

Rethinking the Concept of Global Coverage in the US Intelligence Community

John A. Kringen

The United States is the only country in the world with a truly global intelligence enterprise, but even the significant resources the US government invests are not adequate to cover the world in the depth required to provide robust and reliable warning of events in every corner of the globe.

You want to make sure you have the coverage you think you have when something bad happens.

—Thomas A. Lawson, Executive Vice President, Factory Mutual Insurance Company¹

Introduction

The United States is the only country in the world with a truly global intelligence enterprise, but even the significant resources the US government invests are not adequate to cover the world in the depth required to provide robust and reliable warning of events in every corner of the globe. The most significant transnational threats—such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and the challenges posed by countries such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia typically require disproportionate investments because of their policy priority and because they pose difficult intelligence and policy challenges.

Inevitably then, many issues and countries are addressed with much more limited Intelligence Community (IC) resources:

- As collection capabilities are focused on the highest priorities, signals and human intelligence collection capabilities are less available to target lower priorities. Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) from space can collect globally from space but is still subject to prioritization, and imagery's ability to contribute to a variety of economic and political topics is therefore limited.

- On the analytic side, while intellectual horsepower can partly offset limited collection, the explosion of information available to the analytic community means that these resources are also focused on the highest priorities.

The challenge of making the right investments is further complicated not only by unforeseen world developments, but also by fluctuations in US policy priorities over time. In the increasingly globalized and hypersonic information space that shapes policy decisions, issues and developments can arise with a rapidity that surprises even those directly involved. The events of the “Arab Spring” that began in the winter of 2010 provide a particularly compelling example, but they are hardly

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unique. Natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and low-level insurgencies can quickly move from background

noise to center stage. Consequently, at any given point in time, the attention policymakers focus on an

issue may reflect neither last month's policy agenda nor long-term assessments of US strategic interests.



The Origins of the Concept of Global Coverage within the IC

In the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the IC was forced to come to grips with two unpleasant realities: in the absence of the single, looming Soviet threat, the challenge of allocating intelligence resources had become more fluid and complex, and the resources committed to the intelligence enterprise were being reduced. To address these two challenges, the Clinton administration in 1995 produced guidance for the IC in the form of Presidential Decision Directive 35, "Intelligence Priorities" (PDD-35).^a The document

identified the following as the IC's top intelligence priorities (labeled as tiers)—in descending order:

- Crisis situations, including support to US military operations.
- Countries that threaten regional stability or pose significant threats to US interests, including "rogue" states.
- Transnational threats, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

While PDD-35 provided a reasonable first-cut at a framework for prioritization, its application almost immediately raised questions about IC responsibilities for issues and countries not identified as priorities within the framework. To accommodate the need to prepare for and respond to requirements beyond those designated as the policymak-

ers' highest priorities, the PDD-35 framework was adjusted in October 1996 to include "global coverage." As Acting Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Tenet stated in his 1997 Worldwide Threat briefing, "there will be no relief from the sort of crises that appear suddenly and do not fit the traditional role."² To deal with these sorts of circumstances, he stated, "We will be providing global coverage—including a capacity to surge during crises...."

Subsequent statements by IC leaders have reiterated this view. For example, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte in his 2007 Annual Threat Assessment noted, "it is not too much of a stretch to say that events anywhere can—and often do—affect our interests and the security of our nation and our people. As a result, the Intelligence Community must maintain global coverage."³

a. The directive was issued in March 1995, at the end of a nearly two-year effort to rework the Cold War requirements process begun under the leadership of DCI James Woolsey. See Douglas Garthoff, *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946–2005*, (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005) 227–28.



The Key Elements of the IC's Approach to Global Coverage

The IC has handled the challenge of global coverage primarily as an issue of managing scarcity in collection and analytic resources. Lower priority challenges are allocated fewer—and a reduced range—of collection resources.

Likewise, while some efforts are made to ensure a base level of analytic investment, even where clandestine collection is absent, the analytic level of effort against lower priority issues and countries is reduced. Given the diverse set

of missions and departmental responsibilities that member agencies of the IC have, execution of global coverage tends to have a significant "coalition of the willing" aspect as individual intelligence components balance global coverage

responsibilities against their other priorities. The danger of this approach is the intelligence equivalent of “the tragedy of the commons,” in which investment in developing a sufficient baseline of insight into future threats gets short shrift.

