military-industrial complex multiplied opportunities for American women in science during the 1960s, social expectations still impeded many careers. Despite their purported technical prowess, female Soviet scientists were denigrated in this country as manly, tough, and unattractive, traits that no American woman would...

---

8. Gildersleeve, a Columbia Ph.D. in English, became dean of Barnard College in 1911. She quickly set about lobbying Columbia’s professional schools to open their programs to women. The business, medical, and law schools all capitulated by 1926; only the School of Engineering held out until December 1942.
willingly emulate. Further, as Puaca astutely observes, the American housewife, comfortably ensconced amidst the trappings of middle-class existence, represented an ideal of cultural superiority.

Technocratic feminists again accommodated their approach to the times, advocating for government-sponsored maternity leave, nurseries, and tax deductions for working mothers, allowing women to satisfy professional and maternal imperatives. As well, Sigma Delta Epsilon, the graduate fraternity for women in science founded in 1921, reached out to high achieving secondary school students through science fairs and career days to encourage them to pursue science and engineering majors in college.

Publication of Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique*, waning support for the Vietnam War, formation of the National Organization for Women, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and its establishment of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission) allowed technocratic feminists of the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s to detach themselves from the national security agenda and frame their cause in terms of equal rights for women. Nevertheless, these second-wave activists encountered some of the same political and bureaucratic intransigence as had their forebears. For instance, Estelle Ramey, endocrinologist, professor at Georgetown University School of Medicine, and president of the Association for Women in Science (established in 1971), publicly and privately debated Edgar Berman, Hubert Humphrey’s former physician and political advisor, who maintained that women were unfit for political office due to monthly hormonal imbalances.

Puaca neatly ties the efforts of 1970s technocratic feminists to those of the 1940s by pointing out that the former again invoked arguments about wasted, irreplaceable resources when discussing the continued underrepresentation of women in science and engineering. (Perhaps not coincidentally, President Nixon had proposed creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970.)

Puaca ably sketches the broad historical outlines of the decades in question, providing color with anecdotes from women scientists and engineers that readers will find variously touching, humorous, and distressing. The reader’s appreciation of the study— from the man-made hardships that women scientists and engineers have faced to American existential anxiety during the Sputnik era—will be enhanced by familiarity with Betty Friedan’s aforementioned *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), James M. Gavin’s *War and Peace in the Space Age* (1946), Hanson Weightman Baldwin’s *The Great Arms Race: A Comparison of U.S. And Soviet Power Today* (1958), and Martha Ackmann’s *The Mercury 13: The Untold Story of Thirteen American Women and the Dream of Space Flight* (2003).

And at least two recent events beg a sequel to Puaca’s history, a continuation to the present day. First, the National Science Foundation released a study in 2012 entitled, “Stemming the Tide: Why Women Leave Engineering.” Some of the findings therein, based on a survey of over 5,500 women with engineering degrees, suggest that while advances have been made, many women engineers still feel alienated, unsupported, and subject to different standards and expectations from their male colleagues. Second, Letitia Long (BA, Electrical Engineering; MS, Mechanical Engineering) retired last year as director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, leaving Betty Sapp, director of the National Reconnaissance Organization, and US Army Colonel Nichoel Brooks, commander of the National Ground Intelligence Center, as the sole females heading two of the 17 Intelligence Community agencies. Despite being history, *Searching for Scientific Womanpower* could not be more timely and relevant.
What Brent Scowcroft said and did has influenced US foreign policy for the past forty years. He served under the Nixon administration, first as a military assistant, and later as a deputy assistant for national security affairs for Henry Kissinger. He became the national security advisor for presidents Ford and George H. W. Bush. He chaired an eponymous commission which was charged with looking into US strategic forces, served on the Tower Commission under President Reagan, and was head of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the President George W. Bush administration. He wrote editorials on foreign policy and continued to advise policy officials after he retired. He grappled with issues ranging from the US opening to China in 1972, the evacuation of South Vietnam before its fall in April 1975, debate over the MX nuclear missile in 1983, the breakdown of the national security process under President Reagan in the Iran-Contra affair, the dismemberment of the Soviet empire starting in 1989, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and—indirectly—debate over whether to invade Iraq in the summer of 2002.

The Strategist is the first attempt to capture the full and consequential life of Scowcroft. The book relies on extensive interviews with Scowcroft himself, interviews with those who knew him, histories of his time, and some documentary evidence. This should have all the makings for a solid historical account of the subject’s life; unfortunately, however, The Strategist suffers from two major problems: instead of using Scowcroft’s own words to support a historical account, the book reads more like an oral history backed by some of the documented record; the book also raises the old question about whether it is a good idea for a biographer to like his subject. Sparrow comes across as a huge fan of Scowcroft’s policies and politics, with the result being a biased account in which the author and subject seem to reinforce one another’s views.

The book works off the sensible premise that bad foreign policy outcomes are the result of bad process. So we learn of the way Kissinger ran the National Security Council (NSC)—and the ways in which Admiral John Poindexter and Condoleezza Rice ran it—and are then given a comparison between their ways and those of Scowcroft. Kissinger by all accounts ran a dysfunctional NSC, full of backbiting, poor information sharing, and inconsistent input from the departments on major issues. Sparrow relates how Kissinger had a habit of skewing his options papers for Nixon towards the policy Kissinger supported—usually the second option in the paper. Though Sparrow does not explicitly mention it, this faulty NSC process, in which many officials were cut out, arguably contributed to the disastrous decision to expand the Vietnam War into Cambodia.

Poindexter’s NSC broke down completely under Reagan, leaving the president with only a general idea (though how general is a matter of dispute) of the arms-for-hostages deals, and the funneling of the sale proceeds illegally to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The Tower Commission, with considerable input from Scowcroft, resulted in forced resignations, an independent counsel investigation, and a new national security advisor to tighten up the NSC. Rice’s NSC, in both Sparrow’s and Scowcroft’s view, was unable to get the NSC process to accommodate the clash of egos among Vice President Richard Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. Sparrow contends this is said to have led to the “ill advised” invasion of Iraq.

For his part, Scowcroft receives praise, no doubt much deserved, for restoring perspective to the NSC’s role and raising the morale of those who staffed it after Kissinger’s departure. He cut the staff in half upon becoming director to address the Council’s disproportionate influence on foreign policy. Changes he implemented resulted in a more open flow of paper. Greater input into decisions was encouraged, both from the departments and NSC staff. He gave NSC officers back their passes to the White House cafeteria, overturning a practice Kissinger had enforced to
The Strategist

prevent his staff from mingling with other staffers in the White House. Scowcroft’s policy memos to Ford were not skewed towards a particular option. Later, under President George H. W. Bush, Scowcroft breathed new life into the National Security Council forum as designed in 1947 by creating the Core Group, consisting of foreign policy principals and the president, with the addition of the National Security Advisor. He did the same one level below by convening the Principals Committee to discuss issues without taking up the president’s time. The Deputies Committee became the “workhorse” for the administration, reducing the need for the other two decisionmaking bodies to convene.

This streamlined, structured, and more open process got results. On Scowcroft’s watch, the Ford administration signed the Helsinki Accords that contributed to the opening and eventual disintegration of the communist bloc in Europe and oversaw the massive—some say not massive enough—evacuation of US officials, civilians, and members of the South Vietnamese government from Saigon in April 1975. Scowcroft as President Bush’s chief foreign policy advisor successfully secured widespread foreign support for German reunification. Bush enhanced cooperation with the Soviets on a variety of bilateral issues. Scowcroft also helped engineer the victory of US forces over Saddam Hussein’s military in Kuwait.

However, the author overstates his case when contrasting the Scowcroft-run NSC under President George H. W. Bush with the same entity under Rice. Sparrow repeatedly asserts the George W. Bush administration held no NSC meetings to discuss the rationale for going to war against Iraq. Yet his own narrative suggests the decision to move in the fall of 1990 from defending Saudi Arabia (Operation Desert Shield) to evicting Iraq from Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm) did not go through a formal vetting process, either (see Powell’s comments below). The author also takes aim at the Bush administration’s failure to plan for the aftermath of the Iraq war, but he himself acknowledges that the Scowcroft-run NSC failed to deal effectively with the aftermath of victory in Kuwait, which left two-thirds of Saddam’s military capabilities intact—capabilities that were later used to crush rebellions in the Shia south and Kurdish north that Operations Desert Storm and Shield helped to incite. He then adds a second dubious comparison, that Kissinger and Scowcroft would have done a better job of leading, noting “it is impossible to imagine Kissinger [as National Security Advisor]

letting a secretary of state, secretary of defense, or vice president marginalize his input on policy decisions.” That may be so, but Kissinger himself was guilty of marginalizing others, as Sparrow chronicles earlier in the book.

