Remembering the 1968 Tet Seizure of Hue

Special Operations in WWII Burma
Intelligence and Policy Cooperation in WMD
Energy Data for Intelligence Analysis
A Call for Humility in Analysis

Book Reviews
A Great Place to Have a War
The Ghost
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Code Girls
MacArthur’s Spies

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
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Cover: A North Vietnamese propaganda image showing the capture of the Imperial Palace in Hue in March 1975. This successful attempt was the third North Vietnamese attack on the ancient capital during the Vietnam War. The first, the subject of this issue’s cover story, took place during Tet 1968. The second, also defeated, took place in April 1972.
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The 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the Seizure of Hue

Raymond R. Lau

Editor’s Note: Following the conclusion of his tour as a CORDS advisor, Capt. Ray Lau would leave the Marine Corps in 1969 and eventually join CIA as an operations officer. He would serve through a varied and full career.

The story of the communist seizure of Hue on 31 January 1968 and its recapture by US Marines and South Vietnamese forces weeks later has been compellingly told in several books, most recently in Mark Bowden’s work, Hue, 1968: A Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Bowden details many individual experiences in the battle, but he makes no mention of those engaged in the CIA pacification effort who lived in embassy housing in the city. Ray Lau’s is the story of some of them.

Author’s note: I wrote this for myself in 1998, some 30 years after the event. In my mind, the events seem clear, though undoubtedly many of the details have been blurred by time. The timeline is based on an outline of the events I wrote on 7 February 1968, the day Marines found me and walked me back to the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Compound, ending my eight days behind enemy lines.

Preface

I was nearing the end of a long flight on a Continental Airlines 707. The aircraft was packed with soldiers and Marines going to Vietnam, some for the first time, some returning. Throughout the long flight the attendants laughed, joked, and chatted with the men. Outside the window, I could see wisps of smoke rising from the hamlets, and the numerous circular grave sites that dotted the landscape. Morning was breaking and you could almost feel the hot, humid, sultry air through the double paned windows of the aircraft.

Welcome back to Vietnam! It seemed like I’d never left. Soon we were on the tarmac and everyone was wandering off to their respective units. The embassy driver met me just outside the open barn-like structure that served as the Danang air terminal building, and he drove me to temporary quarters in Danang, where I would stay until my flight to Hue the next day. It was 29 January 1968.

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A CORDS Advisor Remembers

until my flight to Hue the next day. It was 29 January 1968.

That night I rested after the flight, but I was eager to get back to Hue and unpack. It had been a great month of home leave, spending Christmas at home and seeing old friends, especially rekindling a romance with a former girlfriend. I had extended my tour in Vietnam for six months—which came with a month’s home leave back in the United States. My arrival marked the start of the extension. If it was anything like my first 13 months, it would be uneventful. I hadn’t even been shot at during those months, and there were no close calls. I was not sure whether I was cheated out of that experience or grateful for not having gone through it. The most danger I experienced was a rocket attack on the Danang Airbase in early 1967.

Since April 1967, I had been detailed to CORDS in Hue as an advisor to the Revolutionary Development Cadre teams in Thua Thien Province. The Revolutionary Development Cadre teams were paramilitary civic action teams established to “win the hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese by providing armed protection and reconstruction projects for rural villages.

Hue was the ancient imperial capital of Vietnam and the seat of Vietnamese culture and history. The general belief was that both sides recognized that and had spared the city from the fighting. This assumption was to prove wrong!

On the way to the airport the next day, the sprawling Danang Airbase was in a state of pandemonium. We ran into roadblocks at almost every turn. The rumor was that sappers had penetrated the perimeter and there was scattered fighting to ferret them out. The driver took a long, circuitous route to the airport, and we did not arrive at the Air America office until about 10:00 a.m. At one checkpoint, the body of what was identified as a Vietcong sapper lay next to the road. Other than that, the airbase looked normal. It would be a few more hours before I could board a plane for Hue.

Our flight to Hue would be aboard a Pilatus Porter, a Swiss-made single engine STOL (short take-off and landing) aircraft that could fly into and out of postage stamp-sized airfields. As a demonstration of its STOL capability, it would often take off from the parking apron, almost leaping into the air after a short roll out. Unknown to me at the time, I would log many more hours in the Porter in the years ahead. I joked with Jack L., our air-ops person in Danang, that I wanted to get back to Hue where it was safe. By early afternoon I was on my way.

After the short, half-hour flight, we landed at the small dirt airfield located in the northwest corner of the Citadel (the ancient fortress within and around which the city of Hue had formed). I was met there by Jim H., a young, former Special Forces member now with CORDS. We’d gotten to be good friends in the short time we had known each other. He was easy to laugh, and we “hung out” together.

We rode back into town in the jeep chatting about what had happened during the past month, stopping at CORDS provincial headquarters before going to the house we were both staying in. At the US compound I met Tom Gompertz, a young FSO (Foreign Service officer) assigned to Hue. He was the quintessential all-American boy, clean-cut, good looking, with a ready smile that suggested he was always in on a joke. I’d known Tom since coming to Hue. We’d played soccer against the Nung guards and talked together often. Tom welcomed me back and said something about getting together soon. That was the last time I saw Tom until I identified his body some 10 days later. (I visited his gravesite in 2002, finally “getting together” 35 years later.)

That night after dinner, Jim and I chatted in the living room as we loaded the magazines of the “Swedish-K” submachineguns that Jim had just picked up that day. It was like a new toy. We admired the weapon because of its simple uncluttered design, the green metal body with its folding...
stock, highlighted by wooden pistol grip, and the leather carrying case for the 20-round magazines. Leather—I wondered how long that would last before it turned green from the mold and mildew, like everything else.

The Swedish-Ks were different from the M-2 carbines, M-3 “grease guns,” or AK-47s that we usually carried. I remember thinking that they were a bit too “pretty” for combat, but, hell, we hadn’t seen much combat during the past year. Anyway, Jim and I figured there was not much sense having the weapons around if the magazines weren’t loaded, so we stayed up late that night loading them. When we finally went to bed, boxes of 9mm ammunition and tear gas grenades were left on the living room table.

Other than that, it was a pretty normal night. I felt good being back in Hue. I was back home.

Enter the Year of the Monkey

The next morning, 31 January 1968, the first day of Tet, the Year of the Monkey, we were awakened at about 4:00 a.m. to the sound of gunfire and explosions in the distance. The three of us who shared the house at No. 6 Nguyen Hue (Jim, Bob E. and myself) gathered to find out what was happening.

According to our Nung guards outside, the guard camp across the canal at Nam Giao was coming under attack. The guards were noticeably concerned. To us, it wasn’t that unusual because we’d had attacks every few nights in the previous months, as the Vietcong probed outlying ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) and Marine outposts. (A couple of months before, the Vietcong had attacked and overrun a Marine CAP [Combined Action Platoon] post just south of Hue. They killed the young Marine CAP unit leader, a corporal, who I had just met a few weeks before.)

While it wasn’t particularly alarming, the sustained firefight indicated that it was something bigger than a probe. We continued to listen to the surreal pop, pop, pop of small arms fire. I thought how almost harmless it sounded, like firecrackers, not at all like the gunfire portrayed in the movies. We continued to monitor our

Map from The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue by Erik Villard (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008)
radios, as we could hear the sounds of the firefight move west toward the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) camp located at a stately old French colonial compound called Gerard. We were cautiously monitoring the fighting, but we were not alarmed. I started to heat some water on an electric hotplate to make instant oatmeal.

Initially we received conflicting reports about whether Gerard was under attack, but soon we got confirmation that it was indeed under heavy attack. We continued to hear the sounds of small arms fire and the “krump” of grenades and exploding mortar rounds coming from the two locations. The fighting was intensifying rapidly.

At about 7:00 a.m., Bob Hubbard, another Marine captain detailed to CORDS, and Howard Vaughn, a Marine sergeant serving as an advisor to the PRU, arrived by jeep at our house. They, too, had been monitoring the fighting and preparing to evacuate to the MACV compound about a mile away. Hubbard first wanted to go to the house of the Police Special Branch (PSB) advisor, located at No. 9 Phan Dinh Phung, to check on several people living there (Gene W., Dave H., and John C.).

Hubbard said they had not had any radio contact with them that morning. Hubbard and Jim left through our backyard toward the Phu Cam Canal, near where the other house was located. The sky was brightening, but the day was gray and overcast. A light mist shrouded the streets, and there was a slight chill in the air. Howard and I went out to the front of the house to see if we could detect any activity. We did not have long to wait.

We were standing by our gate posts, when Sergeant Vaughn said he could see enemy soldiers running down Le Loi Street toward the Provincial Headquarters about 70 yards away. The soldiers were dressed in green uniforms, trousers rolled up above the knee, and each carried a rucksack and a weapon.

I looked out and could see small figures, crouched low and moving across my front about 100 yards away. It seemed like an endless stream of people running down the street. Vaughn said he was going to mark them with fire and let loose a short burst from his M-16.

**At Home, Under Fire**

Almost immediately, his volley was answered with automatic fire. Chips of stone flew off the gatepost and Vaughn wheeled away from the post and fell to the ground. He spit up some blood, but otherwise there
wasn’t a lot of bleeding, so I could not tell how seriously he was wounded. He said he had taken one bullet under his left arm. He was coughing up blood, meaning the bullet had punctured a lung. I bent over him, but I still did not know the seriousness of his wounds. At that moment, a couple of mortar rounds struck the roof and showered us with shards of broken tile. I asked Vaughn if he could move into the house. He pushed himself up and stumbled, hunched over, into the house and fell, sprawling on the living room floor. I stayed outside for a couple of minutes more, watching the NVA stream down the street, waiting to see if they turned up the street toward our house.  

Things were getting more serious by the minute, yet how serious it was to become would not be known until later. Bob E., who had been inside the house, went out to one of the jeeps to monitor radio transmissions. The radios we had in our jeeps were squawking with a steady stream of English. This was a certain giveaway that Americans were nearby.

A few minutes later, or so it seemed, about 7:30 a.m., Hubbard and Jim returned. They asked if I thought we could make a run for the MACV compound. I told them that a lot of enemy troops had already moved down toward the compound, and I did not think we could make it, besides, I said, Vaughn was seriously wounded. Hubbard went over to check on him and moved him into one of the side bedrooms. Jim and Hubbard took up positions in that bedroom, checking on our wounded comrade and trying to establish radio contact with MACV. I was across the living room in the other bedroom, watching the front door and a window on my side of the house.

A few minutes later, I could see about a half dozen Vietcong emerge from the adjacent house, No. 4 Nguyen Hue. They crossed in front of our house and walked off to the right and out of sight. (I had lived at No. 4 for some 8 months, the last several months with Foreign Service officer Kermit J. (Tom) Krause. Just before I left on home leave, I was told that I would move to No. 6 Nguyen Hue. I was a little upset about the move at the time. No. 4 held fond memories for me. In the end, that move probably saved my life because I was to learn later that during the fighting both Tom and the person who had moved in, Jeffrey S. Lundstedt, were captured by the NVA and executed in the bathroom.  

Tom’s story was especially sad. He was in his 60s and had served in the army through WWII and the Korean War. In WWII he was captured by the Italians. In Korea, he was captured by the North Koreans. This time the North Vietnamese were not so kind, and Tom did not make it. As with Tom Gompertz, I would identify Tom K.’s body about 10 days later.) A few minutes later, at about 8:30 a.m., I saw a grenade coming from somewhere to my right, out of my line of

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a. Throughout my account I mix the term VC (Vietcong) and NVA (North Vietnamese Army), though technically the VC were the local communist fighters, while the NVA were main-line army. During much of the fighting, it was difficult to differentiate between the two. In reality it did not make any difference.

b. Tom and Jeffrey were among four Foreign Service officers listed as killed during the Tet offensive. (American Foreign Service Association Memorial Plaque List available at http://www.afsa.org/afsa-memorial-plaque-list

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Detail Map: Hand drawn by Raymond Lau.
Several minutes went by, and I saw two to four VC parade a group of prisoners past our house, their hands above their heads. I recognized several people as members of IVS (International Voluntary Services), and land on the seat of one of the jeeps parked outside our door. A second later, the jeep was engulfed in flames as the grenade touched off the gas tank. The second jeep soon met the same fate. So much for using the jeeps to escape.

I don’t know what happened to Bob E. In the confusion of the moment, I frankly did not even think of him, as my attention was focused on our rapidly deteriorating situation. Several minutes went by, and I saw two to four VC parade a group of prisoners past our house, their hands above their heads. I recognized several people as members of IVS (International Voluntary Services), though I did not know their names. Also among the group were two of our Nung guards. (I don’t know what happened to the IVS people, either. I recall that one of the Nung guards I saw that morning was reportedly later killed by the NVA.)

Around 9:30 a.m. (times here are fuzzied in memory), an enemy soldier entered the house. He walked slowly and stealthily in, toward the right-side bedroom where Bob Hubbard and Jim were. I was squatting down, pressed up against the door jam, hidden somewhat by a couch, watching the scene unfold. I looked over at Hubbard, who was watching the enemy approach. When the VC was about 10 feet from him, Hubbard stood up, and they both started firing on full automatic. It was like the movies, where chips of wood were flying off the door around Hubbard, but Hubbard’s bullets found their mark, and the VC wheeled, staggered a couple feet and collapsed at our front entrance.

Somehow during this violent exchange, one of the French doors to the bedroom in which Hubbard was standing swung away from the wall, obscuring his view of the front door from that room. Hubbard came away without a scratch. Engaging the enemy at a distance is one thing, but a shoot-out at 10 feet was another thing. My adrenaline was pumping.

About 30 minutes passed before two NVA would approach. I was surprised that our little firefight had not attracted more attention right after it happened—not that I was eager. The lead NVA glanced down at the body at the door and continued to enter the house slowly. The second NVA knelt down to examine the body more carefully. You could see the NVA were used to jungle fighting, their training and experience not having prepared them for urban combat. I don’t think either side was trained for urban warfare. The defender, in this case, us, always has the advantage of surprise. This was certainly the case here, for I was crouched at the entryway to the left-side bedroom, watching the enemy enter. When he was about 10 to 12 feet away, I stood up, braced my back against the doorway, and opened fire on full automatic. I was so nervous that my first rounds hit the floor, but I walked the bullets up the enemy’s leg to his body. He turned and collapsed. I raised my Swedish-K further and shot the other NVA soldier kneeling at the main doorway and he went down right there.

Right after shooting the two, I thought of the fate that brought our lives together. I did not know them, nor did they know me, yet we confronted each other, and the outcome was death for them and life for me. Under different circumstances, had I been born in North Vietnam or they in the United States, we could have been good friends. These were the first men that I’d killed. I said a quick prayer for them with the hope they would find peace in another world. And I thought about how easy physically it was to kill a person, but it is the psychological aspect that is more difficult.

Another 10 minutes or so went by, and the front doorway was rocked by an explosion from an RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) fired from across the street. The blast blew a hole in the wall, to the left of the front doorway. All I could remember


b. Once the North Vietnamese and VC occupied the lightly defended city, they would build complex defensive works throughout it, which Marines would later fight through at tremendous cost of lives and wounded. See Mark Bowden, Hue, 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2017).
was a cloud of red brick dust and the blast picking me up and throwing me about 10 feet back into the bedroom. I was a bit shaken but unscathed as I quickly got up and crawled back into position at the doorway to the bedroom. I could now look out to the street through the open doorway and the hole blown through the wall, but I was feeling very vulnerable, having to divide my attention between the front door and the windows of the left-side bedroom, which had been blown open by the explosion.

I judged my position to be too untenable, so I scurried across the living room to join the others. Hubbard was crouched near the window opening out to the street. Jim H. was just inside the doorway I had just come through. Sergeant Vaughn was lying semiconscious in the center of the room. His wounds were very serious, and we did not know whether he would survive. I took up a position at the doorway, on the opposite side from Jim.

I looked into the living room at the three VC bodies. I could see that a piece of the wall above where the RPG round had hit had come down and crashed on top of one of the bodies. If the fellow was not dead before, the piece of the wall surely finished him.

Hubbard continued to try to establish radio contact on the PRC-25: “Waverly, Waver, Waverly Waver.” (Throughout this ordeal, thoughts would cross my mind that seemed incongruous with the situation.) I can recall looking at the PRC-25 and marveling how the one we had was brand new, not a scratch on it, and I thought that there were operating Marine units with battered, worn-out PRC-25s that could have put ours to better use, especially since we weren’t getting through to anyone anyway. At one point, we could hear communications between units we could not identify. I thought it was the Air Cav because they referred to someone as “pony soldier,” but we could not raise anyone. Unknown to us at the time, MACV had been under attack since 4:00 a.m. and had changed frequencies and call signs.

It was about this time, 10:00 a.m., that the NVA made a concerted effort to dislodge us. Several NVA ran and took cover just outside our front gate. I thought I saw one carrying a satchel charge (high explosives) and could only think of the death and destruction such charges made to the Marine CAP unit outside of Hue. A blast rocked the other side of the building. I could see one NVA soldier hiding behind the gate post—the very same post Vaughn was leaning against when he was wounded. I could see only a part of the soldier’s head, so I aimed my Swedish-K at him and let loose a burst of fire. He screamed and went running down the street holding his head.

**Hell, It could be our last “drink.”**

We looked out again and could see an NVA soldier scurry across the street with an RPG and a couple seconds later a second NVA followed carrying two rockets. I think the same thought ran through each of our minds then, “Oh shit, here it comes.” I think it was then that Hubbard grabbed the bottle of Drambuie off the mantel, took a swig, and passed it around. Hell, it could be our last drink, so we each took a swallow.

We quickly followed with a pact that we would not surrender and would fight to the death. We was a cloud of red brick dust and the blast picking me up and throwing me about 10 feet back into the bedroom. I was a bit shaken but unscathed as I quickly got up and crawled back into position at the doorway to the bedroom. I could now look out to the street through the open doorway and the hole blown through the wall, but I was feeling very vulnerable, having to divide my attention between the front door and the windows of the left-side bedroom, which had been blown open by the explosion.

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Just as suddenly as the attack began, things went quiet. We could hear the sound of helicopters outside, and I saw a Huey (UH-1E helicopter) at treetop level, firing into the tree line. We were certain that this was the counterattack we were waiting for, and the battle would soon be over. For the next half hour, things were deathly quiet. Suddenly just outside our door, we could hear one of the wounded NVA moaning and crying. We were concerned that his cries would bring others, so Jim grabbed a gun, crawled outside and fired a couple of rounds into him. Jim returned and said that he had taken care of him, but it wasn’t more than a couple minutes later that the wounded man began moaning and crying again. We looked at each other, and Jim again went outside and rolled two grenades outside the front door. KRUMP! KRUMP! We were sure we had heard the last of him, but soon, the cries began again. “Forget it,” Jim said, “He’s not real.”

It had been a long quiet period and with the sight of the Hueys
By now, it was obvious we could not stay in the house.

earlier, we were certain that things were drawing to a close. This seemed to match the enemy’s approach of attacking during the night and early morning, then withdrawing during daylight. I don’t think any of us thought the NVA would hold Hue through daylight. However, we would wait until friendly troops could mop up and move through our area before we came out. Around 11:00 a.m., I saw a group of soldiers walking down the street. I thought they were friendly forces, probably ARVN, because they had on green uniforms like the ARVN wore and the lead individual was wearing a steel helmet. Right about then, we took another rocket on our house. I thought it was, but soon realized it was tear gas from the stash of tear gas grenades we had left on the dining room table. Apparently the explosions had ruptured some of those grenades and the smoke was wafting into our room.

Reminiscent of the movie Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, Jim whispered, “Any more good ideas?” He quickly added, “Friendly or not, we’re not going to take this.” Produced two fragmentation grenades, Jim pulled the pins and nodded to me. I did not need further direction, I extended my Swedish-K into the doorway and sprayed a full magazine of bullets into the other room. As soon as I emptied the magazine, I pulled back and motioned to Jim, who rolled the two grenades into the other room. Two loud explosions in the next room, and the house became quiet again.

Farewell to No. 6

By now, it was obvious we could not stay in the house. I was closest to the back door and nervously I pushed it open, fully expecting the NVA to be on the other side. I was “scared shitless,” but I couldn’t ask someone else to do this, since I was there, closest to the door. I thought of the case of frag grenades just on the other side of the door and thought to recover them. As I inched the door open, I was surprised to find that there was no one there, and the route to the rear of the house was clear. I went to the back bathroom and came back to motion everyone to escape through the rear window. Bob Hubbard helped Sergeant Vaughn through the window and out to one of the back houses.

I think these were old servants quarters, but they were empty now. We took the last room in the row. Here we joined up with Bob E. and four of our Nung guards. Bob Hubbard hid Vaughn under a concrete table, affording him good protection. The rest of us took up positions to cover the windows and doorways. We listened as the enemy moved through the main building and systematically blew up the house.

We stayed in this room for about an hour. We had no illusions that we could hold this position, but we had no idea where to move without stumbling into more NVA, so we stayed put. At about 12 noon, a rifle muzzle appeared outside our door. A shot came through the door—the bullet striking Vaughn, this time blowing off his pinkie finger and breaking his leg. Hubbard, yanked the door open and fired, killing three NVA. Hubbard pulled back, yelling that he was out of ammunition. I went to the door, ready to fire, but noticed the three NVA lying outside the room and no one else. I spied a grenade and extra magazines for an AK-47 on one of the bodies, and I stooped to take them. The grenade was knotted to his belt and I was trying to undo
the knot. Looking up, back at the main house, I made eye contact with an NVA soldier standing there in the bathroom window we had come through not that long ago. I think he was an NVA officer because he was wearing a tan pith helmet and seem to be in authority. We looked at each other for several seconds, and then I got up and casually walked around to the back of the building. I am convinced that he took me for a local VC because I was in civilian clothes and carrying an AK-47.

At the back of the building I linked up again with Hubbard and Vaughn. I motioned that I was going over the wall to check out the next compound. I rolled over the wall and ran to the nearest cover, which turned out to be a water shed. As I entered, I saw a body in the water trough. No sooner than I had gotten over that shock than the body rose up. The apparition, a Vietnamese also in hiding, scared the pants off of me, but I motioned him to be quiet, pushed him back down toward the water, and stepped out of the shed.

The only other place was a closet-like room with a small water trough. I went over to it. It looked like a way to climb up to the attic crawl space, where I thought we could hide. I waved to Hubbard to follow, and the two of us hoisted Vaughn up the wall and pushed him up. He let out a muffled scream, and then we heard a thud and moan. It was a Vietnamese outside our building. He wandered about for a while, and then came to the door and peered through the crack, straight at me. I was still squatting on the water trough, with a weapon cradled in my arms. I stared back but did not move. I was certain he saw me, but I wasn’t certain whether he would report our presence. Luck was with us and nothing ever came of this incident.

As night fell, I moved into the small room with Hubbard. He had already moved Vaughn and slid him under the bed in the room. Hubbard faced out the small openings to the back, while I sat in the doorway looking out the window. We had made it through day one. It seemed like forever.

Sometime during that first night, I suddenly heard voices coming from directly in front of me, and in the faint light coming in the window I could see two figures. I think they were a man and a woman. I do not know how or when they came into our building, but they were suddenly there, not more than 4 feet away. I called to them in my limited Vietnamese, saying that I was a friend and not to be afraid, all the while slowly moving toward them, hand over hand. By the time I reached the window, they were gone. I never found out who they were or how they got in and out without my hearing anything. The rest of the night and the next day were uneventful, and Hubbard and I kept our same positions. Vaughn continued to fade in and out of consciousness. We had no idea how long he would last.

On the second night, 1 February 1968, Hubbard noticed two figures moving outside. By their movements, we could tell they were Jim and Bob E. We called to them in a whisper and guided them into our building through a back door. They soon joined us and told us they had taken refuge in the main building of this compound. They said they had hidden in a closet, while just outside their door, less than 5 feet away, NVA soldiers gathered and chatted in the dark. This night, they decided to sneak past the NVA soldiers to escape. They were doing that when we called to them.

Hubbard, Jim, and Bob E. sat on the bed. Vaughn was lying under the bed, and I sat across from them on a bag of rice. Vaughn, now twice wounded, was still alive, but getting weaker, slipping in and out of consciousness. We shared a bar of brown sugar and an apple that I had taken from the worship altar and water from our water source.

**It was increasingly clear that Jim’s wound was not minor. He had lost quite a bit of blood and was weakening.**
By the third day (2 February), we were wondering when US forces would recapture Hue. Where were they?

It was increasingly clear that Jim’s wound was not minor. He had lost quite a bit of blood and was weakening. Hubbard rolled Jim on his wounded side to drain blood from his good lung and gave him water. But Jim was tough and by the next day, he had recuperated much of his strength, but he was getting increasingly concerned about his wounds—that he might lose his right arm to gangrene. We were fortunate to have some food and a ready source of water. The room was small, about 4 feet by 6 feet, but being together kept our spirits up.

Throughout the next few days, we saw no other people. We only heard sporadic firing nearby. Frequently we would hear a loud gun go off, followed by automatic fire. The firing would build in intensity and then gradually taper off. I wasn’t sure if it was antiaircraft fire or other defensive fires. Often this firing sequence was preceded by a whippoorwill-like birdcall, to the point that I thought it might be a signal. Then again, I thought to myself that perhaps I’d been watching too many war movies where people would use birdcalls as recognition signals. To this day, I do not know if there was any significance to the birdcall, or if it actually was a birdcall.

Sergeant Vaughn was steadily getting weaker. He lay under the bed, not making a sound. We knew we could not move him, and the best bet was that friendly forces would recapture this part of the city and we would be able to medevac him. We were still confident that US forces would win this area back. It was just a matter of time before they would, though whether it would be in time to save Sergeant Vaughn was more in question. Thinking back, I cannot recall if he was conscious at any time during the last two days we were in the room. If we had to move quickly, we decided we would hide Sergeant Vaughn under the bed. If we tried to move him, he certainly would not survive.

By the third day (2 February), we were wondering when US forces would recapture Hue. Where were they? Jim was getting increasingly anxious about his wounds, thinking he would lose his arm. We were becoming desperate. We were spinning up crazy plans for escape. One plan had us find the aluminum wrapper from a cigarette pack to fashion a mirror to signal friendly aircraft. Another plan had me pretend to be a VC and march the others at gunpoint toward a checkpoint and then rush the guards and blast our way through. We realized that the chances for success were slim to none.

Amidst this reverie, we heard a commotion outside our door. We quickly bolted the door and listened as a number of NVA soldiers entered our building and interrogated a local Vietnamese, just outside our room. There was a lot of yelling, screaming, crying and an occasional shot. It was confusion. The best we could make out, was that the NVA found Sergeant Vaughn’s blood-stained clothes (which we had stripped off him when we first came into the building.) The only barrier between us and the NVA was a 7 foot high concrete wall—open at the top, and a flimsy wood and tin door held shut by a small bolt lock. We knew it was a simple matter for the NVA to kick down our door or throw a grenade over the wall. We made hand signs, as to who would do what.

We quieted our breathing and the sweat was streaming off our faces. Suddenly someone tried our door. It was obvious the door was locked from the inside and we were certain someone would kick the door in. We readied ourselves to blast our way out. We waited for what seemed like forever, but nothing happened, and just as suddenly, the NVA left. We all let out a huge sigh of relief. We could never figure out what brought them to our house and why they suddenly left, but we were grateful to have avoided a firefight in such close quarters.

The relief of that close call was still with us the next morning. Someone had found a can of sweetened evaporated milk, and we were trying to figure out how to open it, when we heard footsteps. This was about 11:00 a.m. A number of NVA marched into the house, straight to our door and kicked it open. Hubbard rushed to the door and sprayed the room with his Swedish-K. After a couple seconds, he pulled back, saying he was out of ammo. I jumped into the doorway with an AK-47 and fired one round. I thought that I had placed the AK on full automatic, but much to my surprise, it was on semiautomatic. I stood there white knuckled, and only one round came out. I quickly realized my mistake and pulled the trigger in rapid succession. The NVA soldiers who barged in were lying on the floor, but we did not wait around to see who else was there, so we bolted out the door.
Another Escape

We ran to the corner of the compound and climbed over, through what I believe was the Montagnard Center. It wasn’t until later that we learned that an NVA Regiment had made it their headquarters. We skirted the compound and climbed over another wall, and into a garage.

It was then that I realized that, in the heat of the firefight, we had left Sergeant Vaughn behind. A couple of us were ready to go back, but after a brief discussion, we figured we would never be able to get him out alive and that his best chance was to remain hidden under the bed in the house. (We were convinced the NVA couldn’t hold the city much longer and our side would recapture the city soon.) We weren’t even sure he was still alive. He had not made a sound for the last couple of days. To this day, I am haunted by the question of whether we did the right thing.

We left the garage and slowly made our way, half submerged down a water filled canal. We quietly passed a woman cooking in her backyard. I can remember thinking that she could not have not noticed us or she purposely avoided looking at us. I also remember looking down at my Rolex watch which was caked with mud and thinking that if I get out, I will write to Rolex and tell them how my watch continued to keep time, despite the mud and grime of the past few days. I was sure they would print my story or maybe give me a new Rolex. Dream on.

The canal came up to a rusted barbed wire fence. On the other side was a road and our way out. We broke a hole through the fence and slithered through, I ended up at a culvert in the road. I quickly slid into it. As I crawled forward, I could see mosquitoes on the water, and thought to myself, “Oh shit, after all this, now I am going to get bitten and die of malaria.”

Separated and Alone

But that thought was quickly pushed from my mind, as the culvert narrowed and I found my nose under water. I quickly turned over on my back so my nose would be out of the water, as I squeezed out the other end. Good thing I was all of about 125 lbs and could get through. Being exposed on the side of the road, I ran forward, hid in a ditch, and waited for the others. Unknown to me, they had decided they would never get through the culvert, ran across the road and pushed south toward the Phu Cam district, expecting me to catch up.

I, however, got turned around and found myself headed back toward the city. I recognized a compound just down the road from our house. It was the city’s public works department. The roads were empty, though I could still hear gunfire in the distance. As soon as I heard a break in the shooting, I pushed up and ran across the road into the compound, and climbed up into an empty concrete water tower. There I felt I was safe and could dry off. I was soaked from crawling through the canal and I was shivering as the temperatures dropped. I stripped off my clothes and laid them out to dry, just sitting in the dry water tower in my underwear. No sooner did I strip down, than it started to rain, so reluctantly I put my wet clothes back on.

I was cold, miserable and hungry, so I decided to approach the Vietnamese in the compound. I had no better ideas. I jumped down and started to run but thought better of it, so slowed to a walk and walked across the compound to a Vietnamese woman.

Taken Under Wing

Using my scant Vietnamese, I explained that I was an American and that I wanted to know what the situation was. The woman ushered me into her house and told me that the NVA had overrun all of Hue and Phu Bai.a She gave me some rice mixed with some red sauce and I wolfed it down. I never found out what the red sauce was, but at the time, it tasted great. I wasn’t sure what I would do, but I wanted to get out of the wet clothes, so I asked for something dry to wear. They gave me a white shirt and a pair of blue schoolboy trousers and a pair of shower shoes. Nervously they took my clothes and buried them in the yard but not until I retrieved my wallet and dog tags. As I started to leave, they told me I could not leave the compound, that the NVA were everywhere, and I would be killed or captured for sure. Instead, they led me to a small pen that, best I could tell, was an old pig sty. They motioned to me to hide there.

The pig sty was low, and I could not stand up, so I sat leaning against

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a. They actually had not taken Phu Bai.
"Hey Marines, Captain Lau, US Embassy. I’m coming out." A voice called back, “Come on out. We’ve been looking for you.”

A CORDS Advisor Remembers

a wooden side. The next couple of days were uneventful. The family brought me food twice a day, and I occupied myself doing isometric exercises to keep from cramping up. At other times, I looked for things to keep me occupied. Once I found some wire and spent time sewing the buttons back on my shirt. On the second day, the husband came over to me and handed me a rusty knife blade. He explained that during the night the NVA had come to him and asked if they could cut through to the next compound, through where I was hiding. Wanting to give me something to defend myself, he gave me a knife. I took one look and thought it would be useless. It was rusted and dull, and I couldn’t even use it to cut my own throat, if it came to that. But I thanked him nonetheless.

Sitting in the pig sty, I continued to hear sporadic gunfire throughout the city, along with the staccato of automatic fire. Increasingly I could hear artillery rounds going overhead, which I assumed were from the huge Marine base at Phu Bai. By the second day, my existence was turning into routine. I was trying to keep myself entertained when an artillery shell exploded less than 30 feet from me. All I could remember was that everything turned to slow motion and I could see the fireball, and the billowing cloud of red brick dust move toward me. The force knocked me over, and all I could think was, “Oh crap, it’s going to break my leg!”

The walls of the pig sty and the overhead corrugated roofing collapsed on top of me, as I pushed off the ground and back into an upright sitting position, only to see another fireball, almost at precisely the same spot, and another wave of red brick dust knocked me over again. As I pushed back upright again, I checked myself and noticed that I was still in one piece—no broken leg. I did have a small wound on my head, probably from the falling roof and timbers, but the building fell in such a way as to create a small lean-to, very much like a 1950s nuclear bomb shelter—and I was lying in this lean to. I checked around and noticed gouges in the cinder blocks next to me. I did not recall seeing them before the blasts, but I couldn’t say for sure that they were caused by the blasts. If the latter, that I survived was a miracle. As it was, it was a miracle anyway.

That day, for the first time, the Vietnamese family did not bring any food to me, and I fashioned a drinking cup from a discarded C-ration tin and caught rain water dripping from the corrugated roofing for drinking water. I would simply collect the water, allow for sediment to settle to the bottom of the tin and sip the “clean” water off the top. It worked well, especially since the weather cooperated with light drizzle all day. It wasn’t until the next day, when someone from the Vietnamese family came around looking for some roofing material, that they realized I had not died in the explosions. When I waved, the person blanched and looked as if he’d seen a ghost and scurried away. He soon returned with a bandage and some food, which was greatly welcomed. Later that day, they brought me food again.

