Intelligence and US POWs during the Vietnam War

The Strategic Services Unit in Indonesia, 1945–46

The Intelligence Education of DCI Hillenkoetter

Understanding Cross-Functional Teams

Reviews

The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal

Company Confessions
Near and Distant Neighbors
Disciples
The Image of the Enemy
The Secret War
Being Nixon and One Man Against the World
Ghost Fleet

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
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The cover painting from the CIA Intelligence Art Collection is entitled, *Tolkachev: Quiet Courage*. It is an oil on canvas painting by Kathy Fieramosca © 2012. The painting depicts the Soviet aviation electronics engineer Adolf Tolkachev, who for six years provided a wealth of detailed information on highly classified military capabilities being developed and deployed by the Soviet Union into the 1990s. He was betrayed and executed in September 1986.

The lead book review in this issue is a review of David E. Hoffman’s biography of Tolkachev, *The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal*. 
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The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

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*Studies in Intelligence* welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

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Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

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Contributors

Darby Stratford is the penname of a former Directorate of Intelligence analyst now serving in the Emerging Trends program of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Thomas Coffey is a former Directorate of Intelligence analyst serving with the Lessons Learned Program of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Nicholas Dujmovic is a CIA historian, who, during most of his career, served in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. He is the author of The Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for Quotations on Espionage & Intelligence, which was published under the penname Charles E. Lathrop.

John Ehrman is an analyst in the CIA’s Directorate of Analysis and a frequent contributor to Studies in Intelligence.

Clayton Laurie is a CIA historian. He has served as a military historian and has taught history at the university level.

Jason Manosevitz is an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis and a member of the Studies Editorial Board.

Hayden Peake has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” since December 2002.

William Rust is the author of four books about US relations with Southeast Asia during the Cold War. His most recent book, Eisenhower and Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action, and the Origins of the Second Indochina War, will be published by the University Press of Kentucky in the spring of 2016.

Capt. Gordon I. Peterson (USN, Ret.), a naval aviator during the Vietnam War, flew 515 combat missions in attack helicopters with the Seawolves of HAL-3. He was a historical consultant for the Smithsonian Channel documentary, The Spy in the Hanoi Hilton.” David C. Taylor produced and wrote The Spy in the Hanoi Hilton. He is the recipient of numerous awards for historical documentaries, including an Emmy and Peabody.

Nicholas Reynolds is a retired CIA officer and former CIA Museum historian.

Richard Schroeder is a retired CIA officer who serves as an adjunct professor specializing in Cold War and intelligence issues at Georgetown University. He has served in two CIA directorates and its Office of Congressional Affairs.

Frank Strickland and Chris Whitlock are former intelligence officers now serving as directors at Deloitte Consulting. They provide consulting services for various US government agencies and commercial clients, focusing on change management and the use of analytics in decisionmaking.

Nigel West is a British intelligence historian, who has since 1981 authored and coauthored a multitude of works on intelligence, including detailed historical dictionaries of elements of intelligence work and history.
On 2 and 4 May 1972, two US Air Force SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft overflew Hanoi, North Vietnam. A third aircraft stood back, ready to take the place of either plane if it was unable to perform its task. The pilots had not been told the objective of their unusual mission. At precisely noon on each day, flying at supersonic speed, the lead plane set off a sonic boom. Exactly 15 seconds later the second aircraft’s signature shock wave signaled to US prisoners of war (POWs) held captive in the Hoa Lo prison that their proposed escape plan had been authorized.  

Earlier, in April, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed a memorandum to the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command approving Operation Thunderhead, the code name assigned to the US Seventh Fleet’s POW rescue mission. The amphibious-transport submarine USS Grayback, with a platoon of Navy SEALs on board, was deployed off the coast of North Vietnam in June to rescue any POW who had managed to escape and reach a predetermined rendezvous point, a small island at the mouth of the Red River. The platoon was directed to establish an observation post on the island and keep watch. Given the operation’s military risks and political implications, it is reasonable to assume that President Richard Nixon knew of and had authorized the operation.

How was it that the US military in Washington, DC, could know of, consider, and communicate approval of an escape plan the POWs themselves had proposed? How did the Navy’s on-scene operational commanders know the plan’s details in order to deploy suitable forces to identify and rescue escaping prisoners at the correct location and time?

The answers to these questions rest in the innovative and courageous ways the POWs in the Hoa Lo prison—widely referred to as the Hanoi Hilton—communicated among themselves and then with the outside world. Communication with Washington involved the covert assistance of CIA, which worked with the Pentagon and other intelligence agencies to make possible a communication channel maintained during the POWs’ prolonged confinement. After their release in 1973, some former POWs wrote in memoirs about the covert communication techniques. Histories of POW experiences have related others. More details are contained in the book Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs, from Communism to Al-Qaeda by former chief of CIA’s technical operations division Robert Wallace.
(U) Small numbers of US POWs were held in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but the majority, mostly Navy and Air Force aviators, were held in 15 camps dispersed in North Vietnam. The largest was Hoa Lo prison, in central Hanoi. Data derived from map in official DOD history of Vietnam War POWs.
and coauthor Keith Melton. Additional information was contained in the documentary film *The Spy in the Hanoi Hilton*—a 2015 Smithsonian Channel release—which provides a still fuller accounting of the covert communication effort.4

In Robert Wallace’s judgment, the effort to communicate with US POWs ranks as one of the most important operations in CIA’s history.5 Covert POW communications—radio transmissions, messages employing so-called secret writing, and coded letters and postcards sent to family members and then shared with US intelligence agencies—made possible several important developments during the long years of captivity many POWs experienced. Beyond providing opportunities to prepare realistic escape plans, the communication network provided militarily significant information to the Department of Defense (DoD) and US intelligence agencies.

Information provided to POWs also helped sustain morale. The combination of personal fortitude, religious faith, and communication between prisoners and with friends outside prison walls helped sustain hope and life. “Knowledge was both a shield and a sword for those of us fighting the enemy without benefit of conventional weapons,” said Air Force Maj. Samuel R. Johnson, a pilot shot down in April 1966 and imprisoned in the Hanoi Hilton.6

**Beyond providing opportunities to realistically plan escapes, the communication network provided militarily significant information to the Department of Defense and US intelligence agencies.**

number, 113 died in captivity and 658 were returned to US control.7 Small numbers of prisoners were held in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but the majority of POWs, mostly Navy and Air Force aviators, were imprisoned in 15 camps dispersed in North Vietnam. (See map on facing page.)

The Hoa Lo prison in central Hanoi, built by the French during their colonial rule of Vietnam, was the largest. It was dubbed the Hanoi Hilton in 1966 by Lt. Cdr. Robert Shumaker during his imprisonment there after he found in a shower a bucket with the Hilton name on its bottom.

Before North Vietnam improved its treatment of captured aviators in 1970, many POWs were exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes. Intimidation, physical abuse, and torture were used to enforce strict obedience to prison rules, break the will of prisoners, make them reveal information about their fellow prisoners, obtain written or recorded admissions of guilt as war criminals, and to extract statements critical of the US-led war. “If hell is here on earth,” Johnson observed, “it is located on an oddly shaped city block in downtown Hanoi … and goes by the name of Hoa Lo.”8

Cdr. James “Jim” B. Stockdale was imprisoned at Hoa Lo in September 1965 after his A-4 Skyhawk jet was downed by anti-aircraft fire during a mission over North Vietnam. He was the senior US naval officer held captive during the war. During his confinement, he experienced several severe torture sessions, was forced to wear heavy leg irons for two years, and spent four years in solitary confinement. He would become one of the most inspiring and heroic leaders in the ranks of US POWs. Together with a number of other POWs, he became a skilled communicator—both within the walls of North Vietnamese prison camps and with US intelligence agencies.

Stockdale quickly became adept at learning the “tap code” that most US prisoners had adopted and memorized by the time he was captured. He also learned other communication methods such as notes written on a single piece of rough toilet paper and left in designated “dead drops” (concealed locations) in the camp for...
other prisoners to retrieve. Another resourceful POW, Cdr. Jeremiah “Jerry” Denton, Stockdale’s classmate at the US Naval Academy, devised a “sweep code” under the watchful eyes of North Vietnamese guards. The rhythm of his broom while sweeping in the prison courtyard transmitted coded messages throughout his cell block.

Prisoners exchanged messages to describe their interrogations so others knew what to anticipate when they were subjected to questioning. Newly captured prisoners would pass on news and information from beyond the prison’s walls. Resistance and escape plans were coordinated. A chain-of-command structure, often led by Stockdale as the senior ranking officer (SRO), was developed to restore military discipline and morale. He developed new rules governing prisoner behavior during confinement and interrogation sessions, ultimately described as “Unity Over Self.” Time and again, leadership, faith, and communications sustained a POW during the darkest days of his imprisonment.

“We were texting long before the young people today, because we were texting on the wall,” said Lt. Cdr. Eugene “Red” McDaniel, shot down in May 1967. “If you’re out of communications with other prisoners for a long period of time, we found that after 30 days you begin to go off the deep end. You lose touch. It’s important for you to contact people on a daily basis.”9 As their captivity stretched from months to years, Stockdale and other POWs became adept communicators in other ways.

Dangerous Business

In December 1965, three months after his capture, Stockdale was allowed to write his first letter to his wife, Sybil. He was authorized to write again two months later. She received both letters in April 1966. Noting confusing references to friends and nicknames used out of context, she contacted naval intelligence officials in San Diego.

It turned out that Stockdale had used “doubletalk” in his first letter to suggest the names of several other aviators held prisoner. An oblique reference to novelist Arthur Koestler’s *Darkness at Noon* (a book that describes physical and emotional torture inside a Stalinist gulag) also suggested conditions in the prison were not as tolerable as the North Vietnamese wanted people around the world to believe.10

Sybil was soon placed in touch with Cdr. Robert Boroughs, a Naval Intelligence officer stationed in Washington, DC. She met with him at the Pentagon in May 1966 and again in July. During the second meeting, she told him she would cooperate with naval intelligence to communicate covertly with her husband. “It is a dangerous business,” Boroughs told her, and “you are taking his life into your own hands.”11 The collaboration between the Stockdales, naval intelligence, and the CIA, which the Office of Naval Intelligence engaged for technical assistance, lasted for the duration of the war.

*In Love and War*, the autobiography the Stockdales published, the two described the origins of clandestine communications with the Hanoi Hilton’s residents. Meeting at the Stock-
A Shield and a Sword

Sybil and Boroughs coordinated their plans carefully. Her first coded letter to Stockdale, mailed in October 1966 included a Polaroid photograph, prepared by a specialist in CIA. The picture contained a covert message sandwiched between the sealed layers of the photographic paper. Clues in Sybil’s letter led her husband to soak the photograph in water.

The note Stockdale found explained that the letter in the envelope was written on invisible carbon paper. Future letters with an odd date would also be written on such paper. The paper could be used again. Any photo with a rose pictured should be soaked. Instructions described how to use the treated paper to write a letter in invisible ink. When the paper was placed on top of an ordinary sheet of writing paper, Stockdale could impress an invisible message on it that would later be revealed through chemical processing by the CIA technician who had prepared the material.

Stockdale received the letter two months later, on Christmas Eve. Alone in his cell, almost by accident, he soaked the photo to reveal its hidden message. He realized that the instructions and paper he held could make him vulnerable to charges of espionage and war crimes, but he also recognized “a whole new world” had opened up for him.

The World of Secret Writing

As 1966 ended, 13 months of abuse had begun to take a toll on Stockdale. Reflecting on his father’s plight 47 years later, Dr. James B. Stockdale II said, “After months and months in solitary confinement and realizing his prison mates were being treated very brutally, he was looking for some way to overcome the inevitable depressions that come with solitary confinement.”

Stockdale’s first, one-page letter to Sybil using the invisible carbon paper was dated 2 January 1967. It named more than 40 POWs held in captivity. He also reported “experts in torture, hand and leg irons 16 hours a day.” A second letter followed, updating his list of POWs, emphasizing the importance of targeting Hanoi’s propaganda radio station and the north-south rail lines to the east of the city with air strikes, and providing information on the questions being asked during prisoner interrogations.

Before 1970, the pace of letter exchanges depended on the whims of North Vietnam’s leadership in allowing religious or anti-war delegations (primarily American) to visit and serve as mail couriers. Letters could take many months or years to be exchanged. In the case of Stockdale’s first response, Sybil’s had it in her hands in just over a week. She notified Commander Boroughs and sent him the letter. Stockdale and other POWs derived quiet satisfaction in knowing that such anti-war delegations were unknowingly serving their needs.

Boroughs arrived in Coronado soon after and escorted Sybil to a naval intelligence office in San Diego, where he showed her the CIA’s chemically processed secret message that her husband had penned. She

POW holds letter dated July 1968. CIA’s Technical Services Division had devised ways to include secret writing in some POW’s communications from home. Photo: origin and date uncertain.
was devastated to learn that he was being subjected to sustained torture. “The letter was hard for my mother to read and hard for her to share,” her son James later observed.

The technology CIA’s technician used had its origins in a World War II, classified US Army program known as Military Intelligence Service “X” (MISX). From their top secret base at Fort Hunt, Virginia, Army intelligence officers successfully established clandestine communications with American POWs held in all 63 German camps. The highly classified intelligence operation helped hundreds of US POWs to escape. 14

After being established in 1947, the CIA continued and expanded the effort. The CIA’s technical support for its own covert operations or to the US military improved steadily during the Cold War. The agency’s Technical Services Staff was established in 1951 to consolidate technical support for field operations and to conduct research and development to improve collection activities. 15 Renamed the Technical Services Division (TSD) in 1960, it provided operational support for missions in North and South Vietnam after the CIA’s initial involvement in the war in 1961.

“Exfiltration of downed pilots and imprisoned soldiers from behind enemy lines was a CIA and military priority throughout the war.”

According to Wallace, his office employed a large number of chemists during the Cold War to develop various secret-writing compounds. They taught secret-writing techniques to people who might need to use them. “The basic form of communications—covert communications at the time—was secret writing,” Wallace said. The TSD undercover, working-level technical officer responsible for the program was named David E. Coffey. 16 After his normal day’s work, Coffey would return at night to his office to work secretly on developing the systems necessary to enable POW covert communications. 17

The program was enormously important for several reasons. Secret messages, sent with the cooperation of spouses or other family members, would boost POW morale when they learned their welfare was a concern. POW communications could confirm the number and identity of prisoners, where they were imprisoned, and the details of their capture. This information offered valuable intelligence to US military planners contemplating rescue operations. The families of POWs were another important consideration. When POWs provided lists of the names of their fellow prisoners, their next of kin could be informed they were alive and held captive. The families of deceased ser-

vice members were afforded a degree of closure. 19

Introducing Coded Messages

During the earliest years of the war, comparatively few opportunities for sending and receiving mail existed. 5, 20 Prisoners were moved to new camps without notice, and prison guards conducted unannounced, rigorous inspections of all prisoners and cells. A prisoner caught in the act of using the invisible-ink carbon paper faced severe reprisals—possibly execution for espionage. Such measures made it difficult to keep the paper indefinitely. Stockdale, for example, received another letter with carbon papers from Sybil in February 1967, but he was forced to eat his last piece of paper later that year to avoid compromising the communication channel.

Like most POWs, Stockdale had not been instructed in sophisticated methods of encryption. With the last of his carbon paper gone, Stockdale returned to “doubletalk” to signal sensitive information in his letters, a technique taught in some of the Navy’s survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) schools.

Fortunately, a small number of POWs had, in fact, learned more advanced, classified encryption methods during advanced SERE training. 21 Stockdale was first exposed to the techniques after he and 10 other prisoners were transferred to a new prison camp in north-central Hanoi

a. In Wallace’s book and in the film, Coffey was referred to as Brian Lipton.

b. Commander Boroughs thought it would be “sheer luck” if Stockdale received two coded letters in a year.
on the grounds of the Ministry of National Defense in late October 1967. The prison had earned the nickname “Alcatraz.”

The North Vietnamese had decided to imprison the more senior and “incorrigible” POWs in Alcatraz after identifying them as POW-resistance leaders. Two, Lt. George Coker and Capt. George McKnight, had escaped briefly from another prison camp. In addition to troublesome senior officers like Stockdale and Denton, the remaining men included some of the POWs’ most gifted communicators.

POW memoirs name such officers as Cdr. Howard Rutledge, Cdr. Howard Jenkins, Lt. Cdr. Nels Tanner, Lt. Cdr. Robert Shumaker, and Cdr. James Mulligan as powerful communicators. “Bob Shumaker was in a class by himself,” said Denton, “… slicker than anyone at inventing new ways to communicate.” Shumaker taught Maj. Sam Johnson how to send coded messages while both were imprisoned at Alcatraz.23

Held in solitary confinement (wearing leg irons applied at night), Stockdale learned that one of the POWs (popularly called “the master communicator”) had been trained in advanced cryptography. Unable to communicate with him directly using the tap code, the two devised an innovative workaround to signal to one another across the courtyard between their cells. James Stockdale II explained that the other prisoner extended his foot almost outside the door to his cell so that Stockdale could see his big toe. “With his big toe using Morse code and some other modified methods over a period of four or five days, the prisoner … taught dad this cryptographic code and, again,

opened up a channel of communication that he had not anticipated.”24

Stockdale and his small group memorized the code. POWs trained in the encryption code would employ it for covert communications for the remainder of their captivity. “As long as the POWs who did know the code were allowed to write, they’d secretly embed their letters home with prisoner names, the realities of their conditions, or whatever CAG [i.e., Stockdale] ordered; occasionally they’d also receive letters from their wives that the government had encoded.” Red McDaniel was later instructed in the code by some of his cellmates. “We did that as a lifeline,” he said. “And so we knew that the

US knew what was happening in the camp.”26

Finally, 10 of the prisoners incarcerated at Alcatraz were returned to Hoa Lo in December 1969. Their 11th comrade, Air Force Capt. Ronald Storz, was not. Physically and mentally broken by years of solitary confinement and ruthless beatings, he died in captivity in 1970—remembered by other Alcatraz captives as “the hero we left behind.”27

Son Tay prison was located more than 20 miles northwest of Hanoi. POWs held there were able eventually communicate their location. The knowledge allowed the United States to mount a rescue attempt. Unfortunately, the prisoners had been removed before the November 1970 raid. DoD photo dated 31 May 1973.

a. “CAG” was one of Stockdale’s nicknames; at the time he was shot down, he was the commander of Air Group 16 (CAG) on the aircraft carrier USS Oriskany (CV-34)

b. A seven-year study of POW/MIAs found that, outside of the event of capture itself and actual physical torture, solitary confinement is perhaps the most stressful of captor treatments. See Edna J. Hunter, Wartime Stress: Family Adjustment to Loss (Report # TR-USIU-8107, San Diego, CA, United States International University, 1981)
Intelligence and covert communications improved to the point that new opportunities to mount rescue operations emerged.

Son Tay

The mid-years of the POWs’ captivity in Vietnam during the late 1960s saw them experience some of the most extreme forms of abuse and torture. Some contemplated suicide. Some, like Stockdale, actually attempted to take their own lives rather than capitulate to their captors’ demands. Others prayed for death. “I figured that I had about a one-in-four chance of coming out alive and about a one-in-fifty chance of coming out sane enough to live a normal life,” Denton said of those years.

Mercifully, early in 1970, several factors led to a gradual improvement in the conditions and treatment of most POWs. They referred to these years as “the good-guy era.” Notably, in May 1969, the Nixon administration, led by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, renounced the Johnson administration’s public policies with respect to the plight of the POWs. Nixon decided to “go public” to publicize their abuse and torture. Three POWs released to the United States described their harrowing experiences to the news media and in public appearances around the country to counter North Vietnam’s propaganda campaign. The National League of POW/MIA Families stepped up its efforts.

Other developments were at play. In November 1969, two months after the death of Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam’s Politburo promulgated a resolution to improve the treatment of captured American pilots. One motivation for doing so was “… to win over the American people.” Of note, North Vietnam’s decree stated POWs should be allowed to send one letter a month and receive gifts once every two months. Prison authorities soon began to implement the new policies in their camps in North Vietnam.

The ramifications were significant for the POWs and US intelligence as the flow of letters and receipt of gift parcels surged. By the end of 1970, the families of more than 330 POWs had received more than 3,000 letters—compared to a total of just 100 families receiving 600 letters by at the beginning of 1969.

According to the official DoD history of POW policy and planning in Southeast Asia, in early 1969, “Intelligence, although improving, was not yet reliable enough to support possible forcible recovery efforts.” That assessment began to change in 1970 as US intelligence agencies capitalized on North Vietnam’s new policy for mail and gift parcels. It was now possible to smuggle more sophisticated communications equipment and covert messages to those POWs actively communicating with encrypted letters. In addition, radios, microfilm, and micro-dots were eventually added to the POWs’ inventory.

Intelligence and covert communications improved to the point that new opportunities to mount rescue operations emerged. This was particularly the case for POWs in the Son Tay, for whom a raid was mounted in November 1970. Located 22 miles northwest of Hanoi, Son Tay never held more than 55 POWs within its walls. Lt. Jg. Danny Glenn, Stockdale’s roommate in at Hoa Lo for three months in 1967, was one of the first to be imprisoned there.

Owing to its more remote location and isolation from other camps, the POWs at Son Tay were anxious to communicate their whereabouts to US intelligence. Interviewed for The Spy in the Hanoi Hilton, Glenn confirmed that pilots who had overflown a distant mountain named Ba Vi knew its bearing (direction) from the camp. By determining the camp’s direction from other locations, its geocoordinates were calculated. The information was included in coded letters sent from the camp. “Our letters were six lines, short,” Glenn recalled. “You couldn’t say a lot in six lines. What we were able to send out had to be broken down—divided up for different individuals to send out one or two words maybe. Then, back in Washington, it was up to them to piece it together.”

The Defense Intelligence Agency informed the US Pacific Command in April 1970 that Son Tay was an operational POW camp. One POW’s letter included an unusual acronym: “REQMANORSAREPKMTBAVI,” which equated to “Request man or SAR east peak Mt Ba Vi.” Reconnaissance aircraft and overhead drones confirmed the POW’s information. “When a little red drone flies over your compound at maybe 500 feet, you say, ‘That’s not an accident.’ And so we thought they at least know we’re here,” Glenn reflected.

A helicopter-borne US rescue force raided the camp in November 1970, only to be disappointed. The prisoners had been relocated some time earlier. Nonetheless, as news of
the attempt reached POWs, morale soared.

Sam Johnson explained how he learned about Son Tay while eating a piece of hard candy his wife had sent him. “I plopped one in my mouth and sucked on it,” he said. “I felt something stiff, like a tiny plastic sliver, stuck against the roof of my mouth. When I picked it out with my fingers, I found it to be a tiny brown speck, about the size of a pinhead.” The miniscule particle opened quickly after Johnson rubbed it several times. This revealed a length of microfilm containing the front page of the New York Times story on Son Tay. “We knew then that our country had not forgotten us,” Johnson said.35

A New Day

The Son Tay raid prompted North Vietnam in December 1970 to consolidate POWs into a new section of Hoa Lo the POWs called “Unity.” For most, it was the first time they had met face-to-face in North Vietnam. “It was a new day for American POWs in North Vietnam,” Sam Johnson observed. “No longer separated and isolated in tiny cubicles like wild and dangerous animals, we were being allowed to live together in large groups.”36 Communications between prisoners and beyond proliferated. “Over the next few days, we had communications with everyone who had been shot down up to that point, something over 350 prisoners,” Danny Glenn remembered.37

Stockdale soon worked to restore discipline and control to the prisoners’ covert communications back to the United States. A six-month letter-writing moratorium was imposed in 1971. In part an attempt to force improved conditions in the camp, Stockdale also needed time to create a new communication network and policies for encoded messages. “They wanted to coordinate any messages that could be sent outside the prison so that there was no mistake about the leadership’s depiction of reality or what might be tried on their behalf,” said Stockdale’s son, James.38

Radio components were also secreted in the contents of POWs’ gift packages. Concealing contraband was a double-edged sword, however. The North Vietnamese routinely searched all packages.

In addition to microfilm, microdots, and 1-inch Stanhope lens readers were concealed in packages that prisoners received in 1970. Retired Air Force Col. Donald Heiliger described his experiences with microfilm (concealed in cans of Spam) and microdots (mixed into packets of powdered Kool Aid) many years later. “We had to filter our grape Kool Aid, because the microdots were the same size,” he said.41

The main advantage of microdot technology was the large amount of information that could be photo-reduced to the size of a pinhead. Microdots could shrink writing on a standard sheet of typing paper to the size of an 18-point period containing some 200 to 300 words. The microdot program was one of the most closely guarded secrets in the covert-communications program.

Radio components were also secreted in the contents of POWs’ gift packages. Concealing contraband was a double-edged sword, however. The North Vietnamese routinely searched all packages. If illicit items were found, a shakedown of all cells could follow—jeopardizing other covert activities.

On Christmas Day 1970, for example, a special North Vietnamese civilian intelligence team inspected all cells in Unity for any contraband delivered in parcels that had been delivered to prisoners the night before. “As we learned later,” Jerry Denton said, “they apparently found a tape that had been smuggled into camp in a package of Life Savers; it con-
tained certain information from US intelligence. They also found parts of a radio receiver that a prisoner was trying to make.44

Still, some radio-communications equipment slipped past the prison’s inspectors. A radio transmitter-receiver offered the means for real-time communications, a vital capability if a prisoner’s escape plan was to have a higher chance of success. In his memoir, Sam Johnson describes how a handful of POWs at Hoa Lo awaited the remaining parts of a shortwave radio to arrive in 1971. Components were concealed in tubes of toothpaste. Finally, it was fabricated. “The unit was completely assembled, needing only a power source,” said Johnson, “when a guard discovered it during a routine inspection.”45

**Operation Thunderhead**

For some POWs at Hoa Lo, the Son Tay rescue mission, consolidation of prisoners at Hoa Lo, and improved covert communications back to the United States fueled renewed interest in escaping, and a committee was formed. Membership on the committee varied in 1971 and 1972, but Air Force Capt. John Dramesi, Air Force Maj. James Kasler, and several others were key players. They hoarded food, articles of clothing, a signaling mirror, and other items for an “over-the-wall” escape plan called Tiger. A map was covertly delivered to them to aid in their navigation to the Red River and beyond.44 Another small group of POWs was also planning to escape by tunneling out of Hoa Lo; their plan was called Mole.45

Dramesi had escaped one night in May 1969 with another prisoner, Air Force Capt. Edwin Atterberry, from the prison camp at Cu Loc (the “Zoo”), only to be recaptured the next morning. Severe reprisals followed. The two escapees were viciously beaten and tortured; Atterberry died soon after. Other POWs at the Zoo also suffered savage consequences.

“The disastrous escape attempt … resulted in a final wave of havoc and brutality that again pushed many of the Northern POWs to the brink,” according to the DoD history of POWs during the war.46

More than 20 POWs at the prison camp were tortured for a month to obtain information on the escape; then the guards came for Red McDaniel. “I was in an impossible situation; I knew nothing about the escape attempt, and so that began my odyssey,” he reflected years later.47 One of McDaniel’s arms was broken, and he was whipped with a knotted fan belt during a torture session spanning 14 days. Retribution was not limited to the Zoo; the effort to prevent further escapes also spread to other prison camps.

The courage and fierce determination to escape regardless of the consequences displayed by Kasler and Dramesi were unquestionable, but other POWs were highly skeptical any escape plan would work. Breaking out of a camp was less of a problem than what would follow. “I have respect for John Dramesi, a real firebrand, tough guy. I would love to see him be successful. But from my vantage point, it was almost impossible to escape from that system and make it to the coast,” McDaniel said.48

Following the unsuccessful Dramesi-Atterberry attempt in 1969, the POWs’ senior leadership imposed a policy stipulating that no escape plan would be approved without a high likelihood of success and the assurance of outside assistance.49

Undeterred, the Kasler-Dramesi group settled on a plan to escape from Hoa Lo, make their way to the Red River, and continue down the waterway to North Vietnam’s coast for rescue by US forces. According to Kasler’s biographers, the plan was communicated to the United States in encoded messages written by members of the escape team.50 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird approved the plan in January 1972.49,51 When the Strategic Air Command’s SR-71s signaled the plan’s approval over Hanoi on 2 and 4 May, the small group planning to escape had satisfied the SRO’s requirement for outside help.

By June, the Navy’s Seventh Fleet was in position off the coast of North Vietnam and ready to assist. USS Grayback, with Cdr. John Chamberlain in command, arrived on station close to the mouth of the Red River on 3 June. Lt. M. Spence Dry, the officer in charge of Alfa Platoon, SEAL Team One, and his 13 hand-picked SEALs had boarded the Grayback in April at the US Naval Station in Subic Bay, Philippines. Seven members of Underwater Demolition Team Eleven were also assigned to the submarine to operate its four SEAL delivery vehicles (SDVs)—small, free-flooding, unpressurized mini-submarines.52

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a. Veith also states, “The Escape Committee, according to Dramesi, had set up a separate channel [for communications] outside the one normally used by the POWs.”
Two Navy combat search-and-rescue HH-3A helicopters assigned to Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Seven, Detachment 110 (HC-7 Det 110), were assigned to fly aerial-surveillance missions along a specific area of coastline off the Red River’s delta region to search for escaping POWs. Several Seventh Fleet ships operating in the Tonkin Gulf, including the nuclear-powered, guided-missile cruiser USS Long Beach (CGN-9), were designated to provide command-and-control functions and other support as necessary. Detailed information about the specific purpose of their assignments was limited to a handful of people to protect operational security.

