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The Psychology of Espionage and Leaking in the Digital Age

Dr. Ursula M. Wilder

Introduction

In 2003, Studies in Intelligence published my classified article “Why Spy?: The Psychology of Espionage.” A newly unclassified version of that article follows this one. “Why Spy” focused on the personalities, motives, behaviors, and experiences of people who commit espionage. The article also explored how unwitting colleagues might experience a spy’s personality and behavior during day-to-day interactions in the workplace. Leaking was not addressed in 2003 because it was not at the time a leading threat. That has changed, and this essay addresses some of the reasons for the change. (SeeTextbox 1 on the next page for my working definitions of espionage, leaking, and spilling.)

Advances in technology—broadly speaking, the Internet, mobile platforms, social media, and computing power—are driving unparalleled, epoch-defining changes in the world. Communication technologies, in particular, have altered how people relate to each other individually, in social groups, in nations, and globally, and are expanding what people mean when they use the term “reality.”

The new technologies have, unsurprisingly, precipitated changes in the manifestations of spying from within the world of professional intelligence, where leaking now joins espionage as a major threat to national security. Other threats from insiders include sabotage and workplace violence.

The model of espionage presented in the 2003 article describes three core elements that motivate a person toward espionage: personality pathology or vulnerabilities, a precipitating life crisis, and opportunity (finding a safe customer for the spy’s espionage services). The critical role of personality vulnerabilities has not changed in today’s spies, but, as we shall see, the Internet and associated technologies can amplify them. Similarly, the emergence of a life crisis remains an integral part of the decision to spy; in the digital age, technologies can exacerbate existing crises and also generate new ones.

The greatest impact of the new technologies is in the third necessary element—ease of opportunity. During the past 15 years, a prospective spy’s access to customers for espionage via the Internet has grown exponentially, and media platforms seeking leakers have proliferated. Today, many mainstream media outlets provide “leak bait” options on their websites that allow people to anonymously deliver information. Professional intelligence services hunting for prospective candidates for espionage now have Internet-enabled spotting, developing, and recruiting tools that work just as effectively for professional handlers seeking candidates to manipulate into espionage as they do for retailers seeking to target customers susceptible to advertising.

For the remainder of this article, my primary focus will be on the role of the Internet (to include social media) in espionage and leaking. However, other aspects of technology, such as the physical engineering and operational design of devices and software, also play a potentially powerful role in priming vulnerable persons toward spying. Our devices of entry into the Internet “behave” as...

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* a. Readers interested in gaining insights into the perceptions of serving officers on the WikiLeaks website, its sponsors and supporters, and related matters are encouraged to read the transcript of the Director of the CIA’s presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, on 13 April 2017 entitled, “A Discussion on National Security with CIA Director Mike Pompeo”; available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/discussion-national-security-cia-director-mike-pompeo. In his opening remarks, DCIA Pompeo said intelligence officers are “not at liberty to stand up to . . . false narratives and explain our mission to the American people. But fortunately, I am.”

b. This is not to say technology can only have negative effects on the vulnerable. At-risk people may find online interlocutors who alleviate loneliness and alienation in positive ways and who offer balanced views eluding people in crisis and point them toward options other than illegal or dangerous behavior.

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if they have lives of their own; they can have strong “holding power” over the psyche of users (they are designed to have this power). People whose work, play, and relationships are mostly mediated through keyboards and devices and who experience their engagements in the cyber realm as more rewarding than anything else in their lives are, as we shall see, particularly vulnerable to the role the Internet and associated technologies can play in paving the way to spying.5

Despite the breathtaking size and pace of the social and psychological change we are witnessing in the digital realm, much remains the same in human nature. What we witness occurring in global culture because of technology is monumental and disruptive, but it is also coherent to us because we recognize our universal human needs, desires, and common pursuits playing out in the midst of the complexity and change. We can still rely on these universals as a solid basis for explanations for why people do what they do. Human fundamentals include complex positive qualities such as loyalty, dedication, good faith, authentic friendship and social bonds, need for real intimacy and trust, desire to belong in a community, curiosity, creativity, and common sense anchored in factual reality. They also include negative qualities such as treachery, greed, cruelty, malice, duplicity, readiness to dupe and manipulate others for personal gain or entertainment, and susceptibility to powerful psychological control techniques applied by experts. We should examine what is new but keep these fundamentals in mind as anchors to understanding contemporary humans and their behavior and choices.6

Textbox 1: Definitions
The vocabulary surrounding matters of unauthorized disclosures is in flux. For readability and conciseness, in this article the behavior of individuals engaged in either espionage or leaking is referred to as “spying.” I use this word on the premise that in both cases insider access to classified information is deliberately abused to make unauthorized disclosures, in secret or publicly.

Espionage. Spies engaged in espionage secretly deliver classified information to a party the spy understands is working directly against his or her own country. This typically involves an intermediary—a handler—who usually is a foreign intelligence service officer trained in managing agents safely and productively. The aim of a handler is to keep the spy undetected and the transfer of information ongoing and secret. For reasons of security and veracity, professional intelligence officers rarely handle anonymous sources for long periods.

Leaking. Spies who leak make classified information publicly available without authorization, usually through contacts with media outlets or via the Internet. Leakers may have regular, dedicated interlocutors such as journalists, who receive and disseminate the information. Unlike spies engaged in espionage, most leakers are (at present) not paid or otherwise rewarded materially for their actions. Nor do their interlocutors normally engage in the kind of long-term handling tradecraft used by professional intelligence services—although source protection and information authentication are core missions of journalists as well.

Spilling. The key concept in defining spilling is lack of intent. Spies engaged in espionage or leaking have specific goals in mind, whereas spilling is the inadvertent, unintended disclosure of information to uncleared environments, organizations, or people.6

The 2003 article made a distinction between self-serving and heroic spies; this article addresses the former. How professional intelligence officers address the subject is discussed in Note 7. The note also addresses a parallel distinction between leakers and whistleblowers. (See also Textbox 2 on facing page for discussion of ethical dimensions of the issue.)
What Causes Someone to Spy or Leak?

The three essential factors predisposing individuals to espionage or leaking classified material—dysfunctions in the personality, states of crisis, and opportunity—operate symbiotically. Pathological personality features not balanced by healthy traits can result in conduct that precipitates life crises. These in turn, stress the already tenuous coping capacities of vulnerable personalities. Crises and vulnerability together intensify emotions, undermine already compromised judgment, and galvanize impulses to seize opportunities to obtain escape or relief through ill-judged negative conduct. People in this state are ready targets for manipulation and recruitment for espionage. They are also primed for behavior such as leaking, if they believe it will bring them respite and reward.

Personality

Psychologists consistently detect four personality characteristics when they study spies: psychopathy, narcissism, immaturity, and grandiosity (see page 21 of “Why Spy?” for detailed discussion of each). Some of these features are present in the personalities of a great many, if not most, people who will never engage in wrongdoing—the reader is likely

Textbox 2: Observations on the Ethics of Political Disclosure of Sensitive Information

Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or proprietary information to the media for political purposes is an age-old feature of political life and will remain a permanent fixture of any democratic society with a free press. Those seeking political advantages through such disclosures generally partner with established media outlets, both to ensure an extensive audience and to gain legitimacy; they presume that audiences will assume the media partner has screened and verified the information before using it. Less well known is that professional members of the media usually seek comment from relevant members of the Intelligence Community before making public classified information they have acquired. Sometimes they will revise their drafts to mitigate credible risks described to them by the Intelligence Community or may even withhold a story when they are convinced that risks to national security, US citizens, or US allies or innocent persons are too high.

A 2013 case study on leaking published in the Harvard Law Review hypothesizes that periodic, tumult-inducing, unauthorized disclosures are not caused so much by institutional weak points or failures (such as feeble security measures, law enforcement investigations, and prosecutions of leakers) but by the considered choices of high-level officials who benefit from lax enforcement of legal prohibitions against unauthorized disclosures. The author further argues that, in subtle ways, lax enforcement benefits national security, government efficiency, and democratic transparency more than it harms them.8

The Harvard Law Review published a riposte to the essay asserting that the harm caused by “high level” leaking is very real, but, despite the self-evident harm, “the executive branch has been unable and unwilling to close the ‘sluice gates’ due to easily underestimated legal and technological constraints and also because of political constraints emerging from strong passions in American society that exert pressure on democratically elected leaders.”9

In an article in Foreign Policy, William J. Burns (former deputy secretary of state) and Jared Cohen (president of Jigaw (previously Google Ideas) argue that “We should build a global consensus around both the need to protect the integrity of financial data and systems on which the global economy relies and the illegality of cyber-enabled commercial espionage, making a clear distinction between traditional espionage and wholesale commercial theft.”10 (Emphasis added.)

Apparently, in the international consensus these authors propose to build for the cyber age, an exception will remain between nations (in the tradition of a true gentlemen’s agreement) that permits political and military espionage against each other to continue unabated, whereas technology-enabled commercial espionage and digital infrastructure destruction will be forbidden. Intelligence service officers will be pleased that their jobs remain secure, and at least somewhat respectable, according to the proposed rules for the brave new cyber world.

It is hard to predict where all of this is going to take us, nationally and globally; at present, we can only note that a sea change is occurring in the way all levels of society view technology and the access to information it enables. These are major areas of ongoing discussion and conflicts on both the formal governance level and on the “street” level. In regard to the psychology of espionage and leaking, persons considering spying will find ample justification and support to act on their impulses and desires in the evolving and contentious social dynamic in the public commons concerning the uses and control of technology and information.11
thinking of such people now. In the case of spies, however, personality vulnerabilities are relatively unmediated by other characteristics that might provide a counterbalance, as happens with healthy personalities.

A balanced personality might have a strong preference for logical reasoning and the detachment to counter the impulsivity and fantasies of immaturity; a healthy person might have empathy for others or respect for hard-earned expertise that compensates for a tendency toward the egoism and sense of entitlement characteristic of narcissists. Yet another individual might have acquired a capacity to anticipate long-term consequences or a set of acceptable rules for navigating the world that override psychopathic thrill-seeking and a predatory approach to exploiting the present moment.

Features of the Internet and associated technologies have the potential to undermine the counterbalancing traits of even healthy personalities and pose the risk of escalating pathological features. Often this occurs in anonymous encounters with facilitating individuals or groups who mutually reinforce and validate extreme or pathological viewpoints and embolden inappropriate behavior.

Online survey studies of the personality features of Internet trolls conducted by a group of Canadian scholars concluded that trolls are “prototypical everyday sadists.” The researchers explored the links between trolling and what psychologists call the “dark tetrad” of personality traits—narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism—and found that the tetrad was highest among survey respondents who said that trolling was their favorite online activity. Illustrative of the attitudes the researchers were studying was inclusion in their Likert scale surveys of items such as “The more beautiful and pure a thing is, the more satisfying it is to corrupt,” and “Hurting people is exciting.”

The online jargon for producing and enjoying the distress of others is “lulz.” The phenomenon of cruelty for sport on the Internet now has its own etymology (with recognized usages such as “trolling” and “lulz”). Trolling is highly performative behavior: beyond seizing the attention and provoking the responses of the targeted persons, trolls also pursue psychological reward by gaining the attention of admiring audiences who share their taste for “lulz.” Keeping bad company, online and anonymous, egged on by like-minded others looking for entertainment, can stimulate a vulnerable personality toward many harmful and destructive actions, including leaking and espionage.

For example, a person with psychopathic personality features might engage in espionage or leaking simply for the thrill of breaking rules and creating chaos; like trolls, psychopaths “do it for the lulz.” For them, the Web is a playground and its darker elements a confirmation of their view of reality: exciting, Darwinian, and pitiless—a world populated by either predator or prey. When people such as these spy in an Intelligence Community context, their secret enjoyment of the contrast between the day-to-day, “real life” humdrum in their offices, surrounded by unwitting, duped colleagues, and their charismatic, online “spy” persona, uninhibited and free and complete with applauding admirers, provides ample reward for engaging in espionage or leaking. There is also plenty of material and people online to feed the vengeful, spiteful characteristics that are common to both psychopathy and narcissism.

People with narcissistic personality features can find ample fuel online for their grandiose fantasies and can experience on the Internet the expansive, protean sense of power and superiority that characterizes them, complete with clusters of fans and/or supporters spurring them on in espionage or leaking “for the greater good” or validating their desire to get revenge on organizations or authorities they believe insufficiently appreciated them or otherwise wronged them.

Immature personalities, defined by difficulties separating the fictions and dreams of their imaginations from hard, factual reality, find plenty of scope on the Internet for fantasy-driven activity—including espionage and leaking—that simply bypasses any consideration of consequence in real life (“IRL” in Web parlance). The immature personality is more easily seduced into action by the seeming unreality of behavior in the cyber realm, actions that can seem to disappear with the click of a mouse or the swipe of a fingertip.

An enduring paradox of the Internet is that while it is distinctly real (it exists in material reality), it is also distinctly different—and, to some,
quite separate—from concrete reality. This is dangerous ground for those who do not readily distinguish between fact and fiction, between what resides in their imaginations, their desires and hopes, and what resides in concrete, material reality or IRL. In contrast, well-grounded people can find cyberspace exciting, even enchanting, and useful to sustaining a complex, full life—while remaining solidly anchored in the material world and retaining good judgment about the consequences of actions taken in either realm.

Psychopathy, narcissism, and immaturity all have in common the characteristic of grandiosity. A well-known adage of the digital age is: “On the Internet, everyone knows you are a dog.” It could also be said that: “On the Internet everyone thinks you are a hero, or a villain.” Our technology now makes it possible for a person to develop and express multiple selves in cyberspace. This is a context of human interaction and action that can feed and reward grandiose self-perceptions.

Furthermore, the Internet, and the technology and devices that give access to it, are ostensibly under the control of the anonymous user. If the anonymous user feels unrewarded, displeased, or psychologically threatened online, he or she can back out and re-enter in a different persona, not something that is possible—at least not to the same degree—IRL. A user can also set aside, discard, or destroy poorly functioning or frustrating devices, again, something difficult to do with people. Furthermore, both the Internet and the associated devices of entry into it appear to have “lives” of their own (they continue to act autonomously and separately from logged-off users), but the user has an illusion of control because he or she can turn the devices on or off, thus suspending their digital lives until the user chooses to re-engage on his or her own terms. Such seeming sovereignty over something as global and powerful as the Internet, the people one encounters there, and the “thinking and behaving” machines that mediate relationships can feed grandiosity, at least if the tendency toward grandiosity is uncoupled from the leveling and grounding of “real life.”

A Precipitating Crisis

The second necessary element that paves the way for spying is the emergence of a personal crisis of such intense weight and urgency that the vulnerable person experiences a sense of immediate threat, loses perspective and judgment, and becomes fixated on finding a way to put an end to the situation. The state of crisis may or may not be visible to friends, family, and associates. (See “Why Spy?” “Precipitating Crises” on page 31.) Sources of psychological pressure obvious to observers might include a looming bankruptcy, imminent dismissal from work, or a divorce. Sources of psychological crises that are equally acute but invisible to others might include silently carried, lasting rage over perceived slights or injustices, an overwhelming desire for revenge, or other deep-seated feelings or beliefs that compel the vulnerable person to action.

Intelligence services have long exploited crisis states to recruit agents. As described in the 2003 article, unscrupulous services may deliberately create crises in the lives of targets to improve recruitment prospects, for example through escalating gambling debts or entangling the target in a risky sexual or romantic relationship with a partner controlled by the service. Such intelligence services may also find ways to precipitate similar crises in the lives of family members or other loved ones in order to control the prospective spy by offering espionage as a solution to the loved one’s predicament. (See “Why Spy?” “Exploitation of the Vulnerable” on page 34.)

As we have seen, the cyber realm is a hazardous environment for those in crisis or easily led to crisis. Those with a propensity for problematic or pathological behavior—for example, uncontrollable gambling, computer gaming, spending, or sexual behavior—will find on the Internet remarkably easy ways to reach outlets for their addictions or compulsions. In cases such as these, the name “World Wide Web” is apt: psychologically vulnerable people, like insects in a spider’s web, do get snared online. In addition, while they may believe they have found relatively safe outlets for their pathological or hazardous behavior, they are subjecting themselves to the possibility they will be tracked and risk suffering crises.
of embarrassment or becoming the subjects of the attention of those eager to find and exploit vulnerable persons. Finally, the more a person’s online life becomes the center of his or her consciousness and motivation, the more real-life, stabilizing commitments—to self-care, to others, to community—will weaken and attenuate. Work, relationships, health, financial status, and lifestyles suffer for people who have arrived at this point, causing the kinds of tangible, IRL crises that might bring a person with access to national security information to the attention of hostile intelligence services, and from there lead them into espionage.

More subtly, in a context in which seemingly complete anonymity enables the expression of all desires, no matter how deviant, dangerous, or harmful to others, no brakes on behavior exist other than those a person already possesses when entering cyberspace. For the group of people we are discussing—people with personality pathologies, in crisis—these brakes are often already weak and likely to grow weaker.

For those with moral qualms, Internet content can provide justification for behavior that leads to crises and to subsequent illegal choices. That justification can come from online dialogue with kindred spirits or with more focused interlocutors such as intelligence service officers, e.g., agent recruiters, pursuing their own goals through manipulating a person’s crisis. Platforms seeking leakers may also manipulate a person’s crisis. Online material assists in rationalizing or trivializing acts such as espionage or leaking of national security information. This nullifying effect of the Internet, where qualms about espionage and leaking are neutralized by comparisons to a glut of “worse” behavior—is often underestimated. FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen made this argument when he stated to an interviewer who was sharply challenging him to recognize the consequences of his espionage, “In the whole march of history, a little espionage doesn’t amount to a hill of beans.” (See “Why Spy?” “Robert Hanssen: Self-Designated Cold Warrior” on page 30 for a review of the case.) Today’s spies need not turn to human history to find ways to minimize their behavior; they need only visit the Dark Web in the present moment and see what transpires there.

In his book on Internet crime, former FBI futurist-in-residence, Interpol advisor, and police officer Marc Goodman devoted a section to the Dark Web entitled “Into the Abyss.” He used the metaphor of Dante’s circles of hell to provide, in a. The Dark Web forms a small part of the Deep Web, which is the part of the Web not indexed by search engines. Because of free software, anonymity in the Dark Web is at present almost unbreakable, enabling hackers, terrorists, gangsters of every sort, pedophiles, and other criminals to transact their business there in safety, unless they become subject to their own “insider threat” (undercover police informants, for example). More positively, the Dark Web also provides a venue in which political dissenters and others with positive or non-criminal intent are able to communicate and collaborate in relative safety. (See Kristin Finklea, Dark Web, Congressional Research Service Report R44101, 10 March 2017.) escalating order of gravity, a long list of illegal goods and services accessible to paying anonymous customers, ranging from pirated content to drugs, to legal documents (passports, citizenship papers, transcripts, professional licenses), trafficking in organs and humans, and murder-for-hire. He ended the list by describing a site that offered the opportunity to witness through live streaming the worst acts of child abuse—while interacting with other paying anonymous customers and the perpetrators. Goodman called this the very center of hell, and concluded that “the Internet provides a delivery system for pathological states of mind.”

The Dark Web is also an education in nihilism. A prospective spy can find there sufficient reason to discard doubts and move forward into espionage or leaking. After such exposure, for those with compromised moral compasses, espionage seems trivial and leaking seems a lark. People with strong inherent moral compasses and an uncompromised capacity to stay grounded in concrete reality understand that behavior online has consequences in real life, such as the real plight of child and adult victims in Internet-mediated crimes.

Ease of Opportunity

The third necessary element in spying is connecting with a customer, patron, or platform interested in the information on offer. It is in this third element that the greatest changes have occurred since the publication of “Why Spy?” (See “Elements of Espionage” on page 20.) Those currently seeking to connect with customers or platforms for either espionage or leaking now have many
more possibilities and opportunities to explore via the Internet. Those considering leaking have a dizzying array of possible online venues to leak to as well as the promise of global dissemination of the information they provide. Many websites now include instructions for potential leakers, and these customers or patrons provide the option for anonymity, at least initially. It should be noted that, in contrast to media, professional intelligence services do not generally handle anonymous agents for reasons of safety and veracity.

The Experience of Spying After Making the Connection and Commitment

Espionage
The information age has altered the environment for professional intelligence officers handling agents, not just in how they spot and recruit potential spies but also in managing agents engaged in espionage. Handlers work hard to stabilize their agents once they have started spying, because operational security and maintaining cover are paramount in sustaining the espionage, and unstable agents cannot attend to either. For example, a handler will work to prevent an agent from pursuing attention and affirmation by showboating online, will step in to head off or settle crises in the life of the agent (somewhat ironically, given the critical prerecruitment role of life crises in priming potential agents to consider espionage), and if the agent is motivated by the desire to earn a place in history, the handler will provide reassurances about the spy’s impact and offer substitutes for the missed acclaim. Keeping a watchful eye on and reducing the destabilizing elements of the Internet in the agent’s life is part of contemporary professional intelligence officer tradecraft.

Leaking
Such stabilization is generally not the case for leakers, many of whom seek immediate rewards and visible impact on a global scale, now achievable via the Internet. The attention of others is for many the main currency of reward online, and being noticed and famous is often the primary psychological reward pursued by leakers. Psychologically gratifying attention can come in the form of either fame or infamy—even if the leaker’s name is never revealed. In many cases leakers get a double dose of attention and reward: intense responses from admirers and opponents, who engage in vituperative conflicts with each other, adding lulu to the reward accruing to the leaker. As a result, encouraged and validated and absent the stabilizing presence of a professional handler, leakers will tend to intensify their activities, chasing more acclaim, excitement, a sense of power and efficacy—until they are unmasked.

Remedies, Risk Management, and a Caution

My focus throughout this article has been on the human dimension of espionage and leaking, not on specific counterintelligence and security tools, programs, or techniques. The recommendations I made in 2003 remain as relevant today as they were then. (See “Remedies and Risk Management” on page 35.) Safeguarding entry points into Intelligence Community agencies through applicant screening remains a cornerstone of institutional risk mitigation against insider threats. We also still need programs designed to spot and address warning signs in employees’ behavior or in their circumstances; we still must provide support to troubled employees to help them through their crises and return to productivity and a sense of belonging to the community at work.

These measures, necessary and still vital, are not, however, sufficient anymore. In “Why Spy?” I also suggested broad programs of education and community-building. In the digital era, these are now keystones to mitigating the risk of employees’ becoming spies.

Actively Counter Loneliness and Safeguard and Build the Community

The psychological malady of the digital age—paradoxically, given its positive, extraordinary capacity to connect millions across the globe—is loneliness and its close cousin, alienation. These conditions do not apply pervasively, of course. For the majority of people, digital connectivity is just one more way to initiate, sustain, or complement healthy interpersonal relationships. As noted throughout this article, however, the Internet is a dangerous place for the vulnerable—
those who struggle with relationships IRL, and may be alienated from other aspects of real life, or those who find themselves temporarily alone and at loose ends.

In the face of the risks exacerbated or caused by loneliness and alienation, frequent organizationally sponsored events in workplaces—with people in physical attendance, not virtually present—have never been more critical to counterintelligence. When vulnerable employees are embedded in communities in which they feel they belong and are accepted, the risk of their acting on their vulnerabilities in times of personal crisis is mitigated. They will be less prone to seek connections and relief in the dangerous domains of the Internet or susceptible to relationships offered by those seeking to manipulate and exploit them.

Examples of significant traditions and community-building at CIA include annual events such as Family Day and Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) fundraising events before the winter holidays, during which offices and teams develop creative methods, including book sales and auctions, to raise funds—one particularly memorable fundraiser was the auctioning of a gingerbread replica of the model of Usama Bin Ladin’s compound used in planning the SEAL operation against him in 2011. Also important is the commemoration of those lost in service held at CIA’s Memorial Wall each May. Presentations by outside speakers in the Headquarters auditorium that are open to all employees and attended by senior leaders have also become highly popular opportunities for the workforce to gather and consider issues and ideas important to the mission and experiences of professional intelligence officers.

Volunteer employee groups should be actively supported, provided senior sponsors, and validated by the attention of senior leaders, and these groups should be encouraged to reach out to colleagues who seem to need help in connecting with community. In the digital era, such elements of community life in intelligence agencies have moved from being “nice to have” morale-builders to critical features of security and counterintelligence risk mitigation.

The Intelligence Community can also fight digital fire with fire by encouraging its online, secure, classified “village commons” to flourish and grow, including supporting those commons as venues for expressions of creativity, opinion, critique, and even dissent. We can count on the lack of anonymity in these online government-sponsored venues to avert the ills that plague the open Internet: trolling, harassment, bullying, hacking, and the like. At present our secure, classified online venues parallel the best of Internet values and provide a precious insider-threat risk-mitigating resource that must be protected despite potential disclosure risks. Efforts to manage the risks that come from permitting open, online discourse should be devised in ways that protect the current vibrancy of this classified cyber community, because the vitality and the bonds created there will spill over into the Intelligence Community.

One of the hidden benefits of the prohibition of most portable personal devices in Intelligence Community buildings is connection; people are not locked into their screens in meetings and gatherings. This occasionally inconvenient (sometimes very inconvenient) but necessary security requirement may disappear at some point but at present we should celebrate our simple, yet profound, difference from the rest of the working world: we converse with each other, rather than with our screens, in the “open” moments before and after meetings, in the cafeteria, and in our hallways. We have opportunities to break away from the “holding power” of our devices and are therefore able to enjoy the best of both the digital world and the concrete, IRL, material world.

A Caution: The Phenomenology of Surveillance

Big data, allied with machine learning and cognitive computing, has ushered in an amazing panoply of digital surveillance methods purporting to evaluate, profile, and predict the behavior of people, based on the record of their activities online. New technological tools collect and exploit the trail of information—sometimes labeled “digital exhaust”—that all people leave in IT systems as they go about their normal activities at work and in their personal lives. Big data and computing power together allow an individual’s present behavior to be evaluated against his or her personal baseline of past behavior; changes and anomalies—for good or ill—can be flagged and analyzed. Proponents

a. Phenomenology is a specialized branch of philosophy and psychology that studies subjective experience. Here I address how people subjectively experience surveillance when they are aware of being subject to it and how people subjectively experience the process of surveilling others.
of such methods assert that they can be used to expose in intimate detail the psyche driving behavior, including assessing and predicting the current and potential risks individuals present to systems, to others, and to themselves.

For example, some elements of spoken and written language unrelated to the content or meaning being communicated—behaviors such as a person’s habitual choice of words, repeated use of certain grammatical structures, tempo, and syntax—can shed light on a person’s identity, background (regional and educational), state of mind, and emotions at the moment of communication. The “sentiments” expressed by others—such as colleagues, neighbors, friends, and even family members—about a particular person can be collected and assessed using the same methods corporations use to track public sentiments surrounding their brands.23

Currently employers, private corporations, politicians, and governments are applying these and other data analysis tools to assess, influence, and monitor persons and groups. The promise of such techniques to assist security and counterintelligence insider-threat programs is self-evident, but there are risks that must be taken into account in using them and costs to be tallied and weighed against promised benefits. (See Textbox 3, which addresses this point, on the following page.)

There exists a robust body of empirical research in the social and behavioral sciences tallying the potential negative effects on people and organizations of pervasive surveillance.24 The current complex and heated cultural debate surrounding surveillance and privacy issues can be framed in many ways: political, legal, philosophical/ethical, and institutional risk management, as well as in terms of individual personality differences in support of and tolerance for surveillance.25 For the purposes of this article, I focus on research that sheds light on how people experience surveillance psychologically and the potential consequences of those experiences on individual psyches and therefore on their attitudes and behavior.

What the research shows is that people dislike being surveilled.26 Most, however, will tolerate some level of intrusion, if they believe it is necessary for institutional and social safety and to maintain order.27 The surveillance, however, must be experienced as fair and transparent; the consensus from studies in management science in this area is that honest communication with employees—and citizens—about the specific nature of and need for surveillance is critical to gaining acceptance and compliance. Being able to judge for themselves if the level of surveillance is reasonable and knowing with some specificity about the methods used returns some of the personal autonomy that surveillance inevitably removes and recalibrates the relationship of trust and fair-dealing between the surveillors and the surveilled.

Government reports have reached the same conclusions. An atmosphere of constant observation that is perceived to be aimed at control rather than stopping wrongdoing breeds resentment and a tendency toward hidden protest; such surveillance at work undermines morale and productivity, increases stress, and undermines loyalty to the organization. Furthermore, blanket surveillance methods risk flattening a culture into blandness and dulling its creative edge. (See the “Appendix: Considerations on the State of Surveillance in Democratic Societies,” beginning on page 11.)

Finally, it is important to be wary of the long-term, eroding effects of blanket, intrusive, or shadowy surveillance on the composition of teams or across an organization’s workforce. Social and behavioral science research has demonstrated that there are individual differences in attitudes toward and tolerance of workplace surveillance. Technology-driven assessment and surveillance tools pervading a workplace are likely to repel highly autonomous, creative, questioning people who then self-select themselves out of the team or organization, leaving behind a concentrated group of people whose temperaments tend toward caution, order, and safety, and who are comfortable with established systems for security and institutional control. Over time, the “diversity of mind and temperament” necessary for an intellectually fresh, creative organization is damaged by systematic loss of certain types of productive, psychologically healthy people, irrespective of which type they happen to be.

Active Support for CI and Security Officers

In this dawning digital age, those responsible for protecting employees and information in the Intelligence Community have extraordinarily difficult jobs. Pre-Internet and pre-digital methods still apply somewhat, but new technology-driven risks prolifer-
textbox 3: weighing costs and benefits—security at fort detrick in the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks

the week after the 9/11 terrorist attack, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media offices and to two US Senators over the course of several weeks, killing five people and infecting over a dozen more. After a long and complex investigation, the FBI homed in on microbiologist Bruce Ivins, a senior biodefense researcher at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Ivins committed suicide in July 2008 while anticipating his imminent arrest. The investigation had revealed that Ivins had longstanding severe psychiatric conditions; several mental health professionals who had treated him over the years considered him highly dangerous to them, to himself, and others. At work he had shown behavior ranging from the eccentric to the bizarre.

After it was created in 2002, the Department of Homeland Security established the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). The center soon developed a program—Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)—to identify specific psychological characteristics to be assessed in “more comprehensive” security evaluations of scientists and technicians and other “agents” working with the most dangerous biological materials. The PRP-recommended characteristics to be evaluated are: mental alertness, mental and emotional stability, trustworthiness, freedom from unstable medical conditions, dependability in accepting responsibilities, effective performance, flexibility in adjusting to change, good social adjustment, ability to exercise sound judgment [in emergencies], freedom from drug/alcohol abuse and dependence, compliance with requirements, and a positive attitude toward the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)\(^28\).

Setting aside for the sake of argument the infeasibility—on a technical assessment level—of psychologically screening personnel for these characteristics with any degree of scientific reliability and validity, taken together they depict a certain type of person: dependable, responsible, comfortable complying with authority and rules, conscientious, socially and emotionally stable, and predictable. If people could be hired and retained on the basis of these criteria, dangerous biological agents would certainly be in good hands. On the other hand, would a research program staffed solely with this type of person perform with insightful, prescient, inventive science? While the PRP’s criteria might reduce the insider threat in USAMRIID labs, the ability of the resulting team to carry out its missions through innovative, cutting-edge science might also be compromised.

Conclusion

Today’s intelligence officers know they are serving in tumultuous, exciting, astonishing, and dangerous times. In every generation, a few insiders have chosen the destructive path of betrayal and harmed themselves, their families, their nation, and many others who trusted in the United States to keep them safe. Three things keep loyal insiders going when news breaks of another case of espionage or leaking by one of our own: our personal commitment to our mission; our bonds of trust with our colleagues and teams; and the example of the generations of patriots who served before us, who also weathered betrayals by some of their own. So we keep faith, serve the Constitution with integrity and to the best of our abilities, and expect to pass the torch on to a new generation of officers who will do the same.
Appendix: Considerations on the State of Surveillance in Democratic Societies

The discussion within democratic societies about the abundance of data, computing power, privacy and security (some frame this as a political conflict between civil rights and government surveillance) is ongoing. Below are some highlights for consideration.

George Orwell, 1984

Orwell’s classic 1949 novel has enjoyed a resurgence in popularity because of renewed focus on privacy issues and fear of totalitarian government control enabled by technology. The novel explores the psychology of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled. Orwell counted on his readers’ intuitive understanding of the motives of a protagonist who would risk everything to secure a bit of privacy in a world characterized by “Big Brother’s” oversight of every aspect of life. The novel’s enduring power results from the readers’ empathy for the fictional Winston Smith’s effort to resist, and his ultimate failure to attain even a small measure of autonomy, making it one of the great tragic novels in the Western canon.

INSA, 2017

In April 2017 the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) published a list of state-of-the-art surveillance tools available to organizations interested in mitigating insider risks, particularly in the national security context. The document suggested mitigating insider threat through “leveraging innovative technology and data sources to monitor and evaluate individuals on a continuous basis” and noted that the listed computer-based tools could assist in “swift, continuous identification and assessment.” It defined the technology-driven surveillance process as follows:

Effective monitoring tools . . . take advantage of technology to surpass standard [personnel] screening. . . . In particular, advanced text analytics and psycholinguistic tools that track an employee’s communications across social media and other platforms to detect life stressors and analyze sentiment can help detect potential issues early. . . . Another critical element is improving the sharing of information within the organizations among managers, human resources, information technology (IT), security, and legal advisers regarding minor counterproductive work behaviors that may indicate an employee struggling and at heightened risks of committing a malicious act.

