The Psychology of Espionage

Dr. Ursula M. Wilder

They [the KGB] went around and they wrapped all the agents up. I was amazed. I was anxious and amazed and shocked and scared. And in the course of the following years, all of the agents I told them about were recalled, transferred, arrested, whatnot, and then later on some of them were shot. . . . The KGB later told me that they regretted acutely that they had been forced to take those steps [thereby triggering a mole hunt at CIA]. Had I known they were going to do that, I either would not have gone and sold them that information or I would have passed them out one by one.

— CIA mole Aldrich “Rick” Ames

There was just one part of me, a small part of me, I guess, that wanted something that was a bit abandoned, a bit uncontrolled, almost suicidal, maybe.

— Former CIA watch officer William Kampilis

People who commit espionage sustain double lives. When a person passes classified information to an enemy, he or she initiates a clandestine second identity. From that time on, a separation must be maintained between the person’s secret “spy” identity, with its clandestine activities, and the “non-spy” public self. The covert activities inescapably exert a powerful influence on the person’s overt life. They necessitate ongoing efforts at concealment, compartmentation, and deception of those not witting of the espionage, which includes almost everyone in the spy’s life. For some people, sustaining such a double identity is exciting and desirable; for others, it is draining and stressful. For a

a. “Why I Spied: Aldrich Ames,” New York Times interview with Tim Weiner, 31 July 1994. A career CIA case officer, Ames was arrested in 1994 for spying over a nine-year period for the KGB and its successor, the Ministry of Security for the Russian Federation. Ames made a calculated decision to give the Russians the names of US penetrations in Russia who were in position to alert their American handlers—and therefore the FBI—that there was a mole in the CIA. All but one were executed. Weiner wrote, “He sold a Soviet Embassy official the names of two KGB officers secretly working for the FBI in Washington. The price: $50,000. The next month, he volunteered the names of every Soviet intelligence official and military officer he knew was working in the United States, along with whatever else he knew about CIA operations in Moscow . . . he received a wedding present from the KGB: $2 million.” Ames is serving a life sentence without parole.

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
For some people, sustaining a double identity is exciting and desirable; for others, it is draining and stressful.

few heroic people, spying is a moral imperative that they would prefer to avoid but feel compelled to act on.

This article focuses on spies whose espionage appears to be primarily self-interested, rather than altruistic or self-sacrificing. Within this criminal or treasonous type, specific psychological factors commonly occur, providing a guide to understanding the motives, behavior, and experiences of this type of spy. The risk of espionage can be reduced through understanding these psychological patterns and tailoring countermeasures accordingly.

Elements of Espionage

Three essential elements set the conditions for a person’s entry into espionage:

- dysfunctions in the personality
- a state of crisis
- ease of opportunity

The converse is true as well. Safe-guards or strengths in these areas mitigate the risk of espionage.a

First, any consideration of motivation in espionage must closely examine personality pathology. Personality is the mix of traits, attitudes, and values that characterize a person. Spies frequently have pathological personality features that pave the way to espionage, such as thrill seeking, a sense of entitlement, or a desire for power and control. In addition, healthy countervailing traits—such as a calm temperament or strong sense of responsibility—may be either weak or entirely absent.

The second essential motivator is an experience of acute personal crisis resulting in intense distress. Though the spy may have regrets in hindsight, at the time he or she initiates the espionage, it appears a logical decision to solve a problem or the only option available to escape a desperate or painful situation.b

The third, ease of opportunity is a prerequisite for espionage. The potential spy must have access not only to classified information but also to an interested “customer.” The manipulations of such customers, who are often professionally trained to present themselves to potential spies as rewarding and safe patrons, can be a major determinant in motivating a vulnerable person to take the step of committing espionage.

The elements of personality, crisis, and opportunity do not operate independently. Vulnerabilities in one area generate vulnerabilities in the others. A person with a problematic mix of personality features will tend to have more than the average number of life crises, including job terminations, employees to establish a baseline of employee attitudes and opinions regarding counterintelligence and security policies, procedures, requirements, and training. The results attest to employee awareness of the links between psychological factors and counterintelligence risks. Those surveyed identified emotional instability related to ambition, anger leading to a need for revenge, feelings of being unrecognized and unrewarded, and loneliness as the top vulnerabilities on the road to espionage. They ranked such problem behaviors as drug abuse and illicit sex as second, and various mental crises or stresses brought on by debt, work issues, or psychological factors such as depression as third.

Scope Note

A classified version of this article was published in Studies in Intelligence in December 2003. The concepts discussed in the 2003 article are unchanged in this revision, but the case study information contained in textboxes in the original article have been updated with unclassified or declassified material made available since 2003. This revision is intended to supplement the author’s re-examination, 14 years later, of the psychological drivers of espionage and of intentional leaking of intelligence data. The latter is an issue the original article and this, now unclassified, article do not address because such leaking was not then the prominent problem it now is. The new article, “Why Spy? Why Leak?” begins on page 1.

Unless otherwise noted, quotations and information about the convicted spies used in this article are drawn from multiple sources, including law enforcement investigative documents, counterintelligence reports, court documents, and publicly available media accounts and books about US espionage and intelligence.
relationship or family problems, and financial troubles. Such personal crises will, in turn, further stress and magnify problematic traits and behaviors just when the person needs most to function with stability and maturity. Agents “spotting” a vulnerable person may insinuate themselves into the situation and find ways to exacerbate the personal crisis, “ripening” a targeted person’s vulnerability to recruitment. Handlers will then continue to manipulate a recruited asset’s vulnerabilities to maintain the person’s long-term engagement in espionage.

The descriptive categories that follow are offered as a map of the psychological terrain of espionage. All maps oversimplify to a degree, and so does this one. No typology can encompass the full complexity of the psyche of any individual spy. Moreover, a proportion of people caught in criminally oriented or self-serving espionage will not fit the predicted patterns. Therefore, the typology must be applied with caution. Trained professionals can apply these concepts to mitigate risk in contexts such as applicant screenings and evaluations for clearances. Managers and other members of the Intelligence Community may use this information to sharpen their awareness of potentially risky behavior patterns. They should bear in mind, however, that these psychological patterns do not always lead to trouble—and that many troubled people do not exhibit these patterns.