I continued to “live” in my make-shift shelter. My only concern now was the threat of rats, and I wrapped the mosquito net the family had given me tightly around my body to ward off any rat attacks, as well as to keep warm. No rats came. They were probably too smart to venture out in this fighting. I only mention it because it reflects my state of mind—that I may survive the fighting, but something else would do me in, like malaria or rats, or something else.

“The Marines Are Here!”

On 7 February, the firefight grew in intensity and I could hear American English spoken on the other side of the wall. The voices were those of Marines, and I would hear, “Don’t worry, the Marines are here!” “US Marines!” and other such phrases, occasionally punctuated with gunfire. A lot sounded like so much bravado, but to me it was a welcome sound that gave me hope. It was now only a matter of minutes, I thought.

It turned out to be a couple hours before the Marines came through the hole in the wall made by the two artillery shells. Now my concern was how do I come out without being mistaken for a VC and get shot. I got out my dog tags and my military ID and held them in my hand. When I could actually see them, I called, “Hey Marines, Captain Lau, US Embassy. I’m coming out.” A voice called back, “Come on out. We’ve been looking for you.” Holding my military ID card and my dog tags, I crawled out of my shelter, and introduced myself to Capt. J. T. Irons of the Marine Interrogation Translation Team, resplendent in his handlebar mustache. He was ugly, but a most beautiful sight.
Shortly thereafter, Captain Irons escorted me back to the MACV compound. I must have been quite a sight—an 8-day growth on my face, a white shirt and blue school boy trousers, shower shoes. The guard at the MACV compound called out to us, as we entered, “Hey, he can’t go in there!!” Capt. Irons yelled back, “He’s okay. He’s a Marine captain.” We continued walking, and soon I was greeted by my chief, Billy M. He greeted me with a big smile and a pat on the back. It was great to see him.

That day, several others were to make it back to friendly lines. Dave H. and John C. walked in. They had a similar harrowing story to tell, but that’s their story. I also learned that Jim H. had made it down to Phu Bai and had been medevaced to the United States. Bob E. made his way to the Voice of America station just south of Hue and took refuge there. He was safe and would later be taken out of the area. Sadly, Bob Hubbard was killed about three days earlier, crossing the bridge to Phu Cam District. He had been shot at close range and likely died instantly.

Over the next couple of days, I identified the bodies of Tom Gompertz, Tom K., and Jeff L. as their bodies were brought in. A Marine was driving one of the USAID Ford Scouts and would come screeching around the corner to the MACV compound, horn blaring, and I would go down to ID the bodies. I got to dread the wail of the horn, since I knew it meant more bodies. But, I thought it was the least I could do to help get their remains back to their families. I would have wanted them to do that for me, if the roles were reversed.

For the next month or more, we tracked others who were missing, and I brought back the bodies of Sergeant Vaughn and a USAID officer, Steve Miller. (I found the sergeant’s body in a ditch outside the building where we were hiding. I looked, but I did not see any more wounds than those he had suffered that first day.) All told, 10 people from the embassy team in Hue were killed during or as a result of the fighting in Hue: Bob Hubbard, Howard Vaughn, Tom Gompertz, Tom Krause, Jeffery Lundstedt, Steve Miller, and others. Gene W. was captured and ended up as a POW in North Vietnam for seven years, almost all of it in isolation. Other colleagues of the day not named in this story, Tom R. and Sol G., were captured and died along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Steve H.’s body was identified six years later. They will all be remembered.

Readings
In addition to Mark Bowden’s *Hue 1968*, works on Tet and the battle for Hue include:


It is a good book. For an especially moving account of what the civilian population of Hue endured during the Tet Offensive, read Nha Ca’s book, *Mourning Headband for Hue: An Account for the Battle for Hue, Vietnam 1968* (Indiana University Press, 2014–translated by Olga Dror). As brutal as the fighting was for the Marines, the horrors of being caught in the crossfire for the civilian population was worse.

The author: Raymond R. Lau is a retired CIA officer who had served as a Marine officer in Vietnam, which included duty as an advisor to the Provincial Revolutionary Development Cadre in Thua Thien Province.
The Development of a British-American Concept of Special Operations in WWII Burma

By Bob Bergin

Going into the jungle to fight the Japanese was like going into the water to fight a shark.1

—Winston Churchill

Introduction

It seemed an unlikely joint operation—led by a British Army irregular warfare expert in conjunction with two hot-shot American fighter pilots and the “air armada” they had created—to invade an occupied country from the sky. It not only worked, but resulted in a new concept of warfare and established combat techniques that today are used by both regular and unconventional forces.

For the British in Asia, 1942 was the worst of times. Their colonial empire had collapsed, the remnants of the Imperial British Army in Burma had withdrawn to India and seemed immobilized, unable to strike back at the Japanese, then poised to move on India. The US effort on mainland Asia centered on keeping China in the war, but when the Americans sought help to build a new overland supply route through north Burma, the British dragged their feet and added to American suspicions that Britain’s main military interest in Asia was the restoration of England’s lost colonies.

In early 1943, British Army Col. Orde Wingate led his Chindit “Special Force” on an overland deep penetration of Japanese-occupied Burma. To senior British commanders in India, the operation was a failure. To Prime Minister Churchill, having the operation take place at a time when he needed a show of British effort for the Americans, Wingate’s effort was a godsend. When Wingate asked for American air support for a second penetration of Burma, the US Army Air Force’s commander brought into the mix his own interest in expanding air power—and then turned over the creation and command of a supporting force to two fighter pilots. In hindsight, it was a brilliant move. By their nature and experience, fighter pilots blast obstacles out of their way. Their air armada of more than 300 aircraft and 500 highly specialized personnel was ready to take on the Japanese in Burma in three months.

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The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

a. Wingate called his special force “Chindits,” a mispronunciation of the Burmese word Chinthe for the mythological “lions’ that guard Buddhist temples in Burma and in other parts of Asia are called Singh. Wingate first used the term in a then-unpublished interview with a journalist in February 1943.
By mid-1942, the Japanese had reached the outer limits of their offensives that began in 1931, when they occupied Chinese Manchuria. Map from US Military Academy: https://www.usma.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Pacific/ww2%20Asia%20map%2039.jpg

Operation LONGCLOTH
February–April, 1943

As a military operation the raid had been an expensive failure. It gave little tangible return for the losses it had suffered and the resources it had absorbed.

—Viscount William Slim

They came back “in dribs and drabs,” gaunt and exhausted, suffering from malaria, dysentery, and jungle rot. It was a month before the final tally could be made: Of the 3,000 British troops who had entered Burma in early February 1943, only 2,182 had returned to India. And of those, only 600 would be fit for future service. The 77th Indian Infantry Brigade had been behind Japanese lines in Burma for about three months.

“What did we accomplish?” Maj. Bernard E. Fergusson, commander of the brigade’s No. 5 Column later asked himself. “We blew up bits of a railway, which did not take long to repair; we gathered some useful intelligence; we distracted the Japanese from some minor operations, and possibly from some bigger ones; we killed a few hundreds of an enemy.”

When the survivors finally reached Imphal on India’s eastern border with Burma, they were tucked into clean hospital beds. “We slept like logs. And we woke up to find we were heroes.”

The Burma Victory

In May 1943, the British sorely needed a victory in Burma. The entire country had been occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army since its catastrophic defeat of the British Army the year before. In the year that
followed, only two offensive operations in Burma were mounted by the British. The first, on Burma’s west coast to take the port of Akyab, had just ended in failure. The other was Operation LONGCLOTH, the long-range penetration of Japanese-controlled territory by 77 Brigade, a “Special Force” whose value was being questioned.

Thanks to astute British propagandists, the British were to have their victory. Even as 77 Brigade was extracting itself from the Burmese jungle, a Most Secret message from the British Army director of public relations in Delhi to GHQ asked that the commander of LONGCLOTH be kept away from the press when he “re-emerged” and be brought immediately to Delhi for a “suitably controlled Press Conference.”

On 20 May, the LONGCLOTH commander, Colonel Wingate, was introduced to an overflow crowd of international journalists. As Britain’s leading proponent of irregular warfare and its most experienced practitioner, Wingate’s past exploits in the Middle East were not unknown. And, despite Fergusson’s harsh evaluation, 77 Brigade’s penetration of Burma was not without significant achievement. Wingate’s Chindits had penetrated deeply into Japanese territory and moved through it at will. More important than the physical damage done to the Japanese was the lesson learned: The raid had been achieved not with elite troops but with ordinary infantrymen, “family men from Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester.” They had shattered the image of the Japanese soldier as master of jungle warfare.

a. “The 13th Battalion of the King’s Liverpool Regiment . . . [was] a wartime unit raised in 1940 and 1941. Few of them
William Slim later wrote: “Skillfully handled, the press of the Allied world took up the tale and everywhere the story ran that we had beaten the Japanese at their own game . . . [was] important in itself for our people at home, for our allies, and above all for our troops on the Burma front.”

“The real hero of the hour was Orde Wingate who rapidly became the best-known soldier of the day.”

The success of LONG-CLOTH added weight to Wingate’s theories of irregular warfare and, for Wingate confirmed that his thinking was right. Historian Jon Latimer explained it this way:

Perhaps the publicity went to his head. Mike Calvert, commander of No. 3 Column and Wingate’s confidant, noted that Wingate’s thinking was now significantly different. “When long range penetration is used again, [Wingate] said, it must be on the greatest scale possible and must play an essential part in the re-conquest.”

Others were not so sure. Wingate’s great supporter, Gen. Archibald Percival Wavell, had just been moved out of the chain of command, appointed viceroy of India, and replaced as Army C-in-C India by Claude Auchinleck, who believed LRP’s must be considered in proper perspective: “They are of value . . . if their operations . . . have an effect on the enemy’s conduct of the main battle.”

Wingate was commissioned as a Royal Artillery officer in 1923. He gained early experience in bush soldiering in the Sudan, commanding a company of the East Arab Corps in a remote area near the Ethiopian border. In 1936, he was assigned to Palestine, where he organized small teams of Jewish settlers led by British officers in night operations against Arabs in revolt. These became the Special Night Squads (SNS), criticized for brutal tactics, but effective against the rebels. They won Wingate the first of his three Distinguished Service Orders (DSOs) and brought him the attention of then-Major General Wavell, commander of British forces in Palestine, who effectively became his patron in the war years.

Orde Wingate briefing his Chindits. Undated photo © PA Images/Alamy Stock Photo

Orde Wingate

Wingate was a strange, exciting, moody creature, but he had fire in him. He could ignite other men. —Viscount William Slim

Wingate was an eccentric, a bearded Old Testament-like figure under a sola topee. He was critical of his tradition-bound army superiors, and “inclined to be imperious and injusticious when interacting with professional peers.” His thinking on irregular warfare made fellow officers uneasy, but he produced results. Churchill met him and called him “a man of genius and audacity.”

As the war in Europe started, Wavell, raised to head the Middle East command, brought Wingate to the Sudan to run irregular operations against Italian forces occupying Ethiopia. Wingate created Gideon

a. A Wolseley sun helmet, former British Army tropical issue, an “outsized pith helmet of the kind that, as a badge of empire, had long since become a music hall joke.”

b. “The Special Night Squads came to be considered the British Army’s first special forces and the forerunners of the Special Air Service regiments.” Brown and Louis, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, (Oxford University Press, 1999), 193. (NOTE: This citation is from Wikipedia entry on Special Night Squads.)
Force and used it to harass forts and cut supply lines and, through deception, effect the surrender of 20,000 Italian troops. Gideon Force was given pride of place in the triumphal procession that returned Emperor Haile Selassie to Addis Ababa.

It was Wavell again—as head of the India and Burma command—who brought Wingate to India to run guerrilla operations against the Japanese in Burma. But Wingate arrived in the midst of the British retreat and recognized it was too late for guerrilla warfare. He began to advocate long-range penetration operations.

Long-Range Penetration

Wingate had been mulling the LRP concept for years. Bernard Fergusson first met him in Palestine, and again when Wingate was reading his Ethiopian campaign. When they met in New Delhi in 1942, Fergusson was a member of Wavell’s “Joint Planning Staff,” where the many plans for the “re-conquest” of Burma were reviewed. The proposals Wingate made then did not vary from principles which he had expounded for many years, as Fergusson recalled:

Briefly, his point was that the enemy was most vulnerable far behind his lines, where his troops, if he had any at all, were of inferior quality. Here a small force could wreak havoc out of all proportion to its numbers. If it should be surprised, it could disintegrate into smaller pre-arranged parties to baffle pursuit, and meet again at a rendezvous fifteen to twenty miles further on its route. Supply should be by air; communication by wireless: these two weapons have not yet been properly exploited. His proposal was to cut the enemy’s supply line, destroy his dumps, tie up troops unprofitably far behind the line in the endeavor to protect these vulnerable areas, and generally to help the army proper on to its objectives.

A Meeting in Quebec

17–24 August 1943

For Churchill, who believed that T.E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom “ranked with the greatest books ever written in the English language,” attraction to Wingate was inevitable.

At the end of May 1943, 77 Brigade was dispersed and given five weeks leave. Wingate used the time to write his report on LONGCLOTH. A copy reached Churchill at a time “when he was having to reconcile Britain’s strategic aims with those of his American ally.”

Wingate received an order to report to London. When he reached there on 4 August 1943, the chief of the Imperial General Staff instructed him to report to 10 Downing Street. It was dinner time, and the prime minister was leaving the next morning for a summit conference in Quebec codenamed Quadrant. Over a family dinner, Wingate expounded on mastering the Japanese in jungle warfare.

“We had not talked for half an hour before I felt myself in the presence of the highest quality,” Churchill wrote in his history of the war, and “decided at once” to take Wingate along to Quebec “to explain his theories to President Roosevelt.”

Held in Quebec from 17 to 24 August 1943, Quadrant brought the British and Americans together to focus on strategy in Europe and the upcoming invasions of Italy and France. But problems in Asia also needed to be addressed, particularly Burma, where the British Army was making no headway. The American goal was to reestablish a land route though Burma to supply China and keep it in the war; the suspicion was that the British effort “was intended primarily to perpetuate their colonial control of that part of the world after the war.”

Wingate was Churchill’s response, and he stole the show: “In this acrimonious area, Wingate became the point of agreement . . . a warrior, who seemingly evinced disdain for machinations of empire and colonialism.” He impressed President Roosevelt and “made a very favorable impression on the American Chiefs of Staff . . . [USAAF] General [Henry “Hap”] Arnold decided to give him as much assistance as possible.”

To support his next penetration of Burma, Wingate asked the Americans for “approximately 16 DC-3 [C-47] aircraft for airdrop and . . . a ‘Light Plane Force’” to evacuate his wounded. Bombers he requested
were promised by the RAF. Before the conference ended, Lord Louis Mountbatten was named as supreme commander of a new South-east Asia Command (SEAC). For many Americans, the acronym quickly came to mean “Save England’s Asiatic Colonies.”

A Meeting with the Chief, US Army Air Forces

Late August 1943

John Alison walked into the Pentagon office of “Hap” Arnold, “and sitting there was Phil Cochran. We had been great friends before the war, in flying school together and in the same squadron at Langley. We had rented a house together.” Both men were now lieutenant colonels, accomplished fighter pilots, and air combat leaders. Alison had recently completed a tour in China; Cochran had just returned from North Africa. Both were preparing the fighter squadrons they would lead in Europe when they were summoned to meet with Arnold.

Arnold told us about the Quebec conference, how Churchill had introduced Wingate to Roosevelt, and Wingate’s sad story of having no way to evacuate his wounded: Prop the guy up against a tree, give him a canteen of water, a rifle across his lap, and walk away. Arnold said that Wingate wanted to get them out by air, and we would have to provide the airlift. “Which one of you wants the job?” he asked. I immediately said, “General, I don’t!” I had the best job in the USAAF and I was going to England.

Cochran told Arnold essentially the same thing. When he saw that neither wanted the job, Arnold said:

I haven’t told you what I really want done: Wingate walks in; it takes him six weeks to get into position to attack the Japanese support structure. Enroute he loses men, and they’re tired, and have malaria. It just doesn’t make any sense for them to walk. I want to fly them in, and then I want them supported on the ground. I will give you all the resources to do the job.

At Quadrant, Wingate had asked for aircraft to evacuate his wounded and airdrop supplies. There was no suggestion that Wingate or his superiors expected the Special Force to be airlifted into Burma. That idea appears to have originated with Arnold, who was known as an innovator looking to expand the applications of airpower. What Arnold had just told Alison and Cochran was a different proposition; it got their attention. A bit more discussion and then the question, “Can we both go?”

As Alison was senior in rank he would be the commander, Arnold said. Alison pointed out that Cochran ranked him by two months. “Okay, you’re co-commanders,” Arnold told them. The two tried to work as co-commanders for about two months, “but it was too complicated and confused the Pentagon.” Between themselves they agreed that Cochran would be the commander, and Alison his deputy. Arnold’s choice of the two fighter pilots as his commanders created an ideal marriage of talent: their thinking ran on parallel tracks and their personalities perfectly complemented each other’s.

Cochran was aggressive and outspoken; Alison was relaxed, thoughtful, and diplomatic.

Project 9

Colonels Cochran and Alison, both outstanding fighting aces, and, what is not always the same thing, first-class organizers and leaders.

—Field Marshal Viscount Slim

a. Among Cochran’s accomplishments was a starring role in the era’s popular Milton Caniff Terry and the Pirates comic strip as the character Colonel “Flip” Corkin.

b. The RAF did not have the assets needed to evacuate the wounded by air: “The first year the whole [LONGCLOTH] expedition was supplied by Burbury’s 31 Squadron, R.A.F., with three Dakotas [C-47s] and two Hudsons. The Hudsons were a failure; they could not fly down to the speed of the Dakotas . . . they flew so fast that half of the parachutes which they dropped turned inside out . . . and their loads came down whoomp and smashed.” Fergusson, Wild Green Earth, 247.
The operation was named “Project 9” and classified Top Secret. “We had an A-1 priority to get men and equipment, but we couldn’t tell anyone why we needed them,” Alison recounted. The bigger problem was to figure out how to do the job. “We were fighter pilots; now we were in charge of an aerial invasion.” While based in China, Alison had flown over Burma many times. He knew the jungle terrain did not lend itself to aerial delivery of ground troops. Cochran went to London to talk with Mountbatten and Wingate while Alison worked the problem in Washington.

“Parachutes were a possibility; and the idea of gliders was raised. Dick du Pont was at the Pentagon, and I consulted with him.” Arnold had initiated a glider program in March 1942 and put America’s leading expert on gliders in charge of it. Reading reports on Wingate’s first penetration of Burma, Alison noted that the Chindits had taken along a lot of equipment and hundreds of mules to transport it. If that was to be part of Wingate’s planned operation, the use of parachutes was impractical.

To Alison it began to appear that the best option might be “to get gliders and a company of airborne engineers, and go into one of the open glades that I knew in northern Burma. We could build airstrips there and move in an army with transport airplanes. Once the troops were on the ground, we would support them from the air.” Air support meant not just air drops, but using aircraft in place of artillery pieces. It was becoming clear that Project 9 “would require its own specialized air armada.”

Cochran met in London with Mountbatten, and the two got on very well. But his initial meeting with Wingate left Cochran confused: Wingate’s explanation of long-range penetration was a muddle. In two subsequent meetings, as Wingate described how his columns moved separately through the jungle as he directed them to their targets, the concept was suddenly made clear to Cochran: “With radio direction Wingate used his guerrilla columns in the same way that fighter-control headquarters directs planes out on a mission. I saw it as an adaptation of air-to-jungle, an application of air-war tactics to a walking war in the trees and weeds. Wingate had hit upon the idea independently.” Cochran was impressed: “When I left him I was beginning to assimilate some of the flame about this guy Wingate.”

Something else impressed Cochran—mules! To Wingate, “transport meant mules . . . the only way you could get stuff through the jungle was on mule-back. Long-range penetration went clumping along with long ears and a heehaw.”

Cochran headed back to Washington enlightened. He knew the secret of air support for Wingate, and he burned to tell Alison: “You know what Wingate really needs?” he said. “Yeah,” Alison answered. “He needs gliders.” The two had come to the same conclusion via different routes. Former American Volunteer Group (AVG) Flying Tiger pilot R.T. Smith relates what came next:

The initial plan for the invasion of Burma was a far more modest proposal than what Cochran and Alison came up with . . . . Roosevelt had promised . . . air support. . . . However, Wingate’s main concern was to evacuate his wounded, and to supply the columns of troops. . . . He wanted the US to operate a fleet of light planes that could operate out of small, rough strips hacked out of the jungle . . . the British never thought of the possibility of saving many days of forced marches by land-

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a. Richard Chichester Du Pont, of the prominent family, a founder of American Airlines, and a three-time National Soaring Champion. He was killed in the glider crash on 11 September 1943.

b. More recent histories suggest that aerial insertion was included in British talks even

Notwithstanding the importance of air transport, mules remained a staple of movement through Burma’s difficult terrain. The C-47s and gliders of the Air Commando would fly in about 1,100 of the animals. Photo © Everett Collection Inc./Alamy Stock Photo
ing their troops in gliders far behind the Japanese lines. . . 
Phil Cochran and John Alison came up with this idea, and many others that went into the plan . . . and—with consider-
able trepidation—presented to Arnold. They were prepared to be thrown out of his office, but Hap Arnold was delighted with the imaginative approach.a

John Alison recalled something else that helped refine the concept:

The British called us the First Air Commando Force. We called ourselves the First Air Commando Group. Hap Arnold gave us the name. He said, “We’re going to be an air com-
mando group.” Nobody defined what an air commando was, but the term helped Cochran and Alison understand their role and how their project should be structured. Their plan included a list of the aircraft they believed would be needed. Within a month they had commitments for most of their “air armada.”

Lining Up the Aircraft

The armada included a diverse array of aircraft, including the pi-
oneering early versions of the Sikorsky line of helicopters:

• A squadron of 13 C-47 transportsb and, in Alison’s words, “some of the best C-47 pilots in the Air Force.”

• A dozen smaller transports, the UC-64 Noorduyn Norseman, a rugged Canadian single-engine bush plane, a favorite of pilots operating in Canada’s north and in the Arctic.

• 100 Stinson L-1 and L-5 liaison aircraft modified with addition of litters to evacuate casualties.c

• A squadron of 30 P-51Asd for close support.

• 13 B-25 bombers, specially equipped to provide close air support as well, which according to Alison, “we picked up when we got to India,”

b. The C-47 Skytrain—“Dakota” to the British—carried big loads over long distances and could be operated from unimproved strips; it could also tow military gliders. The number was supplemented by in-theater C-47s when the operation began.

c. The L-1 Vigilant, which could evacuate two casualties at a time, was preferred, but only about 20 were available. The remainder were Stinson L-5 Sentinels, which carried only a single litter.

d. Project 9 had originally requested P-38s and then P-47s, but they were committed to Europe. “We were offered the P-51As, which did not perform well at high alti-
tudes, but were great at the low altitudes we used them in Burma.”

100 CG-4A Waco Hadrian gliders that carried 13 troops, (50 more CG-4As were added later).

• 25 TG-5 Aeronca gliders, which were smaller than the CG-4As.

• 6 Sikorsky YR-4 helicopters.

According to Alison, getting the aircraft was not all that difficult:

We had a secret weapon: wrote up our memorandum, signed it General Barney Giles. Giles allocated resources for Arnold. Nobody questioned us; Arnold left us on our own. His ap-
proach was: “Damn the paper-
work, get out there and fight!” That essentially was our orders.
And that’s pretty clear. We had

b. The C-47 Skytrain—“Dakota” to the British—carried big loads over long distances and could be operated from unimproved strips; it could also tow military gliders. The number was supplemented by in-theater C-47s when the operation began.

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tudes, but were great at the low altitudes we used them in Burma.”

25. In January 1944 it became apparent that the RAF would not be able to pro-
vide bombers to support Wingate, Alison appealed to Washington. Twelve B-25H Mitchell medium bombers were diverted from elsewhere in the theater and arrived in early February.
our gliders, and we asked for helicopters. What do you want to do with these things? We can’t tell you.

Getting the helicopters was not easy. “Few people had even seen one,” recalled Alison. Cochran flew to Dayton to look at them, said he needed six, and was told he couldn’t have any. In the end it took a “conference,” where Alison had to convince a panel of generals that the helicopters were a “must,” when no one really knew much about how helicopters could be used. Alison got his six helicopters. Another priority was first-rate communications gear: “I knew we would have to talk to each other all the time, and good commo gear was thin, [in India] at the tail end of the supply line.”

On the all-important question of personnel, Arnold made it easy by granting them carte blanche to recruit almost anyone they wanted. Given their service in the pre-war Army Air Corps, Alison and Cochran knew a great number of competent and experienced airmen—who knew others.

**A Meeting in Delhi**

*Mid-November 1943*

The Air Commando was brought together at Seymour Johnson Field in North Carolina, and in early November, Cochran headed off for India, where “nobody [among the British] realized what kind of force we had and what we were doing . . . . We had not even got into their minds, let alone their plans”26. In Delhi, Cochran found Wingate in the hospital, recovering from a serious bout of typhus and convinced that his planned LRP operation was about to be canceled. Cochran joined a meeting with the SEAC British High Command and American commanders Stilwell, Chennault, and Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. Alison recalled:

> As Wingate’s operation was discussed, Phil quickly found out how controversial Wingate was: The British Army didn’t want him to succeed. They argued that his planned operation was too close to the rainy season: There wasn’t time enough for Wingate to get into Burma; so they would just cancel it. Then Phil spoke up: “You don’t need to cancel it. We’re going to move Wingate in by air. Instead of six weeks to get him into his fighting area, we’ll have him there in one day.”

That caused surprise, and a lot of questions.

Cochran came prepared. He and Wingate had drawn a plan in Wingate’s hospital room. It was “the plan for an air invasion, the seizing of a jungle clearing by glider, the establishment of a Wingate base in northern Burma.” The fact was, “the new Wingate plan made no demand for [scarce, in-theater] air transport. It required nothing of anybody. The verdict was “go ahead.” Mountbatten turned to Cochran: “Son, you’re the first breath of fresh air I’ve seen in this theatre,”28 he famously said. “So then,” John Alison recalled, “We had to do it.”

**The Stronghold**

The Stronghold is a machan overlooking a kid tied up to entice the Japanese tiger . . . . The Stronghold is an orbit round which the columns of the Brigade circulate.

Wingate’s above words describe his vision of the stronghold, the idea central to his evolving LRP concept: “It is a hunter’s blind, overlooking a hobbed, tasty young goat, set out as bait to lure the tiger into range of the hunter’s gun.” It was the Air Commando that would make this picture real.

It was again Fergusson with whom Wingate had shared his early thinking. “I had known the [stronghold] idea when it first burgeoned in Wingate’s mind, but in nothing like the clarity in which it now blazed from his triumphant paper,” the final version in which Wingate set down his ideas in January 1944:29

The ideal situation for a Stronghold is the center of a circle of 30 miles radius of closely wooded and very broken country, only passable to pack transport owing to great natural obstacles, and capable only of slow improvement. This center should ideally consist of a level upland with a cleared strip for Dakotas, a separate supply-dropping area, taxiways to the Stronghold, a neighboring friendly village or two, and an inexhaustible and uncontaminated water supply within the Stronghold.”30

Here, Fergusson found ideas that were not new but had not been expressed before:

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a. “The RAF 1082/83 radio [used in LONGCLOTH] weighed 240 pounds and needed three mules to carry it.” Latimer, *Burma: Forgotten War*. It could not be used to communicate between the columns, but only with the base station in India, which in turn relayed messages between columns.
Finally [the stronghold] must invite attack by the enemy . . . so that one could smite him as he approached and as he deployed. In addition to the garrison, we were to have floater columns, hanging around the approaches, gathering intelligence, watching for the enemy, and buffeting him as he struggled through the jungle toward [his] objectives.\textsuperscript{31}

Viscount Slim had inspired the inclusion of “floater columns” while reviewing the evolving stronghold concept. “I told him [Wingate] to get [General] Scoones’s ideas on the floater model of defense as practiced in 4 Corps, by which each garrison had a satellite mobile column to operate against the rear of any enemy attacking formation.”\textsuperscript{32} Wingate must have seen the value of the floater columns immediately and made the idea an essential part of his “stronghold concept.” Calvert writes that “most important” was to maintain an “external” reserve in the vicinity. “This ‘floater’ company or column was insisted upon by Wingate and proved again and again its usefulness.” The floaters patrolled outside the stronghold, won over the local population, formed local levies, and collected intelligence.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{quote}
The State of British Intelligence in Burma
\end{quote}

We had practically no useful or reliable information of enemy strength, movements or intentions.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
\item It would only get worse. The British administration was collapsing, and the Burmese who helped run it were melting away. There was no Burmese intelligence organization. There were no Japanese prisoners to interrogate. Slim would write, “Our only source of information was identification of enemy units by their dead and documents found on them.” Air reconnaissance, given “the nature of country,” was essentially useless; results were “always negative and therefore unreliable.”\textsuperscript{35}
\item The Japanese troops avoided roads and stayed under the jungle canopy.
\end{itemize}

Slim improvised, started an effort to recruit Burmans employed by British firms cutting timber, which eventually led to organization of the “Burma Intelligence Corps,” which employed indigenous Burmese, Anglo-Burmans, Karen, and Burma-born Gurkhas to support British military units. They served as guides for units inside Burma, dealt with the local inhabitants, and in the process collected information.

Wingate’s Special Force on both expeditions benefited from having 2nd Battalion, The Burma Rifles attached to the force, a platoon deployed with each column. The 2nd Burma Rifles were Kachin, Karen, and Chin, led by British officers. They slipped into villages, disguised themselves as locals, and thereby monitored closely Japanese movements in an area. Wingate wrote of them as “an ideal soldier for aggressive reconnaissance.”\textsuperscript{36}

Fergusson wrote: “Good information is the best protection; and that we had in full from our trusty Burma Rifles.”\textsuperscript{37} Late in the second expedition, the Chindits received intelligence support from the OSS as they moved north into OSS Detachment 101’s operational area, but they depended largely on their “trusty Burma Rifles.” On Wingate’s second expedition in 1944, the Chindits benefited from the aerial reconnaissance provided by the aircraft of the Air Commando, although the difficulties caused by dense jungle remained.

\section*{Theory into Practice}

Things were moving fast. By mid-November, elements of the Air Commando were arriving in India. “Equal to a USAF wing, carrying a normal complement of 2,000 men . . . Project 9 personnel . . . were kept lean: 87 officers and 436 enlisted men.”\textsuperscript{38} Two airfields in Assam were selected, Lalaghat for transports and gliders, and Hailakan-di for fighters and light planes. The Air Commando started conducting exercises with Chindit Special Force. Soon all the elements of the LRP concept were brought together; it was time to put theory into practice.

The glider insertion code-named Operation THURSDAY, of the Chindits into three strongholds (Picca-

\begin{itemize}
\item a. Lt. Gen. Geoffry Scoones, commander of the Central Front. “Scoones must have been a little amused to find this appear as a new Wingate method of defense.” Slim, Defeat into Victory, 220.
\item b. “Exploitation of even this source was limited because in the whole corps there was only one officer who could speak and read Japanese reasonably well.” Slim, Defeat into Victory, 28.
\end{itemize}
dilly, Broadway, and Chowringhee), would coincide with a push into north Burma from China’s bordering Yunnan Province by a Chinese-American force led by General Stilwell. Wingate’s “Special Force” was much bigger than the previous year. Instead of a single Chindit Brigade, he had three. Two would be flown in, and Fergusson’s 16 Brigade would march in to a stronghold that would be named Aberdeen. “Wingate’s main job was to cut the lines of communication of the Japanese facing Stilwell on the Salween River in the East.”

Essentially, gliders would move a strong initial force into the central Burma where the three strongholds would be established and airstrips built that would allow the remainder of the force to be airlifted in by C-47 transports. With their strongholds in place, Chindit columns would range out to cut Japanese supply and communications lines, while the Air Commando stood ready to support the mobile columns with air drops and evacuations and provide reconnaissance and firepower.

Not a Certainty of Disaster
5 March 1944
Men swarmed about the aircraft, loading them, laying out tow ropes, leading mules, humping packs, and moving endlessly in dusty columns, for all the world like busy ants round captive moths.

The operation was to begin on Sunday, 5 March 1943, the date chosen because there would be a full moon to provide some visibility for the glider pilots. A number of SEAC’s most senior officers had come to Lalaghat to watch the take-offs, among them Slim, Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin, and Stratemeyer. They stood by the airstrip with Wingate and Cochran watching the C-47s taxiing into position, when a jeep suddenly raced up. Slim wrote, “A couple of American airmen jumped out and confronted us with an air photograph, still wet from the developing tent.”

To prevent alerting the Japanese, Wingate had banned all reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of the landing sites for the previous week. Cochran grew concerned and earlier that day decided to ignore the order and sent a B-25 to photograph all three sites. “It was a picture of Piccadilly landing ground, taken two hours previously. It showed almost the whole level space, on which the gliders were to land that night, obstructed by great tree-trunks. It would be impossible to put down even one glider safely. . . . We looked at one another in dismay.”

Wingate’s initial reaction was that the whole plan must have been betrayed—probably by the Chinese. Slim asked if the other two landing sites had been photographed. They had been, and they were clear of obstructions. Slim drew Wingate aside. The Chinese would have no knowledge of the actual landing sites—or of the THURSDAY operation itself. It was not likely that the Japanese were waiting in the jungle. Wingate “looked straight at me,” Slim recalled. “‘The responsibility is yours,’ he said. I knew it was.”