The INSA document notes that this “continuous monitoring” approach to mitigating insider threat might have implications for “workplace morale,” “civil liberties,” and concludes that each organization must arrive at its own culture-driven decisions about the optimal balance of privacy and security in the organization:

In the end, this is a critical risk management exercise for senior leaders in all organizations as the destructive power of malicious insiders grows and the tools to monitor and mitigate become more sophisticated and intrusive.

White House Review Group, 2013

Similarly, a 2013 report to the White House from the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies recommended the following:

All personnel with access to classified information should be included in a Personnel Continuous Monitoring Program (PCMP). The PCMP would access both internally available and commercially available information, such as credit scores, court judgments, traffic violations, and other arrests. (239)

The authors added:

We recognize that such a program could be seen by some as an infringement of the privacy of federal employees and contractors. . . . But, employment in government jobs with access to special intelligence or special classified programs is not a right . . . we believe that those with the greatest amount of access to sensitive programs and information should be subject to Additional Monitoring . . . (240–41)

The House of Lords, 2009

In February 2009, the British Parliament received a document from a House of Lords committee titled Surveillance: Citizens and State. It reported the results of a general review of methods and practices and included recommendations for future actions. It also described concerns that ubiquitous surveillance is changing the relationship between citizen and state.
The report quoted a professor of sociology and deputy director of Criminological Research at the University of Sheffield:

_Mass surveillance promotes the view . . . that everybody is untrustworthy. If we are gathering data on people all the time on the basis that they may do something wrong, this is promoting a view that as citizens we cannot be trusted._ (27)

The report also described the distinct social gains—tangible and perceived—of broad surveillance programs, particularly in countering terrorism and crime, and it summarized empirical data suggesting that most citizens support the counterterrorism and crime-fighting functions of surveillance. The report quoted a senior constable and chair of The Association of Chief Police Officers CCTV Working Group, who said:

_Several years ago London was suffering from a nail bombing campaign by an individual . . . targeting specific parts of London with his nail bombs and there were extremist groups claiming responsibility for the actions. That event was entirely supported by CCTV evidence in terms of actually detecting the crime. What value do you put on the price of that detection?_(21)

**Emrys Westacott, 2010**

Philosopher Emrys Westacott begins a 2010 article in *Philosophy Now* by asking if Adam and Eve would have eaten the forbidden apple had God installed CCTV cameras in Eden. A more serious discussion follows this amusing opening in which Westacott explores the distinct pragmatic social benefits that derive from some forms of surveillance (for example, from traffic cameras) and also the harms that too much surveillance, or certain forms of surveillance, can cause by eroding bonds of trust within society, particularly between those who control the surveillance and those being surveilled. He asks, hypothetically, if you would you rather attend Scrutiny College, where examination rooms are equipped with several cameras and jammers prevent the use of private devices for cheating, or Probity College, where students are trusted to abide by an ethics code. The philosopher argues that blanket surveillance aimed at control undermines the ideal that persons in society will behave responsibly because they want to, out of love and respect for themselves and others. He concludes that too much monitoring destroys the free bonds between people in societies; it weakens the internal moral compasses of both the people and their society. He also concludes, however, that not enough surveillance of people’s behavior results in a lawless state, as we have seen on the Dark Web.
Notes and Sources:

1. **Author Note:** When I was drafting my first article on the psychology of espionage 15 years ago, I relied on a long and established history of classified and unclassified scholarship on espionage that has accrued since the establishment of CIA’s forebear, the OSS, in WWII. In contrast to the robust, longstanding literature that was then available to me, this essay on the psychology of digital-age spying must be more provisional. The current social and cultural contexts—in real life, online, domestically, and globally—are developing too rapidly to arrive at definitive conclusions about all of the elements at the core of the psyches and behavior of today’s spies, particularly how they experience their espionage and leaking and the people, groups, and technologies assisting them in spying.

2. **Cyber vs. Material Reality:** Some argue that cyber reality is a part of material reality because it exists; however, the anchors of time, place, and physical contact are different in the digital and the concrete realms. For purposes of discussing how vulnerable people experience both cyber and concrete reality and navigate between the two psychologically, they are treated as distinct in this article, though there are some who would dispute this distinction and consider it as arbitrary as the mind/body division.

3. **Evolving Insider Threat Model:** In the past decade the model of “insider threat”—applicable to both private and public sectors—has evolved, and is commonly understood to include five types of threats from people inside organizations: spills, leaks, espionage, sabotage, and workplace violence. The focus of this essay is on those who leak and commit espionage. The five types of threats can overlap: leaking and espionage can include elements of sabotage and even workplace violence because the spy’s underlying intent may be aggressive, aimed at harming an organization and sometimes targeting specific individuals for danger or distress. CIA officer William Kampiles, for example, said that one of his reasons for committing espionage was to get back at his supervisor who had not supported his desire to leave his entry-level job as a watch officer prematurely in order to gain entry into the operational domain. (See: “Why Spy?”; “William Kampiles: Self-Styled Special Agent” on page 28.) FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen was bitterly angry at and contemptuous of the FBI when he spied for the Russians. (See: “Why Spy?”; “Robert Hanssen: Self-Designated Cold Warrior” on page 30.) Sometimes the danger and violence to others is secondary to the primary goals of the spy; danger to others might be an inevitable and predictable outcome of the espionage. In some cases the spy deliberately pursues harming others as a safeguard against being caught. Many Soviet citizens spying for the United States lost their lives when Aldrich Ames deliberately identified them to his Soviet handlers in order to prevent them from alerting their CIA handlers that there was a mole in CIA, which would have triggered an internal counterintelligence investigation, endangering Ames. By his own admission, Ames was purely driven by money, and he equated the risks he was taking for the Soviets to those Russian agents were taking when spying for the United States. In support of this article’s theme of personality pathology and espionage, the author notes the psychopathic nature of Ames’s rationalization of his ruthless elimination of those endangering him, and yet he remains alive, albeit in prison for life. In contrast, most of the agents he identified to the Soviets eventually were executed in Soviet prisons.

4. For examples of the application of such means in the corporate world, see Doug Laney, “Data as Corporate Asset: Private Sector Applications of Data Science” in *Studies in Intelligence* 61, No. 1 (March 2017).


6. **Spilling and J.K. Rowling.** A spill may be caused by misjudgments or accidental inclusion of classified materials with documents authorized for release, or by skilled elicitors who induce people to say more than they should or intend. Sometimes spillers remain unaware of the spillage, whereas spies always know they are spying. In the digital age, spills may be caused by technical errors involving little human agency. A famous example of spilling is the revelation in July 2013 that Harry Potter author J.K. Rowling was also the author “Robert Galbraith,” a pseudonym Rowling had used to publish an adult detective novel. Rowling’s identity was spilled by one of Rowling’s lawyers, who had inappropriately discussed the book with his wife’s best friend and revealed the author’s true name. The friend then tweeted about it to a columnist. Responding to the resulting firestorm of speculation, the lawyer’s firm confirmed Rowling’s authorship in a statement that included the following language, which illustrates the unwanted, unintentional element of spilling: “We, Russells Solicitors, apologise unreservedly for the disclosure caused by one of our partners, Chris Gossage, in revealing to his wife’s best friend, Judith Callegari, during a private conversa-
Why Spy Now?


11. Disclosures in the Private Sector: The ethical, legal, and media dynamics surrounding the leaking of classified government information also apply to disclosures of private-sector sensitive or proprietary corporate information. These issues were the central themes, for example, of the film “The Insider,” which was based on the true story of a former tobacco industry senior executive and scientist who worked with a reporter to disclose his former employer’s effort to suppress information demonstrating that the company was aware of and manipulated the addictive components of cigarettes. The story was originally carried in Vanity Fair: (Marie Brenner, “Whistleblower: The Man Who Knew Too Much,” May 1996). The article and movie also touched on questions about the scientist’s mental stability, motives, and veracity.

12. Trolls and Trolling: The exact definitions of Internet “trolling” or “trolls” are evolving in tandem with changes in technology. Roughly speaking, there are two broad categories of trolls. Some primarily troll instrumentally and some primarily for fun or “for the lulz”—a variant of LOL, “laugh out loud,” in Internet jargon. They differ psychologically in important ways. Those who engage in online manipulation, attack, and sabotage chiefly in pursuit of some other goal, most often financial profit (for example, those who are paid to disrupt commercial websites), may find only limited pleasure in the trolling itself. Their sense of reward (what psychologists call “emotional benefits”) comes from achieving the primary goal, such as getting paid. The pleasure-seeking trolls do so for the inherent emotional reward (the “lulz”) they generate in the behavior itself. The difference between the instrumental type and the lulz-seeking type is akin to the difference between a professional hit man, for whom killing is an emotionally neutral “professional” act that leads to a secondary reward, and a killer whose gratification resides in the tangible and emotional benefits actually accruing to them. An officer’s true assessment can be quite different from what the officer purveys to a source during handling interactions. Professional officers are trained to use observation, critical thinking, vetting techniques, comparisons with what is known from studies of past cases of espionage, and above all expert judgment to distinguish between sources who are genuinely heroic, and those who are not. Officers also submit their assessments to the scrutiny of their peers, particularly counterintelligence officers who independently evaluate sources and ensure that what is on record about a source’s motives for espionage is unbiased and accurate and handling methods are appropriately matched to the source’s true motives. While self-serving, manipulated, or coerced spies are the subject of this article, it is important to remember that heroic ones do exist and that their personalities, the crises that led them to spy, and the handling trade craft appropriate for them are different from those of other types. There is also a distinction—psychological as well as legal—between whistleblowers, who use legal channels to address their ethical or other workplace concerns, and leakers, who bypass legal, authorized channels of redress. Readers who wish to explore the distinctions may be interested in the recently published, newspaper opinion piece written by a Washington, DC, lawyer who handles classified matters and represents whistleblowers in the national security field: Mark S. Zaid, “Reality Winner Isn’t a Whistleblower—Or a Victim of Trump’s War on Leaks,” Washington Post, 8 June 2017. See also on this subject, US Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration, The Whistleblower Protection Programs, at https://www.whistleblowers.gov.

American Psychologist 39, No. 10 (October, 1984): 1123–34. For a somewhat different take on trolling that examines how it may not be wholly deviant behavior because it corresponds to and fits comfortably within the contemporary media landscape, readers are directed to Whitney Phillips, “Internet Troll Sub-Culture’s Savage Spoofing of Mainstream Media,” Scientific American, 15 May 2015. The article is excerpted from a book by the same author, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture (MIT Press, 2015).

14. This specific survey item from the research cited immediately above was reported by Chris Mooney in Slate, on 14 February 2014, in an article titled: “Internet Trolls Really Are Horrible People: Narcissistic, Machiavellian, psychopathic, and sadistic.” See http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/climate_desk/2014/02/internet_troll_personality_study_machiavellianism_narcissism_psychopathy.html.

15. Dogs on the Internet: In 2017, the New York Daily News published a cartoon by Bill Bramhall that played off of the 1993 New Yorker cartoon and resulting canine-at-a-keyboard meme. The new cartoon captured current alarms about surveillance, diminished or impossible online privacy, and the use of data analytics by private corporations and public agencies to profile, track, and target users who wish to remain incognito when they surf, work, or shop online. Bramhall’s cartoon features a solitary dog at his computer confronting a full-screen pop-up advertisement showing a can of dogfood with the caption “You might like ALPO.” A word bubble shows the dog thinking: “Whatever happened to ‘On the Internet nobody knows you are a dog’?”


17. Internet Aliases: Anonymous online aliases, rhetoric and slogans often hint at the slyness of psychopathy, the egotism of narcissism, and the fantasies of immaturity. For example, some famous hacker handles are Scorpion, SOLO (which gestures to the allure of being a lone operator and also to the Star Wars character), MafiaBoy, Gigabyte, cOmrade, “why the lucky stiff” (sometimes abbreviated “why”), Dread Pirate Roberts, Poison League, Commander X. According to the global computer magazine PCWorld, the British hacker SOLO left a message on a compromised machine that read: “US foreign policy is akin to Government-sponsored terrorism these days . . . I am SOLO. I will continue to disrupt at the highest levels.” (http://www.pcworld.com/article/2989146/security/infamy-and-alias-11-famous-hackers-and-their-online-handles.html#slide1). A famous online motto is this clever but also barbed inversion, from the hacking group Anonymous, of biblical stories of demonic possession and New Testament values: “We are Anonymous. We are legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us.”

18. The Onion Router: Tor (“The Onion Router”) is the most popular gateway into the Dark Web. It is free software, enabling anonymous communication through encryption and multiple peer-to-peer Internet relay channels designed to hide users’ IP addresses from those interested in tracking them. The result is an untraceable, secure platform that conceals users’ location and usage. The concept of “onion routing” (the underlying metaphor is that pursuing an anonymous user through multiple relays is like peeling an onion, never arriving at the core) was developed in the mid-1990s by a mathematician allied with computer scientists at the US Naval Research Laboratory in order to protect US intelligence online communications.


21. Positive Internet Values: In an article in The Wall Street Journal titled “The Dark Side of the Digital Revolution” (19 April 2013), Google’s executive chairman and former CEO Eric Schmidt and Google Ideas Director Jared Cohen described trying to explain the nature of the Internet to North Koreans during a visit to their country. They wrote: “We ended up trying to describe the Internet to North Koreans we met in terms of its values: free expression, freedom of assembly, critical thinking, and meritocracy.” These values are evident in the secure digital commons shared by the Intelligence Community but absent the blight that anonymous negative actors bring to the World Wide Web.

22. Big Data: “Big data” is the term currently in common usage to refer to extremely large data sets that can be analyzed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, often relating to human behavior and interactions. While “big data” specifically refers to the data itself, the term is also used colloquially to allude to the many uses to which such data can be applied, such as profiling, tracking, predicting, and identifying individuals, and trends or patterns in both individual and group behavior.
23. **Psycholinguistics**: Corporations use big data to engage in so-called “sentiment analysis” to evaluate, based on data available on the Internet, the emotions around their brands. Sentiment analysis means computationally identifying and categorizing opinions expressed in pieces of text, and now also in voice communications, in order to determine whether writers’ or speakers’ attitudes toward a particular topic, product, or corporation (or brand) trend toward the positive, negative, or neutral. For a discussion of psycholinguistics (or forensic linguistics), including the history of their development and use, validity, reliability, and the stakes to individuals if computational tools applied to linguistics get it wrong in forensic contexts, see Jack Hitt, “Words on trial: Can linguistics solve crimes that stump the police?” in *The New Yorker*, 23 July 2012.


25. **Readings on Employee Attitudes Toward Surveillance**: Those interested in individual differences in employee attitudes toward and tolerance of workplace surveillance are directed to: G. Stoney Alder, Marshall Schminke, Terry W. Noel, and Maribeth Kuenzi, “Employee Reactions to Internet Monitoring: The Moderating Role of Ethical Orientation,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 80 (2007): 481–98; the American Management Association/ePolicy Institute. *Electronic Monitoring Surveillance Survey* (2007); Bernd Carsten Stahl, Mary Prior, Sara Wilford, Dervla Collins, “Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: If People Don’t Care, Then What is the Relevance?” in John Weckert (ed.), *Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Controversies and Solutions* (Idea Group Publishing, 2005). This last reference explores not only how employees or other subjects react to being surveilled (they do not necessarily see it as problematic) but also how custodians and policy-creators of the surveillance methods react to their roles and the ethical dimensions of their functions. These researchers acknowledge real limitations to their empirical methods (small sample sizes and lack of generalizability) but their findings are still thought-provoking, given that they counter the general, decades-long consensus of scholars in multiple fields that people do not like being surveilled, even if they are willing to tolerate it in some circumstances and contexts.


The Psychology of Espionage

Dr. Ursula M. Wilder

People who commit espionage sustain double lives. When a person passes classified information to an enemy, he or she initiates a clandestine second identity. From that time on, a separation must be maintained between the person’s secret “spy” identity, with its clandestine activities, and the “non-spy” public self. The covert activities inescapably exert a powerful influence on the person’s overt life. They necessitate ongoing efforts at concealment, compartmentation, and deception of those not witting of the espionage, which includes almost everyone in the spy’s life. For some people, sustaining such a double identity is exciting and desirable; for others, it is draining and stressful. For a

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a. “Why I Spied: Aldrich Ames,” New York Times interview with Tim Weiner, 31 July 1994. A career CIA case officer, Ames was arrested in 1994 for spying over a nine-year period for the KGB and its successor, the Ministry of Security for the Russian Federation. Ames made a calculated decision to give the Russians the names of US penetrations in Russia who were in position to alert their American handlers—and therefore the FBI—that there was a mole in the CIA. All but one were executed. Weiner wrote, “He sold a Soviet Embassy official the names of two KGB officers secretly working for the FBI in Washington. The price: $50,000. The next month, he volunteered the names of every Soviet intelligence official and military officer he knew was working in the United States, along with whatever else he knew about CIA operations in Moscow . . . he received a wedding present from the KGB: $2 million.” Ames is serving a life sentence without parole.

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
For some people, sustaining a double identity is exciting and desirable; for others, it is draining and stressful.

few heroic people, spying is a moral imperative that they would prefer to avoid but feel compelled to act on.

This article focuses on spies whose espionage appears to be primarily self-interested, rather than altruistic or self-sacrificing. Within this criminal or treasonous type, specific psychological factors commonly occur, providing a guide to understanding the motives, behavior, and experiences of this type of spy. The risk of espionage can be reduced through understanding these psychological patterns and tailoring countermeasures accordingly.

Elements of Espionage

Three essential elements set the conditions for a person’s entry into espionage:

- dysfunctions in the personality
- a state of crisis
- ease of opportunity

The converse is true as well. Safeguards or strengths in these areas mitigate the risk of espionage.a

First, any consideration of motivation in espionage must closely examine personality pathology. Personality is the mix of traits, attitudes, and values that characterize a person. Spies frequently have pathological personality features that pave the way to espionage, such as thrill seeking, a sense of entitlement, or a desire for power and control. In addition, healthy countervailing traits—such as a calm temperament or strong sense of responsibility—may be either weak or entirely absent.

The second essential motivator is an experience of acute personal crisis resulting in intense distress. Though the spy may have regrets in hindsight, at the time he or she initiates the espionage, it appears a logical decision to solve a problem or the only option available to escape a desperate or painful situation.b

Offenders,” Slammer Psychology Team Technical Report, May 1992; and “Managing At Risk Employees,” Project Slammer Report, February 1993. Project Slammer is an Intelligence Community research effort, initiated in 1983, to understand espionage through in-depth interviews and psychological evaluations of incarcerated spies. More than 40 spies were interviewed.

b. In the wake of the Aldrich Ames case, the CIA surveyed 1,790 randomly selected employees to establish a baseline of employee attitudes and opinions regarding counterintelligence and security policies, procedures, requirements, and training. The results attest to employee awareness of the links between psychological factors and counterintelligence risks. Those surveyed identified emotional instability related to ambition, anger leading to a need for revenge, feelings of being unrecognized and unrewarded, and loneliness as the top vulnerabilities on the road to espionage. They ranked such problem behaviors as drug abuse and illicit sex as second, and various mental crises or stresses brought on by debt, work issues, or psychological factors such as depression as third.

Scope Note

A classified version of this article was published in Studies in Intelligence in December 2003. The concepts discussed in the 2003 article are unchanged in this revision, but the case study information contained in textboxes in the original article have been updated with unclassified or declassified material made available since 2003. This revision is intended to supplement the author’s re-examination, 14 years later, of the psychological drivers of espionage and of intentional leaking of intelligence data. The latter is an issue the original article and this, now unclassified, article do not address because such leaking was not then the prominent problem it now is. The new article, “Why Spy? Why Leak?“ begins on page 1.

Unless otherwise noted, quotations and information about the convicted spies used in this article are drawn from multiple sources, including law enforcement investigative documents, counterintelligence reports, court documents, and publicly available media accounts and books about US espionage and intelligence.
relationship or family problems, and financial troubles. Such personal crises will, in turn, further stress and magnify problematic traits and behaviors just when the person needs most to function with stability and maturity. Agents “spotting” a vulnerable person may insinuate themselves into the situation and find ways to exacerbate the personal crisis, “ripening” a targeted person’s vulnerability to recruitment. Handlers will then continue to manipulate a recruited asset’s vulnerabilities to maintain the person’s long-term engagement in espionage.

The descriptive categories that follow are offered as a map of the psychological terrain of espionage. All maps oversimplify to a degree, and so does this one. No typology can encompass the full complexity of the psyche of any individual spy. Moreover, a proportion of people caught in criminally oriented or self-serving espionage will not fit the predicted patterns. Therefore, the typology must be applied with caution. Trained professionals can apply these concepts to mitigate risk in contexts such as applicant screenings and evaluations for clearances. Managers and other members of the Intelligence Community may use this information to sharpen their awareness of potentially risky behavior patterns. They should bear in mind, however, that these psychological patterns do not always lead to trouble—and that many troubled people do not exhibit these patterns.

**Psychopathy**

Money was a solution. Sorry about this, Hollywood. Sorry about this, Church. Sorry about this, everybody, but money solves everything. And it did. And why did it all fall apart? You wanna know? I’ll tell you. Because the Soviets cut off the money supply and the old lady—I couldn’t pay her off anymore—so she picked up the phone [tipping off the FBI]. Otherwise I would not be sitting here. Money solves everything.a

—Navy spy John Walker

If I really thought of the consequences all the time, I certainly wouldn’t have been in the business. I’m sure that the people from Dow Chemicals in Delaware, I’m sure that they didn’t think of the consequences of selling Napalm. If they did, they wouldn’t be working at the factory. I doubt very much that they felt any more responsible for the ultimate use than I did for my equipment.

—Former CIA Communications Officer, illegal arms merchant, and access agent for the Cubans Frank Terpilb

I don’t believe that I was affecting the security of this country [the United States] and the safety of its people. . . . I didn’t give that stuff to the Soviets because I thought espionage is a dirty game. I mean, that’s trivial.

—CIA mole Rick Amesc

Psychopaths are predators, approaching life with remorselessness, manipulation, pursuit of risk and excitement, and sharp, short-term tactical abilities alongside poor long-term and strategic planning. They frequently leave people with a positive first impression. Over time and with extended exposure, the initial impression wears away as people become aware of, or are directly victimized by, the psychopath. Before they are unmasked, psychopaths can cause severe damage to individuals and institutions.

Psychopaths cannot consistently follow laws, rules, and customs and do not understand the social necessity of doing so. They have limited capacity to experience the feelings of guilt, shame, and remorse that are the building blocks of mature intelligence as an access agent, targeting former CIA colleagues. He died in Havana in March 2016.

a. See case study on page 24.
b. Frank Terpil: Confessions of a Dangerous Man, documentary directed by Anthony Thomas, 1981, WGBH (Boston). Terpil’s comment related to his selling weapons, explosives, torture instruments, poisons, and classified information to such customers as African dictator Idi Amin, Libya, and assorted terrorists. Terpil was a CIA communications officer who resigned under duress in 1972. Arrested in New York in 1979 for illegal arms dealing, he fled the United States while free on bail. He was tried in absentia and sentenced to over 60 years in prison for illegal arms dealing. As a fugitive, he began working with Cuban intelligence.
c. In the 1994 New York Times interview from which this quote is drawn, reporter Weiner described Ames as follows: “Since the 53-year-old Ames was arrested, his hair and skin have grayed perceptibly. On the surface, he is smooth, beguiling, sometimes charming. He fumbles for words only when he considers the nature of his treason and then that calm exterior cracks. His interior? There is an emptiness where pain or rage or shame should be.”
Why Spy?

**Case Studies in Investigating Espionage: Use and Limitations**

Experts in the Intelligence Community and outside scholars rely on case studies for insights into the motives and behavior of those who spy. Case studies look backward and highlight warning signs that in hindsight become obvious. Because it can be easy to discount the factors that obscured such signs, case study methods run the risk of hindsight and confirmation bias, focusing solely on the spy and insufficiently on the context. Often spies go undetected by exploiting or manipulating routine organizational processes and accepted customs or practices, first to “survive” in the system despite problems in personality and job performance, and later to cover their espionage. Sometimes larger organizational variables erode or undermine counterintelligence and security practices to such a degree that these variables are arguably equally instrumental in espionage. The term “systemic failure” is often used in official reports after major catastrophes to account for such variables. It is important, therefore, not to assume that the problem of espionage resides solely in the nature of the individual spy; problems in the context within which the spy operates can be equally serious.a

Alert readers will point out that experts in espionage only have arrested spies to study and that there may be some who have “gotten away with it.” These spies would by definition not be included in our study sample, and therefore our model only describes those who get caught. Ironically, many caught spies eventually tell investigators they were certain they had the skills to avoid capture, unlike their less skilled counterparts. Nicholson, for example, said this about his fellow case officer Ames, whose arrest prompted Nicholson to start his own espionage and “do better” at not getting caught. FBI special agent Hanseen served in counterintelligence and was convinced he could outperform the spies he was tasked to study and catch.

It is extremely difficult to predict complex, relatively rare human behavior such as espionage because of the problem of false positives: many people demonstrate the common warning signs that can lead to the the decision to spy but most will never engage in espionage. It is equally difficult for an organization to detect, measure, and therefore account for the reasons behind good-news “success” stories, for example, when a budding insider threat is recognized early and effectively addressed before causing great harm.

The small number of arrested spies means there is insufficient statistical power to conduct meaningful empirical analyses to predict who in an organization will become a spy. For example, the press dubbed 1985 the “Year of the Spy” because of a string of high-profile cases: eight Intelligence Community insiders were arrested that year on charges of espionage. In fact, the previous year the FBI had apprehended a much larger number: 12. Even in these two consecutive “banner years” for espionage arrests, the total number of spies (20 individuals) was vanishingly small compared to the millions in the US government with top secret accesses who did not commit espionage. The low base rate for espionage cases has not changed since the mid-80s. The 2015 Annual Report of Security Clearances Determinations by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reports that 1,220,678 top secret security clearances were active in 2015, and arrests for espionage in 2015 were in no way comparable to the “high” of 20 cases in 1984 and 1985.

In sum, as a result of these limitations, the Intelligence Community turns to in-depth psychological assessments to better understand the psychology of espionage. The long-term consensus among Community counterintelligence professionals (psychologists, law enforcement and investigative professionals, and analysts) is that the key individual variables motivating espionage described in this article—personality, crisis, and opportunity—are supported through the accumulation of case studies of arrested spies since formal psychological and investigative studies began during and after WWII.

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In the workplace, psychopaths are noteworthy for their central roles in frequent, enduring, and bitter conflicts.

his access to classified materials. Walker also exhibited a psychopath’s excessive need for excitement and characteristic pursuit of thrills and adventure. This need for stimulation can express itself in multiple ways and in many contexts, such as in gleefully breaking rules and disregarding social conventions, deliberately provoking authority, harming others or their property, using drugs illegally, and engaging in hazardous physical activities such as excessive speeding or extremely dangerous sports.

Finally, psychopaths rarely learn from mistakes and have difficulty seeing beyond the present. Consequently, they have deficient long-term planning, and their judgment is weak. In contrast to their problems in strategic planning, psychopaths can be supremely skilled tacticians and exceptionally quick on their feet. Absent the usual prohibition against violating rules or social customs, psychopaths are tactically unbound and remarkably uninhibited.

Snakes in Suits

In the workplace, psychopaths are noteworthy for their central roles in frequent, enduring, and bitter conflicts. Psychopaths exert themselves to charm select superiors, whereas their immediate peers experience their abuse and quickly come to view them with mistrust. Peers see them as possessors of a guilt-free lack of integrity, as remorseless pursuers of their own agendas, and as ruthless eliminators of threatening critics or obstacles—even legitimate competitors. Subordinates of psychopaths most often fear them. A great deal of resolve and courage are required to publicly take on psychopaths because of their ruthlessness, manipulative acumen, and the thrill and excitement they experience from generating stress and conflict.

Those in the bureaucracy responsible for oversight or disciplinary functions—such as security or finance officers—will frequently be the first targets of psychopathic manipulations. These institutional watchdogs or disciplinarians are often in positions to collect hard data against the psychopath, such as fraudulent accountings or inaccurate time-and-attendance records. Therefore, they present an especially acute threat to a psychopath’s freedom to maneuver undetected within a bureaucracy. They often are subjected to vicious attacks instigated by the psychopath, which may take personal rather than professional form. These preemptive strikes serve to obstruct or obscure legitimate efforts to bring to light concerns about the psychopath’s integrity and behavior. In addition, if a psychopath’s immediate supervisor, peers, or subordinates try to feed their concerns upward to management, they often find that the psychopath has been there before them and had prepared key managers to expect such criticism. The warnings, therefore, fall on deaf ears or result in blowback to the messengers.

Because psychopaths thrive in an atmosphere of turbulence and instability, corporate cultures that tolerate risk taking and controversial or even abusive behaviors will provide congenial ground for them. Organizations in which the usual institutional systems of control or supervision are

conscience and moral functioning. They are facile liars. In fact, many psychopaths take inordinate pleasure in lying because perpetrating an effective “con” gives them a sense of power and control over the person lied to, an emotional charge sometimes termed “duping delight.” Their glee in manipulating others may be so acute that it overrides judgment and good sense, causing them to take foolish risks simply for the pleasure of temporarily conning others.

Psychopaths are interpersonally exploitative. The condition is not infrequently associated with acute cruelty and the enjoyment of inflicting pain on others. Harming or alarming others is, to psychopaths, its own reward. They pursue these pleasures with relish irrespective of the risks involved or the limited potential for gain.

Navy spy John Walker illustrates the manipulative, exploitative, predatory characteristics of psychopaths. (See case study on next page.) Faced with retirement, he aggressively recruited family members to preserve
Why Spy?

The John Walker Spy Ring: Keeping it in the Family

John A. Walker joined the Navy in 1955. He developed into an experienced and competent communications specialist, received numerous awards and promotions, and retired as a chief warrant officer after 20 years in the service. At the time of his retirement, he had been spying for the Soviet Union for a decade. Before leaving the Navy, Walker recruited three subagents with active clearances to ensure that his espionage could continue and that he would retain personal control over the feed mechanisms to his handlers.

Walker recruited his friend Jerry Whitworth, a Naval communications specialist who, like Walker, had a “top secret crypto” clearance. Walker and Whitworth agreed to a “50/50 split” of the proceeds, with Walker functioning as the middleman. After retirement, Walker also recruited his brother, Arthur, a retired Navy lieutenant commander, who was working for a defense contractor. He also signed up his 20-year-old son, Michael, who had enlisted in the Navy. Walker used greed to induce his brother and son to spy, though during post-arrest debriefings Michael said his primary motive had been a desire to be like his father.

Walker’s daughter enlisted in the Army in 1978. He offered her “a great deal of money” if she would seek a position in Army communications, giving her $100 and promising that this was only the beginning should she cooperate. She steadfastly refused, but he continued to contact her periodically to ask if she had given it further thought. After his daughter left the Army, Walker appeared at her residence accompanied by Whitworth and Whitworth’s wife and again tried to recruit her, telling her that his “man in Europe” was willing to provide her with special equipment to spy but was worried that she was getting “too old” to reenlist. She rebuffed him again, but Walker later sent her $500, characterizing the money as an advance from his “man in Europe.”

Walker and his subagents were arrested in 1985 after his ex-wife called the FBI after he had stopped support payments to her. She was stunned when her tip-off also resulted in the arrest of her son and said afterward that she would never have called the FBI had she known that Walker had recruited their son. Walker’s daughter called the FBI separately in an attempt to regain custody of her only child, which she had surrendered during divorce proceedings from her husband, who had threatened to reveal her father’s espionage to the FBI if she fought for custody.

During the debriefings after his arrest, Walker characterized his spying as an exciting game and adventure that was also “quite profitable.” Asked if, in hindsight, he would have done things differently, he joked that he should have killed his alcoholic ex-wife, and he maintained that he was caught only because he lost his capacity to pay for “the drunk’s” silence. Walker’s exploitative and callous attitude and inability to appreciate his role in damaging the lives of others are characteristic of psychopaths.

Walker died in prison in August 2014. His son was paroled in 2000 after serving 15 years of a 25 year sentence.

The Intelligence Community has both more protection from and more vulnerability to deliberate manipulation by insiders. The institutional safeguards are greater than in most workplaces because of rigorous medical and security screenings of applicants, regular security reviews of the workforce, and programs for medical and lifestyle support for troubled employees. These unique institutional controls are essential because the Intelligence Community’s compartmentation of information, secrecy regarding programs and activities, and constant mobility of personnel make it relatively easy for unscrupulous employees to maneuver undetected and to manipulate the system. In the national security environment, such behaviors have the potential to do especially grave harm.

Narcissism

I have had much opportunity to reflect on what happened.

. . . Greed did not motivate me. It never did. If it had, I would have taken the actions I did far sooner. There were many chances to pursue greed through sustained contacts with Russians and others in [various locations] . . . but I didn’t. This is not meant to be an excuse, just a reflection. Patriotism, Loyalty, Honor—all these had once been of paramount importance to me. They all took a back seat when
my true loves were threatened—my children and my future.

—CIA spy Jim Nicholsona

Yes, and there were Kapos, too, during the concentration camps.