**Psychopathy**

*Money was a solution. Sorry about this, Hollywood. Sorry about this, Church. Sorry about*

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**No typology can encompass the full complexity of the psyche of any individual spy.**

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this, everybody, but money solves everything. And it did. And why did it all fall apart? You wanna know? I’ll tell you. Because the Soviets cut off the money supply and the old lady—I couldn’t pay her off anymore—so she picked up the phone [tipping off the FBI]. Otherwise I would not be sitting here. Money solves everything. a

—Navy spy John Walker

If I really thought of the consequences all the time, I certainly wouldn’t have been in the business. I’m sure that the people from Dow Chemicals in Delaware, I’m sure that they didn’t think of the consequences of selling Napalm. If they did, they wouldn’t be working at the factory. I doubt very much that they felt any more responsible for the ultimate use than I did for my equipment.

—Former CIA Communications Officer, illegal arms merchant, and access agent for the Cubans

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Frank Terpil

I don’t believe that I was affecting the security of this country [the United States] and the safety of its people. . . . I didn’t give that stuff to the Soviets because I thought espionage is a dirty game. I mean, that’s trivial.

—CIA mole Rick Ames

Psychopaths are predators, approaching life with remorselessness, manipulation, pursuit of risk and excitement, and sharp, short-term tactical abilities alongside poor long-term and strategic planning. They frequently leave people with a positive first impression. Over time and with extended exposure, the initial impression wears away as people become aware of, or are directly victimized by, the psychopath. Before they are unmasked, psychopaths can cause severe damage to individuals and institutions.

Psychopaths cannot consistently follow laws, rules, and customs and do not understand the social necessity of doing so. They have limited capacity to experience the feelings of guilt, shame, and remorse that are the building blocks of mature intelligence as an access agent, targeting former CIA colleagues. He died in Havana in March 2016.

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a. See case study on page 24.

b. Frank Terpil: Confessions of a Dangerous Man, documentary directed by Anthony Thomas, 1981, WGBH (Boston). Terpil’s comment related to his selling weapons, explosives, torture instruments, poisons, and classified information to such customers as African dictator Idi Amin, Libya, and assorted terrorists. Terpil was a CIA communications officer who resigned under duress in 1972. Arrested in New York in 1979 for illegal arms dealing, he fled the United States while free on bail. He was tried in absentia and sentenced to over 60 years in prison for illegal arms dealing. As a fugitive, he began working with Cuban intelligence.

c. In the 1994 *New York Times* interview from which this quote is drawn, reporter Weiner described Ames as follows: “Since the 53-year-old Ames was arrested, his hair and skin have grayed perceptibly. On the surface, he is smooth, beguiling, sometimes charming. He fumbles for words only when he considers the nature of his treason and then that calm exterior cracks. His interior? There is an emptiness where pain or rage or shame should be.”
Why Spy?

Case Studies in Investigating Espionage: Use and Limitations

Experts in the Intelligence Community and outside scholars rely on case studies for insights into the motives and behavior of those who spy. Case studies look backward and highlight warning signs that in hindsight become obvious. Because it can be easy to discount the factors that obscured such signs, case study methods run the risk of hindsight and confirmation bias, focusing solely on the spy and insufficiently on the context. Often spies go undetected by exploiting or manipulating routine organizational processes and accepted customs or practices, first to “survive” in the system despite problems in personality and job performance, and later to cover their espionage. Sometimes larger organizational variables erode or undermine counterintelligence and security practices to such a degree that these variables are arguably equally instrumental in espionage. The term “systemic failure” is often used in official reports after major catastrophes to account for such variables. It is important, therefore, not to assume that the problem of espionage resides solely in the nature of the individual spy; problems in the context within which the spy operates can be equally serious.

Alert readers will point out that experts in espionage only have arrested spies to study and that there may be some who have “gotten away with it.” These spies would by definition not be included in our study sample, and therefore our model only describes those who get caught. Ironically, many caught spies eventually tell investigators they were certain they had the skills to avoid capture, unlike their less skilled counterparts. Nicholson, for example, said this about his fellow case officer Ames, whose arrest prompted Nicholson to start his own espionage and “do better” at not getting caught. FBI special agent Hanseen served in counterintelligence and was convinced he could outperform the spies he was tasked to study and catch.

It is extremely difficult to predict complex, relatively rare human behavior such as espionage because of the problem of false positives: many people demonstrate the common warning signs that can lead to the the decision to spy but most will never engage in espionage. It is equally difficult for an organization to detect, measure, and therefore account for the reasons behind good-news “success” stories, for example, when a budding insider threat is recognized early and effectively addressed before causing great harm.

The small number of arrested spies means there is insufficient statistical power to conduct meaningful empirical analyses to predict who in an organization will become a spy. For example, the press dubbed 1985 the “Year of the Spy” because of a string of high-profile cases: eight Intelligence Community insiders were arrested that year on charges of espionage. In fact, the previous year the FBI had apprehended a much larger number: 12. Even in these two consecutive “banner years” for espionage arrests, the total number of spies (20 individuals) was vanishingly small compared to the millions in the US government with top secret accesses who did not commit espionage. The low base rate for espionage cases has not changed since the mid-80s. The 2015 Annual Report of Security Clearances Determinations by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reports that 1,220,678 top secret security clearances were active in 2015, and arrests for espionage in 2015 were in no way comparable to the “high” of 20 cases in 1984 and 1985.

In sum, as a result of these limitations, the Intelligence Community turns to in-depth psychological assessments to better understand the psychology of espionage. The long-term consensus among Community counterintelligence professionals (psychologists, law enforcement and investigative professionals, and analysts) is that the key individual variables motivating espionage described in this article—personality, crisis, and opportunity—are supported through the accumulation of case studies of arrested spies since formal psychological and investigative studies began during and after WWII.

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conscience and moral functioning. They are facile liars. In fact, many psychopaths take inordinate pleasure in lying because perpetrating an effective “con” gives them a sense of power and control over the person lied to, an emotional charge sometimes termed “duping delight.” Their glee in manipulating others may be so acute that it overrides judgment and good sense, causing them to take foolish risks simply for the pleasure of temporarily conning others.

Psychopaths are interpersonally exploitative. The condition is not infrequently associated with acute cruelty and the enjoyment of inflicting pain on others. Harming or alarming others is, to psychopaths, its own reward. They pursue these pleasures with relish irrespective of the risks involved or the limited potential for gain.

Navy spy John Walker illustrates the manipulative, exploitative, predatory characteristics of psychopaths. (See case study on next page.) Faced with retirement, he aggressively recruited family members to preserve his access to classified materials. Walker also exhibited a psychopath’s excessive need for excitement and characteristic pursuit of thrills and adventure. This need for stimulation can express itself in multiple ways and in many contexts, such as in gleefully breaking rules and disregarding social conventions, deliberately provoking authority, harming others or their property, using drugs illegally, and engaging in hazardous physical activities such as excessive speeding or extremely dangerous sports.

