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Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
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The Levantine coast is perhaps the most blood-drenched landscape in the world. Babylonians, Egyptians, Hittites, Greeks, Romans, Crusaders, Arabs, Philistines, Jews and many others have fought and died in this strategic crossroad between Asia, Europe, and Africa. Today’s ongoing crisis in the Levant eerily mirrors dozens of earlier conflicts, including the British World War I Levant Campaign fought 100 years ago.¹

In 1917, the teetering central government on the brink of collapse was that of the Ottoman Empire. Like today’s regime in Damascus, Istanbul’s government held on in large part due to military support from its powerful ally to the north, Germany. The Western Allies pressing on multiple fronts to defeat Germany and its allies in Central Europe then were seeking regime change on the southeastern

¹ The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
The Modernization of Intelligence in WWI

however, the United Kingdom, the leading Western nation in the region, had a huge force multiplier in the conflict: state of the art military intelligence. The British had honed their techniques for building spy networks, intercepting communications, conducting strategic reconnaissance, and performing deception operations during three years of conflict with the German-led Central Powers.

Although initially under-resourced and disorganized, by 1917 British intelligence, with access to the newest technologies, possessed true all-source intelligence capabilities enhanced by its Western partners and by Jewish and Arab spy networks. After three years of losses and stalemates, the British had finally managed to effectively integrate most of these intelligence capabilities at a little known yet pivotal battle of the Palestine Campaign, the Battle for Beersheba in October 1917. Military intelligence and deception proved to be keys to the Allies’ success during their third attempt that year to penetrate the Turk’s Gaza-to-Beersheba defensive line. (See below.)

The Strategic Setting

The strategic rationale for the Palestine Campaign and the timing for the third battle of Gaza were determined by developments outside of the Levant. Ironically, since the Crimean War (1854–56) the United Kingdom had been a major proponent of sustaining the Ottoman Empire, which was also known as the “Sick Man of Europe.” Similarly, in 1908, many secular “Young Turks” felt deep ideological ties to the West.
However, more conservative Turkish nationalists were skeptical, pointing to a string of Ottoman territorial losses to European nations in the Balkans and the Italian invasion of modern day Libya. Moreover, Istanbul was well aware of historical Russian avarice for Ottoman territory, especially the Turkish Straits through which Russia could gain access to the Mediterranean Sea. Those factors, recent German investments in Ottoman infrastructure networks, and German battlefield successes at the opening of World War I, drove the Turkish government to an alliance with the Kaiser and declaration of war against the Allies on 31 October 1914, two days after German ships bombarded Russian territory on the Black Sea coast.

Within days of Turkey’s engagement in the war, the British began a naval campaign to force opening of the well-defended Turkish Straits to Russian and Allied war ships and commerce. The campaign was also expected to lead to the capture of Istanbul and the withdrawal of Turkey from the war. Unable early in 1915 to penetrate the defenses of the Dardanelles, the western-most of the Turkish Straits, and lacking a substantial troop component, the naval campaign failed and led to a decision to attempt, beginning in late April, to take the Gallipoli Peninsula, which formed the northern shore of the Dardanelles.

Logistical support for the Gallipoli Campaign, which ended in costly failure eight months later, came from bases in Egypt, a former Ottoman client state which Britain had occupied in 1869. Following the evacuation of British forces from Gallipoli in January 1916, British attention shifted from the Turkish Straits to the Turkish southeastern flank, which we now refer to as the Middle East.

There, the British attention was turned to defending Mesopotamia and operating in the Levant. A Levant Campaign was necessary to secure continued access to the Suez Canal and defend the Sinai Peninsula, which the British had taken two years to take back from Turkish forces that had occupied it in January 1915. The canal was the lifeline to both British possessions in the Persian Gulf and to India, “the Jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire.

In addition, the March 1917 abdication of Russia’s Tsar Nicholas II and the chaotic situation in the country increased British concerns about a Russian declaration of peace, which would free up massive numbers of Turkish troops defending against Russia in the Caucasus. Britain feared these forces would be shifted to Mesopotamia to retake Baghdad, which they had only recently recaptured. Therefore, an offensive along the Levantine coast was seen as a means of diverting Turkish forces to Palestine and relieving pressure on Baghdad.