Another theme of the book is that a well-functioning NSC leads to cautious policies that default to “staying the course.” Scowcroft acknowledges as much, noting that he always tried to evaluate how a major policy initiative could go wrong and precipitate lots of unanticipated consequences. Most historians give the Bush administration high marks for managing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of Eastern Europe in a careful and deliberate manner. In one of his relatively few critiques of Scowcroft, however, Sparrow contends neither the president nor Scowcroft had a vision for how a post-Cold War world should function. The “New World Order” Bush cited in September 1990 lacked definition and received little policy process follow-through. Scowcroft had the phrase dropped, its “grandiose meaning beyond anything he or Bush originally conceived.”

The book covers only a few issues regarding Scowcroft’s interaction with the Intelligence Community. His dispute with CIA director William Colby over the Church Committee hearings is discussed. Scowcroft objected to Colby’s giving full cooperation to the Committee by answering its requests and even volunteering some information. Scowcroft saw these requests as a challenge to executive privilege, while Colby was trying to save the CIA and thought that stonewalling would have made matters much worse. Sparrow raises a point often lost in discussions of this topic that Ford let Colby have his way, in part because Ford’s experience as a congressman on the House Intelligence Committee made him more open to legislative oversight. Scowcroft also backed the Team B exercise, whereby a group of outside experts—many of them opposed to détente and the SALT nuclear arms agreement—looked at information similar to the classified materials to which CIA analysts had access in order to come up with alternative conclusions about Soviet capabilities and intent. As head of the PFIAB, Scowcroft launched a study into intelligence reform for the George W. Bush administration; however, its recommendations were not adopted because Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, as was the case with many of his predecessors, refused to give up control over much of the intelligence budget. And, as the report was finished at the time of the September 11th attacks, DCI Tenet did not want to subject
the workforce to a dramatic overhaul when officers were having to grapple with terrorism targeting operations and analysis. Scowcroft contends the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq was a failure of intelligence, when a strong case can be made that it was both an intelligence and a policy failure.

The reader gets a healthy dose of accolades for Scowcroft, many of them earned but gratuitous. One journalist is quoted as describing him as “an honorable public servant, whose instinctive loyalty is to the Commander-in-Chief. He faithfully and competently gets the job done.” (239) Sparrow commends Scowcroft’s comments in his book *America and the World* as “striking for the comprehensiveness of his thinking, his command of the issues, his knowledge of the histories of the individual countries and regions of the world.” (557) One would expect to see such over-the-top praise on the dust jacket of the book and not in the body of the text. The quotes often descend into cliche: “Bush and Scowcroft believed too, in the importance of national service, honor, courtesy, and self-discipline. Both were also well mannered, unassuming, gracious, and cordial—behavior today many would label ‘old fashioned.’” (278) “Scowcroft—and Gates—shared a fundamental commitment to the current and future security of the United States.” (550) A little of this goes a long way, yet the reader encounters such grand and vague tributes throughout the book.

So it comes as frankly something of a relief to read the few critical comments. Former National Security Advisor and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell thought Scowcroft, during the run-up to the Gulf war, “had become the First Companion and all-purpose playmate to the president [and that he] was regularly failing in his larger duty to ensure that policy was carefully debated and formulated.” (398) This quote, borrowed from Bob Woodward’s *The Commanders*, is the most serious charge levied against Scowcroft in the book. Yet Powell’s remark goes largely unexplored. And since Sparrow quotes journalists who praise Scowcroft, it only seems fair to note he should have quoted one of his most vocal critics, the late Christopher Hitchens, who had some rather choice if excessive things to say about Scowcroft’s time with Kissinger and about his policies in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

As another reviewer of this book has noted, Scowcroft also demonstrated a bad habit of putting down those who disagreed with him. Some were too emotional or passionate. Colby was “troubled,” “tortured,” and “overwhelmed” for differing with Scowcroft regarding how to handle the Church Committee hearings. Secretary of State James Baker was “frantic” about Russia’s nuclear weapons’ falling into the wrong hands (Scowcroft thought it simply meant “that many fewer aimed at us.”). Some in the Bush administration had a “religious fervor” for fighting terrorism; for others, it was naiveté. Reagan administration officials who proposed steep cuts in nuclear weapons were said to have a “child-like faith” in strategic warning. His disagreeing with Vice President Cheney—after agreeing on much during their time together in the Ford administration—is ascribed in part to the aftereffects of Cheney’s many heart surgeries. Indeed, some of Scowcroft’s comments about the Bush administration are downright nasty: he suggests President Bush decided to invade Iraq for political gain—to win the second term his father never had. Such dubious and unsubstantiated speculation is beneath Scowcroft, and the author does him no favors by including them in the book. Sparrow conserves them almost certainly to paint Scowcroft as a counter to the “unreasonableness” of others.

But this is not a critical biography, made very clear in the last passage of the book that notes Scowcroft’s (many positive) qualities are “vanishingly rare among those occupying the highest positions of power.” A more objective and reasonable biography of Scowcroft’s distinguished life has yet to be written.
The cigar, the fingers splayed into a “Victory” sign, the scowl and furrowed brow immortalized by portrait photographer Yousuf Karsh: Winston Churchill long ago seared his image into historical memory. And in these days of sound bites, teleprompters, and media handlers, his speeches—often delivered from memory—read like the classic Greek and Roman oratory from which they took their inspiration and cadence. (The wartime prime minister also received a Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953.) Nevertheless, Richard Toye, professor of modern history at the University of Exeter, attempts to lend some proportion to his near-mythic subject. In this iconoclastic study, Toye analyzes the reception of his subject’s Second World War radio and parliamentary addresses among British, Allied, and even Axis audiences, arguing that Churchill’s words often failed to evoke the universal praise and epic effects that historians have attributed to them.

The intrepid scholar goes beyond newspaper editorial pages and Gallup poll results, supporting his findings instead with two relatively unexplored archival sources: reports by the Home Intelligence Division of Britain’s Ministry of Information and by the British sociological research organization, Mass-Observation (MO). Both groups purported to have captured domestic thoughts, opinions, and morale during the war. MO reports were also based in part on entries from over 200 diaries sent into the organization by ordinary British citizens, making them more interesting, if not necessarily more definitive pieces of evidence than statistical surveys.

The first chapter lays out a brief biography, emphasizing Churchill’s early recognition of the relationship between power and rhetoric as well as the path the future politician followed to become a master orator. The reader learns, for example, that the 13-year-old Harrow School student could recite 1,200 lines of The Lays of Ancient Rome by Thomas Babington Macaulay, himself no mean advocate for the British nation and craftsman of the King’s English. The young Churchill also honed his sense of style and irony through close acquaintance with Edward Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. And at 24, just back from a campaign to quell an Indian uprising, he wrote his first book, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (1898). Churchill enthusiasts tend to be an informed lot and certainly have decades and shelf yardage of scholarship with which to indulge their passion. They will find little new here; however, the material is a serviceable prelude to the chapters that follow.

Toye assumes reader familiarity with the more significant events of the war (e.g., the evacuation of Dunkirk, the Battle of Dakar, Operation Barbarossa), particularly with their political and diplomatic implications for Great Britain. This allows him to dispense with historical retelling and instead focus on widening the discursive context within which he asserts past historians have relegated Churchill’s speeches and radio addresses. His archival research reveals, for example, that not all members of parliament were pleased with Churchill’s address in the Commons after Hitler had invaded Norway. Harold Nicolson wrote in his diary how the prime minister hesitated, confused his notes, fumbled for the right pair of spectacles, mistook Sweden for Denmark, and gave an overall “lamentable performance” (38).