Slim also knew that if the operation was postponed or canceled, it would have a great effect on Stilwell’s plan to push into northern Burma and the whole Burma campaign would be in jeopardy. Slim did not believe the obstruction of Piccadilly

a. As a result of Quadrant, two American LRP units were trained by Wingate (commonly known as Galahad Force or Merrill’s Marauders). Originally intended to augment the Chindits, they were later relinquished to Stilwell, who was determined that the only US ground troops in the theater would not serve under the British.

b. “Mountbatten was not present due to a painful eye infection.”Bierman and Smith, Fire in the Night, 348

c. “For some days previously our diversionary air attacks had been almost continuous on the enemy’s airfields and communications centers to keep his air force occupied.” Slim, Defeat into Victory, 258.
was evidence that the Japanese had learned of the operation.4 “There was a risk,” Slim wrote, “a grave risk, but not a certainty of disaster. The operation would go on.”42

Wingate turned to the changes that now needed to be made: The fly-in would go as planned, “with the exception that the force for Piccadilly [under Calvert] would go to Broadway.” (The landing at Chowringhee would take place the next evening.) Cochran gathered the pilots, and Slim watched, curious how he would handle these last-minute changes that could be very disconcerting to the pilots. “Cochran sprang on to the bonnet of a jeep. ‘Say, fellers,’ he announced, ‘we’ve got a better place to go.’”43 The photograph delayed the operation all of 72 minutes.44

On Broadway

John Alison was in the pilot seat of one of the lead gliders. “Phil and I felt the same way. If you command a unit, you lead it. I told Phil that I would fly a glider into Broadway. He would have to mind the store and hold Wingate’s hand—which he was very good at.”

The first eight gliders carried the assault teams. Alison tried to put down near a wooded salient that stuck out into the field and commanded the entire landing area. If the Japanese were waiting, their machine guns would be clustered there. “We hit the ground, traveled off through the weeds, knocking down little trees, stopped right at the salient. Lt. Col. Mike Scott, Calvert’s deputy who led the assault force went into the woods. After a while he reappeared. ‘It’s all clear,’ he said.” There were no Japanese waiting.

Around us, gliders are coming in—one right after another. You couldn’t see them in the night. You heard them, whistling down the wind, coming too fast. . . . You don’t know where it’s going . . . . You side-step, like you’re in a bull-fight. The wing passes right over your head. . . . One young pilot lands and yells, ‘Hey man, I made it!’ The next glider crashes into him and he’s dead. A glider made a terrible noise as it crashed through the trees, like a thousand kettle drums. We knew we were losing a lot of men.

The aerial photographs had not shown ditches that ran across the landing area and were causing much of the chaos. The gliders had to be stopped. “We had two code words: For ‘success’ we would broadcast ‘Pork Sausage’; for disaster on the ground the word was ‘Soya Link,’ the meat substitute we all loathed.”45 Alison found a glider with an intact radio; Calvert broadcast: “Soya Link.” The gliders stopped coming in. Alison and Calvert fell asleep where they were.

They would not rest long. Calvert wrote: “I was startled to hear the roar of a powerful engine coming . . . from the jungle . . . . Alison joined me and we stared in amazement as a bulldozer slowly emerged from between the trees with a US Army engineer at the controls.”46 The bulldozer and its driver had survived the crash of the last glider to land. Alison stepped up to him and the following conversation ensued:

“Can you make an airstrip here?” Alison asked.

“Yes, sir!” the engineer responded.

“How long will it take?”

“If I have it done by this afternoon, will that be alright?”

“God bless you!”

On the strength of that, Calvert sent out “Pork Sausage,” and it was “received with joy at Lalaghat.”47

By Slim’s account, of 80 ready gliders, 61 took off and 35 landed at Broadway. “Many gliders and a few aircraft force landed, some in our territory, nine in Japanese.”48 About 30 were killed on landing at Broadway, and the same number injured. Later, Calvert noted: “On roll call I found I had 350 all ranks under command and ready to fight.”49 Alison would remember,

they made that airstrip. It wasn’t very long—less than 3,000 feet. And then I told Phil to send me airplanes. And they came in . . . one right after the other.

In the middle of the first day 12 light planes arrived to fly the wounded back. An hour after dark, Brigadier General Oldb. Commander of the joint American and British Troop Carrier Command.

a. “Hindsight later attributed the condition to Burmese teakwood farmers.” Van Wagner, Any Place, Any Time, Any Where, 49.

b. As was found at Broadway, teak logs were dragged into clearings by work elephants during the logging season. Some had been left behind at Broadway; those at Piccadilly probably had not yet been collected.” See also Bierman and Smith, Fire in the Night, 355.
tens landed. From then on, for the next few days, 100 Dakotas landed each night. General Slim wrote: “Between the 5th and 10th March, one hundred gliders and almost 600 Dakota sorties flew in 9,000 troops and 1,100 animals. In addition, with the unit that walked in to Stronghold Aberdeen, Ferguson’s 16 Brigade, Wingate had nearly 12,000 troops well-placed, as he put it, “in the enemy’s guts.” That was in addition to the “masses of equipment, and anti-aircraft and field batteries all established behind the enemy’s lines.”

On 12 March, the RAF flew six Spitfires to Broadway, to base them there, a move not coordinated with Cochran. They attracted the Japanese; the next day 30 Japanese fighter aircraft attacked Broadway. The Spitfires took them on and destroyed four but were then withdrawn. The Air Commando fighters and bombers, wisely based in India, were already ranging over wide areas of Burma, destroying supply and communications lines and now starting to support ground assaults by the Chindit columns.

The light plane force distinguished itself in evacuating wounded and supporting moving Chindit columns with supply drops and target-spotting. The fighter pilots wanted air battles instead of ground targets and got both. They destroyed 50 enemy aircraft by the end of March. The helicopters, for the first time employed in a combat area, made 18 evacuations, some not possible by other means. Calvert’s column headed southwest out of Broadway and, after a fierce fight to take the

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a. “The first time an operational airfield had been established behind the enemy.” Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 266.
Long-Range Aerial Penetration

area, established a stronghold among a collection of small hills that became known as “White City,” for all the supply parachutes caught in the trees. From there the Chindits could control the railway and the roads, and Japanese movement to the north.

Wingate’s long-range penetration concept was on its way to total success. On 23 and 24 March, Wingate visited his stronghold commanders at Broadway, White City, and Aberdeen and expressed pleasure with what had been achieved. He showed Calvert messages of congratulations he had received from Churchill and Roosevelt. He returned to Broadway in one of the light aircraft, and got aboard a B-25 to fly back to India.

The Great Concept Dimmed

24 March – 26 June 1944

Then Wingate was gone: “Wingate’s aircraft plunged down into the earth and burst into flames with everyone aboard killed instantly.”

The cause was uncertain. Slim cites the “most probable explanation . . . one of those local storms of extreme turbulence so frequent in the area.” Alison flew over the crash site and saw that no one could have survived. “Throughout the force that [Wingate] had commanded and formed, the shock was felt with amazement and pain of sudden personal grief . . . a great adventure had come to an end.”

The Chindits were meeting a lot of Japanese opposition now, and Operation THURSDAY was entering a difficult stage:

It was vital that his leadership should fall on someone in sympathy with his [Wingate’s] ideas . . . Slim chose Brigadier W.D. Lentaigne, the commander of 111 Brigade, who regarded Wingate as an upstart, held his theories in contempt, and thought them unsound and unproven . . . . Under his command, the momentum slowed, and the great concept dimmed. In the end, the Chindits were villainously misused, and he was powerless to prevent it.”

Harsh words that reflected reality. In Slim’s view, Lentaigne was “the most balanced and experienced of Wingate’s commanders.” Mike Calvert, widely presumed to be Wingate’s choice as his successor, provides perspective:

The task of following in Wingate’s footsteps was an unenviable one. The men who had opposed Orde’s ideas but who had been unable to shift him because of his powerful friends, now had a new and comparatively unprotected target. The knives that had been reluctantly put away were taken out again and lovingly sharpened.

The Chindits became more involved with Stilwell’s campaign in north Burma. On 6 May 1944, they were placed under Stilwell’s command, to support his siege of Myitkyina. “They lost their long-range penetration role and were deployed in battle as regular infantry formations, but without armoured or artillery support,” while the monsoon grounded the attack aircraft of the Air Commando. On 26 June, Mike Calvert’s 77 Brigade took Mogaung, which the Japanese fiercely defended, after a fight of well over a month. It was the last “special force” action. The men were weary and sick, but Stilwell refused to let them be relieved until mid-August, when the Chindit brigades were withdrawn from Burma and later disbanded.

On 28 March, General Arnold called Colonel Alison home to help “establish more air commando units.” A second message requested that en route to the United States . . . “he brief General Dwight D. Eisenhower . . . on Operation THURSDAY.” Cochran was later sent to Europe, to join “the first Allied airborne army,” but the war was winding down, and plans for new activities were soon abandoned.

The Legacy

By bringing the Air Commando into his long-range penetration concept, Wingate took the age-old ways of fighting on the ground into the modern era of airplanes and wireless communication, thereby multiplying the effectiveness of a “Special Force” and the ways in which it could be used.

The 1st Air Commando Group itself achieved a number of firsts on its initial operation. It was the first “composite” air unit of specialized, but mixed aircraft types. It was the first air unit to be given a high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency that enabled it to be highly responsive and flexible. It was the first air unit designed to support a force on the ground and to work out the ways that would be done. Operation THURSDAY was the first invasion of enemy-controlled territory by air, and it was the first employment of
a sizable force of light aircraft in a combat situation—and the first use of helicopters in war.

The influence of Wingate’s thinking, and of Cochran’s and Alison’s, would become very evident after WWII ended and the world moved into the Cold War. The use of air commando units supporting forces on the ground was seen with increasing frequency—in Tibet, during the Korean War, and in the responses to Soviet-inspired and supported insurrections in the Third World, which for the United States culminated in Laos and Vietnam.

Today, the reflections of Wingate’s Special Force can be seen in counterterrorism operations in the Middle East and elsewhere. The instruments may have changed, from the P-51 and B-25 to the Cobra and Spooky, and then to the Warthog and the Reaper, as the stronghold became a fire base and an outpost, all reflections of Wingate and the 1st Air Commando Group—and the concept of long-range penetration—which has endured.

Endnotes

7. John Bierman and Colin Smith, *Fire in the Night* (Random House, 1999), 271. Mike Calvert notes that Wingate chose the Chindit name while 77 Brigade was training at Saugor, India, “though the name was not really established until after the 1943 campaign.” *Fighting Mad*, 116.
11. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 264.
21. Ibid., 180, 182.
23. Except where otherwise noted, the recollections quoted in the following pages are from the author’s interviews with USAF Maj. Gen. John R. Alison, a founder and co-commander of 1st Air Commando Group, who is often cited as the father of Air Force Special Operations. A series of six interviews were done in Washington, DC, in the summer of 2001, on Alison’s Air Force career, with a focus on his role with the 23rd Fighter Group and the planning and execution of 1st Air Commando Group and Operation THURSDAY.
27. Ibid., 117. From Thomas’s interview with Cochran.
28. Ibid., 118.
33. Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 29. Field Marshal Slim’s evaluation of the situation soon after he arrived in Burma in March 1942.
34. Ibid.
39. Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 258. Slim on his arrival at Halakandi airstrip, where gliders were being readied on 5 March 1944.
40. Ibid., 260.
41. Ibid., 261.
42. Ibid., 264.
43. Ibid., 263.
44. Van Wagner, *Any Place, Any Time, Any Where*, 47.
45. Calvert, *Fighting Mad*, 68.
46. Ibid., 145.
47. Ibid., 146.
50. Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 265.
53. Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 269.

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Cooperation in the Libya WMD Disarmament Case

William Tobey

"[I]ntelligence was the key that opened the door to Libya’s clandestine programs," argued George Tenet in February 2004, and he was right.

Introduction

Muammar al-Qadhafi’s induced renunciation of Libya’s nuclear, chemical, and longer-range ballistic weapons programs was a signal accomplishment for US and British nonproliferation policy. Thus, the case holds particular interest for those studying how the intelligence and policy communities work together to prevent nuclear proliferation. Yet, Libya’s decision evolved fitfully and during a dark period for efforts to curb the spread of atomic weapons. In early 2003, Washington was still traumatized by the September 11th terrorist attacks, and anguished that al Qaeda was plotting even more gruesome assaults. The Iraq War was unleashed, in part, out of dread that nuclear weapons could be fused with terrorism. As then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explained, “given what we have experienced on September 11, I don’t think anyone wants to wait for the 100-percent surety that he has a weapon of mass destruction that can reach the United States, because the only time we may be 100-percent sure is when something lands on our territory. We can’t afford to wait.”

Worse still, from the US perspective, a nuclear proliferation tsunami appeared to be cresting, not only from Iraq, but also in Iran, North Korea, Libya, and elsewhere. These broad perceptions and fears by nonproliferation policymakers and intelligence officers informed their approach to the Libya case.

"[I]ntelligence was the key that opened the door to Libya’s clandestine programs," argued George Tenet in February 2004, and he was right. Without detailed, timely, and accurate intelligence, the effort to investigate and follow up with the diplomacy to end Libya’s illicit weapons programs would have been far more fraught. Intelligence information supported actions and arguments that ultimately persuaded the Libyans that they were unlikely to succeed against seemingly omniscient and omnipresent adversaries.

Moreover, intelligence officers conducted the first phase of the operation, an investigation into whether or not Libya was sincere in its expressed desire to clear the air on weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, the policy community created an
As the Iraq War began on 20 March 2003, a senior British intelligence official flew to Dulles International Airport outside of Washington, DC, and the next day met with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet.

environment for intelligence officers to succeed through: clear and brief instructions; short lines of communication; patience and persistence; and international support based on treaties, norms, and cooperative arrangements. After a positive response from Qadhafi was announced, the intelligence and policy communities worked together to effect and verify the elimination of his illicit weapons programs.

The Case

“Cleaning the File”

As the Iraq War began on 20 March 2003, a senior British intelligence official flew to Dulles International Airport outside of Washington, DC, and the next day met with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet. The Mi6 officer brought a message from Tripoli. Using a channel established between intelligence agencies to address Lockerbie bombing issues, Saif al-Islam (Sword of Islam) Qadhafi, the “brother leader’s” second son, and Musa Kusa, Libya’s head of external intelligence, approached the British, expressing a desire to “clear the air” regarding US and British concerns about Tripoli’s unconventional weapons programs. The Libyans asked the British to involve the Americans.

Five days later, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair huddled at Camp David to discuss Iraq’s future. During the meeting, Blair pulled Bush aside, together with their intelligence chiefs Sir Richard Dearlove and Tenet, and their national security advisors, Sir David Manning and Condoleezza Rice. They agreed to test Libya’s seriousness and to do so through intelligence channels. Both Bush and Blair were already frustrated by the outcome in Iraq, in which seemingly endless cat and mouse games between Saddam Hussein and United Nations inspectors had led to a second US war with Iraq. Perhaps an opening to Libya could offer a different path.

Tenet recounted, “I returned from Camp David and called into my office Jim Pavitt and Steve Kappes, the top two officers in our clandestine service.” With Tenet and Pavitt pre-occupied by the war in Iraq, Kappes was given the lead. He was clear on the initial mission—an investigation of whether or not Libya was serious about giving up its illicit weapons programs, to be “handled at a high level, with utmost discretion.”

Both the CIA and its British counterpart, Mi6, had met secretly with Libyan officials in Europe for years, primarily to discuss counterterrorism issues. The Americans and the British set a meeting for mid-April with Musa Kusa and a Libyan diplomat. In a session that lasted more than two hours, Kusa started coy and demanding, but eventually made clear that Libya, “had violated just about every international arms control treaty that it had ever signed.” Kusa suggested that Libya would eliminate its clandestine programs but wanted a “sign of good faith” from the United States and Britain, saying nothing about verification. In response, Kappes explained President Ronald Reagan’s “trust but verify” concept, saying the United States would offer nothing until that condition was satisfied. The discussion concluded without a meeting of the minds.

After Kappes returned, Tenet asked him to attend the president’s daily intelligence briefing in the Oval Office. Despite the lack of real progress, Bush instructed Kappes to stay engaged and to keep trying, saying that Libya could “return to the family of nations” only with a complete and verifiable disarmament commitment.

Tenet and Dearlove met in London in mid-May and agreed to try to push ahead. Kappes and his British colleague arranged another meeting in Europe for late-May, this time with Musa Kusa and Saif Qadhafi. Again, the Libyans were demanding, with Saif taking the lead. Again, Kappes held firm, insisting that Libya would not be “welcomed back into the family of nations” (Bush’s formulation) until there was a verifiable elimination of Libya’s illicit programs. The United States would insist on seeing for itself. After he was briefed on the disappointing meeting, Bush again opted for persistence.

In August, the same parties met again in Europe. Although there was no progress on verification, Musa Kusa extended an invitation to meet the elder Qadhafi in Libya in early September, where presumably Kappes and his counterpart could press their case for verification directly with the leader. Bush instructed them to say the United States would
make no concessions until an irreversible elimination of Libya’s clandestine programs could be verified.\textsuperscript{22}

Qadhafi began with a tirade against the United States and Britain—underscored by his choice of location for the meeting, an office where a US F-111 had dropped four 2,000 lb. bombs on his doorstep in 1986 as part of a larger raid in retaliation for a Libyan terrorist attack in West Berlin that had killed three people and wounded 239 others, mostly American servicemen.\textsuperscript{23, 24} Kappes had been warned during the drive to the meeting that the first 15 minutes would be rough. Eventually, at the fourteen and a half minute mark, Qadhafi calmed, saying he wanted to “clean the file.” Kappes understood that he had witnessed a premeditated performance.\textsuperscript{25} Qadhafi became agitated again, however, at the suggestion of inspections to verify the elimination of illicit weapons programs, although he allowed that “visits” by technical experts might be acceptable. Qadhafi told Kappes to “Work things out with Musa Kusa,” but there was still no specific agreement on how to proceed.\textsuperscript{26}

Kappes and Tenet briefed Bush, with the former offering reasons why he thought the Libyans were seeking to end their isolation—a common enemy in Islamic extremism, a desire for educational opportunities in the West (which both Saif and Musa Kusa had benefited from), and the need for investment in Libya’s decrepit oil production facilities.\textsuperscript{27} Kappes also later recalled being shown a modern clinic sitting idle because Libya did not have sufficient trained personnel to staff it.\textsuperscript{28} Further, he believed that the Libyans were deeply impressed by early US action in Afghanistan, rapidly unseating the Taliban with only a small force, despite logistical challenges posed by terrain and distance. Nonetheless, Qadhafi’s middle name might as well have been Mercurial, and it was hard to say what he might do. Bush, Tenet, and Kappes had a nibble on their line, but they were far from landing a big fish.

\textit{Enter a Merchant of Death}

During all seven years of Tenet’s tenure at the CIA, he and his colleagues had watched and worked to defeat a proliferation network symbolized by a flamboyant figure in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, most often referred to as A. Q. Khan. As Tenet recalled, “Our efforts against this organization were among the closest-held secrets within the Agency.\textsuperscript{a} Often I would brief only the president on the progress we were making.”\textsuperscript{29} So both the information on Khan and nascent opening to Libya were restricted to just a few individuals within the US government. Khan was implicated in efforts to sell nuclear weapons-related technology to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others.\textsuperscript{30} In the beginning, however, the information on Khan was fragmentary—intriguing hints or circumstantial evidence—but not enough to act upon without learning more.

Mindful of criticism that the CIA waited too long to stop Khan, Tenet’s memoir described the dilemma the agency faced between shutting down the network (but losing access to information), and gaining additional insight (even at the risk of proliferation):

\textit{Although CIA struggled to penetrate proliferation operations and learn about the depth of their dealings, there is a tension when investigating these kinds of networks. The natural instinct when you find some shred of intelligence about nuclear proliferation is to act immediately. But you must control that urge and be patient, to follow the links where they take you, so that when action is launched, you can hope to remove the network both root and branch, and not just pull off the top, allowing it to regenerate and grow again.}\textsuperscript{31}

The CIA attempted to resolve the dilemma by tightening the noose on Khan, watching him so closely that he could pose little danger. In a 2004 Georgetown University speech, Tenet described the surveillance:

\textit{Working with our British colleagues we pieced together the}
In Pakistan, the most compelling case against Khan would be treason, not proliferation—that he had sold his country’s most precious national security secrets for personal gain.

picture [emphases in the original] of the network, revealing its subsidiaries, scientists, front companies, agents, finances, and manufacturing plants on three continents. Our spies penetrated the network through a series of daring operations over several years.\(^3\)

In the autumn of 2003, these operations revealed that Khan had sent a shipment of uranium enrichment centrifuge parts aboard a German-flagged merchant ship named the BBC China steaming toward Libya. The two strands of secret intelligence activity were twisting together, and it was time to act.

Interdicting the BBC China would surely tip off Khan that his activities were compromised. So Bush and Tenet acted together, attempting to sow the seeds for Khan’s professional demise before he could flee. Attacking Khan was tricky because, in Pakistan, he was seen as something of a cross between Robert Oppenheimer and Bill Gates, styling himself as the nation’s founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah.”\(^3\)

Even Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf was chary of crossing such a man, although he claimed to have had suspicions dating at least to 2001.\(^3,4\)

In Pakistan, the most compelling case against Khan would be treason, not proliferation—that he had sold his country’s most precious national security secrets for personal gain. To set the stage, on 24 September 2003, Bush met with Musharraf in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, where they both attended the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. At the close of the meeting, Bush asked Musharraf to meet with Tenet the next morning, saying of the topic, “It is extremely serious and very important from your point of view.” Musharraf agreed.\(^5\)

The next morning in Musharraf’s hotel suite, Tenet was blunt, telling him, “A. Q. Khan is betraying your country. He has stolen some of your nation’s most sensitive secrets and sold them to the highest bidders. We know this because we stole them from him.” To prove his point, Tenet produced blueprints, diagrams, and drawings that should have been “in a vault in Islamabad, not in a hotel room in New York.” Tenet also detailed the countries they had been sold to.\(^6\)

Musharraf’s memoir describes it as one of his most embarrassing moments as president.\(^7\) Tenet proposed actions that the United States and Pakistan could take to investigate and root out Khan’s illicit activity, but Musharraf replied tersely, “Thank you George, I will take care of this.”\(^8\)

Eight days later, 3 October 2003, with the consent of Germany, where the ship’s owners resided, and of Italy, where its cargo was inspected, the BBC China was brought to Taranto, a port on the heel of the Italian boot.\(^9\) There, authorities discovered and removed five 40-foot shipping containers with thousands of uranium enrichment centrifuge parts that were manifested merely as “used machine parts.”\(^10\)

According to Kappes, Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative, which mustered a coalition willing to interdict illicit trade, was “the reason they were able to put that ship into harbor.”\(^11\) Qadhafi’s effort to “clean the file” without full disclosure was floundering.

Following the interdiction, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage traveled to Islamabad armed with even stronger evidence, and met with Musharraf on 6 October 2003. He urged Musharraf to take action against Khan using “mind boggling” evidence of proliferation misdeeds.\(^12\)

Pressing the Advantage: Contact and Momentum

In Tripoli, four days later, on 7 October 2003, a British intelligence officer informed the Libyans of the BBC China interdiction and presented them with irrefutable evidence of what appeared to be an ongoing clandestine centrifuge enrichment program. The Libyan explanation was that people who knew nothing of the ongoing discussions with the United States and Britain had arranged the shipment before the talks had started. Finally, though, Tripoli agreed to a US-UK technical team visit during 19–29 October 2003—a major breakthrough.\(^13,4\)

The team’s progress in Libya was fitful. In the initial meetings, the Libyans were tight-lipped. They clearly had not been briefed on the broader plan; they did not know who the Americans and British were, and appeared not to know on whose authority the outsiders were there.
Some Libyans seemed suspicious that the interaction was a cruel test of loyalty by Qadhafi. They remained clear that the Libyans were not providing complete and correct information, particularly in the nuclear realm.

In response, in late November 2003, Kappes and his British counterpart again confronted the Libyans with yet more evidence of the clandestine nuclear effort. According to Tenet, “About this time, the Libyans realized that there was no turning back. Having started to tell us about their programs, they had to complete the effort, given what we already knew.”

That set the stage for a second Anglo-American technical team visit during 1–12 December 2003. This time, the results were substantial. The Libyans acknowledged: a nuclear weapons program, including purchase of uranium hexafluoride for enrichment; 25 tons of mustard agent, smaller amounts of nerve agent, and weapons to deliver them; and, most disturbing, “nuclear weapons design materials acquired from A. Q. Khan.” The US and British experts had cracked Libya’s dam of denial.

Enter the Policymakers

Four days after the weapons experts left Libya, on 16 December 2003, Ambassador Robert Joseph and Sir William Ehrman from the US National Security Council Staff and the British Foreign Office respectively, joined by Kappes and his British counterpart, and David Landsman, also of the Foreign Office, met in London with Musa Kusa, Abdul al-Obeidi, Libya’s ambassador to Rome, Mohammed Azwai, Libya’s ambassador to London, and three other Libyans. Now the talks were political, not technical. The Americans and British sought a clear public statement by Qadhafi that Libya possessed weapons of mass destruction programs and that they would be verifiably dismantled. Washington believed such a statement would signify a strategic decision by the Libyan leader to forgo such weapons and would stand in stark contrast to the evasions of Saddam Hussein, who three days earlier had been pulled from a spider hole near Tikrit in Iraq. Joseph sensed that Saddam’s ignominious capture weighed heavily on the Libyans.

In talks that dragged on for much of the day, the Libyans tried to start the discussion with lifting sanctions, rather than direct acknowledgment of their programs.

In talks that dragged on for much of the day, the Libyans tried to start the discussion with lifting sanctions, rather than direct acknowledgment of their programs. The three paragraph Libyan draft statement “failed even to mention the existence of banned weapons or programs in Libya, nor did it say that Qadhafi was prepared to abandon them.” Joseph shut them down, saying, “That’s not what we’re here to talk about.” Eventually, at Joseph’s and Ehrman’s insistence, after six hours, the Libyans agreed to specific statements about each weapons category, and that all WMD-related materials would be removed.

The Americans and Libyans flew to their capitals on 17 December 2003, and Washington and London awaited word from Tripoli. Could Obeidi and Kusa deliver a statement from Qadhafi? It was a big “ask” of an authoritarian, egotistical, and mercurial leader. Around noon on 18 December 2003, Blair called Qadhafi. They spoke for about half an hour, with Blair telling Qadhafi that a clear statement on possession and elimination was necessary, but also promising that the White House and Downing Street would answer positively.

Blair then called Bush to report on his conversation, and they agreed to continue with the approach Blair had taken. Later that day, the Libyans provided two alternative draft statements, saying that if either were acceptable, the announcement would be made the next day, 19 December 2003. Neither, however, met the standards Blair and Bush had set.

Using the UK embassy in Tripoli to respond on December 19, 2003, London and Washington suggested edits that would fix the problems. A
While there were occasional bumps in the road, and significant logistical challenges, the intelligence and political work leading to the agreement . . . made success possible.

Libyan response received mid-afternoon in Washington, came close, and an acceptable text was quickly agreed to after a brief further exchange. Libya’s foreign minister made the statement, with a written endorsement by Qadhafi issued shortly thereafter.63

The announcement, however, did not end the story. A joint US-UK team of experts worked diligently through January 2004 to catalogue and verify the Libyan illicit weapons programs, and to remove the most crucial materials and equipment with a US Air Force C-17 aircraft, including: 2 tons of uranium hexafluoride; SCUD C missile guidance sets; and crucial elements of enrichment centrifuges. The joint team returned in March 2004, after the Haj, to remove the remaining, and bulkier weapons, materials, and equipment by ship, including: flow forming machines and 38 tons of maraging steel; a modular uranium conversion facility; the remaining components for thousands of centrifuges; and, SCUD C missiles and their transporter/erector/launchers. They also supervised the destruction of more than 3,000 unfilled chemical munitions, and consolidated to a remote and relatively secure location more than 25 tons of bulk chemical agents.64

While there were occasional bumps in the road, and significant logistical challenges, the intelligence and political work leading to the agreement, first limiting Tripoli’s options, and then insisting on a clear statement regarding possession and dismantlement, made success possible. Ambassador Donald Mahley, who headed the verification and removal operations in Libya, contrasted his experience with that of United Nations inspectors in Iraq:

Much has been written about the need for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) personnel to be good interrogators with bulldog tenacity to extract from an unwilling Iraqi host the information and even the access sought. But the Libyan decision had been communicated downward through the Libyan government. When we asked to go to a location, we were taken there. When we asked to see equipment, or inside buildings, or a site where we thought there might be some activity that had not been declared, we got what we asked for, in the overwhelming majority of cases quickly and with outstanding effort on the part of our Libyan hosts.65

Thus, in 2004, Bush and Blair’s hope for a different model for WMD disarmament seemed possible.

How the Intelligence and Policy Communities Worked Together

Why the Intelligence Community?

The first question provoked by a study of how the intelligence and policy communities worked together on the Libya WMD case is: why was the CIA’s role so large? From March to December 2003, the CIA conducted the negotiations with the Libyans, with only broad guidance issued by the president. Moreover, policymakers and diplomats were excluded from the discussions, and, except for a very few individuals, denied even knowledge of the talks’ existence. The reasons are five fold.

First, the issue was initially framed as an investigation into whether or not Libya was genuine in its stated desire to “clean the file” on its illicit weapons programs. While Kappes clearly saw an investigation as his mission,66 Rice did too. She recalled that, “At first we didn’t put much faith in the overture but we ultimately decided to send a joint CIA/MI5 [sic] team to assess the situation.”67 While the investigation inevitably led to negotiations, its outcome was not clear until after the December 2003 visit by experts, and investigations of this nature are conducted by intelligence—not foreign service—officers.

Second, utmost secrecy was vital to both sides. Leaks would very likely embarrass Qadhafi, and embarrassment can be fatal to despots as it undermines their appearance of omnipotence. At the very least, disclosures would likely have caused him to withdraw from the discussions. On the US side, revelations regarding negotiations with Qadhafi would have made them politically impossible to sustain. Joseph believes the negotiations succeeded because the State and Defense Departments were unaware of his mission to London.68

Third, if the negotiations went badly or were somehow discovered,
Fifth, and perhaps most important, the intelligence channel permitted a different kind of dialogue than would have been possible between diplomats representing adversarial nations.

Correctly declare the extent of its illicit weapons programs and allow for their irreversible dismantlement. If Qadhafi did so, Libya would be able to rejoin “the community of nations.” No further concessions would be promised. These principles held through all of Kappes’ meetings, at the London negotiations led by Joseph and Ehrman, in Blair’s phone call with Qadhafi, and in the subsequent resolution of the Libyan statement. Bush issued his instructions in terms of a strategic outcome, not tactical methods for getting there.

Second, there was high-level engagement, but not micromanagement. Kappes and Joseph had access to the president—and importantly therefore could speak authoritatively with the Libyans as to his requirements—but they were also accorded wide discretion on how to conduct the negotiations. Indeed, given the difficulties posed by a lack of secure communications and time differences, Kappes could not have consulted in a timely or detailed fashion with Washington during his trips to Libya. Joseph’s instructions prior to the London meeting merely amounted to, “Don’t screw it up.”

Third, Bush opted for persistent and patient engagement. He repeatedly told Kappes to keep at it, even when the results were frustrating. Very likely, this was due to the fact that he was pursuing an objective even more important than eliminating Libya’s clandestine weapons programs—a new model for disarmament based on a clear strategic decision, not cat-and-mouse-games with inspectors, and one that would avoid war.

Moreover, Blair joined Bush as an equal partner who also held to the same principles and objectives, making possible seamless cooperation between the US and UK officials executing the strategy. Furthermore, both the US and UK governments brought different intelligence and diplomatic strengths to the project, compensating the other’s weaknesses in a true partnership.

The Legal, Normative, and Institutional Environment

John F. Kennedy observed that victory has a hundred fathers. After the success in Tripoli, metaphorical paternity suits flew. On 1 July 2005, the Arms Control Association challenged the putative lineage leading from a Bush Administration policy innovation, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). “Key US Interdiction Claim Misrepresented” accused its headline. The story charges several State Department officials with making misleading arguments that PSI was responsible for the interdiction of the BBC. China. For example, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in 2004, “PSI has already proven its worth by stopping a shipment of centrifuge parts bound for Libya last fall.”

George Tenet saw it differently, recalling that after the BBC China was interdicted, “We learned that then-undersecretary of state for arms control, John Bolton, planned to hold...
a press conference to cite the incident as a great success for the president’s ‘Proliferation Security Initiative,’ a two year-old program to foster international cooperation on limiting international arms shipments. In truth, catching the BBC China had almost nothing to do with that program.”

Was the Libya case simply a matter of great intelligence combined with overwhelming power? Or did legal, normative, and institutional factors also have a role to play—albeit a supporting one? Several factors point toward the second answer.

First, the Libyans themselves referred to international agreements and norms against the possession of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. The initial Libyan desire to “clear the air” in March 2003 or Qadhafi’s insistence on “cleaning the file” both implied a legal brief was relevant (which is not to say the Qadhafi felt compelled to abide by international law; as he clearly did not). Libyan Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem also referred to international law in explaining Tripoli’s policy, “I think they should trust us, because they know that we are genuine. We know they have to trust us because we voluntarily came and said, ‘Now we want to abide by the regulations.’” (Ghanem’s inadvertent irony is substantial.)

Moreover, the two versions of statements that the United States and the United Kingdom rejected on 18 December 2003, both framed Libya’s decision as compliance with the nonproliferation treaties, rather than dismantlement of specific weapons programs. Again, this is not an argument that Libya felt compelled to abide by its treaty obligations; it did not. Rather, there was an understanding in Tripoli that the international norms and treaties could be used as a weapon to justify punishments such as withholding things Libya needed or desired—western education, foreign direct investment, and access to technology, etc.

Second, the spat over PSI’s role is beside the point. PSI was always framed as voluntary cooperation using existing capabilities (e.g. intelligence) and “national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.” PSI afforded the opportunity for nations to commit to use their authorities and resources to interdict proliferation activity and to establish the cooperative links that would make timely and effective action more likely. Prior to PSI, US intelligence and policy officials had too often tracked illicit shipments, but had been unable to stop them, as the goods moved faster than the diplomacy. Under PSI, timely, accurate, and specific intelligence would still be indispensable for successful interdictions, but it would be given a greater chance to succeed. Authorities to interdict would be pre-delegated; correct points of contact for passing information would be established; interdiction skills would be exercised. PSI made intelligence more actionable. Would the BBC China have been interdicted without PSI? Almost certainly. Was it easier to do so, because both Germany and Italy were original PSI participants, and thereby committed to the statement of principles? Almost certainly. Were the Libyans watching as PSI participants worked in concert to improve international capabilities to interdict illicit shipments, and did that affect Libyan judgments about how their future procurement opportunities would be circumscribed? Almost certainly. Thus, the intelligence and policy communities made each other more effective.