Most importantly, the war in Western Europe was not going well and civilian morale was flagging. Although two attempts in the spring of 1917 to move up from the Sinai Peninsula to take Gaza had failed, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George told his new commanding general in the region, Sir Edmund Allenby, that “he wanted Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation.” Allenby’s first step in achieving that prize would be to dis-mantle the Turk’s Gaza-to-Beersheba line of defense.

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Looking Back: British Intelligence Ramps Up

Before the outbreak of war, most of Britain’s intelligence capabilities and processes were modern in the terms of the day; however, knowledge of Turkey in government was almost non-existent. In 1929, Sir Winston Churchill wrote in The Aftermath, “I can recall no great sphere of policy about which the British government was less completely informed than the Turkish.” The reasons for such ignorance are unclear as the British had been working with Turkish officials for years, including, for example, a British admiral who had been reorganizing the Turkish Navy right up to the outbreak of the war.

Clearly, there were at least some senior officials in Britain with a deep understanding of the Turkish military. Fortunately for the British, they did actively pursue British civilians who could offer deep insights into the Arab world. Unfortunately, the government also set up a convoluted intelligence structure for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), which the Brits had established in March 1916 after the failure on Gallipoli. Originally formed of 14 divisions, the force served as a strategic reserve for the British, who transferred many of its divisions to the Western Front.

Brig. Gen. Sir Gilbert Clayton was the chief military spymaster in Cairo. With the formation of the EEF, he came to have three commanders: British High Commissioner Henry McMahon; Governor General of the Sudan Reginald Wingate; and the
The EEF’s Military Intelligence Department (MID) . . . contained only a half dozen officers . . . . Two were uniquely suited to the intelligence mission.

EEF’s commander (initially General Sir Archibald James Murray and then led, after June 1917, by Edmund Allenby, a veteran of numerous campaigns on the Western Front), Clayton’s organization actually had different titles under each of his three “masters.” This could have diminished his effectiveness, but the experienced Clayton—who had served in the region in civilian and military capacities almost continuously since joining the British Army in 1895—used this ambiguity to his advantage.

The EEF’s Military Intelligence Department (MID), which answered to the commander of the EEF in Cairo, was led by Clayton and contained only a half dozen officers, but they were highly competent. Two of them were concurrently serving as members of Parliament. Two others were uniquely suited to the intelligence mission. One, a newly commissioned officer in the army and soon to become legendary, T. E. Lawrence, was an archaeologist. He had been living and traveling in the region years before the war broke out and had learned Arabic. The other was an army veteran seasoned by campaigns in the UK’s African possessions in the previous century, Richard Meinertzhagen.

Early in the war, Lawrence held a dreary desk job in Cairo but he embarked on what in today’s parlance would be called an extremely career-enhancing rotational assignment, and gleefully accepted a transfer from Military Intelligence to the Arab Bureau, which reported to the Foreign Office. That unit would focus on political issues such as the potential for a revolt against Ottoman rule by the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. The bureau also frequently squabbled with the MID, notwithstanding Clayton’s leadership of both.

The initial point of debate between the Arab Bureau and MID concerned a central strategic question: Was deployment of a large Allied army needed to liberate Arabia and greater Syria from occupying Turkish forces? Arab Bureau members led by Captain Lawrence opposed use of such a force, arguing that it would be seen as another Western crusade and push potential Arab allies into neutrality or into the Turkish camp. To settle the question, Clayton decided to take advantage of Lawrence’s skills and sent him on a fact-finding mission into Arabia. That decision would eventually have major implications for the battle of Beersheba.

Meanwhile, the British strengthened and honed their military intelligence capabilities in the region as they expanded the size of the EEF and the MID. By August 1916, MID comprised more than 30 officers. By October 1917, the number had nearly doubled. Historian of British military intelligence Anthony Clayton described the MID’s duties as “air reconnaissance; air photography; tactical questioning of prisoners; with later adding agent handling and signals intelligence together with security duties.” He also wrote that it had responsibility for the “briefing of visitors, publicity, and propaganda.”

Adaptation to a Revolution in Intelligence Technologies

One hundred years ago, military intelligence was also in the midst of a technological revolution. Just as the circumstances in the Levant in 1917 bore similarities to today’s
situation, it is worth remembering that the profession of intelligence during World War I was undergoing a technological revolution as profound as ours is today. Today’s profession is being transformed by the advent of space, counterspace, cyber, and nanotechnologies; in 1917, intelligence was adapting to the introduction of transoceanic cables, radio intercepts, and aerial reconnaissance. All of the modern categories of intelligence, from a just-emerging measurements and signatures intelligence to imagery analysis and then to the most ancient techniques of human intelligence and open source intelligence, were present and influencing events on the battlefield.