After France had fallen to the Nazis and Marshal Pétain had requested an armistice, Churchill spoke to calm British nerves and to steel British resolve, delivering his “finest hour” speech. An initial MO report registered general satisfaction with the address; however, at least one radio listener sent a telegram to 10 Downing Street to express concern about what he suspected to be the prime minister’s heart condition. (A ubiquitous cigar—not a cardiac ailment—had caused Churchill’s halting delivery.) And Toye does an excellent job of describing the fine rhetorical line Churchill traced after Germany invaded Russia. On the one hand, the prime minister welcomed the military strain of an eastern front on the Hitler regime. He had earlier promised British aid to anyone who fought the Nazis. On the other hand, he had been an implacable anticommunist since the First World War. Yet, Pravda
published Churchill’s Barbarossa speech—summarized and without comment—the day after broadcast, inflammatory remarks about communism understandably expunged.

Ultimately, however, the book’s strength is also its weakness. The anecdotal evidence of diaries and memoirs makes for fascinating reading but cannot be taken to represent broader public sentiments nor fashioned into a systematic argument. Toye admits as much in several places, which also leaves him at times to conclude the obvious: “[Churchill’s] speeches, from the beginning, did make many people more optimistic, but initially they made plenty of others feel pessimistic too. The broadcaster did not send an instantaneous thrill through everyone, and they at first attracted a fair amount of criticism, of varying degrees of thoughtfulness” (71). One assumes a few grumblers and malcontents as well amongst the crowds surrounding Pericles and Lincoln. Further, the author several times suggests that historians have unanimously acclaimed the “almost mystical power of Churchill’s oratory” (11) without ever naming one scholar who has done so. Still, if Toye has not succeeded in toppling the prime minister’s oratorical reputation, he does offer valuable and unique insights into the composition, delivery, and reception of Churchill’s speeches.
In this new biography, historian Charles Neu takes on the challenge of Edward M. House, friend and confident of President Woodrow Wilson. There have been other biographies of the “Colonel” (the title was an honorific one), including Alexander and Juliette George’s severely flawed Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (1964) and Godfrey Hodgson’s shorter 2006 biography, Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House. There is also The Intimate Papers of Colonel House by Edward Mandell House (Charles Seymour, ed.), which is an authorized biography with the bias one would expect from such a work. Neu, an experienced scholar of American foreign policy goes much further in-depth on House and his relationship with Wilson than does Hodgson, and avoids the embarrassing psychohistory of the George work. Colonel House is a straightforward biography, covering his entire life (1858–1938), with the most attention paid to the critical years between 1911 and 1920, when House was not only Wilson’s closest confident, but his personal diplomatic representative to the European powers before, during, and after the First World War.

Edward Mandell House was the youngest of eight children (seven of whom were boys) born to a wealthy Houston businessman and his wife. With the family’s wealth, much of which was held in large tracts of land throughout the state, came political contacts, access to the powerful, and influence in state affairs. While his brothers went into business, Edward House found a role as a political kingmaker in the Texas Democratic Party. By the beginning of the 20th century, the support of his political faction, known as “Our Crowd,” was crucial for any would-be Texas Democratic politician to cultivate. House polished his skills at exerting influence not through political office, but by being a useful adviser, an indispensable man to those in elected office. Often in poor health, House decided early on that his place in life was to help other men achieve power and to influence policy through them.

Tiring of Texas politics, House looked for a larger stage, and in 1911 he found that stage with New Jersey governor and former president of Princeton University Woodrow Wilson. The Texas kingmaker was looking for a progressive leader for the national Democratic Party that he could follow. William Jennings Bryan had already lost three races for president by then, and although House and Bryan were friends, he was not the leader House was searching for. Wilson was. House met Wilson in November 1911. The would-be adviser and the would-be president bonded from the start and House began to play a small role in Wilson’s 1912 campaign. Wilson found his new aide’s advice useful, and House was able to help place several members of “Our Crowd” in Wilson’s cabinet. He also helped Wilson choose other members of his new administration. House refused any formal appointments, but became Wilson’s most important confidant and befriended First Lady Ellen Axson Wilson as well. Neu describes how House became a part of Wilson’s family circle, not only the president’s adviser, but one of his best friends.

Wilson’s proclivity for using unofficial diplomatic channels to supplement the State Department’s role has long been a topic of historical analysis (including this reviewer’s own article in a 2007 issue of Studiesa). House was perhaps the most important member of Wilson’s unofficial diplomatic team and he fell on his new role with relish. Meeting with prime ministers and hobnobbing with diplomats in London, Berlin, and Paris gave House the place among the powerful that he so desired. Unfortunately, as Neu notes, he “overemphasized person-to-person contacts.” When meeting with Wilson upon his return to the US after European tours in 1913 and 1914 he “exaggerated his accomplishments, and engaged in wishful thinking rather than analyze the historical forc-

es” that shaped how the European powers behaved. (136). This was a critical fault that House would display again and again: having achieved success in Texas and on the national stage by using his individual contacts, he thought he could duplicate that success internationally. In this he ignored the larger influences that shaped the European power’s policies, and interpreted polite non-committal diplomatic comments as concrete commitments. Then he would report his successes to Wilson, who lacked enough accurate reporting from his own ambassadors that could have placed House’s reports in a more realistic light.

House’s downfall was slow to come, but it came at an especially inopportune time. Ellen Wilson had died in August 1914, just as Europe was going to war. House became the single most important friend and confidant to the grief-stricken president. In March 1915 Wilson met a pretty, local, wealthy Washington widow, Edith Bolling Galt. The meeting had been arranged by members of Wilson’s family and friends, not including House, in hopes that Edith might alleviate the grieving man’s loneliness. She did. Wilson fell madly in love, and he soon proposed marriage. House approved of the president’s new romance, but advised him to wait until after the 1916 election to get married. Wilson and Edith instead married in late 1915. The president’s new wife joined his ranks of advisers, a role to which she was ill-suited. Neu describes her well, she was “lively and stylish, but poorly educated and intolerant of the president’s closest advisors.” (200) She began to resent House and denigrated him to her husband, once writing “I can’t help feeling that he is not a very strong character.” (201, emphasis in original) Edith would eventually manage to alienate and separate Wilson from some of his most loyal counselors, including House.

At the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, House would play an even bigger role than he had before, but it would be a Pyrrhic success. He accompanied Wilson to Paris for the talks, supplanting Secretary of State Robert Lansing as the president’s most important foreign policy advisor. House set up The Inquiry, a group of over 100 academics and other experts who gathered information and wrote briefings for Wilson to help plan the peace for the end of the war. It was, in effect, a temporary intelligence agency, a precursor in many ways to the CIA’s own Directorate of Intelligence.

When Wilson left the conference to return to the United States, he left House to take his place among the Council of Ten to negotiate as the American representative. House feared that growing impatience for a peace treaty among some of the European peoples might lead to increased instability and provide an opening for Bolshevism. Accordingly, he rushed to quickly complete a final treaty to present to the Germans. In doing so, House seemed to agree with France’s demands for a harsh treaty, including the creation of a Rhenish buffer state between France and Germany. Instead of being pleased that so much had been decided, Wilson was appalled when he returned, telling a friend, “House has given away everything I had won...I will have to start all over again...” (406). To make matters worse, the London Times had printed a story that praised House’s role at the conference, which was picked up by an American newspaper. The reporter was close to House so it looked to Edith as if her husband’s advisor was pumping up his own reputation at the expense of the president. She made certain that Wilson saw the story. When she confronted House over the matter he fled the room and the two never met in person again, validating her opinion of him as a “weak vessel.” (412). In the end there was no sudden final break between Wilson and House. They continued to meet and to exchange letters, but the president grew noticeably cooler and House found himself firmly shunted out of Wilson’s circle of advisors. The “grandiose expectations” that Neu notes both men shared for the peace agreement collapsed. (511). House lived for another 14 years after Wilson died in 1924, and he spent much of that time defending his own—as well as Wilson’s—legacy.

House’s failures were, at least in part, the president’s as well. In Neu’s estimate, Wilson sent House “abroad with only vague instructions and carelessly monitored his negotiations on the capitals of Europe.” He left “a void for [House’s] self-importance to fill.” (511). House was positioned to accomplish much more than he did. He was skilled at negotiation and was happy to act outside of the spotlight. Given specific instructions and kept on a tighter leash, he could have been a trustworthy adviser who might have provided Wilson with perceptive insights into European leaders’ personalities and priorities. When he moved from policy advisor to policy creator in Paris, however, House overstepped both his role and his skills.