—Navy civilian analyst Jay Pollardb

a. Harold James Nicholson, in a letter written from prison addressed to a senior Intelligence Community official. A career CIA case officer, Nicholson was arrested in 1996 for spying for the Russians, to whom he had volunteered in 1994 when he was completing a tour of duty as the second-in-command of a post in Asia. In addition to passing a wide range of intelligence documents, Nicholson compromised the identities of numerous CIA colleagues working under cover, including the identities of many newly hired students destined for their first posts. (He had been one of their trainers as a senior faculty member at a CIA training center.) He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. While serving his sentence, he induced his youngest son, Nathan, then 22, to contact and collect over $47,000 from Russian officials, which the elder Nicholson called a “pension.” FBI agents were tracking Nathan and arrested him in 2008; his father then pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Eight years were added to his sentence, which he is now serving in a federal “supermax” penitentiary. His son cooperated with the investigation and was sentenced to five years probation (see “Twice Convicted ex-CIA spy gets 8 more years,” USA Today, 18 January 2011).

b. This comment reflects Pollard’s indictment of Jewish-American officials, including a federal judge, involved in his prosecution, trial, and life sentence for spying for Israel. In “60 Minutes: The Pollards,” an interview with Mike Wallace, CBS, 20 November 1988. (See case study on page 26.)

**Convinced of their own inherent superiority, narcissists blame others for their problems or for negative things that happen to them.**

Narcissistic personalities are characterized by exaggerated self-love and self-centeredness. Alongside an all-encompassing grandiosity runs a subtle but equally pervasive insecurity, into which narcissists have limited insight. Their internal world typically is built around fantasies about their remarkable personal abilities, charisma, beauty, and prospects. They are compelled to exhibit their presumed stellar attributes and constantly seek affirmation from others. Though their imaginings distort common sense or everyday reality, narcissists nevertheless believe in the accuracy of their daydreams and act accordingly. Others, therefore, often experience them as lacking common sense and twisting reality. When facts or other people contradict or interfere with their fantasies, narcissists become combative and vengeful. Their defensive hostility to criticism—even mild feedback—is often well out of proportion to whatever provocation sparked it.

Narcissists possess a careless disregard for personal integrity and can be very unscrupulous and manipulative in pursuing their own ends. They are, on the whole, indifferent to the needs of others, who in turn see them as having flawed social consciences. Narcissists feel entitled to special—even extraordinary—favors and status that they do not believe they have to reciprocate. They needlessly exploit others emotionally and financially, or in other ways that suit their ends. They are deeply antagonistic to sharing decisionmaking with others, irrespective of the legitimacy of the claims of others for some degree of control. Convinced of their own inherent superiority, they blame others for their problems or for negative things that happen to them, including social rejection. Because they do not consider themselves at fault for any troubles or setbacks, narcissists feel at liberty to take whatever steps they deem necessary to redress wrongs or regain a sense of mastery and superiority.

Narcissistic self-absorption should not be confused with an inability to grasp the perspective of others. Their hunger for affirmation produces acute awareness of the reactions they are provoking from the people around them. This deep hunger for affirmation also makes them vulnerable to manipulation, particularly by people whose admiration or approval they desire. Narcissists are particularly sensitive to authorities or to otherwise socially prominent or powerful people. Conversely, they can be inordinately indifferent to or contemptuous of the feelings or needs of people whom they believe to be insignificant or social inferiors.

**Narcissists in the Workplace**

Narcissists are often magnetic because their supreme self-confidence wedded to their urgent drive to impress enables them to project the appearance of talent and charm effectively. Over time, the charisma wears thin as it becomes evident that this appearance is not built on substance, but rather on fantasies and fabrications. Furthermore, narcissists’ pervasive tendency to see others as inferior causes them to be needlessly sarcastic, belittling, or supercilious.
Why Spy?

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Jonathan Jay Pollard: Self-Appointed Hero

Jonathan Pollard, a civilian analyst with the Navy, spied for Israel from June 1984 until his arrest on 21 November 1985. Pollard was highly responsive to Israeli tasking and compromised numerous intelligence documents from CIA, NSA, DIA, and the US military. He has consistently characterized his espionage as the duty of a loyal Israeli soldier and claimed he was a martyr, comparing his life of incarceration to that of an Israeli pilot abandoned after being shot down in enemy territory.

Pollard’s pre-espionage history showed a pattern of self-aggrandizement and lapses in judgment. As an undergraduate at Stanford University, he bragged to fellow students that he was a Mossad agent, claiming that Israel was paying his tuition and that he had fought and been wounded in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In one memorable episode, he brandished a pistol in front of startled fellow students, loudly proclaiming that he needed to carry it for protection because of his intelligence activities. A former college roommate described Pollard as having a penchant for “dirty jokes” and being so immersed in fantasy war games on campus that he was nicknamed “Colonel” (of the Mossad).a

Pollard’s conduct and attitude problems continued after he secured an analytic job with the Navy. One Monday, he arrived disheveled and unshaven for an interview for a new position, claiming that the Irish Republican Army had kidnapped his then-fiancée and he had spent the weekend securing her release. This incident went unreported, although he did not get the job. In a 1980 effort to join the Navy’s HUMINT intelligence element, Pollard made fictitious claims to have completed an M.A., to be proficient in Afrikaans, and to have applied for a commission in the naval reserve. Even more far-fetched, he told his immediate supervisor that he had valuable South African contacts because his father had been a CIA chief of station in South Africa. (Pollard’s father was a microbiologist on the faculty of Notre Dame University.) Based on these fabrications, Pollard secured the assignment. Once on the job, his falsehoods became apparent and his erratic behavior raised further alarms. He showed up at meetings against orders, claiming he was entitled to attend, and he disclosed classified information without authorization to a South African defense attaché, perhaps in an attempt to sustain his lies about his valuable liaison contacts.

In a letter from jail in 1989 designed to raise political support for an Israeli-fostered campaign to gain his release from his life sentence, Pollard wrote, “I do not believe that the Draconian sentence meted out to me was in any way commensurate with the crime I committed. As I have tried to point out on innumerable occasions, I was neither accused of nor charged with having intended to harm this country, as I could have been under the provisions of the espionage statute. In other words, I did not spy ‘against’ the United States. Nowhere in my indictment . . . was I ever described as a ‘traitor,’ which is hardly a surprise given the fact that the operation with which I was associated actually served to strengthen America’s long-term security interests in the Middle East.” Pollard’s lack of insight into his failures in judgment and ethics and his recasting of events to conform to his grandiose fantasies and self-image are consistent with narcissistic personalities.c

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People around narcissists may note stark contrasts in their conduct toward different classes of people, depending on their social rank and usefulness. Furthermore, the hostile and vindictive attacks narcissists mete out when others challenge their grandiosity tend to provoke angry responses in return. The result is that narcissists frequently find themselves the recipients of antagonistic feelings at distinct odds with their view of themselves as infinitely superior and admirable. They have limited insight into their role in these dynamics and tend to blame others for their own lack of social success, in the workplace as elsewhere. Their managers will frequently have to intervene in the interpersonal conflicts they habitually generate.

In addition, narcissists often show a pattern of violating organizational rules and disregarding institutional or managerial authority. They trivialize inconvenient regulations or hold themselves superior and exempt from policies, directives, and laws. They
feel entitled to favorable workplace treatment—whether this comes in the form of forgiveness for transgressions, early or frequent promotions, attractive work assignments, or other advantages such as having their requests expedited by support staff. They are acutely sensitive to the advancement of others and become suspicious and angry if they find themselves being left behind. They perceive workplace competitors who get ahead of them as “stealing” advantages or rewards that are rightfully their own. Finally, narcissists will lie, fabricate information or events, willfully exaggerate accomplishments, and often believe their own fabrications, all in the interest of appearing successful or important.

Many of these characteristics, properly contained, can be very useful in certain types of work requiring flexibility, charisma, and persuasion—for example, in sales, politics, and case officer work. It can be very difficult for managers to know where to draw the line between a tolerable or useful level of narcissism—what psychologists call healthy narcissism—and more dangerous self-absorption and self-aggrandizement.

One way to make this determination is to look for positive, counterbalancing features in the personality—such as tolerance of competition and a realistic self-perception—that control and channel the narcissism into productive pursuits.

**Immaturity**

*My thinking before I joined the CIA was, I think, noble and patriotic and all this, help the United States or whatever. And even when this happened, I didn’t feel anti-American or anti-CIA. It never came to me that this was a—a real damaging thing that I had done. I thought that more good really could come out of it. That’s the reason that I returned to the CIA, contacting them and obviously, you know, the whole thing was backwards and I’m not sure if—even if—I’ll ever really know how it happened. It’s—when I think back about it—it almost seems impossible that it could have happened but it did and I hope maybe it, you know, clears up.*

—Former CIA watch officer William Kampilès

No one is born a spy. Spies are made. Some are volunteers, many are coerced, but all begin somewhere on the other side from where they inevitably end up. . . . My age at the time of entry into the world of espionage was nineteen. I was one of the youngest spies ever in the history of the United States. . . . This story is not only one of manipulation. Like all spy stories, it is also one of betrayal. . . . I betrayed and was betrayed. Today, years after my release, years after my kidnapping and trial, I am confronted by this reality on a near daily basis.

—Enlisted Air Force linguist Jeffrey Carney

Observers frequently compare immature adults to adolescents. Attitudes and behaviors that are expected and even endearing in normal adolescents or children, however, are unsettling, disruptive, and potentially hazardous in adults.

The most salient characteristic of immaturity is the ascendancy of fantasy over reality. Immature adults spend an inordinate amount of time daydreaming, deliberately calling to mind ideas that stimulate pleasant or exciting emotions. In contrast to mature adults, immature adults do not readily distinguish their private world from objective external reality and, in fact, may expect reality to conform to their self-serving and stimulating fantasies. Their fantasies about their special powers, talents, status, prospects, and future actions can be so seductive that they become resentful of conflicting real-world truth.

All three types of personalities described in this article are distinguished by active fantasy lives, but the fantasies tend to differ in both

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*An American’s Cold War Journey* [CreateSpace, 2013], 11–12. Carney was a mole for the East Germans while he was a US Air Force linguist. After he was exfiltrated to East Germany, he developed detailed targeting files on Americans for them. (See case study on page 32.) The kidnapping Carney refers to in this quote is his arrest after German reunification in 1990, when a tip from his former East German handler led officers from the US Air Force Office of Special Investigations to seize him in Germany and return him to the United States for trial. (See case study on page 32.)

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**It can be very difficult for managers to know where to draw the line between a tolerable or useful level of narcissism and more dangerous self-absorption and self-aggrandizement.**

a. See case study on page 28.

b. These quotations are from the opening chapter of Jeffrey M. Carney’s self-published memoir *Against All Enemies:*

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content and degree. Psychopaths tend to fantasize mostly about power, pain, and control, while narcissists focus on their personal superiority and the hostility provoked by those who do not notice it and their plans to get revenge for perceived slights and insults. The fantasy lives of immature persons are frequently much less well defined; they can be likened to the dreamlike blend of perceptions, thoughts, imagination, and facts characteristic of psychologically healthy children. Because the reasoning, judgment, and self-control of immature adults are underdeveloped, such individuals are less tied to factual reality than their mature peers and more dependent on fantasy to cope with events and to maintain stability.

Consequently, immature adults generally expect others to embrace what to them is the self-evident legitimacy of their personal ideas and longings. They often cannot understand why others do not share their perspective and fail to see that reality itself works against the validity of their fantasies. They frequently will act on their fantasies with little anticipation of consequences that to most people would be completely predictable. They are often genuinely shocked when reality intrudes on their plans and interferes with anticipated outcomes.

Furthermore, immature people are persistently egocentric, they see themselves as the epicenter of any crowd or event. They believe others are paying close attention to them personally in most contexts, and as a result they are acutely self-aware. When it becomes clear that they are not the center of attention and that

William Kampiles: Self-Styled Special Agent

In March 1978, after resigning under duress from his position as a watch officer in the CIA Operations Center, William Kampiles passed to the Soviet Union a top secret KH-11 satellite technical manual. He received $3,000 for this document that contained detailed information on a major US intelligence collection system.

Kampiles had joined the CIA in 1977 at age 22. He was offered a watch officer position when his application for Directorate of Operations (DO) case officer training was rejected. He arrived at work with distorted notions of his abilities and prospects and quickly became disgruntled. Uninterested and contemptuous of his assigned duties, he clashed with his supervisor, and his persistent efforts to transfer to the DO led to a formal notice that he was required to serve in his present position for two years, which only deepened his disgruntlement.

Through personal contacts, Kampiles managed to secure an interview with the DO Career Training Staff. His interviewer described him as immature and lacking self-discipline and judgment. Highlights of their discussion include Kampiles revealing that he had only accepted the watch officer position as a way to secure entry into the DO and that he would resign from the CIA if he were not accepted. He attributed his difficulties in the Operations Center to his reputation as a playboy, and when his interviewer asked if this reputation was deserved, he boasted of his successes with women. Questioned about what he had liked best about a past menial job, he quipped that it was the expense account.

Kampiles smuggled a KH-11 manual out of the Operations Center to try to get his CIA supervisor in trouble when it was found to be missing. He also vaguely envisaged that he could turn around his upcoming termination by using the document to initiate a free-lance, James Bond-style operation, thus persuading the CIA that he was indeed case officer material and could be deployed as a double agent against Moscow. Four months after his resignation, he volunteered the document to the Soviets in Athens, Greece, where he was visiting relatives. Upon his return to the United States, he got in touch with a former CIA colleague and revealed his contact with the Soviets. The colleague asked him to describe his activities in a letter. Kampiles wrote about his “accidental” meeting with a Soviet in Athens and noted that other meetings followed, but he did not directly admit to passing documents. “What I have talked about thus far has been generalized,” he explained. “I did this because to be entirely specific it would take the length of a short book to narrate this entire story. If you think there might be agency [i.e., CIA] interest, I might be willing to discuss this experience in full detail.”

The letter led to an FBI investigation and Kampiles’s arrest for espionage, for which he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Reflecting on his motives and state of mind at the time that he took the KH-11 manual and later when he passed it to the Soviets, Kampiles told his FBI interrogators, “I think you know, boiling it down, I think it was monetary and the glamour and the excitement, that this sort of thing might bring on . . . the danger . . . the intrigue, all that together.” Kampiles’s immersion in a fantasy world, his belief that both reality and other people would play along, the profound failures in perception and judgment caused by his fantasies, and his initial shock upon his arrest and eventual remorse at the harm he caused are all consistent with immaturity.
others might, in fact, be indifferent to them, they often react negatively and take steps to bring attention to themselves.

Immature people have difficulty moderating their feelings. Rather than appropriately disciplining and channeling feelings, they are subject to them. As a result, they are given to dramatic displays of emotion when stressed or excited, and while these displays may be congruent to whatever stimulated the feelings—for example, they will become very angry at perceived injustices or delight in successes—observers will sense that the emotions lack proper proportion and moderation.

A significant consequence of poor emotional control is impulsivity. Immature people have difficulty restraining their immediate wishes in the interest of anticipating long-term consequences. When prompted by sudden feelings or urgent desires, they take precipitous action. They tend to have limited attention spans and need to be emotionally engaged with a task or a person to retain focus. They can be quite fickle and easily distracted.

Finally, like psychopaths and narcissists, immature adults have defective consciences, but they are capable of feeling real guilt and often have well-developed moral codes. Their egocentricism and impulsivity limit their capacity for foresight, but in hindsight they often deeply regret their impetuous actions. Though they may want to behave ethically and feel guilt and shame when they behave badly or hurt other people, their capacity to apply their moral understanding and desires consistently to control their behavior is compromised.

An occasional feature of immaturity is dependency, which is highly relevant to espionage because dependency makes a person particularly susceptible to manipulation and control. (See Sharon Scranage case study on page 34.) Dependent people experience relationships to be so crucial to their well-being that they will do almost anything to sustain them. Dependent people may function quite adequately and seem well adjusted as long as they are not required to be on their own and are able to rely on a relationship as a psychological crutch. If the relationship is threatened, or there is even the possibility of separation, they become anxious and less able to cope. Their hunger to both please and cling to the person or people on whom they are dependent necessarily affects their judgment, and they will willingly compromise their own and others’ well-being—including their personal ethics—to sustain the relationship on which they depend.

**Children at Play**

In the workplace, immature people are often spontaneous and imaginative and can be quite appealing. In optimal conditions, they can be productive and inventive people who are eager to form attachments with others and to please and impress them.

When such employees are stressed, however, these characteristics can take distinctly negative turns. Spontaneity can translate into erratic and impulsive behavior, and active imaginations can cause problems with decisionmaking and judgment. If stress is not reduced, immature workers rapidly lose their ability to cope and can become inordinately needy and demanding. Coworkers who discern these patterns become alarmed, and immature people are often considered by others to be somewhat unbalanced and a risk for hazardous behavior and bad judgment.

In general, immature persons are naive about normal expectations regarding adult workplace attitudes and conduct. They are too susceptible to environmental distractions and internal pressures to be consistent performers. They do not readily distinguish between personal and professional spheres. They are easily bored with routine and heedlessly seek stimulation from people and things around them. They can be either too dependent on, or reactive against, control mechanisms. They tend to be very demanding of positive attention from authorities, while at the same time overly hostile or sensitive to negative feedback. Their seeking after attention or stimulation often becomes a drain on supervisors, who must engage in constant oversight, and can deplete peers, who get pressed into fixing problems caused by their immature colleague’s inattention and poor judgment.
**Robert Hanssen: Self-Designated Cold Warrior**

Former FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen spied for the Russians for a total of nine years over a 21-year period, beginning in 1979 and ending with his arrest in 2001. Because of his position in the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Unit and his use of computer technologies, Hanssen was able to pass extensive and highly damaging information.

After his arrest, Hanssen reported that as a junior special agent working in the FBI’s New York office, he was inspired to commit espionage by reading operational files of past and then current Russian agents. While fascinated by the clandestine and secret world described in the files, he was also struck by what he estimated to be amateurish tradecraft and was curious to see if he could do better. He initiated his espionage by leaving a letter signed with a code name for a Russian case officer whose tradecraft he admired. In this, as in all communications with his handlers, Hanssen insisted on remaining unidentified.

His anonymous letters to his handlers provide a window into his psyche. The tone varies from arrogant lecturing to pleading for understanding and communication. He often addressed his handlers with a mixture of superciliousness and admonition, as in the following excerpt from an 8 June 2000 letter in which he describes how they should view the United States: “The US can be errantly [sic] likened to a powerfully built but retarded child, potentially dangerous, but young, immature, and easily manipulated. But don’t be fooled by that appearance. It is also one which can turn ingenius [sic] quickly, like an idiot savant, once convinced of a goal.”

Hanssen was motivated to spy by a mixture of greed, need for excitement, desire to test himself, and craving to feel like a “hero” by becoming involved in something significant. To external appearances, there were many signs of stability in his lifestyle. The Hanssen family was religiously devout with extensive ties in their faith community. Hanssen appeared to be a responsible primary breadwinner. He was a moderately successful FBI special agent who, while not necessarily fitting the typical mold, had secured a niche job that suited his talents. Despite these external signs of stability, however, Hanssen possessed salient secret vulnerabilities. His desire to serve as a hero led him to initiate a mentoring relationship with a prostitute he imagined he could rescue from her lifestyle by showing her a better way to live. He abruptly cut off this relationship when she proved unable to live up to his expectations. He installed a live-feed camera in his bedroom and surreptitiously captured his sexual activity with his wife for a male friend, even discussing with this friend ahead of time what he would like to watch. He also passed to him nude pictures of his wife and posted pornographic stories on the web featuring him and his wife, all without her knowledge.

At work, Hanssen was considered odd and carried several pejorative nicknames. He was disciplined for angrily grabbing a female colleague. He exploited a breach in the computer firewall to break into his supervisor’s computer, claiming he did it to show FBI security the vulnerability of sensitive computer systems. When he was reprimanded as a young special agent for throwing classified information in the trash rather than shredding it, he responded that he knew what was really classified and what was not. The failures in empathy and in respect for others, the self-absorption, and the poor judgment evident in these behaviors suggest a mixed personality disorder.

**Mixed Personality Disorder**

I feel I had a small role in bringing down the USSR. . . . I wanted to be able to contribute in some way to that. . . . So I launched my own war.

—FBI mole Robert Hanssen

While the traits and behaviors of many spies match the features specific to psychopathy, narcissism, or immaturity and dependency, in some cases the personalities do not readily fit any one of these types.

What may be most notable in such cases is a lack of positive personality features to counterbalance negative ones. In addition, some spies show a mix of characteristics from all three dominant types. Some may also show other psychopathologies such as paranoid or compulsive symptoms. A case in point is former FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen, who spied for the Russians over the course of 21 years. A psychological evaluation conducted as part of the damage assessment concluded that his personality contains a mix of psychopathic, narcissistic, and dependent features.

**Healthy Personalities**

In healthy personalities, positive characteristics counterbalance negative ones. Positive features might include the ability to accept criticism; to feel remorse and make reparations for mistakes; to show genuine empathy for at least some people. Healthy personalities also exhibit reasonable stability of mood over time and...
in different contexts; experience, express, and contain a wide range of emotions; show tactical adaptability alongside good long-range planning and self-discipline; and demonstrate ethical behavior across various situations.

In contrast to exhibiting a mix of positive features to temper problem characteristics, pathological personalities tend to be structured around a few dominant, relatively uninhibited characteristics. The complexity of healthy personalities enables them to deploy an array of coping strategies depending on the nature of the challenges they have to address. In contrast, pathological personalities possess a limited range of coping techniques. People with personality pathology tend to adhere stubbornly to a few approaches to problem solving and have difficulty adjusting, changing, and growing despite repeated evidence that their strategies for dealing with life are not working adequately.

Precipitating Crises

I’m growing extremely tired of American society, American modern day values, American class consciousness, American TV, American law; American consumerism, American hypocrisy.

—CIA spy Jim Nicholson

What I was thinking? How was I thinking? It was a very busy and stressful period both professionally and personally and it was like a leap in the dark.

—CIA mole Rick Ames

I think I was pissed off in the fact that all my expectations on what the job would be like were falling short and I guess I was perhaps bitter about the situation as it was and that may have been part of the motive but I’m not sure because when I look back it’s not really all that clear.

—Former CIA watch officer William Kampsile

While problematic personality features are essential, they are not sufficient to provoke espionage. The majority of people who have some, or even many, of the personality features described above will never engage in criminal conduct. Espionage must be triggered by a crisis and the person’s assessment that illicit criminal conduct offers the solution to or an escape from the crisis. The precipitating crisis may be self-evident to observers—for example, the breakup of a marriage, the loss of a job, or bankruptcy. But it can also be private and invisible. Such psychological crises as feeling intensely frustrated and humiliated at being consistently outperformed at work by peers can be just as acute and painful as externally evident problems.

CIA officer Jim Nicholson’s sense of deep personal humiliation at not having savings in the bank and his frustration at not being able to provide his children with a more affluent and sophisticated lifestyle are examples of how a psychological crisis can lead to espionage. To all external appearances, this GS-15 case officer was progressing well in his career and, while not in a superior financial position, was living a solidly middle-class lifestyle. This view did not match his internal sentiments of frustration and failure, which led him to volunteer to spy for the Russians. He was prompted by the arrest of fellow case officer Rick Ames and his observation that Ames had experienced a long and financially lucrative run of espionage for the same customer. Nicholson believed his tradecraft was better than Ames’s and that he would not be caught.

Navy spy Jonathan Pollard also went through a psychological crisis just prior to his espionage—he later described it as a spiritual crisis. In contrast to Nicholson, however. Pollard was experiencing work and financial problems alongside his psychological crisis. In debriefings after his arrest, Pollard said he had resolved to spy for Israel in a state of deep anger and frustration after the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut was bombed in 1983. He claimed that he “walked out of the memorial service [for the Marines] committed to doing something that would guarantee Israel’s security even though it might involve a degree of potential.


**Jeffrey Carney: The Spy Codenamed “The Kid”**

Jeffrey Carney enlisted in the US Air Force on his 17th birthday in 1980 and was granted a top secret clearance a year later. He began spying for East Germany’s Ministry of State Security (MfS) in 1983 while working as a linguist at Marienfelde Base in West Berlin. He continued spying at his next post in Texas, from which he abruptly deserted in 1985. The MfS exfiltrated and resettled him in Berlin, where he helped them target Americans. When the Iron Curtain fell, his handlers abandoned him and tipped off US authorities; he was arrested in 1991.

Carney’s initial motivation for his walk-in was a sense of betrayal by family, friends, and supervisors. His family background was painful and unstable, including severe physical and emotional abuse and neglect and the frequent disappearance of his father. Carney described himself as having been a lonely child, an “underdog” who felt inferior and had a burning desire to prove his worth. He dropped out of high school to help support his mother financially, including paying for her divorce from his father. When he visited home in 1983 on leave, he was shocked to find his father living there. After an acrimonious visit, he returned to Germany, nursing feelings of bitterness and inadequacy. He was also coming to terms with his homosexuality, which at the time put his military career at risk. In addition, Carney was deeply dissatisfied with the Air Force. Despite salient intellectual gifts, he was unable to sustain an unblemished work record, had been decertified as a language instructor, and had trouble regaining his credentials. He was outraged by his decertification, which he blamed on his supervisors’ ill will, and felt humiliated and embarrassed.

On the night of his impulsive attempt to defect to East Germany, all of the acquaintances and friends he approached rejected his overtures to go out. He went alone to some bars, had several drinks, and contemplated suicide. At one bar, he happened to read an article about a Taiwanese pilot who defected to mainland China, was feted as a hero, honored with a parade, and given money. “I’ll show them, I’ll show them all,” was Carney’s reaction. Acting on this thought, he took a cab to Checkpoint Charlie, walked across, and presented himself to the East Germans as a defector. They quickly convinced him to go back to his post at Marienfelde as a spy.

After his routine reassignment in 1984 to a domestic post, Carney became preoccupied with the announcement that all employees with access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) would be polygraphed. He was also furious with Air Force doctors, who refused to operate on what he believed was a hernia. When he threatened to go to the inspector general with his complaint, he was referred for a psychological evaluation and became concerned that drugs would be used to make him say things beyond his control, exposing both his espionage and his homosexuality. He deserted and flew to Mexico City, presenting himself unannounced to the East Germans. Upon his resettlement in East Berlin, the MfS tasked him with transcribing intercepted conversations of US military and embassy personnel, from which he discerned their responsibilities, attitudes, relationships, and personalities. If he felt that particular individuals were vulnerable, he wrote an assessment describing their situation and suggesting the best recruitment approach. Carney claimed that the MfS apparently prized his work.

After his arrest, Carney readily confessed to his espionage and said that it helped him regain a sense of personal pride and purpose. “Each time I took information out,” he asserted, “I felt like I was slapping my supervisors in the face.” He also expressed bitterness that the US government had violated his German rights by forcibly taking him away from his home, his personal belongings, and his common-law spouse. Carney’s impulsive decision to defect in a time of despair, along with the psychological stability and sense of achievement and purpose that he temporarily gained once engaged in espionage, demonstrate the role that stress and crisis can play in motivating a vulnerable person to seek a solution through espionage.

Carney was released in 2002 after serving 11 years of a 38-year sentence. He attempted to return to Germany, claiming German citizenship, but he was denied entry because the East Germans had never granted him citizenship.

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a. In his memoir Carney quotes himself as asking the OSI officers arresting him “What took you so long?” (*Against All Enemies*, 592); he also claims to have made several attempts during the arrest to assert rights as a German citizen but was told to shut up. FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen also contemptuously asked the FBI colleagues arresting him, “What took you so long?” Both Hanssen and Carney demonstrated the reflexive grandiosity described in the personality section of this article in this sarcastic comment. When he was arrested, Ames said, “You’re making a big mistake! You must have the wrong man!” demonstrating the automatic cunning and slipperiness characteristic of psychopaths.
risk and personal sacrifice." During this same period, Pollard had several heated discussions with his supervisor regarding chronic tardiness, conflicts with coworkers, and inability to complete assignments. Moreover, the Pollards frequently were late paying their rent or their rent checks bounced; the Navy Federal Credit Union reported him delinquent in repaying a loan. He and his wife were witnessed using cocaine and marijuana at parties, and an anonymous call to the Navy’s security service reported that Pollard had been involved in an altercation in Georgetown.\(^b\)

Robert Hanssen began spying after an assignment to the FBI’s New York Field Office caused such financial strain on his family that, on one occasion, his wife broke into their children’s piggy banks to collect enough change to carry the family through until the next paycheck. Air Force spy Jeffrey Carney impulsive-ly defected to East Germany in the course of a night of drinking alone, contemplating suicide, and brooding on his loneliness and ill-usage by family, friends and supervisors.

States of crisis often result in patterns of thinking that degrade judgment and behavior. A person in crisis typically experiences a sense of threat alongside a severe loss of control. The combined result frequently is a feeling of paralysis or helplessness, a desire to either fight the situation or to find a way to escape it at all costs. Most significant with respect to motivation for espionage, a person in this state of mind can acquire “tunnel vision,” in which the person’s attention becomes riveted on the current crisis. This fixation on the present can degrade long-term planning and the capacity to anticipate lasting consequences. Such mental conditions make a person vulnerable to taking badly judged actions.

While life crises are ubiquitous, criminal responses remain rare. Personality flaws that weaken moral reasoning, judgment, and control over impulsive behavior are aggravated by the sense of immediate threat, urgent need to escape, and tunnel vision common to crises. A person with personality problems is therefore doubly vulnerable to misjudgments and misconduct in a crisis. Conversely, people who as a rule have strong judgment, good self-control, and healthy consciences have more insulation against tendencies to impulsive action or misconduct when under the pressures of crisis.

Special Handling

**Journalist:** Why did you make the decision to work for the other side?

**Spy:** Some of that started in the 70’s in New York [before volunteering to spy for the Russians in the 1980’s]

**Journalist:** Why?

**Spy:** As you know, I knew some Soviets in New York who were very interesting. The chief Pravda representative in New York and I had lunch together every couple of weeks for about three years. And he didn’t directly teach me a lot, but indirectly I learned an awful lot . . . in terms of what the Soviets are all about.

**Journalist:** How would you arrange to contact the other side [KGB] and meet?

**Spy:** Through a go-between, a Soviet Embassy officer, who’s not a KGB officer. We had an overt relationship—I was assessing the guy [for CIA] to see if he’d be of value as a target and did develop him a little bit—so this [meeting with a Soviet] is all approved [by the CIA].

—CIA mole Rick Ames

“You need to show us that you are serious.” His voice had melted. “You can be a soldier on the Invisible Front. What good are you here? [in East Germany]” he asked rhetorically. “Here, you are one person with perhaps a little ability to make a difference. There [as a mole inside the US Air Force], working for peace—and you don’t even have to be Communist or Socialist—you can make a great difference! You will have earned your right to come and stay here.” . . . There are those who say I was brainwashed, but that is not true. While it is true that I originally lacked the conviction I claimed that fateful April morning, I would soon need little prodding to betray my former colleagues [in the US military]. . . . In my naiveté I also was

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b. Ibid.

Why Spy?

The “Handling” of Sharon Scranage

Sharon Scranage compromised CIA staff officers, agents, and operations while serving as a secretary and administrator in Africa from 1983 to 1985. Her spying necessitated the exfiltration and resettlement of numerous African agents and their families. The total cost of her espionage has been estimated to be several million dollars. Scranage joined the CIA in 1976 as a clerk-stenographer. She consistently received favorable performance reports, including appreciative comments about her pleasant and dedicated workplace demeanor. Her private life was less settled, however. She divorced her husband of two years in 1980, after he had become physically and psychologically abusive, including hitting her and threatening her with a gun. Only two days after Scranage’s arrival at her post in Africa in 1983, a State Department communicator introduced her to the man who subsequently became her handler. He quickly drew her into a sexual affair and—apparently working from an accurate assessment of Scranage’s susceptibility to psychological abuse—began to use a combination of affection and fear to increase his power over her and to elicit more and more sensitive information from her. In addition to establishing a sexual relationship with her and thus asserting physical control, Scranage’s handler also used verbal intimidation and threats to deter her from revealing what she had done to station personnel and to isolate her socially from sources of support in the station and community. He systematically assaulted her trust in CIA and her most senior manager, arguing that this manager had put her in her present position. Her handler also fed her dread of being discovered and made veiled threats to harm those agency personnel and their family members with whom she appeared close. By such means, Scranage’s handler positioned himself as her preeminent authority figure and protector rather than the CIA and her managers and colleagues. In hindsight, she described herself as “a puppet” in his hands. After her arrest, Scranage consistently expressed profound remorse for her espionage.

I have come about as close as I ever want to come to sacrificing myself to help you, and I get silence. I hate silence. . . . It’s been a long time dear friends, a long and lonely time. . . . Perhaps you occasionally give up on me. Giving up on me is a mistake. I have proven iner-

ably loyal and willing to take grave risks, which even could cause my death, only remaining quiet in times of extreme uncertainty. So far my ship has successfully navigated the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. I ask you to help me survive.

—FBI mole Robert Hanssen, in letters to his handlers

Exploitation of the Vulnerable

A well-trained espionage recruiter will search for vulnerable targets. Professional intelligence officers are trained to spot outward signs of trouble in a person’s history or behavior—such as tumultuous relationships or frequent job changes—and to evaluate the deeper, more enduring psychological dysfunctions that may be at the root of the problems. These professional recruiters are trained to deploy sophisticated psychological control techniques matched to the vulnerabilities they have detected in order to manipulate, apply pressure, or induce a person to commit espionage.

Some intelligence services do not limit themselves to exploiting pre-existing problems, but may actively foster crises to enhance the target’s susceptibility to recruitment. Common forms of such aggressive pursuit and manipulation of targets include emotional or sexual entrapment and financial manipulation through increasing the target’s level of debt. A psychologically vulnerable target’s grandiosity, sense of being above the rules, or vengeful impulses can all be manipulated in the service of recruitment.