Finally, psychopaths rarely learn from mistakes and have difficulty seeing beyond the present. Consequently, they have deficient long-term planning, and their judgment is weak. In contrast to their problems in strategic planning, psychopaths can be supremely skilled tacticians and exceptionally quick on their feet. Absent the usual prohibition against gleefully breaking rules and disregarding social conventions, deliberately provoking authority, harming others or their property, using drugs illegally, and engaging in hazardous physical activities such as excessive speeding or extremely dangerous sports.

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Snakes in Suits

In the workplace, psychopaths are noteworthy for their central roles in frequent, enduring, and bitter conflicts. Psychopaths exert themselves to charm select superiors, whereas their immediate peers experience their abuse and quickly come to view them with mistrust. Peers see them as possessors of a guilt-free lack of integrity, as remorseless pursuers of their own agendas, and as ruthless eliminators of threatening critics or obstacles—even legitimate competitors. Subordinates of psychopaths must often fear them. A great deal of resolve and courage are required to publicly take on psychopaths because of their ruthlessness, manipulative acumen, and the thrill and excitement they experience from generating stress and conflict.

Those in the bureaucracy responsible for oversight or disciplinary functions—such as security or finance officers—will frequently be the first targets of psychopathic manipulations. These institutional watchdogs or disciplinarians are often in positions to collect hard data against the psychopath, such as fraudulent accountings or inaccurate time-and-attendance records. Therefore, they present an especially acute threat to a psychopath’s freedom to maneuver undetected within a bureaucracy. They often are subjected to vicious attacks instigated by the psychopath, which may take personal rather than professional form. These preemptive strikes serve to obstruct or obscure legitimate efforts to bring to light concerns about the psychopath’s integrity and behavior. In addition, if a psychopath’s immediate supervisor, peers, or subordinates try to feed their concerns upward to management, they often find that the psychopath has been there before them and had prepared key managers to expect such criticism. The warnings, therefore, fall on deaf ears or result in blowback to the messengers.

Because psychopaths thrive in an atmosphere of turbulence and instability, corporate cultures that tolerate risk taking and controversial or even abusive behaviors will provide congenial ground for them. Organizations in which the usual institutional systems of control or supervision are

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The Intelligence Community has both more protection from and more vulnerability to deliberate manipulation by insiders. The institutional safeguards are greater than in most workplaces because of rigorous medical and security screenings of applicants, regular security reviews of the workforce, and programs for medical and lifestyle support for troubled employees. These unique institutional controls are essential because the Intelligence Community’s compartmentation of information, secrecy regarding programs and activities, and constant mobility of personnel make it relatively easy for unscrupulous employees to maneuver undetected and to manipulate the system. In the national security environment, such behaviors have the potential to do especially grave harm.

Narcissism
I have had much opportunity to reflect on what happened.
. . . Greed did not motivate me. It never did. If it had, I would have taken the actions I did far sooner. There were many chances to pursue greed through sustained contacts with Russians and others in [various locations] . . . but I didn’t. This is not meant to be an excuse, just a reflection. Patriotism, Loyalty, Honor—all these had once been of paramount importance to me. They all took a back seat when

The John Walker Spy Ring: Keeping it in the Family

John A. Walker joined the Navy in 1955. He developed into an experienced and competent communications specialist, received numerous awards and promotions, and retired as a chief warrant officer after 20 years in the service. At the time of his retirement, he had been spying for the Soviet Union for a decade. Before leaving the Navy, Walker recruited three sub-agents with active clearances to ensure that his espionage could continue and that he would retain personal control over the feed mechanisms to his handlers.

Walker recruited his friend Jerry Whitworth, a Naval communications specialist who, like Walker, had a “top secret crypto” clearance. Walker and Whitworth agreed to a “50/50 split” of the proceeds, with Walker functioning as the middleman. After retirement. Walker also recruited his brother, Arthur, a retired Navy lieutenant commander, who was working for a defense contractor. He also signed up his 20-year-old son, Michael, who had enlisted in the Navy. Walker used greed to induce his brother and son to spy, though during post-arrest debriefings Michael said his primary motive had been a desire to be like his father.

Walker’s daughter enlisted in the Army in 1978. He offered her “a great deal of money” if she would seek a position in Army communications, giving her $100 and promising that this was only the beginning should she cooperate. She steadfastly refused, but he continued to contact her periodically to ask if she had given it further thought. After his daughter left the Army, Walker appeared at her residence accompanied by Whitworth and Whitworth’s wife and again tried to recruit her, telling her that his “man in Europe” was willing to provide her with special equipment to spy but was worried that she was getting “too old” to reenlist. She rebuffed him again, but Walker later sent her $500, characterizing the money as an advance from his “man in Europe.”

Walker and his subagents were arrested in 1985 after his ex-wife called the FBI after he had stopped support payments to her. She was stunned when her tip-off also resulted in the arrest of her son and said afterward that she would never have called the FBI had she known that Walker had recruited their son. Walker’s daughter called the FBI separately in an attempt to regain custody of her only child, which she had surrendered during divorce proceedings from her husband, who had threatened to reveal her father’s espionage to the FBI if she fought for custody.

During the debriefings after his arrest, Walker characterized his spying as an exciting game and adventure that was also “quite profitable.” Asked if, in hindsight, he would have done things differently, he joked that he should have killed his alcoholic ex-wife, and he maintained that he was caught only because he lost his capacity to pay for “the drunk’s” silence. Walker’s exploitative and callous attitude and inability to appreciate his role in damaging the lives of others are characteristic of psychopaths.

Walker died in prison in August 2014. His son was paroled in 2000 after serving 15 years of a 25 year sentence.
my true loves were threatened—my children and my future.

—CIA spy Jim Nicholson

Yes, and there were Kapos, too, during the concentration camps.

—Navy civilian analyst Jay Pollard

Narcissistic personalities are characterized by exaggerated self-love and self-centeredness. Alongside an all-encompassing grandiosity runs a subtle but equally pervasive insecurity, into which narcissists have limited insight. Their internal world typically is built around fantasies about their remarkable personal abilities, charisma, beauty, and prospects. They are compelled to exhibit their presumed stellar attributes and constantly seek affirmation from others. Though their imaginings distort common sense or everyday reality, narcissists nevertheless believe in the accuracy of their daydreams and act accordingly. Others, therefore, often experience them as lacking common sense and twisting reality. When facts or other people contradict or interfere with their fantasies, narcissists become combative and vengeful. Their defensive hostility to criticism—even mild feedback—is often well out of proportion to whatever provocation sparked it.