The book reflects the author’s long experience as a researcher familiar with the relevant sources. House destroyed most of his personal documents dealing with his earlier career as a king-maker in Texas politics, but he
left a detailed diary of his years on the national political stage. His diary, however, is a potential minefield for historians, as House used it to reassure himself of his own intelligence, influence, and wisdom—all of which he often embellished. Neu noted how House developed “a streak of vanity…an exaggerated sense of his own importance.” (510). Ironically, House need not have inflated his influence and historical importance: he actually did play a crucial role during a critical point in American history as the United States began to wield its influence as a world power, and Neu expertly captures both House’s strengths and his weaknesses. Neu’s work deserves to remain the standard work on Colonel House for years to come. He mined the relevant archives, knows the secondary literature as well as anyone in the profession, and has been gathering material for this book for years; however, for the intelligence professional, the book is very light on details about The Inquiry. Lawrence E. Gelfand’s book remains the standard work for that subject. Nonetheless, Colonel House is a worthy capstone to a long, distinguished career and a welcome addition to the bookshelf of anyone interested in this pivotal era in American foreign policy.

**Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf**

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

---

**CURRENT TOPICS**

*Need To Know: Eastern and Western Perspectives*, edited by Władysław Buhak and Thomas Wegener Friis

*Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, by Richards J. Heuer, Jr., and Randolph H. Pherson

---

**GENERAL**

*Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence: Over 800 Phrases Used in International and Covert Espionage*, by Bob Burton

*Intelligence: From Secrecy to Policy*, by Mark Lowenthal

*The Secret Agent’s Bedside Reader: A Compendium of Spy Writing*, edited by Michael Smith

*Stories From Langley: A Glimpse Inside the CIA*, edited by Edward Mickolus

---

**HISTORICAL**

*Donald and Melinda Maclean: Idealism and Espionage*, by Michael Holzman

*Double Cross in Cairo: The True Story of the Spy Who Turned the Tide of War in the Middle East*, by Nigel West

*The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA*, by Richard H. Immerman

*Hugh Trevor-Roper—The Secret World: Behind the Curtain of British Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War*, edited by Edward Harrison

*Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*, by William Blum

*Kim Philby: Our Man In Moscow—The Life of a Cold War Master Spy*, by Christian Shakespeare

*Operation Crossbow: The Untold Story of Photographic Intelligence and the Search for Hitler’s V Weapons*, by Allan Williams

*Operation Valuable Fiend: The CIA’s First Paramilitary Strike Against the Iron Curtain*, by Albert Lulushi

*Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe: 1950–1989*, by Paweł Machcewicz

*Pot Shards: Fragments of a Life Lived in CIA, the White House, and the Two Koreas*, by Donald P. Gregg

*A Spy’s Son: The True Story of the Highest Ranking CIA Officer Ever Convicted of Espionage and the Son He Trained to Spy for Russia*, by Bryan Denson

*Stalin's Agent: The Life & Death of Alexander Orlov*, by Boris Volodarsky

---

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
“Are Intelligence Studies a dirty business?”a (7) In their studies of Cold War intelligence, the editors of Need To Know were asked this question by scholars from Central European nations. The mere asking, they concluded, suggested there was inadequate knowledge of the topic in general, and in particular, the Anglo-American tradition of intelligence studies where the value of intelligence has long been recognized. Thus they sought greater interaction among the researchers in East and West. Toward this end, a series of “Need To Know” conferences have been sponsored by the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) and the University of Southern Denmark (USD). The 14 well documented papers from the first conference presented intelligence research “coming out of Central Europe” (11) and are contained in Need To Know.

For many Western readers and scholars, the authors—all academics—and their topics will be at once unfamiliar and enlightening. For example, Helmut Müller-Enbergs asks, “How Successful was the Stasi in the West After All?” Kimmo Elo looks at “East German HUMINT Networks on Nordic Affairs” and Douglas Selvage discusses “Soviet-Bloc Active Measures and the Helsinki Process, 1976–1983.” Jacek Tebinka analyzes “Intelligence in Anglo-Polish Relations,” and Sławomir Łukasiewicz reports on “Polish Communists’ Intelligence against European Institutions during the Cold War.” Czech scholar Matej Medvecký reviews “Czechoslovak Foreign Intelligence Service and Great Britain at the Beginning of the Cold War,” and Kurt Jensen and Don Muton analyze the “Early Years of the Canada-United States Foreign Intelligence Relationship.” Terrorism was also of interest to the Soviet bloc nations, and Przemysław Gasztold-Seń’s article looks at “Polish Intelligence and International Terrorism during the Cold War.” Austria has long been a center of espionage activity, and Dieter Bacher examines the early Cold War days in his piece, “The Recruitment of Austrian Citizens by Foreign Intelligence Services in Austria from 1946–1953.” Belgium, recently labeled the “Kintergarten” and “the place to be for intelligence officers,” (175) is studied by Idesbalk Goddeeris in his piece, “Polish Intelligence in Brussels.” The subject of counterintelligence gets attention from Patryk Plestok in his chapter, “Polish Counterintelligence and Western Diplomats (1956–1989),” and Thomas Wegener Friis considers it, too, in his contribution, “Intelligence and Counterintelligence in Denmark.”

On a more general academic topic, Władysław Bułhak’s contribution, “In search of a Methodology in the Cold War Communist Intelligence Studies,” asks whether Western research methodology can be applied when studying the former Eastern services.

Although the ubiquity of intelligence is taken for granted, Need To Know adds new viewpoints and demonstrates how it is viewed and applied by other nations. We are not alone.


Former CIA deputy director John McLaughlin also served as deputy director for intelligence and in a number of key positions elsewhere in the Intelligence Community. (He is also a member of this journal’s Editorial Board.)
When he takes the time to comment on a book, readers should pay attention. One of the important points he makes in his foreword to this new edition of *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* is that “all analysts should do something to test the conclusions they advance.” He doesn’t minimize the role of “expert judgment and intuition”—he just wants analysts to “rigorously test their own conclusions” and he views this book as a means for “doing precisely that.” (xvi)

Heuer and Pherson developed structured techniques to reduce the inherent risks of analytical error. Besides explaining the techniques themselves, they discuss how to choose the right one for both individual use and for collaborative team analysis. In all cases they consider methods for validating results.

This new edition of the book adds five new techniques, plus a discussion of “intuitive versus analytic approaches to thinking.” (xviii) There are also stimulating inputs on dealing with cognitive bias, idea generation, and challenge analysis to name just a few. While the emphasis is on intelligence analysis, they point out that the structured techniques described are generic in applicability and can be used in any situation—police, security, corporate conflict management—where one is tasked with sorting out often conflicting and incomplete data.

In order to get an idea of how these techniques work in practice, the authors recommend consulting the revised edition of a companion volume, *Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action.*

*Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* is a positive contribution to the literature on analytic techniques. It recognizes the value of the expert while giving sound guidance on how to become one.

---


---

**Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence: Over 800 Phrases Used in International and Covert Espionage** by Bob Burton (Skyhorse Publishing, 2014), 189 pp., appendices, no index.

The entries in this so-called dictionary of phrases by former Marine and current bounty hunter Bob Burton are brimming with semantic blemishes. The most prevalent is the misuse of the word “phrase.” Since *phrase* is defined as two or more words, many of the entries—including the entire first page—don’t qualify. More important is the mischaracterization of generic terms as part of the intelligence jargon—as, for example, anagram, inventory, graphic arts, buck slip, collection agency, danger signals, desk, plain language, interpretation, and release.

There are also a number of entries for alleged, out-of-date, or no longer extant organizations. A few are worth noting: House 7, Pacific Corporation, PICKLE newsletter, PFIAB, Tea and Biscuit Company, Technical Services Division (TSD), W. H. Division within CIA, and the grossly outdated CIA organization chart. (188) The most serious deficiencies in the dictionary are the entries with incorrect definitions or explanations. For example, “Agent-in-place . . . often used to describe a defector . . .” is not only self-contradictory, it is not in the fiction or non-fiction espionage lexicon; (6) “CampX” was a WWII (not a Cold War) designation; “ears only,” “faith-based-intelligence,” (71) “fix the hole,” and “lexspionage” (99) are not in the intelligence or espionage lexicon; “Jedburg” (correct spelling JEDBURGH) was not “an OSS unit that operated in France in WWII,” and JMWAVE was not a “clandestine radio station in Miami.” (95)

The potentially useful Appendix 2, “Equivalent Security Classifications of Foreign Countries and International Pact Organizations,” is unsourced, like all other entries in the Dictionary, leaving the reader wondering about its accuracy. On the other hand, Appendix 4,
“The Intelligence Community,” is out of date, omitting the Department of Homeland Security, among others. Mr. Burton might well have benefited from the contemporary maxim: what does Wikipedia or GOOGLE say? The Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence does not live up to the promise of its title. Caveat lector!