Improved Prioritization of Resources

Given the need to prioritize the use of intelligence resources, one prominent feature of the IC’s approach to global coverage has been the effort to improve the prioritization framework and interagency processes for making allocation decisions. The most prominent result of this effort has been the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was promulgated by the DCI in 2003 and later adopted by the DNI in 2005.⁴ The NIPF assigns priorities to intelligence targets, and the heads of IC elements are directed to ensure “that IC element planning, programming, and budgeting activities and the allocation of collection and analytic resources are informed by the NIPF.”⁵

Given that the diverse agencies of the IC have specific mission and departmental support responsibilities, execution of this guidance varies among individual agencies. Over time, first under the DCI and later under the DNI, a number of interagency mechanisms have been developed to facilitate transparency and coordination across agencies in implementing NIPF priorities. At a minimum, the goal has been to ensure that as agencies make their own prioritization decisions, they can do so with knowledge of the allocation decisions of other IC elements. At most, the intent is to enhance the return on investment on a limited portfolio of collection and

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analytic resources through improved coordination and some burden-sharing. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that at any given point in time the allocation of resources within the IC only imperfectly models the NIPF.

Open-Source as Gap Filler

Since the formulation of the global coverage concept, open-source intelligence (OSINT) has been identified within the IC and by external commentators as the principal collection resource for helping the IC meet its global coverage responsibilities. Among the cited virtues of OSINT are its low cost, ability to quickly turn to the developments of any given day, and potential as a cuing mechanism for more costly intelligence-collection assets.⁶

Within the IC, the Open Source Enterprise (OSE)^a—established by the DNI in 2005 as the Open Source Center and successor organization to CIA’s Foreign Broadcast and Information Service (FBIS)—has the lead role for OSINT within the community. It regards global coverage as an area in which it makes a particular contribution. While OSE is the premier player in the open-source arena, these sorts of capabilities are widespread throughout the IC and other elements of the US government.

In more recent years, with the rapid development of a variety of social media platforms, open-source collection has been broadened beyond traditional media sources (e.g.,

newspapers, television, and radio) and now gives particular attention to exploitation of various kinds of social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube—and their counterparts in other countries). In its FY12 Business Plan, the National Open Source Committee (an ODNI organization that brings together senior IC officers to guide Community-wide open-source collection) noted the importance of monitoring social media:

Social media is a “game changer” in gauging global societal and political developments, providing an unprecedented opportunity to gain insights into public sentiment, trends, and even leadership intentions. Monitoring the pulses of various populations via social media will increasingly provide the IC with a greater warning capability and a better sense of over-the-horizon issues.⁷

Tools for Improved Warning

Over the years, interest in and attention to the application of formal analytic methods and approaches to warning by the analytic components of the IC have generally been limited. In the 1980s, for example, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI)^b conducted quarterly assessments—based on judgments about a common set of indicators—of the prospects for instability in countries around the world. Since 1994, the directorate

a. The organization’s name was changed from Open Source Center in July 2015.

b. The directorate was renamed the Directorate of Analysis in the spring of 2015 in a CIA-wide reorganization.

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has sponsored the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), which has developed models, based on open-source information, to forecast the long-term risk of political instability around the world.

But in the wake of the Arab Spring and amid the growing difficulties the analytic community has in making sense of ever-increasing volumes of information, interest in more formal approaches has increased. While development of such tools is not uniquely focused on global coverage, the IC is moving to improve its ability to provide warning under programs sponsored by the ODNI’s Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA) and at individual agencies. The 2014 ODNI *National Intelligence Strategy* notes, “continued IC vigilance will be required to maintain global coverage of conflicts as they arise and potentially threaten US interests.”⁸ The *Strategy* later pledges that “the IC will expand its use of quantitative analytic methods” and develop “capabilities for dynamic horizon-scanning and discovery to assess changing and emerging conditions.”⁹

Two IARPA programs illustrate the kind of capabilities that the IC and outside researchers are seeking to develop:

- The Open Source Indicators (OSI) program, which was established in 2011, seeks to develop and test novel methods to help analysts anticipate such significant events as political crises, economic instability, mass violence, and various types of humanitarian

crises through the application of innovative statistical methods to evaluate publicly available data.¹⁰ One research focus for this effort is the ability of social media to track and assess the evolution of social disorder.¹¹

- The Aggregative Contingent Estimation (ACE) program, which is based on the concept of “the wisdom of crowds,” seeks to improve the accuracy of judgment-based forecasts by aggregating many independent judgments. As part of this effort, IARPA has launched a large-scale forecasting tournament designed to monitor the accuracy of probabilistic forecasts about future developments around the world.¹² The data from this tournament will be used to identify priority areas for research, including training, statistical approaches to improve the accuracy of expert forecasts, and identifying the attributes of those who have greater forecasting success.