Narcissists possess a careless disregard for personal integrity and can be very unscrupulous and manipulative in pursuing their own ends. They are, on the whole, indifferent to the needs of others, who in turn see them as having flawed social consciences. Narcissists feel entitled to special—even extraordinary—favors and status that they do not believe they have to reciprocate. They needlessly exploit others emotionally and financially, or in other ways that suit their ends. They are deeply antagonistic to sharing decisionmaking with others, irrespective of the legitimacy of the claims of others for some degree of control. Convinced of their own inherent superiority, they blame others for their problems or for negative things that happen to them, including social rejection. Because they do not consider themselves at fault for any troubles or setbacks, narcissists feel at liberty to take whatever steps they deem necessary to redress wrongs or regain a sense of mastery and superiority.

Narcissistic self-absorption should not be confused with an inability to grasp the perspective of others. Their hunger for affirmation produces acute awareness of the reactions they are provoking from the people around them. This deep hunger for affirmation also makes them vulnerable to manipulation, particularly by people whose admiration or approval they desire. Narcissists are particularly sensitive to authorities or to otherwise socially prominent or powerful people. Conversely, they can be inordinately indifferent to or contemptuous of the feelings or needs of people whom they believe to be insignificant or social inferiors.

**Narcissists in the Workplace**

Narcissists are often magnetic because their supreme self-confidence wedded to their urgent drive to impress enables them to project the appearance of talent and charm effectively. Over time, the charisma wears thin as it becomes evident that this appearance is not built on substance, but rather on fantasies and fabrications. Furthermore, narcissists’ pervasive tendency to see others as inferior causes them to be needlessly sarcastic, belittling, or supercilious.
People around narcissists may note stark contrasts in their conduct toward different classes of people, depending on their social rank and usefulness. Furthermore, the hostile and vindictive attacks narcissists mete out when others challenge their grandiosity tend to provoke angry responses in return. The result is that narcissists frequently find themselves the recipients of antagonistic feelings at distinct odds with their view of themselves as infinitely superior and admirable. They have limited insight into their role in these dynamics and tend to blame others for their own lack of social success, in the workplace as elsewhere. Their managers will frequently have to intervene in the interpersonal conflicts they habitually generate.

In addition, narcissists often show a pattern of violating organizational rules and disregarding institutional or managerial authority. They trivialize inconvenient regulations or hold themselves superior and exempt from policies, directives, and laws. They
feel entitled to favorable workplace treatment—whether this comes in the form of forgiveness for transgressions, early or frequent promotions, attractive work assignments, or other advantages such as having their requests expedited by support staff. They are acutely sensitive to the advancement of others and become suspicious and angry if they find themselves being left behind. They perceive workplace competitors who get ahead of them as “stealing” advantages or rewards that are rightfully their own. Finally, narcissists will lie, fabricate information or events, willfully exaggerate accomplishments, and often believe their own fabrications, all in the interest of appearing successful or important.

Many of these characteristics, properly contained, can be very useful in certain types of work requiring flexibility, charisma, and persuasion—for example, in sales, politics, and case officer work. It can be very difficult for managers to know where to draw the line between a tolerable or useful level of narcissism—what psychologists call healthy narcissism—and more dangerous self-absorption and self-aggrandizement. One way to make this determination is to look for positive, counterbalancing features in the personality—such as tolerance of competition and a realistic self-perception—that control and channel the narcissism into productive pursuits.

Immaturity

My thinking before I joined the CIA was, I think, noble and patriotic and all this, help the United States or whatever. And even when this happened, I didn’t feel anti-American or anti-CIA. It never came to me that this was a—a real damaging thing that I had done. I thought that more good really could come out of it. That’s the reason that I returned to the CIA, contacting them and obviously, you know, the whole thing was backwards and I’m not sure if—even if—I’ll ever really know how it happened. It’s—when I think back about it—it—it almost seems impossible that it could have happened but it did and I hope maybe it, you know, clears up.

—Former CIA watch officer
William Kampilés

No one is born a spy. Spies are made. Some are volunteers, many are coerced, but all begin somewhere on the other side from where they inevitably end up. . . . My age at the time of entry into the world of espionage was nineteen. I was one of the youngest spies ever in the history of the United States. . . . This story is not only one of manipulation. Like all spy stories, it is also one of betrayal. . . . I betrayed and was betrayed. Today, years after my release, years after my kidnapping and trial, I am confronted by this reality on a near daily basis.

—Enlisted Air Force linguist
Jeffrey Carney

Observers frequently compare immature adults to adolescents. Attitudes and behaviors that are expected and even endearing in normal adolescents or children, however, are unsettling, disruptive, and potentially hazardous in adults.

The most salient characteristic of immaturity is the ascendancy of fantasy over reality. Immature adults spend an inordinate amount of time daydreaming, deliberately calling to mind ideas that stimulate pleasant or exciting emotions. In contrast to mature adults, immature adults do not readily distinguish their private world from objective external reality and, in fact, may expect reality to conform to their self-serving and stimulating fantasies. Their fantasies about their special powers, talents, status, prospects, and future actions can be so seductive that they become resentful of conflicting real-world truth.

All three types of personalities described in this article are distinguished by active fantasy lives, but the fantasies tend to differ in both

It can be very difficult for managers to know where to draw the line between a tolerable or useful level of narcissism and more dangerous self-absorption and self-aggrandizement.

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**Against All Enemies:** [CreateSpace, 2013], 11–12). Carney was a mole for the East Germans while he was a US Air Force linguist. After he was exfiltrated to East Germany, he developed detailed targeting files on Americans for them. (See case study on page 32.) The kidnapping Carney refers to in this quote is his arrest after German reunification in 1990, when a tip from his former East German handler led officers from the US Air Force Office of Special Investigations to seize him in Germany and return him to the United States for trial. (See case study on page 32.)
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**William Kampiles: Self-Styled Special Agent**

In March 1978, after resigning under duress from his position as a watch officer in the CIA Operations Center, William Kampiles passed to the Soviet Union a top secret KH-11 satellite technical manual. He received $3,000 for this document that contained detailed information on a major US intelligence collection system.

Kampiles had joined the CIA in 1977 at age 22. He was offered a watch officer position when his application for Directorate of Operations (DO) case officer training was rejected. He arrived at work with distorted notions of his abilities and prospects and quickly became disgruntled. Uninterested and contemptuous of his assigned duties, he clashed with his supervisor, and his persistent efforts to transfer to the DO led to a formal notice that he was required to serve in his present position for two years, which only deepened his disgruntlement.