There are about 10,000 books in English devoted to various aspects of the intelligence profession. Most are about espionage and counterintelligence. Many are histories of civilian and military intelligence services. Still others are devoted to the analysis and the role of intelligence in foreign policy, and a number are concerned with the technical aspects of the profession. A few have appeared in second editions with new material. But only one has been issued in six editions: *Intelligence: From Secrecy to Policy*.

Several reasons explain this phenomenon. First, the author is a respected expert in the field. Mark Lowenthal has long experience in government and intelligence services and has taught intelligence courses at Johns Hopkins and Columbia Universities. Second, the book is a contemporaneous account of intelligence events that are in constant flux. Third, it reads well and provokes thought. Finally, the book sells. While the current edition has the same number of chapters with the same titles as its immediate predecessor, it also has 117 pages of new material. The expanded topics include congressional oversight, collection, and the use of “big data” in analysis. To these are added problems associated with “multi-INT” and “all-source” analysis that may confuse policymakers. (189) He also covers the ever-expanding difficulties associated with leaks, especially the contributions of Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden. Finally, many more foreign intelligence services are discussed, and the commentary on drones—unmanned aerial vehicles—has been revised and updated with some thoughts, inter alia, on the ethics of the program.

The flexibility of digital publishing and the constant changes in the Intelligence Community suggest the 6th edition will not be the last. In any case, *Intelligence: From Secrecy to Policy* is likely to remain the premier primer in the field.


In 1957, the Greene brothers—Graham and Hugh—edited *The Spy’s Bedside Book* in which, among other things, they suggested that espionage services of the time recommend that their officers acquaint themselves with public literature on the subject to improve their skills. Intelligence writer Michael Smith follows in the footsteps of the Greenes and, despite the implied limitations in the title, aims to include in the book’s readership those who are not spies. The 44 selections in this *Bedside Reader* include both fiction and non-fiction. All authors had a connection with the British intelligence services, though in some cases (as with William Le Queux, for example), the connection was the influence their fiction had on the profession in the early 20th century since they were never in a service themselves.

A few samples of the entries will convey their scope. Some come from a familiar pen. Ian Fleming probably heads that list—Childers and Maugham are also there—and Smith has chosen samples of his wartime writings...
to show that the foundations for James Bond were solid. On the less-known side, one finds the comments by the world class misogynist, Sir Basil Thomson of Scotland Yard, and his views on the value of female agents. A contribution from former MI5 officer Harry Hunter’s Watcher’s Handbook explains the surveillance techniques he developed and implemented; Anthony Blunt was also impressed and gave a copy to Soviet intelligence. A selection written by Kim Philby came from the KGB archives. The entry by Graham Greene is from The Human Factor, one of the finest counterintelligence novels ever written. Le Carré’s brief “History of George Smiley” is taken from an earlier book, Call for the Dead, and is a reminder that Smiley existed before Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. The final contribution, “Uncommon Enemy,” was written by Alan Judd before he left MI6 and will encourage the reader to seek out his later novels.

The selections are a few pages at most, and each is preceded by introductory comments about the author and the source of the material. The Secret Agent’s Bedside Reader is good reading, whether in bed, on a plane, or just sitting by the fire at home.


It would be close to impossible in the Internet age not to have read or heard about the CIA, most often in connection with espionage or covert action rather than the technical and administrative support functions essential to such operations. Similarly, when media attention does mention the analytic functions of the agency, the focus is on intelligence estimates, which represent the end of the analytic process rather than the analysts and what they do to produce these estimates. In Stories from Langley, former CIA intelligence officer Ed Mickolus has collected a series of analyst and support officer reminiscences that seek to remedy these deficiencies.

The 32 stories included range in length from one to nearly 100 pages. The latter deals with a three-man technical surveillance support team sent to Cuba during the Kennedy administration on temporary duty. Operating under flimsy cover, their mission was to place listening devices in an embassy. They were captured, spent 949 days Castro’s jails, and never broke cover. Three days after returning, their CIA status leaked to the press. Walter Szuminski, the surviving member of the trio, recalls his experiences in the chapter entitled, “Our Man in Havana’s Jails—A Temporary Duty Assignment in Hell.”

In another story from the same era, Hazel Harrison recollects her life on a Virginia farm with “no telephone, no bathroom, and no television.” (225) Starting in the agency as a secretary, without a college degree, she went on to supervisory positions in logistics, serving at Headquarters and overseas. She is candid about the problems female officers encountered in those days and explains how she dealt with them.

With degrees in geology from the University of Virginia and Yale and unsatisfied with his experiences in the commercial world, Nick Starr applied to the CIA because of the variety of opportunities offered. His 32-year career included service in the operations center, work as an arms control analyst, duty in the Counterintelligence Center and on the Intelligence Community Staff. Perhaps his most haunting experience was being shot by Aimal Kasi as he waited to enter the Headquarters compound in 1993; two other officers were killed in the assault. With that one exception, he enjoyed “every minute” of his career.

Among the other fascinating accounts, readers will find stories from a former national intelligence officer on the Soviet Union, an analyst who became the agency’s executive director, a former head of the infamous Publications Review Board (PRB), an inspector general, a Vietnam veteran who served as an analyst in DIA and CIA, and an analyst who worked with Paul Nitze and stood her ground when her judgment differed from that of her immediate supervisor—she was right.
Stories from Langley is just a small sampling of the varied careers CIA analysts and support officers experience—a valuable, unusual, and positive addition to the intelligence literature.

HISTORICAL

Donald and Melinda Maclean: Idealism and Espionage, by Michael Holzman (Chelmsford Press, 2014), 397 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.

The subjects of this dual biography are well known to students of intelligence history. The story has been told before, first in 1955 by Geoffrey Hoare and some 30 years later by Robert Cecil, a former Foreign Office subordinate of Maclean. Hoare’s account contained no sources and relied on conversations with members of the Maclean family he had known for years. Cecil relied on his firsthand knowledge and cited other sources that had emerged in the interim. Now historian Michael Holzman has revisited the subject based on extensive research of new material that has become available since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Holzman’s approach seeks “to avoid the rhetoric of both journalistic and seemingly scholarly writing about espionage” that labels Maclean and his fellow Cambridge spies as drunk, seedy, often homosexual, traitors. “Such characterizations,” he writes, “are not meant to lead to understanding; they are meant to prevent it.” (14) He goes on to suggest “that it is best to avoid talk about treason and traitors when writing about espionage matters.” His sympathetic biography concentrates on “who they were, what they did, and the effects of their actions on their chosen world: the political.” (15)

Thus there is very little new in Donald and Melinda Maclean. As Holzman chronicles their lives, he confirms that Donald’s reversal of allegiance occurred before he reached Cambridge. And Melinda was a communist, in spirit at least, when they met in Paris, though this conclusion was not reported in the accounts cited above. Similarly, though those same accounts did not conclude Melinda was aware of Donald’s espionage, Holzman is convinced that she was a willing supporter.

Holzman discusses Donald’s well known wartime assignments in France, London, America, and Cairo; the material to which he had access; and the events that led to his identification as a Soviet agent in May of 1951. Unlike other accounts, Holzman is convinced Melinda was also witting of Donald’s defection plans and contributed to their success.

The final part of the book discusses Melinda’s decision to join Donald in Moscow, the gradual disintegration of their marriage, her affair with Kim Philby, and her eventual return to America and self-imposed obscurity; their children would eventually follow. Donald remained in Moscow until his death, and Holzman describes his efforts to become a genuine communist. Holzman also quotes some of his writings on the Soviet economy that, he suggests, presaged those of Gorbachev. (354) Donald Maclean died alone in 1983.

While Holzman prefers viewing the Macleans’ saga as an idealist product of the 1930s, the facts he presents suggest a more accurate description would be idealistic traitors. In any case, this book is the best treatment of the Maclean case to date.

Double Cross in Cairo: The True Story of the Spy Who Turned the Tide of War in the Middle East, by Nigel West (Biteback Publishing Ltd, 2015), 321 pp., bibliography, index.