Expanding the Pool of Expertise and Information

Despite more limited access to collection capabilities and a smaller personnel base, the analytic components of the IC responsible for global coverage topics have undertaken efforts to leverage external resources for information and insight. Most intelligence agencies regard “outreach” programs that engage academics and other private sector experts as important tools to augment internal expertise, solicit alternative views, and broaden the information base for their own research. Bring-

ing private sector experts in for consultations, hosting conferences, and commissioning tailored research projects are typical ways of augmenting IC expertise. The DNI’s National Intelligence Council (NIC) and State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) are particularly active in outreach endeavors.

IC components responsible for global coverage also take maximum advantage of the broader pool of expertise and information that resides within the US government as a whole. In areas of the world where clandestine collection is limited, reporting from US embassies and consulates provides a baseline of information that the IC relies on. Beyond State Department reporting, global coverage is a periodic topic for dialogue between the IC and others, such as defense attaches, who have the ability to overtly collect information through their normal duties.¹³

Finally, as it does with any intelligence requirement, the IC seeks to engage friendly foreign intelligence services that can assist—either through collection or analysis—in meeting US global coverage requirements. Such services are likely to have more robust interest in monitoring developments in their immediate neighborhoods and hence may be more willing and able to devote resources to an issue the United States regards as a lower priority. For some US agencies and their foreign partners, these relationships have been formalized into longstanding sharing agreements. For example, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has close working relationships with its counterparts in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada that allow the US Intelli-

gence Community to capitalize on these organizations's capabilities to meet global coverage and other requirements.¹⁴

Facilitating Global Agility

An enduring concern regarding global coverage accounts is the IC's ability to foresee and to respond rapidly to developments in countries allocated limited collection and analytic resources. Congressional concern about IC post-Cold War missions was already high before PDD-35 was issued in 1995, with two parallel congressional inquiries, one a bipartisan presidentially authorized commission composed of House and Senate members and one composed of staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Both would publish similarly titled reports addressing similar issues. The HPSCI staff study, *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century*, devoted a chapter to the subject of global agility, which examined the IC's "surge" capability, noting:^{a, 15}

a. The bipartisan panel was called the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities

But the risks remain: Surprise is more likely in areas in which fewer resources have been applied.

"Surge" capability can be defined very broadly, including the ability to: move resources quickly to address immediate, usually ad hoc, needs; augment existing capabilities from outside the IC; and, improve responsiveness of resources by building more flexible options for collection.

A number of developments since the staff report have improved the IC's agility in responding to global crises around the world. The IC now has in place much more robust and interconnected information networks than was the case in the late 1990s. Consequently, the ability to share information and collaborate analytically in a crisis is now significantly greater, and there are more incentives to do so. At the organizational

of the United States Intelligence Community, and its report was entitled *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence—Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community*.



level, the HPSCI staff's concerns about the then-DCI's authority to "surge" resources are less pertinent in the post-2005 IC world, with the institution of the DNI and a continuing series of initiatives to improve integration across the Community. Moreover, efforts have been made at individual agencies to improve the ability to respond to emerging global contingencies.

Nonetheless, progress is less clear with regard to other aspects of agility the HPSCI report raised. Whether the IC maintains an adequate global "base" of knowledge to facilitate an effective response to an unanticipated crisis is questionable; it is largely assumed that for the lowest priority topics, OSINT and diplomatic reporting will be sufficient. Likewise, despite the dramatic increases in contractor support to the IC since 11 September 2001, making use of knowledgeable external resources to augment IC capabilities on historically low-priority issues is still a budgetary challenge.

IC's Current Approach to Global Coverage: Necessary but Insufficient

The five elements of the IC's approach to global coverage noted above have merit and should be continued. Still, it is unlikely they will result in a systematic improvement in warning about significant developments in lower tier countries, particularly in a period when intelligence budgets are under pressure. Consequently, reliance on those elements

alone poses significant risks both to US interests and to the IC's reputation if failure to anticipate future developments on presumed low-priority issues forces policymakers and the IC to scramble for responses. At the same time, such failure inevitably will leave policymakers disappointed in the IC's performance, notwithstanding their claims over the years

that they understand the implications of the resource allocations the IC must make.