Through personal contacts, Kampiles managed to secure an interview with the DO Career Training Staff. His interviewer described him as immature and lacking self-discipline and judgment. Highlights of their discussion include Kampiles revealing that he had only accepted the watch officer position as a way to secure entry into the DO and that he would resign from the CIA if he were not accepted. He attributed his difficulties in the Operations Center to his reputation as a playboy, and when his interviewer asked if this reputation was deserved, he boasted of his successes with women. Questioned about what he had liked best about a past menial job, he quipped that it was the expense account.

Kampiles smuggled a KH-11 manual out of the Operations Center to try to get his CIA supervisor in trouble when it was found to be missing. He also vaguely envisaged that he could turn around his upcoming termination by using the document to initiate a free-lance, James Bond-style operation, thus persuading the CIA that he was indeed case officer material and could be deployed as a double agent against Moscow. Four months after his resignation, he volunteered the document to the Soviets in Athens, Greece, where he was visiting relatives. Upon his return to the United States, he got in touch with a former CIA colleague and revealed his contact with the Soviets. The colleague asked him to describe his activities in a letter. Kampiles wrote about his “accidental” meeting with a Soviet in Athens and noted that other meetings followed, but he did not directly admit to passing documents. “What I have talked about thus far has been generalized,” he explained. “I did this because to be entirely specific it would take the length of a short book to narrate this entire story. If you think there might be agency [i.e., CIA] interest, I might be willing to discuss this experience in full detail.”

The letter led to an FBI investigation and Kampiles’s arrest for espionage, for which he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Reflecting on his motives and state of mind at the time that he took the KH-11 manual and later when he passed it to the Soviets, Kampiles told his FBI interrogators, “I think you know, boiling it down, I think it was monetary and the glamour and the excitement, that this sort of thing might bring on . . . the danger . . . the intrigue, all that together.” Kampiles’s immersion in a fantasy world, his belief that both reality and other people would play along, the profound failures in perception and judgment caused by his fantasies, and his initial shock upon his arrest and eventual remorse at the harm he caused are all consistent with immaturity.
others might, in fact, be indifferent to them, they often react negatively and take steps to bring attention to themselves.

Immature people have difficulty moderating their feelings. Rather than appropriately disciplining and channeling feelings, they are subject to them. As a result, they are given to dramatic displays of emotion when stressed or excited, and while these displays may be congruent to whatever stimulated the feelings—for example, they will become very angry at perceived injustices or delight in successes—observers will sense that the emotions lack proper proportion and moderation.

A significant consequence of poor emotional control is impulsivity. Immature people have difficulty restraining their immediate wishes in the interest of anticipating long-term consequences. When prompted by sudden feelings or urgent desires, they take precipitous action. They tend to have limited attention spans and need to be emotionally engaged with a task or a person to retain focus. They can be quite fickle and easily distracted.

Finally, like psychopaths and narcissists, immature adults have defective consciences, but they are capable of feeling real guilt and often have well-developed moral codes. Their egocentricism and impulsivity limit their capacity for foresight, but in hindsight they often deeply regret their impetuous actions. Though they may want to behave ethically and feel guilt and shame when they behave badly or hurt other people, their capacity to apply their moral understanding and desires consistently to control their behavior is compromised.

An occasional feature of immaturity is dependency, which is highly relevant to espionage because dependency makes a person particularly susceptible to manipulation and control. (See Sharon Scrance case study on page 34.) Dependent people experience relationships to be so crucial to their well-being that they will do almost anything to sustain them. Dependent people may function quite adequately and seem well adjusted as long as they are not required to be on their own and are able to rely on a relationship as a psychological crutch. If the relationship is threatened, or there is even the possibility of separation, they become anxious and less able to cope. Their hunger to both please and cling to the person or people on whom they are dependent necessarily affects their judgment, and they will willingly compromise their own and others’ well-being—including their personal ethics—to sustain the relationship on which they depend.

**Children at Play**

In the workplace, immature people are often spontaneous and imaginative and can be quite appealing. In optimal conditions, they can be productive and inventive people who are eager to form attachments with others and to please and impress them.

When such employees are stressed, however, these characteristics can take distinctly negative turns. Spontaneity can translate into erratic and impulsive behavior, and active imaginations can cause problems with decisionmaking and judgment. If stress is not reduced, immature workers rapidly lose their ability to cope and can become inordinately needy and demanding. Coworkers who discern these patterns become alarmed, and immature people are often considered by others to be somewhat unbalanced and a risk for hazardous behavior and bad judgment.

In general, immature persons are naive about normal expectations regarding adult workplace attitudes and conduct. They are too susceptible to environmental distractions and internal pressures to be consistent performers. They do not readily distinguish between personal and professional spheres. They are easily bored with routine and heedlessly seek stimulation from people and things around them. They can be either too dependent on, or reactive against, control mechanisms. They tend to be very demanding of positive attention from authorities, while at the same time overly hostile or sensitive to negative feedback. Their seeking after attention or stimulation often becomes a drain on supervisors, who must engage in constant oversight, and can deplete peers, who get pressed into fixing problems caused by their immature colleague’s inattention and poor judgment.
**Mixed Personality Disorder**

I feel I had a small role in bringing down the USSR. . . . I wanted to be able to contribute in some way to that. . . . So I launched my own war.

—FBI mole Robert Hanssen

While the traits and behaviors of many spies match the features specific to psychopathy, narcissism, or immaturity and dependency, in some cases the personalities do not readily fit any one of these types.

What may be most notable in such cases is a lack of positive personality features to counterbalance negative ones. In addition, some spies show a mix of characteristics from all three dominant types. Some may also show other psychopathologies such as paranoid or compulsive symptoms. A case in point is former FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen, who spied for the Russians over the course of 21 years. A psychological evaluation conducted as part of the damage assessment concluded that his personality contains a mix of psychopathic, narcissistic, and dependent features.

**Healthy Personalities**

In healthy personalities, positive characteristics counterbalance negative ones. Positive features might include the ability to accept criticism; to feel remorse and make reparations for mistakes; to show genuine empathy for at least some people. Healthy personalities also exhibit reasonable stability of mood over time and

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**Robert Hanssen: Self-Designated Cold Warrior**

Former FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen spied for the Russians for a total of nine years over a 21-year period, beginning in 1979 and ending with his arrest in 2001. Because of his position in the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Unit and his use of computer technologies, Hanssen was able to pass extensive and highly damaging information.