TRICYCLE, GARBO, and MUTT & JEFF, are among the best known double agent codenames run by the British Double-Cross operation in WWII. CHEESE is perhaps the least known. Sir Michael Howard, the official historian of strategic deception in WWII, wrote that “the importance of CHEESE in Cairo should not be underrated” but gave few details. Military historian Nigel West argues that, as an MI6 agent, CHEESE “is unrivalled, and accomplished more, over a longer period, than any other.” (xxv) Double Cross in Cairo tells his story.

Renato Levi was a multilingual Italian Jew approached by the Abwehr in 1939. He reported the contact to MI6, was encouraged to accept, and he did. The French and Italians also requested his services and he accepted them, too. He didn’t hate Germans, but he was upset over their Jewish policies and remained loyal to the Brits. The Germans sent him to Cairo with poor paperwork, and he made it only with British help. Working with the British deception unit known as ‘A’ Force, Levi became CHEESE and—with his handlers, who were mostly gifted amateurs—established a fictitious agent network that deceived German intelligence for the rest of the war. MI6 would confirm from German records that 21 of the 26 notional divisions identified by CHEESE were accepted in their official order of battle.

A’ Force created personnel files on all the fictitious CHEESE network agents and fed the intelligence they putatively collected to the Germans. Levi even had a notional girlfriend—codenamed MISANTHROPE—who became so important that when the Germans demanded to meet her, a stand-in had to be found to play her role.

The CHEESE case was exceptional for a number of reasons. At one point a German handler learned he had agreed to work for the French, but he survived only when another handler vouched for him. But the most unusual aspect of the case began when Levi was meeting with the Germans in Rome and was arrested, accused of collaborating with the British, and sentenced to five years in jail. In the meantime, though his British handlers realized something was wrong when communications stopped, they assumed Levi would not admit he was CHEESE, and the Brits continued to send misinformation from CHEESE for several months while Levi was imprisoned. Throughout the war, 432 cables were sent in CHEESE’s name.

Double Cross in Cairo chronicles Levi’s wartime experiences and those actions taken in his name, but it does not document them. West does quote National Archive sources but does not identify them by file number. For further work on the CHEESE case, his National Archive files would have to be consulted.

At war’s end, Levi was paid a lump sum by MI6 and left with his family for Australia on a chartered banana boat with a cargo of Turkish carpets. At some point he returned to Italy, where he died in 1954.


In September 2007, Richard Immerman took a leave of absence from Temple University, where he was a distinguished professor of history, and began 18 months service as assistant deputy director of national intelligence for analytical integrity and standards and analytic ombudsman in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Working in the ODNI gave him “new insights on the entire intelligence enterprise.”

(x) It also led to the writing of The Hidden Hand.
This was not Immerman’s first contribution to the intelligence literature. His dissertation was published as a book—*The CIA in Guatemala*—and he contributed the first chapter, entitled “A Brief History of the CIA” to a 2006 book on the agency. The *Hidden Hand* expands on that essay and reflects the views he acquired in the ODNI about “America’s most enigmatic” and well-known institution.

The CIA enigma, Immerman goes on, has attributes beyond the inherent secrecy of its operations. “Opinion poll after opinion poll reveal that it is among America’s most unpopular, disrespected, and mistrusted institutions.” Nevertheless, after discussing several of the popular films and TV dramas that present fictionalized accounts of agency operations, he concludes that “it is unequivocally a cultural icon” and “as central to America’s popular culture as it is to its national security.”

Immerman approaches this task by analyzing the people, policies, and outcomes of the major events in CIA’s history—from the impact of Pearl Harbor to the consequences of 9/11. Topics like covert action and the satellite program occur throughout, and he discusses their contributions. The impact of one-time events like the Church Committee investigation and the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991 are treated in depth. Concerning the latter issue, he notes that the fact that CIA “did not predict the end of the Cold War . . . should not be added to its list of intelligence failures.” While no specific reason is provided, Immerman considers a number of factors, including the April 1991 estimate that concluded “the current political system in the Soviet Union is doomed.”

In his summary of post-9/11 events, Immerman notes CIA’s reservations about the inaccuracy of reports suggesting Saddam Hussein had attempted to acquire yellow cake uranium, and that the president mentioned that “fact” in his state of the union speech, citing British intelligence as his source. Subsequent events however, writes Immerman, revealed that the British investigation of the matter “relied on forged documents.” This assertion is incorrect as pointed out in the Butler report, which stated: “The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made.”

A concluding chapter discusses the reformed Intelligence Community and notes that national intelligence estimates under the auspices of the ODNI are “uniformly superior to their antecedents.” It also mentions CIA’s battle with the DNI over operational responsibilities, the clashes with Congress over enhanced interrogations, the utility and morality of the drone program, and what Immerman sees as the danger of the “militarization of the intelligence.” He concludes that the CIA should shed its “paramilitary responsibilities” and concentrate on its more traditional mission: collection and analysis.

*The Hidden Hand* is a metaphor for Immerman’s critical study of the CIA’s contribution to US foreign policy. Despite chronicling CIA’s track record of controversy, Immerman leaves the impression that it is a necessary element of US national security.

---

*a.* Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (University of Texas Press, 1982).


the last of them, with the exception, of course, of the deferential and reliable Kim Philby, the only one they trusted.” Then in 1968, with the publication of Philby’s memoir, it was the anything-but-deferential Trevor-Roper who, with the official approval of MI6, published The Philby Affair. This now classic account of “the secret world Trevor-Roper shared with Philby . . . provided his own explanation of Philby’s treachery.” (x) The Philby Affair was highly regarded at CIA, and Walter Pforzheimer later wrote that Richard Helms “made the essay ‘must reading’ for all his senior officers.” (xvii) Now historian Edward Harrison has included it in this collection of Trevor-Roper’s writings on intelligence.

In his lengthy introductory essay, Professor Harrison reviews Trevor-Roper’s sometimes controversial wartime service in MI6 and the important friends he made there and in MI5. Trevor-Roper’s skill in winning bureaucratic turf battles, insistence on speaking truth to power, and his ability to express articulately his views on German intelligence won him admiration. It was this array of attributes that led Dick White, who would later head MI5 and MI6, to select him to investigate the death of Adolf Hitler. Harrison explains the scholarly way he went about the task that led to The Last Days of Hitler, the book that made him world famous. In addition to The Philby Affair, Professor Harrison includes nine additional essays, one by Trevor-Roper himself that tells the story of the beginnings of his intelligence career. Several of the others are lengthy book critiques—analyses, really—of well-known, popular books on WWII intelligence. For example, he deplored (for good reason) Anthony Cave Brown’s Bodyguard of Lies. And he found The Man Called Intrepid, a hagiography of Sir William Stephenson, a quest for greater publicity where fantasy was its dominating quality. He concludes his assessment of Spycatcher by Peter Wright, with the comment that “we have not yet found a means of controlling egregious traitors from within like Peter Wright.” (189) Trevor-Roper judged the memoir of the American Cambridge spy, Michael Straight, more favorably and Climate of Treason, the book that exposed Anthony Blunt, “difficult reading; but its content is fascinating.” (151) Harrison also includes a piece Trevor-Roper wrote on “Why Otto John Defected Thrice.” In it he wrote that “successful espionage . . . requires continual regeneration: fresh though constant vigilance, continuous adaptation to changing circumstances.” (204) A concluding appendix contains an exchange of correspondence with Patrick Reilly, personal assistant to the chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, on the subject of Kim Philby.

Hugh Trevor-Roper—The Secret World informs the reader with critical views of the intelligence profession in elegant style. History at its best, an indisputably valuable contribution.

---


The first edition of this book, The CIA: A Forgotten History, was published in 1986. It contained 49 instances of CIA contributions to imperialism through interventions in other nations’ affairs. At least that is how freelance journalist, William Blum, saw it. The updated edition adds new examples that reflect Blum’s unchanged worldview. The West, he suggests, has never gotten over the Bolshevik “audacity of overthrowing the capitalist-feudal regime and proclaiming the first socialist state in history of the world . . . this was uppityness writ large. This was a crime the Allies had to punish.” (7–8)

The 56 operations Blum discusses in this revision are all well-known covert actions, viewed from the left, with the implication that the world would have been better off had they not occurred. A typical tone can be found...
in the chapter on provocative operations involving spy planes—the U-2 included—and book publishing; both, as he sees it, only made matters worse and accomplished nothing. While Blum’s judgment in each is open to debate, in the case of Operation Splinter Factor and the defec-
tion of Polish intelligence officer Jozef Swiatło, he is just wrong: there never was an Operation Splinter Factor.