Particularly in periods of budget stress, implementation of a systematic process like the NIPF to frame decisions about the allocation of scarce resources is clearly necessary. But the risks remain: Surprise is more likely

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in areas in which fewer resources have been applied.

On the collection side, IC capabilities have always been tantamount to taking samplings of reality—some streams reporting on leadership and political situations, some on societal circumstances, some on military capabilities, and so on. Reducing the range of collection (and thus the amount of “sampling”) inevitably constrains understanding of developments in the place of interest.

On the analytic side, having a limited talent pool working on issues of lower concern to policymakers increases the likelihood analysts will stick to existing lines of analysis and reduces the likelihood that analytic judgments will be challenged and tested by peers and management. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect that for lower priority topics there will always be an experienced, fully trained and developed analytic work force ready at a moment’s notice to take on a new crisis.

As noted above, OSINT has long been appreciated in the analytic community, and the increased volumes of publicly available information and the emergence of social media have added to its value. Nonetheless, OSINT has its limitations. As one study on the use of news reporting to track the “swine flu” pandemic noted, “News is not a mere representation of an external reality, but rather a social product; news volume frequently does not neatly parallel scientific risk assessments.”¹⁶ This observation is obviously not limited

to either epidemiology or scientific risk assessments.

The social nature of open-source information suggests that significant investments need to be made in mapping these sources. Illustrative in this regard is a study that examined the use of public media to track the outbreak of diseases.¹⁷ It highlighted two particular limitations. First, the level of reporting reflected resource decisions by news media organizations—coverage, for example, declined over weekends and holidays. Second, there were indications that reporting on one disease could “crowd out” reporting on other diseases, but those effects were disease-specific.^a Interpreting data suffering from such biases is a challenge. Likewise, a problem in the interpretation of social media is that only a limited amount of research has been conducted to develop approaches to sampling social media data sets.¹⁸ And there is the challenge of understanding how attitudes expressed online are translated into offline behavior.¹⁹

Given these kinds of complexities, the development of quantitative tools to analyze social media and other sorts of open-source information is likely to take some time, and the insights that emerge may not be generalizable from one issue to another. As one study conducted under IARPA’s OSI program observed on the use of OSINT to forecast civil unrest, context matters.²⁰ The need

a. The same challenges apply to quantitative exploitation of classified information. Both resource constraints and “crowding out” influence classified reporting streams.

to incorporate context either through improved analytics or through human interpretation, as former Open Source Center Director Doug Naquin and others have argued, will be critical.^{b,21}

Moreover, the application of big data analytics to intelligence questions raises a host of issues that are less important in the commercial world. Divining the intentions and actions of government actors is often key. Many governments and other political organizations have programs to manipulate what appears in the public domain, including social media, to shape opinion in their own and other countries. Russia, for example, has an aggressive information warfare program to misrepresent its activities and intentions and plant false rumors around the world.²² Consequently, there is a significant need for US government entities to develop and continuously improve upon capabilities to conduct credibility analysis of social and other media that report on issues of importance to intelligence, such as the use of chemical weapons in Syria.²³

Finally, the IC’s efforts to broaden the range of information and expertise on global coverage issues are on the mark, but the result is likely to resemble more a patchwork quilt than a reliable safety net because the partners the IC is engaging have their own priorities and capability limitations:

b. Indeed, some have argued that such metaphors as “horizon scanning” using big data imply that “finding faint evidence of possible futures is actually rather easy” when it is not. See Pierre Rossel, “Beyond the Obvious: Examining Ways of Consolidating Early Detection Schemes,” *Technological Forecasting & Social Change* 78 (2011): 375–85.

- With regard to outreach to academia, for example, the opportunities for significant expansion of such ties may be limited. A recent survey of what current and former national security decision-makers (including representatives from the IC) want from academic experts in international relations field found significant gaps between policymaker expectations and academic research interests and capabilities, both in terms of substantive areas of interest and research approaches.²⁴ Perhaps as a consequence, US scholars' engagement in nonacademic consulting is significantly below that of scholars in countries such as France and Israel.