Moreover, the nonproliferation treaties and arrangements, and the norms that they fostered, were one of two conditions indispensable for the creation of PSI. The first was Bush’s determination to pursue proactive measures, as spelled out in his “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The second was a willingness by partner countries to take action consistent with longstanding nonproliferation commitments. According to the Statement of Interdiction Principles, “The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes.”

These were later reinforced by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540—which requires states to secure WMD-related materials within their borders, criminalize WMD proliferation by non-state actors, and enact and enforce effective export controls. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism provides practical means to implement the legal requirements of UNSCR 1540, through capacity-building cooperative action. Without these international treaties and arrangements, there would be neither the authority nor the responsibility to act against proliferation. The Bush Administration policy innovation was to induce a motivation to act.

Moreover, the nonproliferation regime—including export controls—
although imperfect, raised costs and risks for Libya, forced it to rely on suboptimal suppliers, and outright denied it access to critical technologies. Kappes himself, who deployed intelligence so skillfully against the Libyans, enthusiastically points to the importance of the legal, normative, and institutional environment as aiding his efforts to convince the Libyans that they must renounce their weapons of mass destruction.  

What Went Right and What Went Wrong

What Went Right?

To succeed in an undertaking as complex and as sensitive as the voluntary and verified dismantlement of Libya’s WMD programs, much had to go right. Procedurally, the successes included:

• short lines of communication and access to the very top of all three governments involved;
• clear, brief, and outcome-oriented instructions in the United States and Britain;
• strict secrecy, restricting those who knew about the undertaking to a very small group of people, giving time and space for the negotiations to play out; and well-defined lanes of operation between the policy and intelligence communities, without gaps or duplication.

The substantive keys to success included:

• a decision at the outset to demand an unambiguous strategic decision by Libya to renounce its WMD programs, which paid dividends on multiple subsequent occasions;
• devastatingly accurate, timely, and specific intelligence, which likely convinced Tripoli that it could not have reached its objective even if it had tried;
• the willingness to use intelligence to interdict the BBC China and to prove to the Libyans that their programs were exposed;
• multiple instances of individuals exercising good judgment when given wide and independent authorities, in particular Kappes’ interactions with Qadhafi, Joseph’s negotiations in London, Blair’s call to Qadhafi, and Mahler’s dismantlement and removal decisions; and
• Persistence by Bush and Blair, even in the face of disappointing or ambiguous results.

What Went Wrong?

Relative to the broad and important successes, the failures and deficiencies involved in the Libya case were minor. It is, however, worth examining them as the basis for improvement in future similar cases.

The first issue is the one Tenet alluded to: when to wait, watch, and learn—risking proliferation—and when to act—risking that sources of information will dry up and that although branches are lopped off, viable roots will remain. Tenet acknowledges that, “We confirmed that Khan was delivering to his customers such things as illicit uranium centrifuges.” Thus, Iran clearly benefited from trade with the Khan network. Although it might be argued that other cases involving Khan should have been handled differently, in the Libya case, intelligence was repeatedly deployed in a timely fashion with devastating effect. Moreover, the coordination between Bush the policymaker and Tenet the intelligence officer made an effective approach to Musharraf possible. Because so few Americans knew of the Libya and Khan secrets, the president and director of central intelligence had to perform as action officers, which they did effectively—eventually resulting in multiple arrests on three continents.

Another point at issue is the quality of intelligence prior to Libya’s disclosures. Prior to December 2003, no detailed unclassified official US assessments of the Libyan WMD threat were publicly available. Rather there were broad statements of concern. For example, in 2003 Bolton noted in testimony before a House Committee that, “We have long been concerned about Libya’s longstanding efforts to pursue nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles.” The ballistic missile and chemical weapons assessments appear to have been correct, and the nuclear appraisal, driven by knowledge gained in operations against the Khan network, was likely spot on, but no biological weapons program was uncovered in Libya.

There were also two problems related to chemical weapons disman-
The Intersection of Intelligence and Policy

The value of a strategic decision to forego WMD, as opposed to a tactical or transactional agreement to circumscribe capabilities, cannot be overstated.

First, after Qadhafi was overthrown in 2011, the interim Libyan government discovered and announced a clandestine stockpile of several hundred munitions filled with mustard agent. These weapons had gone undiscovered by the US and UK teams and presumably unnoticed by the Intelligence Community. Second, and perhaps worse, was the pace of destruction of declared stocks of chemical agents. While unfilled munitions are easily destroyed under a bulldozer tread, chemical agents are costly and difficult to dispose of in a safe and environmentally conscientious manner. Distracted by other, more urgent crises, US and international attention wavered, which was dangerous, given the violence that has beset Libya. (Although the chemical agents would not have been militarily useful without the munitions to deliver them on the battlefield, in the hands of skilled terrorists, they could have inflicted grave damage.) Thus, almost a decade after Libya’s declaration, only about half the stocks of agents and precursors had been destroyed. While not related to the nuclear issue, these problems reflect on the overall disarmament effort.

Final Observations and Conclusions

First, the value of a strategic decision to forgo WMD, as opposed to a tactical or transactional agreement to circumscribe capabilities, cannot be overstated. While such an agreement may be very difficult or perhaps even impossible to achieve, it is invaluable to secure. Again and again, the US and UK insistence on this principle was later used as leverage for a better outcome (notwithstanding the fact that Qadhafi cheated by retaining undeclared chemical munitions). The strategic decision in the nuclear realm removed the temptation to regenerate lost capabilities and rendered any cheating discovered an unambiguous violation of the agreement. It also made clear to all levels of the Libyan establishment the need to comply with the commitments. Second, the Libyan decision was incremental. Tripoli’s first hope was to be able to avoid declaration and verification. Only repeated and persistent interactions, a key interdiction, skillful use of intelligence, and even some level of nascent trust between adversaries (Saif later disclosed that the discreet handling of the BBC China interdiction convinced the elder Qadhafi that the US intent in the negotiations was not to humiliate him84) allowed the decision to proceed. Even after the December expert team visit, in which the Libyan programs were almost completely disclosed, the Libyans bargained hard in London not to make a complete and public declaration, and it took a call from Blair to Qadhafi to push the deal along, to be finalised even later.

Third, given the first two conditions, is the importance of what Kappes calls contact and momentum. Kappes’ idea of contact is not the genteel banter of a diplomatic cocktail party. It is more akin to the posse that pursued Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, inspiring them to wonder, “Who are those guys?” Kappes recalls that, “We just kept showing up like we knew what we were doing, exerting steady pressure.” The Libyans tried to use their own version of this concept by starting meetings with lists of demands or diatribes against the West. They were bested by use of intelligence and persistence. Kappes started slowly—as he was unfamiliar with Musa Kusa and Saif and Muammar Qadhafi—but increased the frequency and intensity of the interactions as the investigation progressed—contact and momentum.
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A Guide to the Application of Energy Data for Intelligence Analysis

Dr. Brenda Shaffer, PhD

US government agencies and many foreign governments track energy data from around the world for a variety of reasons, some obvious, some less so. The numbers provide material to forecast energy trends, including energy demand and supply, prices, and energy trade flows. Less obviously, intelligence agencies apply energy data to political and economic forecasts, such as estimates of the impact of energy revenue trends on the stability and foreign policies of energy-producing states. Such data is especially important in forecasting political and economic outcomes in major oil and natural gas exporting states, most importantly in the Middle East, where study of energy data trends can contribute to predictions of broad economic trends and assessments of the likelihood and timing of anti-government activity.

The purpose of this article is to provide analysts in intelligence or other government agencies a guide to understanding how energy data can be applied to the analysis of a range of issues in countries around the world.

The purpose of this article is to provide analysts in intelligence or other government agencies a guide to understanding how energy data can be applied to the analysis of a range of issues in countries around the world. It can be used to help train new analysts or to serve as a checklist for analysts and diplomats responsible for monitoring and reporting on developments in foreign countries. The principles in this article can also be applied to academic, commercial, and other entities assessing political and economic developments and political risk.

This guide is a result of my interactions with analysts at government research units in various countries and during NATO-sponsored courses on energy security, which revealed that NATO members and associated countries vary significantly in how they collect, analyze, and apply energy data to their analysis.

In this article, I will walk readers through the following applications of energy data:

- the use of energy data to improve broad understanding of nations and regions
- specific indicators in energy data useful for political and economic forecasting
- issues related to electricity supply
- the importance of the resource depletion rate
- the integration of data showing the gap between energy export revenue and revenue necessary for a balanced budget together with the level of wealth reserves in energy producers
- the implications of subsidies policies

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The Potential of Energy Data

**Energy’s input into understanding foreign states**

Expansion beyond the typical range of energy data studied and the integration of expanded data sets into country or regional assessments can improve the understanding of political dynamics in countries and the accuracy of estimates of the futures of countries. The most important data sets that should be integrated into general area and country studies include:

- a. fuel mix composition (total energy supply and electricity fuel mix)
- b. level of electrification and average price of electricity and the percentage of households for which this price is accessible
- c. energy intensity rate (which is important also for assessing future economic trends)
- d. energy trading partners
- e. details of refining capacity
- f. the state of energy security
- g. the composition and interrelationship of the ownership of the energy infrastructure.

**a. Total Primary Energy Supply, Fuel Mix, and Electricity Fuel Mix**

Study of the relative mix of fuels used in a country’s total primary energy supply (TPES) and electricity generation yields valuable information and is readily available. Yet, many intelligence organizations compile data on fuel production and consumption trends in absolute terms of weight and mass (tons of oil produced, volumes of natural gas consumed, etc.) and in comparison to other states (e.g. 19th largest producer of coal), not analyzing their relative weight in a country.¹

For example, different fuel mixes point to potential energy supply challenges and trade patterns and partners. In addition, a state’s total primary energy supply fuel mix reflects the prioritization of different public interests. For instance, if the share of natural gas and renewables is high, this can reflect a strong interest in environmentally friendly policies. A large portion of coal in the fuel mix can reflect a higher priority on energy security of supply, by basing energy consumption on a fuel source that is easy to import, store, or, in some cases, produce locally. A state’s fuel mix composition can also indicate the level of pollution in a state. For instance, a fuel mix in which coal comprises a large portion will tend to have high air pollution and likely have high levels of water pollution.

The charts on the right illustrate, through the examples of Bulgaria, China, Iran, and Japan, the vast diversity in the fuel mixes of states. The diagrams of the fuel sources of Poland and Vietnam also show the great diversity of electricity fuel mixes, which lead to different foreign-trade, foreign-relations, economic, public-health, and environmental effects. In addition, they pose different security challenges.

**b. Electrification and price**

A state’s household electrification rate is an important indicator of

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¹ The International Energy Agency (IEA), for instance, publishes the fuel mix of its members and other states. For European Union member states, the data is easily accessible through the European Commission’s Eurostat.
economic and human development trends. Accordingly, many major intelligence services routinely include this information in basic reports on a state. Capacity to provide accessible and affordable electricity is an indicator of state strength and can influence the popularity and legitimacy of a ruling government. However, in many states that have the infrastructure to provide electricity, large swaths of their populations cannot afford it. Thus, adding information on electricity prices and the percentage of households for which electricity is affordable provides an additional variable in political circumstances.

c. Energy intensity rate

Energy intensity refers to the amount of energy used per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). Energy intensity rates reflect levels of economic efficiency and thus sustainability. High energy intensity rates are a liability that can hurt future economic growth and leave an economy highly vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of global energy prices. Economies with high energy intensity rates that are experiencing economic growth may be relying on government subsidized energy supplies, a policy that may not be sustainable over time or continue to enable growth in the future.

Energy intensity rates also can point to the dominant sector of an economy (for instance service-based economies tend to have lower energy intensity rates than those based on manufacturing). As a result, significant changes in energy intensity rates can reflect economies transitioning from agricultural to industrial or service-based.

d. Energy trading partners and potential partners

For insight into key trading relationships, analysts may turn to the ratio of imported versus locally produced fuel sources. Among the imported (or exported) energy volumes, a breakdown of where the energy is imported from (and/or exported to) provides useful information on a country’s foreign trade relations and, by extension, political strengths and vulnerabilities. Data on gas trade should be broken down between pipeline trade and liquefied natural gas (LNG).

In assessing the potential political importance of energy trading partners, it is important to focus on trade in natural gas, and less on oil and coal. Oil and coal are traded on global markets, with little direct connection between the supplier and the consumer. In addition, oil and coal trading is conducted primarily on spot markets with few long-term contracts binding suppliers and consumers.

In contrast, international natural gas trade occurs primarily via permanent infrastructure and long-term contracts between suppliers and consumers. Even LNG is traded primarily via long-term contracts between suppliers and consumers. Due to the physical connection and the long-term nature of gas trade today, there is much more room for political and foreign policy considerations, than in oil and coal trade.

e. Detailed refining capacity

The specifics of a state’s oil refining capacity are useful in analyzing its energy trade relations. Refineries vary in the types (and thus origins) of the oil they can process. Understanding the specific refining capacity of a state indicates its potential oil sources. Similarly, for oil producing states, the grade of their oil indicates to which countries they can export.

f. Energy security challenges

Relevant data can also point to energy security challenges, many of which are or can become national security challenges. Knowledge of this data can point to the greatest threats to stability and economic growth and the most serious points of potential vulnerability to external influence.

In looking at energy security challenges, it is important to identify which fuels are used for which sectors in order to identify supply vulnerabilities. While supplies to most sectors, such as industry, are interruptible without major crises, large disruptions to power supplies can severely affect the functioning of states. In addition, electricity can be used to supplant other disrupted supplies (such as heat).

Identification of sectors that consume imported energy is vital to understanding vulnerabilities to disruption of supplies. For example, many observers have attempted to assess how vulnerable European states are to interruption of Russian energy supplies by focusing on the percentage of a state’s gas that Russia supplies. Poland is often cited as a highly vulnerable state, since more than 90 percent of its gas comes from Russia. However, these commentators fail to point out that Poland uses...
In major energy exporting states, the centers of political power are usually different from those in other types of states.

...very little gas as part of its overall fuel consumption (under 5 percent) and that almost none of that gas is used for power generation. So, Russian disruptions of supplies to Poland likely would have little impact on Warsaw’s ability to continue basic functions.4

In examining a country’s energy security situation, it is important to look at the capacity to supply energy when there are disruptions of regular supplies (due to weather, technical breakdowns, acts of nature, terrorism, intentional disruptions by suppliers etc.). Particularly relevant in this case is assessing the energy storage capacity (especially of natural gas) of states. Thus the collection of energy storage data on states should be done routinely.5

g. Power brokers are often power brokers

Identifying the owners or major stakeholders in energy infrastructure in states often lead to identification of the important members of political and economic elites. This group includes owners of power generation facilities, natural gas and electricity grids, refineries, and energy storage sites. In addition, it is useful to identify individuals or companies that hold contracts for the import and/or export of major energy sources.

As part of this analysis, it is important to map out the political affiliations of the players in the energy sector as well as ties they have within their families and other commercial interests. In the case of foreign investors, it is useful to map out their identities and their ties to local political and commercial elites. Local energy companies may also maintain special relationships with foreign entities (governments and/or companies) worthy of analysis.

In major energy exporting states, the centers of political power are usually different from those in other types of states. In states of this type, supervision of the energy production and export sectors are usually in the hands of groups and individuals that are closely linked and loyal to the political leadership. Thus, when mapping out the centers of power in a major energy exporting state, a focus on the power brokers in the energy sector often helps identify the power centers in a state.

It is useful to look at the extent of concentration of ownership or control of energy infrastructure and distribution in a state. Do certain individuals and/or companies own various parts of an energy or electricity supply chain? Do entities own multiple pieces of energy infrastructure in a certain state? Study of these power brokers can advance understanding of the functioning of the energy market in a state. For example, do a large number of players have access to the market or is it concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals or entities.

Political economies of major oil and natural gas producers

States that are major exporters of oil and natural gas possess distinctive economic and political characteristics and propensities that affect their economic performance, regime type, and regime stability, and many other political and economic outcomes. It is therefore important to integrate energy data trends into political and economic analysis of the Middle East where a majority of the states are either major oil and gas producers or possess economies that are highly influenced by the economic trends in oil and gas producing neighbor states.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines a “major energy exporter” as a country in which the average share of oil and/or natural gas exports comprise at least 40 percent of total exports. In 2016, 32 states were classified as “major energy exporters.”3 Most of the major oil and natural gas exporters have “rentier” economies: First, this means that income derived from the state’s natural resources is the most significant input into the economy; second, the majority of this revenue comes from abroad; third, only a small part of the population is engaged in generating the rent; last, the state is the primary recipient of economic revenue.6

Rentier states also possess emblematic economic and political development patterns, often manifesting as the “resource curse.”5 The major characteristics of rentier states are: economic underperformance, lack of transition to democratic regimes, and a high propensity for involvement in conflicts. A factor in the economic underperformance is the volatility of oil and other natural resource com-

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a. Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei, Cameroon, Chad, Columbia, The Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen.
modity prices, leading to recurring cycles of boom and bust.8

During times of high-energy prices and large state revenues, energy and natural resource exporters tend to undertake large-scale state spending. When the price of the exported commodity falls, the states are left with expensive spending commitments and a substantially reduced ability to meet them. Thus, states with boom and bust economies are not effective in developing infrastructure and public goods over time. These states operate in an environment of constant uncertainty, which creates a built-in challenge to budgets on every level of government. This uncertainty leads to unstable state investments and thus often produces inadequately maintained infrastructure, such as roads and electricity grids.9 This cycle can also contribute to the emergence of political radicalism.

Due to the emblematic characteristics of major energy exporters, the policy options available to states of this type differ from that of non-major energy exporters. It is important for policy analysts to recognize this difference and reflect it in policy recommendations. For instance, due to the concentration of political and economic power in most major energy exporters, US- and European-sponsored projects aimed at strengthening the power of nongovernmental organizations as a means to bringing democratic transition, have not yielded significant results. Additionally, while all major international economic institutions recommend economic diversification to resource dependent economies, no major energy producers have succeeded in significantly diversifying their economies prior to the beginning of their depletion of the sources of their wealth.

Many major energy exporters, despite their vast energy resources, have been unsuccessful in delivering stable electricity to their populations.10 When electricity supplies are disrupted in oil and gas producers, the public often is angered by the sense that “their” resource is being sold abroad, while they do not get basic energy provision at home. Lack of capacity to provide electricity is often viewed by publics as a symptom of the weakness of a ruling regime and can encourage demonstrations and demands for regime change.

In recent years in the Middle East, extended power outages have been associated with public mass demonstrations and even regime overthrows. In Egypt, the fall from power of both Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi were proceeded by extensive power outages in Cairo and other major Egyptian cities. In August 2015, insufficient electricity supplies triggered mass demonstrations in Baghdad.11 Power cuts triggered large demonstrations in the Gaza Strip in September 2015, and Nigeria’s unstable electricity supplies were a major issue of contention in that country’s March 2015 presidential elections.

b. Electricity demand trends

Electricity consumption trends often dovetail with economic growth trends: when the economy is expanding, demand for electricity typically increases and vice-versa,2 with paral-

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The inability of a state to maintain stable supplies of electricity is an indicator of the state’s poor capacity, more broadly, to deliver public goods, and it is a precursor of domestic unrest.

Part II. Specific indicators that yield forecast value

The indicators with specific forecast value are:

- a. electricity supply disruptions
- b. electricity demand
- c. resource depletion of major oil and natural gas producers
- d. the gap between energy export revenue and revenue needed for a balanced budget together with currency reserves
- e. policies on subsidies

a. Electricity supply disruptions

The inability of a state to maintain stable supplies of electricity is an indicator of the state’s poor capacity, more broadly, to deliver public goods, and it is a precursor of domestic unrest. Disruption of electricity supply disturbs citizens’ ability to carry out routine tasks, heightens their exposure to crime, harms appliances, machinery and food stocks. Water supplies are generally threatened, as water supply systems are typically dependent on electricity for their operation. In agricultural areas, disruption of electricity supplies can cause the shutdown of water pumps and lead to loss of crops. Unable to work or engage in other activity, people become more likely to be drawn to protests.

b. Electricity demand trends

Electricity consumption trends often dovetail with economic growth trends: when the economy is expanding, demand for electricity typically increases and vice-versa, with paral-

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a. An exception to this connection is when energy efficiency mechanisms are also
Despite clear evidence that energy export revenue to the regimes in Syria and Egypt was rapidly declining, few analysts in academe published assessments that the regimes in Syria and Egypt were vulnerable to instability.

level shifts in employment. For example, change in the electricity consumption rate in China led analysts to correctly assess the 2015 downward trend in Chinese economic growth, even before Chinese authorities and international financial institutions recognized the change.13

c. Energy production rate and resource depletion rate

In non-democratic energy-exporting states, government revenues from energy exports are critical for maintaining patronage networks and funding security services that underpin the regime’s stability. Analysis of energy resource production rates and resource depletion rates contribute to the ability to forecast regime instability in those states. For instance, energy production rates declined steeply in Syria and Egypt in the decade preceding the outbreak of large anti-regime activity, making an additional dramatic decline prior to the outbreak of mass protests. During the year the protests began, Egypt transitioned from being an oil exporter to an oil importer. At the same time, the gap between Egypt’s gas production and domestic consumption narrowed, leaving less gas available for export. That meant dwindling revenue as well as shortages for the domestic market. The data on Egypt and Syria’s production rates was readily available and openly published on the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency (EIA) website in 2010. There was no need for any special or covert intelligence gathering; instead, analysts needed only to analyze data the US government was routinely collecting and publishing:

Despite clear evidence that energy export revenue to the regimes in Syria and Egypt was rapidly declining, few analysts in academe published assessments that the governments in Syria and Egypt were vulnerable to instability because energy export revenues were their main sources of income. Furthermore, representatives of some intelligence services publicly admitted that they did not anticipate instability in Egypt.14

d. Balanced budgets and currency reserves

It is useful to calculate the relationship between a state’s balanced budget requirements and energy export revenue (based on trends in prices of oil, natural gas, or coal). Many intelligence services, academics and political risk companies regularly analyze the gap between a state’s total revenue needs and energy-based revenue.15 However, the relevance of this information is improved when combined with analysis of a state’s currency reserves. The reserves can be used to preserve public spending levels at times when there is a significant gap between revenue from energy export and the balanced budget. Combining the two indicators produces a far more accurate picture of potential challenges to regime stability, one that is based on numbers that point to a regime’s ability to maintain levels of spending rather than looking only at the gap between a balanced budget and revenue from energy export.

Following the recent steep decline in the global oil price (beginning in 2014), many journalists, academics, and policymakers foresaw instability in oil exporters, a judgment based on the exporters’ ability in the low price environment to balance their budgets without major budgetary cuts.16 Many perceived that Russia, for instance, would experience severe economic challenges and thus potentially experience challenges to its domestic stability and maintenance of its military forces. These assessments did not pan out for a variety of reasons,
including the capacity of Russia to fall back on its immense currency reserves. The factor of the access to currency reserves was overlooked in most published assessments.

e. Energy subsidy policies

Significant changes in energy subsidy policies can trigger public protests and affect regime stability. Most major oil and gas producers and many developing countries subsidize energy supplies to domestic consumers. The subsidized energy can include gasoline, electricity, natural gas, fuel oil, and propane. Subsidies of fuel to the domestic market (through loss of revenue from lack of export, direct costs of imported goods sold at a lower cost to the domestic market or externality costs due to the higher consumption of energy), usually form one of the largest items in the government budgets in oil and gas exporting states, often close to a quarter of the state’s annual budget.

Countries have diverse goals in providing subsidized energy to their citizens. In developing countries, the subsidized products are supposedly intended to help the poor move up the development ladder. In energy exporters, low energy prices are often viewed as an entitlement to the public to receive direct benefit from the country’s energy riches. However most of the subsidies of energy do not promote public good and, in the end, tend to benefit the country’s rich more than its poor. There is a broad consensus among economists, especially in international financial institutions, that subsidized energy leads to low energy efficiency, and high externality costs (such as from higher pollution, and thus subsequent increased public health costs).  

Low energy costs encourage high and often wasteful consumption and thus increased resource depletion rates, often turning energy exporters into importers within a short period of time. Energy subsidies tend to benefit the rich, who consume much more energy than the poor. Subsidized gasoline and other liquid fuels are often smuggled to neighboring states (when there is a gap in price—see graphic below) often leading to shortages of fuel at home in the oil producing state and essentially to the government subsidizing energy consumption in some neighboring countries.

Despite the wide consensus that energy subsidies rarely promote public interest, the subsidized energy goods are often highly popular and governments that attempt to remove them often encounter serious opposition. Citizens may doubt, or not be informed, that saved funds would be used for an alternative public good, such as lower education and health costs, but they do notice the “price at the pump” or a change in their monthly electricity bill. Political opposition groups often criticize ruling governments and mobilize populist opposition when they try to remove subsidies. Thus, states that subsidize energy products frequently face the same dilemma: the need to cut subsidies in order to improve economic prospects and prevent resource depletion while at the same time addressing the potential of public unrest and instability cuts could unleash. In recent years, in many cases increases in fuel prices in oil and gas exporting states triggered violent protests as they did in Iran (June 2007), Nigeria (January 2012), Jordan (November 2012), Sudan (September 2013), and Mexico (January 2017).

The converse is true, as well: increases in subsidies can help regimes weather challenges. This is illustrated by the responses of various governments in the Middle East to the “Arab Spring” in 2010. A major trigger of the protests was the rise in

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### Subsidized gasoline and other liquid fuels are often smuggled to neighboring states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin country</th>
<th>Destination country</th>
<th>Price difference per gallon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia &gt; Finland</td>
<td>$2.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China &gt; Hong Kong</td>
<td>$3.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran &gt; Pakistan</td>
<td>$3.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt &gt; Gaza Strip</td>
<td>$3.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria &gt; Morocco</td>
<td>$3.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina &gt; Brazil</td>
<td>$2.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela &gt; Colombia</td>
<td>$3.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria &gt; Chad</td>
<td>$3.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina &gt; Brazil</td>
<td>$2.42</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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**Key**
- Origin country
- Destination country
- Price difference per gallon
fuel and food costs that had occurred over the year preceding the outburst of demonstrations. In response to these demonstrations, Middle East major energy exporting states, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, dramatically increased their public subsidies, blunting the impact of the rise in costs to the population.

In contrast, their resource-poor counterparts did not possess this capacity. States that have gone from being energy exporters to energy importers, such as Egypt, and states with dwindling oil production rates, such as Syria, were not able to mitigate the effects of rising costs through increasing subsidies, since they no longer had extensive revenues from energy exports. In the case of Egypt, the state did not have access to sufficient domestically produced energy resources as well. Thus, we see that except for Libya, which was a target of external intervention, all the ruling regimes that fell during the “Arab Spring” were not major energy exporters. In contrast, the oil and gas rich countries in the region survived the challenge, supported by raising subsidies of energy and other goods.

In sum, changes in policies on subsidies should be regularly monitored. Successful reduction or elimination of energy subsidies can indicate that a ruling government is strong and also possesses capacity for economic reform.

**In Sum**

Having provided a framework for the use of energy data in intelligence assessments on a broad range of intelligence issues, I trust this article will encourage analysts and managers of analysts to more aggressively apply energy data to their analysis. I also hope, having pointed to some of the most accessible sources of data, analysts will monitor those sources for meaningful shifts in energy-related trends in their areas of responsibility. A fuller list of the most potentially useful sources for such data are shown in the table below.

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**Open Sources of Energy Data:**

- Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports - https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
- Politico Europe: Energy and Environment - https://www.politico.eu/section/energy/
The Potential of Energy Data

Endnotes


5. For more on policy instruments that expand a state’s energy security of supply, see ibid.


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A Call for More Humility in Intelligence Analysis

John S. Mohr

Wisest is she who knows she does not know.”

Humility is probably not something most intelligence analysts consider to be a central tenet of their work. The notion of humility and intelligence may create dissonance for many unfamiliar with the intelligence discipline. This dissonance stems from intelligence analysts staking their reputations on their specialized knowledge, in addition to solid tradecraft and polished communication skills.

There is scant literature devoted to the topic of humility and intelligence analysis. Ample studies of humility exist in other fields, including medicine, business, and religion, but writings on the intelligence discipline have only addressed humility as a peripheral issue. The late CIA analyst, national intelligence officer, and intelligence educator Jack Davis’s 2006 work on the analyst-policymaker relationship may contain the most direct allusion to analytic humility. In discussing public criticism of flawed analytic performance, Davis wrote:

Confidence, even overconfidence, in substantive judgments is a staple of the analysts’ environment. Especially the more experienced DI (Directorate of Intelligence in CIA) analysts tend to see themselves as the best informed on the issues they follow as well as the most objective national security professionals in the US government.

Davis follows this critique with his view on how analysts react to negative feedback from policymakers.

A common first reaction . . . is to suspect that either politics or the critics’ lack of requisite substantive expertise is at work. Digging in of heels in defense of the original assessment at times follows.

This essay builds on Davis’s admonition and attempts to add to the body of literature on critical thinking and intelligence analysis by advocating for greater humility in intelligence analysis and addressing the dangers of insufficient humility. I will argue that the Intelligence Community (IC) needs to embrace humility as a central tenet for three reasons.


c. Ibid.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
Uncertainty is among the few certainties in the intelligence field and requires humility to appreciate.

- First, humility helps the community cope with uncertainty that is inherent to the industry.
- Second, a humble perspective reveals that genuine subject matter expertise is rare.
- Finally, a lack of humility can manifest itself as hubris and cause harm to analysis.

While I am writing from an intelligence analyst’s perspective, the facets of humility I discuss apply across functions in the IC.

Scholars of critical thinking Dr. Richard Paul and Dr. Linda Elder include intellectual humility as one of eight intellectual traits in their seminal work on critical thinking. They define intellectual humility as

> having a consciousness of the limits of one’s knowledge, including a sensitivity to circumstances in which one’s native egocentrism is likely to function self-deceptively; sensitivity to bias, prejudice and limitations of one’s viewpoint. Intellectual humility depends on recognizing that one should not claim more than one actually knows. It does not imply spinelessness or submissiveness. It implies the lack of intellectual pretentiousness, boastfulness, or conceit, combined with insight into the logical foundations, or lack of such foundations, of one’s beliefs.a

Intelligence analysts are unlikely to protest the utility or applicability to intelligence analysis in what these scholars postulate. To what extent, however, do IC analysts heed their words? I believe there are three major reasons they should.

**Reason 1: Humility Helps Us Cope with Uncertainty**

Uncertainty is among the few certainties in the intelligence field and requires humility to appreciate. Uncertainty underpins humility, according to Paul and Elder’s view that humility entails comprehending the limits of one’s knowledge. While the IC strives to combat uncertainty by pursuing new collection and methods to fill gaps and goes to great lengths to convey degrees of uncertainty to clients, it remains an uncomfortable and persistent constant.

One of the first lessons I learned as a student at the US Air Force intelligence officer school was to be comfortable saying to a questioner, “I don’t know, but I’ll get back to you.” Author and scholar Leah Cohen devotes an entire book to this theme. In *I Don’t Know* she argues that embracing this theme improves communication and enables more honest debates about issues.b This simple concept of admitting ignorance is hard to implement, particularly when one’s reputation is tied to knowledge of a particular topic.

Washington Post staff writer Joel Achenbach alludes to this awkward acceptance of uncertainty in his 2007 article on the absence of doubt among Washington policymakers. While he does not make reference to the IC, Achenbach’s findings are directly applicable to intelligence analysis. He writes,

> Doubt has been all but outlawed in contemporary Washington. Doubt is viewed as a weakness. You are expected to hold onto your beliefs even in a hurricane of contradictory data. Believing in something that’s not true is considered a sign of character.c

In other words, he is encouraging readers to embrace uncertainty and open their minds to new evidence as it surfaces. Achenbach goes on to discuss the dissonance between asking questions and a culture that demands instant answers: “Defining your problem correctly, examining evidence and contemplating biases can be extremely inconvenient.”d These steps should be staples in intelligence analysis.

Intelligence analysts should strive to employ humility to cope with their lack of knowledge and fallibility, as a means to improve thinking. Paul and Elder argue that an awareness of one’s ignorance can improve thinking by illuminating “prejudices, false beliefs, or habits of mind that lead to flawed learning.”e This idea is central to intelligence analysis, which intelligence community veteran Dr.

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d. Ibid.

Examining how the IC defines this nebulous concept of expertise and at what point it extends into hubris is germane to understanding humility.

**Reason 2: Humility Reveals Subject Matter Experts Are Rare**

Developing expertise is among the IC’s primary tools to fight uncertainty, but true expertise is rare and takes considerable time and effort to develop. Showcasing expertise often manifests in using the ubiquitous and overused title known as “SME” or subject matter expert. It is not clear if this title is self-imposed or earned, or if its use is for self-promotion or to boost an agency’s credentials. Its use is a swift way for an analyst to establish their credibility, whether in an e-mail or during an introduction for a briefing. The term’s overuse, however, risks diluting its value and overplaying the IC’s hand in what it can actually provide to clients, therefore violating Paul and Eider’s position that one should not claim more than one actually knows.

No analyst would want to be introduced as a novice on North Korea, and no manager would want to turn away a tasking because the office lacks expertise, but the IC needs to guard against applying the SME title too broadly and consider what really constitutes an expert.

Examining how the IC defines this nebulous concept of expertise and at what point it extends into hubris is germane to understanding humility.

countries in their portfolios, and have studied their targets’ major facets, from political institutions to security actors. Some have foreign language capabilities, which may amplify understanding of cultural nuances. An academic would be quick to point out that this substantive depth, like understanding the difference between the Tuareg and the Toubou, is not unique to the IC. As in academia, the process aspects of our work—using logic, reasoning, and evidence—are as important as substance. Tetlock and Gardner argue that how forecasters think is paramount and that superforecasters tend to be open-minded, careful, curious, and self-critical.

CIA veteran and author of a seminal often-cited work, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Richards Heuer adds to this by saying, “analysts should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.”