Misfortune and technical problems with two SDVs plagued the small SEAL platoon from the start. During a night reconnaissance mission on 3 June, the batteries on Dry’s SDV were exhausted as the craft battled a strong current. Unable to locate the submarine, the SDV was scuttled. Dry and his three companions treaded water until rescued the next morning by one of the HH-3A helicopters assigned to the mission and were taken to the Long Beach. Problems also developed when the four men were flown by helicopter from the cruiser that night for a low-level “cast” (i.e., jump) to return to Grayback.

The pilots of the helicopter experienced great difficulty in identifying the submarine’s infra-red signaling light. Then, when they thought they had detected the signal, the aircraft commander was unable to maneuver the helicopter properly during his approach for the drop. The pilot called for the men to drop well in excess of the maximum limits of 20 feet of altitude and 20 knots of airspeed.
Operation Thunderhead was now history, but POW covert communications continued until the end of hostilities between the United States and North Vietnam early in 1973.

Dry’s last words before leaping into the darkness were, “We’ve got to get back to the Grayback.” He was killed instantly when he hit the water; one of the UDT operators of the SDV was seriously injured. The survivors retrieved Dry’s lifeless body and again treaded water overnight.

Several hours before this mishap, Grayback had launched a second SDV. Improperly ballasted, it foun-dered and sank in 60 feet of water. The SDV’s team surfaced safely and they soon joined the men from Dry’s SDV. They were all rescued by a Det 110 helicopter at dawn and taken to the Long Beach. Dry’s body and the seriously injured UDT operator were flown to the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63).

The Grayback continued its surveillance. Commander Chamberlain was confident the SEAL platoon would be able to perform its mission with the submarine’s two remaining SDVs. Helicopter surveillance continued along North Vietnam’s coast. Finally, in late June, with no POW sightings reported, Operation Thunderhead was terminated.

No sightings were possible because no POWs attempted the escape from Hoa Lo. In May, following the SR-71 flyovers, the two groups planning to escape requested permission to do so from Colonel Flynn, the camp’s SRO. After consulting with other senior POWs (including Stockdale) in the POW leadership chain, the requests were not approved. As historian George J. Veith concluded, “It was too risky, and the possible NVA retaliation on the remaining POWs would disrupt their hard-won and newly formed communication systems.” Veith noted that both Dramesi and Kasler were furious but obeyed orders. Unfortunately, POW leaders were unable to communicate the decision in time to abort the rescue mission.

Operation Thunderhead became history, but POW covert communications continued until the end of hostilities between the United States and North Vietnam early in 1973. At the end of 1972, radio-communications equipment covertly delivered to Hoa Lo achieved a milestone of sorts. During the joint Seventh Fleet Air Force-Navy Task Force 77 “Christmas bombing” offensive against North Vietnam in late December (Operation Linebacker II), North Vietnam claimed that B-52s had hit the prison. The United States was able to refute the spurious allegation authoritatively. POWs transmitted a radio message from Hoa Lo to US reconnaissance aircraft in Morse code: “V LIE WE OK.”

The following month, after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January, 591 POWs came home from the north and south of Vietnam to the United States between February and April during Operation Homecoming.

Epilogue: “You Saved Our Lives”

President Ford awarded Admiral Stockdale the Medal of Honor in March 1976 for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty” for his leadership of POW resistance to interrogation and propaganda exploitation. A great many of his fellow POWs were also highly decorated for their heroism, leadership, and sacrifices during captivity.

John Dramesi remains adamant that a POW’s principal duty is to escape in accordance with Article III of the US military’s Code of Conduct. It states, in part, “I will make every effort to escape and to aid others to escape.” Article IV, however, states, in part, “I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades.”

In the face of these two potentially conflicting provisions, it unavoidably falls on the shoulders of the POWs’ senior ranking officer to assess and balance the likelihood an escape plan will be successful with the probable consequences an attempted escape will have on other POWs. One pilot imprisoned at Hoa Lo, a veteran of WW II and Korea who was captured in June 1965, described the odds for successfully escaping as “a big, fat zero.” Clearly, the horrific retribution that followed the Dramesi-At- terberry escape in 1969 weighed heavily on the minds of Hoa Lo’s senior POW leaders when the SRO disapproved any escape attempt in May 1972.

There is no doubt, however, about the POWs’ admiration for those who provided the means for them to communicate during their years of captivity and for those who attempted to rescue them at Son Tay and during Operation Thunderhead.

In February 2008, Rear Adm. Joseph D. Kernan, commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command, posthumously awarded Lieutenant
Dry a Bronze Star with Combat V Distinguishing Device for his “heroic achievement” during Operation Thunderhead. It was presented to his family during a ceremony at the Naval Academy. Col. John Dramesi was present, along with several SEALs from Dry’s platoon, a number of Dry’s Naval Academy classmates (including Adm. Michael G. Mullen, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and members of the Brigade of Midshipmen. “I’ve been looking forward to this day for a long time,” Dramesi said.

The POW community also expressed its gratitude to CIA’s David Coffey for his inspired efforts to support them in captivity. Many volumes in Coffey’s large collection of books written by former POWs are inscribed with notes of thanks. One says, “You saved our lives.” Another says, “We could have never endured without you.” Another one says, “Thanks for the groceries.” Coffey regularly attended POW events, was made an honorary POW, and became friends with a number of the former prisoners.

“Over the time that I worked at night on the project,” Coffey said, “I had the deeply satisfying personal pleasure of seeing how grateful the military was that they had this channel. For years, it had been unknown what happened to many of the guys, whether they were KIA or MIA or POWs. After we had the communications link, not only did the military know, but a lot of these families also began to get reliable information about their sons, fathers, and husbands.”


a. In 1997, in connection with CIA’s celebration of its 50th anniversary, David E.
Endnotes

1. Kevin Dockery, Operation Thunderhead (Berkley Publishing Group, 2008), 231–32.
3. LCDR Edwin L. Towers, USN (Ret.), Operation Thunderhead: Hope for Freedom (Lane & Associates, 1981). Towers participated in the Seventh Fleet’s planning for Thunderhead and flew in HC-7 Detachment 110’s helicopter surveillance flights during the operation. His eyewitness account is the most comprehensive and authoritative history of the Navy’s role in the POW rescue mission.
4. Robert W. Wallace and Keith Melton, Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA’s Spycraft from Communism to Al-Qaeda (Plume Penguin Group paperback edition, 2009), 21. The Smithsonian Channel documentary, The Spy in the Hanoi Hilton, initially aired on 27 April 2015. David C. Taylor, a coauthor of this article, produced the documentary. Coauthor Capt. Gordon I. Peterson was a historical consultant for the project. The memoir and Wallace’s comments in the film were reviewed and approved for classification purposes by CIA’s Publication Review Board.
8. Johnson and Winebrenner, 73.
11. Ibid., 137.
12. Ibid., 198, 207.
13. Johnson and Winebrenner, 207. Major Samuel Johnson’s first letter to his wife was delivered to her three-and-a-half years after his capture in April 1966.
15. Wallace and Melton, Spycraft, 21.
16. Ibid., 296–97.
17. Taylor-Wallace interview, 13 May 2014.
18. Wallace and Melton, 300.
23. Johnson and Winebrenner, 225.
24. David Taylor interview with Dr. James Stockdale II, 26 May 2014.
25. Townley, 205.
27. Denton, 199.
32. David Taylor interview with Cdr. Danny E. Glenn, 12 June 2014.
33. George J. Veith, Code-Name Bright Light, the Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War (Dell Publishing, 1998), 298. Veith’s history of POW rescue operations is meticulously researched, relying heavily on personal interviews and declassified DoD/CIA documents.
34. Taylor-Glenn interview.
36. Johnson and Winebrenner, 244.
37. Taylor-Glenn interview.
38. Taylor-Stockdale interview.
41. Oral History Interview with Donald L. Heiliger, (Madison, WI, Wisconsin Veterans Museum, 1999), 77. (www.wisvetsmuseum.com)
42. Denton, 239.
43. Johnson and Winebrenner, 250.
44. Luckett and Byler, 185
46. Ibid., 479.
47. Taylor-McDaniel interview.
48. Ibid.
49. Dockery, 219.
50. Luckett and Byler, 186.
51. Veith, 372.
53. Veith, 377.
55. Ibid, 481.
57. Taylor-Wallace interview.
58. Wallace and Melton, 303.
59. Taylor-Wallace interview.

The images of the Hoa Lo and Son Tay prisons and the POW holding a letter from home can all be found in NARA 342B-VN-117, Filed: Air Force Activities (Vietnam) Prisons and Prisoners.

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Introduction.

The end of World War II in Europe and the Pacific in 1945 refocused the missions of virtually all US entities then posted abroad. Purely military units could begin the process of returning home, but US intelligence around the world, in particular Office of Strategic Services (OSS) units, entered a peculiarly ambiguous zone in which the fog of war gave way to a kind of fog of peace. OSS members suddenly found themselves unclear about their post-war futures: Would they go home or not? Did they have futures in intelligence? What work were they obliged to do while riding through the uncertainty? The answers were debated and gradually answered in Washington. OSS would be abolished and an interim organization housed in the War Department, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), would hold some OSS operational equities and capabilities, and carry on the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the OSS. Eventually the centralization of civilian, national-level (strategic) intelligence that OSS chief William Donovan had wanted appeared with the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947.\footnote{a. A brief take on this history by former CIA historian Michael Warner appeared in Studies in Intelligence 39, No. 5 (1996).}

While most intelligence histories of this period focus on high-level institution-building, the following account looks in detail at the challenges personnel, mostly of the OSS, faced in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), from the time of Japan’s surrender in August 1945 to the formal dissolution in October 1946 of the SSU, the organization into which most had been absorbed. The short-lived entity’s field stations in the colonial world—NEI, Vietnam, India, and Egypt, among others, took on the unfamiliar: POW repatriation; dealing with suspicious, sometimes hostile, colonial hosts; and connecting with and assessing and reporting on revolutionary leaders and their movements. In short, SSUs continued the business of intelligence in new environments, but in ways that very much looked like the work of intelligence in the field today.\footnote{b. Circumstances in Europe are described in David Alvarez and Eduard Mark, Spying Through a Glass Darkly (University Press of Kansas, 2016).} —Editor

Frederick E. Crockett arrived at the port of Batavia on 15 September 1945—one month after Japan’s surrender ended World War II. A major in the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS), the wartime intelligence and covert action agency and CIA predecessor, Crockett had traveled to Java aboard HMS Cumberland. The British heavy cruiser carried a group of Allied officials, whose primary concerns were accepting the surrender of Japanese troops and repatriating military prisoners of war and civilian internees in what was then the Netherlands East Indies.

Crockett’s mission, codenamed ICEBERG, had two principal objectives. The first was immediate and overt: helping rescue US POWs from Japanese camps. This humanitarian assignment provided cover for a second, longer-term objective: establishing a field station for espionage in what would become the nation of Indonesia. 1

Crockett’s ICEBERG mission reflected a fundamental conviction of Maj. Gen. William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, director of the OSS: the United States needed a postwar “central intelligence agency”—that is, a secret foreign intelligence service that preserved OSS’s capacity to report “information as seen through American eyes” and “to analyze and evaluate the material” for policymakers. 2 Unlike other major powers, the United States did not have a prewar espionage organization equivalent to the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), MI6.

Donovan’s intelligence career ended on 1 October 1945 with the official dissolution of the OSS, but the seeds of his proposed postwar secret service took root in SSU stations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. In Batavia, known today as Jakarta, the intelligence collected by the ICEBERG team provided policymakers with information on the initial phases of the Indonesian revolution, a brutal four-year struggle to break free of Dutch colonial rule of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI).

Playing a small role in a larger drama dominated by Indonesians, the British, and the Dutch, US intelligence officers sympathized with Indonesian nationalists, while antagonizing European allies, US Consul General Walter A. Foote. The story that follows is both a case study of the first US intelligence station in Indonesia, 1945–1946, and a window on the institutional transition of a temporary wartime intelligence organization into a permanent peacetime agency.

**Extreme Discretion**

During the second week of August 1945, when it was clear that Japan’s surrender was imminent, Col. John G. Coughlin established a small planning committee at his headquarters in Kandy, Ceylon. Commander of Detachment 404, which was responsible for OSS operations in the India-Burma Theater (IBT), Coughlin appointed four senior intelligence and research officers to the committee: Lt. Cmdr. Edmond L. Taylor (chair), Cora Du Bois, W. Lloyd George, and S. Dillon Ripley II. Their prewar careers—Taylor, journalism; Du Bois, anthropology; George, journalism; and Ripley, ornithology—reflected Donovan’s characterization of OSS personnel as “glorious amateurs.”

With the liberation of Southeast Asia at hand, the committee members selected Singapore, Saigon, and Batavia as locations for new OSS field stations and decided to increase the size of the existing mission in Bangkok. In each capital, an OSS team would overtly locate POWs, gather information about Japanese war crimes, and assess the condition of prewar US property, while simultaneously pursuing the more...
Halpern thought “P” Division “was simply a means for the British to keep an eye on what the hell the Americans were doing.”

Lt. Gen. Raymond A. “Speck” Wheeler, the US theater commander, approved the OSS plan. Unlike many regular army officers, he supported the espionage, paramilitary, and psychological warfare activities of the OSS. In an “eyes alone” message to Donovan, Coughlin wrote that Wheeler was “most friendly” and appeared to have “a real interest in our operations.” The general’s opinion of Detachment 404 had been informed by his own experience managing the logistics of OSS operations in Burma and by the views of his daughter and only child, Margaret, who worked in the New York office of OSS for two years before becoming Coughlin’s administrative assistant. “She is an ardent supporter of OSS and will be a help to the organization,” wrote Coughlin. “She has great influence over her father, who has great confidence in her.”

The OSS plan to expand its regional activities also required the authorization of Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, the supreme allied commander of the predominantly British Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). His organizational mechanism for overseeing allied intelligence operations was a coordinating committee called “P” Division, led by Capt. G. S. Garnons-Williams of the Royal Navy. According to Samuel Halpern, a future career CIA officer who served in Detachment 404, “P” Division “was simply a means for the British to keep an eye on what the hell the Americans were doing.”

The OSS, however, resisted aspects of British oversight. In the application to “P” Division seeking approval for ICEBERG, Detachment 404 described the operation’s overt tasks but made no reference to its covert objective. The collection of political and economic intelligence, Crockett wrote in his top-secret operational plan for the OSS, would “have to be conducted with extreme discretion, as it is largely of a Control nature.” In other words, much of the OSS information would not be shared with other governments.

Dutch officials in Kandy were “extremely reluctant” to allow a US intelligence team in Batavia. Determined to resume their colonial administration of the NEI, the Dutch argued that the archipelago was not within the American “sphere of influence.” Moreover, they declared that OSS operatives would duplicate the work of Dutch and British intelligence organizations, which would tell the Americans everything they “needed to know.” To OSS officers, Dutch opposition to US observers appeared to be “not simply an attitude of arbitrary non-cooperation” but an attempt to control perceptions of political and economic conditions. Because SEAC had authorized American participation in all theater activities, the Dutch were obliged to approve the ICEBERG mission.

The British, too, were apprehensive about an OSS presence in the NEI and its own prewar colonial territories. In his chief of mission report for the month of August 1945, Coughlin commented to Washington on SEAC’s “great reluctance” to assist OSS operations. A 37-year-old graduate of West Point, where he had been a heavyweight boxer and a pitcher for the baseball team, Coughlin helped establish the first OSS field base in Burma and served as the OSS chief in China before his assignment in Kandy. In a cable to Donovan dated 2 September 1945, he wrote that British intelligence officials had been surprised and amazed by his plan to station 85 OSS personnel in Singapore. “What would [you] need that many people for?” they asked. Coughlin did not record his reply, but he envisioned Singapore as a regional headquarters for US intelligence operations in Malaya and Indonesia. Faced with British opposition and the inevitable postwar reduction of American military personnel in Southeast Asia, he decreased the recommended size of the OSS mission in Singapore to no more than 20.

Coughlin proposed to Donovan that, once operations for recovering POWs were over, four-person teams—each with specialists in espionage, counterintelligence, and research and analysis—could form the core of US intelligence stations in Southeast Asian capitals. “[The] smaller we keep our missions the less difficulty we will have at carrying out our work,” he wrote. “We will attract much less attention.” The intelligence collected “while not as voluminous, should be of a much higher grade.” A new postwar intelligence agency, Coughlin suggested, “should be much smaller [than the OSS] and consist of highly specialized and well trained personnel. The bulk of our personnel would not qualify, in my
opinion, but an excellent nucleus is present.”

Despite his doubts about the professional competence of much of his command, Coughlin was enthusiastic about the OSS team selected for Batavia. He wrote to Donovan that ICEBERG’s commanding officer, Major Crockett, was “very able,” eager, and trained in the techniques of espionage. “Freddy” Crockett, then 38, fit the OSS stereotype of an affluent, well-connected adventurer. The son of a Boston physician, he had left Harvard after his sophomore year to join naval explorer Richard E. Byrd’s mission to the Antarctic, 1928–1930. Crockett’s prewar professional experience included prospecting for gold and leading a scientific expedition in the South Pacific. General Donovan initially considered him an ideal candidate to train and lead behind-the-lines guerrilla groups engaged in sabotage operations. OSS evaluators did not share this assessment, giving Crockett only “average” scores in demolitions, weapons, and physical stamina. He did, however, score “excellent” and “superior” marks in espionage subjects—for example, social relations, military intelligence, and reporting.

Coughlin also thought that OSS civilian Jane Foster would be a “very valuable” member of the ICEBERG team. The daughter of a San Francisco physician and a graduate of Mills College, Foster was a 32-year-old artist who worked in Morale Operations, the OSS branch responsible for deceiving the enemy with black propaganda. She was temporarily transferred to the Secret Intelligence Branch for Operation ICEBERG because she had lived in the NEI before the war, acquiring knowledge of the Indonesians, their language, and their customs that OSS recruiters had “found almost impossible to duplicate.” A fact unknown to those
recruiters was that Foster had joined the Communist Party of the United States in 1938. In her autobiography, she wrote that she left the party “of my own free will, some years later.”

Heavy Commitments

While the OSS planned for expanded intelligence activities in Southeast Asia, Mountbatten had the unenviable task of coping with a recent 50-percent increase in the land area of his command. The new SEAC boundaries encompassed the NEI and southern Indochina. For most of the war, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of allied forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, had been responsible for all of the NEI except Sumatra. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, eager for MacArthur to concentrate on the final push to the Japanese home islands, had prevailed upon their British counterparts to have Mountbatten assume expanded tactical responsibilities in the South Pacific “as soon as practicable after the 15th August, 1945.”

With the sudden end of the war, Mountbatten had a new peacetime mission in the NEI: disarm the Japanese military, repatriate allied prisoners of war and internees, and “prepare for the eventual handing over of this country to the Dutch civil authorities.” SEAC was wholly unprepared for this mission. “Neither men nor ships were immediately available,” wrote R. B. Smith, a British military observer in Java. “There were heavy commitments in Malaya, Thailand and Indo-China, and there were thousands of released civilian internees and prisoners of war to be shipped back to England or Australia, and thousands of tons of urgently needed stores to be shipped into these territories.”

Limited manpower and shipping were not the only problems facing SEAC. Mountbatten lacked intelligence about the political and military environment in which his occupation and recovery forces would operate. The fundamental reason for this blind spot was that much of the NEI was never a strategic priority for the United States.

Mountbatten lacked intelligence about the political and military environment in which his occupation and recovery forces would operate. The fundamental reason for this blind spot was that much of the NEI was never a strategic priority for the United States.

Hard Feelings

The ICEBERG plan called for a “Team A” in Batavia that included espionage, counterintelligence, and research and analysis officers, as well as a radio operator and a cryptographer. A “Team B” in Singapore, which had been the headquarters for Japanese military administration of Sumatra, would eventually reinforce the station in Batavia. When Cockett arrived in Java on 15 September, he was accompanied by two OSS subordinates: Lieutenant Richard F. Staples, a communications officer who would encrypt messages and operate a feeble 15-watt transmitter; and John E. Beltz, a Dutch-American US Navy specialist whose qualifications for the mission included the ability to speak colloquial Malay. The intelligence operatives were billeted in two rooms at the Hôtel des Indes, a venerable establishment in central
Batavia that served as an Allied military headquarters.\textsuperscript{17}

One of Crockett’s first meetings was with Lt. Cmdr. Thomas A. Donovan, the senior American prisoner of war in Java. He had been serving on the carrier USS Langley in February 1942, when it was attacked by Japanese aircraft and then scuttled off the coast of Java. Although suffering from malnutrition and other debilitating effects of three-and-a-half years of imprisonment, Donovan played a leading role in the repatriation of US POWs. Jane Foster, who arrived in Batavia on a nearly empty C-54 transport aircraft that returned to Singapore with the first 40 American POWs, recalled that the emaciated naval officer “was yellow from Malaria and, no matter how many K rations we gave him, it did not seem to do much good.” Without regard for his health, according to Crockett, Donovan “made a complete plan for the evacuation” of POWs and “volunteered to remain in Java until evacuation proceedings were in full swing.”\textsuperscript{18}

A less inspiring aspect of the rescue mission, formally known as the Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI), was the anguish caused by the differing approaches of the United States and its British and Dutch allies. Crockett had been ordered to evacuate the US POWs, who numbered in the hundreds, as quickly as possible. This directive, he observed later, was “directly contrary to the policy of the British and Dutch,” who had to explain to tens of thousands of their prisoners that an immediate release was “impracticable.” For their safety, British and Dutch prisoners had to remain in their camps. Crockett reported that expediting the release of Americans not only caused “hard feelings with the British and Dutch RAPWI” but also “a lessening of morale” among their POWs and internees.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{The Fate of HUMPY}

One of ICEBERG’s objectives was to learn the fate of a wartime OSS agent: J. F. Mailuku, an Indonesian whose codename was HUMPY. Born in Ambarawa, Java, in 1917, Mailuku studied engineering in school and became an air force cadet in the colonial armed forces. Evacuated to Australia before the Dutch surrendered to the Japanese in 1942, he traveled to the United States, where he was recruited and trained by the OSS. On 23 June 1944, he was infiltrated into Java by submarine for an operation named RIPLEY I. Temporarily detained by Japanese-sponsored paramilitary forces, he missed a planned rendezvous with the OSS and never contacted the Americans during the war. He did, however, collect military and political intelligence in Java. When the Cumberland arrived in Batavia, Mailuku sought out allied authorities, who introduced him to Crockett. An OSS summary of HUMPY’s intelligence activities characterized his detailed reports as “information of inestimable value.”\textsuperscript{20}

Foster interviewed Mailuku on 20 September. “Throughout the Indies, but particularly Java,” he said, “the great mass of the people are violently anti-Dutch.” This observation—which Dutch officials adamantly
rejected—had been confirmed by other OSS sources. Mailuku, who was “certain that the Indonesians want nothing short of independence,” commented on the increasingly tense atmosphere in Batavia. Returning Dutch officials had been repeating Queen Wilhelmina’s vague pledge of 1942 to grant Indonesia eventual independence in internal affairs and participation in a Netherlands commonwealth. Such declarations “in no way” satisfied the demands of the nationalists led by Sukarno, who had assumed the presidency of the independent Republic of Indonesia, established on 17 August 1945. The red-and-white nationalist flag, said Mailuku, was “the only flag” visible in Batavia.21

In Kandy, British apprehension about “possible disorders” in Java was increasing. On 22 September Capt. Garnons-Williams of “P” Division addressed a top-secret memorandum to the three main allied intelligence organizations operating in Indonesia: Force 136, the Asian branch of Britain’s paramilitary Special Operations Executive; the Inter-Services Liaison Department, the Asian branch of SIS; and the OSS. Garnons-Williams wrote that information was “urgently required” on such topics as the leadership of anti-Dutch movements, their military strength, and the probability of armed resistance to the restoration of Dutch rule.22

That same day Rear Adm. W. R. Patterson, commander of the Fifth Cruiser Squadron and the ranking British officer in Java, summoned Crockett to the Cumberland and asked him “to discuss and pass on intelligence from [his] headquarters which was of allied concern.” It is not clear what information Crockett shared with Patterson. A comment in his summary report on ICEBERG, however, suggests that Crockett might have been less than forthcoming: “Intelligence that the Batavia mission collected was mostly of a U.S. eyes alone nature, especial-

[HUMPY] said, “the great mass of the people are violently anti-Dutch.” This observation—which Dutch officials adamantly rejected—had been confirmed by other OSS sources.

During his meeting with Patterson, Crockett received permission to establish an independent OSS headquarters. In messages to Kandy, both Crockett and Foster had indicated that the Hôtel des Indes was not a secure location for clandestine meetings with agents and other sources of information. Following a recommendation from the admiral, Crockett moved OSS headquarters to a marble mansion that had been the residence of the governor of West Java. Within days of moving his headquarters, Crockett was irritated to learn from the British that he would have to turn over the mansion to Lt. Gen. Sir Philip Christison, the commanding officer of the Allied forces arriving in Indonesia. In his ICEBERG report, Crockett alleged that the move was part of a British attempt “to obstruct” the work of his team.24

First Meeting with Sukarno

On 27 September, Foster and Kenneth K. Kennedy, a lieutenant colonel in the US Army’s Military Intelligence Service, made the initial American contact with President Sukarno, Vice President Mohammad Hatta, and the republic’s top cabinet ministers. The meeting was held at the home of Foreign Minister...
Achmad Soebardjo. Kennedy, who conducted the interview, stressed that his sole purpose was gathering information. This conversation, he said, should not be construed as approval of the republicans’ “movement.” Sukarno, whose nationalists operated Java’s communications, transportation, and other public services, replied that this “was understood by all present.”

Among the topics Kennedy raised was the nationalists’ attitude toward the Japanese. Sukarno had been a collaborator during the war, a political stance the republican ministers attributed to a willingness to work with any country that pledged to support Indonesian independence. Although Japanese promises of independence turned out to be lies, Sukarno and his ministers acknowledged residual gratitude for the recent occupation: the Japanese, either inadvertently or purposefully, had helped unify the Indonesians and provided them with military training. Now the nationalists felt “capable of resorting to force if necessary in order to preserve their independence.”

When Kennedy asked the group about their attitude toward allied occupation forces, Sukarno and his ministers pledged full cooperation with the British. The Indonesians would, however, oppose any Dutch who tried to occupy their country. The republican officials appeared to have an open mind about the possibility of an international trusteeship to oversee a transition to Indonesian independence. What would not be tolerated, they said, was interference in the country’s internal affairs or any attempt to reinstate Dutch rule. “All of those present were most cooperative in answering questions,” wrote Foster in her summary of the meeting. “Much of their long-range program was vague; the impression received was that the Cabinet is in reality a Revolutionary Committee, concerned mainly with establishing an independent Indonesia.”

In Kandy, SEAC officials were disturbed by the allied intelligence reports from Java. “Movement against the return of the Dutch Government is far more widespread than was formerly realized,” reported Charles W. Yost, a State Department official in Kandy who served as political adviser to General Wheeler. Past and current plans to restore Dutch civil authority in Indonesia had envisioned the Japanese as the enemy to be defeated and disarmed. The prospect of suppressing a large-scale Indonesian revolt against the Dutch was more than SEAC had bargained for. Instead of attempting to maintain law and order throughout Indonesia to ease the restoration of Dutch civil administration, Mountbatten narrowed the mission of his forces to securing areas essential to the recovery of POWs and internees.

Senior British civilian and military officials made public statements to this effect in Singapore. John J. “Jack” Lawson, the secretary of state for war, was quoted as saying that British obligations in Southeast Asia did not include fighting “for the Netherlanders against Javanese Nationalists.” General Christison told reporters of his intention to meet with Sukarno and to assure him that “the British do not plan to meddle in the internal affairs of Java.” He also said that he had insisted upon a conference between nationalist leaders and returning Dutch administrators.

These comments angered Dutch officials. Unable to land a significant military force of their own, the Dutch protested to London and issued a statement to the press denouncing efforts in “certain British circles to recognize the so-called Soekarno Government as the de facto government and to persuade us to have discussions with them.” The Dutch statement, which characterized Sukarno as “a tool and puppet of the Japanese,” included a categorical
refusal to “sit at the conference table with this man who may have certain demagogic gifts but who had proved to be a mere opportunist in choosing the means to attain his end.”

OSS Liquidated

An executive order signed by President Harry S. Truman officially dissolved the OSS, effective 1 October 1945. The liquidation of the wartime agency came more quickly than General Donovan wanted or anticipated. During the war, the OSS had encroached on the turf of military intelligence agencies, the FBI, and the State Department. Donovan’s bureaucratic enemies, who included FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, opposed his proposed postwar central intelligence organization and were eager for his return to private life. “A lot of people resented his close ties with Roosevelt,” recalled Fisher Howe, a special assistant to Donovan. “And he was totally dependent on those ties.”

Truman’s executive order transferred Secret Intelligence and other OSS operational branches to the War Department, a temporary expedient to preserve their capabilities for possible future use. Renamed the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), the group was led by Donovan’s deputy for intelligence, Brigadier General John Magruder. The State Department absorbed the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, which was renamed the Interim Research Intelligence Service (IRIS). Truman wanted Secretary of State James F. Byrnes “to take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program.” State Department officials, however, resisted the notion of a centralized organization and wanted the department’s geographic desks to control the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence.

The organizational changes in Washington had little initial impact on the operations of intelligence stations in the field. In Batavia, the preprinted words “Office of Strategic Services” on outgoing telexograms were simply blacked out, replaced by “Strategic Services Unit.” And while Donovan may have been driven out of Washington, the field station in Batavia continued its planned growth. In addition to Crockett, Foster, Staples, and Beltz, the station’s personnel included Maj. Thomas L. Fisher II (secret intelligence), Capt. Richard H. Shaw (counterintelligence), 2nd Lt. Richard K. Stuart (research and analysis), and Pfc. Tek Y. Lin (interpreter).