Given the diversity of issues the IC is expected to follow and significant differences in the amount of information available on those issues, some challenges will be more difficult than others.

- While more can probably be done to elicit insights from non-IC colleagues in the US government, these organizations face their own resource challenges, and there is little reason to expect they will be more forward-leaning than the IC in reporting on lower priority topics.
- With regard to foreign intelligence as sources of assistance for the global coverage mission, a variety of constraints exist. Most of these services are smaller and less

resourced. Their willingness to assist in filling global coverage requirements can shift as their own priorities and resources change. In addition, their willingness to work with US agencies can also be buffeted by broader political dynamics.

The result is that these and similar efforts, while certainly valuable in specific cases, are unlikely to provide more than a partial offset to limited US collection and analytic resources.



Adjusting the Current Paradigm

If the IC's current approach to global coverage is necessary but insufficient, what else can the IC do? The core dilemma of global coverage is that it is unrealistic to expect the application of limited collection and analytic resources to yield levels of knowledge and insight comparable to what can be achieved for the highest priority intelligence targets.^a In this context, there is likely to be significant value to examining the risk-management aspects of global coverage.

a. I am not suggesting that more intelligence resources applied to an issue *will always* yield more knowledge and insight (that is why some intelligence problems are called "hard targets"), but that it is unreasonable to expect the same results *on average* when fewer resources are available.

Expectations Management

As DNI James Clapper has noted in a concept he labeled "immaculate collection," public expectations about the IC's performance tend to ignore risk, cost, and the potential for political embarrassment.²⁵ In this respect, a major challenge for global coverage is expectations management. While IC leaders have used the term numerous times in public briefings and documents since the mid-1990s, articulation of its specific goals and expected standards of performance has been negligible, at least in public.

In what specific terms is the IC covering the globe? At the low end of the scale, the 1996 HPSCI Staff IC21 report suggested the goal might be the development of an adequate information base on all countries and

issues as a platform on which the IC could surge when circumstances require. At the more ambitious end, the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy has the goal of improving the IC's "ability to foresee, forecast, and alert the analytic community ... and convey early warning to national security customers to provide them the best opportunity for action."²⁶

What are reasonable standards of performance with regard to global coverage? Given the diversity of issues the IC is expected to follow and significant differences in the amount of information available on those issues, some challenges will be more difficult than others. For example, looking at the experience of Israeli intelligence with respect to Intifadas in Palestine, the victory of Hamas in

A more complete mapping of the resources available in a crisis could provide insight into potential areas for investment.

the 2006 elections, and the events of the Arab Spring in 2010–2011, one Israeli scholar argues that intelligence organizations have particular difficulty in tracking these sorts of social changes and predicting their political consequences.²⁷ Whether or not this particular observation is true, it would be helpful if the US Intelligence Community provided greater precision about its global coverage goals and at least some sense of what it can be expected to achieve.

More Systematic Assessment of Risk

The agencies of the IC—in both operations and analysis—understand and apply the concept of risk to management of their activities. The types of risk that shape IC activities are wide-ranging and include operational risk (i.e., compromises of operations); analytic risk (i.e., making the wrong call); and political risk (i.e., a policy decision based on erroneous assessments or reporting). Likewise, the IC understands, perhaps more than most organizations, the costs that may result when critical information is not collected because of risk aversion.

Nonetheless, although operating in inherently risky circumstances and having rigorous risk-assessment processes in some areas such as security, the agencies of the IC fall short of being fully mature in their management of risk, at least as defined in the business literature on risk management: Businesses are completely aware of risk and proactive in their management of threats and opportunities through the application of sophisticated and detailed techniques.²⁸

Given that a decision to allocate fewer resources is fundamentally a decision to accept risk, the IC needs to move beyond broad statements that simply acknowledge greater risk. There is no template for undertaking such assessments in the IC, but several approaches could be explored.

Focus Expert Judgment on Global Coverage Risks. The application of expert judgment is a standard technique in risk assessment.²⁹ Fortunately, the IC has at its disposal a wealth of substantive expertise on global coverage topics among the analysts who have responsibility for lower tier countries and issues. One approach would be to systematically survey those analysts about the prospects for game-changing developments in their countries, regions, or topics that would require the IC to significantly increase attention and resources allocated to the targets. These assessments could then be used as a basis for IC contingency planning. There may also be benefit in benchmarking such assessments against those who conduct political risk assessments in the private sector.