Time spent on a subject has also been used to define expertise, suggesting that after some arbitrary period an analyst becomes a substantive expert. In his book, Lowenthal posits a period of around 5 years for an analyst to be considered a subject matter expert. Bestselling author Malcolm Gladwell takes a similar approach in his book, *Outliers*. He offers a “10,000-hour rule,” which says that

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d. For a textbook discussion on expertise in intelligence analysis, see Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (CQ Press, 2016), 163–216.
e. Tetlock and Gardner, 20.
The antithesis of intellectual humility is intellectual hubris, a quality that may be most harmful in the intelligence field because of the impact on analysis.

How did the analyst cross into the expert threshold? The analyst’s house was filled with nearly every book written on his target country, he had regular dialogue with leading academics who had done field research in his country, and he had colleagues who were natives of the country or still lived there. He also traveled regularly to the country, often for extended periods, and journeyed outside of the capital where he could meet various stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations, religious officials, and citizens outside of elite circles. He understood how elites in his target country thought and his expertise was in high demand from policymakers.

True expertise alone does not prevent intellectual hubris and can sometimes foster it. Tetlock, in one of his research’s main points, says that specialists in a field are often not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in forecasting what is going to happen in their region of study. His work is a reminder of the value of self-reflection for anyone working in a field like intelligence analysis, no matter what their experience or expertise.

Dr. Kjetil Hatlebrekke and Dr. M. L. R. Smith, in their 2010 article examining the human and cognitive underpinnings of intelligence shortfalls, allude to the dangers of not practicing self-awareness. They advocate for “the importance of humility and responsibility in relation to threat perception and what the results may be if such humility and self-criticism are not taken seriously.”

(U) Reason 3: Lack of Humility Can Harm Analysis

The antithesis of intellectual humility is intellectual hubris, a quality that may be most harmful in the intelligence field because of the impact on analysis. Analysts are often passionate about their work and employ what is usually a healthy defense to any changes to it. The pressures analysts face to answer salvos of policymaker demands may contribute to arrogance among analysts. Sometimes, however, analysts become entrenched in their views and become unwilling to hear alternative views.

This mentality is commonly manifest in coordination or peer review processes in which analysts receive feedback on articles they have written from colleagues who may take different views. Many analysts instinctively prepare for the defensive by crafting counterpoints, which risk devolution into verbal or e-mail sparring. It is during these moments that Paul and Eider’s guidance to examine the logical foundations of our beliefs is particularly relevant. I once heard that coordination is “free feedback,” which is a mindset that helps advance collaboration, no matter how challenging the coordination. Psychologist Adam Grant’s “givers and takers” framework encourages us to mirror this philosophy when providing feedback.

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b. Philosopher Isiah Berlin, drawing on an ancient Greek poem, originally developed the fox and hedgehog framework, which Tetlock incorporated into his work. (Superforecasting, 69.)
c. Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 69.
Another important facet in evaluating humility is how we respond to criticism or to instances where we are wrong.

An analyst’s ego is also an automatic defense against a dissent because of the stigma associated with it. Few analysts welcome disagreement with their theses and insertion of dissent into their work. Striving to alter this mindset into one that sees a dissent as a means to strengthen analysis would enrich such analysis. Dissent also underscores the complexity of the issues the IC faces, the uncertainty ingrained in them, and presents policymakers with additional perspectives.

Another important facet in evaluating humility is how we respond to criticism or to instances where we are wrong. There are scores of pages devoted to the study of intelligence failures, which focus on system-level deficits. Lowenthal and former CIA officer Ronald Marks advocate for a "robust ‘lessons learned’ capability” to reflect on such analytic lapses. This same mentality is important at the individual level too. How do analysts reconcile their own shortfalls, whether missing an assessment or facing disagreement from a policymaker during a briefing? Amid the steady production grind, it is important to pause to admit one was wrong and reflect on the respective causes that Tetlock and Gardner call an “unflinching postmortem." This may entail revisiting one’s evidence and critiquing one’s own assessment. It could also involve outreach to a key stakeholder who may have had a divergent view that has since become more pertinent. Tetlock and Gardner also suggest that people facing situations with great uncertainty keep a journal to “create an immutable record” that they can reference. These are tough steps to take, particularly when one is on the losing side.

**Proposals to Cultivate Humility**

How then can the IC encourage and institutionalize humility, and how can it keep people humble? The following recommendations seek to achieve these goals:

- **A Recertification process.** An intelligence analysis aptitude assessment, akin to a physician’s requirement to pass a board certification exam every 10 years, would work toward institutionalizing humility. The project management professional’s certification process offers a gold standard model and the Defense Department’s “Certified DoD All-Source Analysis” program is a step toward this, in the way it requires DoD analysts to pass a comprehensive knowledge exam.

- **Continuing education.** The IC Advanced Analyst Program (ICAAP) provides a standard of continuing education for analysts. The IC should seek more informal ways to promote continuing education through avenues such as periodic “coffee” or “lunch” talks in which analysts give presentations on their current research.

- **Double down on analytic outreach.** Analytic outreach is among the fastest ways to overcome the limits of our knowledge. The State Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau’s outreach events serve as a community model. Individual analysts should seek to develop their own outreach networks through the appropriate analytic outreach avenues.

- **A new ODNI analytic standard.** The analytic standards and associated tradecraft standards embody aspects of humility but do not explicitly address them. Incorporating intellectual humility as an analytic standard would be among

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c. Mark Lowenthal and Ronald Marks, “Intelligence Analysis: Is It As Good As It Gets?”, 664.
At its core, intelligence analysis is an intellectual—not mechanical—activity.

the strongest means to apply the principle.

- Embrace a customer service mentality. Remembering our raison d’etre and that we support the greater good is imperative to promoting humility as a community. We exist, not for self-promotion, but to support policymaking clients.

- Utilize humor. Humor is the sister of humility, and self-deprecating humor can go a long way toward promoting humility.

- Personal ownership. No formal program is a substitute for individual efforts to incorporate humility into analysis and devote time to personal reflection. Humility is a private quality and carries different meaning to different people.

Intelligence analysis pioneer Sherman Kent famously said that if given three wishes, intelligence professionals would desire to know everything, to be believed, and to influence policy for the good. Imbued in this, however, is intellectual humility and recognition of the limits of our knowledge and openness to other viewpoints.

At its core, intelligence analysis is an intellectual—not mechanical—activity, as Lowenthal has adeptly described. This activity is nested in a business dominated by uncertainty, a paradigm we must accept while constantly pushing for new and deeper knowledge. Intelligence focus areas are intrinsically complex and the community needs to understand the limits of its knowledge so as to not overplay its hand. Doing so will reflect more accurately the services the community provides to clients, such as providing niche value.

We also must constantly guard against hubris and, in our most confident moments, recall the early days of our careers, when we sometimes seemed overwhelmed by the scope of a new portfolio or the magnitude of our work. All passionate analysts become the chief advocates and defenders of their work, owing to the intimate study of a topic and the slog of written production. While this mentality fuels our work, we need to pause to remind ourselves that we work in a service industry in which a service philosophy will advance humility. Ensuring humility is ingrained in all aspects of intelligence analysis will help uphold the intelligence community’s longstanding, quiet professionals, credo, instilled in President Kennedy’s words that our “successes are unheralded.”

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Intelligence in Public Media

A Great Place to Have a War: America and the Birth of a Military CIA

Reviewed by Thomas L. Ahern

Joshua Kurlantzick says that over the course of a full decade he talked to numerous participants in the so-called “secret war” in Laos. The book that emerged from those interviews, A Great Place to Have a War, rather reads like the result of an attempt to find a new narrative in which to fit the interviews. Following a current fashion in popular history, Kurlantzick treats policy as mostly a byproduct of personalities or bureaucratic competition—and any untoward outcome as the result of someone’s incompetence and/or bad faith.

Kurlantzick asserts that in 1961 CIA found in Laos “a unique opportunity to increase the agency’s powers.” It had “already amassed influence, in the heart of a Cold War battlefield” that the US military was ignoring and could use the little kingdom as the site of an “inexpensive—in American money and lives, at least—proxy war [that] could be a template for fights in other places around the world.” No documentation is furnished for any of these claims, which are presented as the CIA’s justification for becoming “focused increasingly on killing rather than spying.” (14–15)

The result is an intellectually rickety account based on the allegation that the war represented the culmination of a calculated CIA effort to compete with the US armed forces as a military arm of the US Government.

The claim is fantasy. Kurlantzick struggles to make it plausible, but the only documented statement that in any way supports it is attributed to former Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory (1953–62), who is quoted as telling an interviewer that “most of the CIA leadership was ‘all for a war in Laos. . . . They thought that [Laos] was a great place to have a war.’” This can only come from Spymasters: Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words, a compilation of interviews, in one of which Amory says only that “the activists in the DDP [Directorate of Plans] side were all for a war in Laos” (emphasis added). It is a much more limited claim than the one in Kurlantzick’s book, which distorts it by broadening its scope.

It is not Kurlantzick’s fault that Amory apparently chose to make such a frivolous remark, but the fact that it gets no support from the people most directly involved in managing the program is telling. In any case, not even the Amory interview suggests that CIA policy called for using Laos to compete for a new role in US military operations.

There was indeed a spike in the investment in covert action (CA) in the early years of the Cold War, much of it involving political CA in the context of national elections in Western Europe. But this growth was intermittent and transitory, on occasion shrinking into insignificance before a new crisis somewhere led to a new and equally temporary response. This is particularly true of the very era on which Kurlantzick builds his thesis. William Colby’s memoir notes that, as of the early 1970s—the Vietnam War was still raging—“the covert action culture was rapidly diminishing . . . almost to the vanishing point.” Funding for CA programs “had plummeted from more than 50 percent of the overall CIA budget in the 1950s and 1960s to something well under 5 percent.”

So Kurlantzick has it exactly backward. A less myopic perspective would have revealed that the effort in Laos, far from heralding the CIA’s transformation into a quasi-military organization, represented—along with the counterinsurgency programs in Vietnam—the beginning of the decline of Cold War paramilitary activity. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, brought another, equally transitory, surge in the form of support to the tribal resistance, which ended with the Soviet withdrawal.

At no point during the periodic lulls in paramilitary or other covert action did CIA management perceive itself as

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
having ambitions that were being frustrated by the opposition of other agencies. Even at the peak of the commitment in Indochina, viewed by Kurlantzick as the culmination of the effort to convert CIA into a war-fighting instrument, agency management was actually depleting its inability to shed its responsibility for Laos. In the early 1970s, Deputy Director for Operations Tom Karamessines found it “extremely disconcerting” that CIA had managed to cut back its investment in Vietnam but now found itself faced with “very significant escalation” in Laos. The answer, he said, was simply to turn the whole thing over to the Department of Defense and the Thai. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms echoed this theme during a meeting at the western White House at San Clemente, where he informed the president that the agency “simply could not handle the logistical demands of an ever-growing paramilitary program in Laos.”

Far from being cynical manipulators of a helpless client, CIA officers including long-time program manager Bill Lair, Chief of East Asia Division William Nelson, and future DCI William Colby agonized over the cost to the Hmong of the tribe’s growing involvement in the war. The 1965 commitment of US combat forces to Vietnam intensified the imperative to resist Hanoi’s exploitation of the corridor through Laos. But it is not until page 119 that we get any acknowledgment of the connection between the US deployment of combat forces in Vietnam and the expanded program in Laos. Kurlantzick uses the CIA official history of the war in Laos to introduce a few tactical details but ignores all the expressions of concern registered by CIA managers.

The interviews at the heart of the book, the accounts of both American and Hmong participants, add colorful if often dubious detail. There’s no expression of skepticism about any purported recollection, no matter how improbable or self-aggrandizing, if it supports the author’s thesis, or even if it’s just entertaining. The only exception is a bit of hedging on the duration of the alleged US commitment to the Hmong resistance during the Vietnam War.

The reliance on interviews is especially problematic in the case of the Hmong. Anyone with experience of tribal cultures understands how the conceptual frameworks that govern their explanations of experience differ from Western thought processes. Estimates of time and of quantities, assignment of motivation, causation, and probabilities—all are different, and the author’s failure to exercise any judgment about the stories he is told renders them all suspect. The same applies to his principal secondary sources, almost all of them as emotionally engaged as Jane Hamilton-Merritt, the author of a well-known account of the role of the Hmong in the war in Laos. It’s not that there’s necessarily an intent to deceive on the part of either interviewer or interview subject, just failures of objectivity and, on the American side, of understanding of different cognitive styles. In addition, on the Hmong side, we have the ever-present risk of the interview subject trying to please the interviewer with whatever he or she seems to want to hear.

There is the appearance of some naïveté even in interviews with US figures, notably those with legendary paramilitary officer Anthony Poshepny, known as Tony Poe. One cannot disprove the wild tales he told Kurlantzick and other interviewers, but the joy he took in playing games with innocent interlocutors was well known at the time to his then-colleagues, of whom the present reviewer was one. The result of all this is that the book is less a history than an attempted exposé, seemingly designed to satisfy the reading public’s presumptive appetite for tales of CIA malfeasance. As such, it suffers from the endemic weakness of such efforts, namely, credulous acceptance of even the most fanciful accusations.

The effort to explain the war in Laos in terms of a CIA drive for power employs an auxiliary device in the author’s selection of key actors in the shaping of the program. The choices are not always wrong: Bill Lair, the field manager of the program for almost eight years, did a brilliant job of mobilizing Hmong military capabilities with minimum—though in the end serious—Hmong involvement. Agency “simply could not handle the logistical demands of an ever-growing paramilitary program in Laos.”

Verbs and adjectives used to code events should be avoided as much as possible in scholarly writing. In the case of verbiage such as “reduce” and “accelerate,” the implications of causation are uncannily overdetermined, and the reader’s ability to comprehend causation is impaired.

The Hmong nearly always counted enemy forces as numbering either “hundreds” or “thousands,” and the altitude of an aircraft overhead as “a thousand meters.” Any single-engine jet airplane was a “MiG,” in fact never seen over Hmong country. I served with Vang Pao at Ban Pa Dong in the spring of 1961 before being sent to Thakhek in the upper Panhandle that summer to create an irregular force of ethnic Lao. There, I encountered some of the same communication problems while debriefing presumably more sophisticated subjects.

b. Ibid., 456–58, 524.
casualties and disruption of tribal society. And William Sullivan did essentially the same thing with the US military. He won major support from MACV (Military Assistance Command in Vietnam) in Saigon, especially combat air, while fending off pressures for American military intervention in Laos that would have threatened the already-transparent but indispensable fiction of Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s neutralist stance.

If his critics fault Sullivan for delighting in his role as commander of a (very small) theater of war, the fact remains that he exercised his authority to good effect. But an architect of the program he was not: He arrived in Vientiane in late 1964, when it was already almost four years old. The appearance of outsized influence derives from the coinciding of his tenure with the commitment of US troops to Vietnam and the resulting pressure from successive administrations to expand Laotian operations in support of the main effort. What Kurlantzick tries to turn into a bureaucratic power play actually represented the result of events in South Vietnam and of subsequent policy decisions in Washington.

The choice of Vang Pao is fully justified: He probably was in fact the only Hmong leader with the charisma, military skills, and political acumen needed to mobilize his people. But the notion that his basic strategy was to win “big battles against the North Vietnamese” in order to make the Hmong a political force in Laos is another fantasy, one for which Kurlantzick offers no evidence whatever. (118)

Finally, describing Tony Poe as one of the key figures in the Laos program is no more than a ploy to justify attention to his colorful antics and to his denigration of other players of whom the author also thinks badly. Tony was sent to Nam Yu to separate him from Vang Pao, with whom he had a tense, unproductive relationship. The author quotes Poe to admit that even the Nam Yu mission—to recruit and unite the local tribes—did not succeed. Tony’s physical courage and military competence did not confer either knowledge or good judgment about the complexities of the main program, and his comments on it and its managers carry no authority. His influence over that larger program, moreover, was nil. (160)*

One might expect that, having failed to make his case for Laos as the paradigm of CIA’s new military role, the author would at least cite subsequent programs that could be interpreted as examples of its evolution. But the only one he can come up with is Central America, and the argument here is no more cogent than the one for Laos. The Reagan administration and DCI Bill Casey “heartily supported covert paramilitary action in the Western Hemisphere” in the mid-1980s. But it was Reagan, not CIA, who issued the panicky warning that if the Sandinistas controlled Nicaragua, “they could create a haven for anti-American militants just “two days’ driving time . . . from Texas.” (249) To the extent that personalities actually matter here, Casey’s assignment to lead the CIA into the Central American paramilitary program surely owed more to his personal ties to the White House—he had been Reagan’s campaign manager in 1980—than to the workings of a CIA conspiracy allegedly concocted in the early 1960s.

Apparantly irrelevant to the author but key to an understanding of the Laos program’s successes and limitations is the indispensable role played by the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU), created in 1954 by Bill Lair and then-director general of the Thai National Police, Gen. Phao Sriyanond. Lair had helped train the Thai stay-behind cadres recruited to operate against a feared invasion by the newly triumphant Chinese communists. As that threat faded and demobilization loomed, he wanted to preserve this intelligence and paramilitary capability to serve both Thai and US interests, and with appropriate US okays he persuaded General Phao to convert it into an airborne unit under the Thai Border Police. Lair’s twin functions as both CIA staffer and officer in the Thai National Police are what allowed him to propose the deployment of PARU in Laos.

Kurlantzick makes no mention of this unit, which embodied Lair’s conviction that Third World allies were perfectly capable of running irregular warfare operations with only minimal US guidance and material support. The availability of PARU in late 1960 is the reason that Lair came to Vientiane from Bangkok. It is hard to imagine how the Hmong program, or the later efforts elsewhere in Laos, could have thrived without the linguistic and professional skills of the PARU troopers and their cultural affinities with the Lao.**

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*a. The extraordinarily open style of station management at that time allowed working-level case officers to stay abreast of both operational developments and management issues. Recollections from this period are the source of comments about matters such as

**b. Two treatments of the PARU effort can be found in past issues of
Also irrelevant to the author are the contributions of two genuine heroes of the Laos paramilitary program, Ambassador Winthrop Brown and Chief of Station Gordon Jorgensen. As the first supervisors of the program in Vientiane, they set it on the pragmatic course recommended by Lair, one that minimized dependence on US technology, logistics, and direct management and emphasized the development of Hmong leadership with PARU guidance. Brown and Jorgensen consistently fought to preserve this approach, resisting chronic pressures from MACV and Washington for greater US control.

The tone of intellectual and moral superiority that permeates the book undermines whatever authority it might otherwise enjoy. Describing Washington’s concern, in 1961, about the importance of Laos to a communist drive to dominate Asia, the author comments that it “did not seem to matter to American leaders that Laos was so small it had only one major city, Vientiane—the capital, which was basically a muddy village—or that most people in Laos live on subsistence farming and had little idea of the differences between communism, democracy, and other political systems.” (3–4) Whatever the weaknesses of the domino theory as applied to Laos, they did not include inflated estimates either of the country’s size or of its economic strength or political sophistication. Indeed, the country’s very weakness, along with its geography—its neighbors included North Vietnam and China—intensified its vulnerability to subversion and military attack.

There are other pointless comparisons, including one that relates the program’s budget to the scale of postwar Laotian foreign trade. Kurlantzick thinks it relevant that, in 1970, the budget was $3.1 billion in current dollars, for an activity in a country that “today has less outward trade with the rest of the world than Luxembourg does.” (5) So what? No explicit connection is drawn here, surely because there is none to draw.

Undocumented claims abound: “Vang Pao himself had repeatedly shot, bombed, and stabbed to death Vietnamese troops in Laos.” (6) It’s a bit of a stretch: multiple shootings and stabbings by a commander necessarily preoccupied with running a force eventually numbering in the tens of thousands? And “bombing”? A pilot or bombardier
he was not. This kind of sensationalism is a reminder that
the integrity—indeed, the plausibility—of a historical
account is well served if its author keeps to a minimum
the use of unconfirmed, especially when self-serving,
first-person claims. (This one gets no citation at all.)

The aversion to governmental secrecy so pervasive in
American journalism and popular history since Watergate
colors this work, too, but the facts occasionally impede
indulging it. We are told that, “while the CIA divulged
as little as possible to Congress in the 1940s and 1950s,
it had never tried to hide an entire war from Congress.”
True, it had never concealed a war in either the 1940s or
1950s, but it didn’t in Laos, either; Kurlantzick offers no
facts that even suggest otherwise. He later admits that the
CIA’s Laos program was known to “members of presi-
dential staffs and members of Congress . . . the financing
for [it] was as aboveboard as any CIA operations could
be.” The author even acknowledges that, as early as 1964,
delegations from both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives were visiting not just Vientiane but Vang Pao’s
redoubt in MR II. (104–105)

The effect of this candor is vitiated by the claim that,
for these visits, CIA officers created an “entirely fake
‘headquarters’” for Vang Pao, in order to give the appear-
ance of a “tiny Hmong-run guerrilla fight that received
only food assistance and other humanitarian aid from
generous US funds.” The reference is presumably to Sam
Thong, northwest of Long Tieng, Vang Pao’s alternate
command post and the center of his Hmong refugee
community. The visiting legislators knew all about the mili-
tary aid program, of course; it was they who were there.

Fairly or not, the author of any revisionist interpreta-
tion assumes an extra burden of establishing his or her
mastery of the relevant material, especially the most au-
thoritative. A claim to be revealing the origin and purpos-
es of the war in Laos is empty without substantial reliance
on State’s Foreign Relations of the United States, with its
exhaustive replication of diplomatic correspondence and
policy documents. Kurlantzick, however, just ignores it.
One can see why: It would have offered his thesis no help
at all, indeed, would have added further evidence of its
hollowness.a

To cite all the instances of the book’s deficiencies would
turn this article into a book in its own right, but it does
appear that Kurlantzick lacks any background in military
affairs or understanding of intelligence process. Regarding
the latter, he says that, to keep the program secret, “many
station chiefs in Indochina . . . stopped cabling as much
as possible and instead relied on oral communications.
Station chiefs would then tear up or burn any notes from
the conversations.” (207) Something resembling a burn-be-
fore-reading protocol, apparently, and utterly nonsensical.b

He is equally uninformed about military operations.
The reader is told that, during the battle for the Hmong’s
Long Tieng base in early 1971, Vang Pao “personally
dragged several artillery pieces up a small peak facing
the North Vietnamese,” then “firing like mad” into the
Vietnamese trapped in the basin below. Firing what?
Shells strapped to Vang Pao’s back as he dragged the guns
up the slope? (The standard artillery piece used in Hmong
country was the 105mm howitzer, which weighs almost
5,000 pounds.) The author appears not even to know that
howitzers deliver high-angle fire, impossible at the short
range he describes. (217–18)

Worse than ignorance is the repeated insinuation that
US bombing of Laotian territory took place at CIA behest.
There were indeed numerous requests—all from an inter-
agency committee chaired by the ambassador—for the air
support needed to repel North Vietnamese forces assault-
ing Hmong—and other Laotian—positions. But most
of the bombs that fell on Laos were directed at strategic
targets on the Ho Chi Minh Trail or represented ordnance

a. Other, more serious, efforts to chronicle the war in Laos include:
Timothy N. Castle, One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the
Bombing of North Vietnam (Columbia University Press, 1999),
and At War in the Shadow of Vietnam (Columbia University Press,
1993); Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon (Steerforth Press,
1996); Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Shadow War: The
CIA’s Secret War in Laos (Paladin Press, 1995); Douglas Blaufarb,
“Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962–
1970,” (Advanced Research Projects Agency, Report R-919-AR-
PA, January 1972). Also: this reviewer’s earlier cited Undercover
Armies. US Department of State documentation is available in:
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–1960, Volume
XVI, East Asia-Pacific Region: Cambodia; Laos; FRUS, 1961–
XXVIII, Laos. All from US Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, DC. All are available digitally from the State Department
Historian website: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.
b. Other reviewers, including CIA veterans of service in Laos, have
presented detailed critiques of Kurlantzick’s account, some of them
questioning the authenticity of certain of his claimed interviews.
See customer reviews of the book on Amazon.com.
jettisoned by aircraft returning from unsuccessful missions over North Vietnam.⁴

If the point of writing history is to help learn its lessons, the historian must at least try to address the right questions and identify real causes and effects. This is not to say that there is only one legitimate interpretation of any chronology, certainly not one as complicated as that of the Laos conflict. It is to say, however, that a thesis for which evidence is entirely absent deserves no credence.

Some CIA officers did, at least for a while, come to see the four Laos programs as a model for future such efforts. It would combine reliance on air supremacy with a quasi-unilateral exploitation of ethnic minorities in Third World countries. In this reviewer’s judgment, the formula fails because it depends on the simultaneous convergence of too many highly contingent factors, among them a permissive host government, the presence of a cohesive potential surrogate force, the availability of CIA organizational resources capable of directing it, the adversary’s strength and purposes, and favorable terrain. But not even this recipe called for the expansion of CIA authorities or capabilities; it merely tried to define a doctrinal approach to an entirely hypothetical requirement.

It might be argued that what the CIA role in Laos really teaches is an extended lesson in managing the sometimes-conflicting cultural values and policy interests of the partners in a joint enterprise. This reviewer sees it in those terms, as an exercise in which CIA took the lead in reconciling divergent interests and policy preferences of the three nations involved—Thailand in addition to Laos and the United States—and of the other departments and branches of the US government involved in the conduct of the war. Kurlantzick’s conspiratorial reading prohibits consideration of this or any other fact-based analysis.

If it is true that the pursuit of US foreign policy interests requires a capacity for unacknowledged intervention abroad—covert action—and if preserving that capacity requires, over time, the support of the American voting public, the potential for damage created by a work like A Great Place to Have a War becomes obvious. If the author wants to dispute these two premises, let him by all means do so. But he never presents an explicit argument against either the legitimacy or the potential effectiveness of covert paramilitary action. An examination of these questions awaits more serious scholarship.

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a. Thanks to former Intelligence Community historian Timothy Castle for clarifying this point.

The reviewer: Thomas L. Ahern is a contract historian with CIA’s History Staff. He is the author of numerous classified histories, including a number concerning intelligence and the Vietnam War. Redacted versions of those histories can be found at http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/vietnam-histories.
Readers who pick up *The Ghost: The Secret Life of CIA Spymaster James Jesus Angleton* by Jefferson Morley hoping finally to have a comprehensive and objective treatment of the Agency’s shadowy and controversial chief of counterintelligence will be sorely disappointed. What they will find instead is an erratically organized account of most of the key events in Angleton’s life along with an agglomeration of often badly sourced suppositions, inferences, allegations, and innuendos frequently cast in hyperbolic or categorical language. *The Ghost* displays the most prominent shortcomings of journalistic history: reportage substitutes for cohesive narrative, with vignettes and atmospherics stitched together with insufficient discernment among sources. One of Morley’s more dubious ones—an anonymous blog post with no citations, from which he pulls an outlandish quote—has inadvertently provided an insight into what his ulterior motive in writing *The Ghost* appears to be: “This is not about who James Angleton was so much as what he had to be” [emphasis added]. In pursuit of a story he seems to have already written in his mind, Morley manipulates historical facts, engages in long leaps of logic, and avoids inconvenient contradictory evidence and interpretations to produce yet another superficial caricature of a deeply complicated personality.

**Questionable Logic**

Perhaps the most problematic feature of *The Ghost* is Morley’s penchant for reaching grandiose conclusions based on sketchy or no evidence, contorted reasoning, or unfamiliarity with intelligence processes and the history of the events in which he places Angleton. Among numerous instances, Morley overstates Angleton’s part in the Italian election operation—he hardly was its “miracle worker” (53)—and offers no persuasive evidence of his “supporting role” in the MKULTRA project that “help[ed] give birth” to it, or that he “pursued the use of psychoactive drugs for intelligence work” other than his brief relationship with a colleague who worked on the program. (59, 61) An Israeli diplomat “soon became Angleton’s man in Havana,” but they met only a few times, and the diplomat declined Angleton’s request to contact CIA agents in Cuba. (100)

Morley’s highly questionable rendering of the Kennedy administration’s policy toward Cuba and Angleton’s involvement with it is more troublesome. For starters, the United States did not have “two divergent Cuba policies” represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “engineered provocation” plan called NORTHWOODS and the White House’s “autonomous operations” using Cuban exiles, possibly in conjunction with the assassination of Castro. (127) The administration’s policy was what it did, not what was said in meetings or written about in plans and memoranda. NORTHWOODS was never carried out, and the CIA’s integrated covert action program codenamed AMWORLD became the focus for the rest of Kennedy’s presidency. Morley later asserts that Angleton stressed Lee Harvey Oswald’s Cuban ties so the White House would activate NORTHWOODS, but he presents no evidence besides Castro’s suspicions, which corroborate nothing.

Morley describes the CIA Counterintelligence Staff’s paper “Cuban Control and Action Capabilities”—an assessment of the Castro regime’s counterintelligence apparatus, issued in May 1963—as “one of the most important documents bearing Angleton’s name to ever surface” because it “confirms his leading role in U.S.-Cuba policy in 1963.” The paper’s analysis is, as Morley says, “lucid, historical, and comprehensive,” but he offers no indication that Angleton’s “most important contribution to U.S.
policy toward Cuba,” which he “intended . . . to serve as nothing less than the foundation of a new national policy,” had any influence on the Kennedy administration’s deliberations. Moreover, his insinuation that Angleton deliberately withheld the paper from the White House, the National Security Council, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the White House’s point man on Cuban affairs, because of “the alienation of the Kennedy White House and U.S. national security agencies in mid-1963” shows a misunderstanding of the paper’s purpose and intended audience. (126, 128) The Counterintelligence Staff prepared the assessment as part of its responsibilities under National Security Council Directive No. 5 for apprising members of the United States Intelligence Board and other interested agencies about important counterintelligence developments in foreign countries. The Directive states that the Counterintelligence Staff, “in consultation with the US Intelligence Board and other interested departments and agencies . . . shall develop appropriate policy recommendations for National Security Council consideration with respect to the overall U.S. counterintelligence effort conducted outside the U.S. and its possessions.” a

The recipients on the paper’s distribution list were the Board’s members and other US departments with equities in Cuban affairs. The White House, the NSC, and the attorney general would not have received it as a standard practice; Angleton did not leave them off as some devious tactic to influence policy behind the scenes or in a show of antagonism toward them.

One of the most fundamental applications of faulty logic underlays Morley’s overblown discussion of Angleton’s role in the JFK assassination and its aftermath. He asserts that “Objectively speaking, an epic counterintelligence failure culminated on Angleton’s watch,” and he even goes so far as to contend that Angleton’s “preassassination interest in Oswald” indicates his “culpability in the wrongful death of President Kennedy.” (138, 237) For those wholesale claims to be valid, Oswald’s CIA file would have had to contain actionable information that he posed a clear threat to the president that could have been preempted, but nothing in it suggests any plotting against Kennedy before the assassination. To read significance into the random items in Oswald’s file shows fallacious retrospective wisdom. Morley’s treatment of the information about Oswald that was picked up in the HTLINAL-GUAL mail intercept operation—key evidence in his argument about the “epic . . . failure”—also is logically contradictory. The CIA’s surveillance dragnet of letters going between the United States and the Soviet Union, started in 1952, had thousands of targets and created files on nearly all of them—a program that made Angleton “the founding father of U.S. mass-surveillance policies” (258)—yet Angleton and the Counterintelligence Staff supposedly were, or should have been, preoccupied with one person—Oswald—to the exclusion of all the others caught up in the sweep. Elsewhere in his discussion of Oswald and the assassination, Morley unskeptically draws on CIA station chief Winston Scott’s memoir for details about what the agency knew of Oswald’s doings in Mexico City without noting the errors in it that were pointed out in a publicly available CIA critique.

Morley’s credulous use of others’ allegations reaches a low point of ludicrousness when he quotes, without caveat, former State Department official Thomas Hughes’s purely speculative thought that Angleton had the US Navy SIGINT ship Liberty prepositioned off the Egyptian coast during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war “as a hedge against Israeli battlefield reverses.” (178, Morley’s words) “The explanations for the Liberty’s presence in the area are so totally bizarre that you have to think Angleton was behind it. . . . Who ordered it to go there and why?” Hughes asked. “NSA didn’t seem to know. CIA didn’t seem to know. [The] State Department certainly never knew. The Pentagon couldn’t figure it out.” Morley then leaves hanging the preposterous idea that Angleton—who had no such authority—could order a Navy ship repositioned without NSA or the Navy knowing. Angleton later “cooperated” in quelling the outcry against Israel after it attacked the ship, but Morley does not say how or offer any proof that he did. (180)

Many other argumentative shortcomings of The Ghost can be mentioned. Morley asserts that “never was he [Angleton] more wrong than in the case of Yuri Nosenko,” but he never delves into the complexities of that tangled case and does not appear to have read the massive report by CIA counterintelligence officer Tennet Bagley arguing for Nosenko’s male fides although it has long been declassified. Former MI5 technical officer Peter Wright, whom critics routinely deride as semi-paranoid, is conveniently accurate and insightful when needed for negative comments about Angleton. White House Dep-

uty Chief of Staff Dick Cheney’s memo arguing for a presidential commission as a ploy to contain the damage from the “Family Jewels” disclosures was not nearly as significant as Morley suggests; the Rockefeller Commission was quickly denounced as a blue-ribbon whitewash. Is Cheney hyped because of his later notoriety? Morley cites the analysis of the Church Committee’s chief of staff, William Miller, that the political controversies in the mid-1970s over intelligence issues resulted from the clash of two factions, “the King’s Party” and “the Constitutionalists.” The polarity—evocative of the Cavaliers and the Roundheads of Cromwellian England—is simplistic and ahistorical, and, courtesy of Miller, comes complete with a Star Wars allusion, with Angleton as Darth Vader, of course; he “embodied the ‘temptation of falling prey to a fascination with the workings of the dark side.’” (242)

According to Angleton’s former colleague John Hadden, Angleton was guilty of “either treason or incompetence” in his handling of a suspected Israeli theft of nuclear material from a US facility. (260) No alternatives exist? And is a former counterintelligence officer competent to opine on what constitutes treason, which has been defined in federal statute and Supreme Court cases?