Ironically, the most important SSU officer operating in Indonesia, Maj. Robert A. Koke, was not a full-time member of the ICEBERG team in October 1945. During the war, Koke’s responsibilities included training OSS agents and escorting them on submarine operations, one of which was RIPLEY I. The operation’s primary objective was landing J. F. Mailuku, agent HUMPY, on occupied Java for a reconnaissance of the Sunda Strait area and for espionage in Sumatra. (As mentioned earlier, this operation quickly went awry.) Immediately living there, he learned to speak Dutch and Malay and introduced the sport of surfing to the island.

Robert Koke on his Kuta Beach resort and his hotel’s signboard in undated images attributed to his wife, Louise.
The republican leaders did tell the Americans about provocations by Dutch troops, who had just started to arrive in Java in small numbers: “Dutch soldiers are so nervous and ‘trigger happy’ that a number of Indonesians have been killed by irresponsible shooting.”

After the landing, the British submarine that had transported Maluku captured a 35-foot Indonesian junk and began towing it to a more secure area. The junk capsized, and Koke swam to the craft to search for travel documents, local currency, and other items of intelligence value. “A good sea was running and the force of the water had washed the entire contents out of the junk,” according to Ray F. Kauffman, the civilian commander of RIPLEY I. “Koke repeatedly dived under the wreck” until daylight jeopardized the safety of the surfaced submarine.35

After the surrender of Japan, Koke led the OSS team that accompanied British forces reoccupying Singapore. In addition to helping release and repatriate POW’s, he established an OSS mission that served as a regional supply base and a clearing point for intelligence communications from Malaya and Indonesia. He advised the OSS station in Kuala Lumpur on operations and made many visits to Batavia. According to a commendation in his personnel file, Koke “was remarkably successful in collecting much valuable information at the top levels of military and local government circles in Java.”34

A Deteriorating Situation

On 9 October 1945, one day after the death of the first British soldier in Java, Koke and three other SSU officers interviewed Sukarno and representatives of his government. The republicans warned the Americans that the situation was “rapidly deteriorating.” Seeking speedy negotiations to resolve the question of Indonesian independence, Sukarno and his ministers wanted intervention by the United Nations (UN) and expected the British to be their means of communicating with the recently established world body. The SSU officers offered little encouragement on either count. British authority, they said, was restricted to military occupation and to the repatriation of POWs and internees. And the Indonesians’ preferred approach to negotiations would be “difficult” because the UN did not recognize the nationalists’ government.35

During this meeting, Sukarno and his ministers voiced their fears about the Dutch “using the British occupation as a cover to achieve a coup d’etat.” What was left unsaid, or least unrecorded in the notes of the meeting, was that some Indonesians were beginning to view British forces as pro-Dutch targets for terrorism. The republican leaders did tell the Americans about provocations by Dutch troops, who had just started to arrive in Java in small numbers: “Dutch soldiers are so nervous and ‘trigger happy’ that a number of Indonesians have been killed by irresponsible shooting.” Many of these assaults, the nationalists said, were “made from trucks with the marking ‘USA’ on them,” and “many of the Dutch are dressed in U.S. uniforms.” Koke explained that the trucks and uniforms were Lend-Lease supplies issued in Australia. “The U.S.,” he said, “had no responsibility for it.” Sukarno replied that Indonesian leaders knew this. The masses, however, did not, and they had concluded that “the U.S. approves of these assaults.”36

That same day, Koke and other SSU officers were eyewitnesses to the kind of Dutch provocation mentioned by the nationalists. Down the street from SSU headquarters, shouting Dutch soldiers waved their weapons while forcibly evicting some 25 Indonesians from a building facing the headquarters of Lt. Gen. Ludolph H. van Oyen, commander of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. When asked what the soldiers were doing, a Dutch officer replied, “Moving the Indonesians out as they did not want them across the street from General van Oyen.” The officer further observed that “the Indonesians were spies.” The Americans, however, subsequently learned that the building facing van Oyen’s headquarters was a relief and welfare center and that the alleged spies were in their midteens. Their real “crime” had been occupying a building that flew a red-and-white nationalist flag.37

While SSU officers waited to see if the prisoners would be carried off in trucks with US markings, a passing automobile with a nationalist flag on the windshield backfired. Two Dutch guards immediately fired automatic weapons at the vehicle, which crashed into a low wall at SSU headquarters. The driver was killed; his three passengers were wounded, one mortally; and all four were unarmed.

“The Dutch officer who came up to the car after the shooting stopped seemed dazed and at a loss as to why it had happened,” Foster reported.
The SSU officers who witnessed the incident concluded that nervous Dutch guards had erroneously connected the car with the evictions and “opened fire out of sheer panic.”

A less blatant manifestation of Batavia’s dangers was the disappearance of agent Mailuku. He and an acquaintance who reportedly worked for Dutch intelligence went to a meeting of Indonesian nationalists, but he never returned from it. According to one account, the two spies were last seen riding in a car flying a red-and-white flag. “On each side of them there were other men—perhaps guards,” said an SSU source whose codename was PENNY. Because there had been neither word from Mailuku nor ransom demands from his captors, PENNY believed that Mailuku was “executed” for associating with a Dutch agent.

**Going Home**

On October 10 Crockett left Batavia for Singapore and his eventual return to the United States. Including planning, he had been in command of ICEBERG for approximately two months. His term as mission leader had been ended by a British request for his relief. “They asked for my recall as being uncooperative,” he wrote in his ICEBERG report. In Crockett’s view, however, it was the British who had been unhelpful, refusing essential supplies, commandeering OSS vehicles, and denying access to essential local funds: “They stalled us, they sidetracked us, they deceived us in every possible way.”

Crockett, who showed little understanding of the difficulty of SEAC’s mission in Indonesia, appeared to have a monolithic view of British and Dutch interests. The Europeans, he alleged, were “very worried that U.S. observers would report unfavorably, even though accurately, on their subtle endeavors to restore a virtual ‘status quo ante bellum.’” Despite his own pursuit of unilateral US objectives in Java, Crockett did not seem to recognize the irony of his principal conclusion about ICEBERG: “Contrasted with wartime operations where as an American unit we were recognized as a part of a team with a mutual objective, the Batavia mission could at no time be considered a joint and cooperative mission.”

A week after Crockett’s recall, Jane Foster left Batavia—a departure that was also involuntary. Her SSU superiors, apparently unwilling to risk the repercussions from any harm that might befall her, appear to have decided that Indonesia was too dangerous for a woman. They had made a similar decision once before, when Christison’s forces first landed in Java. Anticipating trouble, Crockett requested a British security force for OSS headquarters but was informed that such troops were neither available nor necessary. Foster, temporarily evacuated to Singapore, complained that she “could not understand why Major Crockett should be made more responsible for my safety than for the other members of the mission.”

It seems highly probable that British officials were pleased by Foster’s permanent removal from Java. Crockett praised her “skill and diligence” in collecting political intelligence and “her dealings with the nationalists’ representatives”—activities the British apparently perceived as helpful meddling. Detachment 404’s summary report for the month of October noted that the British had objected on several occasions “to any contact on our part with the leaders of the Nationalist cause. As a result of this, contact which had been established was required to lapse temporarily until more subtle means of communication could be established.”

The members of ICEBERG who remained in Batavia shared a longing that was contributing to a theater-wide turnover of SSU personnel: American citizen-spies wanted to go home. In a message to Kandy, Thomas Fisher, Crockett’s successor as SSU chief in Batavia, used the military’s phonetic alphabet to communicate this urge: “All eligible here desire return to Uncle Sugar as soon as can be spared.” A graduate of West Point, Fisher had led the 50 OSS personnel attached to the British 34th Indian Corps in postwar Malaya and established an OSS field station in Kuala Lumpur. With the war over, he indicated a desire to resume his career with the regular army but volunteered to stay in Batavia as long as necessary.

Like all SSU officers, Fisher was under strict instructions to be apolitical in his conversations with Indonesians, the British, and the Dutch. But also like his fellow intelligence...
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officers, Fisher was more sympathetic to the nationalists than the Dutch. He was convinced that the US government recognized neither the seriousness of the situation in Java nor the need for “some channel of negotiation.” The nationalists, Fisher declared to his superiors in Kandy, would accept a “trusteeship with a definite promise of independence” at a fixed future date. Without negotiations toward that end, they would fight the Dutch, who continued to be “blindly provocative.” On 15 October Fisher warned: “Every hour of stalemate brings anarchy closer.”

SSU director Magruder forwarded the substance of this and other intelligence reports from Batavia to Colonel Alfred McCormack, a lawyer and military intelligence officer whom Secretary of State Byrnes had recently appointed his special assistant for intelligence and the head of IRIS. Because the State Department still lacked a representative in Batavia, SSU reporting undoubtedly influenced portions of a well-publicized speech by John Carter Vincent, director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. In remarks delivered on 20 October to the annual forum of the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Vincent discussed American objectives and policies in the Far East. Commenting briefly on Southeast Asia, he acknowledged that the situation was not “to the liking” of Americans, Europeans, or Southeast Asians. The United States, Vincent declared, did not question the sovereignty of the French in Indochina or the Dutch in Indonesia. US officials did, however, “earnestly hope” that the Europeans would reach “an early agreement” with the local movements opposing them. “It is not our intention to assist or participate in forceful measures for the imposition of control by the territorial sovereigns,” he said, “but we would be prepared to lend our assistance, if requested to do so, in efforts to reach peaceful agreements in these disturbed areas.”

The apparent offer of US mediation in Southeast Asia seemed encouraging to republicans in Indonesia. Perhaps assuming that such a significant announcement could only come from a member of President Truman’s cabinet, Indonesians initially attributed Vincent’s statement to Treasury Secretary Frederick M. Vinson. Dutch officials, however, knew precisely who had made the offer, and they were disturbed by it. They did not want mediation, which would imply recognition of the nationalists and their claims. What they wanted was control of any changes in Indonesia’s relationship with the Netherlands. Critical of the British, who lacked the troops and the will to reoccupy the major islands of the archipelago, Dutch officials were concerned that the United States also was failing them. Henri van Vredenburg, counselor in the Dutch embassy in Washington, pointedly asked the State Department to whom its offer of “assistance” was addressed. Vincent replied, somewhat implausibly, that his offer was “addressed to no one. It is a simple indication of our willingness to be helpful.”

Consul General Walter Foote on his return to NEI, 21 October 1945. Photo © John Florea/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images
Uncle Billy

On 21 October 1945, some three-and-a-half years after fleeing the invading Japanese army, Walter Foote realized his ambition of returning to Batavia to reopen the US consulate. The 58-year-old Texan was an affable diplomat who liked to be called “Uncle Billy.” Albert C. Cizauskas, a Foreign Service officer who worked with Foote after the war, recalled: “Uncle Billy was the epitome of the United States before Pearl Harbor, insular and avuncular, whom everyone liked because they thought he was on their side.”

According to Charles Wolf Jr., a vice consul under Foote in Indonesia, “Much of his life, his feelings, his values, and recollections, were inextricably bound up with the prewar pattern of colonial existence. His attitude toward the plight of the Dutch was naturally one of sympathy.”

Foote’s attitude toward the “natives,” however, was paternalistic and condescending. When he returned to Washington in the spring of 1942, Foote characterized the diverse peoples of Indonesia as “docile, essentially peaceful, contented and, therefore, apathetic towards political moves of any kind. There is no real anti-Dutch sentiment among them.” He made this comment in “Future of the Netherlands Indies,” a 40-page memorandum to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Despite its forward-looking title, the paper was notably lacking in prescience. In an apparent reference to Sukarno, a gifted orator whom the Dutch imprisoned before the war, Foote wrote: “A firebrand leader occasionally arises and speaks in a loud voice of the oppression of his people, but he never gains the support or even the respect of the mass of the people.”

Defending Dutch colonial administration, Foote reported to Hull that since his return to Washington he had heard sincere but uninformed comments about the NEI from unnamed pundits and “probably” some government officials. “The colonies must not go back to their original owners,” they said, and, “The people of the Indies should be independent.” Foote found these opinions “strange and immature.” While discussing the future status of the archipelago, he declared: “The natives of the Netherlands Indies are most definitely not ready for independence. That condition is fifty or seventy-five years in the future.” Foote acknowledged that the “old order will not return.” He concluded, however, that the “only feasible solution” for the Indies was “to remain under Netherlands sovereignty.”

Foote returned to Batavia more than one month after the arrival of the first OSS officers. In his first postwar report to the State Department, he described the city as “nearly dead.” Food, water, and local transportation were scarce, and the streets of Batavia were “unsafe at night.” The sole American diplomat in Java, Foote wrote that the Indonesians and Dutch were politically deadlocked; that Sukarno’s “movement” was “far deeper than thought”; and that the Dutch felt bitter toward their allies, especially the British. Foote summed up the situation as “confused” and “chaotic,” with “no solution in sight.”

Although his initial message to the State Department was reasonably balanced, Foote soon resumed his tendency to parrot the Dutch point of view in his despatches. Although his initial message to the State Department was reasonably balanced, Foote soon resumed his tendency to parrot the Dutch point of view in his despatches. On 12 November, for example, he reported “growing opinion” in Batavia that the nationalists’ cause was not a “real freedom movement” but a Japanese-inspired effort “to create chaos.” Colonel Simon H. Spoor, chief of the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, pedaled a similar line to the SSU, claiming that the unrest in Indonesia was a continuation of World War II: “The world should be informed that the allies are still fighting the Japanese and that the political situation should not confuse the basic aim.”

The Dutch propaganda mischaracterized both the Indonesians and the Japanese. Japanese troops were under orders from both SEAC and their own high command to protect POWs and internees until relieved by allied forces. Although some Japanese fought alongside the Indonesians against the British, most obediently served the under-strength occupation forces. According to a report from Bandung by Major Fisher, leaders of the British 37th Indian Infantry Brigade said that the 4,000 Japanese soldiers performing security duties there were “cooperating 100 percent in carrying out any orders given to them.” And after visiting the coastal town of Semarang, SSU officer Shaw quoted Brig. Richard B. W. Bethell’s one-word assessment of the Japanese troops under his command: “magnificent.”

The Dutch undoubtedly influenced Foote’s conviction that Chris-
... the Japanese, either inadvertently or purposefully, had helped unify the Indonesians and provided them with military training. Now the nationalists felt “capable of resorting to force if necessary in order to preserve their independence.”

tison was largely responsible for the problems in Java. In November 1945, Jan W. Meyer-Ranneft, a Dutch administrator in the NEI before the war and a member of Holland’s Council of State after it, wrote to Foote, describing Christison as “an ignorant British general.” Meyer-Ranneft, who considered Foote’s appointment as consul general “the only good point” in the current state of affairs, declared that Christison “acts like a traitor of Western civilization.”

SSU officers had their own doubts about the political judgment of the consul general. While Foote and the Dutch attributed the strength of the Indonesian nationalists to Japanese treachery, British blunders, and other external forces, the SSU station in Batavia provided a more fundamental explanation for the region-wide resistance to returning European powers: “Universal anti-colonial feeling and the presence everywhere of organized nationalist movements are of greater importance than any foreign influence. Even in the absence of concerted action, every movement toward nationalism supports every other, and appraises the chances of its own success by events elsewhere. Since colonial control is largely founded on the military prestige of the Western nations, psychological factors are of the highest importance. All Asia is coming to realize that the natives are not helpless, nor are the occidentals invincible.”

Edmond Taylor, the SSU theater commander in late 1945 and early 1946, praised the work of his officers to Magruder and criticized Foote, although not by name: “Owing to their training and to the fact that they have no other responsibilities than to report, SSU field representatives sometimes appear to have a broader and more objective approach to the intelligence problems with which they are confronted than other official observers. This is perhaps particularly marked in Batavia.” For his part, Foote did not appreciate competing political analyses by intelligence officers. A report from SSU’s Southeast Asia headquarters declared: “Consulates everywhere, except in Batavia, are still giving our work an enthusiastic welcome.”

Robert Koke, who became commanding officer of the SSU station in Batavia on 2 December 1945, worried that he might have difficulties with Foote. Don S. Garden, an SSU official in Washington, discussed the matter with an unidentified representative of the State Department, who said that Koke had “nothing to fear.” Because the department valued the intelligence reports from Batavia, “Foote would get his ears pinned back if he got obstreperous.”

Political Purposes

In the final months of 1945, “murder, kidnapping, arson, and robbery became the order of the day in Java,” according to US military intelligence. Eurasians, who were predominantly the offspring of Dutch men and Indonesian women, were particular targets of revolutionary terror because of their loyalty to the Netherlands. Organized violence escalated from small-scale skirmishes between Indonesian and Dutch forces—“with equal provocation on both sides”—to a division-strength operation by the British to occupy the port of Surabaya, Java’s second largest city. During the three-week battle, the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade was decimated, suffering 427 casualties. Estimated losses for Indonesians, who lacked the firepower and military training
of British troops, were measured in thousands. An SSU analysis of the Surabaya operation noted the severe Indonesian losses and the British military power but observed that travel outside of the city’s defensive perimeter was “safe only for combat units of considerable strength.”

62 During the fighting and the Indonesian pleas to end it, US officials walked a diplomatic tightrope, balancing a desire to be a good ally to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands with a rhetorical commitment to self-determination for prewar European colonies. The difficulty of maintaining this posture was evident from the conflicting expectations of the principal groups in Indonesia. Most nationalists admired the United States for defeating Japan and for espousing independence and self-government. But according to SSU officers Koke and Stuart, US prestige was jeopardized by the failure to make a “specific statement” supporting the nationalists. The intelligence officers criticized a recent declaration by Secretary of State Byrnes prohibiting the use of US-marked military equipment for “political purposes.” Indonesians, they wrote, “recognize the statement for what it is—a measure which hurts no one, helps no one, and clarifies nothing.” Continued silence about the nationalists would be interpreted as US “agreement with Dutch and British policy.”

US officials, however, agreed with the British that landing additional Dutch troops on Java at this time “would only aggravate an already intolerable situation.” State Department officers asked the UK government if it would be helpful for Ambassador Hornbeck to informally encourage the Dutch to continue “discussions with all Indonesian factions.” Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, delivered the UK reply to Secretary of State Byrnes on 10 December. While appreciative of the US offer, the Foreign Office stated that the problem was not Dutch reluctance to meet with Indonesian leaders but the inability of those “leaders to control extremists.” The United Kingdom, which had made several unsuccessful appeals for greater Dutch flexibility in their dealings with the nationalists, preferred a more general, public statement from Washington “expressing the hope that negotiations would continue.” Seeking to distance themselves from Dutch colonial objectives in Indonesia, the British thought that it would be “particularly helpful” if the US statement acknowledged SEAC’s “important Allied task” in Java: “completing [the] surrender of [the] Japanese and looking after Allied prisoners of war and internees.”

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The equivocation of the United States also bothered Dutch officials. “The Dutch,” according to an SSU report from Batavia, “resent American neutrality in the present Indonesian situation and believe that the U.S. has failed to live up to its wartime agreements by not giving aid to the Dutch.” In The Hague, Dutch diplomats used more tactful language to communicate a similar message to Stanley K. Hornbeck, the American ambassador to the Netherlands. They suggested that US policy lacked a “sympathetic understanding of the situation in the Indies.” As an example, they cited the unwillingness of the United States to equip former Dutch prisoners of war in the Philippines and transport them to Indonesia.

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Brigadier H. P. L. Hutchinson, who was responsible for the reprisal, was “very disturbed” by [SSU officer] Frye’s survey of the ruins.

With Byrnes and Halifax agreeing that “a political settlement was the only practical solution” in Indonesia, the State Department issued a press release on 19 December. In accordance with British wishes, the statement emphasized SEAC’s responsibilities for repatriating disarmed Japanese and allied POWs and internees. This mission, the news release declared with diplomatic understatement, had “been complicated by the differences between Indonesians and the Netherlands authorities.” With talks between the republicans and Dutch apparently suspended, the United States urged an early resumption of “conversations” that could potentially lead to “a peaceful settlement recognizing alike the natural aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the legitimate rights and interests of the Netherlands.” Referring to the principles and ideals of the UN charter, the statement declared: “Extremist or irresponsible action—or failure to present or consider specific proposals can lead only to a disastrous situation.”

Foote reported to the State Department that British and Dutch officials in Batavia found the statement constructive. He was, however, unable to get an immediate reaction from Sukarno or Sjahrir, who were in Jogjakarta, a republican stronghold in Central Java. On 24 December, Richard Stuart interviewed three Indonesian cabinet ministers, who were gratified by the expression of US interest in Indonesia. They particularly appreciated the statement’s reference to the United Nations. Yet the ministers claimed to be “puzzled” by the mention of the Netherlands’s “legitimate rights and interests.” Justice Minister Soewandi acknowledged Dutch “capital interests,” which the republic had “no intention of harming.” He was, however, unaware of any other Dutch “rights” in Indonesia.

Mutually Distrustful

In early January 1946, SSU Captain Marion C. Frye, a 33-year-old Iowan who had been a manufacturing executive before the war, visited the headquarters of the British 26th Indian Division in Padang, Sumatra. The mission of the division was to make Padang and two other cities on the island—Medan and Palembang—safe for evacuating some 13,000 Allied prisoners of war and internees still languishing in camps because of the lack of shipping. “The British are only maintaining a perimeter around these locations and are making no attempt to push on,” Frye reported to SSU’s regional headquarters. “No attempt is being made to disarm the Japanese or to concentrate them under British control.”

Larger in area, smaller in population, and richer in natural resources than Java, Sumatra had been a relatively peaceful battlefield in the fight for Indonesian independence. Resistance to the British occupation of Sumatra was initially limited to sniping and other small-scale military actions. The situation began to change, however, in December 1945, when a British major and a female Red Cross worker did not return from a planned swim near Emmahaven, the port of Padang. After a few days of searching, their mutilated bodies were discovered, buried in shallow graves. “In retaliation,” Frye reported, “British troops burned kampongs [villages] for a distance of six miles along the road where the two bodies were found.” Brigadier H. P. L. Hutchinson, who was responsible for the reprisal, was “very disturbed” by Frye’s survey of the ruins. Apparently concerned by the possibility of unfavorable publicity, Hutchinson claimed that the “area had not been burned by the British but that someone had ‘accidentally dropped a match.’”

As in Java, Japanese soldiers in Sumatra performed security duties for the overstretched British occupation forces. The Japanese, wrote Frye, “are strictly obedient to British commands and do exactly as the British say.” Japanese troops were ordered to quell disturbances in Sumatra, particularly in the northern province of Atjeh. The province’s fiercely independent Muslim population had resisted Dutch control throughout the colonial era. The bold clearing of Atjeh and other troubled areas by the Japanese increased their prestige among the British and Dutch. According to one SSU report, many British officers described their wartime enemies as “good blokes.” And Dutch officials declared that Japanese “brutality” was the “only method [to] control [the] ‘natives.’” Another SSU report, however, indicated that the Dutch were “split internally” over measures for restoring control in Sumatra. On the one hand, older prewar colonial administrators were “convinced that all the trouble could be settled in one or two months by a vigorous secret service and a couple thousand troops.” On the other hand, some of the younger Dutch officers realized that “the problem is far deeper than this.”
Perhaps the most “vigorous secret service” operative in Sumatra, and later Java and Sulawesi, was 1st Lt. Raymond Westerling, a Dutch intelligence officer whose preferred method for establishing order was the summary public execution of suspected “terrorists.” Born and raised in Turkey, Westerling received commando training from the British during World War II. As a member of Force 136, he was one of the first allied officers to parachute into Sumatra after the surrender of Japan. Assigned to the 26th Division, Westerling went about his counterintelligence work “thoroughly and brutally,” according to Captain Joseph W. Smith, commander of the SSU field station in Medan. Noting the price nationalists had put on Westerling’s head, Smith incorrectly predicted to SSU officials that the Dutch operative would “eventually be killed by the Indonesians.”74

Smith’s assignment in Medan was the result of an agreement between Mountbatten and Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Terry, Wheeler’s successor as IBT commander. In November 1945 Mountbatten had recommended the withdrawal of SSU from Southeast Asia because he had “no further need” of its services. Terry, providing cover for the SSU, claimed that he required the unit’s assistance for investigating war crimes. Despite “considerable British antipathy” toward US intelligence officers in Southeast Asia, Mountbatten agreed to allow the SSU to operate in areas where US consulates were not yet fully established. In January 1946 the SSU ordered Smith to Medan to collect military, political, and economic intelligence that would interest the State and War departments.75

Smith, who was later known within the CIA as “Big Joe” and to distinguish him from a shorter agency operative, Joseph B. “Little Joe” Smith, was a graduate of Yale, class of 1942. He had majored in international affairs and possessed an exceptional ability for learning foreign languages. Initially assigned to the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS, Smith waded ashore with the British force that reoccupied Malaya after the war. He helped establish, and later led, the OSS field station in Kuala Lumpur, where he developed a wide circle of secret contacts.76

One of Smith’s first tasks in Medan was determining the fate of Indonesian agents assigned to CAPRICE, a wartime OSS operation to establish a reporting and radio station on the Batu Islands off the west coast of Sumatra. In January 1945 friendly villagers sighted the CAPRICE party. With help from a sympathetic village headman, the OSS team avoided capture by the Japanese for five months. Eventually betrayed, the seven-man CAPRICE party engaged in a series of firefight with Japanese troops and their Indonesian auxiliaries. Although the OSS hoped that at least some of its agents had survived, British and US attempts to find them failed. Smith, who reviewed the available evidence and interviewed Indonesians who had helped the CAPRICE team, informed his superiors: “It would appear that there is little doubt that the entire party is dead.”77

Smith’s reporting from Sumatra indicated that political developments on the island were closely linked to the policies of the republican government in Java. The nationalists’ political gains, however, were threatened by conflict among the diverse peoples of Sumatra, who spoke no fewer than 15 distinct languages, each with several dialects: “The Indonesians in Sumatra are tending to split into mutually distrustful groups along ethnic, political or economic lines, with a general increase in the strength of the extremists.” Targets of revolutionary attacks included the sultans of East Sumatra, who had traditionally ruled the coastal districts on behalf of the Dutch. “The Sultans,” Smith reported, “have been in contact with the Dutch and their general aim is to bring together all elements loyal to the old regime.” Commenting on the “rapid and violent” nationalist reaction to this plan, Smith observed: “The death rate among the nobility is exceedingly high.”78

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a. Westerling, who died in 1967, was the leader of a ruthless Dutch pacification campaign in South Sulawesi during December 1946–February 1947. After a lawsuit in 2012, the Netherlands government acknowledged a “special responsibility” for his summary executions, apologized for them at a ceremony in Jakarta, and paid compensation to families of Westerling’s victims. (“Dutch Apologize for Massacre,” The Jakarta Post, 13 September 2013.)

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Centralizing Intelligence, Closing SSU

In early 1946 the US government made halting progress toward the creation of a centralized foreign intelligence agency. On 22 January,
At a time of increasing US concern about the postwar intentions of the Soviet Union, the SSU employed many experienced, committed officers who provided intelligence “of definite value.”

President Truman signed a directive establishing the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). Comprising the secretaries of state, war, navy, and a personal representative of the president, the NIA would have the ultimate responsibility for coordinating the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence relevant to national security. To assist the NIA in its work, the departments of state, war, and navy were directed to contribute personnel and facilities that would collectively form the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), led by a director of central intelligence (DCI) appointed by the president. In addition to coordinating intelligence, the CIG would perform “services of common concern” to US intelligence agencies, as well as other unspecified “functions and duties.” For reasons of security, the vague language in the presidential directive did not reveal the understanding that CIG would operate “a clandestine service for procurement of intelligence abroad.”

The first directive of DCI Sydney W. Souers, former deputy chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, established a fact-finding board of military and civilian officials to make recommendations about preserving functions and assets of the SSU after its “liquidation.” Despite its contributions to policymakers, the SSU “in no way constitute[d] a complete or adequate world-wide clandestine intelligence agency,” according to its director, General Magruder. A key weakness of the SSU, evident in Batavia and elsewhere, was that foreign governments and their intelligence organizations were familiar with its people. Whitney H. Shepardson, chief of secret intelligence for OSS and SSU, estimated that “85% of the intelligence personnel, through exposure to foreign representatives and agents in covert activity, have been compromised for any future secret intelligence activities.”

Another shortcoming of the SSU was that the OSS, the source of its personnel, had not conducted rigorous security investigations of its recruits. The exigencies of war did not allow it. In October 1945, however, the Security Division of the SSU began “a special sifting” of personnel records to ensure the “exclusive loyalty” of its employees to the United States. Andrew Sexton, chief of the Security Division, told the CIG fact-finding board that “new extreme security measurements” had led to terminations of employment. It is unclear whether the new security measures or the planned postwar reduction in SSU strength was responsible for Jane Foster’s release from the unit. Her personnel records only show that Foster’s position was “abolished” and that she was “involuntarily separated” from the SSU in January 1946.

Establishing an entirely new clandestine intelligence service untainted by association with the OSS may have been theoretically desirable, but it was simply not feasible. At a time of increasing US concern about the postwar intentions of the Soviet Union, the SSU employed many experienced, committed officers who provided intelligence “of definite value” to the State Department, War Department, and other government agencies. “Any cessation in the gathering and dissemination of such intelligence,” the CIG fact-finding board concluded, “would definitely impair the work of the customer agencies.” The board, therefore, recommend that the SSU “should be placed under CIG and properly and closely supervised, pruned and rebuilt.”