The role of such manipulations by a potential customer and the prospective spy’s own sense of the ease and safety of espionage are often underestimated as key factors in increasing or decreasing motivation. Adept professional handlers depict themselves not only as willing to reward espionage but also as capable of safeguarding their agent. Good professional “handling” is designed not only to collect classified information but also to stabilize and reassure the spy in the interest of sustaining his or her

unusual to sense my true value to the MfS in those early days, and it would be many years later before I understood the damage I had caused the United States

—Air Force spy Jeffrey Carney, describing his recruitment

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—FBI mole Robert Hanssen, in letters to his handlers


a. Carney, Against All Enemies, 155–56.
capacity to commit espionage for as long as possible. As a result, the relationship between an agent and a handler is frequently highly personal, intense, and emotional, at least from the perspective of the spy, and the nature of this relationship is often a powerful force behind an individual’s choice to spy.

**Remedies and Risk Management**

How people who have the potential to spy gain clearances and secure entry into the Intelligence Community, how they progress and function once inside, and how the risk they pose might be mitigated are questions of critical interest to security and counterintelligence personnel as well as to medical and management professionals. The risk of spying can be mitigated through programs designed to spot and address warning signs at each stage of an employee’s career and by providing support services to troubled employees once they have been identified or by disciplining them appropriately.

The entry points into an organization can be safeguarded through rigorous security and psychological evaluations of applicants designed to spot and weed out chronically dysfunctional people unsuitable for clearances. Patterns of personality deficiencies that can result in trouble both at work and in personal lives not only attract the attention of trained observers of human behavior—such as psychologists and case officers—but also can be registered by more incidental observers, such as coworkers and neighbors. For this reason, background checks in the security clearances process are designed to tap into this informal reservoir of observations to identify maladaptive patterns that would put an intelligence organization at risk.

While such medical and security screenings of applicants are the first line of defense, ongoing security reviews of the employee population are the second line, with the intent of detecting personnel who demonstrate patterns of troubling attitudes or behaviors and intervening before serious misconduct occurs. The typology of psychological factors in espionage presented here has been helpful in organizing observations regarding the personalities, behaviors, and life circumstances of captured spies, with an eye to developing countermeasures and risk-mitigation strategies applicable to the workplace.

Routine security and counterintelligence reviews of applicants and staff should not be the only lines of defense, however, because while such reviews can pinpoint problems they do not necessarily ameliorate or fix them. Programs of education and support for the cleared workforce must supplement the safeguards provided by regular reviews. Educational programs regarding danger signs can assist employees and managers in spotting emotional or behavioral problems in colleagues or subordinates, or even occasionally in themselves, before they evolve into serious counterintelligence or security problems.

Effective follow-through once problems have been spotted is imperative in the form of active and well-staffed medical support for troubled employees. It is especially important to make such services available to employees who identify their own problems and come forward to seek support voluntarily.

Finally, case studies of apprehended spies have demonstrated that some

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**The Anger of Edward Lee Howard**

Howard was dismissed from the CIA in 1983 after a polygraph exam indicated he was involved in petty theft and drug use. In the months after his dismissal, he moved to New Mexico with his wife, Mary. His alcohol abuse escalated, and he became increasingly angry at what he perceived to be the agency’s unfair treatment. Howard claimed he provided information to the Russian KGB and eventually defected to Russia when he became aware of US surveillance of his activities, while believing he was unfairly targetted and accused. A book about Howard by David Wise and Howard’s own memoir, though filled with significant errors of fact, provide good examples of how a vulnerable person’s sense of disparagement and perceived ill-usage can provide the impetus to turn to espionage and the flawed, but compelling, justification for doing so.* Readers will notice similar strands of acrimony and disparagement in the Carney, Pollard, and Hanssen cases.

Howard’s death in Russia was reported on 22 July 2002. He supposedly broke his neck in a fall at his dacha, but the exact circumstances have never been made public.

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began their espionage in a state of crisis marked by intense anger and frustration, and sometimes by financial desperation, after being fired or in anticipation of termination. (See textbox on Edward Lee Howard on preceding page.)

Prudent risk mitigation in cases of termination or forced resignation should include, when possible, safeguarding the dignity of the person to inhibit feelings of vengefulness and disgruntlement and, on a pragmatic level, making efforts to provide for job placement programs and psychological and financial counseling services to assist the person in establishing a stable lifestyle outside of the Intelligence Community.

The Intelligence Community recoils every time a spy is caught. Laws have been broken, national security has been breached, and the bond among patriotic professionals has been violated. It would be consoling if the capture of major spies in recent years and the end of the Cold War signaled a downward trend in espionage. But the impetus to spy grows out of the human psyche, and personality dysfunctions, personal crises, and opportunities to serve other masters will never vanish. Understanding the elements of espionage is critical to remaining vigilant and safeguarding the vital mission of US intelligence.
Cold War Spy Fiction in Russian Popular Culture: From Suspi-

cion to Acceptance via Seventeen Moments of Spring

Erik Jens

Introduction

In 1972, a classified CIA document (right) describing an episode of a novel that was serialized in Komsomolskaya Pravda during January and February 1969 was filed in CIA Headquarters. The episode involved a supposed Soviet intelligence operation early in 1945, in which a “Colonel Isayev” successfully “sabotaged” negotiations OSS officer Allen Dulles was then conducting with the Germans in Bern, Switzerland. According to the report, Isayev also met two senior Germans, “Chancellor Bruening” and “Gestapo chief Mueller.” The report writer went on to conclude the account was “in all probability a fabrication”—although the Dulles negotiation was a fact—but in the interests of caution the report’s preparer recommended it be filed in Heinrich Muel-

ler’s CIA file—where it remained at least until 2008, when it was declassified. As it turned out, the episode was neither a real operation nor a “fabrication,” but a synopsis of an episode in a Soviet spy thriller titled Seventeen Moments of Spring, which went on to become one of the USSR’s most popular and enduring television miniseries.

That US intelligence analysts could mistake a work of Soviet-era spy fiction for reportable intelligence says much about the opacity, to Western observers throughout the Cold War and even afterward, of Soviet popular culture. The single most popular and venerable hero of Russian spy fiction, for nearly 50 years, has been Col. Maxim Maximovich Isayev, known to every Russian of a certain age by his working cover name, Max Otto von Stierlitz, or simply as “Stierlitz,” the hero of several Soviet-era novels and, most famously, the 1973 television miniseries Seventeen Moments of Spring. The series, commissioned by then-KGB chief Yuri Andropov to burnish the reputation

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a. This essay will use the terms “Soviet” and “Russian” interchangeably when discussing cultural attitudes, which had, and retain, deep roots in the Russian motherland.
of the intelligence profession, was hugely successful upon its broadcast premiere, and its annual broadcast thereafter until the 1990s remained a major pop culture event for Soviet viewers.

Seventeen Moments of Spring may even have played a role in the rise of Vladimir Putin. In his first job following his 1991 resignation from the KGB, Putin, then a St. Petersburg city official, had himself featured in a local documentary reenacting, as “Stierlitz,” an iconic scene from the miniseries. The episode, which also marked Putin’s “coming out” as a former spy, helped launch his political career, and the subsequent decade of adoring media comparisons to Stierlitz helped him all the way to the Russian presidency in 2000. Vladimir Putin, thus, like Schwarzenegger, rode the coattails of a fictional person to political leadership.

Yet Stierlitz, “one of the central characters in Soviet [and present-day Russian] grassroots mythology,” remains almost entirely unknown outside the former Soviet Union. For the intelligence historian, the background and production of Seventeen Moments of Spring provide worthwhile glimpses into Russian popular attitudes, informed by their national history and temperament, toward intelligence work as a subject of fiction.

Soviet Espionage Fiction Before the Cold War

In the Soviet Union of the late 1940s and 1950s, espionage, as a genre of fiction, held little appeal for the Soviet reading and movie-going public. This was partly a result of Tsarist Russia’s cultural affiliations with European high society. Russian political, cultural, and literary life had closely followed that of France since the 17th century; the connection strengthened throughout the 19th century and persisted until the establishment of the Soviet Union cut off, officially at least, most such Western influences. The 19th-century European literary disdain for fictional “spies” had therefore persisted in Russian literature and popular attitudes far longer than it did in the West. And, at the turn of the 20th century, the decade-long machinations of the sorry Dreyfus affair, perpetrated by mendacious French intelligence officers, gripped Russian readers and helped to solidify their image of “intelligence” as, by definition, wicked and, at best, a necessary evil.

The Russian literary world had therefore, by the start of the Great War and later, abdicated the field of espionage fiction to (primarily) the English, with Rudyard Kipling leading the charge. Along with him came the respective anti-German Jeremiads dressed up as popular fiction of novelists Erskine Childers and William le Queux, who established the spy thriller as a permanent fixture in the English literary landscape. But, neither Kim, that pivotal novel of Great Game espionage, nor the later writings of T.E. Lawrence (who, if not the first British “political” to don native garb, was surely the first to lend a largely fictional glamour to the intelligence business by posing in full regalia for the home newspapers as “Lawrence of Arabia”) had counterparts in or made any lasting impression on Russia or the Soviet Union of the period.

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The Soviet Union’s own early history created a second, more immediate and visceral, source of Russian cultural antipathy toward espionage as a genre of entertainment. By the start of the Cold War, “intelligence” in the collective Russian memory meant spies, informers, and secret murder, from the revolution through years of purges culminating in the Great Terror of the mid-1930s.

The Soviet intelligence services also emerged from the Great Patriotic War with few, if any, sweeping, ready-for-fiction espionage or counterintelligence. The respective anti-German Jeremiads dressed up as popular fiction of novelists Erskine Childers and William le Queux, who established the spy thriller as a permanent fixture in the English literary landscape. But, neither Kim, that pivotal novel of Great Game espionage, nor the later writings of T.E. Lawrence (who, if not the first British “political” to don native garb, was surely the first to lend a largely fictional glamour to the intelligence business by posing in full regalia for the home newspapers as “Lawrence of Arabia”) had counterparts in or made any lasting impression on Russia or the Soviet Union of the period.

A tipping point in overcoming Soviet popular disdain for fictional espionage was the 1961 elevation of Vladimir Semichastny to the head of the KGB.

Japanese fleet’s location and defeat it at Midway.

Yet another primary obstacle to the emergence of fictional hero-spies was the Russian obsession with defense. This long predated the USSR, but the Soviet Union could not be portrayed, even in fiction, as an aggressor; its mighty military and security forces were wholly for the people’s protection. But espionage, by definition, is something that a state does primarily to other states, usually on their territory. Indeed, the very name of the Stalin-era counterintelligence organization, Smert’ Shpionam (English acronym, SMERSH), meant “death to spies.”

Given all the obstacles—historical disdain for spying, memories of the Terror, and a lack of inspiring dramas in actual Soviet espionage history—Soviet “spy” fiction in the early Cold War centered less on traditional espionage and more on military scout or reconnaissance units, which at least were incontrovertibly a part of the Soviet military machine that had saved the motherland in the Great Patriotic War. Most Soviet films and books involving intelligence were thus packaged as “historical” or “adventure” films, their spy-like plot elements dressed up as Red Army scout patrols, or perhaps domestic counterintelligence—all ideally set in the early Cold War centered less on traditional espionage and more on military scout or reconnaissance units, which at least were incontrovertibly a part of the Soviet military machine that had saved the motherland in the Great Patriotic War.

A tipping point in overcoming Soviet popular disdain for fictional espionage was the 1961 elevation of Vladimir Semichastny to the head of the KGB, a post he held until 1967. Only 37 upon his ascension to KGB leadership, Semichastny had little direct memory of the Terror and had been just old enough to be drafted late in the Great Patriotic War. Jealous for the reputation of his agency, Semichastny anonymously wrote an article for Izvestia to assure readers that “many young Communist Party and Communist Youth League workers have joined the KGB and none of the people who, during the time of the personality cult of Joseph Stalin, took part in the repressions against innocent Soviet people is now in the Service [italics added].” Throughout his tenure, Semichastny not only supported positive fictional portrayals of the KGB, but also worked
At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov produced from his novel a script for a television miniseries, which was produced—again, with KGB approval and support.

to publicize the feats of formerly obscured, if not officially denied, Soviet intelligence officers. During and after Semichastny’s time in the KGB, the Kremlin came to lionize such Soviet intelligence officers and assets as Rudolf Abel, Kim Philby, and Richard Sorge.

Soviet Reactions to the Rise of James Bond

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Ian Fleming’s James Bond novels were gaining increasing popularity throughout the late 1950s and 1960s. The Bond film franchise, beginning in the early 1960s, launched Agent 007 into the global cultural stratosphere alongside Coca-Cola and Mickey Mouse. The Kremlin made sure to have Bond blasted in the pages of Komsomolskaya Pravda (not unjustly) as “liv[ing] in a nightmarish world where laws are written at the point of a gun, where coercion and rape are considered valour and murder is a funny trick.” Privately, however, Soviet leaders were well aware of Bond’s propaganda value to the West and of the absence of any equally charismatic Russian hero who might excite and inspire socialist readers.

Seeking a literary riposte to the increasing global popularity of the Bond franchise, Soviet officials turned to Bulgarian author Andrei Gulyashki, whose 1963 novel The Zakhov Mission had brought him to the attention of Soviet authorities as the likeliest candidate to create a Soviet literary rival to James Bond. Gulyashki, probably with KGB approval and support, visited London in 1966 to ask the late Ian Fleming’s publisher for permission to use James Bond as a character in his new book. His presence in England created a minor splash in Time magazine, which wondered in print, “Who would that baggy Bulgarian be, prowling up Bond Street, slipping into pubs all over town and quietly haunting the men’s clubs?” Gulyashki failed. Fleming’s publisher not only promptly denied him permission to use Bond or his 007 prefix, it took immediate steps to protect its copyright by commissioning Kingsley Amis to write, under a pseudonym, the first of over 30 post-Fleming Bond novels.

Gulyashki, undeterred, renamed his forthcoming book Zakhov vs. 07 and saw it into print in 1968. While as literature the novel has little to recommend it, it does illustrate a perennial distinction between Western and Soviet-era fictional spies: Agent Zakhov is more of a detective than a superspy, a man of simple tastes who nonetheless is able to best the brutal and misogynist “07.” Curiously, while the original novel leaves 07 alive and chastened at Zakhov’s hands, its English translation has Zakhov throwing 07 off a cliff to his death—which may say more about the political or money-making agendas of Cold War-era translators than about Gulyashki himself.

Beginning the Transformation

In 1966, the Soviet author Julian Semyonov, a longtime news reporter and tracker of Nazi war criminals, published a novel about a young Soviet intelligence officer, one Colonel Isayev, working against anti-Bolsheviks in 1921. His book attracted the favorable attention of KGB chief Semichastny and his successor, Yuri Andropov. Also intent on rehabilitating the KGB’s popular image, Andropov commissioned Semyonov to write a follow-up novel about a Soviet agent in Germany during the Great Patriotic War. Semyonov accordingly wrote his next novel, Seventeen Moments of Spring (1969) with substantial KGB support, including access to its secret archives.

While the perennial Soviet “book drought” prevented most Soviet citizens from reading Seventeen Moments before the miniseries premiered in 1973, many had read at least some of the story in the installments noted above in the CIA report on the Komsomolskaya Pravda series early in 1969. As printed, Seventeen Moments relied heavily on official-looking “dossiers” to introduce characters and move the plot along—doubtless one reason the CIA analyst took it seriously enough to have it filed as possibly genuine intelligence.

At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov produced from his novel a script for
a television miniseries, which was produced—again with KGB approval and support—during 1971–72. Upon completion of filming, a first edit of the miniseries sparked a spat between the KGB officials who had midwifed it and their military counterparts; the latter castigated _Seventeen Moments_ for ignoring the Red Army’s role in actually winning the Great Patriotic War. To placate the generals, director Tatyana Lioznova was forced to add a number of “meanwhile, on the battlefield” interludes, mostly random stock footage of Soviet ground forces in combat.17

The television premiere of _Seventeen Moments_, eagerly anticipated by Russian viewers, was an immediate smash success. Viewed by an estimated 30–50 million viewers nightly, the 12-part series was immediately heralded—and remains to this day—a cultural touchstone of Russian popular culture and the single most transformative event in rehabilitating, in the eyes of the Soviet citizenry, the image of the heroic Russian spy. It continued to be annually rebroadcast nationwide well into the 1990s.

The plot of _Seventeen Moments_ plays out in and around Berlin, during the war’s final months in 1945. Max Otto von Steriitz (played by the popular actor Vyacheslav Tikhonov) is a longtime mole high in the Nazi hierarchy. His primary mission is to disrupt secret peace talks between Germany and the United States, a scenario based very loosely on talks OSS officer Allen Dulles and SS commander Karl Wolff had as part of Operation Sunrise, a negotiation to secure the surrender of German troops in Italy. Along the way Steriitz disrupts a German nuclear weapon project, recruits several agents, and engages in a battle of wits with various high-level Nazis, especially Gestapo chief Heinrich Mueller. As the Javert-like Mueller comes closer and closer to identifying Steriitz as the mole within his organization, the latter must rely almost entirely on his wits to avoid detection.

To a Western viewer, the miniseries is deliberately paced—even for a Soviet film production—sometimes to the point of catatonia. Steriitz seems to spend as much time taking languid walks and engaging in conversations with people unconnected to intelligence—or the plot of the miniseries—as he does actually thwarting the Nazi high command. And in contrast to the typically lethal, kinetic climax of a Western spy thriller, as the entire Gestapo appears to be rummaging Berlin to find Steriitz, we see him sleeping in a car just outside of town. Yet this is part of the point of the story: Steriitz spends time and does things with people who have nothing to do with his mission, simply because, while an active intelligence officer, he remains a human being. He balances the necessary hardness of clandestine intelligence work with his need to remain a functioning social being with meaningful relationships—even if they are mostly with citizens of an enemy state.

The show’s “documentary” style, complete with portentous voiceovers and onscreen “dossiers” providing background on various characters, lends even its creative fabrications an authoritative air. Most notably, the central plot point of the series, which Russian viewers largely accepted as fact, is that the supposed secret peace talks were designed to carve up the postwar world behind Stalin’s back, not for its more limited aims, about which Moscow was duly informed.18 American journalist Hedrick Smith, traveling in Russia during 1973–74, found that “ordinary Russians,” almost universally admirers of _Seventeen Moments_, routinely accepted as historic truth its depiction of American connivance with Nazis at the Soviet Union’s expense.19

_The television premiere of Seventeen Moments, eagerly anticipated by Russian viewers, was an immediate smash success._

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**Seventeen Moments of Spring’s Uniqueness in Soviet Television**

The series was very well-made by Soviet standards, on par with theatrical films of the era. Among many other cultural accolades, Mikael Tariverdiev’s music, especially the theme song “Moments,” has entered the Russian pantheon of popular, frequently performed film music.20 But its production quality was only one of several factors that ensured _Seventeen Moments_ cultural immortality. Firstly, and in sharp contrast to most genre films and books to that point in Soviet culture, the script almost never refers to “the Soviet Union” or “the party.” Steriitz works and fights for “Russia.” And, significantly, we learn that Steriitz has spent “over a decade” in deep cover in Germany and thus cannot have been involved in the Great Terror of the mid-1930s. In Semyonov’s earlier books, Steriitz had been on duty at least since 1921, but that backstory was dropped from _Seventeen Moments_.

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Among Russian citizens, the cultural legacy of Seventeen Moments was the lasting positive impression of espionage it created.

Casting was another factor lifting Seventeen Moments far above the usual run of Soviet television productions. In contrast to the usual Soviet depictions of wartime Germans as unequivocally evil, most of the Gestapo high officials with whom Stierlitz spars throughout the series were played by beloved Russian character actors, whose mostly advanced ages in this KGB-assisted production also served as “a courteous bow to the vitality of Soviet gerontocracy.”

In particular, Leonid Bronevii, the Jewish actor and survivor of the Great Terror, playing Gestapo chief Mueller, pulls off the same trick that Tommy Lee Jones famously achieved in the 1993 American film The Fugitive: making the antagonist at least as sympathetic as the hero.

The sympathetic portrayal of many Germans throughout the series—including most lower-ranking and civilian Germans—not only deepened the story’s depth and subtlety in contrast to decades of politically orthodox hackwork in Soviet film and television but also served to assure the German audience of the 1970s that they were not held to blame for the evils of Nazi Germany. This approach, in turn, reflected the long-running Soviet propaganda strategy that separated Western leaders and their policies from Western countries’ citizens, an approach that was perhaps wiser than the West’s less subtle approach to Cold War propagandizing by railing against the “commies.”

Finally—and perhaps most critically for the continuing respect and affection Russians felt, and feel, toward Stierlitz—the hero’s predicament as a deep-cover operative in Nazi Germany echoed for more discerning Soviet viewers their own daily lives: an intelligent person surrounded by mostly sympathetic characters, to whom they can never utter a word of their secret thoughts. In informed-saturated Soviet Russia, this was a compelling metaphor. Indeed, many critics identified the Nazi Party of the television series as an allegory for the Soviet Communist Party.

In this reading of the miniseries, Stierlitz represents and speaks for the Soviet intelligentsia, forced to live within a society hostile to much of what they hold dear, prevented from ever speaking aloud what they truly believe. Seventeen Moments thus works both as a typical espionage thriller and as an unusually nuanced metaphor for Soviet daily life.

Critics differ on whether the KGB allowed or even encouraged such “dog whistles” to the Soviet educated class. Given the extent to which the KGB had involved itself in the production of both the source novel and the TV series, it seems likely that it licensed a calculated degree of subversive language and imagery that would help the series’ bona fides with cynical Soviet viewers.

For example, Stierlitz, while certainly never approaching “Bondian” levels of ostentatious consumption, is not above enjoying black-market treats from America and France: cigarettes, cognac, and other items that Soviet orthodoxy disapproved of but many ordinary Soviets of the 1970s craved and acquired whenever possible.

In any case, even under the KGB’s scrutiny, Seventeen Moments of Spring director Tatyana Lioznova made the most of her talents and her opportunities to introduce many layers of subtlety in realizing the approved shooting script on film—even beyond the unusually long leash the KGB provided.

Lasting Cultural Impact: Who Is the “American Stierlitz”?

Among Russian citizens, the cultural legacy of Seventeen Moments was the lasting positive impression of espionage it created. This emerging popular appreciation of the spy trade became, as will be discussed below, first an inspiration and later a powerful political asset for an ascendant Vladimir Putin. To fully appreciate the miniseries’ impact on Russian culture, we must first examine candidates, in the English-speaking world, for a similar position in our own popular culture.

While Stierlitz is often called “the Russian James Bond,” he is not nearly so cartoonish or formulaic a figure as is Agent 007 or indeed the majority of Western, and especially American, fictional spies. While of course Bond’s love of creature comforts and use of high technology reflect Western ideas (one might even say, the Western id), he also springs from a society that, much as it suffered in World War II, for the most part cannot begin to comprehend the shadow the Great Patriotic War cast throughout the Cold War over the roughly 80 percent of Soviet citizens who survived the German
onslaught. No fictional Russian spy, either approved by the Kremlin or accepted by the Soviet citizenry, could take such a cartoonish view of life and death as do James Bond and his countless Western imitations. Stierlitz’s strength lies rather in his intellect, his ability to keep a secret, and, especially, his endless patience, which, on film, occasionally tests the patience of, at least, the Western viewer. More George Smiley than James Bond, Stierlitz remains a step ahead of the Gestapo “by cunning and rhetoric, not an ejector seat.”

Comparisons of Stierlitz to Bond, or even to more cerebral and well-written Western creations like George Smiley, fall short in another sense. Bond is a pop-culture icon, on the same plane as Superman, Tintin, or Mickey Mouse. And however intricately and realistically John le Carré rendered him or how compellingly Gary Oldman and the late Alec Guinness played him on-screen, Smiley remains a creature of the shadowy intelligence world, known mainly to fans of the genre and having little to say to the wider culture.

Finally, Stierlitz’s quiet fidelity to his wife throughout a decade of cover assignment contrasts strongly with James Bond, Stierlitz’s strength lies rather in his intellect, his ability to keep a secret, and, especially, his endless patience, which, on film, occasionally tests the patience of, at least, the Western viewer. More George Smiley than James Bond, Stierlitz remains a step ahead of the Gestapo “by cunning and rhetoric, not an ejector seat.”

as a piece of technical filmmaking, Seventeen Moments has had little discernible influence on other filmmakers within or outside the former Soviet Union.

throughout Seventeen Moments but with never a whisper of seductive intent. Handsome enough to garner the lasting adoration of millions of Russians, Stierlitz nonetheless remains the consummate father figure, no more romantically available than Mr. Spock or Atticus Finch to those around him.

Indeed, Atticus Finch, as written by Harper Lee in To Kill a Mockingbird and played on-screen in 1962 by Gregory Peck, may be the Western literary and screen character whose impact most closely mirrors that of Stierlitz in Russia. This lawyer of the Deep South is, like Stierlitz, a morally complex and admirable character, highlighting by sheer force of character a national cultural attitude (in his case, awareness of the evil of racism). And Atticus, like Stierlitz, works to redeem an oft-disdained profession. Finally, again like Stierlitz and emphatically unlike the ever-fungible James Bond, Atticus was, and for most Americans could only be, played onscreen by a single beloved actor, whose face and persona have become inextricably linked with the character he played.

Frivolous as it might initially seem, Mr. Spock is nearly as apt a Western analog of Stierlitz as is Atticus Finch. The original run of Star Trek (1966–69) probably did more than any other television series to recast science fiction as a genre garnering the attention of an intelligent audience. Indeed, the Kremlin evidently had its share of Trekkies. Pravda allegedly complained after the first few episodes about the lack of any Russians in the otherwise overtly “liberal” and progressive series, resulting in the last-minute assignment of Ensign Chekov to the Enterprise.

Imagine a Soviet-era intelligence or propaganda service trying to understand American culture without ever having heard of either To Kill a Mockingbird or Star Trek, and the lesson for American intelligence and messaging professionals about the value of keeping up, to some degree, with Russian popular culture becomes clear.

As a piece of technical filmmaking, Seventeen Moments has had little discernible influence on other filmmakers within or outside the former Soviet Union. Though much admired in Russian culture, the veteran director Tatyana Lioznova’s masterpiece has never been emulated by her peers in the same way that, for example, Stanley Kubrick or the great Russian

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a. The author’s wife recalls classroom diatribes, all through her Moscow childhood in the 1980s, about America’s pernicious delay in opening a second front against the Russians during the Great Patriotic War. Like many former Soviet citizens, she remains impatient with Western film depictions of the war as a gallant adventure, won by the Western Allies as a matter of course.

b. The 2015 publication of the Mockingbird “sequel” Go Set a Watchman, featuring, alas, a racist Atticus, does not change this cultural history, though the character’s image has surely been tainted for those readers (not including this author) who accept the 2015 book as “canon.”

c. This claim, which producer Gene Roddenberry first made in a 1968 book, The Making of Star Trek, has never been verified or disproved, though a 1996 book by the series’ original producers reproduces a letter that Roddenberry wrote to Pravda, apparently in response to its complaint, informing the editors of Chekov’s addition to the cast—Herb Solow and Robert Justman, Inside Star Trek: The Real Story (Pocket Books, 1996).
Vladimir Putin was 21 when he first saw Seventeen Moments of Spring and has often credited the show as a primary influence in his joining the KGB.

director Andrei Tarkovsky continue to influence the language of film.

That said, at least one Hollywood spy thriller, Brad Bird’s Mission Impossible: Ghost Protocol (2011), paid homage to perhaps the most famous scene of the entire miniseries. Stierlitz is allowed to see, from across a café, his wife, secretly smuggled into Berlin from Russia for the sole purpose of this one meeting after a decade of being apart: they gaze at one another for over six minutes of screen time, allowed neither to approach or even speak to the other. In the final scene of Ghost Protocol, Ethan Hunt, still in deep cover like Stierlitz, is granted the chance to approach or even speak to the other. Of screen time, allowed neither to a decade of being apart: they gaze at one another for over six minutes of screen time, allowed neither to approach or even speak to the other. In the final scene of Ghost Protocol, Ethan Hunt, still in deep cover like Stierlitz, is granted the chance to approach or even speak to the other.

Russian popular affection for Max Otto von Stierlitz has not prevented the emergence of an entire genre of jokes (anekdoty) lampooning the often portentous and self-evident voiceovers throughout the series: Stierlitz had a thought. He liked it, so he had another one.

A flower pot fell off the window sill of the secret apartment and smashed Stierlitz on the head. This was the signal that his wife had just given birth to a son. Stierlitz shed a single manly tear. He hadn’t been home for seven years.

In these jokes, Stierlitz is affectionately conceived as a combination of the American TV characters Joe Friday and Maxwell Smart: a competent if self-important “straight man” within his fictional universe, but a hapless stooge outside of it. An entire academic subfield addresses the phenomenon of Soviet-era anekdoty, and Stierlitz and Gestapo chief Mueller, his chief foil in the miniseries, loom large in this literature.

Finally, there is a small irony in the fact that starting in 1973, the same year when Soviet intelligence, after decades of popular disdain, acquired via Seventeen Moments of Spring new respect and esteem at home, the American Intelligence Community began suffering a series of public blows—Watergate, Seymour Hersch’s revelations of spying on domestic groups, and reports from the Church and Pike Committees—from which it would take decades to recover in the public eye. Indeed, most pre-1990s American scholarship on “intelligence ethics” proceeded on the assumption that intelligence work is amoral and those who do it, by definition, morally compromised. To what extent was this badly mistaken stance influenced by the contemporary depictions of spies in American culture as violent and/or evil? Not only James Bond’s objectively poor behavior, but any number of 1970s thrillers using the CIA as the plot’s default Big Bad, and even M*A*S*H’s paranoid counterintelligence officer, Colonel Flagg, come to mind—and all suffer in contrast with the virtuous, and virtuoso in espionage, Stierlitz.

Vladimir Putin was 21 when he first saw Seventeen Moments of Spring and has often credited the show as a primary influence in his joining the KGB: “What amazed me most of all,” he was quoted as saying, “was how one man’s effort could achieve what whole armies could not.” Putin has also credited another miniseries of the Andropov KGB era, The Sword and the Shield (1968), which, however, seems to have left very little impression on Soviet and subsequent Russian culture—likely because of its strict party orthodoxy and inferior overall quality.

From the very beginning of his political career, Putin cultivated his media image as a “real-life Stierlitz.” Indeed, Putin’s first television appearance, when he was working...
in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office the year after his resignation from the KGB, was in a 1992 documentary about the city government. Putin himself urged the director to stage a famous scene from the miniseries finale—Stierlitz’s long drive back to Berlin after his final mission, as the iconic theme music plays—with Putin himself as Stierlitz. This “homage” to Russia’s most beloved fictional spy both announced Vladimir Putin to the nation as a former KGB officer and helped launch his national political career.28

Throughout the 1990s, Putin would continue to benefit politically from the stream of media comparisons to Stierlitz. The KGB veteran’s public image of quiet, reassuring professionalism played into popular angst about Russian political and social instability and the “public longing for a real-life Stierlitz who could deal with any crisis calmly and efficiently.”29 Indeed, the “Stierlitz phenomenon” had already become a cliché in Russian media commentary by early in Putin’s first presidency. The newspaper Vlast noted the political value to Putin of such comparisons:

The only thing that puts any blood at all in the veins of the generally rather pallid image of Putin is his past as a spy. Work in Germany, devotion to the homeland, shedding a tear on Soviet holidays. Maxim Maximovich Isayev [Stierlitz’s true Russian name], the very one.30

In 2003, presumably in recognition of his debt to the actor whose popularity and talent had helped launch his own career, Putin presented a medal (the Order for Service to the Fatherland, Third Class) to the 75-year-old Vyacheslav Tikhonov, who had remained a pop-culture icon since the 1970s based on his portrayal of Max Otto von Stierlitz.31

An important lesson that Vladimir Putin—and indeed, any political leader who studies the role of misinformation in consolidating power—might have drawn from this four-decades-old miniseries is its artful blend of facts and propaganda, presented with little effort to distinguish historic truth from creative fiction. As a result, even today many Russians derive their understanding of the wartime US-Soviet relationship largely from old memories of watching Seventeen Moments of Spring, cheering Stierlitz’s noble ef-
forts to thwart America and Germany from plotting against the motherland.

In our era of rapidly increasing, politically driven, and often highly successful “fake news,” increasingly abetted by high-tech fakery, it is worth remembering that carefully crafted, low-tech misinformation can be at least as effective, even after several decades. The KGB has seldom enjoyed such lasting success with any propaganda or disinformation campaign as with its support of Julian Semyonov’s story about a spy—nashi (one of ours)—in the Great Patriotic War.

**Conclusion**

While both Western and Soviet/Russian espionage fiction have historically developed at least partially in response to their respective governments’ agendas, as well as what their readership wanted, *Seventeen Moments of Spring* represents the apotheosis of a high-quality, enduring work of popular art—which nonetheless had its origins in, and was both supported and vetted throughout by, the very government whose agents’ secret heroics it portrayed. The CIA analyst who wrote the report quoted at the beginning of this essay may easily be forgiven for filing the plot of *Seventeen Moments of Spring* in the Agency’s historical Nazi files, given the book’s (and miniseries’) highly permeable membrane between historical accuracy and creative fiction. Whether the enduring Russian love for Max Otto von Stierlitz is in spite of, or due to, the KGB’s involvement with its production, *Seventeen Moments of Spring* remains well worth watching, both as entertainment and as a window into Russian popular culture and its effect on recruiting for, and glamorizing that nation’s intelligence community—no less in recent years than four decades ago.

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Endnotes


4. Ivan Zasoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (Routledge, 2004), 144.


9. Ibid., 63.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


17. Ibid., 111.


22. Ibid.


28. Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, chapter 8.