The telephone and wireless radio greatly increased military command and control, as well as situational awareness, but introduced new signals intelligence vulnerabilities. Advances in mathematics resulted in prodigious leaps in both sides’ ability to encrypt and decrypt communications. Although initially at a disadvantage, British military intelligence had noticeably outclassed its German and Turkish rivals by the summer of 1917.

How did the combined capabilities of the Arab Bureau and the MID serve the British? Let us take a bit of literary license to use today’s terminology and examine each intelligence discipline, individually and when fused together.

**Human Intelligence (HUMINT)**

Multiple aspects of HUMINT supported the Levant Campaign. The British had very active spy networks in Egypt, using the Bedouin across the desert and Jewish settlers of Palestine along the coast. T. E. Lawrence fed invaluable HUMINT reports into this network. Lawrence confronted Auda with this intelligence and was able to retain his allegiance.

Of course, the Germans also were active in the spying game. Under the leadership of Kurt Prufer, they attempted to stir up a revolt in Egypt against British authority in Cairo. This in turn led to a robust British counterintelligence (CI) presence. CI, seen to resemble police work, was treated as a subset of HUMINT and was manned by civilian policemen, who quickly adapted their methods to suit CI’s requirements. The CI unit in MID uncovered and trapped numerous Turkish and German spies, most famously the Jewish doctor, Minna Weizmann. Moreover, 25 years before the WWII “Double-Cross System,” the British were already quite adept at using double agents. They fed intentionally corrupted, dated, or partially true intelligence to the Germans via unwitting Arabs who were being paid by both sides.

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a. See in this issue J. R. Seeger’s review essay of the recently republished collection T. E. Lawrence’s work, 27 Articles (page 51). In it he further details Lawrence’s and British thinking about intelligence gathering in the region.

b. Weizmann was a Russian-born, German-educated physician, who practiced medicine in Palestine and the Levant. She was caught on a mission to Italy, briefly imprisoned, and generously returned to Russia. She was the youngest sister of Chaim Weizmann—then a prominent Zionist in touch with senior British leaders about the future of Palestine. He would become Israel’s first president in 1948. Minna’s lenient treatment has led to speculation she was herself a double agent.
Military attachés and Turkish and German prisoners also were lucrative sources of intelligence. Allied military attachés were especially important for providing enemy order of battle (OOP) information—enemy’s military command structure and personnel, unit locations, and equipment. Before the October Revolution, Russian attachés were the most valuable sources of such information. Perhaps more surprising, substantial contributions were made by attachés of smaller countries such as Romania and Bulgaria.²

With respect to prisoners, there were plenty to debrief. For example, in August 2017, German troops attacked a rail line the British were building along the Mediterranean coast from the Suez Canal toward Gaza. The attack failed, with the Germans suffering 9,000 casualties, including the loss of 3,000 prisoners.¹²

**Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)**

Detailed maps have long been the backbone of military planning. Lawrence and Meinertzhagen were both adept at producing them because both had acquired geospatial skills in the course of years of living in the region. Meinertzhagen was said to be an especially good artist, and Lawrence would have been familiar with the Middle East from his archaeological research and writing. Just as today, mapmakers drew from many sources of information, including such unclassified sources as newspapers, oil company surveys, and academic treatises. Firsthand accounts from cavalry units, other scouts, debriefings of enemy prisoners, and captured maps also were especially valuable. Yet, the most lucrative geospatial intelligence eventually came from the air.

In addition to strafing and bombing, pilots of the nascent Royal Flying Corps (RFC) had a considerable reporting mandate. Intelligence was based on air crew observations and the interpretation of photography taken from their aircraft. Post-strike intelligence reporting contained descriptions of “routes flown to and
from the objective, as well as the location, intensity, and effectiveness of any enemy countermeasures encountered." Information concerning casualties, damage assessments, and the tonnage of bombs dropped was sent through channels specifically intended for such reports a,13

In the Middle East, aerial reconnaissance benefited from multiple factors not present on the Western Front. The weather was extremely dry and cloud free and there were fewer natural and man-made barriers to effective observation. Germany maintained a qualitative aerial superiority from 1914 to 1917, but the RFC’s quantitative advantage enabled effective aerial reconnaissance. Because this method of intelligence collection was in its infancy, German and Turkish military leaders probably underestimated its efficacy.