After his arrest, Hanssen reported that as a junior special agent working in the FBI's New York office, he was inspired to commit espionage by reading operational files of past and then current Russian agents. While fascinated by the clandestine and secret world described in the files, he was also struck by what he estimated to be amateurish tradecraft and was curious to see if he could do better. He initiated his espionage by leaving a letter signed with a code name for a Russian case officer whose tradecraft he admired. In this, as in all communications with his handlers, Hanssen insisted on remaining unidentified.

His anonymous letters to his handlers provide a window into his psyche. The tone varies from arrogant lecturing to pleading for understanding and communication. He often addressed his handlers with a mixture of superciliousness and admonition, as in the following excerpt from an 8 June 2000 letter in which he describes how they should view the United States: “The US can be errantly [sic] likened to a powerfully built but retarded child, potentially dangerous, but young, immature, and easily manipulated. But don’t be fooled by that appearance. It is also one which can turn ingenious [sic] quickly, like an idiot savant, once convinced of a goal.”

Hanssen was motivated to spy by a mixture of greed, need for excitement, desire to test himself, and craving to feel like a “hero” by becoming involved in something significant. To external appearances, there were many signs of stability in his lifestyle. The Hanssen family was religiously devout with extensive ties in their faith community. Hanssen appeared to be a responsible primary breadwinner. He was a moderately successful FBI special agent who, while not necessarily fitting the typical mold, had secured a niche job that suited his talents. Despite these external signs of stability, however, Hanssen possessed salient secret vulnerabilities. His desire to serve as a hero led him to initiate a mentoring relationship with a prostitute he imagined he could rescue from her lifestyle by showing her a better way to live. He abruptly cut off this relationship when she proved unable to live up to his expectations. He installed a live-feed camera in his bedroom and surreptitiously captured his sexual activity with his wife for a male friend, even discussing with this friend ahead of time what he would like to watch. He also passed to him nude pictures of his wife and posted pornographic stories on the web featuring him and his wife, all without her knowledge.

At work, Hanssen was considered odd and carried several pejorative nicknames. He was disciplined for angrily grabbing a female colleague. He exploited a breach in the computer firewall to break into his supervisor’s computer, claiming he did it to show FBI security the vulnerability of sensitive computer systems. When he was reprimanded as a young special agent for throwing classified information in the trash rather than shredding it, he responded that he knew what was really classified and what was not. The failures in empathy and in respect for others, the self-absorption, and the poor judgment evident in these behaviors suggest a mixed personality disorder.
in different contexts; experience, express, and contain a wide range of emotions; show tactical adaptability alongside good long-range planning and self-discipline; and demonstrate ethical behavior across various situations.

In contrast to exhibiting a mix of positive features to temper problem characteristics, pathological personalities tend to be structured around a few dominant, relatively uninhibited characteristics. The complexity of healthy personalities enables them to deploy an array of coping strategies depending on the nature of the challenges they have to address. In contrast, pathological personalities possess a limited range of coping techniques. People with personality pathology tend to adhere stubbornly to a few approaches to problem solving and have difficulty adjusting, changing, and growing despite repeated evidence that their strategies for dealing with life are not working adequately.

Precipitating Crises
I’m growing extremely tired of American society, American modern day values, American class consciousness, American TV, American law, American consumerism, American hypocrisy.

—CIA spy Jim Nicholson

What I was thinking? How was I thinking? It was a very busy and stressful period both professionally and personally and it was like a leap in the dark.

—CIA mole Rick Ames

I think I was pissed off in the fact that all my expectations on what the job would be like were falling short and I guess I was perhaps bitter about the situation as it was and that may have been part of the motive but I’m not sure because when I look back it’s not really all that clear.

—Former CIA watch officer William Kampsiles

While problematic personality features are essential, they are not sufficient to provoke espionage. The majority of people who have some, or even many, of the personality features described above will never engage in criminal conduct. Espionage must be triggered by a crisis and the person’s assessment that illicit criminal conduct offers the solution to or an escape from the crisis. The precipitating crisis may be self-evident to observers—for example, the breakup of a marriage, the loss of a job, or bankruptcy. But it can also be private and invisible. Such psychological crises as feeling intensely frustrated and humiliated at being consistently outperformed at work by peers can be just as acute and painful as externally evident problems.

CIA officer Jim Nicholson’s sense of deep personal humiliation at not having savings in the bank and his frustration at not being able to provide his children with a more affluent and sophisticated lifestyle are examples of how a psychological crisis can lead to espionage. To all external appearances, this GS-15 case officer was progressing well in his career and, while not in a superior financial position, was living a solidly middle-class lifestyle. This view did not match his internal sentiments of frustration and failure, which led him to volunteer to spy for the Russians. He was prompted by the arrest of fellow case officer Rick Ames and his observation that Ames had experienced a long and financially lucrative run of espionage for the same customer. Nicholson believed his tradecraft was better than Ames’s and that he would not be caught.

Navy spy Jonathan Pollard also went through a psychological crisis just prior to his espionage—he later described it as a spiritual crisis. In contrast to Nicholson, however. Pollard was experiencing work and financial problems alongside his psychological crisis. In debriefings after his arrest, Pollard said he had resolved to spy for Israel in a state of deep anger and frustration after the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut was bombed in 1983. He claimed that he “walked out of the memorial service [for the Marines] committed to doing something that would guarantee Israel’s security even though it might involve a degree of potential
Jeffrey Carney: The Spy Codenamed “The Kid”

Jeffrey Carney enlisted in the US Air Force on his 17th birthday in 1980 and was granted a top secret clearance a year later. He began spying for East Germany’s Ministry of State Security (MfS) in 1983 while working as a linguist at Marienfelde Base in West Berlin. He continued spying at his next post in Texas, from which he abruptly deserted in 1985. The MfS exfiltrated and resettled him in Berlin, where he helped them target Americans. When the Iron Curtain fell, his handlers abandoned him and tipped off US authorities; he was arrested in 1991.

Carney’s initial motivation for his walk-in was a sense of betrayal by family, friends, and supervisors. His family background was painful and unstable, including severe physical and emotional abuse and neglect and the frequent disappearance of his father. Carney described himself as having been a lonely child, an “underdog” who felt inferior and had a burning desire to prove his worth. He dropped out of high school to help support his mother financially, including paying for her divorce from his father. When he visited home in 1983 on leave, he was shocked to find his father living there. After an acrimonious visit, he returned to Germany, nursing feelings of bitterness and inadequacy. He was also coming to terms with his homosexuality, which at the time put his military career at risk. In addition, Carney was deeply dissatisfied with the Air Force. Despite salient intellectual gifts, he was unable to sustain an unblemished work record, had been decertified as a language instructor, and had trouble regaining his credentials. He was outraged by his decertification, which he blamed on his supervisors’ ill will, and felt humiliated and embarrassed.