To preserve the future usefulness of experienced intelligence operatives in Asia, SSU headquarters made every effort “to get OSS personnel with long-range intelligence potentialities back to the United States or completely disassociated from OSS in the Far East.” SSU planners recognized that key officers would not be able to work in the region “for a considerable period of time, unless they lived there before the war and have a prewar occupation to which it is perfectly logical and natural for them to return.” Robert Koke, who returned to the United States in March 1946, fit this profile. He had expressed an interest in continuing intelligence work while ostensibly resuming his career as a hotel proprietor. “It will undoubtedly take him some little time to re-establish his cover,” an SSU planning document noted, “but once this is done he should be in an ideal position to establish himself as an observer and letter box at first, later possibly as an agent.”

Before he left Batavia, Koke and other intelligence officers responded to a request from the SSU theater commander, Lt. Col. Amos D. Moscrip Jr., for ideas about establishing a postwar espionage network in Indonesia. They warned him that any American observer “planted” in Java and Sumatra would have to be
particularly cautious in his activities.” With the British planning their withdrawal and the Dutch assuming greater military control of the archipelago, security regulations would likely be tightened: “Even at present, phone tapping is being employed by Dutch security people. It may be stated conservatively that for the next three or more years any observer in the NEI must assume he is under wartime surveillance.”

As an “interim expedient” to maintain a minimal intelligence capability in Southeast Asia, the SSU had a small number of operators released from the armed forces and assigned to consulates in Bangkok, Batavia, Kuala Lumpur, Saigon, and Singapore. In each capital, an intelligence officer and a cryptographer ostensibly employed by the consulate worked for the SSU. The consulates provided communications facilities but the SSU stations had their own codes and ciphers. From the start, the so-called consular-designee system proved “unsatisfactory” to the SSU because of “the lack of cooperation from the State Department.” The fundamental problem was control over reporting. In Saigon, for example, Consul Charles S. Reed II “insisted that SSU should give him all reports for filing to State.” In Batavia, Walter Foote “again claimed for himself alone the privilege of political reporting.”

The SSU quickly scrapped the consular-designee system in Southeast Asia, with the exceptions of Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. The two SSU civilians in Batavia—intelligence officer Stuart and cryptographer George W. Thomas—withdraw from the consulate on 18 June and returned to the United States. With CIG’s newly established Office of Special Operations assuming responsibility for espionage and counterespionage abroad, the SSU was officially shut down globally on 19 October. “It must be clearly understood that SSU has been liquidated and that the employment of all SSU personnel has been terminated,” wrote Colonel William W. Quinn, Magruder’s successor as director. “Certain selected individuals,” however, secured positions with the CIG.

Characterized as “a step-child of three separate departments” by its general counsel, Lawrence Houston, the CIG lacked the authority and budget to be an effective central intelligence organization. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Souers’ successor as DCI and a future Air Force chief of staff, helped persuade President Truman that the organization and staffing of the CIG was “unworkable” and that “only a fully funded, formally established, independent intelligence service would suffice.” In 1947 the CIG was dissolved and replaced by the CIA.

As has often been observed, many of the CIA’s first generation of officers—including future DCIs Allen W. Dulles, Richard M. Helms, and William E. Colby—were veterans of the OSS. Among the OSS officers in Indonesia who had multi-decade careers with the CIA were Robert Koke and Joseph Smith. Richard Stuart pursued his long intelligence career at the State Department, working in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and serving as a liaison with the CIA. Frederick Crockett, the commanding officer of the first US intelligence station in Indonesia, wrote a highly selective account of his weeks in Batavia for the March 1946 issue of Harper’s magazine. His postwar career included an unsuccessful bid for political office in California and a return to the CIA in the early 1950s. He died in 1978, having spent the last 24 years of his life as a commercial real estate broker.
Endnotes


6. OSS (Kandy) to P Division, 11 August 1945, and Crockett, “Basic Plan, ICEBERG,” 14 August 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 25.


9. Coughlin to Donovan, 2 September 1945.

10. Coughlin to Donovan, 18 August 1945; Crockett personnel file, RG 226, Entry A1 224, box 154.


12. Combined Chiefs of Staff to Mountbatten, 20 July 1945, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Terminal Conference (Joint History Office, 1973), 177.


15. Mountbatten, Post-Surrender Tasks: Section E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1969), 289.


24. Ibid.; Crockett to Coughlin, 20 September 1945; and Foster to George, 20 September 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 25.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.


32. Truman to Byrnes, 20 September 1945, and John J.McCloy to Magruder, 26 September 1945, FRUS, “EIE,” d. 15 and d. 95.

33. Taylor to Coughlin, 26 March 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 22.

34. Koke personnel file, RG 226, Entry A1 224, box 400.

35. Ibid.

36. Foster to George, 9 October 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 21.

37. Ibid.

38. Foster to George, 11 October 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 21.

39. Ibid.

Endnotes (cont.)

42. Ibid.
43. Foster to George, 5 October 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 21.
50. Ibid., 25.
52. Ibid.
54. Foote to State Dept., 12 November 1945, RG 59, DF 1945–49, box 6448; SSU Kandy to War Dept., 21 November 1945, RG 226, Entry NM-54 6, box 8.
56. Meyer-Ranneft to Foote, 6 November 1945, and 27 November 1945, RG 84, Entry UD 2728, box 1.
58. SSU Kandy to War Dept., 21 November 1945, and 19 November 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 211, box 9 and Entry NM-54 6, box 8.
59. SSU Kandy to War Dept., 17 November 1945, RG 226, Entry NM-54 6, box 8.
61. Taylor to Koke, 5 January 1945 [sic], RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 30.
66. Memorandum of conversation, 10 December 1945, FRUS, VI, p. 1181.
68. Foote to State Dept., 23 December 1945, FRUS, VI, pp. 1185–86; Stuart to Bluechel, 26 December 1945, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 21.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.; Foote to State Dept., 29 May 1942, RG 84, Entry UD 2732, box 1.
74. “Contacts in Medan Area,” 8 March 1946, RG 226, Entry 214, box 5.
77. Smith to SSU Singapore, 20 February 1946, RG 226, Entry A1 110, box 25.
79. “Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities,” 22 January 1946, and “Establishment of Clandestine Collection Service for Foreign Intelligence,” 14 February 1946, FRUS, EIE, d. 71 and d. 103.
Endnotes (cont.)

81. Meeting minutes, 20 February 1946, and Foster personnel records, RG 226, Entry A1 210, box 314, and Entry A1 224, box 154. In 1957 a federal grand jury indicted Foster and her husband, George Zlatovski, for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union, a charge they denied. The case did not go to trial because the United States was unable to extradite them from France, the couple’s home since 1949.

82. “Memorandum from the Fortier Committee to the Director of Central Intelligence,” 14 March 1946, FRUS, EIE, d. 105.


85. SSU progress reports, Far East Division, Secret Intelligence, April and May 1946, RG 226, Entry A1 210, box 379.


88. See, for example, The Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan (Simon and Schuster, 2015).

The Setting

The oldest permanent US intelligence organization is the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), dating to 1882. Within three years the Army founded its own intelligence organization, and both services developed a cadre of foreign intelligence collectors: naval and military attachés assigned to American missions abroad. When the United States entered World War I on 6 April 1917, there were only a handful of US naval attachés stationed overseas, and those in Germany and Austria were expelled.

Other offices in Europe were quickly opened, however, and the ONI needed candidates with foreign language skills and experience. As Lt. Col. James Breckinridge, the first US Marine naval attaché in Scandinavia, later said:

We need two things, and we need them badly. These are a knowledge of languages away and beyond the usual American ability to stutter. . . . We are a joke in any international gathering. . . . The other thing is to have a small class in which to teach what intelligence duty is . . . to begin with, [attachés] should know the language fluently, know the history of the people and the country, something about their social conditions and persuasions, their national ambitions and prejudices. . . . They then will be at home. . . . If [the attaché] is prepared for that sort of work, there is no limit to what he can do.¹

Rear Adm. Roger Welles, Jr., director of naval intelligence during World War I, was even more explicit in a reflective letter to the chief of the Naval Postgraduate School shortly after the war: “[The attaché] should be a man with a keen imagination, able to draw correct conclusions from very scanty evidence, courteous in manner, a man of the world (but not too worldly) and, in general, with sufficient intelligence to be a good mixer in all classes of society.”²

One of the best qualified of those new candidates was John Allyne Gade, the son of an American mother and Norwegian diplomat father. He is ably profiled by Patrick Devenny in a 2012 Studies in Intelligence article.³

Once the United States entered the war, Gade was given a Navy commission and made assistant naval attaché in Oslo, responsible for Norway and

Switzerland. Soon he was promoted to be naval attaché in Denmark. Gade worked closely with allied attachés, but “found it humiliating to realize what a greenhorn I was in comparison with my [British and French] colleagues.” As Devenny demonstrated, Gade learned quickly.

By the 1930s, American intelligence organizations were wasting away just as fascists were seizing control of Germany and Italy, militaristic imperialists were dominating Japan, and the communist Soviet Union was aggressively planting spies and agitators all over the world. In 1933, one of Gade’s college classmates was appointed ambassador to Belgium and although Gade was then almost 60 years old, he agreed to return to Europe as naval attaché to Belgium and the Netherlands.

From that vantage point he watched growing German aggressiveness in rearming and reoccupying the Rhineland, Austria, and Sudeten portion of Czechoslovakia while communists and Nazis fought for dominance in the Spanish Civil War. Having begun his service as a naval intelligence officer working with Scandinavian partners against imperial Germany, Gade ended that service at the age of 65 in 1940, watching Nazi German armies march into Brussels.

**Hillenkoeter in Europe, 1938–41**

A month later, in June 1940, a much younger naval intelligence colleague, 43-year-old St. Louis native Cdr. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, watched another victorious German army occupy Paris. Too young for World War I, Hillenkoetter had graduated with distinction from the United States Naval Academy in 1919 and spent his early years as a naval officer serving on surface ships and submarines and as a staff aide to senior commanders. Following two years teaching modern romance languages at the Naval Academy, and more sea duty in cruisers and destroyers, in October 1933, just as the Navy was imposing a 15-percent pay cut and drastic cuts in meager attaché expense accounts, he was appointed assistant naval attaché in Paris, where he served until September 1935.

While Gade had been sent out with little preparation, by the 1930s prospective attachés like Hillenkoetter first came to Washington to review intelligence files and consult with Navy technical offices about their particular interests. The Navy also scheduled a few weeks of overlap at post so that the departing attaché could brief his successor.

Like President Woodrow Wilson during World War I, President Franklin Roosevelt tended to rely upon his personal friends in matters involving foreign intelligence. Unfortunately, the president’s personal interest did not always lead to successful collection activities, especially when rival government agencies were involved. For example, while Roosevelt was “delighted at the idea” of assistant Paris naval attaché Hillenkoetter’s acting as a diplomatic courier traveling to Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow, and Prague as an excuse to observe military facilities, the Navy decided that it would be illegal for the State Department to pay his expenses. The Navy also decided that after his promising service as an intelligence officer, Hillenkoetter should return to sea, and from 1935 to 1938 he was stationed on the battleship Maryland in the Pacific. In April 1938 he was back in Paris, this time with additional responsibility for Madrid and Lisbon.

These were very turbulent years, and both Hillenkoetter in Paris and his senior colleague, Captain Gade in Brussels, were very active, especially in observing combat in the Spanish Civil War. The American Civil War had been an effective laboratory demonstration of industrial mass warfare for European military experts, and the Spanish Civil War offered American officers early exposure to 20th-century technological war. In his memoirs, Gade talks about visiting Portugal and Spain where he observed the German Air Force practicing the tactics that soon would give the German military such easy victories in Poland and western Europe.

He met with French Marshal Philippe Pétain, then-ambassador to Spain, and in March 1939 was invited to join the French embassy staff in watching Gen. Francisco Franco enter Madrid and review his own victorious army and those of his German and Italian allies. Gade, reluctant to be seen at a fascist celebration, declined the invitation on the grounds that he didn’t have a suitable uniform, and just over a year later Hillenkoetter would use a similarly flimsy excuse when invited to join the victorious German general to review his troops marching into Paris.

With the victory of Franco’s nationalists in Spain, and the collapse of his opponents, American citizens, diplomats, journalists, and anti-Franco Spaniards were evacuated from
the war zone by American and other western warships. The New York Times reported that “Spanish insurgent bombers” attacked the Spanish harbor of Caldetas near Barcelona, and American naval officers said that, although the American cruiser Omaha illuminated its Stars and Stripes flag with a searchlight, “projectiles and shell fragments were raining on us, and we thought for a while we would bring some of them back in our pockets.”

The bombing of the town was particularly fierce, with estimates of hundreds of casualties, but instead of escaping by ship, Lt. Cdr. Hillenkoetter and Lisbon army attaché Lt. Col. Henry Cheadle left the city by car to better evaluate bomb damage and observe the activities of Franco’s forces. Hillenkoetter’s detailed reporting of the fall of Barcelona included descriptions of the “appalling destruction” caused by fascist bombers.

Beyond physical courage, self-confidence and boldness are essential traits for military officers, diplomats, and intelligence officers. Beyond physical courage, self-confidence and boldness are essential traits for military officers, diplomats, and intelligence officers. American ambassador to Paris William C. Bullitt was a particularly aggressive officer, and years later Hillenkoetter remembered an episode that occurred shortly after his dramatic escape from the bombing of Barcelona. The FBI told the embassy in Paris that a blonde-haired, German beauty parlor operator was suspected of being a spy, but had managed to escape New York on a German steamship before she could be arrested.

Since the ship would stop in the French port of Cherbourg, Ambassador Bullitt and Hillenkoetter fabricated an “imposing looking” fake arrest warrant and Hillenkoetter was dispatched to Cherbourg while the new American liner United States delayed its departure to take the spy back to New York. The French police immediately recognized the warrant as a fake, but agreed “if our blonde disembarked . . . even if only for a walk,” they would arrest her and turn her over to Hillenkoetter. “By the time anybody, meaning the Germans, complained, she would be on her way back to the United States.” In the end, the woman never left the ship “but we got an ‘A’ for effort and it was so characteristic of [Bullitt] to try to get the right solution in a difficult and involved situation . . . ”

Ambassador Bullitt and his assistant, Robert Murphy, were both convinced that European war would directly threaten the United States, but France appeared paralyzed in the face of German aggression, first in annexing Austria in March 1938 and then in seizing the German Sudeten region from Czechoslovakia.

In July 1938 in the midst of a Czech war scare, Hillenkoetter surveyed German border defenses by driving from the North Sea southward along the Mosel and Rhine rivers. “South of the Rhine . . . the country is saturated with troops, aviation fields are numerous, and labor battalions are everywhere.” Aside from what he could observe from the road, he picked up hitchhiking labor corps “boys” and soldiers and “by the aid of a few cigarettes and mentioning that we were ‘Amerikaner,’” got the Germans to describe the depth of their fortifications and tank traps.

Shortly after his trip, the Germans closed the border area to all attachés and even retired military officers. In September 1938 at a Paris dinner for military attachés, the German officers present expressed annoyance that the United States was supporting British and French resistance to Hitler’s Sudeten threats. Still, they predicted that war between Germany and the United States would only occur if the United States sent an army to Europe. According to Hillenkoetter’s chief, embassy naval attaché Capt. Francis Cogswell, “[The Germans] were sure we would never do that again, implying that they could act as they wished in Europe regardless of the opinion of the United States.”

As the Sudeten Crisis continued in the fall of 1938, the naval attachés reported that “the exodus from Paris
Day celebration described a huge military display by French forces and their British allies. The report also noted that ongoing Franco-Russian treaty negotiations were “furnishing the Russians with many laughs” amid rumors of a secret German-Russian treaty: in fact, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was revealed on 23 August 1939 and included secret protocols dividing Poland between Russia and Germany, and giving Stalin a free hand in Finland.

In August 1939, Hillenkoetter sent a message to the chief of naval operations reporting that German forces were ready to invade Poland and predicting that in such an attack Great Britain and France would enter the war. In late December 1939, during the pause after the Blitzkrieg attack on Poland (which some called a Sitzkrieg), Captain Gade wrote a thoughtful analysis of this “war of nerves.”

By mid-May, with Holland overwhelmed, Belgium about to fall, and the French government preparing to flee Paris, Ambassador Bullitt decided to remain in the city with Murphy, naval attaché Hillenkoetter, and army attaché Col. Horace H. Fuller. On the night before the German army reached Paris, Murphy and Hillenkoetter went out for a midnight walk.

At the doors to the embassy they encountered the Grand Rabbi of Paris and his wife, who had decided, too late, to flee the city and now hoped that an American embassy car could take them with the rest of the embassy staff to Bordeaux. Murphy ordered an embassy chauffeur to take them, but the car was turned back at the outskirts of Paris by the German armored divisions now surrounding the city. As Murphy wrote: “I never saw the Grand Rabbi again but learned afterwards that he died in Paris.”

On the morning of 14 June 1940, as German forces entered Paris, Murphy, Hillenkoetter, and Fuller crossed the boulevard from the American embassy to German military headquarters in one of Paris’ best hotels to pay a formal visit to provisional military governor Maj. Gen. Bogislav von Studnitz. While they waited for a German military convoy to pass, they were politely approached by a German lieutenant who confirmed they were Americans and then asked, “Can you tell us where we might find a suitable hotel?” Since not only the French government but many citizens had fled in the face of the German occupation, the Americans laughed in surprise and responded, “The whole city seems to be in your possession. It has hundreds of empty hotels. Take your pick.”
city seems to be in your possession. It has hundreds of empty hotels. Take your pick.”

They found von Studnitz and his officers in excellent moods as they drank expensive champagne in the luxurious Hôtel de Crillon.

Von Studnitz had been German army attaché in Warsaw and assured his visitors that he understood that their duty was to gather intelligence and he was thus quite willing to answer their questions fully and frankly.

He confidently predicted that, because both the French and British armies were shattered, the war would be over in a few weeks. Hillenkoetter asked how the Germans expected to cross the English Channel, but the general confidently responded that “plans were all made and . . . the war would be over in six weeks . . .”

In fact, the Germans proved so open and friendly that von Studnitz invited Hillenkoetter and Colonel Fuller to join him in reviewing his 87th Infantry Division as they marched into Paris. As Hillenkoetter later remembered:

[We] could easily see how that would look in newsreels, photos, etc.—two American officers taking a review with a German general. So we hastily, but firmly, declined, saying that we didn’t feel worthy to share the general’s honor; that it was his division and his glory; and that it would be a shame to deprive him of even a share of the glory.”

To take advantage of initial German friendliness, Bullitt decided to leave Murphy and the attachés in Paris where they collected much intelligence from high ranking German officials to be transmitted back to Washington and shared with the British. Murphy proudly noted, “Paris proved to be one of the best, if not the best, of intelligence centers of Europe at that moment.”

Because the embassy had destroyed its codes, and all diplomatic telegrams were being read by the Germans, this useful but sensitive information was guarded by embassy staff until they left Paris.

Beyond intelligence collection, the embassy took advantage of German cooperation in other ways. Murphy had not been able to rescue the Grand Rabbi—who, in fact, did survive the war—but the German army gave the embassy exit permits to allow not only American and British citizens, but hundreds of French, to escape German-occupied France. Finally, at the end of June 1940, Ambassador Bullitt, Murphy, foreign service officer Carmel Offie, Hillenkoetter, and the army attaché, accompanied by a British couple carrying fake American passports, drove from Paris through German lines to the resort town of Vichy, where the new French government was being set up.

False documents identified the civilians as the ambassador’s butler and maid, but a border guard complained that the lady was too well-dressed to be a maid. “Of course not,” Offie piped up—never at a loss: “Don’t you understand that the ambassador has a mistress?”

Trying to calm the furious French admiral, who felt betrayed by Winston Churchill, was undoubtedly the most difficult diplomatic challenge facing a relatively young and inexperienced junior naval attaché, but Hillenkoetter had other duties as well. In early August he was again mentioned

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As good summer flying weather and suitable weather for cross-Channel landing operations were coming to an end, so was initial German confidence in an early and easy victory.

in the New York Times, as on his third attempt he managed to deliver diplomatic pouches from the embassy in Vichy to the US embassy in Paris despite German army insistence that he needed the permission of German occupation authorities. Again, boldness and persistence paid off.30

Much more important to the course of the war, however, was a brief trip Hillenkoetter made to French North African Morocco and Algeria. While the Vichy government seemed paralyzed by defeat and despair, Murphy reported that Hillenkoetter

was agreeably surprised and encouraged. . . . Contrary to rumor . . . from London, he found that the Nazis had left French Africa almost completely to its own devices . . . practically the same as before the war.

Furthermore, the [French] military . . . was far stronger than he had expected . . . Hillenkoetter added that ‘these experienced army, navy, and air force officers and men had not lost their . . . fighting spirit . . . [and that] the atmosphere over there is not comparable to the confusion in Vichy,’ Hillenkoetter told us.

‘If France is going to fight again anywhere in this war, I believe North Africa will be the place.’ He impressed us all with his hopefulness, which was reflected in the reports our Vichy Embassy sent to Washington.40

Shortly thereafter Murphy was summoned back to Washington where President Roosevelt had carefully read Hillenkoetter’s North African reports and dispatched Murphy to French North Africa as his personal representative.41

In September 1940, with Western Europe in German hands, the Battle of Britain raging, German bombs falling on London, and Winston Churchill rallying his countrymen and appealing to the United States for help, Hillenkoetter reported on a conversation with his former German naval attaché colleague from Paris. As good summer flying weather and suitable weather for cross-Channel landing operations were coming to an end, so was initial German confidence in an early and easy victory. The Germans couldn’t understand why Great Britain had not surrendered:

[The Germans] are in the position of a prize fighter who hits his opponent with all his strength in what presumably is a vulnerable spot and yet the opponent won’t go down . . . The failure of England to realize, according to the German viewpoint, that she is beaten leaves the Germans a bit perplexed.42

Beyond that, Hillenkoetter observed that his “German acquaintances and friends” were worried about the United States’s entering the war, and angry that Roosevelt had given Churchill 50 old American destroyers to defend British convoys and blockade the European continent. The former German attaché admitted the blockade was hurting, and that German Ford automotive plants building vehicles for the German military were only working at 35-percent capacity.43 The German gloomily predicted that all of Europe would suffer a hard and hungry winter.44 Hillenkoetter concluded by noting that the Germans were expressing their unhappiness with the United States in petty ways in “any transaction of whatever kind between the [American] Embassy and German offices.”45

At the end of December 1940, a new ambassador replaced Bullitt in Vichy. Adm. William Leahy, born in Hampton, Iowa, in 1875, had retired as chief of Naval Operations in 1939 and was governor of Puerto Rico when Roosevelt recalled him to try to keep the French—many of whom now felt that England had abandoned and betrayed them—from actively helping Germany. Commander Hillenkoetter met Leahy and his wife in Lisbon, and after a harrowing journey across war-torn Spain, Leahy met with Marshal Phillipe Pétain and Adm. François Darlan.

Although Darlan was very friendly, Leahy judged him “incurably anti-British” and “prejudiced beyond convincing.”46 Indeed, he told Leahy that “he had asked the Germans to seize Gibraltar and bomb the Suez Canal, in order to destroy British power in the Mediterranean.”47 Nonetheless, when Dwight Eisenhower’s American army invaded North Africa in November 1942, Admiral Darlan—by then commander-in-chief of French forces—eventually ordered them to join the allies, and his order was obeyed.
During their time in Vichy, Leahy and his wife formed warm friendships with Hillenkoetter and embassy third secretary Douglas MacArthur II, whose father Arthur was a Naval Academy graduate and friend, and whose uncle was Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Although embassy staff tried to maintain normal social and diplomatic activities, life in Vichy was extremely stressful. Because of German espionage, all sensitive reporting had to be dispatched to Washington by very infrequent and slow couriers.

One of Hillenkoetter’s most interesting and sensitive reports came in July 1941, when a French source gave him the French General Staff analysis of Franco-British cooperation during the Spring 1940 Battle of France. Hillenkoetter, who was a certified interpreter of French, Spanish, and German, produced a sophisticated translation of the entire report, which concluded, “when the German drive . . . began, cooperation became lamentable; even ill-will was apparent. Days went by when one side didn’t know what the other was up to, and vice versa.”

In his commentary, Hillenkoetter noted the difficulties in trying to get allies to cooperate, even if both had the best of intentions. He quoted a French general on why the Germans were so militarily successful: “They have no allies.” Finally, he praised the French for their rigorous objectivity and harsh self-criticism, commenting that his French source warned, “Here is a very valuable lesson to be learned. For goodness sake, when America comes into the war, don’t make the foolish mistakes we did.”

Embassy telephones were tapped by both Vichy and German agents, and US embassy officers were followed. One young diplomat wryly noted, “Foreign ladies of a type never to have noticed me in the past, in fact of a type to have avoided me, now find me irresistible.” Six years later as Hillenkoetter, now a rear admiral with the French Legion of Honor award, returned to Washington to take up duty as Director of Central Intelligence, the Washington Post described his secret activities in Vichy:

Hillenkoetter was a familiar figure in the lobbies and bars of the fabulous Hotel Les Ambassadeurs in Vichy after the fall of France . . . he served as a link in the ‘underground railway’ through which thousands of Frenchmen, British, and Americans got out of occupied France and the Continent to join the fight against Hitler.

Les Ambassadeurs—often called the ‘international monkey house’—was his headquarters. It was also the hangout of most of Europe’s spies, diplomats, and counter-intelligence agents. Hunted men sidled up to him at the bar. During an apparently aimless conversation they received identification papers, gasoline permits, money or a rendezvous with an innocent-appearing truck heading for the border.”

There was great concern that Germany might finally occupy Vichy, France, and even overthrow their Spanish ally, Gen. Francisco Franco, to seize control of the British outpost of Gibraltar and thus the Mediterranean Sea. The embassy, therefore, plotted escape routes and hid supplies of gasoline in buried tin cans along the way so embassy staff could, if necessary, escape in their cars.

Leahy was viciously attacked by the German-controlled French press: “Combining Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy with Jewish rapacity, this Admiral was performing a task that we ordinarily confide to secret emissaries called spies.”

Embassies, of course, did house intelligence officers, and eventually Commander Hillenkoetter received a new assistant naval attaché—a young Chicago lawyer named Thomas Cassady. Leahy remarked:

I soon found he did not know which end of a boat went first and wondered what kind of officers the Navy was commissioning. Some time later, I learned he was a secret OSS agent planted in the American Embassy. Cassady was a very good spy—capable and discreet. He succeeded so well in keeping his secret that when the Embassy staff was imprisoned by the Germans in November 1942, the Nazis could not make a case against him, although they definitely suspected espionage.

As Leahy admitted, “I did not know either [Office of Strategic Services director William J.] Donovan or the OSS. . . . We learned later of their efficiency in collecting and evaluating intelligence about Axis military and political plans.”

Leahy respected Hillenkoetter’s skill in helping French underground members escape to North Africa, and in collecting information from both French and German sources: like
Cassady, “He never got caught.” A year later as President Roosevelt’s representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy was part of the senior military leadership to whom William Donovan’s OSS reported, and at the end of the war, as Harry Truman’s military chief of staff, Leahy recommended Hillenkoetter to become director of the Central Intelligence Group.

To the Pacific and War with Japan

In June of 1941 Germany invaded Russia, and that fall, French Indochina was captured by Japan. By then Commander Hillenkoetter had been recalled to the United States, and on 19 November 1941, he was assigned as executive officer, or second in command, of the battleship West Virginia at Pearl Harbor. Leahy remained in Vichy until the unexpected death of his wife in April 1942, after which he escorted her body back to the United States.

Leahy resigned as ambassador on 18 July 1942, and two days later Roosevelt recalled him to active military duty as chief of staff to the commander-in-chief of the United States Army and Navy, a position he held for both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman for the next seven years.

Among the first to suffer the consequences of America’s fractured intelligence apparatus were Hillenkoetter and the sailors of the Pacific Fleet on Sunday, 7 December 1941. The captain of West Virginia, Mervyn Bennion, was mortally wounded early in the attack and Hillenkoetter was trapped by fierce fires sparked by the explosion of Arizona and by over a half-dozen torpedoes and bombs which struck his ship.

Thanks to the heroism and skill of her crew, the West Virginia was saved from capsizing but settled to the bottom of the harbor with relatively light loss of life as her surviving crew continued to fight raging fires. The next day, on orders from Adm. Walter Anderson, who as director of naval intelligence had been Hillenkoetter’s boss when he served as attaché in Paris in 1940, Hillenkoetter sent two sailors to hoist a US flag over the ruins of Arizona.

Within a week of the Japanese attack, Hillenkoetter was appointed executive officer of Maryland, whose crew worked around the clock to make quick repairs allowing the battleship to support the decisive Battle of Midway in early June 1942 that fatally crippled Japan’s naval air forces.

In September 1942, newly promoted Captain Hillenkoetter was given one of the most important, but also most controversial, intelligence assignments in the Navy when he was appointed chief of the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area (ICPOA), supporting Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet. Although a European expert, he replaced brilliant Navy Japan linguist and cryptographer Joseph Rochefort, who had finally fallen victim to jealous Washington enemies like Navy director of war plans Richard Turner, who withheld access to Japanese MAGIC.

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Aside from serious morale problems, Hillenkoetter had to deal with many of the same resource problems facing the entire American war effort. New personnel would appear with basic Japanese language skills but without necessary analytic skill or experience, requiring extensive “on the job” training.

Normally analysts would work 15–17 hours a day, seven days a week, but during Hillenkoetter’s months, the number of personnel would sometimes not match the workload and people would be moved to other assignments in a

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“helter-skelter personnel flow” that hindered the delivery of intelligence to Nimitz. Hillenkoetter did have access to OSS reports since a small Coordinator of Information office had been set up in Honolulu a month after Pearl Harbor and the office continued under OSS to provide analytic studies, secret agent reports, and interrogation information to the Navy. Adm. Nimitz, on the other hand, never permitted OSS to receive ICPOA information.