When Allenby assumed command of the EEF in June, he demonstrated an insatiable thirst for intelligence. The arrival of five additional aircraft squadrons, which included reconnaissance aircraft and Bristol fighter planes, would help quench that thirst. Moreover, with their arrival in mid-1917, British combat air power became superior to its German rivals.

At about the same time, major advances were made in British geospatial capabilities. New cameras improved imagery resolution, and the British were able to continuously image linear features of interest such as railroads and defensive fortifications.14 The experience level of photo interpreters also improved markedly.

Nonetheless, critical gaps in aerial coverage remained, and all commanders wanted the best tactical reconnaissance possible just before any operation. Detailed knowledge of Ottoman defenses still required major ground reconnaissance efforts. Army cavalry scouts frequently brought back handheld photos of enemy strong points.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Cryptology

The Germans were initially more technically proficient in SIGINT and clearly had communication security (COMSEC) superior to that of the British. . .

The Germans were initially more technically proficient in SIGINT and clearly had communication security (COMSEC) superior to that of the British in the Middle East, but that changed as the war progressed. In 1915, a British radio intercept station was established near the Great Pyramid outside of Cairo. British spy ships started collecting SIGINT while patrolling the Levantine coast and reconnaissance aircraft plucked it from the sky. A prized British possession was a high-tech device called a Wireless Compass. Modified for military use by the famed scientist Guglielmo Marconi, the compass enabled intelligence officers to locate the source of enemy radio transmissions. It was particularly useful in identifying Ottoman military headquarters.15

SIGINT was a star at the operational level, providing the British what proved to be extremely accurate information on the arrival of Turkish reinforcements into the theater. As Anthony Clayton noted in his history, “Intercepts of signals proved especially useful in the third battle of Gaza, when Allenby deduced the German plan for strengthening the coastal flank would entail weakening the centre.”16

Superb tactical SIGINT should have given Allenby a nearly decisive advantage, but that was not to be the case. Because of security concerns and procedural and logistical constraints, British frontline commanders rarely received decrypted and translated intercepts in time to influence an ongoing battle. Meaningful tactical SIGINT became even rarer as the Turks relied on “runners” and landline communications, vice radio, to transmit orders.

Perhaps surprisingly, this campaign did contain an early version of communications intelligence (COMINT). Both sides tapped into newly erected telephone lines and listened to unsecured conversations. The encryption used to counter this threat mainly consisted of time-honored letter substitution codes, but the addition of a second layer of mathematical encryption guaranteed much higher security.17 The resulting improvement in COMSEC led to a requirement for increasingly sophisticated code breakers.b

b. Originally the most heavily encrypted material had to be shipped to London in a process that resembles today’s National Media Exploitation Center in Washington, DC, handles foreign language OSINT. The 2–4 weeks required to process intercepts in London was deemed inadequate, so code breakers were forward deployed to Cairo. As the Battle for Beersheba approached, code breakers were

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a. For a history of aerial reconnaissance on the Western Front, see Terrence J. Finnegern, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War I (National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006)
**Deception Operations**

Given Prime Minister George’s insistence that Jerusalem be taken by Christmas, Allenby had less than six months to overcome two failed efforts by his predecessor to breach the Gaza-Beersheba line and open the way to Jerusalem. The third major British offensive against these fortifications could not be totally hidden, but could its specific objectives be disguised? Could the German-led Turkish forces defending the line be made to believe an attack was intended at one place and not the other, true, target?

The answer was that it was worth trying, and thus entered into the annals of military history one of the greatest exemplars of a deception operation ever conducted. Known as the “Haversack Ruse,” the operation involved—just before the October 1917 offensive was to begin—the intentional loss in enemy territory by a British staff officer of an apparent dispatch case containing the British attack plan. (See box at right.) Through this ruse, Allenby hoped to fool the commanders facing him regarding both the timing and direction of the attack, with the goal of convincing the enemy that the British would conduct a third direct assault on Gaza while moving a force to Beersheba to act as a feint. The Haversack Ruse: Who Deceived Whom?