**Bad Sourcing**

Throughout The Ghost, Morley uses a variety of dubious sources to substantiate key arguments while ignoring material that reaches different conclusions. He overuses books by Joseph Trento, Tim Weiner, and Michael Holzman, whose scholarship has been heavily criticized. Too much of his information about Angleton and the MKULTRA program comes mostly from H. P. Albarelli’s aptly titled book A Terrible Mistake (Trine Day, 2009) and John Marks’s The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate” (Times Books, 1979), which relies mostly on anonymous interviews. Morley uses reminiscences without apparently weighing such factors as accuracy, access, timing, or agenda, and he routinely quotes the most fault-finding passages. When facts are not available, Morley recurs to fiction to make his points. The story of Angleton’s proposed exploitation of one of actress Greta Garbo’s movies for intelligence purposes comes from a novel. Portions of an account of Angleton’s relationship with a Shin Bet officer are taken from an imagined after-death conversation between the two men. A passage from Norman Mailer’s Harlot’s Ghost (Random House, 1991) indirectly supports the idea that Angleton had some role in John F. Kennedy’s death.

Morley references some conspiracist blog postings, and other citations are bizarre; for example, a lecture by Beat poet Allen Ginsberg purportedly demonstrates Angleton’s extensive involvement with the agency’s covert action office, which was not the case. Lastly, Morley ignores other sources entirely, such as Frank Rafalko’s book on MHCHAOS, Samuel Halpern’s and Hayden Peake’s article on who ordered Nosenko’s detention (Angleton did not), and this writer’s account of CIA and the JFK assassination, all of which describe the agency’s role in those events quite differently from what appears in The Ghost.

**Numerous Errors**

Many easily avoidable, factual errors compound the other flaws of The Ghost and further call into question the reliability of Morley’s narrative and conclusions. To mention only some of them:

- OSS Director William Donovan did not receive a Medal of Honor for “aerial heroics” in World War I; he led an infantry unit. (15)
- Bletchley Park was not an OSS spy school. (15, 17–18)
- Angleton arrived in London in March 1944 amid destruction from the German’s V weapons, according to Morley, but the V-1 and V-2 were not used until June and September, respectively. (17–18)
- DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter was not “brought on” to CIA when it was created; he already was there as head of the agency’s predecessor. (36)

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• The CIA’s early espionage component was the Office of Special (not Secret) Operations. (36)

• DCI Walter Bedell Smith, not Allen Dulles, merged OSO with the agency’s covert action element, the Office of Policy Coordination, to create the Directorate of Plans. (54)

• Dulles resigned in September 1961, not November. (100)

• Angleton had no authority to allow NSA spy Sidney Joseph Petersen “to plead guilty and avoid a public trial,” nor does Morley’s source, an article by historian Cees Wiebes in Intelligence and National Security, suggest that. (104)

• The Soviet spy ring called the Rote Kapelle operated during World War II, not in the 1920s; Morley confuses it with the Trust deception operation. (108)

• The reporting of GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy was not called the “Penkovskiy Papers” (112); his documentary material was named IRONBARK, and reports of his debriefings were labeled CHICKADEE.

• Operations director Richard Helms, not Angleton, got Harvey posted to Rome in 1963, according to Harvey’s biographer (see Flawed Patriot by Bayard Stockton (Potomac Books, 2006)). (126)

• KGB officer Yuri Nosenko resurfaced in Geneva in February 1964, not January. (156)

• Public Law 110, which allows the CIA to admit up to 100 persons into the United States each year for national security reasons, is not “a secret arrangement”—it was part of the CIA Act of 1949 (specifically, section 7 of 50 US Code section 403h) that established the agency’s special administrative authorities. (157)

• MHCHAOS did not—could not, because it had far too small a staff—“spy on and infiltrate the entire antiwar movement.” (182)

• Nosenko was not given LSD during his detention. Administering it and truth serum was discussed, but DCI Helms refused to authorize using either. (183)

• KGB officer Yuri Loginov was not executed after Angleton arranged for his turnover to the Soviets; see Tom Mangold’s interview with Oleg Gordievsky in Cold Warrior (Simon & Schuster, 1991). (186)

• Helms’s cryponym was Fletcher Knight, not Thomas Land or Lund. (187)

• John Tower was vice chairman of the Church Committee, not Howard Baker, who held that position on Sam Ervin’s Watergate committee two years earlier. (241)

• “[T]he CI Staff was the nexus of the CIA’s plans to get rid of Castro”—ignoring Task Force W and the Special Affairs Staff, which did all the operations. (262)

**Sensationalist Style**

Morley tells his Angleton tale in a succession of relatively short paragraphs and terse sentences with lots of brief, loaded segues or section endings, along with several irrelevant passages seemingly dropped in for some atmospheric or contextual effect (Hunter Thompson on Americans’ political mood in the early 1960s on page 154, for example). The Ghost is chock with hit-and-run allegations (often couched with “probably,” “might have,” “possibly,” and “perhaps”), overstatements, and profound-sounding but unsubstantiated observations. Here are just a handful of them:

- “Angleton had become a lethal man.” (20)

- “Imbued with fascist sympathies and anti-Communist passion, Angleton channeled his convictions into Anglo-American hegemonic ambition.” (27)

- “With this apparatus, Angleton would move the world.” (73)
• “... Angleton and [American labor official Jay] Lovestone effectively controlled what American labor unions had to say about U.S. foreign policy.” (75)

• “Then his power became unparalleled.” (76)

• “By the mid-1960s, Angleton reigned as the Machiavelli of the new American national security state, a thinker and strategist of ruthless clarity.” (155)

• “Angleton was a man unbound. His empire now stretched from Mexico City to London to Rome to Jerusalem.” (167)

• “Angleton was a ghoul, a specter who showed up around the time of death.” (210)

And, in a closing farrago:

“He was an ingenious, vicious, mendacious, and foolish man who acted with impunity as he sought to expand the Anglo-American-Israeli sphere of influence after the end of World War II. Like his friend Ezra Pound, his master was sometimes indistinguishable from his madness. He was indeed a combination of Machiavelli, Svengali, and Iago. He was brilliant, charming, and sinister. In retirement, at last, he was harmless.” (263)

Still a Gap

As this writer has noted elsewhere, historians and journalists have produced what seems in overview to be a workable bibliography on Angleton, but, including after The Ghost, significant gaps remain. The literature on him still shows flaws in scholarship, distorted focus, and a propensity to either rationalize or, more often, demonize him without sufficiently understanding him as a historical actor who was shaped by and in turn shaped events. Morley’s use of the JFK assassination records at the National Archives and his interviews with Angleton’s family and associates add a small measure of insight, but the conundrum of Angleton’s life and career remain. As one scholar of Angleton has written with only mild exaggeration, “One could ask a hundred people about [him] and receive a hundred lightly shaded different replies that ranged from utter denunciation to unadulterated hero worship. That the positions could occupy these extremes spoke of the significance and the ambiguity of the role he had played.”

Angleton is perhaps the CIA’s most compelling and misrepresented figure, and until still unrevealed information about him and the Counterintelligence Staff becomes available, he will continue to be to history the enigma he fancied himself to be in life.


The reviewer: David S. Robarge is CIA’s chief historian. He is the author of several classified histories of CIA and is a frequent contributor to Studies.
Current published material on Afghanistan generally falls into one of three categories: memoirs from senior US government officers, discussing strategic issues post-9/11; memoirs from Special Operations officers detailing combat operations in Afghanistan; or detailed reporting by journalists assigned either to Kabul or to another capital in Southwest Asia. These stories offer critically important context for a public struggling to understand what is happening today in Afghanistan—why the United States still has troops deployed in the country and why we devote considerable time and money to keep the central government in Kabul functioning. However, these stories provide little background on the US involvement in Afghanistan either right before or in the immediate aftermath of the al-Qa’ida attacks of 11 September 2001.

Sixteen years after 9/11, Duane Evans provides a detailed account of his role in CIA’s effort to take on the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, offering a clear understanding—from the intelligence foot soldier’s perspective—on why we became involved there in the fall of 2001. I was the leader for another team in Afghanistan at the same time and have known Duane Evans for more than 20 years. I can say from personal experience that Evans’s book resonated for me in a way no other book on post-9/11 Afghanistan has since I read Gary Schroen’s First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan (Presidio Press, 2005).

Unfortunately, while Afghanistan has borders, a flag, and a seat at the United Nations, it is not a nation—though most Americans (including policymakers) tend to view it as such, seeing it through the lens of the modern concept of “nation state.” Focusing our attention on defeating the Taliban insurgency, stamping out al-Qa’ida and Daesh, and building a strong government and national army, we expect our efforts in Kabul to expand outward, from there to other parts of the Afghan “nation”—and to result in a peaceful solution to the current conflict. But Afghanistan is a 19th century amalgamation of multiple tribes, ethnic groups, and religions, where at least two major languages—and three other, less commonly spoken languages—are used by groups that are further separated from one another by the region’s rugged terrain, including the Hindu Kush—a mountain range that divides the country in half. Adding to this complexity is the fact that one of the major ethnic groups—the Pashtuns—are further divided into two major tribes, which are further segmented into multiple clans that have been hostile to each other (and to any central government) for at least the last century. The efforts to create an Afghan “nation” that began in 1974 have only resulted, outside Kabul, in a simmering civil war among ethnic and religious groups and between rural and urban dwellers.

When al-Qa’ida attacked the US homeland on 9/11, CIA’s network of tribal and ethnic leadership contacts, dating back to 1979, was intact. In December of that year, CIA had established clandestine relations with commanders who were then conducting operations against occupying Soviet forces and against the proxy government in Kabul that was supported by the Soviet Union. These relationships comprised a network that was entirely separate from the US government’s formal political and military support relationships with the seven Afghan resistance parties in exile in Peshawar, and separate from the combined military support relationships CIA, Pakistan, and other allies were providing to the resistance fighters there.

As part of the Soviet forces’ agreement to leave Afghanistan in 1988, the United States agreed to end military support to the resistance; however, it was support from regional CIA stations that provided the resources that the DCI Counterterrorism Center/Special Operations (CTC/SO) used in developing the post-9/11 plan of attack.

Readers who have no ties to the agency will be surprised at how much leeway CIA Headquarters allowed Evans and other CTC/SO team leaders in designing and implementing operations. The normal bureaucratic hurdles so common in discussions related to any foreign policy decision simply evaporated, once CTC received the order from the president and the CIA director to take the fight to the enemy in Afghanistan. Evans outlines in...
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great detail the complex effort that was required to get into Afghanistan and set to work, recalling that, by way of guidance, team members received but a brief few sentences from CTC/SO seniors on what the military would call “commander’s intent”:

Gentlemen, things are moving along in northern Afghanistan, but we’ve got nothing going in the South. The Taliban and AQ are still in control. We need you two to get out to Pakistan and work with Station to get things going in the South. Any questions? (40)

Beneath this simple set of instructions was the understanding that the team would leverage established, local contacts inside Afghanistan; enlist US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) manpower and communications resources; and use Islamabad station assistance to get a small team of CIA officers, USSOCOM operators, and a contingent from a US Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) into Kandahar—and into the fight. But this effort was neither simple nor direct: challenges associated with Afghan tribal politics, US matters of state, limited resources, and weather were numerous, and Evans describes them all in detail. Evans arrived in Islamabad in late October, arriving in Afghanistan via helicopter on 19 November, quickly moving from boarding a plane at Dulles International Airport in Washington, DC, to leading Operation Foxtrot in fewer than three weeks.

The second half of the book addresses the complex game of working through local surrogates in Kandahar—in this case, a Kandahari tribal chief and regional warlord named Mohammed Shafiq Barakzai (more commonly known by his “war name,” Gul Agha Shirzai). Adding to this complexity was Evans’s partnership with US Special Forces and their interest in conducting combat operations “by, with, and through” Shirzai’s fighters. Shirzai was an established contact with Islamabad station and Evans’s team included Shirzai’s case officer. But Shirzai’s tribesmen were not organized like a standard military force, and much of Team Foxtrot’s intelligence and paramilitary work required them and their Special Forces partners in ODA 583 to work in primitive conditions as they tried to influence Shirzai to remain focused on destroying the Taliban and occupying Kandahar City. Evans’s book makes it clear that, whether he knew it or not at the time, he was following the tenets of T. E. Lawrence in the Great Arab Revolt in 1916:

Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if CO of the expedition. To do your work, you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige when you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. . . .

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.a

CIA officers will be well served by Evans’s discussions on the leadership challenges a CIA officer faces conducting operations in the field. This was particularly true once Kandahar City had fallen and Shirzai, ODA 583, and Team Foxtrot arrived from the South when Hamid Karzai, ODA 578, and Team Echo arrived from the North. Suddenly, both team leaders had to coordinate operations and persuade their respective Afghan leaders to cooperate. This was no small feat given the longstanding tribal feuding between Shirzai’s Barakzai and Karzai’s Pololazai tribes. One critical insight Evans offers is that CIA officers can often become so tied to their own tribal contexts that they can—and often do—fail to see the larger, strategic picture or the shortcomings of their local Afghan leader. This is another leadership lesson that could also be found in memoirs of OSS officers working with the French or Yugoslav resistance, or CIA officers during the Cold War.

Foxtrot in Kandahar is an excellent read. A book of modest size, it is worth reading more than once—as a simple adventure story, as a story of the people of the CIA in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11, as a description “from the trenches” of how to work with tribal leaders and their followers, and as a leadership textbook on how to lead teams of CIA officers team in a combat zone. Evans’s book belongs on the intelligence professional’s shelf, beside the very few unclassified memoirs that emerged from this period in CIA history.

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The reviewer: J. R. Seeger is a retired operations officer. He is a frequent reviewer of works on paramilitary operations.
On publication in 2013, these two books were part of a growing cottage industry of works designed to dissect intelligence failures and help the Intelligence Community—and CIA in particular—do its job better. Both draw from, and seek to improve on and update, classic works like Roberta Wohlstetter’s *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford University Press, 1962) and Richard Betts’s *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Brookings Institution Press, 1982).

Each book starts by providing a framework to understand the complexities involved in preventing a future intelligence failure and then uses this framework to revisit historic case studies of infamous failures. Erik Dahl’s book goes two steps beyond and discusses intelligence successes as well as failures and some unique challenges of dealing with terrorist attacks. Jones and Silberzahn dismiss the “dark matter” of what they assume are “CIA’s many intelligence successes” because these successes became “nonevents.” (14) Strangely, even though Jones and Silberzahn assert that CIA suffers from multiple defects that spawn intelligence failures, they make no effort to examine why these supposed flaws did not affect the “many intelligence successes” they chose to ignore.

Dahl is a former naval intelligence officer and is currently a professor teaching homeland security at the Naval Postgraduate School. His insider status shows through, as he examines the complexity of preventing an intelligence failure. Dahl looks at four steps that need to be accomplished to prevent a failure: intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and the policymakers’ willingness to accept the intelligence provided. This fourth step is a unique contribution of his work. Dahl expects a lot from intelligence producers. To avoid being blamed with a failure, CIA must not only collect sufficient, specific information to provide for both strategic and tactical warning, it must also shepherd this information through an analytic production process that results in timely dissemination to the policymakers who need it, and convince them of the accuracy of the intelligence—even though the message is likely not one the policymakers will want to hear. If policymakers refuse to accept the intelligence, then Dahl lays the blame back on CIA, insisting the rejection must be due to a lack of clarity or specificity.

Dahl recognizes this dilemma, writing, “The argument can be made that I am setting the bar too high; it may seem unreasonable to hold the Intelligence Community at fault if leaders do not listen. And at the same time, it may appear that I am letting decisionmakers off too easily, if a failure on their part is defined as an ‘intelligence’ failure. My answer is that we need to take a broader view, and realize that the surprise can be just as great, and the harmful effects just as serious, when a surprise attack is successful, whether or not intelligence professionals ‘called it right.’” (20) Given the fact that policymakers are unlikely to ever admit that intelligence “called it right” but they just did not believe the news, the result will likely be more blame in the future.

Despite this drawback, Dahl’s work provides a valuable new look at this subject through its review of intelligence successes, his insights into the unique challenges of warning of terrorist plans, and his comprehensive examination of 9/11. Dahl is not afraid to take on conventional wisdom, such as when he asserts that Wohlstetter was wrong in *Pearl Harbor*; the issue was not “picking out the signals from the noise,” but rather the failure to collect sufficient specific intelligence to provide tactical warning. He points out the same problem happened on 9/11—the failure was not a lack of strategic warning that something was coming but that actionable intelligence was missing to allow policymakers to respond in time. The book’s appendix, listing 227 “Unsuccessful Plots and Attacks against American Targets, 1987–2012,” is a particularly valuable contribution to the literature and provides future
researchers with leads to look at what went right in these cases.

In contrast to Dahl’s balanced and insightful work, the authors of Constructing Cassandra appear to have little understanding of how intelligence works and rely on a wide variety of secondary sources to prop up their cultural and organizational arguments. The book, which Jones has described as essentially his doctoral dissertation, begins with a list of what CIA has gotten wrong—including the usual cases of the Cuban missile crisis, the fall of the Shah of Iran, “missing” the collapse of the Soviet empire, and 9/11. Jones and Silberzahn explain that their book is not meant to be an attack on CIA but rather “to understand why the agency fails so often.”

The authors attribute this failure to CIA’s “identity and culture” and assert that these factors drive the analysts’ perceptions and questions, resulting in their missing pertinent information or discarding it because it fails to conform to their perception of reality. The authors, both instructors in European business schools, try to make the case that identity and cultural issues (which they further define as a lack of diversity in the workforce, an overreliance on “scientism” in analysis, a fixation on secrets, a demand for consensus in finished analysis, and a servile attitude to policymakers as “customers”) are the roots of CIA’s failures. (50)

While CIA has readily acknowledged that it continues to build a more diverse workforce, the authors’ first assertion, that the agency, and particularly the analytic workforce, is composed of white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men who came from Ivy League schools and never traveled or lived overseas is bizarre. Dr. Mark Lowenthal, former senior CIA analyst and manager, addressed this claim in a joint appearance with Milo Jones at the Spy Museum on 3 September 2014. According to Lowenthal, the workforce Jones describes looks nothing like what he was part of and, if it existed at all, it would have been the workforce of the 1960s, not that of the 21st century.

Lowenthal also took strong exception to the authors’ description of “scientism” as a basis for analysis. While on one hand the authors decry the large number of political science majors among the analyst ranks, they also recommend bringing in more anthropologists and sociologists—as if one form of social science would balance another.

The authors get little right when it comes to analysis. They assume CIA analysts pay little or no attention to open source products and only rely on “secrets.” They advocate “educating” analysts rather than “training” them—ignoring the fact that analysts come in as well-educated individuals who are often selected because of their proven academic expertise in an area, and are then “trained” in the writing style and the range of classified products that they can now use, in addition to the open source products they relied on as students.

The two business school professors appear to be confused by the use of the term “customer” in intelligence and demonstrate no understanding of how tasking originates in the intelligence cycle. They assume that analysts adhere to a “the customer is always right” business-style attitude and tailor their products inappropriately to tell customers what they want to hear, that analysts will not produce anything that goes against the consensus of everyone they work for, and that they provide false levels of predictive certainty (again, based on an overreliance on “scientism” in describing human actions). The authors incorrectly assume that CIA managers create their own taskings and, as such, they advocate changing the relationship with consumers to teach them that CIA “is not in the answer-fetching business and arguably should give the consumers more questions to consider rather than answers.” (15)

If the authors had remained with the title’s premise, to identify Cassandras who were correct but unheeded in specific intelligence failures and then examine why they were right and everyone else was wrong, the book could have been useful. However, the Cassandras cited do not live up to the title. For example, in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, DCI John McCone is offered as an example and while it is true that McCone believed the Soviets would take a risk in Cuba at a time when CIA experts disagreed with that assessment and omitted it from a Special National Intelligence Estimate one month before the nuclear missiles were found, McCone admitted that his view was based on his “judgment” that had little value until hard evidence was obtained. (150) The best the authors can suggest is that the missiles might have been identified more quickly if McCone had been believed—not that the

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Two Books on Intelligence Successes and Failures

crisis could have been averted. None of the four intelligence failures they cite offers a clear, well documented example of a person (or persons) who clearly predicted exactly what happened in advance and had views that could have changed the outcome.

Jones and Silberzahn are right on one point however: intelligence successes do tend to result in “nonevents” or at least in the public’s not hearing about what occurred until 25 to 30 years have passed. As a result, intelligence failures will continue to seize the public’s attention and generate more books intended to fix intelligence so that the failure will never happen again.

In the interim, intelligence professionals will have to continue to live with accusations of failure, real and imagined, and continue to provide US policymakers with the answers they need to keep the country safe. Dahl’s book is a welcome addition to an intelligence officer’s bookshelf and will likely be a valued text for intelligence classes. Jones and Silberzahn need to study the realities of CIA and the intelligence process more closely before offering ideas for improvements.

The reviewer: Randy Burkett is a member of CIA’s History Staff. He has served on the faculty of the US Naval Postgraduate School.
The 9/11 attacks and the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq have both entered the American consciousness as archetypal intelligence failures. Major intelligence failures, whether characterized as such or not, produce self-reflection within the Intelligence Community (IC) and external scrutiny designed to drive intelligence reform, so “this will never happen again.” Noting that “we learn more from our failures than from our successes,” Robert Clark opens the fifth edition of his book *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach* in that spirit. Clark identifies two goals for the book: “to redefine the intelligence process to help make all parts of what is commonly referred to as the ‘intelligence cycle’ run smoothly and effectively, with special emphasis on both the analyst-collector and the analyst-customer relationships” and “to describe some methodologies that make for better predictive analysis.” (xvii) Further, Clark establishes a rationale for an intelligence process: “First, it should make it easy for customers to ask questions. Second, it should use the existing base of intelligence information to provide immediate responses to the customer. Third, it should manage the expeditious creation of new information to answer remaining questions.” (xix) To do this, according to Clark, the process must be collaborative and predictive.

What is the motivation for this book? Clark raises two justifications (in Chapters 1 and 2). The first, as noted above, is based on the assertion that previous, notable intelligence failures were preventable, and that if only intelligence analysts and collectors and their customers did a better job, then at least some future failures could be avoided. Clark identifies three types of intelligence failures: “failure to share information, failure to analyze collected material objectively, and failure of the customer to act on intelligence.” (3) Although it is true that there have been some spectacular failures, this assertion raises a host of questions that Clark (or most anyone else) cannot answer, including: how often do failures occur and what are their proximate and underlying causes? More importantly, scholars and pundits typically do not look at cases of success (mostly because success in the IC tends not to be remarkable) and causes of success. As such, it is difficult to suggest causality and perhaps even correlation.

A second motivation for the book is the change in the nature of current conflict. Clark asserts that 21st-century “conflicts call for a different pattern of intelligence thinking, if we in the intelligence business are to provide the support that our customers need.” (19) Clark writes that the conflicts of today stand in contrast to the interstate wars fought in the 20th century. Clark argues that, at least in part because of globalization and the Internet, the two dominant characteristics of contemporary conflict involve the increased roles of networks and of nonstate actors. Networks simply refers to the multiple relationships between various actors on both (or more) sides of a conflict; nonstate actors include insurgents, transnational criminal enterprises, and individuals. Interestingly, the list appears to be missing terrorists, which some would argue is an area that the IC is too focused on. Clark mentions that subsequent chapters will explore “how to provide such support,” that was called for above—but it is questionable whether Clark explicitly answers why different intelligence thinking is called for. (19)

The book is well organized and presented in three parts. As noted above, two introductory chapters set the book’s goals in motion: the first offers examples of intelligence failures as a justification for better thinking about intelligence analysis; the second examines the role of intelligence in contemporary conflict. The latter chapter is a new component of this edition. Part I, in Clark’s words, is “how to do analysis.” (29) The nine chapters in this section focus on defining Clark’s “target-centric” process. Part II, which focuses on estimative modeling, or “creating target models of the future,” (215) contains an initial key chapter that discusses three types of prediction: extrapolation, projection, and forecasting. One
methodology Clark explores as a tool for looking at the future is scenario-building, also known as alternative futures analysis. A second is simulation models, which are “mathematical descriptions of the interrelationships that are believed to determine a system’s behavior.” (275) Part III examines analysis as a function (how the analytic unit functions, what types of intelligence it should produce, and some reasons for intelligence failures), as a process, and as a structure (with such topics as what makes a good analyst and collaboration). This section of the book concludes with chapters on the nature of customers and of collection. Appendix 1 examines different analytic approaches in two National Intelligence Estimates—reports which represent an IC-wide view—on Yugoslavia and on Iraqi WMD. Appendix 2 is an example of a project plan, and Appendix 3 offers advice on how to present analysis.

It is important to note here that, within the field of intelligence studies, there is no accepted common definition of intelligence, and hence, no way to develop a theory to understand how it works. Clark, like many other scholars, has his own definition. He writes, “Intelligence is about reducing uncertainty in conflict [emphasis in original].” (19) The conflict does not have to be violent; it can refer to friendly competition. Conflict stems from “the divergence of two or more parties’ ideas or interests.” (19) Further, “[r]educing uncertainty requires that intelligence obtain information that the opponent in a conflict prefers to conceal.” (19) Clark then states, “A typical goal of intelligence is to establish facts and then to develop precise, reliable, and valid inferences (hypotheses, estimations, conclusions, or predictions) for use in strategic decision making or operational planning.” (19) Clark argues that national security intelligence is similar to other types of intelligence, such as market research, with the difference being that there are specialized techniques and methods that are unique to the intelligence field. An overarching theme for Clark is the notion of “conflict,” and although he notes it is a very broad concept, he tends to fall back to a narrower definition, which is connected with violence or the threat of it. Based on this definition, Clark develops his “Target-Centric Approach,” which ultimately should result in better analysis and, most importantly, better serve the needs of the customer. However, Clark makes several assumptions that may not adequately reflect how the IC actually works.

Students (and practitioners) of intelligence often find some dissonance between an ideal IC and the real world one. The current US IC comprises 17 agencies. Some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Defense Intelligence Agency, focus more on collecting all sources of information to create assessments, while other agencies, such as the National Security Agency or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, conduct analysis prompted by focusing on a single source of information, such as communications between adversaries or satellite imagery, respectively.

Moreover, the IC is quite large, and to a great extent it evolved organically after World War II. Given the secret world that the IC operates within, it is difficult for anyone outside it to be aware of all the current programs, organizations, etc. Although Clark has the bona fides to tackle this topic and had insider status (having worked at CIA), it is important to note that he is somewhat removed from considerations and challenges related to his recommendations, for example in encouraging greater collaboration among analysts at multiple intelligence agencies. Three examples illustrate this concern. First, most analysts and customers probably do not have the time to do what Clark is proposing. Clark does recognize this, but does not really address it (126). Second, he implies a closer relationship between the customer and the others in the IC than probably actually exists. Third, he assumes the IC is more collaborative than it actually is. Given that time, a close analyst-customer relationship, and collaboration are key to his approach, its viability can be called into question.

In addition to these possibly faulty assumptions, there are other gaps in Clark’s work. First, Clark says good intelligence requires teamwork. This is a testable hypothesis, yet Clark provides little evidence for the assertion. This is not unique to Clark: most scholarship in the field of intelligence is based on reasoning and not empirical evidence. There are numerous works that have identified the pros and cons of working in groups, yet very few of them are referenced or discussed to support Clark’s position. This in turn is a product of having no accepted definition, (and subsequent theory) of intelligence in the field that builds knowledge incrementally. Second, although Clark is well aware of individual cognitive biases and biases in group settings (e.g., “groupthink”), they receive little attention in the book. More important is the unanswered critical question of how the Target-Centric Approach would specifically mitigate such biases.
Finally, Clark does not really explain how to do analysis but rather generally describes various analytic methods and approaches to analysis. He says that “all intelligence analysis methods derive from a fundamental process,” and that this is what he is explaining in the book. (6) The basic process consists of “creating a model of the intelligence target and extracting useful information from that model” or synthesis and analysis. (6) Additionally, Clark is also providing a “general conceptual framework for all types of intelligence problems.” (7) There are several issues here. First, there is no empirical evidence presented that a conceptual framework, structured analytic technique, or method actually improves the quality of analysis either in the strength or accuracy of the argument. It seems reasonable that it would, and, in fact, many theorists believe this to be the case. Yet the field of study lacks hard data to support this position. Second, Clark never really provides a great deal of specificity on how to model a target or actually use these suggested frameworks. Finally, structured approaches are inherently prescriptive and can be complex. Analysts with little experience in using them can go awry, and the resulting analysis can be far less coherent and accurate than if an analyst did not attempt to lock-step through a structured approach.

Nevertheless, the book is valuable for students of intelligence and intelligence professionals for a number of reasons. It highlights many of the complex issues involved in producing quality intelligence analysis. The process is not linear and involves a lot of art in addition to science. As to structured analytic techniques, although they are not panaceas for analytic success, they can be useful and familiarity with them is not a bad thing, particularly with some of the more mathematical techniques like time series. Quantitative frameworks are useful if analysts know how to use them properly. His focus on “targets” and, more specifically, targets as systems is refreshing. Systems are complex and linkages within those systems critical. Anything that improves our understanding of potential targets is welcome. Clark is also to be commended for taking the notion of a new edition seriously—by rearranging the book and updating the discussion and examples throughout. It might have been easier to simply tack on a new preface or new concluding chapter, but Clark seems to have invested some time in trying to improve the book as it evolved through subsequent editions. Finally, the book is well organized and flows logically. Those interested in intelligence and those who are actually intelligence practitioners should read this book for all of these reasons and, if for nothing else, because it highlights the enormous complexity and obstacles to quality intelligence analysis.

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The reviewers: Christopher Marshall is on the Faculty at the National Intelligence University, where he teaches in the Department of Collection and Analysis and is currently serving as the College of Strategic Intelligence Master’s Program Director.

Dr. John Sislin is an imagery analyst at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and is currently on a joint duty assignment as visiting faculty at the National Intelligence University, where he is teaches in the Department of Collection and Analysis.

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a. Times series analyses seek to identify patterns in data over time. A common example would be stock market trend analysis. The analysis can also be used for forecasting.
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When Japanese bombs and torpedoes targeted the planes and ships of the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, the critical value of codebreaking was already common knowledge in select circles. With the US entry into the war, a problem soon arose: the men (primarily) who had done that critical task put on uniforms and headed to theaters of war around the globe. Who would step into the breach and ensure that the vital job of codebreaking would continue? As author Liza Mundy’s Code Girls ably demonstrates, the answer was, “America’s women, naturally!” It would prove to be women who would help rescue a nation “emerging from two decades of disarmament and isolation.” (3)

For a number of those who would serve as codebreakers during the war, it all began with the receipt of an innocuous “secret letter,” initially sent to 10,000 young women in America, which asked them two questions—“Are you engaged to be married?” and “Do you like crossword puzzles?” The letters, from the US Navy—the first of the services to recruit women codebreakers—initially targeted well-to-do, better-educated women, especially those majoring in the sciences, math, and foreign languages and attending such elite colleges and universities in the Northeast as Wellesley, Bryn Mawr, and Mt. Holyoke. Those who responded with the “correct” answers—“No” and “Yes”, respectively—were offered a training course in codebreaking; those who passed were given orders to report to Washington, DC, to enter the fascinating and absolutely top secret world of cryptanalysis. Arriving late to the party, the US Army found its fertile ground for the recruitment of female codebreakers in the teaching colleges of the South and Midwest, the first of several differences between the Navy and Army cadres of female codebreakers. One requirement was the same, however—both services were only interested in women who could “keep their lips zipped.” (9)

Of the first 197 women who received letters from the Navy, 74 ultimately made their way to Washington, hired as SP-4 “Assistant Cryptanalytic Aides,” and paid the munificent sum of $1,620 per year. The first of these débutante decoders arrived in bustling Washington, DC in the late spring of 1942, only a few months into the war. Housing was extremely tight, and the women had to move often—sharing bedrooms and bathrooms was de rigueur, and even sharing beds was not uncommon. Both the services and the women discovered, however, that the professions to which the latter were often relegated in 1941 America would prove ideal for codebreaking, especially that of schoolteaching. At the time, no barriers prevented women from working in the prestigious field of codebreaking; the phrase “release a man to fight” was often expressed, and the nation was grateful for the women’s willingness to do their part—and much more—in the war. By 1945, of the 10,500 codebreakers working at the Army’s Arlington Hall facility, for example, 7,000 were women—a quantitative measurement of their value to the war effort.

As Mundy begins her engaging study, readers are introduced to several “government girls”—“g-girls,” for short—who spent the war in the “obscure profession” (57) of cryptanalysis—and whose personal lives and wartime labors are the focus of Code Girls. Early on, readers make the acquaintance of such legendary female codebreakers as Elizabeth Friedman and the legendary “Miss Aggie,” Agnes Meyer Driscoll, one of the 11,000 women who served as yeomen codebreakers during World War I, thanks to a loophole in the Naval Reserve Act of 1916. During the interwar years, the concept of engaging women in military service predictably fell out of fashion, but after Pearl Harbor, the Army chief of staff, Gen. George Marshall, was an early advocate. In May 1942, the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps bill was signed, allowing the WAACs (Womens Auxiliary Army Corps, WACs by 1943) to render an important service, albeit at a lesser salary than men and only in an auxiliary capacity, at least initially. In contrast, their Navy counterparts—WAVES—

a. Numbers in parentheses refer to the page numbers on which the author’s assertions appear.

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became US Naval Reserve officers once their training was complete and were committed to serving for the duration of the war plus six months, although the unfortunate public notion that they were actually “camp followers” in uniform persisted.