Slowly the war began to produce useful intelligence for Hillenkoetter’s analysts. The first Japanese prisoner of war had been ensign Kazuo Sakamaki, the only survivor from the five midget submarines that participated on the attack on Pearl Harbor. He considered his capture a disgrace, demanded to be shot, and refused to answer any questions. On the other hand, 32 sailors from the aircraft carrier Hiryu, including the chief engineer, had been abandoned as the carrier sank during the Battle of Midway.

An interrogator flown out from ICPOA found them “reasonably cooperative” in disclosing “many facts and details clarifying our knowledge of the battle.” In early 1943, according to an ICPOA analyst, US troops on Guadalcanal began capturing a “steady stream” of Japanese personal diaries written in a cursive script that American translators found very challenging. “Japanese soldiers and sailors were addicted to keeping diaries. Some . . . had real literary merit. Sometimes they provided intelligence of considerable value and occasionally they were evidence of war atrocities.”

Two analytic successes were particularly important. A map from a crashed Japanese airplane showed the secret code used to designate any geographic location in the world, but it was not until Marine officer Alva B. Lasswell suggested using a nursery rhyme by which Japanese children learned their language that the code “fell into place like a Marine platoon at the bugle’s call.”

In early 1943, ICPOA codebreakers also broke the code used for Japanese supply convoys. Every morning intelligence analysts would meet with Pacific Fleet submarine planners to compare the movements of Japanese convoys to the current locations of US submarines. “There were nights when nearly every American submarine on patrol in the Central Pacific was working on the basis of information derived from [codebreaking].”

Soon, new and more effective American aircraft and tactics were turning the tide in the south Pacific. With the Japanese increasingly unable to supply or reinforce their troops, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, the victor of Pearl Harbor, decided to launch mass waves of inexperienced pilots against Allied positions in New Guinea and Guadalcanal. Their exaggerated reports of success so encouraged the Japanese that Yamamoto decided to visit them, and in mid-April, codebreakers in Hawaii decoded the route his airplane would take.

Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer, immediately reported the news to Admiral Nimitz, and on 18 April 1943, thanks to MAGIC, Japan’s best World War II military commander and strategist was ambushed and killed by US army fighter planes.

Just a few weeks before this great success by the analysts of the Pacific Fleet’s Intelligence Center, Captain Hillenkoetter had been transferred back to sea duty. As Hillenkoetter’s successor, Army colonel, later brigadier general, Joseph J. Twitty, concluded, the Intelligence Center’s goal was not to produce “‘apple polishing perfection,’ but to provide enough intelligence to get the job done.”

From this perspective, “getting the job done” meant helping Admiral Nimitz and the troops and sailors under his command in their daily fight against the Japanese from island to island and over, on, and beneath the broad Pacific ocean.

The “combat intelligence” Hillenkoetter—and then Twitty—supplied included information about Japanese forces, their strength, disposition, and probable movements, but necessarily quickly expanded to include detailed data about the islands on which the Americans would fight in their long march to Japan. More general global information to help the president and his generals and admirals direct the worldwide war was left to ONI in Washington, the Army’s Military Intelligence Division, and an ambitious new organization led by dashing World War I Medal of Honor winner William J. Donovan.
The end of World War II was formalized on the decks of new President Harry Truman’s favorite battleship, Missouri, on 2 September 1945. At the end of September, by Truman’s directive, the Office of Strategic Services was abolished. At about the same time, Capt. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who had spent the last year of the war in senior positions in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, assumed command of the famous “Surrender Ship.” In the spring of 1946, the Navy sent the battleship to the eastern Mediterranean ostensibly to conduct the body of the late Turkish ambassador home to Istanbul, but also to send a pointed message of American power and global reach to shaky western governments in Turkey, Greece, and Italy and to the aggressive communist forces threatening them. In the summer of 1946 he returned to France for his third tour as naval attaché, and on 1 May 1947 as a newly promoted rear admiral, Hillenkoetter was appointed third director of the Central Intelligence Group by President Truman—on Fleet Adm. William Leahy’s recommendation. With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the CIA, he became the first statutory director of central intelligence and director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Hillenkoetter attempted what would now be called the “rendition” of a suspected German spy, “exfiltrated” belligerent citizens from occupied territory, planned and cached supplies along potential escape routes, and challenged military perimeter controls. With little formal training, he was collector, operator, reporter, and analyst, and his attaché reports to the Office of Naval Intelligence reflect the level of sophistication and skill of someone with his impressive academic and linguistic record, and someone worthy of assignment to one of the most critical diplomatic and military hotspots of the decade before the outbreak of the European world war.

Having witnessed the destruction of Spanish and French forces in the face of modern industrial war, and survived the destruction of his own battleship along with the entire American battle line, Hillenkoetter had earned a postgraduate education in the role that intelligence—or intelligence failure—plays in national security and he put that knowledge to work as the first director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

DCI Hillenkoetter (right), standing next to his successor, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. CIA file photo, date uncertain, most likely December 1950.
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Are intelligence centers really necessary?

In March, 2015, CIA Director John Brennan announced a major reorganization that included a number of new multi-function centers modeled on CIA’s Counterterrorism Center.1 Brennan’s move is similar to one that was begun in the Defense Intelligence Agency two years earlier, bringing analysts, technical collectors, and human intelligence collectors together in four mission centers.2 While these major agency-wide reorganizations naturally cause consternation, these changes are a continuation of intelligence integration initiatives sparked by the 9/11 attacks and furthered by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. From a historical perspective, the mission center concept is part of a long evolution begun in 1947 to promote information sharing and collaboration across intelligence stovepipes.3

That said, it is fair to ask, “Are these centers really necessary?” After all, today’s Intelligence Community (IC) can electronically share information and enable people to work together through an increasing array of digital tools, such as video conferencing, chat, workflow, file sharing, and application sharing. With a digital, global economy driving continuous development of digital collaboration tools, why do IC leaders need to bring teams together under the same organization? Additionally, if the center concept is good for CIA and DIA, should the entire IC be reorganized into mission centers?

This article aims to help IC officers think in substantive and practical terms about the value of colocated, cross-functional teams. Drawing upon a rich body of quantitative research, and our experience as entrepreneurs, management consultants, and executives in large IC and commercial firms, we outline the implications from the research and how these apply to intelligence integration.

Why is intelligence integration essential for hard problems?

Metaphors can be memorable summaries of complex realities. Connecting the dots became the popular metaphor for intelligence problems in the aftermath of 9/11. Metaphors can also be misleading. Intelligence problems are less like connecting dots, and more like putting together large, complex puzzles. As analysts dissect each intelligence report and seek to synthesize a picture from the many pieces, they do so without the benefit of the completed picture (the...
Also highly pertinent to the Intelligence Community, the news and journalism industry has come to recognize the criticality of proximity in creating quality products.

To illustrate the need for intelligence integration, consider a typical signals intelligence (SIGINT) analyst and a human intelligence (HUMINT) reports officer. Both write and distribute intelligence information—pieces of the puzzle—but neither shares everything in their minds at any given time—what they are thinking and why. Lots of valuable information lies beyond these officers’ formal reports. Some of that information may not be noteworthy standing on its own. However, when combined with information, ideas, and concepts from other functions or disciplines, new intelligence often emerges—gaps in the puzzle are filled. When people from different functions and disciplines begin exchanging ideas, such as talking about prospective analytic angles or means to target collection, opportunities will often emerge that otherwise would have gone unrealized. The alternative to such collaboration was seen in an aspect of the pre-9/11 environment—i.e., “We did not know you were looking for guys taking flying classes.”

As technology and management processes have matured over the decades, so have the means for integrating different sources of information and functions. Data processing has done much to increase the integration of data from multiple intelligence sources, producing new “multi-int” information products and opening the possibility for more coherent tasking of multiple collection sources. Moving the IC to a common IC Information Technology Environment (IC ITE or “eye-sight”) offers additional gains in shared computing, storage, data, and applications across IC organizational and functional boundaries. Commercial IT has also provided the IC with a wide range of electronic means to network people and enable collaborative work. Management structures and processes, such as the National Intelligence Manager (NIM) and Unifying Intelligence Strategy, have also improved intelligence integration.

In light of these many ways for promoting and strengthening integration, it would be easy to miss the simple, powerful, and foundational role of in-person human interactions, especially to highly creative tasks and the building of trust between people. Conceptualizing a new analytical approach, designing a new collection strategy, and testing alternative hypotheses are just a few intelligence activities that require tremendous creativity and trust among participants.

Not all intelligence tasks require the same levels of creativity and trust. Routine production of a scheduled information product and delivery of a high volume standardized service are important tasks, but they are unlikely to require the same degree of daily collaboration across a cross-functional/cross-discipline team. The IC has strong advocates for virtual interactions and strong advocates for physical colocation of cross-functional, multi-agency teams. Attempting to force a choice between these two approaches to integration is unnecessary, unrealistic, and unhelpful.

Deploying a new technology over an existing network is not nearly so taxing as changing where people are physically located and ensuring they have the right tools—this very reality prompts leaders to approach colocation with caution. A key issue for leaders—which this paper explores—is understanding the value of in-person interactions and taking a structured approach to creating and assessing colocated teams.
What does the data from academe and commercial research tell us?

The early years of the Internet and associated technology boom led to studies and books such as Cairncross’s 1997 work *Death of Distance*, which extolled the benefits of electronically connecting people. More recent studies have focused on the results of in-person interaction among people. With two decades of experience using the Internet and related technologies, many analysts now take a more measured view of the balance of physical interaction and virtual ones.

For example, *Humanyze* (formerly known as *Sociometric Solutions*) studies the interaction of people and organizations. This company’s work reveals that 40–60 percent of a worker’s regular interactions (inclusive of e-mail, calls, etc.) occur with people they sit next to in an office. Consequently, they recommend office designs that deliver proximity for workers and functions that share dependencies or the need to work together.

A series of academic studies over more than 10 years on collaborative tools and work indicate that collaboration and interaction drop markedly between people more than 90 feet apart. A Harvard study of academic research quality demonstrated that physical proximity produces research products with far more subsequent citations—one measure of academic quality. This study evaluated work relationships across several structures: same building, same floor; same building, different floor; and different building with varying distance combinations. Distance between team members lowered the academic quality, as measured by number of ensuing citations.

Ironically, the very industry that builds collaboration and social media tools develops those products with teams working in close proximity. Consultants to leading software design companies employing hordes of millennials emphasize the need for office space that brings workers and teams together physically. The American Economic Association sponsored studies of Google (and others). Research on how employees at Google process information and predict future performance reveals a very strong connection to physical proximity. In effect, when employees are on different floors of the same building, they might as well be in different cities. While social media and other factors register, no other issue has as much bearing on predicting information processing and performance than where employees sit in relation to one another. In software development, efforts increasingly shift to “agile” techniques which many argue function best (and maybe only) when teams are physically together, given the nature of their work.

Also highly pertinent to the Intelligence Community, the news and journalism industry has come to recognize the criticality of proximity in creating quality products. News organizations are all about geography—and proximity to the news desk. If you’re close, it’s easy to suggest stories and become part of the process; conversely, out of sight is literally out of mind.” A leading editor at NPR added: “We have found that proximity really is important to the success of projects. Although we have done this for a while, increasingly other organizations are reorganizing along these lines after coming to realize the benefits of breaking down silos and colocating people with different skill sets can produce more innovative solutions at a faster pace.”

Lastly, a body of sociological research focused on trust and the impact of proximity and various collaboration tools. The essence of this work would strike most of us common-sensically—face-to-face interactions are foundational in building trust and an associated sense of connection. Chat and even video teleconferencing tools do not eliminate the impediments imposed by distance and organizational boundaries. This is not at all to argue that these technologies are irrelevant or have no positive impact; clearly they are an important part of the solution. But research reveals advantages in using these tools to enhance relationships and to foster further interaction rather than as the primary form of communication. In other words, in designing for intelligence integration the IC must design to build trust; such a design probably looks quite different from what might have been conceived in earlier years.
How should intelligence leaders approach integration given the research?

Agency directors, center directors, NIMs, and other intelligence leaders should consider the full range of approaches to better intelligence integration. The graphic to the right outlines four categories key to continued improvement of integration in an operational context.

We believe three of the four categories progressed substantially over the past 10 years—technology, priorities/strategies, and processes—but opportunities remain to harvest gains around more purposeful face-to-face interactions. Video teleconferences, Unifying Intelligence Strategies, chat/instant messaging, and other initiatives are bringing organizations into closer alignment and creating an environment more conducive to integrated approaches to intelligence problems. This progress aside, it should be expected that organizational boundaries and distance will continue to present obstacles to integration that require persistent and ongoing effort to overcome and will likely benefit from a broader effort to drive colocation of multi-functional, cross-agency teams.

The research clearly indicates that physical proximity and face-to-face interactions can be a powerful tool to drive cross-functional and organizational performance, but the approaches need to include micro geography, process, technology, and product considerations. For example, getting people in the same building is not enough. Most seasoned intelligence officers are familiar with stories such as: “the XXX people sit on the fourth floor. We don’t see them much. We each tend to go to lunch as groups at separate times.” Such anecdotes align with the research.

Similarly, getting people into the same area is not sufficient without attention to what work is being performed and how the work is accomplished. Integrated intelligence is not simply about putting people into the same general location; the micro-geography and work process matter. Improved intelligence integration will focus on the intelligence products, work processes, workspace management, and technology at a detailed level—all designed around the desired impact to customers’ missions.

Leaders should carefully consider specific areas, issues, or tasks that warrant permanent integration nodes that cut across agencies and functional boundaries. More complex tasks and problems benefit most from physical proximity; however, leaders need not co-mingle the entire team. Target development for non-military threats is an activity requiring a great deal of iteration and discovery work that can benefit from multi-agency collaboration. Permanent thematic or issue-driven nodes (potentially quite small) can be used to bring together a subset of people, who in turn reach back to their organizations knowing the full capability. The highest benefit may come from using these rotational assignments to prompt parent organizations to cycle staff through these integration sites, thereby expanding personal networks and generating practical knowledge of other agency capabilities. US Special Forces have honed this model by rotating intelligence staff between headquarters and decentralized work locations, such as other agencies and forward-deployed sites.

Some problems only require temporary effort and both leadership and facilities should accommodate this. For example, creating a collection and analysis approach on a particularly knotty problem or responding to a high-level tasking may warrant a short-term effort. Putting people in the same place for even a limited period of time will likely enhance the degree of integration. Participants can reach back to their parent orga-
nizations while being integrally involved in the natural back-and-forth of creative problem solving. This might reasonably be a capability that each national intelligence manager exercises on at least one topic annually. Several facility environments in the IC could potentially play host to such regular, temporary activities.

These studies do not imply diminished contribution of social media and collaboration technologies, but they do strongly suggest care in thinking through the application and expectations. For many functions and in the context of established relationships, virtual tools may be sufficient to sustain ongoing operations when supplemented with periodic in-person meetings. Academic research demonstrates some dispersed teams function with “high perceived proximity” or as if they sit together while other colocated groups do not reap the gains of proximity. The tools are important, particularly in the context of relationships often built through personal interaction, temporary duty around a shared mission, etc. But for creative and knowledge work, these tools are unlikely to replace the texture and richness of cross-functional, cross-organizational teams working together on problems.

Lastly, if we look beyond operations to joint training courses, some changes could potentially yield substantially greater return for the Community. Consider the case of two joint leadership courses. One draws IC participants randomly through open enrollment with participants from a wide range of organizations with diverse missions. In this class is an HR representative from DIA, a CENTCOM military analyst, a contracts specialist from NSA, a counterterrorism analyst from the FBI, a Coast Guard intelligence officer, a Department of Treasury analyst, and an engineer from CIA. This is a wonderfully diverse group in function and organizational affiliation; however, none of these participants is likely to work any significant project together after leaving the training.

Now consider a similar course, but one whose participants are chosen thematically, e.g., officers who work counterproliferation or advanced weapons. In this notional class are a DIA Missile and Space Intelligence Center analyst, an NSA analyst working Iran, a CIA case officer focused on WMD, an Air Force National Space and Intelligence Center analyst, DIA all-source analysts, a CIA WINPAC analyst, and some support-oriented leaders from those organizations. A far greater probability exists that this training session results in the meaningful extension of personal networks and relationships.

The quantitative research makes a strong case for colocating teams when the intelligence problem and task(s) require high degrees of creativity in collection and analysis.

Conclusion

The quantitative research makes a strong case for colocating teams when the intelligence problem and task(s) require high degrees of creativity in collection and analysis. Leaders should approach colocation in the context of other means of integration, giving careful attention to when and how some teams are colocated. Intelligence strategies, workflows, and technologies are valuable tools for integration. However, the research suggests that these cannot replace the unique performance effects of regularized face-to-face integration among people.
Endnotes


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The title of David Hoffman’s excellent new book, *The Billion Dollar Spy*, unintentionally (I think) evokes a famous item from *Studies in Intelligence* many years ago, “The Million Dollar Photograph.” According to the late Dino Brugioni, CIA director Allen Dulles was impressed by the ability of the U-2 spy plane to dispel the Eisenhower administration’s fear that the Soviet bomber force was large enough to pose an existential threat to the United States—the so-called “bomber gap” of the mid-1950s. The key photograph, in Brugioni’s telling, was a U-2 shot of the Saratov-Engels airfield, which showed fewer bombers than had been estimated. The “bomber gap” disappeared. Dulles was said to have asked Frank Wisner, his chief of espionage and covert operations, “How much would you have paid for the information in this photography?” After a moment, Wisner answered, “About a million dollars.”

Whether or not the Dulles-Wisner exchange took place, the greater point is valid—that intelligence activities, though difficult and often expensive, can be extremely valuable for the national security and even, in a cost-benefit sense, a profitable economic investment. President Eisenhower in his memoir praised the U-2 program for depriving the Soviets of the capability to use “international blackmail,” and intelligence historian Christopher Andrew has claimed that the U-2 “saved the American taxpayers tens of billions of dollars and spared the world a major escalation in the arms race.”

Hoffman’s narrative concerns the Cold War espionage case of Adolf Tolkachev, a Soviet electronics engineer who wanted to inflict the greatest possible harm on the Soviet Union by giving the United States highly classified information on sensitive military projects. Tolkachev worked as a valuable CIA asset for seven years, from 1978 to 1985. Just how valuable was he? The US Air Force estimated that Tolkachev’s intelligence saved roughly $2 billion in research and development (121)—and this was in mid-1980, just two years into Tolkachev’s run of espionage. Moreover, as Hoffman makes clear later in the book, the overall benefit to the United States went far beyond this dollar figure.

As is the style of histories published these days, *The Billion Dollar Spy* opens not at the beginning of the story but with a dramatic event briefly recounted—in this case, a CIA officer’s attempt in December 1982 to recontact Tolkachev, who had not been able to communicate for several months. This anachronistic approach works—the vignette is gripping and very effectively draws the reader into the stressful, high-stakes business of clandestine intelligence operations.

There is much to like about this book. Almost every chapter is a gem. Hoffman begins the narrative proper with a superb summary of the Cold War espionage context, including the challenges CIA faced in trying to gather intelligence from the Soviet Union. Some of those challenges came not from the powerful efficiency of Soviet counterintelligence but from the US government itself. Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms recalls that the pressure from US policymakers “ranged from repeated instructions to do ‘something’ to exasperated demands to try ‘anything’” (7). Even so, for many years CIA operations against the Soviet Union were hamstrung by excessive caution.

That began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a younger generation of operations officers, chafing under the prevailing institutional caution, devol-

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
oped new operational methods they argued would enable them to operate in the so-called “denied areas.” In chapter two, Hoffman introduces the Tolkachev operation as a turning point for Moscow Station, as one prize case ends (that of TRIGON, Aleksander Ogorodnik, a valuable CIA asset who was caught and committed suicide) and an uncertain one begins, as Tolkachev makes the first of several attempts to contact CIA. Chapter three details Moscow Station’s frustration at having to maintain an operational “stand-down” by a CIA leadership (DCI Stansfield Turner) that discounted the value of human spies and that wanted no “flaps.”

Hoffman relates Tolkachev’s persistence in trying to make contact, the unwillingness of Headquarters to pursue a potential KGB set-up that would result in the expulsion of CIA officers, and Moscow Station chief Gus Hathaway’s arguments to Headquarters that the potential intelligence was worth the risk. Contact was approved.

In describing Moscow Station’s first approaches to Tolkachev, Hoffman emphasizes the care taken with every espionage case: “Running a spy was undertaken with the concentration and attention to detail of a moon shot”—nothing was left to chance. “Photographs and maps were prepared of each site; surveillance detection runs plotted; scenarios scripted and rehearsed; and the question was asked again and again: What could go wrong?” (69).

Hoffman has an insider’s feel for how the spying business is conducted. His description of dialogues between the field and Headquarters (59–63) illustrates the inherent and eternal tension in that relationship. Chapter 11 (“Going Black”) is the best primer on the hows and whys of SDRs—surveillance detection routines or routes—I have seen anywhere, and it is must-reading for any would-be case officer. “On a surveillance detection run, the case officer had to be as agile as a ballet dancer, as confounding as a magician, and as attentive as an air traffic controller” (140). Hoffman covers innovation in operational technology with a passage on the Discus agent communications system—CIA essentially invented text messaging in the late 1970s—and relates the operational pros and cons of using it (111–14).

At the same time, Hoffman is very good about the personal side of espionage. Chapters 12 and 13 delve into Tolkachev’s background and motivations for betraying the Soviet system and also highlight the importance for CIA of treating a spy as a human being with personal considerations, not just “a robot with a Pentax [camera].” Likewise, Hoffman’s portrayals of the CIA officers handling Tolkachev are sensitive and personal. When Tolkachev is finally caught—as a result of the treason of former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard (a well-told sub-story)—Hoffman’s straightforward and unsentimental descriptions of Tolkachev’s arrest (235–39) and sentencing, along with that of his last meeting with his son (246–47) are nonetheless almost heartbreaking.

Was running such a spy worth the risk? In addition to the $2 billion estimate by the US Air Force in 1982, Hoffman points to the one-sided scorecard of its fighter jets against Iraq’s Soviet MiGs in 1991—39 to zero—and when aerial engagements in the Balkans are counted, the score becomes US Air Force 48, Soviet built fighters zero (254). All this, Hoffman persuasively argues, was the result of many factors, but one of them was the intelligence provided by a brave electronics engineer who wanted to help the West.

Others have written about the Tolkachev case in shorter, more focused accounts, including former CIA officers Barry Royden, Bob Wallace, and Milt Bearden. Royden emphasized the operational tradecraft used, while Wallace’s narrative is mostly about the technical means to facilitate Tolkachev’s espionage. Bearden’s treatment is episodic and after-the-fact, focusing on the counterintelligence aspects of this case among many other cases compromised in 1985 during the “Year of the Spy.” All these have value; indeed, Hoffman is aware of these sources and cites them all. Hoffman’s achievement is to integrate these threads into an impressive tapestry that includes much new information from his access to newly declassified CIA documents (remarkably including declassified cables between CIA Headquarters and Moscow Station) as well as from his contacts with Tolkachev

family members and from extensive interviews with CIA participants in the operation. It helps that Hoffman previously served (1995–2001) as Moscow bureau chief for the *Washington Post; The Billion Dollar Spy* benefits both from his knowledge of the city and from his ability to tell a compelling story that brings out the human factor in espionage operations.

a. Hoffman makes a few of the cables available on his website, www.davidehoffman.com/documents. All told, CIA declassified 944 pages of mostly operational material. Curiously, none of it is posted on CIA’s public website.

b. A former CIA historian, Ben Fischer, has written a speculative article dismissing Tolkachev as a KGB deception operation; one of Fischer’s few factual statements is that Tolkachev’s workplace was too far from his home to photograph documents during the day as he claimed. Without citing Fischer or his theory, Hoffman nevertheless uses his knowledge of Moscow to demonstrate that Tolkachev could easily go home from work on his lunch break and photograph documents. Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Spy Who Came in for the Gold: A Skeptical View of the GTVANQUISH Case,” *The Journal of Intelligence History* 18, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 29-54.

c. My only quibble—and it takes nothing away from what Hoffman has achieved with his book—is his recounting of the Soviet gas pipeline sabotage story. CIA allegedly modified pipeline technology bound for the Soviet Union, creating conditions in 1982 that resulted in a spectacular explosion and fire. Though at least one such gas pipeline disaster occurred in 1982, CIA apparently had nothing to do with it. Policy discussions about such covert action went on for years, into 1986, but no decisions were made or findings signed, in large part because of the ethical implications. Yet it remains a persistent myth.

After 10 years of reading and reviewing intelligence books as a CIA historian, I’ve seen the gamut. A few are poisonous—*Legacy of Ashes* comes to mind—but most are at least satisfactory, with good points as well as flaws. Very few are nearly flawless, demonstrating the author’s mastery of the subject: factual accuracy; insight into the atmospherics of the business, i.e., what it is like; and a fair assessment of what it all means. I would put Hoffman’s *Billion Dollar Spy* into this category of the best intelligence books available. Every intelligence officer should read it.
Company Confessions: Revealing CIA Secrets
Christopher Moran (Biteback Publishing, 2015), 346 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Reviewed by Hayden Peake

The Central Intelligence Agency is a rich source of reputation-enhancing material for historians, journalists, Hollywood, and even former intelligence officers. Hence readers and viewers of today’s media in all its forms have become accustomed to stories about the CIA and its activities. But it has not always been thus. In Company Confessions: Revealing CIA Secrets—it would be more properly subtitled “protecting” CIA secrets—University of Warwick historian Christopher Moran examines the origins and evolution of the agency’s battle with secrecy and openness. And from the myriad of well-documented detail presented, the portrait constructed is a less than charitable one.

Moran begins by reviewing the precedents for maintaining secrecy in national security matters that led to the formation of the CIA’s Publications Review Board (PRB) by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George H. W. Bush in June 1977. He then considers the results in subsequent years as the PRB acquired the degree of notoriety for which it is well known.

His benchmark example is Herbert Yardley’s The American Black Chamber, a best selling exposé memoir of America’s codebreaking exploits that included many official secrets. Yardley was never prosecuted, since no law covered his transgressions. But government response was firm; he received no pension, the manuscript for his sequel was impounded; and all his attempts to work again in any official capacity were actively thwarted. The second challenge was a 1958 memoir by Sylvia Press, a former OSS officer who had joined the CIA. Summarily dismissed for security reasons, she wrote The Care of Devils, a thinly disguised autobiographic novel. The agency allegedly bought all copies and Press, too, was denied a pension. (54) Moran attributes this decision to the CIA penchant for secrecy that “stemmed as much from a desire to maintain a mystique about the CIA as it did from a requirement to protect sources and methods,” a gratuitous judgment that he doesn’t support. (54) In any case, for the balance of the decade, Moran concludes, “the CIA had never really had to worry about employees wanting to tell stories out of school” (109) and to a large extent DCI Dulles controlled what was released to the public.

Then came the U-2 shoot down, the Bay of Pigs disaster, rumors of covert actions in Latin America and the assassination of President Kennedy. When the CIA refused to comment on its role in these matters, journalists, historians, and the KGB filed the gap with a mix of alleged wrongdoing, truth, and exaggeration. Among the many instances Moran discusses, several resulted in lasting precedents. The first was the 1962 book CIA: The Inside Story, a putative expose that drew on Soviet sources, though that was unknown at the time. (94) From then on, the CIA was fair game. The following year, by then retired DCI Allen Dulles’ attempted to place intelligence, and by implication the CIA, in a more positive light with his book, The Craft of Intelligence, a quasi-memoir published, notes Moran, without his successor’s “knowledge or approval,” (100) thus setting its own precedent.

Moran’s assertion is contradicted in CIA Chief Historian David Robarge’s recently released study, John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965, which indicates that Dulles’s successor both acknowledged and approved of the contents of The Craft of Intelligence: “McCones and Dulles together formulated the terms of the consulting contract under which the ex-director would work on his proposed book on intelligence. The DCI ratified the procedures whereby Dulles would have access to CIA facilities and records, could discuss his work with Agency officials, and would not rebut open-source accounts with classified information.”

a. Herbert Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Bobbs Merrill, 1931).
e. In fairness to Moran, the Robarge work, which was published in 2005 by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, was in review as Moran researched and wrote his book. It can be found in the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.
It was *The Invisible Government* with its “fully-fledged attack on the myth of the CIA that sent shock waves through Washington.” (95) The agency responded with herculean and ultimately unsuccessful behind-the-scenes efforts to discredit and suppress the book. These included a failed attempt to purchase all copies. (95–96) “The CIA's decision to stay quiet as its dirty laundry flooded the market place” (102) wasn’t working, Moran asserts, and in the 1970s it only got worse.

Then amidst the fallout from Watergate, Vietnam, charges of “domestic spying,” and congressional investigations, agency “whistleblowers” struck. For the first time, dissenting former officers broke the secrecy agreement all officers signed and published memoirs attacking the CIA. Victor Marchetti’s, *The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence* (1974) set the pace. Philip Agee followed in 1975 with *Inside the Company*.b Moran describes the self-inflicted ordeals both endured while CIA countered with its “strategy for dealing with the renegades and whistleblowers . . . a carefully coordinated PR programme.” (179) But it didn’t work either, and the PRB was established with the objective of preventing revelations before they occurred.