MID intelligence officer Richard Meinertzhagen laid claim to both the idea and its execution—a claim that has been credibly disputed. As Meinertzhagen has told the story, pretending to be on a courier mission, he intentionally rode close to the frontlines near Gaza and been taken under fire by an enemy cavalry patrol. He slumped forward in his saddle, feigning injury, and let the haversack (previously coated in blood) drop to the ground, reckoning it would be recovered by the cavalrymen. Among common items that any soldier might possess, the haversack contained official papers and rough notes on a cipher which would enable the enemy to decode any encrypted messages Britain might send later. Once the haversack was successfully “lost”, British headquarters immediately began broadcasting encrypted messages in that code, that ordered urgent efforts to recover it. The sack and its contents soon were in the possession of the German commander of the Turkish force. The papers indicated that the British would yet again directly attack Gaza while moving a force to Beersheba to act as a feint. The papers also also indicated that a French force would attempt a simultaneous amphibious landing well north of Gaza on the Syrian coast.

Most historians accept that the Turks and Germans both fell for the deception, thus enabling the Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) light horse brigade to capture the strategic water wells at Beersheba and begin to roll up the Gaza-Beersheba line from the east and move on to Jerusalem in December. As noted above, Brian Garfield put forth a compelling argument in his book, *The Meinertzhagen Mystery*, that although the deception took place, almost every claim Meinertzhagen made for himself was false. According to Garfield, Meinertzhagen was neither the author of the plan nor the British rider who dropped the haversack. Moreover, the enemy clearly dismissed several elements of a larger allied deception plan. Perhaps some elements of this plan helped the British at Beersheba, but the biggest deception may have been Meinertzhagen’s elaborate postwar scheme to use the incident to enhance his reputation.¹⁸

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¹⁸ Decrypting an average of 16 German or Turkish telegrams each day. (Sheffy, 227.)

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Image © LookandLearn.com
All-Source Analysis

All-source analysis is simply making use of all sources available to an intelligence analyst. Therefore, it has been a staple of intelligence since the time of the ancient Assyrians, Chinese, and Egyptians. The key variables have been the analyst’s intellectual capabilities, as well as the relevance, timeliness, and reliability of available sources. During the Le- vant Campaign, the Allies developed excellent all-source analysis, but it was a bifurcated effort, divided between the Arab Bureau and the MID. The Arab Bureau. The Arab Bureau focused on political and economic intelligence. Its flagship product was the Arab Bulletin, which was distributed to fewer than 40 people. Basically, it was a regional version of today’s Presidential Daily Brief. Many of the Arab Bureau’s insights are still worth consideration today, among them, for example, that any Western military troops in the Hijaz would eventually be seen as “crusaders” and become the enemy. Moreover, Lawrence judged and wrote that Turkish railroad locomotives were critical nodes for targeting. Railroad tracks could easily be replaced; locomotives could not.

Yet, the bureau’s analysis was not always correct. Lawrence told Allenby that a successful attack on Beersheba would have to take place by mid-September before his Bedouin fighters had to move their flocks to better pastures in the east. Although this timeline was not met (the battle actually took place at the end of October—see timeline in box below), Allenby managed to take Beersheba.
fairly easily. Even the world’s best intelligence analysts make some bad calls.

**MID Analysis.** Rather than politics and economics, the parallel all-source effort of the EEF’s MID focused on order of battle analysis and targeting. A number of bad analytic judgements were made during the first and second battles for Gaza, when MID assessments were largely dependent on debriefings of ignorant or intentionally deceptive prisoners of war. EEF tradecraft improved markedly as SIGINT and GEOINT became increasingly available to enable true all-source analysis. By the third battle, the enemy force deployed on the Gaza to Beersheba front was accurately estimated to consist of one cavalry and six infantry divisions, totaling 46,000 rifles, 2,800 sabers, 250 machine guns and 200 guns.

EEF officers also developed skills and instincts possessed by the best modern military infrastructure analysts. This included Clausewitzian “center of gravity” analysis. They realized the first two attacks on Gaza had been failures in part because of the lack of sufficient water. An 88,000-man desert operation required massive amounts of water, especially for the Desert Mounted Corps, which contained both light horses and camels. The legendary wells at Beersheba could provide just such sustenance for the army’s march north to Jerusalem. Beersheba also had other militarily significant infrastructure attractions, such as an airfield, railroad, and paved roads.