29. Ibid.


The Office of Naval Intelligence in World War I: Diverse Threats, Divergent Responses

Dr. Eric Setzekorn

Between 1917 and 1919, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) operated a multifaceted intelligence organization and was far ahead of its bureaucratic rivals, the still nascent FBI and US Secret Service, in a wide range of intelligence capabilities. It operated intelligence and counterintelligence programs both at home and abroad and pursued relatively sophisticated joint operations with other government agencies.

In key US industrial and scientific facilities, such as the Sperry plant in Brooklyn, New York, ONI gathered intelligence and detained suspects in cooperation with local police agencies. It also worked to impede German smuggling operations by disrupting financial networks. Efforts to develop a foreign intelligence capability, including collection and analysis, however, were less successful.

Examination of ONI during World War I offers a perspective into several aspects of American intelligence history, such as homeland security operations and intergovernmental bureaucratic politics among military, civilian, and nongovernmental agencies.

The ONI case also suggests the United States did have the organizational framework and ideological orientation to develop an effective internal security organization along the lines of the United Kingdom’s MI5 (The Security Service). However, ONI’s clear rejection of nonmilitary intelligence functions in the postwar period was a major inflection point in the evolution of US intelligence organizations.

ONI and the American Intelligence Community, 1914–18

The Office of Naval Intelligence was the first agency of the US government organized specifically to collect information on foreign threats. During the late 19th century, naval intelligence became an urgent requirement as the Industrial Revolution changed the nature of the global security environment on land and sea. In the case of the latter, ships rapidly switched from sail to steam and rifled steel cannons increased engagement ranges to miles rather than yards. In 1882, General Order 292 established an Office of Naval Intelligence attached to the Bureau of Navigation. The primary function of the new office was the selection and assignment of naval officers to US embassies in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. This program was steadily expanded, and by 1900, ONI could draw on a network of roughly 15 full-time attachés, each with a small staff, to collect and translate foreign...
After 1914, and particularly after the United States entered the war in 1917, multiple US executive agencies vied for counterintelligence primacy.

The Department of State had bureaucratic prestige and an existing global network to undertake an integrated intelligence program, and in 1916, it established an office—under a chief special agent to the secretary of state—with the mission of providing security for American diplomats, exchanging interned enemy aliens, and conducting investigations of foreign espionage. After the passage of the Travel Control Act in May 1918, the State Department also had control over the issuance of US passports and visas, a vital first step in any counterintelligence system. Factors working against the State Department were a limited staff and an institutional culture centered around a politically appointed elite with little inclination for intelligence “grunt work.”

The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Investigation had been created in 1908 to handle both domestic terrorism, specifically anarchists, and criminal violations of interstate commerce. It expanded rapidly after 1914, doubling in size to 200 agents by 1916, in large part because of instability along the US southern border associated with the Mexican Revolution and shipments of weapons to Mexico. The Achilles’ heel of bureau investigations was, and remains, an institutional structure and work culture based around the pursuit of legal prosecutions, which require information gathered to be both certain and judicially admissible.

The military rival of ONI was the US Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MI), established on 3 May 1917 as the result of the efforts of the energetic Col. Ralph van Deman as an appendage of the Army War College Division. Although the Army’s bureaucratic position was extremely weak and administratively chaotic, it had legal authority to draft personnel, an advantage that allowed it to grow much faster than other agencies. At the MI’s Washington DC headquarters, a massive staff of 1,259 supervised global operations. Domestic divisions of the MI did exist, but the organization’s primary duty was supporting American ground forces in France.

The X factor in the American Intelligence Community was the role of private contractors. The largest private intelligence organization was the American Protective League (APL), founded in 1917 by a Chicago advertising executive. The APL operated a national system of offices staffed by volunteers, generally

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The X factor in the American Intelligence Community was the role of private contractors. The largest private intelligence organization was the American Protective League (APL), founded in 1917 by a Chicago advertising executive. The APL operated a national system of offices staffed by volunteers, generally
upper-middle-class businessmen or professionals who helped government departments gather information on draft dodgers and enemy aliens.10 While not trained in counterintelligence duties, the APL provided all US intelligence groups with information, especially in the form of background details on suspects. While APL members were not paid, World War I presented a business opportunity for many former law enforcement, private detectives, and retired bureaucrats to form private intelligence companies. The Federal Service Bureau, which former Bureau of Investigation inspector Raymond Horn established, was typical of this type of contractor. Horn offered “to secure prompt and accurate information of value” by developing private intelligence sources in factories and conducting surveillance on designated targets.11

After the war began, ONI was challenged by a wide range of new duties in foreign and domestic intelligence. Wartime conditions hindered the operations of naval attachés, especially those assigned to Berlin and Vienna, and security measures such as censorship eliminated most of the open-source material attachés had relied on. Domestically, ONI was faced with the challenge of working with other US government agencies to maintain peace and stability while multiple nations, international groups, and domestic activists sought to influence policy. The term “domestic intelligence” refers to efforts by US government organizations to gather, assess, and act on information about individuals or organizations in the United States that is not necessarily related to the investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity. 

ONI was in a strong position to pursue counterintelligence operations during WWI. It had a strong bureaucratic position, a lengthy organizational history, and a global network of naval attachés. Despite these difficulties, ONI was in a strong position to pursue counterintelligence operations during WWI. It had a strong bureaucratic position, a lengthy organizational history, and a global network of naval attachés. It was also well motivated to pursue unglamorous jobs such as plant protection because the Navy was the premier “high tech” service during World War I and was heavily reliant on sophisticated equipment. ONI was also well placed to leverage its organizational familiarity with foreign trade networks that, in an era before air transport, was dominated by maritime connections. Like the Army, ONI could also use the draft to fill manpower shortfalls, but, unlike the Army, which had few facilities in major cities, ONI could operate from naval bases already established in all major American harbors.12

ONI's Three Primary Missions

ONI devoted the majority of its time and personnel to plant protection, shipping security/antismuggling violations, and nonattaché foreign intelligence collection. As we shall see, ONI had its greatest success in domestic intelligence operations to protect against enemy sabotage or espionage. However, in the third area, methods for collecting foreign intelligence were poorly conceived, horribly executed, and added little to national security.

After “Black Tom”: Plant Protection and the Sperry Corporation

During the period of US neutrality, 1914–17, the American defense industry grew as it exported war materials to Great Britain and France. Blocked from purchasing American munitions and supplies, Germany sought to destroy or disrupt the flow of American supplies, often at its source in the United States. In 1915 alone, explosions in 10 US munitions plants and aboard 13 British ships that had sailed from US ports caused widespread concern over industrial sabotage.13 Although poor safety
procedures and untrained workers were most likely the cause of some explosions, several German embassy personnel, with the knowledge and support of Amb. Johann von Bernsdorff, conducted a sabotage campaign aimed at crippling munitions shipments. The most spectacular of German sabotage operations was the destruction of the munitions depot on Black Tom Island in New York Harbor, resulting in seven deaths and the destruction of $17 million in property (over $400 million in 2014 dollars).

A key facility the US Navy was especially interested in protecting from sabotage was the Sperry Gyroscope Company in Brooklyn, New York. Established by the brilliant inventor Elmer Sperry, by 1917 the company was responsible for numerous Navy contracts and the sole producer of a series of highly sophisticated gyroscopes used for navigation and accurate gunnery operations aboard navy ships.

In early July 1917, ONI ordered Lt. Albert Fish to begin a confidential investigation into the security of the Sperry plant. The facility was seen as particularly vulnerable because of its urban location and because of its heavily German workforce. Lieutenant Fish began his investigation by establishing an independent office away from both the Sperry plant and nearby Navy facilities. Fish was in a strong position to demand cooperation from the company’s founder and president Elmer Sperry because of a clause inserted into all naval contracts that allowed for oversight of all production methods—and the Sperry plant had over $1.2 million in Navy contracts.

Lieutenant Fish’s first action was to compile an extensive system of dossiers on all company personnel, with managers subject to lengthy examinations of their personal history and associations. Based on these documents, Fish identified key individuals who had questionable personal behavior, unsupervised work positions, or family relationships in Germany, Austria, or Russia. The major problem facing Fish was the composition of the workforce, with only 509 workers out of a total workforce of 1,371 born in the United States to US-born parents. Roughly 25 percent of the workforce were non-US citizens, with Germans and Austrians representing the overwhelming majority of this group. Looking at Sperry Company management, Fish concluded that Elmer Sperry lacked both the skills and inclination to handle day-to-day management, which was delegated to Otto Meitzenfield, the plant superintendent. A German immigrant himself, Meitzenfield had been influential in recruiting highly trained German workers to operate the complex machinery.

With a solid understanding of the company structure, operations, and
personnel, Fish proceeded to the second phase of his investigation: focusing on key security risks. In August 1917, he engaged private detectives and local citizens to verify the personal information in the security dossiers, interview family members, and question neighbors about the personal behavior of Sperry employees. Common questions during these interviews included details of family members living overseas, personal finances, and political statements. The majority of these investigations turned up nothing substantive, but areas of concern such as frequent contact with foreign nationals or a recent change in spending habits were flagged, marking the subject for further investigation. 

The third phase of the investigation was in-depth surveillance of high-risk targets, using private investigators working in shifts. The New York Police Department (NYPD) greatly assisted ONI efforts by lending the services of a German-speaking detective to the surveillance operation. The detective entered bars or restaurants in the German immigrant community wearing plain clothes and engaged the subjects in conversation or a game of cards. 

During the investigation, Lieutenant Fish also used passive defense measures to strengthen the physical and information security (InfoSec) procedures at the Sperry plant. Fish arranged for five Navy personnel to be assigned to the Sperry plant security team. Unlike the civilian watchmen, the Navy personnel were armed and reported directly to Fish.

Supporting the investigations was a network of informants developed among plant workers. Although his presence was not officially announced, Lieutenant Fish was known at the plant, and several workers volunteered to provide information if they saw anything illegal or unpatriotic. Although Fish had initially planned to use bribes to gain information from within the factory, this was not necessary. Many of the informers at the plant appear to have been motivated by a strong dislike for Meitzenfield, who was nicknamed “the Kaiser” for his domineering style and temper. Moreover, Meitzenfield had promoted a large number of ethnic Germans to foreman and management positions, causing discontent among many workers.

With a solid network of informants, an ONI staff of 17, effective liaison with the NYPD, and a methodically collected intelligence database of potential security threats, Lieutenant Fish asked for permission to arrest workers on precautionary security charges. Since ONI’s evaluation of what constituted threats to the Sperry plant was not sufficient to bring direct charges, Fish identified only foreign nationals who could be detained for violations of immigration procedures and presidential directives. The specific charge used to detain the suspects was Article 4 of Presidential Proclamation 1364 from 6 April 1917, which stated, “An enemy alien shall not approach or be found within one-half of a mile of any . . . workshop for the manufacture of munitions of war or of any products for the use of the army or navy.”

After receiving authority from the ONI office in Washington DC, Lt. Fish coordinated the arrest of 96 workers in the early morning hours of 27 September. As a result of excellent surveillance work and using the resources of 250 police officers in 30 vehicles, all of the targets were seized with no reports of escape or resistance.

ONI operations at the Sperry plant demonstrated a highly methodical and apparently successful counterintelligence operation. While the scale of the detentions might appear excessive, all ONI actions between July and September 1917 were conducted in a logical, phased process and, in the threatening times, were seen as legitimate. The New York Times lauded ONI for identifying the “nests of Teuton Troublemakers.”

A special characteristic of the ONI operation at the Sperry plant was the use of “private contractors” ranging from unpaid plant informants to “trailing men” (surveillants). The small size of the federal government before the New Deal often required the use of short-term private contractors to fulfill government responsibilities. Many criticized the practice because of the potential for fraud and abuse of power, and in 1893, Congress passed the so-called An-
An indirect but more lasting method of disrupting smuggling was breaking apart the network of financial institutions and brokerage companies acting as fronts for German agents.

Shipping Control and Smuggling

A corollary to ONI’s involvement in the protection of vital defense industrial plants was the protection of American ships and enforcement of trade embargoes against Germany. After American entry into the war, an executive order established the War Trade Board on 12 October 1917 with authority to control all imports and exports. The board included representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce and sought to block all shipments to the Central Powers regardless of the type of product. While not a full member, ONI quickly became a vital source of information for the War Trade Board, supplying background information on ship’s personnel, placing informants on ships suspected of smuggling, and tracking vessels to foreign ports in order to monitor transfers.

A major problem for the War Trade Board and ONI was Germany’s well-developed smuggling network. During World War I, Great Britain’s naval blockade slowly crippled the German economy by restricting all imports. Prior to the war the German economy was a dynamic and integral part of the world economy, but without vital imports of key raw materials and foodstuffs, its war efforts and the domestic political system came under increasing pressure. American smugglers and agents of the German government used dummy corporations, refagged merchant ships, transshipped cargoes in neutral ports, and forged paperwork to get around British and, later, US countermeasures.

The most direct method of hindering smuggling was to arrest the smugglers and seize their vessels. Although most smugglers limited their efforts to small loads, several major arrests did occur, including with the seizure of the SS Ryndam, which was carrying 750,000 pounds of copper, 250,000 pounds of brass, and 1,700 barrels of lubricating oil to the Netherlands for transshipment to Germany. In another case, 1 million rounds of rifle ammunition were seized from a Norwegian ship bound for Denmark, another major transshipment point into Germany.

An indirect but more lasting method of disrupting smuggling was breaking apart the network of financial institutions and brokerage companies acting as fronts for German agents. Despite the possibility of seriously disrupting German operations, the practical details of investigating multiple layers of front companies, maneuvering through legal codes, and tracking international financial transfers proved difficult.

The case of George Mogensen is an example of the difficulties and opportunities ONI faced in creating a proactive intelligence investigation of smuggling. Mogensen first came to ONI’s attention in April 1918 after one of his clerks was reported making large purchases in Barranquilla, Colombia. Mogensen was a Danish immigrant who had settled in the United States, and in 1914, he and a French partner, Gerome Dumont, established the United States Brokerage and Trading Company to conduct a general import and export business between Europe and ports throughout the Western Hemisphere. Initially, the two partners invested only $10,000 but after only three years in business, gross revenue for 1917 was estimated at over $5 million.

As general manager of the United States Brokerage and Trading Co., Mogensen’s primary business was the shipment of foodstuffs to his home country of Denmark. Mogensen’s father Christian and brother Knud managed the firm’s branch office in Copenhagen. Knud Mogensen was on a State Department watchlist and was denied entry into the United States as the result of his frequent departures to and from Denmark.
ONI sent more than 85 nonofficial cover (NOC) agents—those not protected by diplomatic immunity—to locations as varied as China, Denmark, and Japan, but the overwhelming majority went to countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Upon arrival in Brazil, Breck energetically tracked wild rumors of Germans establishing secret bases, supplying U-boats, and storing arms for an insurrection.

by diplomatic immunity—to locations as varied as China, Denmark, and Japan, but the overwhelming majority went to countries in the Western Hemisphere. The threat of German activity in the Western Hemisphere was complex, with political instability in Mexico, the presence of large German immigrant communities in South America, and widespread smuggling in Central America and the Caribbean. ONI NOC agents attempted to integrate themselves into local communities, gather information and report to headquarters but were not tasked to undertake any kind of covert action or contact with local government.

The case of Edward Breck is indicative of larger patterns of foreign intelligence operations. Breck had previously served the US Navy by providing reports from Spain during the Spanish-American War. He entered ONI service in February 1917 and was dispatched to Brazil the following month. On paper the opportunity of sending a highly qualified, independent agent to conduct intelligence work that naval attachés could not conduct seemed ideal. Breck was well educated, had traveled widely, and spoke German, Spanish, and Portuguese fluently. The cover developed for Breck was that he was “Dr. Ernst Brecht,” an independently wealthy “traveling professor” with pro-German sympathies.

The intelligence mission assigned to Lieutenant Commander Breck was to evaluate the potential for pro-German Brazilians to influence foreign policy or provide support to Germany. Brazil had attempted to remain neutral during the war but after German submarines sunk several Brazilian ships, most notably the ship Parana in April 1917, Brazilian public opinion shifted in support of joining the war against the Central Powers. Breck’s arrival in Brazil coincided with a period of extensive political maneuvering as prowar politicians, especially Brazilian President Venceslau Bras, organized political support against pro-German leaders, most notably ethnically German Foreign Minister Lauru Mülle.

Complicating Breck’s mission was the uncertain communications system. Operating independent of the US embassy and therefore unable to use diplomatic communications services, Breck was forced to use Western Union to send reports to the ONI office. And because of the encoding, his reporting created a security risk because it would have been highly unusual for a foreign traveler to send encoded messages to the US Navy telegraph office. Moreover, because Breck had to do the encoding himself, the messages per force were extremely short and had many small errors that could have hindered the operation. Breck mailed longer reports to the Navy attaché at the American embassy in Rio de Janeiro for inclusion in diplomatic pouches; it could take more than three weeks for these reports to reach ONI headquarters. Along with the formal reports sent through the Brazilian mail service, Breck enclosed personal correspondence to his wife with full names, addresses, and personal information. Both of these methods exposed Breck’s association with the ONI, and even the most basic counterintelligence operation could have discovered that association.

Upon arrival in Brazil, Breck energetically tracked wild rumors of Germans establishing secret bases, supplying U-boats, and storing arms for an insurrection. Some of the more outlandish claims involved the building of a secret German U-boat base upriver in the Amazon jungle. Much of Breck’s reporting appears to be unsolicited political and diplomatic advice rather than anything resembling an intelligence report. He frequently noted that Brazilians were “hypersensitive” to social norms and status and felt it would be helpful if an American admiral arrived in the area. That Breck appears to have lied about his ability to speak Portuguese and was forced to find English-speaking sources of information also hindered his investigations.

ONI Director Roger Welles had instructed Breck to avoid unnecessary exposure, but upon arrival in Brazil he decided to announce himself to the British in order “simplify
the work, and probably save much time and money” and, he reasoned, “in any case the U.S. and Britain would probably be allies soon.” After meeting the British naval attaché, Breck gullibly agreed to follow some of the “good leads” the British officer had given him and share information.

The one systematic aspect of Breck’s misadventures was the way in which he addressed his finances. In his letters Breck is careful to continually ask for large amounts of money to ensure his ability to mix with high society and entertain. Entertaining prominent Germans appears to have been the primary method of Breck’s intelligence collection. “I am laying plans to get in more closely with the aristocratic element, the headquarters of which is the Deutscher Club,” he reported. “The chief interests seem to be wine, women, and horses, with some gambling thrown in. A little bird shooting also takes place also (sic).”

Breck’s other primary investigative technique was reading German-language newspapers. He argued that although ethnic Germans in Brazil were not well integrated and there was no real chance of significant violence, nevertheless the German-language newspapers were a “real German menace to Brazil.” He believed closure of the outspoken German-language newspapers would send a signal to the population and eliminate the trouble of “loud-mouthed” agitators.

After four months of investigation, Breck was able to report that fears of German-inspired violence in Brazil were unfounded. As he put it, “I have not been able to discover the actual existence of a single wireless plant, a single collection of arms and ammunition for war purposes of any account, or of any naval base for provisions or ammunition.”

Enclosed in this final report was a newspaper clipping from a Brazilian English-language newspaper reporting that a US naval officer using the name “Ernest Brecht” was engaged in spying on Brazil’s German community. The English paper was reprinting an earlier article in the German-language Urwaldbote (Jungle Courier), which had interviewed many of the Brazilians that “Professor Brecht” had contacted and found that he had repeatedly tried to induce them to make statements supporting the Central Powers and the kaiser. Astoundingly, Brecht appears to have contacted the Urwaldbote newspaper to demand a retraction. “The gentleman assured us very volubly that he has only the most friendly feeling for the German colonists,” the Urwaldbote wrote, “but we do not believe him.”

Based on this newspaper clipping, it appears that from his earliest arrival in Brazil, Breck had been identified as an agent of the American government engaged in espionage. His official reports contain little real information and are, for the most part, filled with rumors and speculation inferior in quality to any local newspaper.

Although to an intelligence analyst the adventures of Edward Breck appear incompetent, amateurish, and a waste of time and resources, in postwar correspondence Admiral Welles gave great praise to foreign intelligence collectors and Edward Breck in particular. When writing close friend Adm. Austin Knight, Welles stated that during the war, Lieutenant Commander Breck traveled to Buenos Aires and joined German clubs and was convincing, valuable and “a perfect wonder” of an agent.

Organizational Change and the MI5 Model

After the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918, ONI quickly relinquished all major responsibilities in plant protection and shipping security. After Admiral Welles was reassigned, the new ONI director, Adm. Albert Niblack, made decisions strongly favoring attaché activities over domestic intelligence operations. “It has been the aim of the office to use only reputable business methods and avoid anything savoring of ‘gumshoe’ methods,” he wrote.
In congressional testimony, Niblack explicitly said that he would forgo many of ONI’s wartime functions. . .

In 1920, “This point can not be too strongly emphasized.” The clearest manifestation of this approach can be seen in the rapid contraction of ONI headquarters staff from over 300 officers in late 1918 to 24 by July 1920. All branch offices closed in December 1918 regardless of the status of investigations.

In congressional testimony, Niblack explicitly said that he would forgo many of ONI’s wartime functions even if it meant relinquishing the large budgets and staff that went with the domestic counterintelligence mission:

One of the great things I have had to contend with has been to get the Office of Naval Intelligence away from some of the wartime activities which grew up and which had to do with enemy agents. I have done my best to unload that . . . my endeavor has been to get back to the old-fashioned system with a naval attaché who is a member of the Diplomatic Corps and who conforms to all the conventionalities.

By dropping ONI’s counterintelligence mission, Admiral Niblack moved from a budget of over $1 million per year allocated for fiscal year 1918/19 to only $65,000 projected for 1919/20.

Whatever the explanation for Niblack’s unloading of counterintelligence, he may well have protected the Navy from the kind of condemnation Attorney General Mitchell Palmer would eventually suffer for his actions in 1919 and 1920 against perceived internal enemies. Niblack’s shrinkage of ONI functions to core functions of technical collection was in this sense a “safe bet” that maximized long-term organizational security over short-term budgets.

Implications for US Intelligence

ONI’s operations during World War I demonstrate that in its early years the US intelligence apparatus was highly fluid, with shifting boundaries of authority and objectives defined by intelligence organizations themselves. In spite of press attention to the “confusion and impotence of the spy-catchers,” no agency established a strong bureaucratic claim to the domestic intelligence role. Despite operations ranging from the protection of defense industrial facilities, commercial surveillance, and foreign intelligence collection, ONI essentially rejected these functions.

The Navy’s decision not to maintain the large intelligence posture it had created during the war, especially for domestic and commercial surveillance, represented a clear difference between the US experience and those nations that adopted a dedicated domestic security service. Before 1918, ONI and MI5 shared roughly equivalent roles and similar military structure and operating procedures. The greatest difference between the two appears to be the level of political support and personal encouragement given to MI5 by Winston Churchill, who at various times filled the role of home secretary, first lord of the admiralty, secretary of state for munitions, and secretary of state for war. Churchill’s use of MI5 in each overlapping area appears significant in allowing a steady expansion of MI5 functional boundaries. In addition, MI5’s first chief retained the post from 1909 through 1940, ensuring a stable organizational system.

In contrast, ONI functioned within a military structure that had clearly defined areas of specialization. US Navy officers had no specialized career track for naval intelligence, and ONI was often headed by officers destined for early retirement. Rapid turnover among ONI staff and the retention of a traditional Navy promotion track ensured that no ambitious officer would seek an ONI posting.

The experience of ONI during World War I demonstrates that the US intelligence system had the potential to evolve along lines similar to MI5, with ONI as the nucleus. Instead, domestic “intelligence” functions would grow within the FBI and eventually a US intelligence community would emerge that maintained an almost sacrosanct distinction between organizations responsible for domestic security functions and those with foreign intelligence responsibilities. The decision marked, in my judgment, a key moment in the evolution of US intelligence.
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Tracking the History of a Counterinsurgency Expert: Four Books by David Kilcullen

Reviewed by JR Seeger

Intelligence in Public Media

Most of Kilcullen’s arguments are not entirely new and, to his credit, he acknowledges the fact that he is writing on a subject that has a long history. His focus on the human motivations of allies, neutrals, and adversaries and the cultural and politico-military environment of the conflict is consistent with that of many earlier writers on the subject. For example, his focus on the importance of the motivations of locals as a key to understanding the reasons for an insurgency or terrorism is entirely consistent with the writings of previous experts in the same fields. What makes the Kilcullen books well worth reading is that he has applied the same theories of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to the current world, where culture and ideology are mixed with accelerating factors more often studied by economists and futurists. In short, he is using established theory, modified to address the 21st century, in which insurgents and terrorists are linked to the outside world through transnational economies and global telecommunications networks.

In the first two books, Kilcullen describes the hostile environments that the US government faced in the first 10 years of the 21st century. US forces were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in multiple, smaller but just as deadly actions in other regions of the globe. The original counterterrorism purpose for these conflicts—the hunt for terrorists and/or the defeat of state and non-state sponsors of terrorism—had an entirely different result. By 2005, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to the current world, where insurgents and terrorists are linked to the outside world through transnational economies and global telecommunications networks.

In the last 15 years, David Kilcullen has become one of the most influential scholar-warriors of his generation. Kilcullen started his career as an Australian infantry officer. During his service, Kilcullen was deployed to East Timor and West Papua. His interests in the local insurgency there resulted in a PhD in anthropology from the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2000 with a thesis entitled, “The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia, 1945–1999: A Fieldwork Analysis of the Political Power-Diffusion Effects of Guerrilla Conflict.” This began Kilcullen’s transformation from a well-respected infantry officer to a leading strategist and policy expert in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, in both Australia and the United States. He served as an advisor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2011, the special advisor for counterterrorism to the Secretary of State from 2005 to 2009, and as a senior counterinsurgency advisor to General Petraeus in 2007, when Petraeus was commander of the Multinational Force—Iraq. He is currently the chairman of Caerus Global Solutions.

Most of Kilcullen’s arguments are not entirely new and, to his credit, he acknowledges the fact that he is writing on a subject that has a long history. His focus on the human motivations of allies, neutrals, and adversaries and the cultural and politico-military environment of the conflict is consistent with that of many earlier writers on the subject. For example, his focus on the importance of the motivations of locals as a key to understanding the reasons for an insurgency or terrorism is entirely consistent with the writings of previous experts in the same fields. What makes the Kilcullen books well worth reading is that he has applied the same theories of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to the current world, where culture and ideology are mixed with accelerating factors more often studied by economists and futurists. In short, he is using established theory, modified to address the 21st century, in which insurgents and terrorists are linked to the outside world through transnational economies and global telecommunications networks.

A review of all of Kilcullen’s publications is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper focuses on the four books he has published since 2009. In these four books, we see Kilcullen working through the changing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism threat landscape, and in each book, he focuses on strategic and policy issues, offering specific tactical and operational guidance to on-the-ground practitioners involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

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ing terrorist networks in both countries. In *The Accidental Guerrilla* and *Counterinsurgency*, Kilcullen focused his writing on capturing the reasons why these insurgencies occurred, the transformative nature of these insurgencies, and how US and allied forces might better address these challenges at the operational and tactical level. The title “the accidental guerrilla” arises from the premise that adversaries in conflict zones gain additional manpower simply in response to the actions of the counterinsurgency force. Individuals who had been neutral or even potential allies at the beginning of a conflict can become committed adversaries if they see the counterinsurgency force as doing more direct harm than the insurgents.

Kilcullen begins *The Accidental Guerrilla* with a list of ways to think about the new conflict environment, which Kilcullen describes as “complex, ambiguous, dynamic, and multi-faced . . . impossible to describe through a single model.” (7) The four models to consider the problem, he suggests are:

- as a backlash against globalization,
- as a globalized insurgency,
- as a civil war within Islam, and
- as asymmetric warfare.

Kilcullen uses the example of three 21st century battles to help explain what happened, why it happened, and possible solutions for winning the battle or—at the very least—mitigating the damage that the conflict environment might do to the local population. In *Counterinsurgency*, Kilcullen reinforces this sophisticated argument by stating categorically, “Even if we are killing the insurgents effectively, if our approach also frightens and harms the local population, or makes people feel unsafe, then there is next-to-no chance that we will gain their support. If we want people to partner with us, put their weapons down, and return to unarmed political dialogue rather than work out their issues through violence, then we must make them feel safe enough to do so…” (4)

Kilcullen’s message in these two books argues for a level of nuance that is a challenge for any conventional military force commander who has young soldiers and Marines not trained in the culture and not able to speak the language of the people they are supposed to be protecting. The messages of these two books resonate with what theatre commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010 regarded as the “way forward.”

However, some of the same problems Kilcullen identifies in his first two books remain problems in the second decade of the 21st century. Akbar Ahmed in his 2013 work *The Thistle and the Drone* (Brookings Institution Press) reiterates Kilcullen’s premise of the risk of alienating local populations while attacking adversaries. It is clear that not all strategic advisors on terrorism and insurgency understood the challenges. This may have been due in part to the shift, late in the George W. Bush administration and early in that of Barack Obama toward a smaller military footprint in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and greater use of manned and unmanned air assets to conduct counterterrorism operations. If nothing else, Ahmed’s book underscores the importance of Kilcullen’s focus on cultural, economic, and political environments that create both insurgents and terrorists. In counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions, kinetic solutions from the air alone will not translate to strategic success.

In the second two books, Kilcullen moves from a focus on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan toward a focus on the international terrorist threat and the transformation of terrorist networks in the second decade of the century. *Out of the Mountains* is a very specific discussion of how the United States and US allies must transform strategic counterterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures in response to terrorist networks’ moving from rural, mountainous safe havens to the mega-cities of the developing world. Kilcullen continues to use the term “guerrilla” and often conflates counterterrorism operations with counterinsurgency operations—in part, because he views al QA’ida as a globalized insurgency. This is not surprising because his experience in Iraq blurs the line between insurgents and terrorists, between those fighting in the cities (because they were hostile to a central government in Baghdad nominally allied to US and UK forces in country) and those fighting in the cities (because they were determined to establish an extremist foothold in a state riven with conflict).

Kilcullen argues that the nature of the conflict is going to change because

“... the context for these operations ... will differ radically from what we’ve known since 9/11. In particular, research on demography and economic geog-
raphy suggest that four megatrends are driving most aspects of future life on the planet, including conflict. These are rapid population growth, accelerating urbanization, littoralization (the tendency for things to cluster on coastlines), and increasing connectedness. If we add the potential for climate-change effects such as coastal flooding, and note that almost all of the world’s population growth will happen in coastal cities in low-income, sometimes unstable countries, and we can begin to grasp the complex challenges that lurk in this future environment.” (25)

In Blood Year, Kilcullen focuses on the rise of Daesh, also known as the Islamic State. He addresses the origins of Daesh and looks at the challenges the Western world faces in handling this new and complex terrorist threat. Kilcullen attributes some of the threat to the efforts of the United States and its allies to “disaggregate” al Qa’ida by decapitating its leadership, by disrupting and demolishing funding networks, and by breaking al Qa’ida into regional component parts. He argues that this disaggregation helped to build a different threat, which calls itself Daesh or the Caliphate.

“For those of us who worked so hard to ‘disaggregate’ al-Qa’ida, the implication was as obvious as it was uncomfortable: a fully disaggregated terrorist movement, with an ideology insidiously attractive to alienated and damaged people likely to act on it, combined with omnipresent social media and communications tools that hadn’t even existed on 9/11, could enable a spread of terrorist violence unconstrained by time, space, money, or organizational infrastructure. Add in a do-it-yourself tactical toolkit of improvised weapons and random targets, and we could be looking at an atomized, pervasive threat even harder to counter than the global insurgency it replaced.” (113)

In these two books, as with his two earlier works, Kilcullen brings the reader back from the academic and strategic and returns to the practical and tactical.

There have been many articles and books published on the conflicts that followed the tragedy of 9/11. Scholars have debated in detail the question of whether the United States has been fighting a “global war on terrorism,” a “transnational terrorist network,” or fighting multiple wars defined as insurgencies, civil war, and even “wars of civilization.” Kilcullen offers a different perspective on these conflicts. He sees the conflicts as part of a larger, single “global insurgency,” generated by and reflecting the massive changes that have taken place in the Islamic world at the end of the 20th and the first decades of the 21st century. While Kilcullen’s scholarship matches that of others in the field of military strategic thinking and structures an explanation for why we are facing the challenges we are facing, he never loses sight of the fact that many of his readers are practitioners of counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorism who are directly involved in these conflicts. He provides concrete recommendations for the practitioner, even as he closes his books on strategic transformation (or in the case of Blood Year, an argument on what he sees as our strategic failure). Kilcullen is not the only author that specialists in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency need to read, but he is certainly one of the authors that practitioners need to read if they wish to understand current and future threats and design strategies and tactics to address them.
Intelligence in Public Media

Shattered Illusions: KGB Cold War Espionage in Canada
Donald Mahar (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 221 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Shattered Illusions is a quirky example of intelligence history. It tells the story of a Soviet illegal in Canada, Yevgeniy Brik, who became a double agent for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in the early 1950s, was betrayed and imprisoned in the Gulag, resurfaced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and finally resettled in Canada. The case is little known—Mitrokhin gave a brief summary and Sawatsky a longer, though necessarily incomplete account—but Mahar’s recounting shows why it is one to be familiar with.1

It’s easy to see why the KGB chose Brik to be an illegal. His father worked in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and in 1926, when Yevgeniy was five, was posted to the Soviet Trading Corporation office in New York. Yevgeniy and his mother joined the elder Brik a year later and the family lived in Flatbush, where Yevgeniy went to school and became a native English speaker, until they returned to Moscow in 1932. Yevgeniy continued his education at the Anglo-American School until he went to a Russian school in 1936, and was a university student when he was drafted in 1939. He served as an army communicator during the war, achieved a high level of proficiency in Morse, and joined the Communist Party. Small wonder, then, that in the late 1940s when he was back in school and working as a part-time English translator, the KGB came knocking. Yevgeniy needed none of the years of language and cultural training that most illegals recruits require; trained in tradecraft and equipped with a false identity, Brik arrived in Canada in November 1951, with the mission of ultimately moving to the United States to become the communicator for another illegal, Rudolf Abel.