The first test of the PRB and the legality of the secrecy agreement came quickly with Frank Snepp’s 1977 book, *Decent Interval*.c Snepp, a CIA analyst, did not submit his manuscript for review. The agency, under DCI Stansfield Turner, filed a civil suit that eventually reached the US Supreme Court. Snepp lost and was denied all royalties. Moran relates two ironical consequences of the case. First, Snepp was prosecuted, though at least three former agency officers had published memoirs without any review and gone unpunished.d Second, when Turner wrote his memoir—another precedent setting act—he was “trapped in a maze of his own making;” the manuscript “had been gutted” in review. (214)

Moran explains how in the succeeding decades the PRB became a permanent fixture in the CIA bureaucracy. That is not to say that its relationship with agency authors was without challenges. Moran gives many detailed examples, mostly from the writer’s perspective, of the often extended conflicts that justify the “prevailing wisdom that its review procedure is inconsistent and unfair.” (279)

While *Company Confessions* is generally balanced, it is not error free. Two instances are worth mention. During a discussion of how former OSS Director William Donovan encouraged publication of individual WW II exploits, Moran notes that FBI Director Hoover circulated the rumor that Donovan “was sleeping with President Truman’s daughter-in-law Mary, a blatant lie.” (63) Indeed it was: the president did not have a daughter-in-law. The second error involves Walter Pforzheimer, who reviewed many of the early controversial books; he was never in the OSS, nor was his father a rare book dealer.

The very existence of *Company Confessions* is a measure of the change from the days of “officers don’t write memoirs or publish articles on their profession” to today’s policy of controlled openness. Christopher Moran has portrayed the process well while leaving the solution of persistent problems he identifies to the CIA.e

d. Examples include Joseph Burkholder Smith, *Portrait of A Cold Warrior* (Putnam, 1976); Miles Copeland, *Without Cloak or Dagger* (Simon & Schuster, 1974), and Philip Agee.
e. Another perspective on the intelligence memoir can be found in a review of the separate memoirs of three former CIA officers by John Hedley in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, No. 3 (December 2005). Hedley is a former chairman of the Publications Review Board.
Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence
Jonathan Haslam (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 400 pps.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Where does one go to start reading the history of the modern (that is, post-1917) Russian intelligence services? Certainly, there is no shortage of books on the topic. Some, like George Leggett’s The Cheka (1981), focus on narrow slices; others, such as John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev’s Spies (2009), look at operations in a particular country or era; scores of other books, of varying quality, look at individual Soviet espionage cases or the lives of spies. The British academic, Christopher Andrew, has collaborated with former Soviet officers on the two most thorough treatments—the first, KGB (1991) with Oleg Gordievskiy, and the second, The Sword and Shield (1999), with Vasili Mitrokhin. While encyclopedic, Andrews’s books are aging and check in at around 600 pages each, and the Mitrokhin volume, especially, is hard going (a third, and lesser-read, Andrews-Mitrokhin volume adds almost another 700 pages to their work). No doubt, we can use a short history of Soviet intelligence, one that is both thorough and readable. This is what a US-based British scholar of Soviet history and foreign policy, Jonathan Haslam, seeks to provide in Near and Distant Neighbors.

The results, however, are mixed. Haslam’s strengths are that he provides a good overall summary of the course of Soviet intelligence and goes into some areas that other writers overlook. Beginning with the establishment of the Cheka soon after the Bolshevik coup, he walks through Soviet intelligence’s early focus on preventing counter-revolution, its gradual shift to collecting foreign intelligence, the era of the Illegals in the 1930s and 1940s, and the gradual decline of human intelligence capabilities as the pool of Soviet sympathizers in the West dried up. Almost all of this—the stories of the Trust, the Cambridge Five, the impact of the purges, the strong counterintelligence tradition, and the later volunteers such as the Walkers, Ames, and Hanssen—will be familiar to anyone with a basic knowledge of Soviet intelligence. But unlike a lot of other intelligence histories, Haslam takes the time to explore the lesser-known aspects of the Soviet experience. He is particularly informative on the importance of military intelligence in the early days, the gradual professionalization of the services, and the underdevelopment of Soviet codebreaking.

Haslam is also insightful on Soviet intelligence’s chronic weaknesses, most of which stemmed from the nature of the Soviet system itself. In the 1920s, Soviet intelligence wasted its time and resources countering British plots that existed only in the paranoid minds of the leadership. Then, in the 1930s and 1940s, intelligence had to toe the Stalinist line. Haslam notes that this was especially problematic for codebreaking because under Stalin, who prized human intelligence above all, the study of the requisite mathematics was under an ideological cloud. Once Stalin was dead, Soviet mathematicians began to catch up with the United States and Britain only to find, in the 1960s, that the West was starting to leap ahead in computers. Soviet cryptanalysis again fell far behind, according to Haslam, its practitioners condemned to work with paper and pencil in a digitizing world.

Finally, Haslam also points out that advancement in the KGB and other Soviet services depended more on loyalty to communist ideology and personal ties than on talent. In general, Soviet intelligence was run by mediocrities who had risen by never asking hard questions or rocking the boat. Small wonder, as Haslam notes, that defections and betrayals from within were a far greater problem for the Soviets than for the British and American services.

Haslam presents all this in a concise, organized, and clearly-written package, based on archival research and a wide reading of Russian and Western secondary sources. Nonetheless, several aspects of his account give the reader pause. Some are the usual small mistakes that creep into broad histories; Aldrich Ames, for example, was the chief of CI for SE Division, never “heading counterintelligence at CIA.” (226) Curiously, Haslam also consistently states the nomenclature of KGB and SVR directorates backwards—they are not S Directorate or T Directorate, as he calls them, but Directorate S, and so on. More troubling, however, is Haslam’s insistence that the United States was able to “trick” the Soviets into invading Afghanistan in 1979. (245) This is a claim he made in a

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previous book, *Russia’s Cold War* (2011), but one based on a remark made by Zbigniew Brzezinski in an interview 20 years after the fact and for which there appears to be no documentary or other substantiation. While anyone writing on Soviet intelligence needs to be aware of the reality of conspiracies and bizarre plots, this claim seems to go a little far.

These errors are unfortunate because they might lead some readers to question a good point that Haslam saves for the last few pages. The behavior of the Soviet intelligence services, he posits, is less a result of Soviet experiences and conditions than something deeply ingrained in Russian political culture. That is, he makes an excellent point about the continuities from Tsarist times through the Soviet and post-Soviet periods—the emphasis on counterintelligence to the point of obsession, the routine use of assassinations, and the use of intelligence services as political police. This is a sobering thought, indeed, for anyone who hopes that the Russian services will alter their ways or can become partners for the West in areas of mutual concern.

Overall, *Near and Distant Neighbors* is a useful book that, if read with care, can be helpful in learning about Soviet and Russian intelligence history. As broad and readable as it is, however, it still cannot stand alone.
Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors who Fought for Wild Bill Donovan
Douglas Waller (Simon and Schuster, 2015), 592 pp., notes, index.

Reviewed by Nicholas Reynolds

Douglas Waller is known to many readers of these pages as the author of *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage* (Simon and Schuster, 2011). It is, for most students of OSS history, the most successful, accessible, and up-to-date biography of William J. Donovan ever published. In *Spymaster*, Waller shows how, in the history of American intelligence, Donovan was the prime mover. He was the man who conceived the idea of a centralized, full-service, independent agency responsible to the executive, and then created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in that image to help the United States fight World War II.

Between 1942 and 1945, OSS made a respectable, but not decisive, contribution to the war effort. Even though the organization only outlasted the war by a few weeks, it also left its mark by introducing a number of remarkable younger leaders to the work of intelligence. In *Disciples*, Waller has written a group biography of four of those men—William J. Casey, William Colby, Richard Helms, and Allen Dulles—all of whom went on to become directors of central intelligence (DCIs) during the Cold War.

The book is divided into three parts: what Waller’s subjects did before 1941, World War II, and the Cold War. World War II, for 19 of the 27 chapters, is at the heart of the book. Waller does an excellent job of recounting the wartime careers of each of the four. Not much of this is new, but Waller has clearly mastered the material and tells each man’s story with verve and energy. Based on extensive research in original sources, which he lays out in endnotes, the chapters are literal page-turners, in spite of the fact that many similar books have been written about OSS over the years.

Dulles emerges as the diplomat, Wall Street lawyer who shines on independent duty as the OSS chieftain in Switzerland—running spies who bring priceless information from Nazi Germany, following the ins-and-outs of the German Resistance to Hitler, and even orchestrating the secret surrender of German forces on the Italian front.

Casey is the brilliant young lawyer who starts his career by bringing order to Donovan’s own office, and then moves overseas to London, where he conceives and executes operations to parachute agents into Germany in late 1944 and early 1945. With Donovan’s support, he overcomes British and American resistance to this kind of operation. Casey also emerges as the family man who misses his wife and daughter more than many other Americans who went overseas during the war. Helms works with Casey in London—they even share an apartment—before going on to forge his own identity as a practitioner of classical espionage from bases in France and later in Germany itself, where he hunts war criminals and, early on, sees the need to spy on the Soviets.

The only one of the four to actually serve at the tip of the spear, Colby is the paramilitary officer who over-achieves, driving his men—and himself—even harder as they prepare for, and then conduct, operations in France in 1944 and Norway in 1945. In both countries, he fights a lonely, dangerous war, taking enormous risks. Particularly moving are descriptions of the hardships that Colby and his men faced in the bitter cold of the Norwegian winter as they attacked German rail lines.

Once the war was over, none of the four disciples found it easy to adapt to peacetime conditions. It was not that any of them had PTSD—on the contrary, Waller depicts each as having been energized by the war and, for that reason, unable to settle back down to peacetime pursuits. They were, he writes, “strong, decisive, supremely confident men of action, doers who believed they could shape history rather than let it control them. They returned from World War II not emotionally drained or scarred . . . but rather invigorated and ready for the next battle. The OSS, which had interrupted their lives, now delineated them” as intelligence officers. (Prologue)

Helms, the former journalist who once interviewed Hitler, showed no interest in returning to his pre-war profession and stayed on as OSS morphed first into the Strategic Services Unit and then CIA. The three law-
The Disciples

...Dulles, Casey, and Colby—returned home to practice law after the war, but could not drain the wartime adrenaline out of their systems. Starting at or near the top, all eventually joined Helms at CIA. Dulles was director during the Eisenhower years in the seminal 1950s. Helms ascended to the directorship in 1966 and managed to stay in office until 1973. After serving in Europe and Vietnam, Colby followed Helms as director, serving until 1976. Casey waited to return to spy work until Ronald Reagan appointed him director in the 1980s.

Waller gallops through the disciples’ post-war careers in three chapters, with only one chapter for their tenures as director. He sums up each man’s time at the helm without delving into much detail and points out all of the unhappy endings: President Kennedy fired Dulles after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961; Helms was tried in federal court for perjury; Colby became a pariah at CIA for collaborating with congressional investigators; Casey did not understand the limits of covert action, and almost brought down the Reagan administration in the Iran-Contra affair.

Though Waller set out to write about World War II, he could have devoted more time on his four subjects’ tenure as directors, and explored more fully the extent to which they had truly been disciples in the long run. They all started in OSS, and they all believed the gospel of central intelligence that Donovan had preached—but beyond that connection, one may question how meaningful it is to analyze their service during the Cold War in terms of their OSS origins. Readers may be left wondering to what extent each man found himself responding to new challenges and growing to meet them (or not).

With a portrait of Donovan literally watching over him, Casey seems to have stayed closest to his wartime roots, which may help to explain his management style and his legacy—but this may not necessarily be said of the other three disciples. Dulles developed his approach to operations in Bern during the war—like his predilection for covert action and his loose management style—but he did go on to run an agency that did many things well, to include the amazing overhead reconnaissance programs that allowed the United States to understand Soviet capabilities. Helms comes across in Waller’s book as a solid but somewhat colorless professional, the spymaster who perfected the art of charming his interlocutors without really ever saying anything. But he also developed a sophisticated feel for classical Cold War espionage that was quite different from anything that the OSS was involved in. Colby was perhaps the man who progressed furthest from his wartime debut in intelligence and arguably took on greater challenges than any of the other three World War II veterans, from firing his old OSS comrade-in-arms James Angleton (whose roots were showing, but not in a good way) to trying to understand and deal with the threats that CIA faced after Vietnam. He may have been a pariah to many of the old guard for showing the Family Jewels to Congress, but he also proved that CIA was about much more than its OSS origins.

These minor observations aside, Disciples is a worthy addition to the library of any intelligence officer.
The Image of the Enemy—Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries Since 1945
Paul Maddrell, ed. (Georgetown University Press, 2015) 298 pp., notes, index.

Reviewed by Jason Manosevitz

Are American, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, Israeli, or Saudi Arabian leaders using intelligence to make decisions about how to deal with their enemies? When, how, and why are leaders’ choices influenced by intelligence reporting or analysis? What factors influence that intelligence and how do they interpret it? These are the kinds of questions the contributors to The Image of the Enemy—Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries Since 1945 seek to address. To do so, they use case studies primarily from the Cold War from the United States, Soviet Union, Israel, Pakistan, and others to show how cognitive, organizational, and political factors color how leaders and intelligence services view the world.

The collection casts itself as following in the footsteps of Earnest May’s 1984 work, Knowing One’s Enemies, which focuses on how well intelligence services and policymakers assessed their adversaries before each of the world wars. The case studies in Image of the Enemy are welcome additions to the growing body of comparative work in the study of intelligence by showing common flaws across a range of policymakers and intelligence services. Key takeaways from the case studies include suggestions that policymakers may be most open to intelligence support when facing crises but are likely to ignore such support when they have fixed policy goals in mind and that many intelligence services struggle to identify and assess emerging, strategic issues.

The authors also highlight ideology as hobbling intelligence assessments and security decisionmaking, particularly for the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Pakistan. Image of the Enemy breaks little new ground in the broader security decisionmaking literature, however, and it suffers from an all too brief concluding chapter, which is a scant three pages. Readers should balk at the assertion that Western intelligence services achieved a greater level of objectivity than their Eastern counterparts because most of those services were not set up to provide analytic support.

The arguments in Image of the Enemy rest mostly on previously declassified documents and the authors keenly recognize the limitations of their findings. Paul Maddrell, the volume’s editor and a lecturer in modern history and international relations at Loughborough University, assembled a mix of intelligence academics and former practitioners who lend authority to the collection. For example, Benjamin Fischer, who provides a trenchant analysis of US intelligence assessments on the Soviet Union, had a 30-year career with the Central Intelligence Agency. Raymond Garthoff, well known for engaging on US-Soviet intelligence and security issues, assesses Soviet policymakers and intelligence on the United States up to and through the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tamir Libel and Shlomo Shapiro, both academics focused on Israeli intelligence and security issues, coauthor a chapter examining the missteps of Israeli intelligence services in understanding Palestinian social movements that led to the first Intifada. Julian Richards’s chapter on Pakistan’s views of India draws on his 20 years in British intelligence and record of critically examining intelligence issues. Chapters by Eunan O’Halpin, Mark Stout, and Matthias Uhl about British intelligence on Northern Ireland, US assessments of jihadist terrorists, and West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service views on East Germany similarly draw on professional and academic experience on intelligence matters.

The interplay among the case studies is fascinating and instructive for academics and intelligence professionals alike. The same cognitive biases, institutional issues, and leader policy preferences that feed intelligence failures and poor security decisionmaking arise again and again across states and intelligence services. Garthoff’s retells how Kruschev in 1961 rejected valid intelligence on US and NATO plans, which he believed were attempts to dupe the USSR. His rejection stemmed from his authorization of efforts to deceive the West by planting false information. Richards explains that Pakistani officials similarly rejected useful intelligence because they thought the Indians were attempting to mislead them, which the Pakistanis themselves were attempting to do to the Indians.

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Fischer shows how rational actor biases and an institutional fear of being wrong led the CIA to inaccurately assess possible actions by the USSR and Warsaw in the early 1980s to deal with the Solidarity Movement, leading to two false warning memos and the withholding of a third that would have been accurate had it been released. Libel and Shapiro demonstrate that Israeli intelligence’s focus on Arab state threats led them to initially miss the rise of Palestinian terrorism. These state-based blinders are central to Stout’s argument about why US leaders were slow to recognize the threat of terrorism until the 9/11 attacks.

The collection suggests policy leaders rely on their intelligence services most in times of crises or when their views are inchoate. Garthoff relates that Soviet leaders turned to the KGB to gather as much reporting as possible in the early 1980s “war scare,” during which they believed the US was preparing to attack. Stout shows that US leaders greatly relied on the US Intelligence Community (IC) and sought as much reporting as possible following the 9/11 attacks. Under the Russian program RyAN and a US terrorist threat matrix, both services collated and passed on nearly all reporting, however farfetched, with little analysis or filtering, according to Garthoff and Stout.

Policymakers and intelligence professionals alike would be wise to resist the urge to follow these past practices and encourage more attention to analysis—not less—during crises. It is easy to see how a deluge of unanalyzed information and a collection posture focused solely on threats could lead to an inflated sense of threat, an overestimation of one’s enemy, and ultimately poor decisionmaking. This problem is particularly wicked since the information overload comes at a time when decisionmaking. This problem is particularly wicked since the information overload comes at a time when intelligence analysis may have its greatest impact, while policymakers view the world through a narrow lens.

Stout, for example, shows that CIA analysis through the “Ziggurat of Zealotry” had a powerful impact on policymakers in the early years after 9/11. This framework provided them a means to comprehend the Islamic jihadist threat facing the United States by delineating it from Islam in general, helping to scope the threat facing the United States and reducing inflated policymaker fears.

Image of the Enemy also suggests that, when policymakers have specific policy goals in mind, they are less likely to consult or listen to their intelligence services and that poor strategic analysis is common among leaders and intelligence services. Libel and Shapiro’s discussion of Netanyahu’s moves to open the Hasmonean Tunnel in 1996 parallels Garthoff’s narrative of Kruschev’s effort to put missiles in Cuba. Both leaders based their policy goals on their respective intelligence service until after their moves provoked intractable crises. The implication here is that there will be times when, no matter how good the intelligence reporting or analysis is, policymakers will set their own course—for better or worse.

Showing the difficulties of strategic analysis, underestimating and overestimating one’s enemy, Garthoff argues Soviet intelligence downplayed US willingness to cooperate as Gorbachev set a new course in the 1980s while Fischer reviews how the US IC and policymakers struggled to see the USSR as a political entity crumbling under its own weight during the same period. Richards explains how Pakistani intelligence repeatedly underestimated Indian fighting capabilities and willingness to confront Islamabad. This was particularly true in Pakistan’s misreading the Sino-Indian clash and peace agreement in 1962, which reaffirmed Islamabad’s flawed view that New Delhi’s “Hindu” mentality made it weak. The prevalence of these strategic problems raise questions about the ability of leaders and intelligence services to see things from their adversary’s point of view and to forecast how future events might unfold.

A flaw in the volume’s comparative approach is the assertion that Western services were superior to Eastern ones because they conducted more analysis and achieved a higher degree of objectivity. Several of the authors demonstrate that Eastern services often merely served to report intelligence in a way akin to the “news.” However, many of these services were not set up specifically to provide analysis. Soviet leaders, for example, tended to rely on think tanks for analysis, which Garthoff lightly references, albeit KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov did try to change this. Moreover during crises or for high profile policy priorities US services often provide daily situation reports made up of intelligence reporting with scanty analysis.

Image of the Enemy is well worth reading to acquire a broad view of how several intelligence services and leaders are plagued by very similar problems leading to intelligence failures. The danger of focusing on intelligence failures in this area of the study of intelligence, however, continues to need close scrutiny. By reviewing only the negative aspects of mindsets, organizational structures,
and policy priorities we end up with a skewed sense of what leads to particular intelligence and security decision-making outcomes. As former acting CIA Director Richard Kerr in a study of CIA analysis from 1950 to 2000 clearly showed, these same issues played important roles in both intelligence successes and failures. Therefore in trying to understand when, how, and why policymakers use intelligence or to improve the analysis they receive, we need to examine a broad range of outcomes or risk adopting cures when we do not fully understand the disease.

Max Hastings is a distinguished journalist who made his reputation reporting during the Falklands campaign in 1982 and went on to edit the Daily Telegraph for a decade. His position regarding intelligence generally is highly skeptical, and his views on the literature are robust. He rightly considers much of the material published on the French resistance as “romantic twaddle” (xxvi); he condemns Anthony Cave Brown’s Bodyguard of Lies as “largely a work of fiction”; and he sees William Stevenson’s notorious A Man Called Intrepid as “wildly fanciful” (xxv). M.R.D. Foot’s histories of Special Operations Executive are “tendentious” and most intelligence operations are “inherently wasteful.” (xix) For good measure, he is also justifiably dismissive of the recent movie The Imitation Game, which has a “negligible relationship to fact” (xxv) and purports to tell the story of Alan Turing.a

The author’s previous books are remarkable for the absence of any consideration of an intelligence dimension. This is especially true in his reporting on the Falklands and, perhaps more surprising, his much-praised Overlord, an account of the D-Day landings and the battle of Normandy in which strategic deception might be said to have played a pivotal role. Without any background in intelligence, and demonstrating a definite disdain for the discipline, the author recalls that in 1974 he declined to review Fred Winterbotham’s The Ultra Secret because the whole concept of Bletchley Park’s contribution to the Allied victory sounded improbable. Quite simply, he had never heard of what the codebreakers had accomplished, and had therefore failed to recognize the significance of a book that we now acknowledge as a significant milestone in the history of intelligence and, indeed, the 20th century.

Hastings has taken an ambitious, “big picture” approach to secret intelligence and clandestine operations conducted during the Second World War and seeks to offer a broad canvas illustrated by concentrating on a selection of individuals and events. Superficially, this is an attractive solution to the considerable challenge of covering so much terrain without falling into the trap of regurgitating very familiar material. On the other hand, adopting such a tactic requires a careful choice of representative characters and incidents and addressing the question of whether to include new research. At first blush, it would appear that the author has avoided polemics and has sought to produce his evidence objectively, but the devil, of course, is in the details.

Some of these issues create a problem for the reader because, consciously or otherwise, Hastings has gone much further than conventional historians, and made some surprising assertions requiring close scrutiny. Some are plainly erroneous, such as the muddle between two celebrated double agents, TRICYCLE and GARBO. It was the former, the Yugoslav playboy Dusko Popov, who traveled to the United States in 1941 and endured chronic mishandling by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, Hastings mistakenly ascribes this episode to the Spaniard Juan Pujol, claiming that he had spent “some months of 1943 in the United States, and the FBI mismanaged him so grossly that he was almost blown.” (285) Actually, GARBO never visited the United States at any time during the war, and there was no inter-Allied dispute with the FBI over his management.

This vignette may be nothing more than an inconsequential slip, but it raises a troubling doubt that materializes constantly because the book’s source notes are so thin that it is impossible to discern whether the author has made a bold disclosure based on new digging in the archives, or merely tripped himself up over a confusing detail. Take, for example, the unequivocal sentence “Canaaris had a mistress in Vienna whose sister was married to Menzies’s brother” (67). Both spymasters act as a thread running through Hastings’ narrative, so this statement is quite important, and requires some explanation. The MI6 Chief Stewart Menzies’s brother Ian, a City insurance broker, was married to an Austrian, Lisel Gärtner, and her sister Friedle, a cabaret artiste, was run as a double agent by MI5, which codenamed her GELATINE. That much is well-documented, but Hastings has added a further layer

a. See also David Hatch, “Two Cryptological Nights at the Cinema” in Studies in Intelligence 59, No. 2 (June 2015).
of intrigue by revealing that Friedle had been Canaris’s mistress. If true, this is much, much more than a mere “trifling coincidence,” but there is absolutely nothing in the footnotes to indicate where the author acquired such a notion. Could it be that he has mixed up Lisel Gärtner with Canaris’s known Polish mistress, Halina Symanska, whose incomplete story is also referred to in his text? In any event, there is nothing to clarify the true position.

Nor is this an isolated example where doubts develop. Hastings covers the CICERO case in some detail, but again his version, intentionally or unintentionally, is slightly revisionist in several respects. Firstly, he says that the story was first revealed to the world “by Bazna himself in the 1950s,” (463) although the correct chronology is that the former Sicherheitsdienst officer Ludwig Moyzischt let the cat out of the bag with Operation Cicero in 1950. Bazna did not make his belated contribution until 1962 with the release of I Was Cicero. Secondly, Hastings says that the existence of a leak from the British embassy in Ankara had been discovered in January 1944 by the Americans, and Churchhill had been informed of it by President Roosevelt who had relied on an OSS report from Berne. However, this purported sequence is directly contradicted by Guy Liddell who recorded in his diary on 20 January 1944 that the cryptographic source codenamed ISOS had prompted an investigation into the ambassador’s lapses of security. Although Allen Dulles, the OSS representative in Berne, came to believe that his agent, Fritz Kolbe, had first revealed the Ankara leak, he was unaware that MI5 had warned the Foreign Office about problems as far back as October 1941 and then had acquired solid ISOS evidence of unauthorised access to the ambassador’s safe in January 1944.

As Hastings records, MI6’s Claude Dansey was strongly opposed to Dulles’s cultivation of Kolbe, but definitely not because he believed “Kolbe to be a double agent.” (309) That assertion is an ancient canard circulating before the secrets of ULTRA had been exposed. In reality, Dansey rightly believed that if Kolbe was caught passing German Foreign Office telegrams to Dulles, the enemy would take the obvious and appropriate countermeasures by changing their cipher systems, with all the implied disastrous consequences. In short, Dansey took the view that Kolbe’s product was a dangerous, unnecessary duplication and that the contact should not be encouraged. However, ignorant of ULTRA, Dulles misinterpreted MI6’s position, and Hastings, apparently unaware of the literature on this topic (in the absence of any relevant source-note) has taken a very mistaken position.

That Hasting relied on the Dulles version is not surprising, but the real heart-stopper is the assertion that the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Bill Cavendish-Bentinck, had “prepared deception documents—supposed war cabinet papers relating to peace feelers from Bulgaria to the Allies—which were placed in Knatchbull-Hugessen’s briefcase” although “nobody touched the bait.” (468) Once again, is this muddle an invention or a breathtaking discovery? Did Cavendish-Bentinck ever draft false information for exploitation by double agents? Hastings is the first and only author to make this claim, but he does not cite his sources.

Much the same thing happens with the author’s treatment of Karl-Heinz Krämer, the Abwehr representative in Stockholm, in support of the proposition that the organization was inept and headed by indecisive incompetents. Ignoring the well-documented cases of Hans Ruser, Otto Mayer, Willi Hamburger, Richard Wurmann, Otto John, and Johannes Jebsen, Hastings incorrectly states that Hans-Berndt Gisevius was “the only Abwehr officer known to have been a source for MI6.” (64) He then explains that Krämer’s “agent network was the figment of a fertile imagination; his reports to Berlin were founded on a diplomatic rumpus. Far from proving that the Abwehr was run by unimaginative buffoons or that Krämer was a charlatan, the JOSEPHINE case proved that the German government had successfully tapped into Sweden’s diplomatic reporting, as described by Keith Jeffery in his official history, MI6. Oddly, this is the sole source cited by Hastings who, for whatever reason, misrepresents the actualité.
Thus we have four incidents—GELATINE, CICERO, GARBO, and JOSEPHINE—where the real story is quite at variance with the Hastings version, and one is left wondering whether the explanation is poor research or prejudice. Nor is it just the British, American, and German intelligence agencies that receive this derision. Particularly informative is Hastings’s treatment of a costly Soviet deception campaign, codenamed MONASTERY, which identifies the principal perpetrator, codenamed MAX, as an established NKVD agent, Alexander Demyanov, who was recruited by the Abwehr and run as a double agent. According to Hastings, Demyanov was parachuted into Nazi-occupied territory under the supervision of General Pavel Sudoplatov, and proceeded to peddle a toxic mixture of authentic and bogus information to the gullible Abwehr. Furthermore, Hastings says, the British intercepted the MONASTERY traffic but never realized the entire operation was a Soviet deception. “The British never entirely fathomed ‘Monastery,’ partly because it was beyond the imagination of their intelligence officers”, (235) he says, citing various reports from the Radio Security Service and MI-14. However, the truth is rather different and illustrates eloquently the perils of venturing untutored into this particular minefield.

Actually, the Soviets ran two quite separate deception campaigns on the eastern front, one run by Demyanov and codenamed MONASTERY and the other designated KLATT, headed by an Austrian Jew, Richard Kauder, who was also a fabricator with a highly developed sense of self-preservation operating in tandem with a White Russian, General Anton Turkul. Confusingly, Demyanov was codenamed MAX, and so was one of the KLATT wireless circuits, although they had no other connection. However, Hastings fell into the trap of ascribing various British assessments of the KLATT traffic to Demyanov’s network, and just to muddy the waters further he claimed that the main Abwehr dupe was “Dr. Wagner Delius, head of the Abwehr station in Sofia.” This is a further confusion, for actually that officer was Otto Wagner, alias Otto Eisentragger, codenamed “Dr. Delius,” who had a central role in the KLATT affair but was never involved in MONASTERY. Contrary to Hastings’s conclusion that MI6 was baffled by the KLATT traffic, there was a prolonged study of the material which concluded when Kauder and Turkul were arrested in Austria and, under interrogation in Oberursel, admitted their duplicity. Alas, 70 years later, Hastings, relying on the deeply flawed and discredited 1994 Sudoplatov memoirs Special Tasks, once again combined two quite different operations to support his prejudice against career intelligence personnel in preference of talented graduates.

Initially puzzled by KLATT’s true loyalties, the British analysts eventually came to a consensus that the entire organization, apparently directed from Sofia and then Budapest, was orchestrated by the Soviets, despite incurring heavy losses. This verdict seemed to be confirmed in October 1943 when Moscow failed to take any action after MI6 had warned the NKVD of the problem. Hastings portrays KLATT as proof of rank incompetence within British Intelligence, whereas any fair assessment would acknowledge that the very people the author indictes came to what turned out to have the right call.