It was all very heady stuff—living and working in the nation’s capital, making lifelong friendships, sharing hardships, knowing but unable to tell anyone the critical role they were playing in the war effort. Yet, as Mundy makes clear in the numerous personal examples she relates, any tendency to view this whole adventure as nothing but a frivolous lark was tempered by the fact that lives were at stake daily, a realization which lent a certain grimness to the heavily-guarded code rooms—especially so when the women were agonized to learn that husbands or brothers or fiancés were missing or dead but they could tell no one. In most cases, the women suffered little angst in the knowledge that their daily work directly resulted in air raids and naval sorties that brought death and destruction to the foes’ women and children. As the author notes, “The women were living life in the moment, with little idea what the future held.” (212)

The “wartime labors” of codebreakers had begun prior to America’s unplanned entry into World War II. As early as 1940, US Navy codebreakers were working on Japanese Navy ciphers, while their Army counterparts concentrated on military and diplomatic messages in Italy, Germany, Japan, and Mexico. But early on in the war Germany and Japan alike severely challenged the United States, especially on the high seas. The Imperial Japanese Navy controlled one-fourth of the vast Pacific Ocean area in 1941 and had not lost a naval battle in 50 years, while the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) had dispatched 170 U-boats—each equipped with an Enigma coding machine—along the US East Coast, rendering the Battle of the Atlantic “a battle of codebreaking prowess.” (152–53) Although it took some time, codebreaking did make its impact felt, first paying dividends in the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea, technically a draw; by contrast, the Battle of Midway a month later, was a clear-cut US victory, thanks in large part to codebreaking. Naval commanders who had had little patience previously for the laborious, time-consuming process became advocates—commander-in-chief US Pacific Fleet Admiral Nimitz characterized the skill as a “priceless advantage” at Midway.

The Army’s codebreaking enterprise at Arlington Hall Station tended to be more freewheeling than the Navy’s, with more civilian than military participation. However, the Army effort was no less critical—as proof, Mundy relates the accomplishments of 22-year-old Ann Caracristi, the physician’s daughter from New York and English major in college who nevertheless had “the mind of an engineer.” (231) Caracristi and colleague Wilma Berryman first cracked the Japanese Army code, which provided critical insight into the loads being carried all over the Pacific by marus, the freighters that brought nearly everything to Japanese troops dispersed throughout the Pacific. The breaking of this code by Berryman and Caracristi, the renowned future deputy director of the National Security Agency, contributed directly to the success of Operation Cartwheel, Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s “island hopping” campaign in the Pacific Theater. Arlington Hall also engaged in “offensive” cryptography: on the eve of D-Day, a section at Arlington Hall engaged in “protective security,” using William Friedman’s SIGABA encoding machine to create the fake message traffic that convinced the Germans that General Patton’s fictional First US Army Group (FUSAG) was planning to come storming ashore at Calais.

While the hub of the nation’s codebreaking efforts was clearly the metropolitan Washington, DC area, other sites were critical, too—such as the former National Cash Register facility in Sugar Creek, Ohio, which became the home of 600 Navy women working in Building 26, soldering wheels for the new generation US-built bombe decoding machines, to assist their British ally. These new high-speed bombes were ready by September 1943 and were running 24 hours a day by the following year, focused on cracking the codes produced by the three-rotor Enigma machines that the German army and air force used, since the U-boat threat had been blunted. According to a US Navy memo, these bombes—and the young women who constructed and operated them—particularly proved their worth on D-Day, when they provided a “considerable gain in intelligence during a very critical phase of the invasion of France.” (320)

These female codebreakers first learned of the end of the war but could tell no one, at least until President Truman announced it formally several hours later. With the advent of peace, some remained in the codebreaking

ranks, but most returned to their former lives, especially those who now had families. As Mundy puts it, “Motherhood was the dividing line between brilliant women who stayed in the work, and those who did not.”(380) The same US government that a few years before had eagerly recruited these women to leave their classroom and dorms for the scintillating world of cryptanalysis now just as resolutely sought to propel them into the kitchens and nurseries of America. This campaign included propaganda-style films that cajoled women to “leave their jobs, return home, and take care of their families.” Their husbands and brothers needed jobs and their patriotic duty now was to make way for them. While most abided by that request, the sudden departure from a most special workforce left a sizable gap, which is why some, missing their former lives and burdened with children and housework, began a round-robin letter-writing campaign, simply to keep in touch. While they would never forget their service, they could not talk about it either, at least for the foreseeable future, and needed the social outlet they had earlier taken for granted.

Mundy, a senior fellow at New America, a think tank and civic enterprise, is also a former reporter, and she has used her skills to make Code Girls a compelling read. Although this is her first book about intelligence and codebreaking, she is generally at home discussing such topics and does an especially good job explaining the “hardware” of codebreaking and how the machines operated. Her expertise shows in her ability to take the convoluted details of codes and ciphers and make them understandable to readers, giving them an enhanced appreciation of the intricate and demanding work these talented young women did on a daily basis that had such profound effects. As she accurately writes, “the military and strategic importance of their work was enormous.” Her writing of this largely untold story was made possible by the discovery of a cache of documents at the National Archives and Records Administration, untouched for 70 years, as well as 55 oral histories in the Library of Congress, interviews with 20 surviving codebreakers, and such novel archival sources as college yearbooks. She also has a knack for providing readers with extraneous but interesting tidbits, such as the fact that 23 pairs of brothers died in the Pearl Harbor attack and that, regrettably, no oral history exists for Agnes Meyer Driscoll. Readers will appreciate that she brings her subjects’ lives up to the present and will find her chapter titles engaging. Who could resist reading one entitled “Pencil-Pushing Mamas Sink the Shipping of Japan”?

Criticisms of the book are few and minor. On one occasion, one codebreaker’s hometown—Beaufort, Mississippi—becomes “Bourbon” further down the same page (129) and the 1945 atomic bombing of Nagasaki was on 9 August, not 12 August. The one statement throughout the book most likely to engender conversation—if not ire—is her reference to the Battle of the Bulge as “one of the war’s worst intelligence failures,” a broad-brush characterization few historians would ascribe to, perhaps giving such an “honor” instead to the Pearl Harbor attacks or other candidates.

Nevertheless, the book is a very engaging read on an important topic, a welcome reminder that not all the allied codebreaking efforts occurred at Britain’s Bletchley Park. While the current social and work environment for women in general has changed dramatically and markedly improved since World War II, it is well to remember that progress on this front has been uneven, to say the least. Code Girls pays tribute to an unsung group of patriotic Americans who, more than seven decades later, are just now receiving their due. The book is a welcome addition to literature on the subject.


The reviewer: David A. Foy is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews.
The Japanese juggernaut that struck Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, early on the morning of 7 December 1941 also overwhelmed other perceived threats to the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” notably the Philippine Islands, then a US Commonwealth Territory. The Japanese invasion came as a nasty surprise to those in the Philippines who either assumed that Japan would not go to war at all or, if it did, would never attack the islands. But on 12 December 1941, Japanese forces appeared before the Philippine capital of Manila and by 2 January 1942 had occupied the city, where they would remain for more than three years, creating an increasingly oppressive and dangerous environment for Filipinos and Westerners alike. The Japanese assault prompted Gen. Douglas MacArthur to implement War Plan Orange that, among other measures, declared Manila an open city. As US forces retreated to the Bataan Peninsula and the island of Corregidor, some Filipinos—as well as US military personnel cut off from their units—retreated to the hills to wage guerrilla war against the Japanese until 1945. MacArthur’s Spies focuses on three individuals who, in various forms, took part in that struggle—American nightclub owner and amateur intelligence officer Claire Phillips; US Army Corporal John Boone, separated from his unit but one of the first to organize a resistance movement against the Japanese; and “businessman” Charles “Chick” Parsons, whose counterfeit documents affirmed his status as a Panamanian diplomat, but who was in reality a US Naval Reserve intelligence officer and spymaster.

The major character in MacArthur’s Spies is clearly Claire Phillips, who had initially fled to the hills to be with her husband, who was serving in the US Army. Life in the hills was hard, however, especially for a woman who had adopted a Filipina child, whom she named Dian. She sought to provide food and clothing for the civilian internees at Santo Tomas University and for the US military members who had endured the Bataan “Death March” and were now in the Cabanatuan POW camp; but this goodwill gesture required money, and she had little. Always enterprising and determined, able to both adapt and deceive, she decided to open a nightclub in Manila, catering to Japanese military officers and officials. Such an arrangement would provide her with enough income to live, make a slight profit, and share some with the civilian and military captives. Thus was born the “Tsubaki (chrysanthemum) Club,” appropriately run by “Madame Tsubaki”—Claire Phillips, or, as she called herself at the time, Dorothy Fuentes, a throwback to an earlier marriage. This subterfuge prompts the author’s comment that Claire was accustomed to “maintaining various versions of the truth about her life.” (97)

Claire soon found she had common cause with Corporal Boone, who desperately needed both supplies and intelligence from the capital. The two, who would work closely together for the next three years, were introduced by a priest, and their intelligence collaboration began. Safe for a time because of his doctored diplomatic documents, Parsons was ultimately sent without explanation to Santo Tomas as a civilian internee, although he was soon released—at least until the April 1942 Doolittle raid on Tokyo, when he was seized again and placed in Ft. Santiago, a civilian detention facility where the Japanese overlords routinely engaged in torture to extract information. Eisner notes that the Japanese may have waterboarded Parsons, adding the uncomfortable reminder that the United States had used the practice in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War nearly 50 years earlier. Ultimately deemed undesirable aliens, Parsons and his wife and son were deported and arrived in August 1942 in New York where Parsons was detained by the FBI, which only gradually conceded that Parsons was not a spy.

Within three months, Claire/Dorothy/Madame Tsubaki had established important connections to those within MacArthur’s intelligence circles, especially Boone, who appreciated the “take” from the Tsubaki Club’s loose-lipped customers. However, the information Claire was passing to him was not actionable, as no one on the island of Luzon, where Boone had his “headquarters,” had a working radio transmitter at the time. Furthermore,
MacArthur did not even become aware of an active Filipino resistance movement until December 1942, after receiving a report from Parsons. The Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) commander then issued a by-name request for Parsons, who arrived in Brisbane, Australia, in January 1943. Assigned to the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB), he returned to the Philippines by submarine in March on a supply mission, the beginning of a truly organized guerrilla war in the islands and the genesis of an intelligence link between the Philippines and MacArthur in Australia. As Parsons conveyed to MacArthur, Filipino resistance groups were growing increasingly restive as the Japanese tightened their grip on the uncooperative Philippine Islands, eager to strike back; MacArthur, however, concerned a bloodbath would ensue, was adamant that the guerrillas be patient and instead gather intelligence for his triumphal return as the head of an eventual US invasion force.

By February 1944, tensions were high in Manila. Food shortages were severe and prices for what little could be bought were exorbitant. From secret news reports, Claire and the others knew that the war was not going well, a conclusion confirmed by the air raid shelters Japanese soldiers were building around Manila. The increasing anxiety was also a result of the arrests of those close to Claire and other members of the resistance movement, prompting her to wonder when the Gestapo-like Kempeitai would come for her—a question answered on 23 May 1944 when she, as she confided to her diary, “went to school,” her code for being arrested. As Claire endured waterboarding sessions and other tortures, however, US invasion plans for the Philippines were moving swiftly—US air raids on Manila began in September 1944, and the invasion of the island of Leyte was set for 20 October.

But the Japanese were not simply withering on the vine. They began sending able-bodied POWs to factories in Japan, leading to such tragedies as the “friendly fire” bombing and strafing of the Oryoku Maru, one of 156 “hell ships” sunk that resulted in the tragic deaths of 21,000 allied POWs at sea. It was also only a few days after the US invasion of Leyte that the first kamikazes—“divine wind” suicide planes—appeared, intent upon diving into US ships and causing numerous casualties, and the massacre of US POWs by immolation at the Palawan POW camp occurred, convincing MacArthur that the rescue of allied POWs was the most pressing priority. This concern prompted the 27 January 1945 raid by US Rangers to free 513 startled US POWs from the Cabanatuan POW camp. Claire, meanwhile, had been transferred to a women’s prison, and her original death sentence had been commuted to one of 12 years hard labor, all made irrelevant when US troops liberated the camp on 10 February 1945. Yet dogged Japanese resistance meant that even as US troops were moving into Manila, casualties were staggering—between February and March 1945, 100,000 died in Manila alone, mostly Filipino civilians.

On 2 April 1945, Claire, her adopted daughter, and fellow resistance member and one-time friend Peggy Utinsky returned to the United States, where Claire began telling her fantastic story—fantastic in part because of her penchant for forgetting some details, blurring others, and sometimes simply making things up. Suspicions about Claire and what she had actually done during the war would rise sharply in the postwar years. Fellow resistance members consistently believed that she overemphasized her role while de-emphasizing theirs, and FBI agents on board her return voyage conducted a Hoover-authorized investigation of her for collaborating with the Japanese, as well as for fraud and lying to immigration officials. Nonetheless, when Claire arrived home, she was treated as a celebrity—she soon landed a book deal and by the end of 1945 was busily working on her memoirs, which appeared in 1947 as Manila Espionage.

That same year, the FBI investigation concluded that she had not been a collaborator, freeing her of legal suspicion. Particularly tense was the growing estrangement between Claire and Peggy—as the result of a private bill in Congress, Peggy received $9,280 ($87,000 in 2017 dollars) in restitution for funds expended to support resistance members from 1942 to 1944. She also received the Presidential Medal of Freedom and wrote her own book, though it never took off like Claire’s, was never made into a movie, and by all accounts was partly fictional. But it was Claire who ultimately claimed the limelight. At MacArthur’s behest, Gen. Mark Clark was directed to present Claire her Presidential Medal of Freedom, and in 1950 she was featured on the hit show, This Is Your Life, where she and her fifth (depending on how one counts) husband, Robert Clavier, were feted with a new house and furnishings, along with a full-ride college scholarship for Dian.

On 24 May 1950 she was featured on the hit show, This Is Your Life, where she and her fifth (depending on how one counts) husband, Robert Clavier, were feted with a new house and furnishings, along with a full-ride college scholarship for Dian.
discussion to Claire’s circumstances. She sold the film rights to Manila Espionage, which became the movie I Was An American Spy, that opened in May 1951 but played fast and loose with the facts. What occupied her attention for several years was the suit she brought in US Claims Court—the records of which were discovered in the archives, prompting the writing of this book—to be recompensed for the funds she had expended in supporting the POWs and resistance fighters. Although Boone testified that she had spent 30,000 pesos (then equivalent to $15,000) to support the guerrillas and that the intelligence she provided had been excellent, the government’s star witness was the embittered Peggy, who denigrated the accomplishments of her former friend. Claire’s claims compensation case ended on 11 January 1957 with an award of only $1,349.21 ($11,000 in 2017 dollars) to her, leaving her embittered and increasingly reliant on alcohol. Claire, who, as Eisner notes, “did not fit the easy mold of a noble hero” (289), died in 1960 and was cremated; the main meeting room in the US embassy in Manila is named in her honor. Peggy died in 1970, and Boone 10 years later; he is buried alongside his wife and fellow resistance fighter Mellie in Arlington National Cemetery. Of the three major figures in the book, only Chuck Parsons lived to a ripe old age, dying in 1988 at age 88.

Although a number of recent books discuss the Filipino resistance movement during World War II, few focus on Claire Phillips’s role as does MacArthur’s Spies; the one exception would be Edna Binkowski’s Code Name: High Pockets: True Story of Claire Phillips, and the World War II Resistance Movement in the Philippines, which appeared in 2006. Peter Eisner has published two other World War II books, one on an American pilot shot down over Belgium and aided by a young people’s group, and one on Pope Pius IX. He was inspired to research and write MacArthur’s Spies by the discussion of the Filipino resistance movement in Hampton Sides’s Ghost Soldiers, which focuses on the 1945 rescue mission that freed the Bataan Death March survivors; by his father’s experiences as an officer on a Navy tank landing ship (LST) that was part of the Philippine invasion force; and particularly by the accidental discovery of Claire Phillips’ diary hidden in a folder at the National Archives dealing with her US Claims Court case.

MacArthur’s Spies is organized into short chapters, which makes it convenient to read in small bits and is enhanced by a sizable section of photographs. The writing is lively and engaging, and the “whatever-happened-to” section in Part Five, “Telling the Story,” is especially welcome and a nice touch all authors should consider. However, the book’s title is somewhat of a misnomer, for two reasons—first, it is hard to be acting as one of “MacArthur’s spies” when he is not aware of your activities for the first year and unable to act upon them for six months thereafter, and second, because the clear focus of the book is on “the singer,” with “the soldier” and “the spymaster” playing critical but clearly secondary roles. Nevertheless, MacArthur’s Spies is a welcome addition to the genre, one that rightfully acknowledges Claire’s selfless acts of compassion and intelligence gathering while simultaneously recognizing her as a flawed heroine.

The reviewer: David A. Foy is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews.
CURRENT TOPICS

America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State, by Osamah F. Khalil

The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy

The Operator: Firing the Shots that Killed Osama bin Laden and My Years as a SEAL Team Warrior, by Robert O’Neill

FICTION

A Legacy of Spies, by John le Carré

GENERAL

American Covert Operations: A Guide to the Issues, by J. Ransom Clark

Intelligence Engineering: Operating Beyond the Conventional, by Adam D. M. Svendsen

Intelligence Success & Failure: The Human Factor, by Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott

Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges, edited by Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson

Working on the Dark Side of the Moon: Life Inside the National Security Agency, by Thomas Reed Willemain

HISTORICAL


Game of Spies: The Secret Agent, The Traitor, and The Nazi, by Paddy Ashdown in collaboration with Sylvie Young


Spynest: British and German Espionage from Neutral Holland 1914–1918, by Edwin Ruis

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
CURRENT TOPICS

America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State, by Osamah F. Khalil. (Harvard University Press, 2016) 426, endnotes, bibliography, index.

By 1902, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, US Navy, had achieved an international reputation as a naval strategist, and he is often credited with coining the term “Middle East,” though as University of Syracuse professor Osamah Khalil notes in America’s Dream Palace, the phrase had appeared earlier. (297) Khalil asserts that Mahan’s influence on the subject of the Middle East was eventually surpassed by T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), in part due to his book, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, that “became an instant classic . . . [though the fact that] it exaggerated Lawrence’s role and bordered on fiction was irrelevant.” Despite the latter gratuitous and unsupported comment, Khalil then quotes Lawrence’s reference to the Arab Revolt: “I meant to make a new nation, to restore a lost influence, to give twenty millions of Semites the foundation on which to build an inspired dream-palace of their national thoughts.” Without further explanation, Khalil borrows the rather ambiguous term “dream palace.”

The principal focus of the book is how US foreign policy shaped the development of expertise in this important, turbulent, and poorly understood region of the world. Khalil argues that before World War II the United States was content to rely on Christian missionaries, Orientalist scholars, and commercial contacts to provide what it needed to know about the Middle East.

Toward that end, these groups founded the American University of Cairo and the American University of Beirut, both of which would later become rich sources of knowledge. To meet a more urgent requirement toward the end of World War I, however, an ad hoc but somewhat unsatisfactory solution was found. President Wilson’s confidant, Edward House, organized a group of experts dubbed The Inquiry to assist the president at the peace negotiations. Among its inadequate results, the Orientalists members “concluded that Muslims and Arabs were incapable of self-rule,” (10) a view that Wilson accepted, revealing inexperience all around—no one realized it.

During World War II, William Donovan tapped academic experts for service in the OSS. The arrangement worked well and established relationships that carried over to the post-war era. At the onset of the Cold War, when America’s national security requirements demanded dedicated professionals devoted to Middle East affairs, new relationships with prestigious universities like Harvard, Princeton, and MIT were formed, and with the passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the universities created Middle East study programs that addressed security requirements from the State Department and the CIA.

Trouble surfaced with this arrangement in 1964 with the publication of The Invisible Government, by David Wise and Thomas Ross (Random House, 1964). (174) The book revealed “the two-way relationship between academic institutions and the CIA and the State department.” These problems were later exacerbated by revelations published in Ramparts magazine and the New York Times concerning CIA support to student groups and cultural organizations. All this was playing out in the divisive atmosphere of the Vietnam War.

These developments, writes Khalil, led to a breakdown in the relationship between the government and academics, who gradually backed away from government programs and the secrecy these programs imposed. Correspondingly, a decline in the number of area studies programs at colleges ensued, and the 1960s saw an exodus of academic expertise to think tanks, where it was possible.

a. Numbers in parentheses refer to the page numbers on which authors’ assertions appear.

b. Khalil omits the part of Lawrence’s quote that reads, “Those who dream by night . . . wake in the day to find that all was vanity, but dreamers of the day are the dangerous men for they act their dream with open eyes, and make it possible. This I did.” T. E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Wordsworth Editions, Ltd., 1999).
to address topics of national security without triggering the tensions around social responsibility that often led to public protest.

*America’s Dream Palace* tracks the rise of policy-related think tanks in the late- and post-Cold War period at “the expense of university-based area studies centers.” Khalil argues that “think tank-based experts were often ideologically predisposed to ensure alignment with US foreign policy goals and interests.” (251) But government agencies, think tanks and Middle East scholars missed or discounted the threat of terrorism. (274) This is particularly evident after 9/11, the ensuing war on terror, and the Iraq War—topics he pursues at some length. Attempts to improve the situation have resulted in programs that once again involve both the US military and American social scientists and are aimed at “obtaining a better understanding of social and cultural issues in combat areas,” though funding and staffing problems continue to haunt some private Middle East study centers. (276–80) On the other hand, many universities are establishing campuses in the Persian Gulf region and some Persian Gulf states are funding Washington think tanks. (288)

Khalil is uncertain as to the nature and future of the government, the think tank, and academic relationship, but he appears to hope for some sort of reconciliation to the benefit of both. The likelihood of that is uncertain, he concludes, because much of the data necessary to decide has not been released: we “have taken secrecy to new levels.” (295) America’s unreal conception and construction of the Middle East will continue to dominate—or, to quote Khalil, “as American involvement in the Middle East deepens, it appears the dream palace will remain.” (295)

A different perspective on the problem.


Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy are British investigative journalists with extensive experience in Pakistan and the Middle East. Their book, *The Siege: 68 Hours Inside the Hotel Taj* (Penguin, 2013), told the story of the terrorist attack on the Taj Hotel in Mumbai in 2008. *The Exile* probes multiple themes, starting with Osama Bin Laden’s and his cohorts’ planning and reacting to the 9/11 attack. This is followed by an account of their escape to Pakistan, the search for a safehaven, and finally Bin Laden’s demise in Abbottabad.

Woven among those events are several other story lines. One deals with the power struggles among al Qaeda’s leaders as Bin Laden battles to maintain his position from afar while promoting further acts of terrorism. Another concerns the complex relations within Bin Ladin’s large extended family, the families of his closest followers, and the often wretched conditions of their fugitive existence.

Unlike other books that address these topics, the authors do not rely mainly on Western sources. They provide a unique perspective by drawing on contacts developed during their years in the Middle East. These include members of “Osama’s family, friends, mentors, companions, factotums, security chiefs, and religious and media advisers.” (xviii) The result, as the subtitle claims, is both a stunning level of detail and a viewpoint—particularly the emphasis on family life—that is truly from the inside. Though this amounts to a “trust me” account, most sources are identified by name, and the result is persuasive.

The narrative begins with glimpses of Bin Laden in the caves of Tora Bora, sipping sweetened tea as he learns of the 9/11 attacks and then records a video heralding his achievement. At the same time in Karachi, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed—or Mokhtar as he was then known—sent out for Dunkin Donuts as he watched the attack on TV. Only when the towers collapsed “did Mokhtar momentarily look panicked,” exclaiming, “I think we bit off more than we could chew.” (14) The reaction of other Bin Laden followers was guarded admiration even from those who had opposed it, fearing the reaction it would inspire.

The authors deal with that reaction in two ways. First, they describe the effects of US attacks on fighters and their families in the Tora Bora caves that eventually forced them to flee to Pakistan. Second, they include an incident (one of many in the book) that characterizes Bin Laden’s self-serving leadership style: they tell the story of a doctor serving there who recalled that Bin Laden
“insisted everyone remain” in the caves—yet when the physician went to see him, Bin Laden himself had disappeared. “Osama didn’t care about anyone but himself,” said the doctor. (94)

_The Exile_ paints a grim picture of al Qaeda on the run and how after a lengthy journey “a disguised Osama arrived in Abbottabad at the end of August” in 2005. (240) Thanks to the Kuwaiti brothers who acquired land and built a house for him, Bin Laden remained there until his death. One of the brothers served as a Bin Laden courier between subordinates and his family members, one stressful task among others that led him to ask Bin Laden to find another home (Bin Laden agreed). But before arrangements could be implemented, one Kuwaiti brother is said to have unintentionally led the CIA to the house. It is worth noting, in the preface and elsewhere (498ff) that the authors challenge—not without an air of sanctimony—the CIA public account of how they learned of the courier.

Bin Laden’s family life in Abbottabad is dealt with in detail, and the narrative conveys something of their dreary day-to-day existence. The authors provide background on each of his wives and most of his 21 children, some of whom joined him for a while before the strain became too great, and others who stayed with him until the end. Some of his family and followers ended up in Iran, where they endured a 10-year stateless existence. A few eventually managed to escape to friendly Middle East countries. Two sons who remained managed to communicate with their father, and, when finally released, tried to join him in Abbottabad. It is this aspect of the book that provides the “inside” look. While his followers were concerned about the safety of their families, Bin Laden is portrayed by the authors as most concerned with assuring that al-Qaeda’s leadership would fall to his chosen son.

The irony here is that, at their most effectual, al Qaeda communications had entailed the use of satellite and cell phones, video cameras, TVs and computers—all fruits of Western technology.

One of the most contentious issues surrounding Bin Laden’s time in Abbottabad is whether the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, knew he was there and aided in his support while keeping the secret. The authors conclude that the top generals did not know. (446–48) In his review of the book, Indian author Indranil Banerjie, finds this “hard to believe.”

_The Exile_ concludes with two unsettling stories. One quotes a Guantanamo detainee who wrote in a book that “I would like to believe that the majority of Americans want to see justice done, and they are not interested in financing the detention of innocent people.” (501) The other quotes Bin Laden’s thoughts expressed on 9/11 recognizing that contemporary histories will condemn the attacks, but in the end, “the time will come… when there is time to write our own version… an unexpurgated document is what will emerge—about an epoch that begins today.” (505) The implications of those thoughts are left to the reader to infer.


_The Operator: Firing the Shots that Killed Osama bin Laden and My Years as a SEAL Team Warrior_, by Robert O’Neill. (Scribner, 2017) 368, photos, index.

Robert O’Neill was discharged from the US Navy on 24 August 2012, after more than 400 combat missions as a SEAL (SEa, Air, Land) during which he earned two silver stars and four bronze stars (for valor), among more than 52 decorations. Born in Butte, Montana, on 10 April 1976, O’Neill left college after one year and joined the Navy in 1995 to become a SEAL. _The Operator_ is the story of his career, from his early training to his role on the team that rescued Capt. Richard Phillips from Somali pirates, to the mission on 2 May 2011 that killed Usama Bin Laden in Abbottabad.

For reasons of tradition and security—personal and national—the Navy prohibited SEAL Team 6 members of the Abbottabad mission from commenting on it or identifying themselves publicly. But to no one’s surprise,
books and movies soon appeared, rendering versions of Bin Laden’s demise with varying degrees of detail and accuracy. Some had official cooperation—one that didn’t, No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission that Killed Osama Bin Laden—The Autobiography of a Navy SEAL (Dutton, 2012), by an O’Neill teammate, resulted in a lawsuit that cost the author his royalties. For more than three years after the raid, although congressmen and journalists knew his name, O’Neill managed to keep his role out of the press. Then, according to author Joby Warrick, when O’Neill realized his role was about to be made public, he decided to write The Operator and reveal that he had shot and killed Usama Bin Laden.\(^a\)

The Operator isn’t just about the Bin Laden raid; it is also an autobiography. O’Neill tells about his family, how he got married after becoming a SEAL, and what caused him to apply to join a numbered SEAL Team, which indicates there are tests of one’s fitness for service that are more demanding than those that “conventional SEALs have to pass. Every distance is longer, every time faster, every exercise has more reps.” (120) After skydiving; participating in close quarters battle exercises; and survival, evasion, and resistance training—all at an advanced level—he graduated in December 2004 and earned his spot on a numbered team. Overseas assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other places, followed.

One of the special assignments O’Neill includes—the story of the planning and execution of the rescue of Capt. Phillips—is fascinating reading and conveys the team spirit on which they relied. The other special assignment, of course, is the Bin Laden raid, and O’Neill follows that from how they first learned of the raid to their return from Pakistan. This high-risk mission led the SEALs to half-jokingly dub themselves “the Martyrs Brigade.” (289)

The aftermath of the Bin Laden raid had some unexpected consequences for O’Neill. After meeting the president and receiving another silver star, the team was cautioned about speaking to the press, but leaks soon came to light. O’Neill was called in by superiors several times and asked whom he had spoken to—and when repeated denials didn’t quell their curiosity, he began to think it was time to retire. After one more mission, he did. O’Neill reveals his thinking at the time and how he found his civilian calling by cofounding a veterans assistance organization, “Your Grateful Nation.”

The Operator conveys—in very salty language—the importance of team spirit in Special Operations teams, all of which are now comprised of men—but O’Neill hopes women are soon among these skilled operators. It is an impressive account.

**FICTION**


Although he appeared in *Call for the Dead* (1961), John le Carré’s first book, and again in *The Spy Who Came In From The Cold*, many will best remember George Smiley from the book *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (1974) that became a 1979 TV series, starring Alec Guinness as Smiley. Le Carré wrote to Guinness after the final episode of *Tinker, Tailor* noting “that the lights seemed to have gone out on your wonderful, wonderful Smiley, but of course they never will.”\(^b\) And, of course, they did not: he surfaced again in *Smiley’s People* (1980), which was followed by a TV version (1982) with Guinness reprising his Smiley role. Then in 1991, Smiley appeared in the TV adaptation of le Carré’s 1962 book, *A Murder of Quality*, though this time Guinness declined the role, as did Anthony Hopkins. Le Carré himself was briefly considered for the part but thought better of the idea, and the role went to Denholm Elliott. The same year, Smiley was featured in le Carré’s *The Secret Pilgrim* and then disappeared from le Carré’s literary sight.

For more than two decades le Carré continued writing books, several with espionage themes, and—though absent the intriguing Smiley, who had presumably retired—his most famous character was not forgotten. In 2011, Smiley was introduced to a new generation of view-
ers with a two hour adaptation of *Tinker, Tailor*, starring Gary Oldman, whose characterization of Smiley earned him an Academy Award nomination. But this was not to be Smiley’s final bow. At age 85, John le Carré has given voice to Smiley once again, in *A Legacy of Spies*.

*Legacy* is, in part, a sequel to *The Spy Who Came In From The Cold*, a story of counterintelligence deception that ended with MI6 officer Alec Leamas (performed in the movie by Richard Burton) and his naive, communist girlfriend both shot dead at the base of the Berlin Wall on the East German side, while Smiley waits helplessly a few feet away in the West. Some 50 years later, it emerges in *Legacy* that the children of two victims of operation WINDFALL—an operation Leamas was running as head of station in Berlin—were now threatening to sue MI6 for his wrongful death: one was his son, and the other, the son of an agent.

The issue of responsibility is not foremost in the Service’s mind; the possibility of public exposure is. Enter Peter Guillam, a Smiley protégé, now retired in France. The only surviving officer with firsthand knowledge of the case besides Smiley—who can’t be found—Guillam is abruptly summoned to “the Services’ shockingly ostentatious new Circus headquarters” (13) in London. His task is to explain the absence of the usual WINDFALL case files and enlighten the MI6 lawyers on what the files contained, so a defense to the lawsuit can be prepared.

Vintage le Carré is the narrative of Guillam’s lengthy interrogations, which are conducted by a young Service lawyer whose lack of field experience—coupled with a phony obsequiousness and truly arrogant manner—is subtly manipulated by Guillam to his own advantage. His vivid abhorrence of bureaucrats is a part of his legacy.

As the story unfolds, hidden records surface in a still-functioning safe house—now unofficial archive—used to support Smiley’s long dormant operation. As Guillam dutifully draws together the details, he reveals operational and organizational conflicts within the Circus that contributed to the deaths at the Wall. Here we learn how MI6 officer and KGB mole Bill Haydon, the protagonist in *Tinker, Tailor*, worked to compromise Leamas’s principal agent in Berlin and what Control (head of the Circus) did to protect the source.

Guillam does not reveal all that he learns to the lawyers and, escaping their constant monitoring of his activities, he sets out to contact surviving sources and somehow make amends, especially to the children. He is successful, only to learn his own life is in danger—as are the lives of others involved.

In the end, it becomes clear that only Smiley can provide a comprehensive picture of the operation that the MI6 mandarins will accept. Guillam sets out to find him by contacting Jim Prideaux, another retired officer who served Smiley loyally and is best remembered for his role in *Tinker, Tailor*.

*A Legacy of Spies* is a clever mix of le Carré’s now-classic espionage works featuring George Smiley and their impact on the present. Readers will not be disappointed with the typically complex story, though it may be a bit difficult to follow unless the reader pays close attention to the timeline. In the final chapter, le Carré places an immense burden on the reader, who must decide just how Smiley resolved things—if he did.

*A Legacy of Spies* is wonderfully written, rich in character detail, with a complex but not contrived plot. A pleasure to read.

**GENERAL**


After a 25-year career with the CIA, Ransom Clark turned to teaching at Muskingum University in Ohio. He also wrote his first book, *Intelligence and National Security* (Praeger, 2007), and created an electronic annotated bibliography of intelligence books and articles (http://intellit.muskingum.edu). *American Covert Operations* is his second book.

Despite the title, the book also covers special operations and covert action; each addresses conditions and objectives where size, mobility, special training, and se-
crecy are major factors. Clark acknowledges that “‘covert operations’ were generally viewed as a ‘civilian’ activity and ‘special operations’ as a ‘uniformed’ activity.” (2) But a glance at history—from Jefferson’s response to the Barbary pirates, to the OSS in WWII, and the SEAL Team 6 operation that killed Bin Laden—reveals that these operations often involve both. “Covert action” alone remains a civilian function. Clark’s opening chapter presents updated definitions for each term.

Subsequent chapters provide examples from the Revolutionary War to the present. The early operations were ad hoc, in response to political or military challenges. Even in World War II, Special Operations units were formed or modified as the situation demanded. Clark shows how the Cold War institutionalized Special Operations units. At the same time, covert action became a controversial policy option. He gives many examples of how each was used. It was then, too, that Congress began to play an ever increasing role, especially in covert action, and Clark reviews the executive-legislative relationship that evolved.