Despite his promise, Brik was a disaster as an illegal. He spent much of his time binge drinking and whoring, and then fell into an affair with the wife of a Canadian soldier to whom he eventually confessed his identity and mission. She, in turn, convinced him to walk in to the RCMP, whose Security Service at the time was responsible for Canadian counterintelligence. He did so in November 1953, and soon was giving his debriefers full details of his biography, mission, and tradecraft. He also handed over his shortwave communications schedule and one-time pads, enabling the Mounties to read all of Moscow’s messages. The KGB, with no idea that Brik had been doubled, increased his operational responsibilities, and gave him agents to run. He promptly identified all of them to his RCMP handlers.

Brik was a handling nightmare for the Mounties, frequently drunk and erratic in his behavior, but overall the case went well until February 1954. Then, in a decision that violated the basic rules of operational security, the head of the Security Service, James Lemieux—who had risen in the RCMP’s criminal side and had no intelligence experience prior to his appointment to run the Security Service—asked Corporal James Morrison, a Mountie who was not read into the case, to drive Brik from Ottawa to Montreal. (Morrison had managed to ingratiate himself with Lemieux, and the Security Service chief’s main reason for detailing Morrison to the drive seems to have been to have the corporal bring back some smoked meat from their favorite Montreal deli.) Morrison, like Brik, was a womanizer. In addition, he was a spender and chronically in debt, to the point that he began to steal RCMP funds. The inevitable came in June 1955 when Morrison, realizing his thefts were about to be discovered and that he needed to replace the money, approached a Soviet intelligence officer in Ottawa and betrayed Brik for $3,000.

Two months later, Brik was called to Moscow for training; before he departed Canada, the RCMP and British (to whom the Mounties had declared the case) gave him a communications plan. Brik, however, was arrested on his arrival, interrogated, tried for treason, and sentenced in 1956 to 15 years imprisonment. Brik likely was saved from execution by his decision to tell all and then cooperate in a deception operation that identified Daphne


The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
Park—who eventually rose high in SIS and was made a baroness but at the time was a first-tour officer at the British Embassy in Moscow—as an intelligence officer.

More twists were to come. Morrison continued his espionage—he no longer had any meaningful access and, to the Soviets’ annoyance, little to give up after Brik—until he was caught in 1958. Rather than charge Morrison, however, the RCMP cashiered him and covered up the affair. Not until 1983, after journalist John Sawatsky published *For Services Rendered*, did the Brik case, Morrison’s treachery, and the RCMP’s cover-up become public knowledge. He was charged under the Official Secrets Act, convicted, and sentenced to 18 months. Meanwhile, Brik survived the Gulag and, after his release, became a low-level railroad worker. He retired in 1985 and, with his pension, also received a lifetime railroad pass, which he used to go to Vilnius in 1992 and, recalling his 1955 instructions, walk in to the British Embassy. There, he asked the British to contact the Canadians. In June, after several months of careful preparation, Brik was exfiltrated and flown to Canada. There he lived until his death in 2011, as much a handling problem in resettlement as he had been decades earlier. Morrison died in 2001.

This summary barely hits the highlights, let alone captures the complexities and tragic ironies of the Brik case. Making Brik’s case even more interesting is the number of others it touched. Brik’s was the first of a number of Soviet cases to go bad for the RCMP and, as the mole hunt began, suspicion fell on Leslie James Bennett, who happened to be a personal friend of Morrison’s from whom the traitor elicited information (and also the focus of Sawatsky’s book). In what has become a classic example of a CI investigation gone bad, Bennett became the lead suspect, eventually resigning from the Mounties and emigrating to Australia (he was publicly exonerated in 1993). Others who came into contact with Brik include his cellmate, Grigoriy Maironovskiy, who developed poisons for the KGB; one of his formulations was used to kill Cy Oggins, an American who had spied for the Soviets but wound up in the Gulag. Two more prison acquaintances were Pavel Sudoplotov, who had been in charge of assassinations for the KGB, and his deputy, Leonid Eitingon, who had directed the murder of Trotsky. One certainly could meet interesting people in Soviet prisons.

The author of *Shattered Illusions*, Donald Mahar, started his intelligence career with the Mounties and retired from CSIS, which took over Canada’s CI mission when it was established in 1984. He worked on Brik’s exfiltration and debriefings in the 1990s and now, with the aid of declassified files and interviews with surviving figures, has written a fast-paced account of this fascinating case. Therein, unfortunately, lies the problem with the book. Mahar keeps the story moving so fast—189 pages broken into 38 chapters—and writes in such a terse, just-the-facts style that the reader is left wanting additional detail to flesh out the characters and operations. While he writes with commendable clarity, Mahar gives so little background, in fact, that his book is best suited to readers who already are familiar with the history of Russian intelligence and illegals operations, the Bennett case, and the recent history of Canadian intelligence. Additional background information would have made *Shattered Illusions* accessible to an audience beyond specialists.

The reader is also left with the nagging feeling that Mahar has left out important points. For example, while Mahar understandably withholds details of Brik’s exfiltration in 1992 because the particulars remain classified, one wonders why there was such a complex operation at all. Brik had no trouble taking a train to Vilnius, so why did the Canadians not simply fly him to North America right away, rather than spend months making elaborate preparations? (Other former Western agents left Russia during this period by openly obtaining visas from the countries they had worked for and then flying or taking trains out of Moscow.) It makes no sense, unless the explanation still is too sensitive for publication, which raises the question of what else Mahar may have chosen to omit or was required to leave out.

These issues aside, *Shattered Illusions* is a solid and accurate account that tells the basics of its story and fills in the historical blanks. For that reason, it is a worthwhile addition to the literature on Soviet and Russian intelligence.
A common pitfall in writing revisionist history is the tendency of authors who set out on such endeavors to realize—at least on some levels—that the orthodox interpretation of historical events or leaders had much going for it. Such is the case with *The Fall of Heaven*, Andrew Scott Cooper’s biography of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the last king of Iran. The title says a lot about what the author probably intended to write, but also about what the book becomes in the end. Cooper wants his readers to reconsider the Shah and the prevailing image of him as a cowardly, prevaricating despot who squelched democracy, squandered Iran’s enormous oil wealth, and ruled with—to mix metaphors—an iron fist, disguised in a velvet glove. At the outset, in fact, Cooper boldly declares that the Shah has been misunderstood and that his rule marked a golden era of Iranian history. By the time he is finished, however, Cooper shows more balance, and focuses on telling a compelling story about how the Shah’s family managed the end of its dynasty and, in the process, makes a noteworthy contribution to the literature on the Iranian Revolution.

Some of the praises Cooper showers on Pahlavi in the opening chapter are excessive and would appear to even the informed generalist as transparently questionable and probably unsubstantiated. Take, for instance, his claims that the Shah “outmaneuvered ruthless and wily American presidents” such as Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, or that he “steered Iran through the treacherous currents of World War II.” (13–14) In the former example, most American presidents viewed the Shah, when considering him at all, as a necessary ally against Soviet encroachment in the Middle East and resigned themselves to working with him in spite of his weak character and grating pomposity. In the latter example, Cooper shows more balance, and focuses on telling a compelling story about how the Shah’s family managed the end of its dynasty and, in the process, makes a noteworthy contribution to the literature on the Iranian Revolution.

Cooper struggles almost from the outset with the evidence before him. If he intended to reevaluate the Shah, too often he is confronted with anecdotes and illustrations that point to the Shah’s being who we thought he was. Cooper, to his credit, does not try to explain them all away and tries—more often than not—to paint a nuanced picture of Pahlavi, drawn from an impressive array of interviews with those who knew him and a smattering of secondary sources. However, in several cases, Cooper fails to give sufficient weight to evidence that suggests his efforts to rehabilitate the Shah’s image are in vain. For example, Cooper describes how the Shah adored his teenage daughter but grew to neglect her because his second wife did not care for her. (68–69) He pointed out that this decision would haunt the Shah when his daughter later turned on him publicly, but Cooper fails to mention how this reflected the Shah’s own personal weakness. In another instance, Cooper recounts an interview the Shah gave during a trip to the United States in which he declared, “this king business has personally given me nothing but headaches” (35)—comments Cooper calls “maudlin and self-pitying” (100) but implies were the exception rather than the rule. The problem, however, is that Cooper provides the reader sufficient evidence to argue that the opposite was more likely the case.

*The Fall of Heaven* is not without its merits. Cooper convincingly argues that Queen Farah probably deserves more credit than contemporary observers gave her, and he draws a flattering portrait of her as a frustrated reformer. He highlights her efforts to tone down the over-the-top, weeks-long celebration of what the Shah called 2,500 years of Persian monarchy at the site of the ancient city of Persepolis in 1971, as well as corruption within the
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The Fall of Heaven

royal family and its court. Likewise, he credits Farah for promoting women’s issues and education for girls, as well as promoting the arts and public health. Also, Cooper’s almost day-to-day account of the last few months of the Pahlavi rule and the Shah’s mismanagement illustrates how a crisis so unthinkable to outside observers—including the CIA and the State Department, until the damage was largely done—could unfold over a relatively short period of time.

Perhaps the most novel aspect of Cooper’s account is his discussion of the revered Iranian-Lebanese cleric, Musa Sadr, whom Cooper argues was a closet supporter of the Shah and was prepared to return to Iran from Lebanon in 1978 to stand with the king in a call for national unity before disappearing during a trip to Libya. Many theories exist about Sadr’s disappearance; he was never seen again, but Cooper lays his death at the feet of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his revolutionaries. This story is interesting and shines a light on the Shah’s efforts to find a clerical counterweight to Khomeini, but no evidence indicates that Sadr could have successfully challenged the exiled Ayatollah by that late stage.

Another aspect of this book that bears further examination—even if Cooper’s conclusions do not always hold up—are points of evidence that suggest the Shah’s regime was less repressive than is commonly believed. For example, Cooper highlights the research of former seminarian and Islamic Republic bureaucrat Emad al-Din Baghi, who led the post-revolutionary investigation into the Shah’s crimes. In short, Baghi found that the number of those the Shah ordered killed or imprisoned for political crimes was far smaller than what the mullahs and other political opponents had claimed. Where Khomeini had accused the Shah of killing over 100,000 people during his rule, Baghi could only find fewer than 4,000, a number that included 2,781 fatalities during the 1978–79 revolution. Those numbers pale in comparison to the 12,000 who are believed to have been killed by the Islamic Republic during Khomeini’s decade in power from 1979 to 1989, including an estimated 3,000 political prisoners in one week in July 1988.

Cooper is not the first to cite Baghi’s data to a Western audience, but he uses that information to argue convincingly that the Shah’s repression was no worse than that of contemporary despots such as Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, and that his was milder, certainly, than Iraq’s Saddam Hussein or Syria’s Hafez al-Asad. What he fails most importantly to do, however, is to put that repression into the proper context of the Iranian people and their leaders. With the exception of only a very few members of the royal court and family, Cooper points out that the Shah shared power with practically no one by the mid-1970s.

In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two nominal political parties and established the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party, commonly referred to as the “King’s Party.” As Cooper points out, the Iranian people interpreted this as “a final, brazen attempt to bury their cherished 1906 Constitution.” (217) In the end, the Shah had few true loyalists who would stand and fight for him against Khomeini and his followers, and he had only himself to blame.

The Fall of Heaven falls short of the best biography of the last king of Iran—Abbas Milani’s The Shah (St. Martin’s Press, 2012)—but it is more nuanced and balanced than most other Shah biographies to date. At the very least, its careful examination of Queen Farah, detailed account of the royal family’s last days in power, and reconsideration of the true level of Shah-era repression should prove useful to students of Iranian history and politics, political psychologists, and leadership and political analysts writ large.

Thus the book will also inform those who have absorbed literature addressing intelligence in the period 1954–79, including books such as Columbia scholar Robert Jervis’ Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. The work, published in 2010, is partly based on Jervis’ classified research—since declassified—into CIA analysis before the Shah’s fall.\footnote{See Torrey Froeschler’s review in Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 3 (September 2010).} \footnote{As this issue was being prepared, the State Department released about 1000 pages of declassified documents concerning TPAJAX. It is available in State’s digital Foreign Relations of the United States collection.}
This book provides an unusual view of World War I through the archival scholarship and research efforts of James Srodes. Srodes’s idea for *Spies in Palestine* came about while he conducted research to produce a biography of Allen W. Dulles, a fact he shares in the prologue. While combing through British archives, he came across references to an intelligence organization referred to as “A Organization.” This led him to Sarah Aaronsohn and her heroic intelligence efforts assisting the British in defeating the Ottomans during World War I. The book itself is poorly titled and misleading, as it is about so much more than Sarah Aaronsohn—and only roughly five pages of it is spent on her love life and betrayal. Instead, this is an excellent history of how, in search of a homeland, Jews worked globally through diplomatic and intelligence efforts to establish a separate state, free from Ottoman rule.

Srodes begins by introducing the Aaronsohn family. In 1882, Ephraim Aaronsohn and his family arrived in Syria-Palestine from Romania, becoming one of the most prominent families in the First Aliyah of Jews to migrate. Srodes deftly explains the reasons behind the Jewish migration, and the environment and challenges that the first wave of Jewish settlers faced. In fact, it was these challenges that fortified the Aaronsohn family and many others to fight for Eretz Israel, the biblical homeland of the Jews. In the migration, Ephraim brought over two sons, Aaron and Zvi. Aaron is a central figure in the book and is critical to the American and British Zionist movements. His relationship with his sister Sarah, who was not born until 1890, is crucial to the intelligence work they eventually embarked upon.

Aaron Aaronsohn, a well-educated young man, found his first opportunity to spread Zionism to America through his studies of wheat. In 1905, and during the Second Aliyah of Jews to migrate from Europe, University of California Berkeley invited Aaron to visit and share his research on wheat as America was searching for additional ways to feed its own booming population. He was offered a lucrative position at the university, turned it down, and headed on a tour of the United States that later greatly benefited the Zionist movement. By the end of his first trip to the United States, Aaron met with and received patronage from a number of prominent Americans, including Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. In 1910, he returned to Palestine with $20,000 to support the Zionist movement and to establish an agricultural research station named Athlit. Over time, this research station—in Ottoman territory—provided the Aaronsohns the opportunity and cover to conduct clandestine intelligence operations.

After Srodes introduces the Aaronsohn family, he breaks from the storyline to focus on the Three Pashas, Ottoman rulers established through conflicts in the region. While the dialogue of the book takes on a journalistic style at this juncture, the background is critical to the storyline. By 1913, the Ottoman Empire was ruled by a trio of war heroes, Ismail Enver, Mehmed Talaat, and Ahmed Gamal Djamal, who established power through the invasion of Libya in 1911, and the First Balkan War that ended in 1913. Once in power, they sought to cleanse the Ottoman territory of foreigners. As history reports, Constantinople set its sights first on cleansing the territory of Greeks and Armenians. During this period, Arabs in the territory also experienced executions and police action against them. These unfortunate and reprehensible actions against foreigners provided a warning for the Jewish population and ultimately led to the founding of NILI.

What began as an attempt by the Aaronsohns to use World War I to their advantage and break free from Ottoman rule to establish a Jewish state eventually became a full-fledged intelligence organization called NILI. The name of the organization originated from the Book of Samuel, “Nitzach Israel lo Ishakari,” translated to “The Eternity of Israel shall not lie.” Because Sarah was a woman, she was unable to travel outside of her hometown; as such, she was left behind to run intelligence operations, while her brother Aaron traveled to garner
funds, support, and ensure that NILI’s intelligence reports made it into British hands.

As Srodes reports, NILI initially provided the British with maps of Palestine and the Gaza Desert, which included geological and cultural specifics. Then, in 1917, the British formally recognized “A Organization” as a source of “reliable” intelligence and began requesting and receiving up-to-date intelligence reports. To do this, NILI used homing pigeons, trained and provided by the British, and drops-offs in the nearby port and off-coast excursions. Until the end of the war, NILI provided up-to-date Turkish troop activity, including the movements of artillery and other weaponry and transportation vehicles. NILI’s intelligence and Aaron’s diplomacy won over the British High Command to eventually pursue a Jewish state.

Sarah and Aaron, working together, were able to provide critical intelligence to the British on a geographical and cultural area sorely misunderstood by the British. In fact, throughout the book, one cannot help but think about the American struggle in the Middle East and how important knowledge and intelligence is to operational planning. In his quest to fight for a Jewish State, Aaron worked beside T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and was present at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference that ended World War I. It took 28 more years for Israel to become a state.

*Spies in Palestine* reads as part novel, part history book. Srodes did an incredible job weaving history into a palatable story of human suffering and accomplishment. This book is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in intelligence operations, the Ottoman Empire, World War I, and the history of the Zionist movement and establishment of the State of Israel.
The goal of any historian worth his or her academic salt should be to either plow new ground or rearrange the furrows with newly-planted facts or interpretations. Author James Stejskal has satisfied that goal with this brief volume on the history of Special Forces Berlin (SF Berlin). Known by various names throughout its three-decade existence, the unit—initially known as “Det A” (unclassified), formally the 39th Special Forces Detachment (then classified)—has been described by the former commander of the US Army Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland (Ret.), as a unit that “remained in the shadows until history and discretion allowed a public accounting.” (vii) The author, who served in the unit in the 1970s and 1980s, volunteered to write this book—dedicated to the 800 members who served in SF Berlin—seeking to preserve their stories while they are still alive to tell them. Understandably, there were few extant official records concerning the unit during its existence and fewer now, which amplified his challenge.

The warriors of SF Berlin, located 110 miles inside East Germany, knew their primary responsibility in wartime was to conduct unconventional warfare (UW)—specifically, missions targeting the Berlin road, rail, and canal infrastructure. In a larger sense, their mission was to buy time for the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), who had only 10,000 US troops in West Berlin to temporarily fend off 575,000 East German and Soviet troops. Additionally, they were to train whatever local guerrilla forces could be located or organized, using the extensive caches of weapons, explosives, radios, and dollars buried in the area; the theory was that a 12-man team could train 1,200 guerrillas.

As Stejskal notes early on, the first SF units were patterned after those of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II. After some experimentation with structure, SF settled on 12-man teams, each member cross-trained in several areas to add depth to the limited manpower. Besides being SF-qualified, each unit member was required to hold a Top Secret clearance and to demonstrate a high level of proficiency in German or an Eastern European language; those with the best language skills and who represented the bulk of the unit early on tended to be “Lodge Act” soldiers, ethnic Eastern Europeans welcomed into the US Army in the postwar period.

Two external developments affecting Det A were the 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall five years after the unit arrived in Berlin, which heightened the tension and potential danger, and the Vietnam War, which decreased the pool of potential replacements for the unit. From a high of 10,000, the number of SF troops declined to 4,200 by the mid-1970s. As the author points out, the unit also had to deal with the constant challenge of missions other than its primary UW one: underwater operations, in which only one team was trained; counterterrorism operations, which involved close coordination and training with the German police and anti-terrorist force GSG-9; and close quarters battle training, in concert with the FBI, the Israelis, and Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS).

As the author notes, Det A was training for participation in the Iranian hostage crisis following the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. Even then, its primary mission was intelligence collection and the rescue of the three Americans held captive at the Foreign Ministry. Again, the Det’s mandatory support to Army exercises limited personnel available for the Iran hostage rescue mission. The collision of a helicopter and a C-130 at the Desert One landing site in Iran aborted Operation EAGLE CLAW and led to widespread adverse publicity; an unintended consequence was that team members were left in Iran to find their own way out. Afterward, the Det A contingent began training for its own follow-on, SNOWBIRD, inside the Foreign Ministry. The 20 January 1981 release of the hostages made the task superfluous.

In 1981, SACEUR Gen. Bernard Rogers visited the unit for a briefing, the upshot of which was a refocusing on strategic intelligence collection and reporting and an emphasis on CT operations—the latter both an “oppor-
tunity” and a “problem,” according to Stejskal—rather than UW, which he notes was still perceived as counter to “the American way of war.” (5) Fatefully, the shift also triggered an OPSEC survey of the unit that uncovered irregularities. Adding insult to injury, the unit’s OPSEC was compromised by a Newsweek article focused on a team member who had participated in the hostage rescue operation and mentioned an “SF unit in Berlin.” As a result of that disclosure, the OPSEC survey judged that the unit should be shut down and a new unit be created in a different location, which happened in 1984.

The new unit was designated the US Army Physical Security Support Element-Berlin (PSSE-B), its classified designator the 410th SF Detachment. The PSSE-B was ostensibly an MP unit tasked with conducting vulnerability surveys on US government facilities. This renaissance brought with it two significant problems, however—first, Det A and the PSSE-B were never divorced from one another, not in the eyes of the German police, with whom they trained and not with the German public, with whom they had interactions, and most definitely not in the eyes of Soviet and East German military and intelligence entities. Second, PSSE-B’s Regional Survey Teams found themselves doing little else; thus, the unit was spending 60 percent of its time on its cover rather than on its true mission. Although the unit was able to participate in a full urban UW exercise in 1985, other missions still intruded, including CT (such as TWA 847, the Achille Lauro cruise ship attack, and the La Belle disco bombing) and the fatal shooting of Military Liaison Mission (MLM) member Maj. “Nick” Nicholson by a Soviet border guard.

The other unexpected development was the fall of the Berlin Wall. The event prompted security concerns and the withdrawal of all SF and Military Intelligence (MI) units in Berlin until a decision could be made concerning future dispositions in Germany, if any. In the meantime, the unit’s extensive linguistics capabilities came in handy when a flood of refugees from the former East Germany began inundating the West. The unit’s last mission was to provide linguistics support to the Joint Allied Refugee Operations Center in Berlin. In this radically changed environment and with no need for its mission, PSSE-B was officially disbanded on 15 Aug 1990 and the UW mission would fade for a decade.

In retrospect, did it matter that Det A and PSSE-B had ever existed? While the author clearly thinks so, his statements that Special Forces “contributed greatly to the end of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe” and that “principal Warsaw Pact commanders were aware of its existence and respected its capabilities” (268) are largely unproven. Stejskal does admit, however, that since Warsaw Pact forces never swept through Western Europe, it is impossible to say if the unit could have performed its wartime mission. He notes, for example, that OSS had the benefit of pre-existing resistance movements to work with in Europe; these did not exist in the Soviet satellites.

Stejskal concludes Special Forces Berlin with a look at how the Soviets and the East Germans viewed the SF unit and what they knew of its mission and operations. He notes, for example, that the Military Liaison Mission, Field Station Berlin, CIA’s Berlin Operations Base, and the 766th MI Group were prime targets of Soviet and East German intelligence, as was the SF unit. The Stasi’s first report on Det A was produced in 1975, with a fuller one in 1982—while the adversary services apparently never knew specifics, Stejskal writes that they had a good idea of the general SF mission in Berlin.

Given the unit’s secretive nature, its limited manpower, and the passage of time, it is not surprising Stejskal’s book is the only one on this somewhat esoteric subject. An extensive selection of photographs adds to the volume’s value, but readers will need to have a tactical bent to appreciate the numerous weapons references. The SCUBA jargon (85) will leave non-Woods Hole researchers in a haze, and the near-glorification of alcohol use and abuse does not redound to the credit of an elite military element. The author also spends pages (101–103) explaining how sergeants major “choose” brigade commanders, which will come as a surprise to the US Army, and he clearly has no use for such skills as Soviet uniform recognition, described as a “stupefyingly monotonous subject,” (107) despite its proven value in ground order-of-battle and related intelligence collection and reporting. Finally, the repeated appearance of “[Redacted]” in the text serves no useful purpose and is frustrating for readers.

Despite some flaws, Special Forces Berlin is a decent and valuable study of a little-known topic whose significance is enhanced by the continuing challenges in the US-Russia strategic relationship in Europe and elsewhere. In short, if we did not have the information in this volume, we would be the worse for it.

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The very mention of the word “Gestapo” brings immediately to the minds of most people nightmarish images of sadistic butchers working for a criminal organization that prided itself on its ability to expertly and enthusiastically engage in genocide within Germany and occupied Europe before and during World War II. British historian and author Frank McDonough has written The Gestapo to refute that false impression, to provide what he calls a “fresh interpretation”—some would call it a “revisionist” view—of how the Geheime Staatspolizei operated, primarily within Germany from 1933 to 1945. As he states categorically, “The assumption that Gestapo officers arrested individuals, interrogated them brutally, then sent them to a concentration camp, is a myth.” (54) He also refers to his book as an example of “history from below,” written from the standpoint of individuals affected, rather than the traditional approach of “history from above,” focused on the organization. McDonough’s book is derived from research into a group of Gestapo records that amazingly survived the war: 73,000 records from the Dusseldorf region of Germany that document the interactions between the Gestapo and the German populace.

It is important to remember, McDonough posits, that the Gestapo began as nothing more than a police department, whose detectives followed strict protocols and were even issued an instruction manual for the conduct of investigations, arrests, and interrogations. He assesses that the Gestapo left most German citizens alone, because they were determined to be no threat to the state; furthermore, the vast majority of even those Germans who were investigated was usually released. It was not only a question of proclivities and authorities, it was a matter of numbers—McDonough claims that at no time in its history did the Gestapo ever have more than 16,000 active, full-time officers to monitor 66 million people, making it impossible to live up to their reputation of being omnipotent and omnipresent. His research also enables him to “bin” the victims of Gestapo abuse and torture into specific categories—religious dissidents, Communists, “social outcasts,” and Jews. The mature Gestapo recruited ordinary officers from either working-class or lower-class backgrounds, many of whom had left school at age 16 with no formal qualifications. By the late 1930s, those who were “up-and-comers” tended to be young, well-educated, middle class individuals, many of whom had law degrees or doctorates. Those German males who procured coveted posts in the political police/Gestapo were selected for their police training and experience, not their Nazi Party membership or status, and only a minority of Gestapo officers were ever Party members. Most who did join the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (Nazi Party)) did so simply to keep their jobs, the only way to enjoy a lucrative pension in retirement.

In his opening chapter, McDonough discusses the origins and rapid development of the Gestapo, from a Prussian political police force in 1932, led by World War I fighter pilot ace Hermann Göring, to what was by 1936 a secret state police force for all Germany. McDonough credits Göring, along with Rudolf Diels, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich, with the creation of the Gestapo.

The year 1933 proved to be a watershed for the development of the Gestapo—the Reichstag fire of February, likely set by mentally handicapped Dutch communist Marinus van der Lubbe, prompted the declaration of the Gestapo as the secret state police in Prussia by April. As Göring and Diels consolidated their gains and expanded their authorities in Prussia, Himmler and Heydrich competed with Sturmbteilung (SA) leader Ernst Rohm for control of the police in the other states of Germany. Rohm naively believed that Himmler’s Schutzstaffeln (SS) was subordinate to the SA, a conclusion McDonough accurately characterizes as “a grave tactical error.” (27)

Wrongly believing that Rohm intended to wage a coup, Göring, Himmler, and Heydrich murdered him during the 1 July 1934 “Night of the Long Knives,” a bloody purge of the SA by the SS. Heydrich used this non-existent threat to redefine the term “enemy of the
state” and justify the continued existence of the Gestapo after 1934. Within two years, the Gestapo was recognized as the secret state police for all of Germany, and by the advent of World War II in 1939, the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) was the centralized security authority for the entire country, solidifying Himmler’s victory.

Predictably, the tenets of the major religious faiths in Germany before and during World War II ultimately meant conflict with the Gestapo. The welcome news of the Concordat between the Papacy and the Third Reich deceived many Catholic bishops, who were reluctant to criticize Hitler’s regime, at least until priests began being charged with currency smuggling and sexual abuse and once Hitler adopted the T4 program, the innocuous cover name for a program of euthanasia. Among religious groups in Germany, the Gestapo particularly singled out Jehovah’s Witnesses for persecution, as they were a small group with no defenders and were officially banned by 1935.

The most systematically persecuted political group in Nazi Germany proved to be the Communists. The Reichstag fire provided the pretext for a crackdown, and 10,000 Communists were arrested that night. Some tragically fled to the Soviet Union, where they became victims of Stalin rather than Hitler; ironically, even after the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, German Communists remained supporters of the Soviet Union. The bottom line was that by the late 1930s, most German Communists resigned themselves to the Nazis as a fact of life, just another form of oppression the bourgeoisie waged against the proletariat.

Also falling victim to the Gestapo’s deprivations were all those categorized as “social outsiders”—specifically, habitual criminals, homosexuals, sex offenders, prostitutes, juvenile delinquents, members of street gangs, Gypsies, and even the long-term unemployed. The most-hardened habitual criminals—the “three strikes and you’re out” equivalents—could find themselves in a concentration camp; 20,000 died, and most died, according to McDonough. In the most extreme cases of sexual misconduct, the state resorted to sterilization in a last-ditch effort to salvage these individuals as members of the “National Community.” Between 1933 and 1945, McDonough estimates that the state involuntarily sterilized more than 350,000 Germans.

Although not the primary target of the Gestapo, at least not initially, German Jews also fell victim to the secret police service. The author partially attributes the stage-by-stage persecution of the Jews in Germany to the economic success of German Jews, which prompted resentment from the rest of the populace. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws motivated many Jews to leave Germany, while those remaining faced increased persecution by the Gestapo, especially for “race defilement,” the legal definition of Aryan-Jewish sexual relations. But worse was to follow, especially in the wake of the November 1938 murder of a minor German consular official, Ernst vom Rath, by a German-Jewish teenager and refugee incensed at learning that his parents had been deported from Germany to Poland. The response to the murder was a nationwide Jewish pogrom known as Kristallnacht (“The Night of Broken Glass”), in which the windows of Jewish-owned shops were smashed, prompting more Jews to leave the Fatherland. In September 1941, when German Jews were forced to begin wearing the yellow Star of David with the word Jude (Jew) in black in the middle, most non-Jewish Germans applauded. Beginning the next month and continuing until the summer of 1942, the Gestapo organized wholesale deportations of German Jews. As McDonough puts it, “It is hard to understand the consequences of a tidal wave in the hours of darkness.” (211)

Although McDonough argues effectively that the Gestapo, at least in the pre-war period and the early days of the war, generally operated in accordance with the law, he also points out in an interesting chapter how the Gestapo always investigated denunciations of individuals by the public. He claims that 26 percent of all Gestapo cases began with a denunciation of, usually, a neighbor or family member. While few such cases resulted even in imprisonment, much less death, the advent of war predictably brought less tolerance of dissent, especially in the wake of the February 1943 German defeat at Stalingrad. Many such denunciations were “self-inflicted,” resulting from “loose lips” freed either by alcohol or unrestrained rage and frustration.

The final chapter of The Gestapo discusses the bringing of the Gestapo before the bar of justice during the postwar period, from 1945 until the mid-1960s. McDonough highlights the “sub-trial” of the Gestapo at Nuremberg, where a German defense attorney vigorously denied the charge that the Gestapo was a criminal organization, because it was acting in accordance with the
The attorney also refuted the idea that the Gestapo was all-powerful or filled with rabid Nazi Party members. Although the Nuremberg tribunal rejected such statements out of hand, a paucity of surviving documentation made prosecutions difficult and rare, and leniency was the usual result of denazification court trials as well.

McDonough concludes his book on the depressing note that in postwar Germany, many former Nazis had prominent positions and the vast majority of former high-ranking Gestapo officials with law degrees were able to return to their law practices without having to worry about looking over their shoulders.

*The Gestapo* is a welcome restoration of balance to history’s view of the Gestapo and provides much new information. It is well-documented, and the author’s familiarity with archival sources and the historiography of the Gestapo is evident. It is a readable volume, with a nice selection of photographs, although the addition of maps would be helpful. By the same token, however, readers need to be aware of what they’re getting into—*The Gestapo* reads more like a quantitative, scientific study than a flowing historical narrative. Particularly vexing is the author’s penchant for including a personal account and then, once the reader is hooked on the details, abruptly ending the discussion with the phrase “ultimate fate unknown,” perhaps understandable but also avoidable.

Readers who seek a more traditional history may be more satisfied reading other books or at least supplementing *The Gestapo* with such, although the number of books focused on just the Gestapo is limited—Carsten Dams’s 2014 volume *The Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich* seems to suffer from some of the same criticisms as McDonough’s, and Jacques Delarue’s *The Gestapo: A History of Horror* is extremely dated and colored by the author’s background as a French Resistance member captured by the Germans. Nevertheless, *The Gestapo* is worth the read, especially for its “revisionist” view that the Gestapo was not inherently evil but prostituted to serve other causes than law enforcement.
Spinning History: Politics and Propaganda in World War II
Nathaniel Lande (Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 277 pp., photos, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Clayton Laurie

Historical figures and episodes are often the focus of the dramatic arts and have been, from the time of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, to Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and Henry V, to today’s Hamilton. Just as often, however, history on stage and screen is changed, glossed over, misinterpreted, or even ignored for the sake of making a particular political or social point or in creating what scriptwriters may perceive as a more interesting or captivating story. Historians are used to this. Where, after all, would Hollywood, cable TV, and much of the print and broadcast media be without history as the basis for much of our popular entertainment?