Killing Hope is documented with sources that support Blum’s position, including several books by former CIA officers John Stockwell and Philip Agee. For those with an open mind it provides a view-
point from one dedicated to avoiding that option.

Kim Philby: Our Man In Moscow—The Life of A Cold War Master Spy, by Christian Shakespeare (CreateSpace, 2015), 312 pp., photos, no index.

Three recent books about onetime MI6 officer and KGB agent Kim Philby have each contributed in different ways to the continuing interest in the case. Two of these added new perspectives about his relationships with others and his traitorous motivations: one was based on scholarly research and interviews with those who knew Philby; the other was a memoir by a schoolboy friend and fellow MI6 officer. The third book, Kim Philby: Our Man in Moscow, is an undocumented compendium of material whose most prominent qualities are the number of factual errors, the amount of pure speculation, dodgy judgments, sloppy editing, and lack of a single source. Readers familiar with the Philby saga will find nothing new in this book. Those new to the subject are cautioned not to begin their inquiry with this piece of literary malfeasance. Philby was not, as the author asserts, a “double agent” (1), and the atomic material to which he and his Cambridge spies had access did not tip “the atomic balance away from the West.” (6) His second wife bore each of his five children, not just three. (6) Philby was not the first to let the Venona secret “slip to the USSR.” (134) And MI6 does not have a director general, nor was Philby “groomed for that position.” (157) The unsupported claim that Philby “was the most damaging of all the traitors” (5) is unwarranted speculation equaled only by the author’s imagined description of Philby’s escape from Beirut. (1)

Bluntly summarized, Kim Philby: Our Man in Moscow should be allowed to slip into history unread.

Operation Crossbow: The Untold Story of Photographic Intelligence and the Search for Hitler’s V Weapons, by Allan Williams (Preface Publishing, 2013), 450 pp., sources and bibliography, photos, index.

British historian Allan Williams is Curator of the National Collection Aerial Photography at Medmenham. The collection, he writes, documents the “triumphs of photographic intelligence during the conflict.” (10) Operation Crossbow, which he describes as “the hunt for the flying bomb,” involved “over 3,000 sorties . . . and 1.2 million prints” for interpretation. (9) Still, his characterization of the operation as a triumph seems an exaggeration. The more than 7,000 V1s successfully launched killed some 6,000 Londoners, injured 18,000 more, and destroyed 750,000 homes in about 80 days. Then came 1,900 V2s, the supersonic missiles that struck without warning, of which 500 hit London, killing 2,724 and injuring 6,467. (7) And these figures, provided by Williams, don’t include the missiles that struck Paris and Antwerp. (302)

It is true that, beginning in November 1943, the interpreters had targeted launch sites and manufacturing locations which were bombed by the RAF. And this accounts for Operation Crossbow’s success, he explains, since, in
bombing launch sites and support facilities, the Allies reduced the V2 launch rate below the quantity needed to change the course of the war. It is also true that the launches stopped as the Allies advanced toward Germany. Which event had the greater effect is not discussed.

Leaving aside the adjectival reservations, Operation Crossbow does provide a detailed and well documented—with primary sources—account of the role aerial reconnaissance and photo interpretation played in WWII. Williams begins before the war and tracks the players—British and American, many with famous names—along the sometimes bumpy road of progress through to the end.

The photo interpreter best known to Americans, Flt. Off. Constance Babington-Smith, headed the section that interpreted the image that showed the flying bomb “sitting on a ramp, ready to fire,” (178) at Peenemünde, Germany. After the war in Germany ended, she was seconded to the Americans and worked in the Pentagon. She was the first British woman to be awarded the American Legion of Merit for her work. (361) In 1957, she wrote Air Spy, a book about her wartime experience. It was the first to bring attention to the role of photo interpretation in the war.

Operation Crossbow is a good account of WWII aerial reconnaissance and will be of interest to PIs everywhere.


Albert Lulushi is an Albanian-American who learned in the 1970s of the multiple operations conducted by the CIA and its allies aimed at overthrowing the communist Albanian regime—headed by Enver Hoxha—beginning in 1949. He remembers the museum in Tirana, run by the Albanian secret police (the Sigurimi) that housed an extensive display of artifacts taken from the “diversionists”—teams captured when their attempts to bring down the regime failed.

After the protests of 1989 led to reforms by the communist government, Lulushi left Albania and arrived in the United States in 1990. It was here that he learned about other versions of the unsuccessful attempts to topple the Hoxha regime. The prevailing explanation for the failed operations at that time was laid out in a book by Nicholas Bethell that placed the blame squarely on Kim Philby, a view he accepted. Then in 2012, Lulushi had occasion to examine the case again and discovered that the timeline of events ruled out Philby as the source that compromised many of the operations. Seeking to find the complete story, he learned the CIA files on the operations had been declassified and were available at the National Archive. Access to former participants in American and Albania followed. Operation Valuable Fiend is the result.

There was no Operation Valuable Fiend. Project FIEND or BGFIEND (xii) was the first, or one of the first, covert action projects undertaken by the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The more experienced British, who initially played an equally active role in the project, gave their plan the codename VALUABLE. (53) Lulushi describes some operational collaboration between the two, for example, his very interesting account of the 15 November 1949 joint planning session in the Pentagon chaired by Frank Wisner, with Philby representing SIS. But his emphasis is on FIEND, the Albanian reactions and the multiple sources that could account for failure after failure of the infiltration attempts. And while he makes a plausible case that Philby was not the one who compromised the first British attempt, he does not disprove Bethell’s assertion, and the MI6 didn’t provide any documents that helped. By 1950, with CIA’s absorption of the bulk of the effort, it was agreed that, while collaboration would continue at the policy level, operations would be continued unilaterally. (95)

Operation Valuable Fiend chronicles in detail the numerous attempts to achieve the FIEND goals even as the possibility of success spiraled out of view. Lulushi also describes ancillary programs of propaganda, economic warfare, and psychological persuasion designed to enhance the probability of success. Nothing worked, and by 1953 the programs were shut down. Thus ended any hope that the former ruler of Albania, King Zog—who had cooperated in FIEND projects, albeit reluctantly at times—could regain his throne.

Lulushi concludes, somewhat surprisingly, that despite the failure of the project, “the world is a better place because of the efforts spent.” (259) His is the most complete account to date and well worth close attention.

---


In his 2010 book, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond author Ross Johnson discussed the CIA-sponsored radio broadcasts to listeners behind the Iron Curtain and the reactions of various communist regimes. At one point he mentions that the Polish Interior Ministry files were being examined by Pawel Machcewicz, a history professor at the Institute for National Remembrance, the custodian of the vast records of Poland’s communist past. Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe is the result of that research.

Professor Machcewicz tells his story chronologically, beginning with the start of the Radio Free Europe (RFE) Polish service in May 1952. There are four predominant themes. The first concerns RFE operations—financial, transmitter power, program content, etc.—and the links maintained with Polish dissidents and other listeners. The second focuses on attempts by the Polish security services to disrupt programing by jamming and other means, the extensive efforts to deal with those caught listening, to monitor the broadcasts for their superiors, and to estimate the total number of listeners. The latter numbers were obtained by anonymous audience surveys—data acquisition details are skimpy—and show listenership ranged from 12–60 percent, depending on extant political tensions. (4–5)

The operations planned and mounted against RFE outside Poland is the third theme. Besides propaganda portraying RFE as a tool of the CIA, there were penetrations of RFE broadcasting staff (124), the spreading of false accusations about RFE leaders—the Jan Nowak case is a good example (205)—and the creation of problems among RFE, Germany (the location of its headquarters), and the United States (the source of its support). (195ff) The fourth theme, though somewhat understated, is the influence of the Soviet Union on Polish affairs, RFE included. The notion of “Poland’s War” on RFE in the title is somewhat misleading, since the efforts of the secret police to counter “foreign political and ideological sabotage” (115) were closely linked to the KGB.

The impact of RFE on Polish listeners during the Cold War can’t be quantified, but much anecdotal evidence is provided, including the persistent efforts to silence it. Markus Wolf later observed that, “of all the various means used to influence people against the East during the Cold War, I would count [RFE] as the most effective.”b

Extensively documented, Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe conveys the importance of the broadcasts to Polish listeners, the risks they took to defy their government, and the punishment they endured when caught. It is a strong argument against absolute government control of information.