Such episodes serve to undermine The Secret War’s overall authority, and it may be that these quibbles are not wholly relevant when the book is judged against the sheer scale of the undertaking. His stated objective is to look at outcomes, or the way espionage influenced the war, rather than add to the existing historiography of secret missions and adventurous endeavour. To this extent Hastings accomplishes his goal, even if he leaves plenty of unanswered questions. For instance, one of the great unsolved mysteries of the war is where the GRU’s Rote Drei network in Switzerland acquired its accurate information about German military intentions. Hastings devotes considerable space to sketching the organization’s many tentacles but leaves the central conundrum unanswered, although he does claim that Sandor Rado “revealed after the war that the sources he and Rössler had guarded so zealously for so long were . . . strips of punched paper.” (188) Actually Rado did not make quite the disclosure suggested, but he did contribute a foreword to the 1976 Hungarian edition of Moscow’s Eyes, a book published three years earlier in Germany by a former Wehrmacht communications officer, Bernd Ruland. Allegedly Ruland had discovered after the war that two anti-Nazi teleprinter operators at the OKW’s headquarters at Zossen had been stealing carbon copies of geheimeschreiber messages and having them smuggled to Switzerland, but this cannot be the whole story.

The Secret War does not pretend to reveal secrets or offer a new perspective on the successful prosecution of the war against the Axis, and it may be said that probably some of the disclosures detailed above, such as the identity of Canaris’s mistress, are unintentional and erroneous, but the author’s somewhat jaundiced view of what turned out to be the finest of times for intelligence professionals may not be greeted wholeheartedly by their successor practitioners.
# The Secret War by Max Hastings—Errata

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The spectrum of opinions about Richard M. Nixon is wide, if the two most recent biographies of our 37th president of the United States are any indication. Evan Thomas, Newsweek columnist and author of several nonfiction books, has concluded that Nixon was not such a bad guy after all; whereas Timothy Weiner, New York Times reporter, discovered Nixon was even worse than imagined. How did these two authors come to such opposite conclusions?

For Thomas, the answer lies partly in his sourcing, which includes reminiscences of Nixon’s daughter, Julie Nixon Eisenhower, whose 1986 book on her mother, Pat Nixon: The Untold Story, is a poignant look at the president’s family. Being Nixon is a refreshing and well-written attempt to get past the sinister caricature of Nixon by constantly searching for the good in the man. Thomas quotes a touching letter from Nixon to the teenage son of Thomas Eagleton, who lost his spot on the ticket with presidential candidate George McGovern when it came out that Eagleton had received electroshock therapy—“[y]. . . your father has] won the admiration of friends and foes because of [his] courage, poise, and . . . guts. . .” (398).

Thomas attempts to be fair by providing context to some of the more controversial episodes in Nixon’s life, noting that the Democratic Party leader Adlai Stevenson had a much larger “secret fund” of private donations for campaign expenses than Nixon, who nearly parted with presidential frontrunner Dwight Eisenhower over the controversy. He reminds readers that Nixon was hardly the first postwar president to abuse the powers of the office. The IRS audited Nixon three times during the Kennedy administration, and—being Nixon—he was actually encouraged by this abuse, for it showed in his mind that the Kennedys believed Nixon still mattered.

But Thomas’s persistent search for the silver lining behind Nixon and his misdeeds appears strained as Thomas comes to increasingly rely on Chief of Staff H. R. Halderman’s unadorned and damning diaries, as well as the bunker mentality nastiness that pervades the transcripts of Nixon’s White House conversations. Being Nixon and its bid to discover what made the president tick fizzes out, ending on the you-can-say-that-again note of, “Nixon was no saint.”

Understatement and looking at the bright side rarely burden the writing of Timothy Weiner. After examining two darker US institutions with books about the FBI and CIA, Weiner has proposed that Richard Nixon is the embodiment of darkness. And, much like his take on the two federal agencies, the author finds little of redeeming value in his subject, making the subtitle of the book a false one: Weiner clearly sees nothing “tragic” about Nixon’s rise and fall.

The start of One Man Against the World reads like a prosecutor’s brief: the prose has a hectoring, overwrought tone, with Weiner’s noting “Nixon never for a moment saw combat.” (11) (Why include the words “for a moment?”) Or that Nixon’s promotion of two later-Supreme Court justices whose votes were decisive in the 2000 Bush v. Gore ruling “bear the trace of Nixon’s fingerprints.” (28) He interprets everything in the worst way, viewing Nixon’s close relations with the military junta in Athens as a reward for illegal Greek financing of his campaigns, rather than as resulting from the importance Nixon attached to US access to a major naval base. (20) Weiner makes critical assertions about Nixon by quoting dubious sources. One source who, as an undersecretary at Housing and Urban Development, was clearly out of Nixon’s inner circle, is quoted as concluding Nixon was an “amoral” person. (54–55) But, given this official’s outsider status, how exactly would he come to know this about the president?
Some of Weiner’s claims are contradictory. Weiner alleges Nixon was out to destroy his predecessor’s Great Society programs; however, he earlier says Nixon had little interest in domestic affairs ("outhouses in Peoria").

(55) One would think Nixon would need to care deeply about domestic affairs if he wanted to end programs strongly supported by an opposition-controlled Congress. Lastly, Weiner exaggerates his case, contending Nixon sold ambassadorships for campaign contributions. (52–53) Besides the “gambling in the casino” naïveté of this charge, he makes a rather thin case for why the reader should care, given the postings were in backwaters—two in Central America and one in Jamaica—hardly plum jobs for a political supporter or, for that matter, a careerist.

Once Weiner gets this opening salvo out of his system, the book settles into a more measured narrative that proposes Watergate and the Vietnam War were inextricably linked. First, he quotes former National Security Advisor Walter Rostow, who contends Nixon’s underhanded and successful interaction with South Vietnamese President Thieu right before the 1968 election drove home the lesson of doing whatever it takes to stay in office in 1972. (19) Weiner is understandably critical of Nixon’s sending a back-channel message to Thieu that he’d get a better deal with him as president than with his opponent Vice President Humbert Humphrey.

Thomas takes issue with Nixon as well but provides some balance to Weiner’s one-sided portrayal, stressing Nixon could hardly be blamed for seeing President Johnson’s announced bombing halt, coming just a week before a tight presidential election, as a blatant political stunt, especially since peace talks with Hanoi had gone nowhere for eight months. Thomas also suggests Thieu hardly needed to hear Nixon’s reassurances to understand his chances for better peace terms rested with the staunch anti-communist Republican candidate. Johnson found out about Nixon’s duplicity but begged off making this discovery public because doing so would divide the country and reveal US spying on its South Vietnamese allies. Thieu’s backing away from the talks took much of the air out of the peace initiative and Nixon won the election by a razor thin margin of 0.7 percent.

Nixon’s actions against Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers classified history of the Vietnam War, was the other link between the war and Watergate. Originally seeing the Papers as Johnson and Kennedy’s problem since the history ends before he took office, Nixon fed off National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s determination to do something to stop foreign policy leaks. Weiner notes that assistant to the president, John Ehrlichman, believed the burglary of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office to find incriminating information was the seminal Watergate episode, the one that set the stage for all that followed. This crime occurred nine months before the Watergate break-in. (297)

In a more general sense, One Man Against the World drives home the point that Nixon’s obsession with the Vietnam War fueled the bunker mentality and paranoia that took over White House deliberations. Despite historic breakthroughs in relations with the two most powerful communist nations during visits to them in 1972, Nixon could only underscore, “It is not about China or the Soviet Union. It is about South Vietnam.” Weiner points out that Nixon liked to throw out the phrase “bomb them” as he did during the North Vietnamese offensive of 1972—“Those bastards have never been bombed. They are going to be bombed this time.” (174) He was not shy about badmouthing administration officials to others, crassly describing his secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, as a “miserable bastard” for being slow in finding bombing targets. (374) Thomas, after noting the somewhat comical, if dangerous, nature of the “enemies list,” warns that “Nixon seemed oblivious to the corrosive power of his own rage.” (372) And into the breach created by the FBI and IRS’s opting-out of the illegal activities in which they engaged for Nixon’s two predecessors came the private actors working for the aptly-named CREEP (Committee to Reelect the President). Their bungling at the Watergate complex led to Nixon’s downfall.

Nixon held the CIA in some contempt. After the agency failed to catch the 1970 coup in Cambodia, Nixon rhetorically wondered, “What do those clowns do out there at Langley?” (264) Likewise, he complained, “the CIA isn’t worth a damn” after its officers failed to prevent Salvador Allende in 1970 from taking office in Chile. (298) It did not help matters that some CIA officers had links to the Georgetown set, which made a habit of belittling Nixon. Thomas points out that Polly Wisner, wife of former CIA chief of covert operations Frank Wisner, often played host for members of this set. Amazingly, Cynthia Helms, the wife of Nixon’s director of central intelligence (DCI), Richard Helms, was a frequent guest and apparently joined in the anti-Nixon fun. Nixon was well aware he was an object of ridicule at these get-togethers. (213)
So it is one of those twists of fate that the CIA came to play, some of it coincidentally, an important role in the fortunes of the Nixon administration. The success of Nixon’s plan to withdraw US troops from Southeast Asia and turn over most of the fighting to South Vietnamese forces depended on cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail supply line to communist forces. And for this he thought he needed the CIA-run “secret war” in Laos more than ever. Weiner gives a sense of the scale of CIA operations, to include training Laotian irregular forces, assisting Thai forces sent to fight in Laos, and directing combat operations. As CIA historian Thomas Ahern points out in his book about the secret war in Laos, Helms became increasingly concerned the CIA was out of its depth in trying to direct such a massive operation, and he told Nixon that CIA could only interdict so much given the incredible complexity of the trail.

CIA links to Watergate had the most impact on Nixon’s presidency. The botched Watergate break-in was conducted by a number of ex-CIA officers, including E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, as well as some contractors. Weiner sees the key break in the stalled Watergate investigation’s being McCord’s testimony against former Attorney General and CREEP Director John Mitchell. Disgusted with the Nixon administration’s attempt to have his revered CIA take the fall for the break-in, McCord decided to come clean; however, the most consequential role the CIA played was in refusing to provide cover for Nixon to end the FBI’s investigation into the matter. Nixon saw the burglars’ affiliation with the CIA as an opportunity to claim the break-in was about national security, with some vague and odd link to the Bay of Pigs. Haldeman told Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Vernon Walters to tell the FBI to cease and desist with the investigation for these very reasons. Upon being informed of this meeting, Helms refused to comply and told Walters there was “nothing about the Bay of Pigs that has not been in the public domain.” Weiner is wrong in asserting Nixon wanted CIA to deter the FBI from the whole Watergate investigation. Thomas quotes Helms’s account that notes Haldeman told the CIA director to tell his FBI counterpart further investigation into Mexican money transfers could expose CIA assets. In any case, when the White House recording of Nixon suggesting this act of cover-up became public—the “smoking gun” tape—Nixon was finished.

The release of new tape transcripts and other primary documents propel Weiner’s narrative, but the story he tells feels old. The new documents seem only to confirm what is known about Nixon’s dark side. Paradoxically, Thomas’s book, which is based mostly on secondary sources, has an air of originality, perhaps because it looks extensively at a relatively untapped avenue of inquiry, Nixon’s good side. In November 1962, after an ill-advised and failed bid for the governorship of California, Nixon petulantly announced to reporters he was leaving public life, so they would “not have Nixon to kick around anymore.” More than 50 years and countless books later, we have to ask: how much more of Nixon’s life is there left to kick around?

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In their first novel, *Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War*, P.W. Singer and August Cole tell the story of a future war between the United States on one side and China and Russia on the other. The authors paint a compelling scenario in which the simmering Cold War turns hot with the opening salvos taking place in outer space and continuing in cyberspace. Malware loaded onto the semiconductor chips of all US military hardware is activated to disable US military communications and weapons systems, giving the Chinese and Russians a decisive advantage. With communications down and most US military equipment disabled, Hawaii is quickly occupied after a successful attack on Pearl Harbor.

As troubling as the loss of the state, the Chinese also have found a way to destroy US nuclear ICBM submarines while they are at sea. With cutting-edge military technologies and the nuclear arsenal partly disabled, the US turns to alternative solutions, including leveraging US companies to make replacement parts using 3D technology. Meanwhile survivors of the attacks on Hawaiian military facilities launch an insurgency that begins to turn the grim situation around with the help of the US Navy’s ghost fleet of decrepit, pre-digital-age war ships, Silicon Valley companies, an adventurous billionaire, and even Anonymous. And as for intelligence, good old fashioned espionage provides the US its first clue of how to reverse the situation—but it isn’t understood until well after the shooting starts.

Singer and Cole’s expertise in the defense world has pundits and strategists alike lauding *Ghost Fleet’s* nearly 400 end-notes, something not often seen in novels, document the years of research the authors did to bring their story close to fact. The authors weave a variety of political tensions, social changes, emerging technologies, and weapons systems now in various stages of development into the narrative. Among the plot drivers are cyber theft of intellectual property, freedom of navigation tensions in the South China Sea, and even diminishing etiquette in the use of personal electronic devices. In addition to the depiction of the future of warfare, glimpses of the future of intelligence are woven throughout.

Despite their obvious focus on technological developments, Singer and Cole still manage to embed the human element. Although cyberwarfare plays an outsized role in this vision of a future world war, and therefore should be of interest to large swaths of the Intelligence Community, I was drawn to the book’s human intelligence aspect.

Early in the book, the authors paint a detailed picture of the embassy party of the future, where HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and more combine into a smorgasbord of collection and intrigue. In a post-communist Beijing, a US Navy commander is finishing his two-year stint in the Defense Attaché Office and is being fêted by the US ambassador. The diplomatic circuit cocktail party is well attended with “everyone in the room . . . there to collect. Eyeglasses, jewelry, watches, whatever—all were constantly recording and analyzing. Suck it all up and let the filters sort it out.” (18)

One of the guests even has an antenna embedded under her skin. The authors’ vision appears to be of a merging of technical and human intelligence either via wearable devices or physical augmentation—rather than the trope we’ve heard since the late 1970’s of technical replacing human intelligence. In such a situation where everyone, and even cocktail glasses, are presumably recording conversations, how would a case officer practice her craft?

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a. Singer drew heavily from his books *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century* (Penguin, 2009) and *Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know* (co-authored with Allen Friedman). According to the blurb about the authors in *Ghost Fleet*, Cole was a defense industry reporter for the *Wall Street Journal* before moving to the Atlantic Council where he is focusing on using fiction to explore future warfare.
Part of the answer to that question is answered at the same cocktail party where a Russian general brings up the original 1960’s-era Star Trek television series and draws a parallel between his friendship with the Commander and the relationship between the USS Enterprise navigator, Pavel Andreievich Chekov with that of Captain James T. Kirk. The general embeds a key piece of intelligence that the Americans were going to need during the upcoming conflict in his observation that Chekov was named after a Russian Nobel Prize winning scientist.

Once the import of the Russian’s comment becomes clear in Washington—after the war has started, unfortunately—a complicated high-stakes operation is developed to meet again with the Russian general during his biweekly visit to a Shanghai bordello. The operational meeting must take place under the noses of pervasive surveillance, which includes not only video and audio, but also monitoring of individual vital signs and temperature variations in a denied area during wartime. The female case officer—who’s taken the place of his usual “partner”—delivers her recognition signal, or parole, in the Klingon language so that the Russian would know that the Americans finally understood the intelligence he’d given them. The case officer’s ability to build trust, and ask follow-up questions shows that, at least according to Singer and Cole, the human role in intelligence will remain more than as a sensor platform.

Singer and Cole are quite deserving of the accolades they’ve received on their first novel from the technology and forecasting perspective. Overall, it is a first rate techno thriller and its roots in today’s trends and technology—whether under development or already deployed—make it as disquieting a read as it is enjoyable. I would have liked to see more of the authors’ vision of espionage and tradecraft of the future in their novel; however, they give us enough to imagine what human intelligence operations might be like when security services are collecting and analyzing all data available to them. The authors’ depiction of the advantage that our potential adversaries might have because of cyber-attacks over the past few years, and the insecurity of our supply chain for electronics is more than enough for the Intelligence community reader to ponder.

On the downside, the interaction among characters and much of the individual character development tend toward the cliché—which, along with the lack of an expository backstory of how the relationship of the United States, China and Russia evolved—highlight the authors’ inexperience at fiction writing.
Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

CURRENT TOPICS


Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate Intelligence Committee’s Study of Its Detention and Interrogation Program, edited by Bill Harlow

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The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection, edited by Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark

Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence, by Robert W. Pringle

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Queen of Spies: Daphne Park—Britain’s Cold War Spy Master, by Paddy Hayes

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

The 2 April 1965 issue of Time magazine featured an article entitled, “The Cybernated Generation” that conjectured about the kinds of things “cybernetics” would provide. While the term is now obsolete, many cyber-related forensic expressions have since come into being; examples include the words “phishing,” “phreaking,” “[an] exploit,” and “zero day.” When Microsoft developed the Windows operating system nearly 30 years ago, security was not a major consideration; thus, vulnerabilities were unintentionally left inside the millions of lines of code that made the system work—vulnerabilities that allowed the addition of programming instruction that would change the performance of the computer and the programs the computer was running. If a vulnerability was discovered and kept secret by the hacker as he wrote an “exploit” program to install viruses or other malicious software on a machine, he had found a “zero day”—that is, the victim would have “zero days” to take preventive measures.

Countdown to Zero Day tells the story of how the STUXNET worm—some call it a virus—was discovered by a small, obscure Belarus computer security firm called VirusBlokAda in June 2010, and the worldwide efforts to uncover its purpose and its originator.

Author Kim Zetter, a journalist with Wired magazine, follows a chronologically crooked path from one security firm to another, all over the world, as they gradually deconstructed the incredible, complex STUXNET code. As is customary, VirusBlokAda notified Microsoft that a “zero-day exploit” had been located in their operating system and had been found in commercial software, though they didn’t know its purpose. When no response was forthcoming, VirusBlokAda posted a warning on an Internet security forum, warning of possible infections. Soon, infected customers were identified and Microsoft, after naming the worm STUXNET, began work on a fix.

But Microsoft couldn’t do it alone: STUXNET was far too complex. The American security firm Symantec played a major role as layer upon layer of complexity was revealed in fits-and-starts. They discovered that the code didn’t behave like most viruses or worms that steal or damage data. In fact, it appeared to do nothing at all except spread and replicate itself in other computers if those computers had certain characteristics; if not, no infection would be transmitted. When the code found a new home, it would notify its home base server, often in Asia, and reveal details of the new location so its originators would know which computer targets had been infected. For infected computers, STUXNET only came to life only when it encountered certain industrial-control devices containing proprietary software produced by the German firm Siemens. Zetter tracks the complicated path to devices running that software; initially all of these devices were found to be installed in very secure Iranian facility in Natanz.

Eventually, it became obvious to the security sleuths that STUXNET was so extraordinary that it had likely been state-sponsored. At one point espionage was suspected, (17) and it would later develop that earlier variants of STUXNET, undetected or unreported, had been used for that purpose. (259)

Even after the circuitous path to STUXNET exposed its purpose as intended to be used against Iranian centrifuges, there remained the outstanding question of who was responsible. After speculating about a White House role in its approval, Zetter asserts it was intelligence agencies in the United States and Israel, though the only direct support she provides is a 15 January 2011 article in the New York Times. She considers the blowback potential (e.g., others may do the same to the United States) and the moral implications analogous to those surrounding the use of the atom bomb. So far, she writes, “STUXNET still holds the distinction of being the only known case of cyber warfare on record.” (408)

**REBUTTAL** contains eight short critical essays by former senior CIA officers who were directly involved in the Agency’s Detention and Interrogations Program, but none of whom were interviewed by those conducting the SSCI study. Former DCI George Tenet argues that the SSCI “failed to seek the truth or honestly portray events in the months and years following 9/11 in a manner that bears any resemblance to what my colleagues and I at CIA experienced.” (1) Porter Goss, a former DCI and former chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, noted, inter alia, that the “SSCI Democratic staff selected supporting materials and connected disjointed dots, willfully omitting and avoiding any information” that would contradict the views of its chairwoman. He also pointed out that “there was congressional oversight of the RDI program . . . and the specific enhanced interrogation techniques were briefed and discussed with the top committee leadership. I recall no objections being made.” (8–9)

Former D/CIA General Michael Hayden challenges the Committee on its inaccurate characterization of previous testimony and its refusal to accept “the important role that detainee-derived information played in tracking Usama Bin Ladin to Abbottabad.” (12–13) Former DD/DCI John McLaughlin follows up on this latter point, adding that “everyone who worked with the information knows the allegation is false.” (14) He then provides a number of examples, as does former DD/CTC Phil Mudd, who adds even more detail in describing the incremental nature of analysis and the value of detainee information, especially the impact of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Mudd is perplexed that those who were not there and did not do the analysis could reach a different conclusion.

Former DD/CIA Michael Morell contributes a piece that, among other topics, attacks the media—naming first that they ignored the two reports (one by the CIA, and the other by the SSCI Republican members) that were issued with the SSCI document, and that “not a single media analyst or commentator rigorously examined the report’s assertions or took an in-depth look at all three documents.” (22)

John Rizzo, the CI’s chief legal advisor for seven of the eight years after 9/11, had more direct continuous knowledge of the RDI program than most other officers. Although he is cited over 200 times in the SSCI report, his request to be interviewed during its preparation, so he could refute their charges of providing inaccurate data, was denied. In his article, he summarizes the legal precautions he would have discussed with them. On the issue of detainee information value, Rizzo quotes former CIA director Leon Panetta that the program “yielded important . . . even critical intelligence.” (33)

The final article is by Jose Rodriguez, who was chief of the CounterTerrorism Center during most of the RDI program. He explains why the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah was of value and what corrective action was taken when abuses were discovered. He ends by clarifying the practical impact that being labeled “torturers” has on operational effectiveness, especially when it contradicts previous authorities.

The last two documents in **REBUTTAL** are the official CIA response to the SSCI report and the report of the SSCI Republican minority, which did not participate in the effort. Both are nearly 100 pages, with many redactions. Nevertheless, they add additional data; in the cover memorandum, current D/CIA John Brennan explains his concurrence and differences with the findings.

Bill Harlow, former chief of the Office of Public Affairs at CIA, has assembled an informative, easy-to-read, succinct collection of position papers. For many readers, these papers will demonstrate an unacceptable degree of confirmation bias on the part of the SSCI staff who wrote the RDI study. But the SSCI is unlikely to be persuaded that their facts and judgments are wrong or that they were the victims of confirmation bias.

In 2013, the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University sponsored an examination of the historical, legal, policy and ethical aspects of Edward Snowden’s decision to disclose classified information to journalists. The panel presentations were subsequently revised, expanded, and updated with government and other documents that deal with the issue. The result is The Snowden Affair.

Several contributors criticize, on legal grounds, the US government programs allegedly revealed; one challenges them as inappropriate, while ignoring their security objectives. This “ivory tower” approach is echoed in a piece on policy issues. Another discusses the effect of poor oversight of the operational programs. The damage to foreign and domestic policy, as well as any cyberwarfare programs, is also analyzed. A final essay looks at whether Snowden’s civil disobedience actions are consistent with precedent, and not surprisingly, concludes they are.

The second part of the Reader contains congressional reports, court decisions, and official statements by government officials. The latter include President Obama, the director of national intelligence, the attorney general, and the NSA public affairs officer. To these are added comments from industry leaders, and from Snowden himself. While not enjoyable reading, the Reader presents a basic foundation about a case with profound cybersecurity implications that have yet to be resolved.

GENERAL

The Ethics of Intelligence: A New Framework, by Ross W. Bellaby (Routledge, 2014) 189, end of chapter notes, index.

The world of intelligence is “in dire need of an ethical framework . . . it has never before been subjected to any extended effort to ethically evaluate it.” So argues Aberystwyth University scholar Ross Bellaby in his book, The Ethics of Intelligence. Ignoring the Church and Pike Committee hearings, Bellaby claims that former DCI Allen Dulles asserted that “any restrictions on the Intelligence Community would be counterproductive in regards to its overall mission,” though he provides no source that Dulles ever made such a statement. (1) Based on these questionable presumptions, Bellaby acknowledges the “unsavory” nature of espionage, concluding it must nevertheless “be made to respect ethical norms.” (2) After drawing on Just War Theory and several other concepts, he offers a modest proposal for accomplishing that objective—the “Ladder of Escalation”. (3)

The qualitative unit of measure Bellaby applies is “harm.” He accepts the vital necessity of intelligence but assumes that the “notably disreputable” profession can cause damage, or harm, in various degrees. Thus “there should be limits on its use” and he develops a “set of Just Intelligence Principles to determine if and when these harms are justified.” (16)

Bellaby establishes a basis for his ethical concerns by examining intelligence collection in the form of IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT. In the first two, privacy and individual autonomy are the principal concerns. With HUMINT, the means of acquisition are the issue. He provides lengthy discussions of potential problems each area of intelligence collection presents. For example, with HUMINT, he deals with questions of ethics involved in deception and manipulation, false flag operations, defectors, agent recruitment, blackmail, and torture. All this is necessary, he concludes, because “professional state intelligence has yet to develop an ethical framework that offers a means of determining if and when intelligence collection is ethically justified.” (171) His “Ladder of
“Escalation” provides a step-by-step procedure with questions for filling this gap that should be asked at each rung.

But is Bellaby’s picture complete? His conclusion does not consider the possibility that an ethical framework already exists and that the ethical issues he raises are, in fact, part of the operational training and field procedures employed by intelligence officers. Under these conditions, violations of ethical norms might better be treated as a legal matter.

*The Ethics of Intelligence* raises important conceptual issues involving the intelligence profession, but it should not be accepted without further scholarly inquiry.


The five INTs recognized by the US Intelligence Community are Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). They are frequently mentioned in the literature with brief, if any, explanations. *The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection* is the first book to address the topics separately, in depth, in a single work. Former CIA officers Mark Lowenthal and Robert Clark have edited and contributed to the book, along with five other authors, each a specialist in one of INTs.

The chapter on OSINT was written by Eliot Jardines, a former assistant deputy director of national intelligence for open source in the office of the DNI. He was responsible for strategic direction, policy, and oversight of the OSINT programs in the 16 organizations of the IC. His contribution makes clear that, while OSINT has long been a source of information, it is particularly important in the era of the World Wide Web, social media, the smart phone, and as a source of “gray literature” (not classified but of limited distribution). He reviews who uses and collects OSINT, the types of data of interest, the burden of validation it imposes before it can be accepted, the future of the field in terms of technology, and the legal considerations.

Retired CIA officer Michael Althoff has long experience in managing collection and dissemination of HUMINT on targets in Russia and the former Soviet bloc countries. His article presents a historical review and explains just what HUMINT is and is not, stressing that it involves collecting secrets that can’t be acquired any other way. He also discusses who does the work, the relationships with friendly services, how HUMINT is managed, and the special problems that arise as a consequence of operating in the digital world. For perspective, he includes how HUMINT is approached in Russia, France, China, and Great Britain.

William Nolte, a former NSA officer, discusses SIGINT with a twist. In addition to the two well-known components of SIGINT—COMINT (communications intelligence) and ELINT (electronic emissions from missiles, for example)—he includes FISINT. Defined as foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, FISINT is derived from an instrument intentionally placed on a platform (like a launch vehicle). Nolte explains in detail how SIGINT became an NSA core responsibility in addition to, and largely separate from, NSA’s better known cryptologic mission. He also summarizes the requirements, the collection platforms (in general terms), and how the data are processed and disseminated. He concludes with some not pessimistic comments on the continuing value of SIGINT in the digital world.

GEOINT is a relatively new term, defined officially in 2003; thus, one might conclude that few have prolonged experience in the field. (111) But that would be wrong; GEOINT is concerned with high accuracy mapping and maps, plus the supporting geospatial data, as, for example, orbital and geography parameters. Both are long-time intelligence functions. Darryl Murdock and Robert Clark have impressive credentials in these areas. After discussing the official definition of GEOINT, they present a history of its mapping origins, followed by commentary on the
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sensors employed, the end products, and how collection dissemination systems are used and managed. Many countries produce GEOINT for similar purposes and the authors review the areas of overlap for 11 of them. They conclude with thoughts about the use of drones for collection and new applications due to the Internet of Things.

MASINT as a discipline dates from the late 1970s and encompasses a collection of techniques several of which are much older. Examples include acoustic techniques for locating submarines and field artillery pieces, radar, and seismic sensing. Authors John Morris—known as “Mr. MASINT”—and Robert Clark provide a history of MASINT development and many examples of the different types, their applications, contributions, and management in the contemporary environment.

In the final chapter the editors discuss how the five INTs are managed individually and collectively to comprise an anti-stovepipe system. The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection will prove a valuable source for students and specialists who need to learn what these disciplines are and how they work as a system.


Robert Pringle served in the State Department and later as a CIA analyst. This new edition of his book has 66 additional pages. While most of the additional pages are devoted to new entries, the extensive bibliography (with its own table of contents) and the appendices have been updated.

Pringle’s thoughtful introduction is worth the attention of those wondering about the background of the Russian intelligence services and why they remain of interest today. At first glance, readers may not find entries for relatively recent cases, as, for example, Adolf Tolkachev. But he is mentioned in the entry for Edward Howard, the former CIA officer who exposed him to the KGB before defecting to Moscow in 1985. Had the publisher provided an index, this kind of problem would have been prevented.

Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence is a valuable contribution to the intelligence literature, especially for those seeking reliable summaries for important cases, evidence of how the Russian services function today, and some history on their origins.