In Spinning History, author Nathaniel Lande takes this “theater meets history” connection to an absurd level, applying the terminology and processes of the stage to his interpretation of the politics and propaganda of World War II, which he describes not just as the 20th century’s greatest conflict but also as “its greatest theatrical production.” This thesis may seem plausible to anyone in the arts, from actor to scriptwriter or producer, to whom history seems one grand saga, a long-running stage play, carefully and deliberately crafted and scripted, acted, produced, and managed. This book, as a cover blurb notes, “illuminates how all sides used social psychology, propaganda, and drama to skew public opinion” and how “theatrical staging, dramatic storytelling, and message manipulation were key to the efforts of both sides,” as demonstrated by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Stalin. The thesis indicates a total misunderstanding of history, and this book ironically accomplishes what the title states—if only historical events and human beings were as simple, understandable, or predictable as Lande’s interpretation implies. Serious scholars and intelligence officers can safely ignore this book.

To those in the fine arts looking for a basic primer or broad overview of World War II propaganda, media, and politics, or those entirely new to history or to the conflict, this work will superficially enlighten, as it touches on ideas, people, and events that are rapidly moving beyond living memory. While Lande’s thesis makes sense from a theatrical viewpoint, he repeatedly demonstrates a very shallow knowledge of people and most subjects discussed, often elevating trivial and anecdotal episodes and people to major significance. The duplex drive tanks that failed on D-Day and the Slapton Sands training fiasco are certainly tragic, but neither was a war-changing event. That Hollywood studios self-censored their movies to enable export to Nazi Germany in the 1930s is interesting, but also not significant because the nefarious Nazi soon became a stock film character.

In addition, neither the subversive “black” propaganda of the OSS or Britain’s Political Warfare Executive had any measurable impact on the course or outcome of the war, nor did Frederick Kaltenbach or the handful of Americans who made Nazi propaganda broadcasts. Poet and Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish and journalist Norman Corwin were fleeting players, and even though millions viewed Frank Capra’s Why We Fight film series, Americans were convinced of the justice of the Allied cause before then. The fact that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis, and Stalin and the Communists, excelled at producing glitzy rallies, lurid posters and movies, and solemn rituals that garnered cult-like support is not new. The author does not address how Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill managed to elicit similar support without such displays; he evidently deems fireside chats and BBC broadcasts as equally effective even though the totalitarian governments controlled all media toward a single party line. Historians will note that leaders since ancient times have used whatever means they deemed necessary to muster support for national goals, but that often such persuasion is not needed as people respond to threats, invasions, or attacks without much higher-level inducement. World War II was not new in this regard even though film, radio, and a more literate public made messages easier to convey to wider audiences.

The book contains far too many factual errors to list here; one of the most egregious places the D-Day inva-
sion on 7 June 1944 rather than the correct 6 June date used several pages later. Thorough historical fact-checking and editing would have helped, but every error of fact and interpretation further undermines what is already an amateurish history. The book contains a large bibliography of many older works, many long ago deemed inaccurate or superseded by newer, more solid research. Lande has overwhelmingly relied on popular, non-scholarly histories, a genre prone to sensationalizing or simplifying for the sake of the story. A much, much larger, yet uncited, scholarly corpus exists on every one of the subjects he attempts to cover.

Scholars in the humanities welcome interdisciplinary crossover, where subject matter experts in the various fields enhance the collective understanding of human affairs. Historians are quick to concede that their profession rarely produces award-winning plays, films, movies, and TV series without collaboration from experts outside their immediate discipline. Those in the dramatic arts will just as rarely produce quality history without like collaboration from historians. Sadly, that vital crossover did not occur here.
Intelligence in Public Media

Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway’s Secret Adventures, 1935–1961
Nicholas Reynolds (HarperCollins, 2017), 357 pp., notes, bibliography, photographs, index.

Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

Nicholas Reynolds’s work on Ernest Hemingway offers new insights into one of the most famous American writers of the 20th century. This extensively researched book highlights Hemingway’s interest and participation in the major wars of the century and, whereas other books have covered this ground before, Reynolds’s is the first to use historical records, declassified intelligence, and personal correspondence to focus on Hemingway’s personal and professional links to both the US and the USSR intelligence communities of the mid-20th century. Reynolds makes clear in this book that Hemingway was in periodic contact with the Soviet foreign intelligence service—the NKVD (the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs)—while at the same time in contact with and informally assisting both the US Navy Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and, following the invasion of France in June 1944, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The question that Reynolds poses throughout the book is, “Who was in charge of this relationship?” By the time the reader finishes the book, the only reasonable answer is, “Ernest Hemingway was in charge.”

It is easy enough to imagine why the Soviets would want to establish contact with a writer of Hemingway’s stature. His works had been published in multiple languages and he was one of the most popular writers of the 1930s. In 1935, Hemingway submitted an article to the leftist journal New Masses which was a scathing description of the US government’s handling of the Matecumbe Keys catastrophe, following a hurricane landfall in an area that was housing World War I veterans. Reynolds points to Hemingway’s experience in assisting in the aftermath of this hurricane as the start point for Hemingway’s disenchantment with Depression Era America. It was also the starting point for NKVD interest in Hemingway.

Though on the NKVD radar, it is unlikely that there was a plan to recruit Hemingway, but rather a disposition to take advantage of any opportunities that might present themselves. If that happened, the NKVD—or its surrogates—would craft a suitable approach, sending the appropriate man or woman to sound him out and find out how far he was willing to go.

In 1937, Hemingway served as both a journalist and a part-time fighter in the Spanish Civil War, on the side of the Republicans. Reynolds outlines the cast of characters who were all part of the same civil war environment, including fighters, writers, polemists, and political advisors, who were all associated with the communist volunteers fighting for the Spanish Republic. Among this cadre were two close associates of Hemingway—Joris Ivens and Alexander Orlov. Reynolds points out that Ivens was a member of the Communist International (Comintern) and Orlov was an established recruiting agent for the NKVD. While in Spain, Hemingway made no secret of his grave disappointment with the US and the UK official position of neutrality while Nazi Germany supported the fascists in Spain. The only Republican lifeline for resources was from the Soviet Union—and from Hemingway’s perspective—the only nation-state focused on the fight against fascism. Hemingway used a phrase later in his life to explain this commitment at the time: he called himself a “premature antifascist,” to describe his strong support for the Comintern effort in Spain.

Reynolds describes in detail how Ivens used his access to Hemingway to introduce this well respected American author to Comintern-selected warriors, connecting him to...

...the right people: communist fighters. For this purpose, the International Brigades, created and run by the Comintern to fight for the Republic, were made

a. The Communist International, abbreviated as Comintern and also known as the Third International (1919–1943), was an international communist organization that advocated world communism. The International intended to fight “by all available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the State.” Source: “Communist International” Wikipedia page, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_International.
to order. They were filled with tough, colorful, and educated men (as well as a few women) from various countries, including the United States, the kind of people who appealed to Hemingway. (25)

This was the beginning of a multi-year effort, first on the part of the Comintern and then the NKVD to formally recruit Hemingway as what would most accurately be called an “agent of influence.” By 1937, Hemingway was writing articles, stories, a stage play, and even making public speeches that supported both Republican Spain and Soviet assistance to the Republicans. Reynolds offers no evidence Hemingway did this for any reason other than his own commitment to anti-fascism. However, in the summer of 1940, Hemingway was formally pitched to serve the Soviet Union, and that pitch was managed by an established NKVD talent spotter—Jacob Golos. Reynolds’s research effort uncovered a Soviet summary of the recruitment; below, he quotes a key line from the report:

Before he left for China, [Hemingway] was recruited for our work on ideological grounds by [Golos]. (81)

After this recruitment message, all subsequent NKVD reporting used Hemingway’s NKVD issued cryptonym: Argo. We know from available Soviet intelligence records and from declassified intercepts of Soviet cable traffic from the United States that cryptonyms were used almost exclusively for individuals the Soviets believed to be their committed agents.

The most important part of this book follows, as Reynolds takes us through the extensive research effort he used to confirm what he saw as the NKVD claim to have recruited one of America’s greatest writers. Reynolds describes the painstaking effort of wading through Soviet archives that were available in the first few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the end of the chapter entitled “The Secret File,” Reynolds has made a very strong case that the Soviets certainly were convinced their talent spotter and agent handler, Golos, had recruited Hemingway.

It is common for US intelligence officers after a recruitment to point out that their target said “yes,” but it is not entirely clear what “yes” means until the new contact begins to deliver on tasking. Throughout the remaining two-thirds of the book, Reynolds underscores that it is not entirely clear what Hemingway thought he had agreed to and, for that matter, what the Soviets wanted from him.

What is abundantly clear is that they made a critical error in case management: they did not maintain regular contact with their newly recruited agent as he went off on a journalist mission to China. By the time Hemingway returned to the United States and then onward to his residence in Cuba, the United States was at war, and Hemingway had alternative means of satisfying his commitment to fighting fascism.

Reynolds takes us through Hemingway’s war years, focusing on his links first to the US Navy—through the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)—in Cuba, and then with the Office of Strategic Services in Europe after D-Day. The Cuba episodes underscore both Hemingway’s enthusiasm for adventure and intrigue as well as his regular disregard for chain of command and tasking by the US government. This period in Hemingway’s life also brought him in direct contact and conflict with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Havana. Cuba had local political intrigues as well as embassy conflicts, and Hemingway seemed drawn to both—perhaps because of his interest as a writer, but more likely because conflict was part of the “essential” Hemingway.

The conflict and intrigue started when Hemingway offered to create an informal “counterintelligence bureau” (which he called “the Crook Factory”) that he directed, to hunt and report on suspicious characters in Havana and throughout Cuba. The Crook Factory ran in a manner more akin to 1930s and early 1940s film noir than any formal effort that might produce results usable by the US government. It was almost as if Hemingway were creating a novel of intrigue in real life. Hemingway’s enthusiasm and charisma charmed the US ambassador and the naval attaché, and they sidestepped any effort on the part of the FBI to claim primacy on spy hunting. This followed a scheme by Hemingway to use his fishing boat, the Pilar, to hunt for German submarines in the Caribbean. In the early days of the US entry into war, Hemingway’s suggestions made some sense and were consistent with the overall effort to “just do something.” By late 1943, however, these types of operations were no longer useful and Hemingway moved on to Europe.

In the European theatre of operations (ETO) in 1944, Hemingway found another role in intelligence operations—this time with other “glorious amateurs” from the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS Special Operations and OSS Operational Groups in France focused on
supporting, training, and guiding French resistance forces. Just prior to and after D-Day, this effort included working with the allied commands to synchronize the French resistance operations with the strategic and operational efforts to defeat the German Army in France. Hemingway was initially affiliated as a war correspondent with the 4th Infantry Division and specifically with a brigade commanded by Col. Charles Lanham. Lanham provided Hemingway with a jeep and a driver and gave Hemingway remarkable leeway to travel throughout his area of operations; in fact, Hemingway used this mobility to travel beyond the frontlines. He spent much of the summer of 1944 in French villages between the advancing US forces and the retreating German Army.

Along the way, he picked up some members of the French resistance and, while doing so, he met with OSS colonel David K.E. Bruce and other the French resistance fighters who were under Bruce’s responsibility—though not his “command.” Hemingway thrived in this type of battlefield, which was consistent with his experience in the Spanish Civil War. Reynolds focuses much attention on the short period between mid-July 1944 and the liberation of Paris on 24 August 1944. Multiple authors have done the same, since it was during this period of Hemingway’s involvement that his role in the war arguably morphed into something complex. Was Hemingway a correspondent, or was he an informal combatant? Did he lead French resistance forces, or was he simply a partner in the effort lead by Bruce? The compilation of Bruce’s diaries suggests that Hemingway was both correspondent and sometime resistance guide. In her book on the Paris Ritz Hotel entitled The Hotel on the Place Vendome, Tilar J. Mazzeo presents an image of Hemingway arriving in Paris as part soldier, part journalist, and a full time violent, sometimes charismatic individual. It is hard to know who Hemingway was at any given time.

As Michigan State University journalism professor William Coté writes in an article for The Hemingway Review,

"Pinning down the truth of the particular claims is elusive, as with many aspects of Hemingway’s life. It is necessary to try to sift what he said from the exaggerations and total fabrications that sometimes infused his accounts of his wartime exploits. As in many other activities during his life, he often viewed the war—and the portrayal he sought of his own personal involvement—through a storyteller’s eyes."

Reynolds spends the last third of the book on the remaining 16 years of Hemingway’s life, describing the author’s time in Cuba as he watches the Cuban Revolution unfold before his own front door. It was a bittersweet time for Hemingway who was suffering from both physical and mental maladies and difficulty writing commercially successful works of fiction. As Reynolds and other biographers have pointed out, after the publication of The Old Man and the Sea (1954) and his winning the Nobel Prize for literature that same year, Hemingway began a downward spiral that would eventually result in his suicide. During that period in America, the revelations of Soviet espionage in America, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) investigations, and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s hearings clearly played on Hemingway’s mind. Reynolds’s research into Hemingway’s letters at the time make it clear that he was concerned not only about the accusations concerning his former friends’ activities but also about the possibility that he himself might be called to testify.

Hemingway carried an inner and outer burden. Hemingway was able to tell Lanham and one or two others about his outer burden of “premature antifascism,” but the inner burden of his relationship with the NKVD was known only to himself and the Soviets—he could not share it with anyone else. To make matters worse, Hemingway certainly would have had to worry that there might one day be a defector—another Gouzenko or Bentley—who happened to know his secret, and would share it with the FBI or HUAC. (213)

Reynolds’s book belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in Hemingway, the Spanish Civil War, and World War II operations in the ETO. His extensive research establishes him as an excellent historian, and he is a superior storyteller. At another level, Reynolds’s book is important to any practitioner of espionage. The book illustrates

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several key points in “the trade.” First, it identifies how a man most would argue was a quintessential 20th century American could be recruited to spy for the Soviets. It shows in detail how well the Soviets managed the case during the spotting and assessment phase and how they slowly developed Hemingway for the recruitment pitch. Second, it shows how easy it is for the recruiter to get the target to say “yes,” even when it can remain unclear to either the target or to the recruiter—or to both—what “yes” means. This part of the story demonstrates precisely how and why the recruitment effort failed. Finally, it emphasizes the importance of maintaining a regular and professional relationship with a target—especially in the first year of the relationship. Hemingway may have said “yes” to the Soviet recruitment pitch, but unless there is some additional trove of material in the NKVD archives that argues otherwise, it is clear Hemingway was never a productive Soviet agent.
Berlin Station
Produced by Olen Steinhauer (EPIX, 2015), 10 episodes

Reviewed by James Burridge

Berlin Station is a 10-episode cable television mini-series that aired on the premium cable channel “EPIX” in October 2016. The series is the first collaboration between two writers well known to the Intelligence Community audience: the espionage novelist Olen Steinhauer and the former CIA officer and frequent agency critic Robert Baer, credited as a “technical consultant.” The literary roots of the series may include Graham Greene, Charles Dickens (in terms of scope and number of characters), and, of course, John le Carré—in fact, New York Times critic Mike Hale called the series “le Carré light.” The Christopher Isherwood novel “Cabaret” or any of its stage or film adaptations is probably also in the mix.

The place is Berlin and the time is 2015. European stations and Berlin, in particular, are under siege by a Snowden-like leaker named “Thomas Shaw.” Shaw favors the Berliner Zeitung paper and appears to be an insider. The CIA deputy director secretly sends a case officer named Daniel Miller to Berlin to plug the leak. Miller is killed at the beginning of the first episode, and we flash back to his arrival.

We next meet the station personalities. The COS is a cerebral patriarch, played by Richard Jenkins, a wonderful character actor nominated for a Best Actor Oscar in 2008. The D/COS is a twitchy bundle of energy and profanity. We first encounter him when he emerges from his office to ask, “Who do I have to (expletive deleted) around here to get a password reset?” The chief of operations is ambitious, manipulative, and rarely misses an opportunity to undermine the COS and his deputy. The only ops officer we get to know is a burned-out but effective recruiter who trolls the Berlin sex scene with considerable success. He is apparently bisexual and willing to sexually engage developmentals if helpful. He is guilt-stricken over his role in administering enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) at a black site in Morocco.

The personal and operational subplots are too complex to describe here, without considering their spoiler potential. Eventually the leaker is unmasked, but he escapes and leaves us with a monologue about the collective responsibility of everyone at CIA for the moral stain of EITs:

My name is Thomas Shaw and this is my final message. From the start I’ve tried to make the CIA accountable for its actions. I’ve not always succeeded, but I have tried. And along the way I’ve ruined the lives of real people. Now I need to be accountable for my own actions. The CIA’s hunt for Thomas Shaw through what it called an eyewash has resulted in too many deaths and too much destruction. To what end? They still don’t know who I am and they’ll never know. All that’s left of their deceit is broken bodies and broken lives. It would be irresponsible to continue on my path. We’re all complicit. We all know that something is wrong, and we’ve known it for a long time, but we do nothing. Exposing wrongs is not the same as righting them.

Now the bottom line question that motivates most of us to watch these shows: what did they get right about our business? Not much, in this reviewer’s opinion. First of all, there is no bureaucratic context. This is a common feature in fictional portrayals of CIA. The COS talks to the director and the deputy director, but there is no intermediate level—no Mission Centers, no Headquarters divisions. There is also no ambassador or embassy; it’s as if CIA rented an entire building and hung out a sign saying “US Embassy.” Although the leaks and failed operations disturb the broader US-German bilateral relationship, there is no interaction with anyone from the embassy. No one does any cover work. Operations with enormous flap potential are undertaken very casually. In one episode,
Miller is simultaneously directing two unrelated operations from a rooftop: a cyber attack on the Berliner Zeitung and a lethal CT operation against a suicide bomber in a local market. The cyber operation succeeds, but the suicide bomber blows up the market after a sniper kills an innocent woman.

Everyone except Miller is ethically challenged, some to the point of criminality. In previous posts, the COS and the D/COS both invented assets and pocketed the money, the COS to cover his 2008 investment losses and D/COS to pay for an expensive divorce. The COPS fell in love (and lives with) a German bar owner who provided access to an Algerian suspected of terrorist financing. She closed the case prematurely so as not to complicate her relationship with her lover, concluding that the Algerian was clean. He wasn’t, and later helped fund the Charley Hebdo attack. The administrative assistant is sleeping with the COS and destroys evidence of the bogus assets. The COS sabotaged the recruitment of an Iranian cabinet minister solely to discredit a rival.

Station’s treatment of both assets and officers is both callous and counterproductive. The body count of those sacrificed for bureaucratic convenience or personal advancement expands with every episode. After the first Berlin leak, the station leadership scapegoats an officer to placate the BND, although he had nothing to do with the program revealed.

The station leadership keeps a Saudi asset in place despite warnings from his case officer that his increasingly flagrant homosexuality had placed him in danger of being recalled to Riyadh. Another subplot involves a Chinese general who defected by means of a CIA-BND operation and is awaiting resettlement. When the computer penetration of the Berliner Zeitung reveals that the next Shaw story will describe the BND role in the general’s defection, the COS and his BND interlocutor develop a brilliant but heartless way to discredit Shaw. They “undeffect” the general, returning him to the Chinese authorities. The Chinese agree to propagate the story that the general was under surveillance in Beijing the entire time, making Shaw’s account of the BND role in the defection look completely false. Finally, the COS ignores warnings about the danger to a non-official cover officer (NOC) in a fake ISIS bride operation, because he has been led to believe that success will ensure a promotion. The NOC is killed.

A stock situation in nearly every fictional depiction of CIA is a verbal confrontation between an asset and a case officer, and Berlin Station is no exception. Perhaps script writers and directors should get a pass from insider critics on this issue. Good tradecraft minimizes face to face meetings. But the asset-case officer relationship is so inherently dramatic that slavish adherence to tradecraft would deprive the writers of some of their best moments. So this reviewer will no longer bash writers for their depictions of such meetings.

To recap, we have a station where the conduct of the leadership is highly unethical and even criminal. It is completely autonomous and answers to no higher management levels at Headquarters nor to an ambassador. The leadership views its assets and even its own officers as disposable. This is not a station most of us have ever encountered.

Shaw’s rationale for his leaks is that we’re all complicit. The notion that the entire CIA workforce is complicit in the use of EITs is the underlying artistic and ideological premise of the series. Even the Christ-like Miller, who sacrifices his own life for his colleagues, is guilty. At one point he says, “I accept the fact that I choose to work for an imperfect institution.”

In summary, this is an ambitious portrayal of the spy business, beautifully filmed and enhanced by a terrific cast. Its central premise of collective guilt is both implausible and objectionable—but it is, after all, entertainment. Perhaps Season Two will bring redemption.

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In this article, all statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

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INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

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**Swedish Military Intelligence: Producing Knowledge**, by Gunilla Eriksson

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The image of Edward Snowden as champion whistleblower—propagated by a generally friendly, sometimes fawning media⁴—is irreconcilable with the account articulated in How America Lost Its Secrets. Author Edward Epstein first came to the attention of many in the Intelligence Community with his book Legend (McGraw-Hill, 1978) about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko, and the JFK assassination. It was there that he argued Nosenko was a KGB provocation—not a genuine defector. The source of this controversial view, he later admitted, was former CIA counterintelligence officer, James Angleton. History suggests that Epstein was wrong about Nosenko. Now, using multiple sources, is he right about Snowden?

The central theme of How America Lost Its Secrets is how and why Snowden violated his oath and stole classified information that he gave to journalists and foreign nations. A corollary question is whether he was also a source of classified material for Chinese and Russian intelligence.

With those issues in mind, Epstein turns to Snowden’s credentials: Snowden was a high school dropout who failed to complete army basic training; at CIA, a “derogatory” performance rating forced his resignation. He cheated on the entrance exam when he applied to NSA and demanded a senior ranking position (which was not granted). He lied about his educational achievements, embellished the titles of various positions he had held, and faked illnesses when convenient. Nonetheless, he was an accomplished “hacktivist” who managed to retain his clearances and become a computer systems administrator with Dell Corporation, where he began to steal classified material.

Epstein examines Snowden’s carefully planned chronology of theft. His research for the book confirms Snowden’s own account about the files he stole from Dell. Those acquired later at Booz, Allen, Hamilton (BAH), however, were a different matter: they were more highly classified than those at Dell and Snowden did not have access. Just how he managed to acquire them remains a mystery, but NSA’s subsequent damage assessment was that “more than one million of them had been moved by [the] unauthorized party.” (138)

Before he left BAH in Hawaii, Snowden made elaborate arrangements with journalists that led to a meeting in Hong Kong. Epstein went there as well, and traced Snowden’s actions. Epstein soon discovered anomalies in the timeline Snowden had provided and discrepancies in the events he claimed had taken place; for example, although he told journalists who interviewed him that he had been at the Mira Hotel since his arrival on 20 May 2013, hotel records showed he had not checked in until 1 June. Where had he been in the interim? One of his Hong Kong lawyers, Albert Ho, said Snowden stayed at “a residence arranged for him by a party Snowden knew prior to his arrival.” (82) Epstein suggests it is not unreasonable to assume that during this time, the Chinese managed “to drain the contents of the laptop that Snowden brought to Hong Kong.” He cites several other sources who reached the same conclusion. (180)

By the time Snowden decided to leave Hong Kong, his credit cards had been nullified and his passport cancelled. Yet after meeting with Russian officials—and without hindrance from the Chinese—he boarded an Aeroflot flight with neither a visa nor a valid passport. After arriving in Moscow, Snowden spent several weeks incommunicado. Surely, Epstein suggests, he was being debriefed by Russian intelligence and security services.

Prior to leaving Hong Kong, Snowden provided some 50 million documents to journalists Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras taken from the Dell downloads, which Greenwald and Poitras then began releasing to the media; however, Snowden claimed he did not release the more classified material acquired from BAH. In fact, according to one report, he claimed to have destroyed the files for patriotic reasons. Yet months after arriving in Moscow, a
story alleging that German chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone had been monitored appeared in Der Spiegel, (287) a fact that was not in the Dell documents.

*How America Lost Its Secrets* analyzes these events and Snowden’s relations with the press, and explores a variety of possible motivations. While Epstein sees some benefit from the selected disclosures, he concludes that the persistent assertions by the media that Snowden was just a splendid whistleblower are implausible. Put another way, it is unlikely that the Chinese and Russians were aiding Snowden as a humanitarian gesture. The history of these intelligence services suggests Snowden earned their protection because he was a valuable source and gave or allowed them access to all his stolen files. Few counterintelligence officers would disagree.


Pamela Kessler set the precedent with her 1992 book, *Undercover Washington: Touring the Sites Where Famous Spies Lived, Worked and Loved* (EPM Publications) that included about 100 entries. In the 25 years since then, many new espionage cases have become public and new details about previous ones discovered. In *Spy Sites of Washington*, retired CIA officer Robert Wallace and espionage historian H. Keith Melton account for these changes in 220 entries that contain crisp commentary, color photos, and maps that locate each site.

*Spy Sites* contains seven chapters, each encompassing a historical period beginning with the Revolutionary War and ending in the post-Cold War era. Each chapter contains familiar topics, such as Washington’s intelligence contributions, and some less well-known entries, such as Dolly Madison’s efforts to save White House treasures during the War of 1812, including her rescue of the Gilbert Stuart painting of Washington. (6) The seldom mentioned exploits of Daniel Webster are also included. (7–8) To the Civil War era, *Spy Sites* adds the story of Confederate spy Benjamin Franklin Stringfellow and points out locations used by spies from both sides in the war, many of which are still standing. (26–28)

The post-Civil War period section includes an entry for the elite Alibi Club, where OSS officer David Bruce and DCI Allen Dulles were among the elite membership (limited to 50). (46) The story of Agnes Meyer Driscoll, a groundbreaking cryptographer, runs through the World War I and World War II sections covering the period during which she worked on the Japanese naval codes, until her retirement from NSA in 1952. (57–58)

The WWII chapter contains many OSS-related locations, including a photo of the French embassy where OSS agent Elizabeth Thorpe, clad only in a necklace and high heels, stole codes from the embassy safe. (87–88) Several British intelligence officers serving in America are also mentioned, one of whom was Roald Dahl, who would later author the beloved children’s book, *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory*. (107)

Among the many Cold War entries is one for Ashford Farm, a once-top secret, Maryland safehouse where many Soviet defectors and U-2 pilot Gary Powers were debriefed. (138) This was also the time of early NSA penetrations, and the section contains an entry about Soviet spy and NSA employee Jack Dunlop, whose sad end as a suicide is particularly morbid.

The later Cold War period section includes the story of the hapless former CIA officer Edwin Moore, who attempted to peddle documents to the KGB and was caught when the KGB didn’t believe him and notified the FBI. (192–194) A more uplifting entry deals with the first CIA female chief of station, Eloise Page, (158) and a photo of the first National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) building in the District. (163) Even Congress got into the act when Soviet officer Aleksandr Mikheyev attempted to recruit an aide to then-Congresswoman Olympia Snow, who reported the pitch to the FBI. The aide wore a recorder to the next meeting, ending Mikheyev’s tour in America. (231)

The final chapter includes the much publicized 21st century cases. In addition to the narrative, *Spy Sites* adds locations and other less well-known details. For example, it identifies the parks where Brian Regan, the NRO would-be spy who couldn’t spell, hid stolen classified documents and then forgot where he had hidden them. (251) Then there is the Alexandria, Virginia, restaurant
on the Potomac River where a US diplomat met his
Taiwanese handler, while the FBI observed the exchange
of documents. (256) And then there is the case of the 11
Russian illegals, three of whom lived in the Washington
area. (261) The final entry lists intelligence officers who
are buried in Arlington National Cemetery. (272)

If you want proof that the Washington area has been
the crossroads of international espionage, follow the paths
laid out in Spy Sites and see for yourself.

**HISTORICAL**


To some, *Agent 110* may be the surprise book of the
year—not because of its content, but because it was writ-
ten at all. After two lengthy biographies, Dulles's own
recollections about one part of his wartime OSS adven-
tures, and a 10-page summary of his career on the CIA
website, what more is there to say about Allen Dulles? a, b
Veteran foreign correspondent Scott Miller answers, with
the first account that focuses mainly on Dulles's service as
OSS chief of station, Bern.

*Agent 110* begins with a review of Dulles’s introduc-
tion to intelligence during World War I. Miller then tracks
the events that led to Dulles’s OSS recruitment by William
Donovan in June 1941, and ultimately his assignment to
Bern. Dulles didn’t go through any tradecraft training;
none existed at the time, and it isn’t likely he would have
considered it necessary. Moreover, there was no formal
relationship between OSS and the State Department. Thus
his ad hoc administrative and operational procedures in
Bern were developed on the job—but they worked. Miller
tells how he set up his station, acquired local support staff,
and hired a reports officer secretary—the married daughter
of the editor of the *Wall Street Journal*—with whom he
had an affair. To encourage potential agents, he put out the
word in Bern that he was Roosevelt’s personal representa-
tive. While establishing safehouses throughout Switzerland,
he developed a liaison arrangement with the Swiss
intelligence service and the Allied representatives in Bern,
and then began recruiting agents who could inform him
about events in Germany.

Miller deals at length with the principal agents re-
cruited, the most important being a German foreign
ministry officer, Fritz Kolbe (code named George Wood),
who had been rejected by the local Brits. Kolbe’s re-
ports were considered valuable by OSS and MI6, though
t thanks to Philby, the British took the credit within their
organization. It was Kolbe’s reporting that revealed a
penetration—codenamed CICERO by the Germans—in
the British embassy in Turkey, though he was not initially
believed by MI6. Only after Dulles convinced Roosevelt
that CICERO had provided data about D-Day—that the
Germans ignored—was Churchill informed.

Some of the most vexing challenges for Dulles
involved requests for support from Germans plotting
to assassinate Hitler, but because of the “unconditional
surrender” policy of the Allies, they were rebuffed by
Washington. After the unsuccessful assassination attempt
on 20 July 1944, one of the participants, Hans Bernd Gi-
sevius, a principal Dulles agent, was trapped in Berlin and
Dulles arranged a complicated but successful exfiltration.

Perhaps the most complex and controversial covert
action Dulles facilitated was dubbed Operation Sunrise,
which involved dealing directly with SS general Karl
Wolff to obtain the early surrender of German forces in
Italy. The Russians were not told of the early contacts,
which precipitated an angry exchange among Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Stalin. In the end, it was a success and
lives were saved.

Miller describes Dulles’s brief post-war assignments
in Germany after the surrender, and his efforts to help
his former agents—Kolbe in particular—even after he
returned to civilian life. For those who want a good sum-
mary of Dulles’s wartime experiences, *Agent 110* is the
best single source.

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a. Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Houghton
Mifflin, 1994); James Srodes, *Allen Dulles, Master of Spies* (Reg-

b. Mark Murphy, “The Exploits of Agent 110,” *Studies in Intelli-
gence* 37, no. 1 (1993), 25–32; available online at https://www.cia.
gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol37no1/
html/v37i1a05p_0001.htm.

Albrecht Dittrich’s makeover began in September 1970 while he was studying chemistry at university in Jena, East Germany; at the time, he was headed for academia. Then came “a life changing knock” on his dorm door. (67) The stranger who entered asked him intriguing questions that indicated he knew a great deal about Albrecht’s life and capabilities. Albrecht assumed he was Stasi. When invited to Moscow for further training, he realized he was dealing with the KGB. Years of training to be an illegal followed. Albrecht developed a legend, polished his English, learned espionage tradecraft, and studied imperialist Western societies. Then he was dispatched to Canada, where he acquired the birth certificate of Henry van Randall of California and a US passport under that name. When the certificate arrived marked “Deceased,” Albrecht realized the incongruity and returned to Moscow immediately; someone had not done his or her homework.

While waiting for the KGB to straighten things out, Albrecht married his Berlin sweetheart and she was read in to the program; she would bear his first child. When the KGB rezidentura in New York obtained the birth certificate of a Staten Island boy who died in 1955, Albrecht went to New York and assumed his identity: Jack Barsky was reborn.

Following instructions, Barsky learned New York City, first as a bike messenger, then as a college student at Columbia, and then as a MetLife computer programmer. After eight years, he married and had a second child. All the while he maintained contact with his KGB masters by coded radio messages, secret writing letters, and periodic trips to Moscow. Crunch time arrived in December 1988, when he noticed an emergency danger signal at a prearranged location: he was to return immediately—but he didn’t. In 1997, he was contacted by the FBI.

How did the FBI learn about him? Was he doubled against the KGB? Did he avoid KGB retaliation? What about his families in Germany and America? How did he become an American citizen? The answers to these questions are what make Deep Under Cover an engrossing book. In addition, Barsky includes the details of his extensive KGB tradecraft training and fieldwork as an illegal. He also points out some surprising errors the KGB made in his control procedures, while he was overseas. Deep Under Cover is a valuable contribution to the literature.


The irony of the early Cold War influence operations conducted by the KGB and the CIA to promote the cultural benefits offered respectively by communism and democracy is striking: those working for the KGB knew their masters, while the well-known writers, poets, artists, historians, scientists, and critics, who were supported indirectly by the CIA to display Western values and opportunities, for the most part did not.

Finks: How the CIA Tricked the World’s Best Writers devotes little space to the Soviet propaganda operations that were the genesis for what became the CIA-sponsored responses. Instead, journalist Joel Whitney dwells on the “liberal hawks, non-aligned leftist novelists, and Russian dissidents” whose writings and other artistic gifts portrayed life in the Western democracies. (5) Personalities like George Plimpton, Arthur Schlesinger, Ernest Hemingway, Arthur Koestler, Vladimir Nabokov, Irving Kristol, Arthur Miller, James Baldwin, Stephen Spender, and Boris Pasternak—to name just a few—are woven into the narrative. He also addresses charges of censorship—he is on shaky ground here—and undue influence on some writers, especially those thought to be too sympathetic to the communists.