On the night of his impulsive attempt to defect to East Germany, all of the acquaintances and friends he approached rejected his overtures to go out. He went alone to some bars, had several drinks, and contemplated suicide. At one bar, he happened to read an article about a Taiwanese pilot who defected to mainland China, was feted as a hero, honored with a parade, and given money. “I’ll show them, I’ll show them all,” was Carney’s reaction. Acting on this thought, he took a cab to Checkpoint Charlie, walked across, and presented himself to the East Germans as a defector. They quickly convinced him to go back to his post at Marienfelde as a spy.

After his routine reassignment in 1984 to a domestic post, Carney became preoccupied with the announcement that all employees with access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) would be polygraphed. He was also furious with Air Force doctors, who refused to operate on what he believed was a hernia. When he threatened to go to the inspector general with his complaint, he was referred for a psychological evaluation and became concerned that drugs would be used to make him say things beyond his control, exposing both his espionage and his homosexuality. He deserted and flew to Mexico City, presenting himself unannounced to the East Germans. Upon his resettlement in East Berlin, the MfS tasked him with transcribing intercepted conversations of US military and embassy personnel, from which he discerned their responsibilities, attitudes, relationships, and personalities. If he felt that particular individuals were vulnerable, he wrote an assessment describing their situation and suggesting the best recruitment approach. Carney claimed that the MfS apparently prized his work.

After his arrest, Carney readily confessed to his espionage and said that it helped him regain a sense of personal pride and purpose. “Each time I took information out,” he asserted, “I felt like I was slapping my supervisors in the face.” He also expressed bitterness that the US government had violated his German rights by forcibly taking him away from his home, his personal belongings, and his common-law spouse. Carney’s impulsive decision to defect in a time of despair, along with the psychological stability and sense of achievement and purpose that he temporarily gained once engaged in espionage, demonstrate the role that stress and crisis can play in motivating a vulnerable person to seek a solution through espionage.

Carney was released in 2002 after serving 11 years of a 38-year sentence. He attempted to return to Germany, claiming German citizenship, but he was denied entry because the East Germans had never granted him citizenship.

a. In his memoir Carney quotes himself as asking the OSI officers arresting him “What took you so long?” (Against All Enemies, 592); he also claims to have made several attempts during the arrest to assert rights as a German citizen but was told to shut up. FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen also contemptuously asked the FBI colleagues arresting him, “What took you so long?” Both Hanssen and Carney demonstrated the reflexive grandiosity described in the personality section of this article in this sarcastic comment. When he was arrested, Ames said, “You’re making a big mistake! You must have the wrong man!” demonstrating the automatic cunning and slipperiness characteristic of psychopaths.
risk and personal sacrifice.\textsuperscript{a} During this same period, Pollard had several heated discussions with his supervisor regarding chronic tardiness, conflicts with coworkers, and inability to complete assignments. Moreover, the Pollards frequently were late paying their rent or their rent checks bounced; the Navy Federal Credit Union reported him delinquent in repaying a loan. He and his wife were witnessed using cocaine and marijuana at parties, and an anonymous call to the Navy’s security service reported that Pollard had been involved in an altercation in Georgetown.\textsuperscript{b}

Robert Hanssen began spying after an assignment to the FBI’s New York Field Office caused such financial strain on his family that, on one occasion, his wife broke into their children’s piggy banks to collect enough change to carry the family through until the next paycheck. Air Force spy Jeffrey Carney impulsively defected to East Germany in the course of a night of drinking alone, contemplating suicide, and brooding on his loneliness and ill-usage by family, friends and supervisors.

States of crisis often result in patterns of thinking that degrade judgment and behavior. A person in crisis typically experiences a sense of threat alongside a severe loss of control. The combined result frequently is a feeling of paralysis or helplessness, a desire to either fight the situation or to find a way to escape it at all costs. Most significant with respect to motivation for espionage, a person in this state of mind can acquire “tunnel vision,” in which the person’s attention becomes riveted on the current crisis. This fixation on the present can degrade long-term planning and the capacity to anticipate lasting consequences. Such mental conditions make a person vulnerable to taking badly judged actions.

While life crises are ubiquitous, criminal responses remain rare. Personality flaws that weaken moral reasoning, judgment, and control over impulsive behavior are aggravated by the sense of immediate threat, urgent need to escape, and tunnel vision common to crises. A person with personality problems is therefore doubly vulnerable to misjudgments and misconduct in a crisis. Conversely, people who as a rule have strong judgment, good self-control, and healthy consciences have more insulation against tendencies to impulsive action or misconduct when under the pressures of crisis.

\textbf{Special Handling}

\textbf{Journalist: Why did you make the decision to work for the other side?}

\textbf{Spy: Some of that started in the 70’s in New York [before volunteering to spy for the Russians in the 1980’s]}

\textbf{Journalist: Why?}

\textbf{Spy: As you know, I knew some Soviets in New York who were very interesting. The chief Pravda representative in New York and I had lunch together every couple of weeks for about three years. And he didn’t directly teach me a lot, but indirectly I learned an awful lot . . . in terms of what the Soviets are all about.}

\textbf{Journalist: How would you arrange to contact the other side [KGB] and meet?}

\textbf{Spy: Through a go-between, a Soviet Embassy officer, who’s not a KGB officer. We had an overt relationship–I was assessing the guy [for CIA] to see if he’d be of value as a target and did develop him a little bit–so this [meeting with a Soviet] is all approved [by the CIA].}

—CIA mole Rick Ames

“You need to show us that you are serious.” His voice had melded. “You can be a soldier on the Invisible Front. What good are you here? [in East Germany]” he asked rhetorically. “Here, you are one person with perhaps a little ability to make a difference. There [as a mole inside the US Air Force], working for peace – and you don’t even have to be Communist or Socialist – you can make a great difference! You will have earned your right to come and stay here.” . . . There are those who say I was brainwashed, but that is not true. While it is true that I originally lacked the conviction I claimed that fateful April morning, I would soon need little prodding to betray my former colleagues [in the US military]. . . . In my naiveté I also was


\textsuperscript{b} Ibid.
The “Handling” of Sharon Scranage

Sharon Scranage compromised CIA staff officers, agents, and operations while serving as a secretary and administrator in Africa from 1983 to 1985. Her spying necessitated the exfiltration and resettlement of numerous African agents and their families. The total cost of her espionage has been estimated to be several million dollars.