The frequency with which covert action is used, coupled with new sophisticated weapons systems, increased in the post-9/11 era. Clark discusses these factors (though cyber concerns are omitted) and the ever-increasing congressional involvement—from recommending organizational change, to the use of drones and conventional oversight. He concedes that “covert operations in general have been and will undoubtedly remain a contentious issue—morally and legally—for the American political system and public.” (199) But on these points Clark offers no solutions.

*American Covert Operations* concludes with an often overlooked point: special operations are not an alternative to conventional military missions, “although they have been used as a substitute when well-articulated and political policies are lacking.” (201) Recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan make his point. Professor Clark has provided a fine, up-to-date summary of the evolution of covert operations. A most worthwhile contribution.


Adam Svendsen earned his doctorate in politics and international studies at the University of Warwick and is currently an associate consultant at the Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies, Denmark. *Intelligence Engineering* is his fourth book dealing with intelligence studies, in this case the complexities of analysis. It is, in many ways, the most challenging, thought provoking, and confusing of the four.

The challenges discussed result not so much from the originality of his ideas as from their semantic formulation. For example, he states that, since the time of his earlier research, much has “been accomplished clarifying the complex links and nexuses to currently developing ‘system of systems’ or ‘federation of systems’ concepts. Overall, these constructs are collectively encapsulated and rationalized as System of Systems Dynamics (SoSD). These multifaceted SoSD approaches, at their broadest System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) and System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) constructs are currently emerging in their application to intelligence, security . . . ” and related disciplines. (5) This is so because “intelligence continues to move beyond being merely a combination of arts and sciences and it continues to extend into engineering realms.” (6)

Before presenting a series of charts illustrating the concept of *intelligence engineering*, Svendsen defines intelligence and then intelligence engineering (IE). The former, though semantically complex, offers nothing new. (18) But when fused with the dictionary definition of engineering, IE he defines as follows:

with more specific intelligence context—spanning both human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical intelligence (TECHINT) realms—and which in turn significantly involves the collection and processing (analysis) of information that is particularly of military and/or political value, and which especially (and purposefully) relates to international relations, defence, and national (extending to global, via regional) security (threats, encompassing at their most broad, the full spectrum of issues-problems-hazards-up-to-risks confronted). The last of these efforts frequently also involves secret (covert and/or clandestine), and often (although not exclusively—as private and sub-/non-state actor contributions are also included) state activity conducted by specialized ‘intelligence’ institutions (or organizations) to understand or influence entities. (20)

The balance of the book reflects this same level of clarity—which is to say, the discussion remains obtuse. But there are other problems, as well: the extensive chapter endnotes contain so many references that it is impossible to tell which one or ones support or complement the topics referenced. Second, the IE examples provided are strictly theoretical, and claims for their usefulness are not supported by any real world problems. Finally, the book is so badly edited that it is often difficult to comprehend the precise meaning of the ideas it tries to put forth.

In short, although the author claims “IE stands out positively as a progressive approach to adopt,” (105) readers may in the end be left more perplexed than enlightened.


Rose McDermott is a professor of international relations at Brown University. She earned her PhD in political science and her MA in experimental social psychology from Stanford. Her “interest in all things military in general and the critical importance of proper intelligence in particular” (xiv) followed upon experiences related by her father, who was serving at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. She did not, however, accept his explanation for the surprise attack—“Roosevelt let it happen”—and her anecdote attesting to the intensity of his conviction is matchless. Coauthor Uri Bar-Joseph also earned his PhD from Stanford and is now a professor at Haifa University, Israel, where he teaches and writes on intelligence and national security. In *Intelligence Success & Failure*, they deal with the familiar question, “Why do states so often fail to predict surprise attacks?” by analyzing three gaps or “lacunas” as they term them, not considered in previous works.

The first gap was created by an over-concentration of studies of failures to predict surprise and too little on cases of success. This is important because the authors “assert that . . . successes are born of failures.” (2) The second gap involves the contributions of specific individuals and how they dealt with the intelligence available. The third gap exists because the most frequent approaches to the study of surprise “focus on the American experience in the field.” (3)

For this book, the authors selected three pairs of case studies for their analysis “in which intelligence played a critical role.” (26) The first pair, or “dyad” as they call it, considers Operation Barbarossa—Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union—and the subsequent Battle for Moscow, which was linked to “a correct estimate of Japan’s intentions” concerning whether to invade the Soviet Union. The second case concerns the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 and the Chinese intervention five months later. The third pair deals with the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 and the second Egyptian offensive six days later. (26)

*Intelligence Success & Failure* contains two parts. The first establishes a theoretical framework that attempts to answer the question, “In theory, what should analysts do to predict surprise and prevent failure?” Their answers provide criteria for analyzing the case studies. As background, the authors examine a number of cases discussed in the literature, including studies involving Pearl Harbor, where they suggest that the conclusions of Roberta Wohlstetter’s famous study “were not entirely accurate” (19)—and they explain why. This part also considers the human factor, the role of individual behavior, and a review of the “critical psychological topics most relevant to the study.” (26)
Part II deals with empirical evidence related to the three dyads mentioned above. Each is subjected to a lengthy analysis of the multiple factors that led to failure or success. For example, they suggest that the Red Army’s lack of preparedness was not due to poor intelligence, but rather to Stalin’s psychological inadequacies that resulted in a degree of closed-mindedness that led to a refusal to accept even the possibility of Hitler’s treachery. Not a startling conclusion, but one extensively documented.

The second dyad, surprise and the Korean War, introduces the problem of sycophantic staff bias. In particular, MacArthur’s G-2, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, takes a terrific beating. Augmented by MacArthur’s narcissism and excessive self-confidence in estimating the situation, the failure to foresee the Chinese intervention is better understood.

The third dyad, “intelligence failure and success in the War of Yom Kippur” begins with the prediction of the Israeli chief of staff to Prime Minister Golda Meir: “The possibility of an Egyptian-Syrian attack is entirely improbable.” (184) Nevertheless, despite excellent intelligence services and experienced government officers, Israel was surprised. The authors review the many contributing circumstances, including the government’s decisionmaking apparatus. Among the causative factors, the authors observe that Israel’s military intelligence officers were inflexible in their beliefs as to the conditions that Egypt needed to fulfill before declaring war.

The principal conclusion of Intelligence Success & Failure is that “the primary explanation for failure to accurately estimate a strategic threat resides mostly at the individual level.” (235) The authors provide extensive documentation to support this view, but warn that it is not a general solution since it is based on a small sample.

Finally, the authors offer two policy-oriented conclusions worth remembering. First, the American tendency following intelligence failures is “to react with perceived need for large-scale reorganizations of the intelligence community . . . [which, as] the experience of more than seventy-five years shows . . . proves counterproductive.” Second, “the most critical information about an incoming attack did not come from technical means but from highly placed human sources.” Whether this remains true today is not debated. (240–42)

Intelligence Success & Failure offers new thinking on the subject of strategic surprise. It is a most valuable contribution to the literature.


After six years as an intelligence analyst with the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service, Gunilla Eriksson now holds a post-doctorate position at the Swedish National Defense University (SNDU), Department of War Studies. Ulrica Pettersson has a PhD in risk management and is employed by the Swedish Armed Forces assigned to the SNDU to perform research on Special Operations Forces (SOF), Lessons Learned. Maj. Gen. Urban Molin, Chief Special Forces Command, Swedish Armed Forces, is coauthor with the editors of the introduction and conclusions chapters of this volume.

The thesis of Special Operations from a Small State Perspective is that the use of SOFs in the Western world is increasing not only for states with large military forces, but “also for small states with limited and/or developing military institutions.” (1) That the latter is true may not be immediately obvious, however, since the scholarly literature concerning SOF and the special operations they conduct—a necessary component for public understanding of the issues—deals mostly with the former. The present work, therefore, is intended to help correct this situation by presenting a collection of articles by academics and professional military authors that discuss the use of SOF—both nationally and internationally—from a small state perspective.

The contributors to this volume—most identified only by initials—explain the “small state perspective” using the Swedish case as an exemplar in its deployment of SOF units in the Balkans, the Congo, Chad, and as part of NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Theories of application, strategic value, small state security benefits in international relationships are also examined in relation to the Global SOF Network (GSN). The relationship
between the GSN the United States Special Operations Command is dealt with in a separate chapter. (65)

The chapter on leadership in SOF operations is particularly important in light of what one author terms the “special operations paradox,” the situation in which offensive forces are numerically inferior to the defending units. (119)

The basic SOF functions—direct action (DA), military assistance (MA), special reconnaissance and surveillance (SR)—are analyzed by experienced officers. They also include cyber operations, a new factor in SOF operations that may become a force multiplier for small states with a magnitude disproportionate to their size. The role of small state strategies in applying these functions receives detailed attention, especially with regard to asymmetric conflict in which “opposing strategic approaches favor the weaker.” (144)

The use of SOF units to support conventional forces and to conduct missions on their own is becoming a dominant aspect of modern warfare. Special Operations from a Small State Perspective clarifies their potential and explains why they are important to national and international security. A very broadening and valuable contribution.


An electrical engineer with a BSE from Princeton, and a PhD from MIT who taught at Harvard, MIT, and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (where he is now professor emeritus), Thomas Willemain was a natural choice for NSA’s scholar-in-residence program during 2007–2008. In fact, his contributions earned extensions over several summers, and he became a contractor for several more.

In Working on the Dark Side of the Moon, Willemain explains the title as an allusion to what he—and the general public—knew about NSA before applying, and then what it was like working there. He acknowledges he hesitated on moral grounds before applying, because he “had a bad feeling that the Agency had been used improperly,” (3) but he decided to go forward when the head of the program for which he was applying at NSA assured him that his doubts were neither exceptional nor disqualifying. The only way to find out for sure was to join.

Willemain’s decision to write a memoir of his NSA experience came when his contract was not renewed, after prolonged and often hostile exchanges with the publications review apparatus of the NSA subordinate element with which he interacted. (4) NSA itself, he writes, was generally reasonable in this regard and the redactions—15% blacked out in the text—were “well founded.” Still, he was dismayed by the process because the book is not a tell-all tale about NSA operations; instead, he presents a view “from down in the craters . . . what it felt like to me as a person.” Also, he wants to give other academics a glimpse of what they can expect if they apply and go to work at NSA. (viii) With a few exceptions, the names he mentions are pseudonyms.

The topics Willemain covers include the selection process, especially the polygraph experience; learning the security rules; his austere workspace, shared with interesting colleagues and interns; the parking arrangements and gift shop; and the final step, a PowerPoint presentation required to convince NSA management that he was suitable.

Assigned to the Mathematics Research Group, Willemain’s tasking involved statistics, mathematics, and programming on projects that had no visible connection to what he describes as “the bloody end of the Kill Chain,” (38) or events that clearly contribute to a death. In one instance, he notes, it was possible that he had contributed, but he was given no further details and he never knew the outcome of how his work was used. That is as close as he gets to mentioning anything operational.

There is a chapter devoted to the kinds of people he worked with, their educational backgrounds, and the general nature of their work at NSA. He mentions enjoyable collaboration with “Five-Eyes countries” (58) and the sometimes-eccentric behavior of the extraordinarily bright staff, for example, the “Ph.D. mathematician wandering

around in circles wearing pajamas and a bathrobe, and talking to himself.” (59)

The administrative duties associated with daily work sometimes confounded Willemain. These duties included classifying his reports, participating in the annual personnel evaluation program, and learning the meaning of the color distinctions of the badges everyone wore—green, blue, and white.

Working on the Dark Side of the Moon concludes with a discussion of life as a contractor working for an NSA-linked organization. He gives a separate chapter on the women working there, who “added a new level of sociability to a group that tends toward classical geeky introversion.” (102) Overall, his career at NSA is told with a sense of humor and the hope that his experience “will stir interest among other professors to add their brains to the fight.” Professor Willemain has given us a view of NSA like no other: it is an unusual and valuable contribution.

HISTORICAL


Michael “Mick” Smith, currently a visiting fellow at Kellogg College, Oxford, served in the British Army Intelligence Corps before becoming a national security journalist with, respectively, the BBC, The Daily Telegraph, and the Sunday Times. He has written several books on intelligence, including MI6: The Real James Bonds (Dialogue, 2011), Station X: Decoding Nazi Secrets (TV Books, 2001), and Foley: The Spy Who Saved 10,000 Jews (Hodder Stoughton, Ltd., 1999). Yet despite his varied experience, until now, one question remained unanswered: Why do agents spy? Put another way, what is their motivation? The Anatomy of a Traitor is his answer. The book offers no surprises, but it does offer some seldom discussed cases.

Smith identifies six motivations he claims explain most agents’ behavior: “sex, money, patriotism, revenge, ego, and ideology.” (259) He acknowledges that, in most instances, no single motivation accounts for an agent’s betrayal—and there two further qualifications: first, it may never be known with certainty which motivations apply. Second, even when the six factors above are involved, under some circumstances spying is simply deemed “the right thing to do.” (221) The case summaries presented includes examples from Delilah to the ideologically motivated ISIS executioner, Jihadi John, (255) all of which are offered to support these conclusions.

Operation Junk, run by MI6 in post-war Germany, involving the smuggling of Swiss watches and other items into the Soviet Union as a source of rubles, is discussed as an example of motivation for financial gain. Controlled initially by a Polish citizen who used the curiously familiar pseudonym Mandel Goldfinger, the CIA also played a role, and the operation ran for nearly 10 years before being blown by KGB agent, George Blake. (73–75)

In the late 1940s, MI6 made plans to recruit patriotic “businessmen, musicians, ballet dancers, actors, and sportsmen” (120–121) for service behind the Iron Curtain since they could be expected to have fewer cover problems. Unfortunately, all efforts came to naught after Kim Philby informed his Moscow masters. Ryszard Kuklinski, the Polish army colonel who spied for CIA, is a recent example of successful patriotic motivation, although other factors were also involved, and Smith discusses many of them. (133)

Cases that clearly involved multiple motivations include Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Edward Lee Howard. Smith covers each one, although little new is added to their stories. Likewise with the DIA analyst, Ana Montes—although Smith classifies her as being in the “right thing to do category.” (244ff)

The Anatomy of a Traitor is not well documented, though recommended reading is given for each chapter.

And while the components of an anatomy are evident, there is no analysis of their relative importance. Nonetheless, the book presents a wide range of cases that demonstrate the difficulties and importance of determining agent motivation, both for the case officer and the agent.


Three directors of Central Intelligence were from Missouri. Rear Adm. Sidney Souers, a St. Louis businessman in civilian life, had served in naval intelligence before and during the war. The second future DCI, Rear Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, was a Naval Academy graduate. He was the US naval attaché in Paris when WWII erupted in 1939 and stayed into mid-1941, when he was assigned to the USS *West Virginia*. He was the battleship’s second in command when, moored in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the ship sank after Japanese torpedo attacks struck her. He would later become an adviser to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. The third Missourian DCI, Judge William Webster, wrote the foreword to this book. Another Missourian, Clark Clifford, who served as Truman’s naval aide and during the early Cold War as his White House counsel, made important contributions to the National Security Act of 1947. After a distinguished career in the CIA, Schroeder—a fifth Missourian—has written *The Foundation of the CIA*.

The author, now an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, assesses the contribution of Truman’s White House “Missouri Gang,” as they came to be called, not only to the foundation of the CIA, but also to the concept of a national intelligence service and the functions it should perform.

To set the stage for the events that led to the creation of the CIA, Schroeder provides a summary of how intelligence was used by American governments from Revolutionary War times to World War II. Not surprisingly, the military played a dominant role in peace and war until the turn of the century, when ad hoc contributions from the State and Justice Departments increased to satisfy foreign relations demand and threats to domestic security. While the names of many of the key players in the book will be familiar to readers, Schroeder also includes less well-known participants like John Gade, the naval intelligence officer who wrote *All My Born Days* in 1942 (Charles Scribner’s Sons). The son of an American mother and Norwegian father, Gade grew up in Norway and spoke French and German. When World War I started, Gade was commissioned as a naval attaché and began putting his languages to good use; he also became involved in various espionage activities.

Schroeder reviews the ups-and-downs of intelligence in the inter-war years that set the scene for World War II, and treats the rapid institutionalization of intelligence beginning with the formation of the OSS—despite opposition from the military and the FBI.

The book focuses on the principal Missouri advisors to President Truman and his efforts to meet the demand for intelligence in what quickly became the Cold War. Schroeder reviews their careers (especially their extensive intelligence experience), the reasons Truman selected them, and their contributions. Hillenkoetter, not surprisingly, receives primary attention; his role as the first DCI of the newly formed CIA was sometimes controversial—particularly regarding congressional relations—and though he felt pride in the CIA, he was not unhappy to return to the US Navy in 1950. By then, however, the CIA was firmly established, and Schroeder notes that Hillenkoetter’s successor, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, went on to build on a firm foundation.

*The Foundation of the CIA* concludes with some complimentary quotes from CIA successors to the Missouri Gang, who remembered with admiration the contributions they made. This is a timely book that adds perspective to CIA’s origins, while clarifying the obstacles that were overcome by dedicated officers who should not be forgotten.
Game of Spies: The Secret Agent, The Traitor, and The Nazi, by Paddy Ashdown in collaboration with Sylvie Young. (William Collins, 2016) 376, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Lord Paddy Ashdown served in the Royal Marine Commando, the Special Boat Service, and the Foreign Service before entering Parliament and then the House of Lords. Sylvie Young was a London stockbroker before becoming his collaborator in a series of histories on British Special Operations during World War II. When Lord Ashdown learned some papers about a Special Operations Executive (SOE) officer known as ARISTIDE had surfaced in a private collection, he asked Ms. Young to investigate. She determined that the trove was the personal archive of Roger Landes. They were aware that Landes had been an SOE radio operator and had mentioned him in a previous book, A Brilliant Little Operation.a Now they discovered Landes had also been head of the scientist resistance circuit in the Bordeaux region, codenamed ARISTIDE. The papers also mentioned André Grandclément, a resistance leader who had betrayed the Landes network to Friedrich Dohse, a Gestapo officer in Bordeaux. In his memoir, Dohse wrote that “his overriding priority was to catch Roger Landes.” (xiii) Game of Spies tells the story of these three men who operated in southwest France from 1942 to the liberation of Bordeaux in 1944.

Five-foot, four-inch Roger Landes was born and raised in Paris until 1934, when his parents emigrated to London, his father’s birthplace. He joined the army when war was declared and eventually became a radio operator. In 1942, he was summoned to London where SOE asked him to volunteer—and he did.

The six-foot, three-inch Friedrich Dohse “joined the Hamburg police and the local Nazi party because it was the only way to get a job.” (28) Fluent in French, he was sent to Bordeaux where he was co-opted by the Gestapo and became an effective counterespionage officer. His job was to neutralize the resistance.

André Grandclément, the tall son of an admiral, was described variously as “intelligent, amiable, pompous, an ‘ideological gigolo’”, a “dangerously militant communist,” and an unfaithful husband. (36) Medically retired from the French army, he managed to be called up when the war started, and he served until the French defeat in 1940, when he returned to life as an insurance agent in Bordeaux. Through connections, he soon joined the resistance. By early 1942, he was the head of the Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM), the “largest and most powerful Resistance organization in southwest France” (38) that worked in partnership with the scientist circuit.

Game of Spies tracks the three protagonists as they endured the growing pains associated with learning on the job. For SOE agents, communications with headquarters and between circuits were a constant problem. Supply drops often missed their targets and, when successful, competing resistance elements fought over them. False documents were not always correct, and in one case the Gestapo arrested an agent because they had noticed that SOE agents all carried the same brand and style of suitcase. (49) Adding to these difficulties, De Gaulle’s resistance units operated independently in France, often complicating SOE operations.

Grandclément was never trained in security or clandestine operations; his appointment was mainly political. He met with Landes and they agreed to cooperate, but the relationship soon deteriorated.

The Bordeaux Gestapo had many advantages. They controlled communications, though the resistance constantly disrupted them. But they were very successful in convincing suspected resistance members to provide details about their colleagues. Their standard methods included threatening harm to family that was regularly carried out when cooperation proved inadequate. When assassinations and sabotage occurred, they took reprisals by arbitrarily executing civilians. In some cases prisoners were transferred to Paris, where waterboarding and more harsh techniques were routinely employed. Lord Ashdown goes to some length in showing that Dohse resisted the latter, preferring subtle persuasion to thumbscrews and beatings. He was very successful.

By August 1943, the frequency of Gestapo arrests required the extraction of the scientist circuit leader and Landes was ordered to assume command. The next month, Dohse arrested Grandclément and persuaded him to cooperate, and he attempted to recruit former colleagues. This placed Landes’s operations in jeopardy, and

a. A Brilliant Little Operation was reviewed in Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf in 2013 (Studies in Intelligence 57(2):82).
he was recalled to London. After his return, he activated the networks that had been deactivated in his absence, and initiated operations in support of the upcoming D-Day landings. Meanwhile, local network leaders had learned of Grandclément’s treachery and demanded his execution. London approved, and the authors give a vivid description.

For context, Lord Ashdown weaves into the narrative the ongoing military situation that the SOE operations supported and the amorphous nature of the French Resistance with its many competing factions. To complete the story, he discusses the post-war careers of Landes and Dohse.

*Game of Spies* is an interesting and valuable assessment of WWII European SOE operations in Southern France and of the challenging contribution of volunteer agents.

The third volume of the official history of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIO) completes this trilogy, begun in 2014. In his preface to this volume, David Horner, now emeritus professor and historian at the Australian National University and author of the first book in the trilogy, points out that “the series is a history of the Organisation. It is not a history of espionage in Australia, of the Cold War, of the Communist Party of Australia, of the organisations or people targeted by ASIO, of Australian politics, or of the terrorist threat, although these matters figure prominently in the series.” He stresses that, while the authors were given access to “the Organisation’s closed records,” the material contained in the histories has been reviewed by ASIO officials for security and thus does not contain many details—such as names, cases, and sources—that would no doubt be of interest to readers. (xvi) The volumes do “contribute to an understanding of the history of ASIO within the Australian community.” (xvii)

In volume three, authors John Blaxland (also a historian at the Australian National University, and author of volume two) and Rhys Crawley (a historian at the Australian National War Memorial) cover events that took place in the governments of Prime Ministers Malcolm Fraser and Robert Hawke, and the ASIO Directors-General who served them. Throughout their tenures, the topic of reform was a foremost concern and two royal commissions—both headed by Justice Robert Hope—investigated ASIO’s handling of counterterrorism, counterespionage, and organizational issues. Their conduct and their impact on ASIO are dealt with at length.

The first Hope Royal Commission was formed in 1974 by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam to consider necessary reforms. Then the Whitlam government unexpectedly fell in 1975, due in part to “accusations it [ASIO] was involved in the Government’s downfall” (14) and in part to “rumours of CIA interference” (4) that were propagated by David Combe, a former secretary of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Combe was a suspected Soviet agent run by KGB officer Valeriy Ivanov and the KGB Resident, Lev Koshlyakov. To help deal with the resulting controversy, the infamous former CIA officer Victor Marchetti “was brought to Australia by Combe’s lawyers.” No indication is provided as to why that choice was made. (249) At this point, Malcolm Fraser (Liberal Party) became prime minister, and he continued the Hope Commission investigation. The authors devote a chapter to the case.

ASIO’s counterterrorism operations also receive considerable attention. For example, a major case was created in February 1978, when a truck bomb exploded outside the Hilton Hotel in Sydney. The investigation lasted until 1982 when ASIO determined from agent reports and telephone intercepts that the Indian “spiritual organization, Ananda Marga (“path to bliss”) had carried out the attack.” (88)

*The Secret Cold War* records the numerous changes in organization throughout the period of the Fraser government that ended in 1983, when Bob Hawke became prime minister. “The Hawke government’s introduction to ASIO and its counterespionage work was a very public one. Spy fever was rife and the Combe-Ivanov affair was . . . a regular feature on then nightly news.” (382) This and other revelations led Hawke to establish the second Hope
Royal Commission to investigate Australia’s security and intelligence agencies, whose main threat was thought to be from the Soviet and Asian intelligence services. The Mitrokhin archives supported this assumption, and the details he supplied led to a mole hunt. Though his information on Australian espionage was not included in the books that were based on his revelations, the authors supply some of the details and discuss the changes in ASIO operations that resulted from these and related events.

The concluding chapter of *The Secret Cold War* provides a good summary of how ASIO changed from its formative days to the end of the Cold War, when some argued ASIO’s intelligence services were no longer as important as its budget and staff was cut significantly. September 11th changed all that, and today the service is a vibrant modern and effective organization once again.

**Spynest: British and German Espionage from Neutral Holland 1914–1918**, by Edwin Ruis. (The History Press, 2016) 255, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

All belligerents respected the neutrality of the Netherlands during World War I. Britain and Germany took advantage of the neutrality by establishing intelligence stations there to report on each other’s naval movements, and to conduct espionage operations in the combat zones. Both nations also conducted counterintelligence operations aimed at identifying agents dispatched from the Netherlands to spy in their respective countries. British and German historians have written about these events from their individual points of view. For example, in his authorized history of MI5, Christopher Andrew discusses how MI5 dealt with German spies in Britain. Likewise, Keith Jeffery in his history of the Secret Intelligence Service, assesses MI6 operations in the Netherlands. And Colonel Walter Nicolai described German intelligence operations in Holland as “a secret service centre.” But until now, little has been written in English that considers the Dutch role in these events. Dutch historian Edwin Ruis has filled this gap with *Spynest*.

At the start of World War I, the “Netherlands had nothing worthy of the name of secret service,” writes Ruis. (31) There was a military intelligence element—designated GSIII—that collected open source information about foreign armies but consisted of only a single officer. Eventually a cryptographic section was added. Funds to support agent operations were not available.

To complicate matters, “secret services of all the warring parties were active in the Netherlands . . . though the first generation excelled in clumsiness.” (139) As Ruis explains, this forced the Dutch, who were learning on the job, to acquire a counterintelligence capability. They were soon monitoring each warring party’s activities to assure they were not endangering domestic security. In the telling, Ruis provides new data on familiar figures. The case of Richard Tinsley (T-network) is a good example: accounts by British historians note he was one of its most valuable agents in the Netherlands, and they describe the material his agents provided. Ruis goes into much greater detail about the difficulties he encountered and how he operated under the cover of his Uranium Steamship Company. He is a major figure in the book because he cooperated with the Dutch authorities fully.

In a brief aside, Ruis notes that post-war stories about the mysterious spy chief, “Fräulein Doktor and her Antwerp spy school that trained spies for operations in France and Britain were fantasy” as shown by reports of Dutch spies. (107)

The “mail watch” was one of the most effective methods the Dutch employed, a task made easier by the inexperienced foreign agents they encountered. When they discovered agents on their way to Britain, they informed the Brits. Most often naval intelligence was involved—the Germans’ naval intelligence service (designated “N”) recruited Dutch agents—and the British were alerted. Sometimes Americans—or those posing as neutral Americans—were involved, and the Dutch merely monitored them unless they violated Dutch law.

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Spynest adds many new agent names to the history of WWI espionage while describing their often complex relationships. But its main contribution is the surprising story of Dutch intelligence getting up to speed and how the Dutch managed to deal with both sides while avoiding invasion considered by both. A well-documented and interesting contribution to the literature.
Books Reviewed in

Studies in Intelligence

2017

Reviews can be found on the Internet at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/index.html.

CONTEMPORARY TOPICS

**America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National Security State**, by Osa mah F. Khalil (61 4 [December 2017] Bookshelf)


**Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America’s Special Operations Forces** by Mark Moyar (61 3 [September 2017] J. R. Seeger)

**A Passion For Leadership: Lessons on Change and Reform from Fifty Years of Public Service**, by Robert M. Gates (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)

**Practise to Deceive: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners**, by Barton Whaley (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)

**Special Forces: A Unique National Asset** by Mark D. Boyatt (61 3 [September 2017] J. R. Seeger)


**War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Success Into Political Victory** by Nadia Schadlow (61 3 [September 2017] Clayton Laurie)

**Whistleblower at the CIA: An Insider’s Account of the Politics of Intelligence**, by Melvin A. Goodman (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.
**Books Reviewed in 2017**

**GENERAL**


*Constructing Cassandra—Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001* by Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn (61 4 [December 2017] Randy P. Burkett)

*Intelligence and Surprise Attack—Failure and Successes from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond* by Erik J. Dahl (61 4 [December 2017] Randy P. Burkett)

*Intelligence Engineering: Operating Beyond the Conventional*, by Adam D. M. Svendsen (61 4 [December 2017] Bookshelf)

*Intelligence Success & Failure: The Human Factor*, by Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott (61 4 [December 2017] Bookshelf)


**HISTORICAL**

*Agent 110: An American Spymaster and the German Resistance in WWII*, by Scott Miller (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

*Agent M: The Lives and Spies of MI5’s Maxwell Knight*, by Henry Hemming (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)

*Agent Michael Trotobas and SOE in Northern France*, by Stewart Kent and Nick Nicholas (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)


*The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War*, by Sarah Harris (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)

*Codenamed DORSET: The Wartime Exploits of Major Colin Ogden-Smith, Commando & SOE*, by Peter Jacobs (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)


*Code Girls: The Untold Story of the American Women Codebreakers of World War II* by Liza Mundy (61 4 [December 2017] David A. Foy)
Cold War Counterfeit Spies: Tales of Espionage; Genuine or Bogus?, by Nigel West (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)

Deep Under Cover: My Secret Life & Tangled Allegiances as a KGB Spy in America, by Jack Barsky with Cindy Coloma (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight, by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy (61 4 [December 2017] Bookshelf)

The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran by Andrew Scott Cooper (61 2 [June 2017] Brent G.)

Finks: How the CIA Tricked the World’s Best Writers, by Joel Whitney (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)


Game of Spies: The Secret Agent, The Traitor, and The Nazi, by Paddy Ashdown in collaboration with Sylvie Young (December 2017)


The Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police, by Frank McDonough (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf) and (61 2 [June 2017] David A. Foy)


A Great Place to Have a War: America and the Birth of a Military by Joshua Kurlantzick (61 4 [December 2017] Thomas L. Ahern)

House of Spies: St. Ermin’s Hotel, The London Base of British Espionage, by Peter Matthews (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)

Inventing Loreta Velasquez: Confederate Soldier Impersonator, Media Celebrity, and Con Artist, by William C. Davis (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)

LORENZ: Breaking Hitler’s Top Secret Code at Bletchley Park, by Captain Jerry Roberts (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)

Lawrence of Arabia’s War: The Arabs, The British and the Remaking of the Middle East in WWI by Neil Faulkner (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)


Operation Blunderhead: The Incredible Adventures of a Double Agent in Nazi-Occupied Europe, by David Gordon Kirby (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

OSS Operation Black Mail: One Woman’s Covert War Against the Imperial Japanese Army by Ann Todd (61 3 [September 2017] J. R. Seeger)

Our Man in Charleston: Britain’s Secret Agent in the Civil War South by Christopher Dickey (61 1 [March 2017] Clayton Laurie)

RAF and the SOE: Special Duty Operations in Europe During WW2, edited by John Grehan (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)

Rogue Heroes: The History of the SAS, Britain’s Secret Special Forces Unit That Sabotaged the Nazis and Changed the Nature of War, by Ben Macintyre (61 1 [March 2017] J.R. Seeger) and (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

A Season of Inquiry Revisited: The Church Committee Confronts America’s Spy Agencies, by Loch K. Johnson (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)


Shattered Illusions: KGB Cold War Espionage in Canada, by Donald G. Mahar (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf) and (61 2 [June 2017] John Ehrman)

Sikunder Burnes: Master of the Great Game, by Craig Murray (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

Silver: The Spy Who Fooled the Nazis—The Most Remarkable Agent of the Second World War, by Mihir Bose (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)


Sons and Soldiers: The Untold Story of the Jews Who Escaped the Nazis and Returned with the US Army to Fight Hitler by Bruce Henderson (61 3 [September 2017] David A. Foy)


Spies in Palestine: Love, Betrayal, and the Heroic Life of Sarah Aaronsohn by James Srodes (61 2 [June 2017] Dr. Carly Speranza, Lt. Col. USAF)

The Spies of Winter: The GCHQ Codebreakers Who Fought the Cold War, by Sinclair McKay (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)

The Spy Who Couldn’t Spell: A Dyslexic Traitor, an Unbreakable Code, and the FBI’s Hunt for America’s Stolen Secrets, by Yudhijit Bhattacharjee (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)
Spy Sites of Washington, DC, by Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton with Henry R. Schlesinger (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

Spymaster: The Life of Britain’s Most Decorated Cold War Spy and Head of MI6, Sir Maurice Oldfield, by Martin Pearce (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)

Spynest: British and German Espionage from Neutral Holland 1914–1918, by Edwin Ruis (61 4 [December 2017] Bookshelf)


True Believer: Stalin’s Last American Spy, by Kati Marton (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)

War in the Desert, by T. E. Lawrence, edited by Jeremy and Nicole Wilson (61 3 [September 2017] Bookshelf)


MEMOIR

Foxtrot in Kandahar: A Memoir of a CIA Officer in Afghanistan at the Inception of America’s Longest War by Duane Evans (61 4 [December 2017] J. R. Seeger)

The Operator: Firing the Shots that Killed Osama bin Laden and My Years as a SEAL Team Warrior, by Robert O’Neill (December 2017)


INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

The Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures, edited by Bob de Graaff and James M. Nyce with Chelsea Locke (61 1 [March 2017] Bookshelf)

Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform, by Peter Gill (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

Swedish Military Intelligence: Producing Knowledge, by Gunilla Eriksson (61 2 [June 2017] Bookshelf)

FICTION


A Legacy of Spies, by John le Carré (61 4 [December 2017] Bookshelf)
Books Reviewed in 2017


Review Essays

The Life of John Le Carré

Tracking the History of a Counterinsurgency Expert
Four Books by David Kilcullen (61 2 [June 2017] J.R. Seeger)

“The Rest of the Story”
Reflections on Key Readings on 9/11, Iraq WMD, and the Detention and Interrogation Program (61 3 [September 2017] Martin Petersen)

James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia
A Review of the Memoir Enhanced Interrogation (61 3 [September 2017] Erik Jens)

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