Whitney’s choice of a title is a tad misleading: the world’s best writers were not “tricked” and the pejorative term “fink”—an unpleasant or contemptible person who informs on people to the authorities—is ambiguous in application. Whitney writes that “the finks the book is named for” are those who attempted to thwart exposure of
the CIA relationship with the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF) and its ancillary organizations. (5)

The basic story of the CIA’s role in the CCF has been told before but Whitney adds new details based on recently discovered letters and other archival documents. His storyline describes how the idea of counteracting the persistent communist propaganda originated among liberal Western writers and artists, many with firsthand knowledge of the Soviet truth. It also reveals how their need for funds and publishing venues coincided with the nation’s need to counter the communist version of events. While he identifies the key players, his discussion of CIA organizational structure and management is not quite right.

The CCF supported writers, books, and magazines throughout the world. (37) Nevertheless, Whitney’s central focus is on the Americans. To that end, he provides short biographies of the principals—artists and CIA officers—as they sought to conduct international CCF publishing programs, exhibits, and conferences.

But to assert, as Whitney does, that “the Congress of Cultural Freedom was CIA’s new propaganda front” is disingenuous. (15) Many of the contributions supported over more than 15 years were anything but propaganda and reflected the genuine views of the authors.

In the end, the book’s implicit assumption that the CIA role in the CCF was somehow immoral and ultimately unproductive is problematic, when viewed in the Cold War context—a topic Whitney tends to downplay, if not ignore. The final chapter attempts to extend this argument to post-Cold War CIA operations. There he discusses the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, preposterously asserting that “the United States lured them there,” (262) and that the CIA attempted to propagandize the Afghans. More recent examples include what he considers the inappropriate CIA influence on motion pictures such as Zero Dark Thirty and Argo. His arguments leave room for alternative interpretations.


In 1946, American opponents of a central intelligence service argued that the United States didn’t need a Gestapo, the notorious German secret police of Nazi era fame. Movies of the era—O.S.S. (1946, starring Alan Ladd), 13 Rue Madeleine (1947), another O.S.S., (1947, starring James Cagney) and later The Diary Of Anne Frank (1952)—perpetuated an image of the Gestapo as the acme of Nazi terror. In Berlin today, a museum called the “Topography of Terror” on the site of WWII Gestapo headquarters on Prinz-Albrecht-Straße (now Niederkirchnerstraße) displays torture cells, and photos of Gestapo treatment of communists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, uncooperative Catholics, the mentally ill, gypsies, homosexuals, and Jews.

Frank McDonough’s The Gestapo doesn’t refute these images, but it does attempt to show that some historians have exaggerated reality when dealing with ordinary German citizens in domestic matters. In short, he concludes that representing the Gestapo as an omnipotent force that monitored and harshly punished citizens for anti-Nazi acts is inaccurate.

After reviewing the origins of the Gestapo, McDonough presents examples of how ordinary citizens who criticized or denounced to the Gestapo received fair, even lenient, treatment. The organization, he suggests, was only about 15,000 strong and could only deal with serious threats to the regime.

In what McDonough calls “history from below,” he uses recently discovered Gestapo files covering operations in the Düsseldorf region of Germany to support his position. But even if he is right about domestic operations, it is still hard not to conclude that the Gestapo’s control of the concentration camps and its treatment of anti-fascists at home justify its well-earned reputation as an evil organization.

In 1910, aspiring Oxford academic, archeologist, and author, Thomas E. Lawrence, selected a title—Seven Pillars of Wisdom—for a contemplated travel book based on seven Middle Eastern cities. World War I interrupted those plans and he discarded the idea for the book—but not its title. He would later use it for his personal account of the Arab Revolt, which curiously makes no mention of pillars of any kind.

Lawrence of Arabia’s War is a less misleading title than Seven Pillars, especially when taking the subtitle into account. But it is not just another biography of Lawrence and his role in the Arab Revolt—there have been more than 100 to date—although major, familiar parts of those topics are covered. Marxist archeologist and historian Neil Faulkner correlates Lawrence’s story with the conventional war operations in the Middle East during World War I. Fought on two parallel fronts, this hybrid war saw the Turks defeated in the West by a conventional army commanded by Gen. Edmund Allenby. Success, however, had little to do with Lt. Col. Richard Meinertzhagen’s so-called Haversack Ruse, as Faulkner claims. (299) and in the east by “a tribal insurgency of camel-mounted guerrillas.” (xiii)

Faulkner looks at both, factoring in strategic conflicts in the British War ministry between those whose priority was the European front and those favoring the Middle East to protect the gateway to India—the Suez Canal—while tying down Germans supporting the Turks. Using results from an archeological study, Faulkner concludes the Turk’s defensive efforts to protect the railway were far more sophisticated than is portrayed in some popular accounts. He also shows that the Turks, motivated by religion more than nationalism, were not the incompetent peasants and farmers some made them out to be, especially at Gallipoli and Armenia. The Great War cost them millions of dead and wounded.

Faulkner’s analysis of the conventional land war under Wavell (General Sir A. P. Wavell, Commander in Chief, South West Pacific) is straightforward, though his acceptance of Richard Meinertzhagen’s so-called Haversack Ruse is surprising, since it was discredited by Lockman. a

The Arab Revolt is given detailed attention as Faulkner describes its failures and successes, like the Aqaba battle depicted in the David Lean film, Lawrence of Arabia. Lawrence’s capture in Deraa where he was on an intelligence gathering mission is briefly described. Faulkner accepts Lawrence’s account, given in Seven Pillars, that he was “sexually abused” (367) by the Turks, without commenting on other authors’ speculation that the event never happened. He discusses his conclusion that the Deraa experience and the British acceptance of the Sykes-Picot Agreement that denied the Arabs the fruits of their victorious revolt were to have a lifelong psychological impact on Lawrence.

Lawrence of Arabia’s War provides a broad view of the Arab Revolt and the war in the Middle East during World War I. Ironically, as Faulkner observes, the Turks lost their war, but ended up with a stable secular state. The Arabs who defeated the Turks and entered Damascus victorious eventually submitted to a contrived geopolitical solution that remains in disarray to this day. A fascinating story, well told and well documented.

a. In his published post-war diaries, Meinertzhagen claimed to have placed false war plans in a haversack that successfully deceived the Turks as to the location of the main attack into Palestine. Lockman showed that to be a false claim, but the myth has persisted. See J. N. Lockman, Meinertzhagen’s Diary Ruse: False Entries on T. E. Lawrence (1870; reprinted by Cornerstone Publications, 1995).

Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography (Westview Press, 1983), by the late OSS veteran George C. Constantinides, remains the best critical treatment of the literature written before 1982. He was especially unforgiving when it came to popular but unreliable books, a notorious example of which was Ronald Seth’s Encyclopedia of Espionage (New English Library, 1975). Constantinides described the book as “abounding in errors, poorly prepared, needing editing and cluttered with inane and trivial material . . . experts will not be happy with the results.” (406–407) Seth had already written 25 equally dubious books on espionage and fancied himself an expert. Were they unreliable, too? Constantinides thought so, and Operation Blunderhead explains the backstory.

British historian David Kirby encountered Ronald Seth while studying the history of the Baltic countries—Estonia in particular—where Seth was a very popular English lecturer for three years prior to World War II. In his 1952 memoir, A Spy Has No Friends (Arnold Deutsch), Seth tells how he returned to England and joined the Royal Air Force when war broke out. Seconded to the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in 1942, he volunteered to parachute in to Estonia on a sabotage mission to destroy shale oil processing plants. The book contained no references and disguised many names. Thus, when Kirby checked recently released SOE files, he found Seth’s story “often at variance with the evidence available in the archives.” (16) Operation Blunderhead sorts out the facts and fantasies in Seth’s wartime record. Kirby also establishes a pattern of behavior that explains why Seth’s postwar writings were unswervingly unreliable.

Using archival documents, Kirby shows that Seth never performed any acts of sabotage. In fact, he gave himself up to the Germans shortly after landing, and he never contacted SOE by radio. Then, after being officially presumed dead, British intelligence learned he had been “captured.” In 1944, he was spotted wearing a Luftwaffe uniform in Paris. Later the same year, British received a report signed “Blunderhead,” written, the author claimed, in an SS hospital in Paris. Further reports from Blunderhead and others indicated that he had been in several POW camps, where he was viewed as a stool pigeon. The ultimate surprise occurred when he turned himself in to the British minister in Switzerland where he claimed to be a double agent, returning to England with written peace proposals from Heinrich Himmler, meant for the British government. (203–204)

Seth was returned to London and interrogated by MI5, among others. Kirby shows that much of Seth’s explanation regarding how he avoided execution and where he had really been could not be documented. Complicating matters, Seth exhibited a pattern of embellishment and fabrication that confounded his interrogators. In the end, there was no evidence that he had cooperated, except to fool the Nazis. No charges were ever brought; he was honorably discharged and received back pay. Kirby questions why SOE ever allowed Seth to undertake the mission. He concludes the “soubriquet ‘Blunderhead’ was a mocking comment on the entire show.” (201) But Seth viewed himself as a successful agent and resorted to writing creatively embellished or just inaccurate espionage stories. Operation Blunderhead reaffirms Constantinides judgment: Ronald Seth was no avatar of truth.

Rogue Heroes: The History of the SAS, Britain’s Secret Special Forces Unit That Sabotaged the Nazis and Changed the Nature of War, by Ben Macintyre. (Crown, 2016) 380, bibliography, appendices, photo, index.

In July 1941, while newly appointed Coordinator of Information (COI) William Donovan was setting up his new organization, British Lt. David Stirling was in a military hospital in Egypt recovering from a near-disastrous first parachute jump and planning an elite Special Forces unit that would become the Special Air Service (SAS). Rogue Heroes first tells how he managed to convince skeptical generals that his idea of a small, highly trained unit operating behind enemy lines in North Africa could wreak havoc on German airfields, lines of supply, and communications. And second, Rogue Heroes describes the operations in unforgiving African deserts that proved him right.
Stirling exits the battlefield saga in late 1942 after his capture by a German officer—“the unit dentist”—while on a mission in Tunisia. (197) One of his cell mates, nominally, “Capt. John Richards,” proved to be Private Theodore Schurch, the only British soldier executed for treachery during the war. (351) Stirling was not fooled. And although he proved adept at escaping on four occasions, he was equally susceptible to being captured and he spent the balance of the war in Colditz prison.

What was, by the end of the Africa campaign, an SAS regiment did not collapse after Stirling’s capture. It did, however, undergo reorganization and was temporarily stalled before reinstatement. And as demands for Special Forces services grew, a second regiment was formed—commanded by Stirling’s somewhat less colorful brother, Bill.

*Rogue Heroes* is initially concerned with SAS missions in Libya that destroyed aircraft and supplies behind enemy lines, after attacking from the desert (which few thought could be done). Modifying its tactics as needed, the regiment would go on to serve in Egypt, Italy, France, and Germany. Macintyre’s account of these exploits weaves in perceptive narrative portraits of the eccentric, aristocratic dilettante Stirling and his maverick, malcontent “Dirty Dozen” colleagues. All were self-reliant volunteers and most contemptuous of traditional army conventions and formalities. Stirling’s successor to command was Capt. Robert “Paddy” Mayne, a Northern Irishman characterized as “unexploded ordnance.” (209) A moody, heavy drinker “given to violent explosions of temper . . . and insubordination,” (38) Mayne was a dedicated, effective fighter and controlled his demons when necessary; he would lead his troops until the end of the war. More in Stirling’s mold was a subordinate, Capt. George Jellicoe, 2nd Earl Jellicoe, the self-deprecating son of the World War I admiral. He would go on to become the first commander of the Special Boat Service (SBS), an SAS wartime spin-off.

For reasons not mentioned, Macintyre does not include source notes in his account. He does acknowledge the contribution of the *SAS War Diary* (Extraordinary Editions, Ltd., 2011; facsimile of original diary, 1946), a monumental volume that lists all wartime missions, and these are included in an appendix.

*Rogue Heroes* concludes with a summary of the post-war lives of the regiment’s survivors. Stirling, among other activities, helped train security units in Arab and African countries, and was knighted in 1990. (345) One survivor became a pub owner, while Paddy Mayne turned to exploring but never came to terms with his demons.

As with all Ben Macintyre’s books, he tells his story wonderfully, and in *Rogue Heroes* he has made another significant contribution to WWII Special Forces and intelligence history.


The era of “the great illegals,” wrote Cambridge historian Christopher Andrew, occurred before World War II. a. These KGB officers, operating in foreign countries without diplomatic or other official protection, recruited and handled some of the most successful Soviet agents. The Cambridge Five are well-known examples. After the war those illegal officers had either been eliminated by Stalin himself or neutralized by Western services, thanks to defectors and the VENONA decrypts. Thus the KGB attempted to recreate new illegal networks in the West. Canada was a useful entry point on the road to America, and Col. Rudolf Abel of *Bridge of Spies* fame followed that path; years later, Yevgeni Brik tried to do the same. *Shattered Illusions* tells his story.

After two years of tradecraft training in Moscow, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Brik arrived in Canada under a false name that he abandoned immediately, assuming another—David Soboloff (a long dead Canadian)—as his operational identity. Brik’s instructions were “to take a familiarization trip across Canada” and continue to Toronto to acquire an intimate knowledge of the city where the real Soboloff had lived. (25) Ultimately, he would, “at a time chosen by Moscow, immigrate to the United States,” where he would join Rudolf Abel. (29) Things did not go as planned.

Brik took a variety of jobs to establish an employment record before he received approval to take a photography course in New York. He would later start a photography studio in the Verdun suburb of Montreal as his cover; Moscow’s plan that he become a watchmaker proved unfeasible.

Before starting his business, Brik needed to travel to other towns where Soboloff had lived or visited. It was on a trip to Winnipeg that he met and began an affair with Larissa Cunningham, the wife of a Canadian army corporal, to whom he eventually revealed his “illegal” secret—and his life changed irrevocably. She suggested that he turn himself in to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and he did just that. Brik was given the code-name GIDEON, and the RCMP Security Service began Operation KEYSTONE.

Although his relationship with Larissa didn’t work out, Brik’s dual role with the Security Service went well. Things even improved a bit when Moscow Centre—KGB headquarters—decided not to send him to assist Abel and assigned him instead to support agents in Canada. Brik even envisioned becoming the illegal rezident there. (29)

Then in August 1955, Brik left on a scheduled trip to Moscow via Rio, and disappeared. Shattered Illusions explains how they later learned GIDEON had been betrayed by a Security Service officer to the KGB. He was presumed dead until 1991, when an old man walked into the British embassy in Vilnius, asking to see the MI6: Brik was back.

After confirming Brik’s identity, Donald Mahar, a retired Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officer, was assigned to help implement the exfiltration. He explains what happened to Brik when he was arrested and interrogated by the KGB, and how he managed to avoid execution.

After his return, Brik spent 19 often contentious, even prickly years in Canada, unbothered by the SVR (the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service). This is a famous case in Canadian intelligence history, and Mahar has provided a fine account of its complexities.

Sikunder Burnes: Master of the Great Game, by Craig Murray. (Birlinn, Ltd, 2016) 437, endnotes, bibliography, photos, maps, index.

The “Great Game,” a term popularized but not originated by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim, refers to 19th-century intelligence operations between Britain and Russia when the former saw a threat from the latter. Alexander Burnes was a British military intelligence officer, a gifted linguist, and an active participant in the Great Game. Sikunder Burnes tells his story.

Author and former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, learned of Sir Alexander Burnes while studying history at the University of Dundee. A great-nephew of the famed Scottish poet Robert Burns, Sir Alexander had an impressive record of his own: as a 15-year-old cadet, Burnes arrived in India on 31 October 1821 and before his death in Kabul just 20 years later, he would enjoy audiences with British monarch, be knighted for service to the crown, honored by the Royal Geographical Society, and write a best-selling, three-volume account of his travels from India to Bokhara and another book about his service in Kabul during the First Afghan War.a

Ambassador Murray acquired the details for his book by visiting long unexplored archives in India, Afghanistan, and London that revealed documents discussing Burnes’s travels on intelligence missions throughout India, Afghanistan, and neighboring regions. He often traveled in disguise while in unknown territory using the name “Sikunder Kahn” (“Sikunder” is Persian for Alexander). Facilitated by his gift for linguistics, Burnes met with tribal officials on nominally political matters while collecting military and geographic intelligence. His reports included hand-drawn maps and fortress details that were sent to London and contributed to his growing reputation.

Perhaps the most surprising result of Murray’s research was his discovery of Burnes’s portrait in the Mumbai Asiatic Society archive; the portrait is included in the book. Burnes’s books featured a frontispiece of him in a turban, but this was not his true likeness: he had insisted on a distorted rendition to protect his anonymity. (128–129)

Burnes was not a solitary intelligence officer: Murray introduces the reader to a number of his espionage colleagues, while describing their often contentious relationships, exploits, and awkward communication methods.

Of his many assignments, Burnes’s mission to Kabul as liaison to the Afghan leader Dost Mohammed was the most challenging. He “recruited spies in the Afghan court” (204) to monitor the threatening alliances contemplated and formed with the Persians, Russians, and the region’s many factions. When the Indian government decided to replace Dost, rejecting Burnes’s recommendation to support him, Burnes reluctantly agreed and his friend Dost was replaced by a British surrogate. The result was the first disastrous Afghan war and Burnes’s violent death and that of his younger brother Charles, who had followed him to India, in the courtyard of Burnes’s home. Some historians concluded Burnes was killed because of sexual affairs with native women, but Murray explains that Burnes observed the Afghan rules about such matters and traveled with his own harem. (170)

There are two interesting sub-themes in Sikunder Burnes. In the first, Murray find parallels with his own foreign officer career and, from time to time, points them out in the narrative, which interrupts the flow a bit. Then there are his digressions concerning Alexander and his brother, James—a doctor, also in India for a while—and their connection with the myths that link the Knights Templar and Scottish Freemasonry. Murray ponders whether this connection supports the conspiracy theories of “Da Vinci Code.”

Sikunder Burnes is the first biography of Burnes’s extraordinary life. Whether, as some historians have claimed, there was no genuine Russian threat to India at the time, it is clear the British thought there was. What they did to counter it will confound those who follow events in Afghanistan today; there are many analogous mistakes. A fine and important book that reveals how intelligence was practiced “back in the day,” and to some extent, how the practice continues.


Peter Fleming graduated from Eton and Oxford before joining the Army at the start of World War II. His younger brother, Ian, chose the Navy. While serving in India as chief of intelligence under General Sir A. P. Wavell, Commander in Chief, South West Pacific, Peter recruited an Indian agent to report on local anti-British movements and codenamed him SILVER (his true name was Bhagat Ram Talwar).

Talwar’s true pedigree was unknown to Fleming. A popular and dedicated communist, Talwar had been chosen by the Party in early 1941 to escort Subhas Bose (no relation to the author), the well-known Indian anti-British communist, to Kabul, Afghanistan. Bose planned to go to Germany and seek foreign help to free India from the British, but when a visa proved difficult to acquire, the astute Talwar made friends with the Italian ambassador, and soon Bose was on his way. Talwar so impressed the Italian ambassador that he recruited him to provide details on anti-British activities in India. On his return to India, unwilling to betray his country or the communists, Talwar established a fictitious secret organization—the All-India National Revolutionary Committee—and on his next trip to Kabul convinced the ambassador that it was the source of the information he began supplying, for which the ambassador began paying. When the ambassador passed the information to his Nazi colleagues, they were equally impressed and also recruited him. When Hitler invaded Russia, ending the Hitler-Stalin pact, Talwar, ever the loyal communist, offered his services to the Soviets in Kabul. He would spy for them throughout the war without telling the Nazis, the Italians, or the British. Later in the war, Fleming sent Talwar to Kabul—one of 12 trips he made during the war—to discover how the Japanese were colluding with the Germans. Talwar managed to convince the Japanese he could be of help to them and was recruited. To speed
communications, the Germans provided Talwar with a radio. Unbeknownst to him, the British at Bletchley Park were intercepting German communications and learned some of what SILVER was doing.

Inevitably, Talwar had confidants who knew aspects of his activities, if not their ultimate purpose and controllers. This led to suspicions about him from all sides. The author describes how he managed to survive through artful lying. But at least one case pestered him after the war, when he was suspected of having betrayed his former colleague, Subhas Bose, to the British.

Silver: The Spy Who Fooled the Nazis is a complicated, occasionally convoluted though very readable account of Talwar’s adventures as he struggled to keep his multiple masters satisfied. They, on the other hand, had their own difficulties dealing with SILVER. The author explains how the British and Soviets cooperated and competed for control of SILVER without alerting the Germans, who thought of him as their agent. All this amidst a war and the volatile political situation in pre-independence India that influenced SILVER’s allegiance.

As to the value of his contribution, British deception historian Sir Michael Howard found SILVER “comparable with GARBO himself.” (24) This account does not entirely support this judgment, since he had much less impact on the outcome of World War II. Nevertheless, though Talwar’s exploits are mentioned in passing in the literature from time to time, Silver: The Spy Who Fooled the Nazis is the first full treatment of his contributions.


At the annual OSS dinners in Washington, DC, veterans toast the late OSS Col. David Bruce and his friend Ernest Hemingway in honor of their ‘liberation’ of the Ritz Hotel bar in Paris in 1944. In 2010, Nicholas Reynolds, then-CIA museum historian recalled that story while working on the Agency’s OSS exhibit and wondered whether Hemingway was also in OSS.

A search of the National Archives OSS collection revealed there was, in fact, a file on Hemingway. It showed that his wife—Martha Gellhorn—“had lobbied OSS to put him on the payroll,” but he had never joined. (xviii) Further research into the open literature, however, disclosed an astonishing fact: Hemingway had “an official Soviet file” that exposed him as an NKVD agent! (xix) Was he also an American traitor? Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy answers that question and weighs how Hemingway’s links to spying influenced his work.

Reynolds begins the story with brief allusions to the 18-year-old Hemingway’s WWI experiences. Rejected by the US Army for poor eyesight, he volunteered to the Red Cross as an ambulance driver and was sent to Italy in June 1918. On 8 July, he was badly wounded by a mortar round and was hospitalized. After his recovery, he married, found work with Toronto Star Weekly as its European correspondent, and returned to Paris, where he became a member of the so-called lost generation “of talented writers” that included Ezra Pound, James Joyce, Gertrude Stein, and Ford Madox Ford.

By 1935, he had published two best sellers, The Sun Also Rises and A Farewell To Arms, was living in Key West with his second wife, and “was so successful that he was on his way to becoming a touchstone for every American writer.” (2) It was also when his left-leaning thinking surfaced in print, in an anti-New Deal article published in the communist supported magazine, New Masses. While the piece wasn’t “left” enough to label him a communist, it “attracted attention in . . . Moscow . . . probably the first time that anyone in the NKVD . . . took any interest in Hemingway . . . he was now on the NKVD radar.” (12–14)

Reynolds is unsure whether the NKVD influenced Hemingway’s assignment by the North American Newspaper Alliance to Spain in 1937. But there is no doubt his...
reporting from the Republican government’s side—fighting Franco and his Nationalists—exhibited a growing anti-fascism. This view was also evident in a film he narrated about the Nationalists in the war; in his anti-fascist play, The Fifth Column; and his articles for Pravda. (48) Reynolds also names other American communists, like Milton Wolff of the International Brigade, Hemingway met in Spain and would encounter later in his career. He also met NKVD officers. Hemingway’s best known account of the war, of course, was his book For Whom the Bell Tolls, which was based on his reporting experiences in Spain. It was there that he had become friends with and received help from the head of the NKVD in Spain, Alexander Orlov, and on whom he modeled the character Varloff. (17)

When Hemingway realized the Republican cause was all but lost, writes Reynolds, “although he was fond of saying he had signed on for the duration,” (52) Hemingway left for the States a few months before the war ended in April 1939. In short order, Hemingway divorced his second wife, remarried, moved to Cuba, began work on For Whom the Bell Tolls, defended the Nazi-Soviet Pact, (77) and made plans for a trip to China after the book was published in 1940. Then an unexpected event occurred.

In late 1940, although “the contact details remain a mystery,” (77), writes Reynolds, Hemingway met Jacob Golos, the veteran NKVD case officer in New York. (79) Reynolds then cites a NKVD report stating that, “before he left for China, Hemingway was recruited for our work on ideological grounds.” (81) More specifically, after several meetings with Golos, “by January, the American novelist agreed to work with Moscow.” (88)

Based on his professional knowledge, Reynolds conjectures sensibly about the nature of these initial contacts and what they may have meant to both sides. He also adds some interesting facts. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Hemingway “received a telegram from the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov . . . inviting him to visit the Soviet Union.” (125) He never made the trip, but the NKVD didn’t give up. Hemingway was contacted by the NKVD several times during and after the war. Reynolds also found message traffic between the NKVD residency in Washington and Moscow inquiring about ARGO—Hemingway’s codename—as late as 1950. (215) But he found no evidence that Hemingway was ever a participating NKVD agent.

Hemingway did become involved in two intelligence actions concerning Cuba, however, before he went to Europe to report on the war. One was a cockamamie counterintelligence operation called “The Crook Factory” that Hemingway designed and implemented to “keep an eye on actual or potential Axis sympathizers.” (123) The other was a bizarre scheme in which Hemingway, accompanied by local recruits, would employ his boat—the Pilar—to search for and even sink Axis submarines. As Reynolds notes, Hemingway had official sanction for these efforts from the US embassy in Cuba, apparently took them seriously, and received much praise (the limited results notwithstanding). Reynolds considers the possible motivations and the impact they may have had on Hemingway’s patriotism.

In 1943, with the Axis Caribbean threat diminished, Hemingway left for Europe, where he would meet the lady who would become his fourth wife. In 1944 he would follow the troops to France and there undertake another self-generated, quasi-intelligence mission. The latter involved his independent efforts to identify the best route to Paris for the Army, during which he met David Bruce—and they went on to liberate the Ritz. He was subsequently involved in some actual fighting in the field, for which he was nearly court-martialed. For his “combat” efforts, he thought a Distinguished Service Cross appropriate; he later received a Bronze Star. Reynolds uses these anecdotes to reflect on Hemingway’s courageous character and his desire to be part of the action—without assuming all the responsibility.

It was during the combat events that he met Gen. Charles “Buck” Lanham, who became a close friend for the rest of his life. As part of their continuing correspondence, he once wrote to Lanham that “he had done odd jobs for the Soviets in Spain and, after the Civil War, stayed in touch with ‘Russkis’ who shared secrets with him.” (86, 211)

Hemingway tired of the war once the end was in sight and returned to his home in Cuba in early 1945. There he followed the congressional hearings on communist espionage and continued his literary life. The former “kept him on edge,” (215) and he worried that his own case might surface in defectors’ testimony—but it never did. Reynolds uses these anecdotes to reflect on Hemingway’s courageous character and his desire to be part of the action—without assuming all the responsibility.

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a. A Bronze Star is the only Army award allowed for a non-military participant in war.
olds found no evidence in the archives or in Hemingway’s many letters to Lanham that he ever admitted to anyone he had met with the NKVD. It was equally clear, however, that he retained his sympathy for Stalin—who “had to be ruthless in order to protect the Soviet Union from enemies like Hitler.” (193)

*Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy* follows Hemingway’s reactions to the major events of the early Cold War. He continued writing and was awarded the Nobel Prize, but did not go to Sweden to accept it. He was also increasingly concerned that the FBI was bugging his phones and monitoring him—more so as his health gradually deteriorated and he was hospitalized several times. The diagnosis was “depression complicated by paranoia.” (253) He “tried at least twice to kill himself,” (258) and on 2 July 1961, he succeeded. In 1980, when the FBI released its Hemingway file, it emerged that Hemingway had been partially right: the Bureau file showed he had been a continuing subject of interest because of his leftist tendencies, but he was never under surveillance. (263)

Nicholas Reynolds’s fine intelligence biography of Ernest Hemingway adds much to the story of this famous man. As a writer, Hemingway succeeded by any measure. As an amateur sailor, in addition to writing *The Old Man and the Sea*, Hemingway used his nautical skills in attempts at gathering intelligence and assisting in covert operations, droll examples of which Reynolds does not fail to provide. His portrait of Hemingway as the “vet-eran” soldier shows that that particular image was more in Hemingway’s mind than it was rooted in reality. But Hemingway’s role as an NKVD spy remains curiously ambiguous, though Reynolds makes a strong case that—at heart—he was a patriot.

*Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy* is a thoroughly documented, positive contribution to the intelligence literature and a thoughtful contribution to the reputation of Ernest Hemingway.

**INTELLIGENCE ABROAD**

*Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform*, by Peter Gill. (Routledge, 2016) 225, end of chapter notes, references, index.

What is “intelligence governance and democratisation”? British intelligence scholar Peter Gill suggests that intelligence governance has to do with the organization, control, and oversight of an intelligence community by legitimate authorities. Democratization on the other hand, is “concerned with the process by which intelligence in former authoritarian regimes in Europe and Latin America have become more democratic, or not.” (3) *Intelligence Governance and Democratisation* examines the evolution of these concepts, the operational problems encountered, and the options for reform. It also extends the discussion beyond nation-states to include private and corporate security elements and non-state entities.

Gill summarizes the historical precedents that led to the necessity for reform in democratic and authoritarian regimes and the difficulties encountered in implementation. In the process, he cites the work of many other academics that resulted in conceptual models like securitism, which illustrates various forms of intelligence and security relationships. The chapter on “Kosovo and Amexica”—the latter refers to the American-Mexican border region—argues in favor of “the proposition that there are, indeed, general issues of governing intelligence that transcend national peculiarities.” (81) His lengthy treatment of democratization issues includes the notion that “the implementation of a ‘deeper’ democratization of intelligence by means of moving from ‘thinner’ to ‘thicker’ versions of the rule of law is from the perspective of ‘culture’: specifically the attitudes and values toward intelligence work that exist in the broader society.” (149) On the subject of external oversight, Gill notes that it “does not just refer to reviewing or overseeing the work of others but also to an unintentional failure to notice or do something.” (163) He offers examples of oversight problems in a number of countries. Allowing that “some progress has been made in achieving oversight of state agencies, the vexed issue of overseeing international intelligence cooperation remains, and the corporate and para-state sectors remain effectively untouched.” (191)

If these admittedly selective but typically phrased concepts seem esoteric, it is because *Intelligence Governance and Democratisation* is an academic assessment written
mainly for academics. While practitioners will agree that reform and oversight are ongoing components in democratic and would-be democratic intelligence organizations, Gill’s complex treatment fails to persuade readers that the existing mechanisms should be replaced.


Dr. Gunilla Eriksson is a political scientist with six years’ experience as an intelligence analyst with the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militära Underrättelse-och Säkerhetstjänsten—the MUST). Now a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies at the Swedish National Defense University, she finds “intelligence-related research . . . [an] exciting topic.” (1)

In *Swedish Military Intelligence*, Eriksson considers intelligence “a special kind of knowledge,” what she calls “intelligence knowledge”—is a kind of unique database within an intelligence entity that is “more than empirical data alone” and forms the foundation of judgments that “help security policymakers to make informed decisions.” (1–2) A critical requirement for intelligence knowledge, she argues, is that it be based on unbiased, explicit rather than implied, evidence and assumptions. That these conditions are not always met, she suggests, may explain why assessments reach the wrong conclusions.

Eriksson’s approach to a system intended to prevent failure is described in the answers to the following questions: “What kind of knowledge does intelligence produce?” Are there current paradigms of analysis “that might obstruct or at least hamper the emergence of valid descriptions of explanations?” “Are there some traits in the social context of knowledge production (inherent norms and values, routines, or organizational patterns) that might constrain or hamper the emergence of valid knowledge?” (2)

Eriksson formulated these questions during her work in MUST, where she concluded that they hadn’t been adequately addressed. Thus, at the National Defense University, using strategic estimates produced at MUST, she investigated their “intellectual and substantial content” as well as the “social milieu and social context of knowledge production.” (3) Her overall purpose is “to examine the characteristics of knowledge in intelligence analysis and also to investigate how that knowledge is affected by the social context of its production, the military service.” (11) *Swedish Military Intelligence* presents the results.

The book includes a foundational discussion of analytical views expressed by CIA analyst Sherman Kent and Roger Hilsman, former director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the State Department, which Eriksson draws into her inquiry of “the characteristics of intelligence knowledge.” (8) As is typical of a political scientist, there is a chapter on the need for an intelligence theory that answers the question, “In theory, how should it work?” Here she introduces the concept of “critical discourse analysis,” where she argues that “discourse and discursive practices can further our understanding of intelligence knowledge by uncovering and conceptualizing the manner in which meaning is assigned and interpreted.” (24–25) She devotes several chapters to expanding her theory, using MUST as the exemplar organization.

A less theoretical viewpoint is expressed in the chapter on “creating knowledge” that assesses how MUST analysts function. It is based mainly on interviews with practitioners. She concludes that, “If assessments are not put into use by various kinds of decision makers, the knowledge is irrelevant.” (111) This is a bit surprising since the assertion appears to conflict with her previously articulated concept of “intelligence knowledge.” Eriksson then turns to how efforts to keep intelligence knowledge objective and unbiased can be influenced by the analyst’s or the institution’s overall worldview. She discusses examples involving relations with NATO, Russia, and terrorism, still using MUST as a reference point. She concludes by cautioning against the risks of “a collective of thought and a style of thought”—perhaps a kind of group-think—that can unintentionally and inappropriately shape results. (207)

Some new terms and unfamiliar concepts in *Swedish Military Intelligence* should stimulate thinking while providing a look at how Swedish military analysts function. Eriksson’s prose is at times intellectually and semantically challenging, but seeking to grasp her meaning is worth the effort. A very interesting, stimulating contribution to the intelligence literature.