Scranage joined the CIA in 1976 as a clerk-stenographer. She consistently received favorable performance reports, including appreciative comments about her pleasant and dedicated workplace demeanor. Her private life was less settled, however. She divorced her husband of two years in 1980, after he had become physically and psychologically abusive, including hitting her and threatening her with a gun.

Exploitation of the Vulnerable

A well-trained espionage recruiter will search for vulnerable targets. Professional intelligence officers are trained to spot outward signs of trouble in a person’s history or behavior—such as tumultuous relationships or frequent job changes—and to evaluate the deeper, more enduring psychological dysfunctions that may be at the root of the problems. These professional recruiters are trained to deploy sophisticated psychological control techniques matched to the vulnerabilities they have detected in order to manipulate, apply pressure, or induce a person to commit espionage.

Some intelligence services do not limit themselves to exploiting pre-existing problems, but may actively foster crises to enhance the target’s susceptibility to recruitment. Common forms of such aggressive pursuit and manipulation of targets include emotional or sexual entrapment and financial manipulation through increasing the target’s level of debt. A psychologically vulnerable target’s grandiosity, sense of being above the rules, or vengeful impulses can all be manipulated in the service of recruitment.

The role of such manipulations by a potential customer and the prospective spy’s own sense of the ease and safety of espionage are often underestimated as key factors in increasing or decreasing motivation. Adept professional handlers depict themselves not only as willing to reward espionage but also as capable of safeguarding their agent. Good professional “handling” is designed not only to collect classified information but also to stabilize and reassure the spy in the interest of sustaining his or her

unable to sense my true value to
the MfS in those early days, and
it would be many years later
before I understood the damage
I had caused the United States

—Air Force spy Jeffrey Carney,
describing his recruitment

I have come about as close as I
ever want to come to sacrificing
myself to help you, and I get
silence. I hate silence. . . . It’s
been a long time dear friends,
a long and lonely time. . . .
Perhaps you occasionally give
up on me. Giving up on me is a
mistake. I have proven inver-
etately loyal and willing to take
grave risks, which even could
cause my death, only remain-
ing quiet in times of extreme
uncertainty. So far my ship
has successfully navigated the
slings and arrows of outrageous
fortune. I ask you to help me
survive.

—FBI mole Robert Hanssen, in
letters to his handlers

b. Excerpts from Hanssen’s letters to his
Russian handlers, dated 15 July 1988,

a. Carney, Against All Enemies, 155–56.
capacity to commit espionage for as long as possible. As a result, the relationship between an agent and a handler is frequently highly personal, intense, and emotional, at least from the perspective of the spy, and the nature of this relationship is often a powerful force behind an individual’s choice to spy.

**Remedies and Risk Management**

How people who have the potential to spy gain clearances and secure entry into the Intelligence Community, how they progress and function once inside, and how the risk they pose might be mitigated are questions of critical interest to security and counterintelligence personnel as well as to medical and management professionals. The risk of spying can be mitigated through programs designed to spot and address warning signs at each stage of an employee’s career and by providing support services to troubled employees once they have been identified or by disciplining them appropriately.

The entry points into an organization can be safeguarded through rigorous security and psychological evaluations of applicants designed to spot and weed out chronically dysfunctional people unsuitable for clearances. Patterns of personality deficiencies that can result in trouble both at work and in personal lives not only attract the attention of trained observers of human behavior—such as psychologists and case officers—but also can be registered by more incidental observers, such as coworkers and neighbors. For this reason, background checks in the security clearances process are designed to tap into this informal reservoir of observations to identify maladaptive patterns that would put an intelligence organization at risk.

While such medical and security screenings of applicants are the first line of defense, ongoing security reviews of the employee population are the second line, with the intent of detecting personnel who demonstrate patterns of troubling attitudes or behaviors and intervening before serious misconduct occurs. The typology of psychological factors in espionage presented here has been helpful in organizing observations regarding the personalities, behaviors, and life circumstances of captured spies, with an eye to developing countermeasures and risk-mitigation strategies applicable to the workplace.

Routine security and counterintelligence reviews of applicants and staff should not be the only lines of defense, however, because while such reviews can pinpoint problems they do not necessarily ameliorate or fix them. Programs of education and support for the cleared workforce must supplement the safeguards provided by regular reviews. Educational programs regarding danger signs can assist employees and managers in spotting emotional or behavioral problems in colleagues or subordinates, or even occasionally in themselves, before they evolve into serious counterintelligence or security problems.

Effective follow-through once problems have been spotted is imperative in the form of active and well-staffed medical support for troubled employees. It is especially important to make such services available to employees who identify their own problems and come forward to seek support voluntarily.

Finally, case studies of apprehended spies have demonstrated that some

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**The Anger of Edward Lee Howard**

Howard was dismissed from the CIA in 1983 after a polygraph exam indicated he was involved in petty theft and drug use. In the months after his dismissal, he moved to New Mexico with his wife, Mary. His alcohol abuse escalated, and he became increasingly angry at what he perceived to be the agency’s unfair treatment. Howard claimed he provided information to the Russian KGB and eventually defected to Russia when he became aware of US surveillance of his activities, while believing he was unfairly targeted and accused. A book about Howard by David Wise and Howard’s own memoir, though filled with significant errors of fact, provide good examples of how a vulnerable person’s sense of disgruntlement and perceived ill-use can provide the impetus to turn to espionage and the flawed, but compelling, justification for doing so. Readers will notice similar strands of acrimony and disgruntlement in the Carney, Pollard, and Hanssen cases.

Howard’s death in Russia was reported on 22 July 2002. He supposedly broke his neck in a fall at his dacha, but the exact circumstances have never been made public.

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began their espionage in a state of crisis marked by intense anger and frustration, and sometimes by financial desperation, after being fired or in anticipation of termination. (See textbox on Edward Lee Howard on preceding page.)

Prudent risk mitigation in cases of termination or forced resignation should include, when possible, safeguarding the dignity of the person to inhibit feelings of vengefulness and disgruntlement and, on a pragmatic level, making efforts to provide for job placement programs and psychological and financial counseling services to assist the person in establishing a stable lifestyle outside of the Intelligence Community.

The Intelligence Community recoils every time a spy is caught. Laws have been broken, national security has been breached, and the bond among patriotic professionals has been violated. It would be consoling if the capture of major spies in recent years and the end of the Cold War signaled a downward trend in espionage. But the impetus to spy grows out of the human psyche, and personality dysfunctions, personal crises, and opportunities to serve other masters will never vanish. Understanding the elements of espionage is critical to remaining vigilant and safeguarding the vital mission of US intelligence.