Many CIA officers would be happy with a career summed up by the subtitle. But Donald Gregg also served in the Army Security Agency (ASA), was ambassador to South Korea, and after retirement taught at Williams College—his alma mater—and also worked with The Korea Society. Pot Shards gives a glimpse of these and other fragments of time well spent.

During his senior year in college (1951), Gregg was interviewed by an astute government recruiter who quickly
decided he was best suited for the CIA: “they jump out of airplanes and are going to save the world.” (17) He did that and more during his training at The Farm with his classmate Jack Downey; later, he would meet Downey in Japan, the night before he left for Korea, just prior to his ill-fated mission to China with Richard Fecteau.a They would be reunited many years later at CIA headquarters.

An early career challenge arose when his preference for an Asian assignment yielded a language course in Bulgarian. Before overcoming that obstacle by threatening to resign—an unusual step for a young officer—he introduced himself to a young lady in the CIA library, beginning a relationship that continues to this day and is an inspiring theme throughout the book.

After service on Saipan training Asian paramilitary troops, Gregg spent several years in Japan where he learned the language, played tennis, and made important friendships. Then came duty at Headquarters on the Vietnam desk, two years in Burma, and a tour in Vietnam. The year 1970 he began a memorable period, first as chief of station in Seoul, South Korea, then back to Washington—this time on the agency staff that dealt with the dysfunctional Pike Committee investigation and later serving under DCI Stansfield Turner. Gregg adds firsthand insights about this difficult period for the clandestine service. By the end of the decade he was on the National Security Staff under Brzezinski, and he remained there during the Reagan administration.

Gregg’s White House years are some of the most interesting of his career. He traveled widely with Vice President Bush and records a memorable account of the “missing brassiere” during dinner at 10 Downing Street. He endured the Iran-Contra affair without career damage, and when Bush became president he appointed Gregg ambassador to Seoul.

With the advent of the Clinton presidency, Gregg’s government career came to an end. But his service continued with The Korea Society, a non-profit group dedicated to improving relations between America and Korea. His work there also led to six “unofficial” trips to North Korea. and his account of those experiences casts new light on that enigmatic country.

_A Spy’s Son: The True Story of the Highest Ranking CIA Officer Ever Convicted of Espionage and the Son He Trained to Spy for Russia_, by Bryan Denson (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2015), 350 pp., endnotes, index.

On 17 June 1994, just two months after onetime CIA officer Aldrich Ames was sentenced to life in prison, CIA operations officer James Nicholson volunteered his services to the Russian intelligence service (SVR) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Nicholson knew the Ames story and rationalized that “the SVR might be in the market for another highly placed mole inside the CIA.” (54) They were. Brian Denson, an investigative reporter with _The Oregonian_, first saw Nicholson in a Portland, Oregon, courtroom on 29 October 2009, where he was charged with espionage for a second time. Nicholson’s 20-year-old son, Nathan, was also in the courthouse that day and later would be charged with the same crime. Denson spent the next five years investigating the circumstances that led to this extraordinary situation. _A Spy’s Son_ tells what he discovered.

Denson would learn that on 5 June 1997, Harold James Nicholson had first been sentenced to 23 years, 7 months for spying for the Russians. Most of his story was in the public record and he reports it in _A Spy’s Son_ to lay the groundwork for the unknown part of the story: how did Nathan come to be charged with espionage and what role
had his father played? Answers to these questions came gradually as Denson established contact with Nathan, his sister, brother, and mother—long divorced from James.

Nathan, the youngest of the three children, was also the closest to his father and visited him frequently in prison not far from his Oregon home. It was during these visits that James “recruited” his son. During their meetings in the prison’s visiting room, he instructed Nathan how to contact the SVR and how to convince them his father wished to cooperate again from prison. James told Nathan he would be paid and that he could use the money for family expenses, including education. Nathan was soon his father’s enthusiastic agent. Denson describes how James took advantage of the prison’s incredibly lax security to pass written instructions and other details to Nathan, undetected. Nathan contacted the SVR successfully and met with his father’s former case officer multiple times at various locations, including in Mexico and Cyprus—always returning with cash.

Things went well for a couple of years and then Nathan was arrested by the FBI. How was he discovered? Why did he confess, and what happened to Nathan and his father after they were convicted? Denson answers these questions convincingly, though on some key points he only identifies his sources as “counterintelligence experts.” (296) The only other weakness in the book is the lack of sourcing on biographical detail.

*A Spy’s Son* illuminates a dark corner of espionage history: narrative journalism at its best.

**Stalin’s Agent: The Life & Death of Alexander Orlov**, by Boris Volodarsky (Oxford University Press, 2015), 789 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

Volodarsky has taken a revisionist look at Orlov in *Stalin’s Agent*. His central thesis asserts that much of what has been written about Orlov is incorrect. In addition to many inaccuracies concerning his NKVD career, Volodarsky aims “to prove” that “Orlov” was not in fact Orlov, that he was not a defector, and that he had never been a general. He did not recruit Burgess, Philby, Maclean, and Blunt or any member of the Oxford spy ring, as widely believed.” The sources for his “proofs” are “original documents from the KGB archives . . . declassified documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), MI5 (British Security Service), and the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST).” (2)

Before commenting on Volodarsky’s claims of career inaccuracies, the other charges can be considered quickly. It is true that Orlov was not Orlov: his real name—Leon Lazarevich Feldbin, later changed in the Soviet Union to Lev Nikolsky—was public knowledge after he surfaced in 1953. He kept the Orlov name when he was given
permanent resident status.\textsuperscript{a} And while Volodarsky calls him a “deserter”, to the FBI and CIA, he was a genuine defector—albeit an unusual one. The question as to his rank remains ambiguous; Volodarsky says there was no such rank when Orlov was in the NKVD. And while it is true that some publishers called him a general, when he testified before the Senate committee, he was referred to as “Mr.” and as a former Soviet diplomat. Similarly, there was no mention of his rank in his book on Stalin’s crimes. Finally, the authors who claim Orlov was involved in the recruitment of Burgess, Philby, and Maclean, document their positions and Volodarsky does not refute them with facts. Moreover, Orlov had left London long before Blunt was recruited and no one has claimed he had anything to do with the so-called Oxford Ring.

Turning to Orlov’s early life and his NKVD career, Volodarsky’s voluminous book challenges many details found in other public sources. These include putative discrepancies in his assignments, job titles, travel details, his operational accomplishments and his professional relationships with colleagues and superiors. He is particularly harsh about Orlov’s poor performance in Spain where Orlov was head of the NKVD element, though he does note that he received the Order of Lenin while serving there, (236) hardly a measure of Stalin’s dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that Orlov may have embellished his credentials and that previous biographers may not have had solid sources. As to whether Volodarsky has got it right, only a thorough source comparison will tell.

\textit{Stalin’s Agent} provides an unexpected windfall beyond the Orlov story. Volodarsky’s voluminous research allowed him to include much new detail about Orlov’s NKVD and GRU colleagues and political acquaintances. In fact, most of the book is about these figures, their operations, and their mostly unsuccessful efforts to survive the purges. The aggregate is a stunning portrait of Soviet intelligence officers and operations from WWI to the Cold War.

A final word about Volodarsky’s source material is essential because he states in his acknowledgments that the “declassified KGB, CIA, FBI and French DST files” were provided by Hayden Peake! (viii) When I was queried about this claim by British historian Nigel West, I replied it was untrue and I was as surprised as he was to read it. West then e-mailed Volodarsky for an explanation. Volodarsky replied with an astonishing correction. He wrote, “thanks to Pete Bagley [a former CIA officer] I received all the CIA-FBI-DST-KGB staff [stuff?]” from the CIA.” As to his “original documents from the KGB archives,” mentioned above, he added that “honestly, I did not have direct access to the KGB files.”\textsuperscript{b}

In sum, \textit{Stalin’s Agent} gets high marks for its robust coverage of Soviet intelligence while its treatment of British and American operations is a bit knotty and open to other interpretations. Thus Orlov ends up with a blurry legacy, which may have been Volodarsky’s intention, and the reader is left with areas of uncertainty.


\textsuperscript{b} E-mail from Boris Volodarsky to Nigel West, 16 February 2015. Copy in the author’s possession.