Systematically Assess the Resiliency of Global Coverage. Recently, scholars from several international think tanks called attention to the possibility that actors operating far below the level of formal institutions or outside established governance structures could have destabilizing effects in today's increasingly interdependent world—a phenomenon they labeled as “femtorisks.”³⁰ These scholars argue that conventional risk-assessment approaches that rely on estimating

the probability and consequences of future events, are inadequate to deal with these sorts of challenges. Rather, it is preferable to focus on the resiliency of the organizations charged with dealing with them.^a

Applying this approach to the problem of global coverage suggests the need to look more deeply and systematically into the IC's ability to respond to crises in global coverage countries. Some of the relevant factors—for example, the number of analysts on an account or existing language expertise—are now scrutinized by the IC, but a meaningful assessment of resiliency would require that the net be cast much more broadly. Areas that would need to be assessed and integrated include the ability of different collection capabilities to respond in a crisis; the sufficiency of current databases (e.g., the Modernized Integrated Database); and the IC's real ability to leverage external resources, such as expertise in the private sector.

A more complete mapping of the resources available in a crisis could provide insight into potential areas for investment. One relatively inexpensive means to examine the IC's ability to respond to crises in global coverage countries would be to conduct table-top exercises with collectors, analysts, and decisionmakers (the military and policy communities) to examine the IC's ability to respond effectively in different scenarios.

a. The researchers explained they derived the word “femtorisk” from the terms “femtocell” and “picocell,” in the field of cellular communications, where “femto-” describes a unit 15 orders of magnitude smaller than a pico unit. In short, a “femtorisk” is a seemingly very minute player on the global stage.

Such exercises are common on high priority areas, but they seldom occur with global coverage issues.

***Examining “Lessons Learned”
From Past Global Coverage Crises***

While the risk of failure in forecasting adverse developments overseas is a known part of the global coverage challenge, less appreciated is the difficulty the IC sometimes has in knowing the thresholds at which these developments are likely to engage policymakers. Africa, for example, has over the years seen a variety of developments (e.g.,

One of the recommendations of the WMD Commission that was not implemented was “the establishment of at least one not-for-profit research institute to serve as a critical window into outside expertise for the Intelligence Community.”

government repression, humanitarian crises) that sometimes elicit dramatic policy responses and sometimes do not. The world’s increasingly globalized and hypersonic information space appears to have introduced a significant element of uncertainty and volatility in policy responses to such developments. While research along this line would not fit easily into the

IC’s mission set, a historical examination of thresholds for policy intervention could help inform IC risk assessments and planning processes related to global coverage. Table-top exercises involving policy people as noted above might be one avenue for exploring such questions.



Adjustments in Global Coverage Investment

Beyond improving the IC’s ability to understand and communicate more precisely about the risks the US government is accepting, improvements in risk assessments should make it possible for the IC to make more fine-grained adjustments in allocating resources to global coverage accounts. The often thin base of external global-coverage-related expertise the IC can call upon in a crisis may be something that can be tackled at modest cost:

- At a minimum, it would be worthwhile to do some surveys of external expertise in lower priority topic areas and begin preliminary engagements with those experts to establish a foundation for collaboration when it may be required.
- Along this line, it would also be worthwhile to explore the feasibility of taking better advantage of government capabilities outside

the National Intelligence Program through targeted investments. Possibilities to be examined include military components, such as the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers, and the law enforcement community.

- More ambitiously, consideration should be given to establishing dedicated “knowledge broker” units outside the IC to facilitate the building of more permanent relationships between private sector researchers and experts within the IC.³¹ One of the recommendations of the WMD Commission that was not implemented was “the establishment of at least one not-for-profit research institute to serve as a critical window into outside expertise for the Intelligence Community.”³² The commission envisioned an organization not directly managed by the

IC whose principal mission was to serve as a vehicle to reach out to private sector experts, including those from academia, business, and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers. Given the more limited IC resources focused on lower priority countries and issues, global coverage would be a particularly useful focus for such an entity.

It may also be worthwhile to re-examine the analytic business practices for global coverage countries and issues. Currently, these accounts are largely handled as more thinly staffed versions of higher priority accounts. Given the more limited policy demand for reporting and analysis on global coverage issues, it may make sense to shift the focus of the analytic effort toward warning about game-changing developments and preparation for future contingencies.



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