For CIA officers, the polygraph is initially a rite of passage and later becomes a routine part of their careers. Some find it an unpleasant experience, others a necessary inconvenience. But how many have wondered about the examiner on the other side of the “box”? He or she may know all about you—but what kind of a career does he or she have in the intelligence business? A Life of Lies and Spies is one answer to that question.

An agency brat, Alan Trabue attributes his life-long love of travel to growing up in faraway places due to his father’s many overseas assignments. At the suggestion of his brother (who had also served in the agency), Alan decided he would give the CIA a try after college. He was accepted and after his orientation training became a polygraph examiner. He describes his own introduction to the polygraph and, though some of his classmates fell victim to what they called they termed the “mental colono-scopie,” (23) he survived. Then travel the world he did for the next 38 years while he rose through the ranks to direct the worldwide covert operations polygraph program.

A Life of Lies and Spies begins with a description of the polygraph process that includes typical behavior and also
examples of the less-frequent, even bizarre effects—physical distress, fear, anger, threats of violence—it produced in those examined. (10-11) Then he turns his attention to the covert operations section that conducted polygraph examinations and interrogations overseas. With the exception of some years teaching and managing training, he spent the remainder of his career in this area.

Now the fun begins! Trabue devotes most of the book to “war stories”—or, more properly, case summaries—that illustrate a covert operations polygrapher’s life in the field. He avoids geographic specifics and most names, but conveys general procedures, the functions of key players, and the essence of certain tradecraft issues. He pays particular attention to his time-tested techniques for handling examinees, especially foreign agents.

His case summaries include the Castro agent that beat polygraph examinations administered by Trabue and two others; the peculiar circumstances presented by some female agents; poorly chosen test sites; problems that arise between the examiner and the station case officers; dealing with nervous examinees; and the use of interpreters. He even includes some examples of interoffice practical joking among examiners.

*A Life of Lies and Spies* provides an interesting look at how and why the CIA employs the polygraph. A valuable contribution.


The objective was Anwar al-Awlaki; his codename was TROY; the weapon of choice was the drone; the mission was successful. Why was it necessary and was it legal? Investigative journalist Scott Shane addresses these and many related questions in *Operation TROY*.

Born in the United States, al-Awlaki enjoyed the student life at Colorado State until suddenly giving up engineering for religion in late 1990 during Desert Storm. A gifted orator, he rose rapidly and was soon preaching at a mosque in San Diego before becoming a popular imam of his own mosque in Northern Virginia. After 9/11, the FBI discovered that two of the hijackers had worshipped in al-Awlaki’s San Diego mosque and he became a person of interest. Among other things, the Bureau discovered al-Awlaki’s penchant for prostitutes that they documented in full. When he learned they knew, he bolted to London and then to Yemen. It was there that he rose to lead al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and instigated the Christmas 2009 underwear bomber’s attempt to bring down an airliner. By 2010, he was “openly calling for killing Americans, including civilians” and his slick magazine *Inspire* and YouTube sermons were winning converts. He was soon added to the “kill list.” (284) *Objective TROY* covers the legal, moral, and political elements of that decision from the intelligence, public, and White House perspectives. While the White House remains officially silent about many aspects of the operation, the potential for civilian casualties and the use of drones in general are discussed at length. (285) Shane uses the president’s own speeches and extensive staff interviews to convey the decisionmaking quandaries that presented themselves. Not all the legal issues are resolved, but he quotes the president’s judgment that, “I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took him out.” (310) But that did not quiet the critics: they insisted that drones were somehow immoral; that al-Awlaki’s effectiveness had not been diminished; and that his legacy persists, inspiring even more jihadis. (302)

In his efforts to discover “the toxic mix that had turned al-Awlaki into an outlaw” (290) and led to his death, Shane interviewed his associates and family members. Their views on the legality of his death are sobering. Anwar’s younger brother, Ammar, Shane writes, claimed the CIA made a “brazen pitch” to enlist his help finding his brother; he declined. (267) Attempts by a former jihadi who penetrated al-Awlaki’s entourage by helping him find another
wife also failed. Efforts by other intelligence agencies were extensive but also unsuccessful. In the end it was an unspecified agent who revealed the target’s location. (289)

**Objective TROY** is a fine account of the al-Awlaki case in all its dimensions.

**HISTORICAL**

**Avenue of Spies: A True Story of Terror, Espionage, and One American Family’s Heroic Resistance in Nazi Occupied Paris,** by Alex Kershaw (Crown Publishers, 2015) 286, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Members of the French resistance often learned the practicalities of clandestine life on the job. The Jackson family is a prime example. Dr. Sumner Jackson, an American, had served in WW I, married a Swiss nurse (Toquette), and settled in Paris, where their son Phillip was born. Sumner was chief surgeon at the American hospital when WW II began and he and his wife decided not to follow many of their colleagues who returned to America. Their introduction to the resistance began with Sumner’s efforts to help escaped pilots who found their way to the hospital. Soon, their home at 11 Avenue Foch was enlisted as a dead letter drop and safehouse, and they became part of an escapee network. They functioned successfully under the noses of the Gestapo, then headed by Helmut Knochen, until their arrest just before D-Day. Ironically, Gestapo headquarters was located at 84 Avenue Foch, and its offices at 31 Avenue Foch—headquarters for the elements dealing with the deportation of Jews—were both close to the Sumner home.

In **Avenue of Spies,** historian Alex Kershaw tells of story of the Gestapo battle against the resistance and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) networks that arose to support it. Using French informers and brutal interrogation techniques—often genuine torture—they gradually penetrated both. In May 1944, the Libération escape line, supported by Dr. Sumner, was compromised. The entire Sumner family was arrested and imprisoned in Gestapo jails. Toquette survived the Ravensbruck concentration camp. Phillip and his father were sent to Neuengamme labor camp near Hamburg. In May 1945 as the Allies neared Germany, they were placed on the SS Thielbek, headed for an unknown destination. Dr. Jackson, as an American, was judged eligible to transfer to Sweden, but declined in order to remain with his son and patients. The Thielbek was sunk by RAF fighters; Phillip survived, but his father did not.

**Avenue of Spies** ends with a summary of what happened to those who survived the war. Knochen was imprisoned but soon pardoned, as were many other Gestapo officers. Toquette and Phillip were decorated, but it was a long struggle to any kind of normal life. She died in 1968, her son in 2014. Kershaw’s account insures they will not be forgotten.

**Daughters of the KGB: Moscow’s Secret Spies, Sleepers, and Assassins of the Cold War,** by Douglas Boyd (The History Press, 2015) 224, end of chapter notes, photos, maps, index.

Readers anticipating a book brimming with Jason Matthews-esque tales of espionage adventure will be disappointed in **Daughters of the KGB.** Historian and linguist David Boyd a tells quite a different story from what the book’s title implies—the word “daughters” doesn’t even appear in the index. These “daughters” are the surrogate intelligence organizations formed by the Soviet Union after WW II in what became the communist Bloc countries.

Boyd begins by establishing his unusual credentials: in 1959, while serving in the Signals Section at RAF Gatow, West Berlin, he was arrested in East Berlin by the Stasi—he never explains why he was there—and spent
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several weeks as their guest in a Potsdam prison until his exchange. His service career at an end, he entered the international film business and in the succeeding years developed contacts with filmmakers in Soviet Bloc countries. After the Wall came down, he went back to Berlin and read his Stasi file that revealed, among other details, that the working level Stasi officers disliked their Soviet masters and the repressive measures that they institutionalized against East German citizens. He then decided to examine the security services in the other Soviet Bloc countries; Daughters of the KGB is the result.

After a discussion of Stalin’s postwar plans to control the eastern European countries occupied by the Soviets, Boyd deals first with the Stasi. He provides historical background and then discusses how it originated and operated, domestically and against the West—mainly the CIA, MI5, and BND—citing a number of cases, some of which are well known, other less so.

Succeeding chapters follow this pattern as he examines the intelligence services in the other Bloc countries, including Albania. There is a chapter titled “The Horizontal Spy,” but it has no salacious detail and the cases—mainly Polish—of seduction for espionage are well known. One exception concerns Hendryk Bogulak, who Boyd claims defected to the United States and disappeared. (145)

Daughters of the KGB provides interesting detail about the East European security services in the Cold War era.


At the start of WW I, Britain controlled much of the world’s telegraph infrastructure and it promptly cut all but a selected few of the cables Germany used to communicate with the world. At the same time, it placed human “censors” at the 120 cable offices still operating around the empire and began intercepting and reading the 50,000 messages that passed through them each day. A special unit—Room 40—was established to break the messages that were encrypted. These acts, writes BBC journalist Gordon Corera, led to “the birth of modern communications intelligence . . . [and] the first global communications surveillance system.” (2) Intercept is the story of how “computers and communications merged with the creation of the Internet and the emergence of hacking to exploit vulnerabilities, which in turn has changed the age-old practice of spying.” (9)

The central theme of Intercept is cybersecurity. Drawing on the legacy of Bletchley Park and the special intelligence USA-UK relationship that followed WW II out of mutual necessity, it tracks the introduction of the first computer, which Corera discloses was a British invention kept secret for security reasons (34, 384), and then examines several sub-themes in depth. These include the evolution of computer capabilities; why commercial software made hacking a breeze; how private, secure encryption techniques complicated matters for NSA and GCHQ and what they have done to deal with the issue; the impact of the Internet and “big data”; how the United States and Britain labor to provide cybersecurity; how other countries—mainly Russia and China—use the Internet to penetrate other nations’ databases; how to deal with cyberespionage, and the vulnerability of national infrastructures to cyberattack.

Of particular interest are Corera’s accounts of the sophisticated virus or worm, STUXNET, and its use against Iran’s nuclear program. He also includes the first case of state espionage conducted over computer networks that was conducted by the KGB and discovered by an observant American academic. (146)

In addition to the rapid technological advances, Corera describes the concurrent political, bureaucratic, and professional rivalries, as well as WikiLeaks and Snowden disclosures, that complicate the security missions of NSA and GCHQ. These problems have no technological fix and no Harvard Business School, off-the-shelf solution. Corera describes the players in government,
academia, business—and even the hacktivists—that have worked in this ad hoc cyber world to make it function.

Corera concludes with some perceptive thoughts on “the fundamental questions of the crypto wars—privacy versus security, anonymity versus identifiability and the place of encryption—that remain unanswered.” While working to find solutions, he cautions us to remember that the “Word Wide Web is for everyone.” (389–91) Intercept is an often unnerving yet thoughtful, valuable account of the evolution of the cyber world in which we live now and its implications for the future.


This interesting study gets off to a contentious start. In his preface to this recent acquisition, Professor Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones sets out some of the perils encountered by those studying intelligence as the field has evolved since the late 20th century. He makes “special mention of the American curse of the revolving door”—those who join the Intelligence Community from academia and then return to teaching. They can “go native, remerging in academia as propagandists. They may not have been the best scholars in the first place.” And those who are “top scholars do not relish the contempt in which they are often held, once having dabbled in ‘dirty espionage.’” Jeffreys-Jones’s scorn is not reserved for those with experience in both professions. “Teaching and scholarship in the intelligence field,” he goes on to say, “is, to too great an extent, blighted by the presence of pensioners who are not only biased in favour of officialdom, but also second rate intellectually. Such problems do not exist in Britain.” (xvi–xvii)

No specifics are provided and fortunately his snippy affronts do not reflect the tenor of the 16 contributions that examine how questions of truth, evidence, and method have been dealt with in intelligence history. The first eight articles deal with American intelligence, four by American authors and the balance by UK academics. The second eight focus on British intelligence, with articles by British scholars.

The topics covered in the first eight articles begin with four by British academics. The first, by Richard Aldrich, surveys what has been written about US intelligence since the end of the Cold War. Then come two separate studies of CIA covert action, one by Kaeten Mistry and the other by Matthew Jones and Paul McGarr. Whether espionage fiction mirrors the real word is discussed by Simon Willmetts.

The four American contributions include a study of the historical writings about the FBI by US academic Melissa Graves, a comparison intelligence fiction and nonfiction by former CIA inspector general Fred Hitz, and an analysis of the CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom, by academic Eric Pullin. Although Pullin complains about “CIA’s history of pathological secrecy [and] routine obstructionism,” (47) he manages an interesting account. The piece by CIA historian Nicholas Dujmovic assesses the value of using the putative CIA history, *Legacy of Ashes* by Tim Weiner, in teaching intelligence. Even though his earlier review of the book established its severe weaknesses, he argues it should be used in conjunction with other texts so the issue can be seen in context.

The articles on British intelligence historiography cover an interesting range of topics. They include a discussion by Robert Johnson on the origins and contemporary significance of the term “the Great Game,” Jim Beach’s piece on the relatively few historical accounts of military intelligence, and a study of interrogation by Samantha Newbery that focuses on the intelligence to be gained. Christopher Murphy looks at the precedent-setting publication issues encountered before M.R.D. Foot’s *SOE in France* went to press, and Daniel Lomas examines a number of WW II operations and the often inconsistently-applied government policies to control their telling with particular attention to the story of the interrogation unit known as the “London Cage.” Adam Svendsen contributes
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a study of the British intelligence literature—books and articles—that appeared in 1968, arguing that these established a trend in intelligence history that continues to this day. The late Chapman Pincher provides a “retrospective” on British intelligence from an investigative journalist’s point of view that modestly highlights his contribution. The concluding article by historians Christopher Baxter and Keith Jeffery analyzes the contribution of “official histories,” acknowledging that they are seldom “definitive” since deletions and omissions are always required.

Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US is a valuable contribution to intelligence history.


Readers of British intelligence history may understandably have concluded that Christopher Andrew’s 2009, 1032-page volume, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, is the definitive treatment of the subject. Independent scholar Chris Northcott agrees with this assessment, noting that Andrew’s work “will most likely stand as the definitive history of MI5 for at least a generation.” (xiii) Yet he asserts, paradoxically, after a detailed review of the current literature, that it “does not pay enough attention to some of the key factors that help to explain why MI5’s organizational structure developed into the shape that it did.” This weakness can now be addressed, he suggests, due to the recent release of MI5 files that “make it possible to examine MI5 at the micro level and understand the intimate workings of its six branches.” (xviii) MI5 at War 1909–1918 attempts to correct these deficiencies for the first 10 years of MI5’s existence while recognizing that the new records amount to a version of official history and such “history is predisposed to present a distorted, official viewpoint . . . compilers of official histories may choose not to reveal everything or be prohibited from doing so.” (xix)

Does Northcott accomplish his objective? The short answer is no. His book is not organized by discussions of the six branches. Instead, he presents a chronological history of MI5’s development with emphasis on the many cases with which it was involved and only short digressions on the organization, from time to time. And most, if not all, of which he writes has been covered by previous authors—some of whom he cites. Had he flagged the new points and compared them to omissions in previous works, his case might have been strengthened.

MI5 at War 1909–1918 does discuss the organizational evolution of MI5 branches, but this evolution is well covered elsewhere. Interesting history, little new.


Captain Reginald Teague-Jones was assigned to military intelligence at GHQ, New Delhi, in 1917. Educated in St. Petersburg, he was fluent in Russian, German, and Persian, among other languages. After the Bolshevik Revolution, he was sent to Baku to assess the situation and determine whether the local anti-Bolsheviks were likely to remain in the war. On 20 September 1918, 26 Bolshevik commissars of Baku were executed. Initially forgotten—fog of war—when the Bolsheviks recaptured Transcaspia in 1919, they discovered the fate of their colleagues, some of whom had been personally known to Lenin. A lawyer was sent to investigate. His report blamed Teague-Jones for the decision to execute the commissars—by now treated as martyrs—and he was publicly accused by Stalin and Trotsky. When in 1922 a Russian book repeated the charges, Teague-Jones, fearing for his life, officially changed his name to Ronald Sinclair and disappeared. Although he kept in touch with a few friends
under his birth name, it was only when Sinclair died in 1988 that his obituary revealed his long kept secret.

In *Most Secret Agent of Empire*, Taline Ter Minassian, an historian at the Paris Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, expands on previous accounts of the Teague-Jones story that mainly concerned the commissar incident and his disappearance. Based on Teague-Jones’s voluminous papers (now in the British Library), Minassian covers his early life—including a brief marriage—and his work for the Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) service prior to WW I, when he worked often disguised as a local in Persia. There is also a fascinating chapter with new material on his later, unsuccessful efforts to capture the German imperial agent, Wilhelm Wassmuss, unofficially known as the “German T. E. Lawrence,” who was attempting to enlist Persian support for Germany.

Of special interest, Minassian explains that Teague-Jones’s name change had been supported by the British intelligence services with whom he was cooperating at the time. He would continue collecting intelligence, sometimes under the cover of working for unnamed “British manufacturers,” (193) on Soviet activities in Transcaspia, Persia, and Tibet until in 1941 when he was assigned as British consul in New York City, a cover assignment. In reality he worked in the MI6 station called British Security Coordination (BSC), which was headed by William Stephenson, all the while remaining attached to the IPI (219). He served, inter alia, as coordination officer for Bermuda and the Caribbean, the resident expert on India. One of the reports furnished to IPI assessed the potential of creating Pakistan. It was prepared by the Research and Analysis Division of OSS and was received “with no more than amused condensation.” IPI was dismayed by “the very fact that [the] research was necessary” and judged OSS “a very peculiar body.” (221)

Teague-Jones remained with MI6 in New York until he retired with his second wife—who had worked for MI5—first to Florida in 1952, and eventually to London, via Spain. *Most Secret Agent of Empire* is a valuable intelligence biography of historical and professional interest.

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*The Secret War Between the Wars: MI5 in the 1920s and 1930s* by Kevin Quinlan (The Boydell Press, 2014), 266 pp., illustrations, bibliography, and appendices.

For more than 30 years, former students of Cambridge University professor Christopher Andrew have written books on intelligence history. No other program has done more to stimulate its study in academia and interest in the public at large. The latest contribution comes from an American at Cambridge, Kevin Quinlan, who argues that successful intelligence collection depends on the tradecraft employed.

At the outset, Quinlan poses a paradox that confronts authors writing on intelligence and international relations. First he notes that sources and methods, and thus “the tradecraft employed in intelligence operations that inform international relations, remain the most closely guarded secrets of intelligence services.” Then he adds that “tradecraft is commonly regarded as either scholarly antiquarianism or the stuff of movies. Almost no academic book on international relations considers it.” (xviii) Whether this omission is the unsurprising consequence of the secrecy involved or that the tradecraft details of collection are not as important to academics as the results produced, or both, is not discussed directly. Nor does he acknowledge that strict application of the “most closely guarded secrets” paradox would have prevented his research into the relationship between tradecraft and collection. Thus a relaxed or pragmatic understanding of tradecraft secrecy is necessary and that is implicit in *The Secret War Between The Wars*.

To make his point concerning the importance of tradecraft, Quinlan analyses a number of historical cases where some tradecraft data is now available from published case studies and various national archives. At the same time, he examines how tradecraft influenced and was influenced by the growing pains of Britain’s nascent Security Service (MI5) between the first and second world wars. By implication, Quinlan shows that these topics
can’t logically be separated since successful tradecraft is a function of both organizational and individual competence.

The end of WW I left Britain with reduced manpower, a budget to match, and a growing threat from communist subversion. While it retained a relatively strong cryptographic capability and an effective mail surveillance system, Britain’s counterespionage program suffered because it was split between Scotland Yard-Special Branch and MI5. Quinlan shows how MI5 struggled to deal with agents of the so-called Red Menace while convincing its political masters more resources were required and organizational changes were necessary.

The seven chapters in the book cover six topics: official and non-official cover, countersubversion operations, agent recruitment and handling, penetration agents, and defectors. In each chapter, Quinlan discusses cases that illustrate organizational difficulties that MI5 overcame and the role played by tradecraft in the success or failure of selected operations. But readers expecting examples of clever implementation of tradecraft in their resolution will be disappointed. In the familiar 1920s cases of communist agents Wilfred Macartney and William Ewer, for example, Quinlan discusses their recruitment and handling. Macartney, a Lloyds broker, attempted to give classified military data to the Soviets. Turned in by a colleague, he was arrested and sent to prison. Ewer, a journalist, ran an agent network that provided political information to the Communist Party and thus the Soviets. Since no classified data were involved, he was allowed to emigrate to Poland. The tradecraft employed was rudimentary since neither had been well trained. Their Soviet masters did better. They penetrated Scotland Yard, learned their agents were under suspicion, and thus avoided involvement.

In his subsequent case studies, Quinlan shows how MI5 solidified its organizational structure and gradually improved the quality of its officers and their tradecraft. He devotes two chapters to the penetration operations of Maxwell Knight and another two to the debriefing of Walter Krivitsky, an NKVD defector. And while they show marked improvement in operational skills, they contain nothing new and have been covered in greater depth elsewhere.

Overall, The Secret War Between The Wars provides an unexceptional account of well known cases and demonstrates how MI5 expanded between the wars to meet the Soviet and later the German threat while applying routine tradecraft techniques effectively. It fails, however, to establish that tradecraft, although important, was the dominant factor in solving cases, especially where international relations are at stake.


At least nine books have been written on the “intellectual reparations” policies implemented by the Allies after WW II. The first, Operation Paperclip, appeared in 1971 and dealt mainly with former Nazi rocket scientists and engineers brought to the United States. A recent account under the same name added new material based on declassified documents and named more individuals involved. A broader version of that topic, Wanted!, also covered former military and SS members. And now journalist Eric Lichtblau has revisited the matter, adding details gathered from material released by the CIA and FBI.

In The Nazis Next Door, Lichtblau uses the story of the self-admitted onetime Nazi SS officer, Tscherim (Tom) Soobzokov—originally discussed in Wanted!—to illustrate how the United States overlooked evidence of criminal pasts, not just in the scientists, but also in those categorized as “moderate Nazis”—former intelligence officers—in order to recruit anti-communist agents. Soobzokov had sued the New York Times (that published Wanted!) for its coverage of his case and won a large settlement out of court. Lichtblau describes how the rumors about Soobzokov had originated and the harassment that followed. Since he had been an agent for the CIA...
and FBI, he sought their help—which was not forthcoming. In the end, he was assassinated in a car bombing.

Soobzokov is not the only former CIA agent Lichtblau discusses. In the case of former SS officer Theodor Saevecke, he writes that the CIA provided him with “whitewashed documents” and he was “exonerated,” dying in America of old age. (35) An even more notorious case involved Wilhem Höttl, whom Allen Dulles had “first pursued . . . as an American spy.” (36) Höttl later testified as a witness at the Nuremburg trials, but his promised knowledge about the Soviets was useless.

Lichtblau devotes a chapter to Dulles and his contacts with “The Good Nazis.” The most well-known was SS General Karl Wolff, with whom he worked to secure an early surrender of German troops in Italy toward the end of the war as part of Operation Sunrise. Lichtblau belittles Dulles’s “sharing a fireside scotch with Himmler’s former chief of staff” during their first meeting. (15) But he neglects to mention that he was not alone and that they were attempting to get the cooperation of the man in charge of the German army in Italy. Intelligence professionals may interpret Lichtblau’s analysis as evidence of ignorance of intelligence tradecraft.

The Nazis Next Door conveys the impression that the recruiting of German sources was largely fruitless and morally unfounded, no matter what. Thus the attempts to honor the agreements made to those brought to the United States were unjustified. In essence, there were no good or reformed Nazis. This jaded view aside, Lichtblau has added some case-closing detail to a controversial period.


On 20 June 2014, as Washington Nationals fans emerged from the parking lot at 1st & M Street SE and headed for the stadium to see the Stephen Strasburg pitch, they passed a partially demolished building across the street in the Washington Navy Yard. Few knew that they were witness to the end of Building 213, former home of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) where, from 1963 until 1996, the nation’s satellite imagery had been exploited by teams of CIA, DIA, and military imagery analysts. In **NPIC: Seeing the Secrets and Growing the Leaders**, former CIA officer Jack O’Connor, a veteran of 15 years at NPIC, tells the story of its creation as part of the U-2 Program and its operations as the key producer of intelligence from satellite imagery.

Although O’Connor mentions each of the eight NPIC directors, his account is intentionally not comprehensive. Such a history would require a much longer treatment. Instead, he looks in-depth at the two directors who did the most to shape NPIC’s future—Art Lundahl and Rae Huffstutler. It was Lundahl who was given secret marching orders by Allen Dulles to create what, in time, became NPIC, established to handle the imagery exploitation from the U-2 in 1956. And that is what he did while working in less than optimal facilities before moving to Building 213—an absorbing story in itself.

It was Huffstutler that managed NPIC’s transition from film to digital imagery. This required new facilities, equipment, and additional training for the analysts. At the same time Huffstutler, building on the Lundahl foundation, created a management culture that, O’Connor argues, produced many senior executives who later served throughout the Intelligence Community.

To give the reader a sense of NPIC’s operations, O’Connor discusses each of the satellite systems and its impact in terms of launch frequency (and occasional failures), quantity of imagery collected, and NPIC’s methods of organizing the work. He also describes the sequence of events from the requirement to request coverage, to the reporting on the imagery acquired. As a real-world example, he presents an account of how the disaster at Chernobyl was documented by digital satellite imagery.
before the Soviet Union admitted the catastrophe. Chernobyl was not a routine collection experience and he describes the organizational and bureaucratic battles that had to be overcome, just one of many such conflicts that were routinely confronted as various agencies competed for the scarce overhead coverage and often disagreed with the imagery-analysts’ reporting. An example of the latter is discussed in the account of the “Third Typhoon,” a Soviet submarine whose NPIC-reported launch disagreed with the Community consensus. (148ff) As O’Connor relates these examples and others—particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis—readers get a good sense of the life of an imagery analyst and what happened when differences arose with all-source colleagues who often thought they could read the imagery just as well.

For those who encountered NPIC over the years, O’Connor’s contribution will bring back mostly agreeable—if not amusing—memories. It was an unusual organization with its own personality. For all other readers concerned with the history of the nation’s imagery interpretation program, he has provided a solid, well written foundation. O’Connor has implicitly made a good argument for a sequel. NPIC is a great contribution to the intelligence literature.

**Queen Of Spies**: Daphne Park Britain’s Cold War Spy Master, by Paddy Hayes (Duckworth Overlook, 2015) 328, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In April 2008, at a conference on intelligence sponsored by the German Historical Institute, London, former CIA officer James Pavitt and the late NSA director William Odom joined Daphne Park, Baroness of Monmouth and the former MI6 Controller/Western Hemisphere, to discuss the world of contemporary intelligence. At 87, Baroness Park, radiating a “Miss Marple” charm, was both engaging and circumspect—leaving listeners coveting more detail about her career. *Queen of Spies* answers that call.

Daphne Margaret Sybil Désirée Park was born in Surry, England, in 1921, home-schooled in Tanganyika under austere circumstances until 11, and then sent back to England to live with relatives and get a proper education. She did a bit more than that: by the time of her retirement, she had graduated from Oxford University with honors, served in WW II as a volunteer with Britain’s First Aid Nursing Yeomancy (FANY), and later worked as an officer with the SOE. After the war she joined the Foreign Office, became an SIS officer, and after retiring in 1979, served as president of Somerville College at Oxford. In 1990 she was made a life peer and served as SIS’s semi-official spokesperson in the House of Lords. None of these achievements was accomplished without precedent-setting breaks with tradition, so author Paddy Hayes focuses on how she met and overcame her constant career challenges.

Baroness Park’s path to her MI6 appointment illustrates her outspoken determination to speak truth to power. As a FANY, she wrote a letter denouncing the performance of her superior and was promptly punished for her efforts while her superior was promoted. But her abilities had been noticed and Hayes tells how her SOE JEDBURGH colleagues came to her rescue and secured her return to duty as an officer. Likewise, after the war, Hayes describes her groundbreaking path into the Foreign Office and eventually SIS. She would learn Russian, subsequently serving in Moscow, Leopoldville, Lusaka, Hanoi, and Ulan Bator.

It was in Moscow in the mid-1950s that Park learned her tradecraft and honed her political skills while enduring the disruptions caused by the exposure of KGB agents in the British ranks, and the fallout from botched British operations against the Soviets. As head of station in Leopoldville, she became embroiled—with her CIA counterpart, Larry Devlin—in the Patrice Lumumba affair. It was there, too, that her ability to deal effectively in male-dominated circumstances was recognized and the likelihood of further advancement enhanced. Hayes’s description of her time in Hanoi, a genuine hardship tour, is illuminating.

Daphne Park remained single and Hayes does not dodge the obvious questions. He writes about two serious af-
fairs, one that came to nothing—in part, at least, because of the SIS policy that women in the service who married would have to resign. He also mentions instances when her gender threatened to become an issue when working with agents and how she subtly but forcefully and successfully asserted her command of the situation. (155)

*Queen of Spies* is documented by the relatively scant official record available, comments from former colleagues, and the few interviews of Park herself—all approved by SIS. And this accounts for the principal shortcoming of the book, since Hayes devotes considerable effort articulating Parks’s feelings and views on the situations that confronted her. At one point he admits “being forced into the realm of speculation.” (127) Thus the narrative is sprinkled with examples—comments that “she enjoyed the hot sun on her back”; (11) that “she’d have got the low-down on her rival” from her friend Maurice Oldfield; (198) that Oldfield “would have been instrumental in getting her a Controller’s position”; (245) and on the issues he “probably influencing her decision” while in Kenya. (199)

There are a few factual items where Hayes’s background in international commercial intelligence fails him. Examples include: Oleg Gordievsky was not a “defector-in-place”—he was an MI6 penetration. CIA officer Ted Shackley did not occupy the third most senior position in the agency. The statement that “the Agency was far more WASP than the Bureau and was naturally more sympathetic to Britain’s interests” defies explanation. (257)

In spite of these, *Queen of Spies* is the only biography on Baroness Park and it fills a big gap. Hayes has produced an interesting and informative work.