In addition to identifying critical infrastructure to protect or obtain, the EEF also targeted command posts, telegraph lines, bridges, ports such as Aqaba, and railroads. Captain Lawrence’s Bedouin became quite adept at disrupting the latter.

**Allied Intelligence Collaboration**

During the campaign, the Allies developed what we might today call intelligence sharing among the “Three Eyes” partners. The British served as the clear senior partners, working closely with the French and incorporating an infantile US effort into the arrangement. Like today, the Allies also had secondary and tertiary levels of foreign intelligence exchanges. Useful tidbits were traded, but the quality and sensitivity of the data varied based on the level of trust. For example, the British periodically exchanged information with the Russians on Turkish military movements—at least they did so until the Russian Revolution in 1917. As we will see, the United Kingdom also maintained similar exchanges during the Gaza Campaign, including an intelligence relationship with several local irregular forces. Although these sources would prove immensely valuable on several occasions, their reliability and responsiveness were always in question.

What, then, did each major nation or ethnic group bring to the military intelligence table?
“Playing the Long Game”—France

Clearly it was in France’s best interest to divert German attention away from Western Europe and to knock the kaiser’s weakest ally out of the war. France invested a small military presence of approximately 200 men in Cairo. Its leader, Col. Edouard Bremond, was not an intelligence officer, but he possessed years of experience dealing with Arabs, having had previous assignments in Morocco and Algeria. He has been described as a fluent Arabist, but his version of Maghreb Arabic may have been incomprehensible to the average Egyptian or Palestinian. Overall, French intelligence contributions to the British war effort were minor. In sharp contrast, it had excellent access to British intelligence and campaign plans.

The French were keenly interested in the work of T. E. Lawrence. Bremond’s instructions from Paris appeared to require him to support the Arab revolt while simultaneously making sure that it was not too successful. Bremond and his political counterpart in Cairo, Marc Picot, were pleased that Lawrence’s Arab forces were harassing and tying up the Turks, but they feared too much success in the Hijaz would encourage the Arabs to turn their liberating gaze northward to Lebanon and Syria.a

By early 1916, Bremond’s correspondence with Paris was describing Lawrence as a threat to France’s own colonial Middle East ambitions, which were codified in a secret British promise (Sykes-Picot Agreement) granting the French dominion over most of the Levant. The French generally supported British military operations in Palestine, as they did during the third Gaza Campaign, but they always remained bore-sighted on their ultimate territorial objectives further north.20

“Mainly Just Watching”
—The United States

Modern military intelligence exchanges are almost never equitable affairs. Junior partners tend mainly to be on the receiving end. . . .

which were codified in a secret British promise (Sykes-Picot Agreement) granting the French dominion over most of the Levant. The French generally supported British military operations in Palestine, as they did during the third Gaza Campaign, but they always remained bore-sighted on their ultimate territorial objectives further north.20

William Yale had come to the State Department’s attention because of his extensive travels in Palestine, where he had been able to pinpoint the German military installations around Jerusalem. Yet, by his own assessment, Yale was less than ideally suited for the job, saying “I lacked a historic knowledge of the problem I was studying. I had no philosophy of history, no method of interpretation, and very little understanding of the fundamental nature and function of the [regional] economic and social system.”22 In short, he was a less than ideal intelligence officer.

When Yale traveled to Alexandria, Egypt, to meet General Allenby, he had so little military experience that he actually practiced saluting while standing outside Allenby’s door. At first Allenby ignored Yale, but then turned to him and yelled, “What are you going to do at my Headquarters!” Yale stammered that his job was to send reports back to Washington. Allenby, clearly not pleased, told Yale that he did not care if Washington sent a butcher to his HQ, but he would have to at least act like a military officer. That was a rough way for any intelligence officer to meet the commanding general.23

Like Lawrence, Yale spoke Arabic fluently; had a vast network of Arab, Turkish, and Jewish associates; and frequently traveled in Arab garb throughout the Levant. Unlike Lawrence’s academic missions to the region, Yale’s pre-war assignment to the Middle East was on behalf of the commercial interests of the Standard Oil Company of New York (SOCO-

Modern military intelligence exchanges are almost never equitable affairs. Junior partners tend mainly to be on the receiving end. . . .

a. Ironically, Bremond also recommended Lawrence for the Croix de Guerre, which Lawrence refused to wear largely because of the Arab delegation’s treatment at the Versailles Conference. (Korda, 458.)
With the world’s attention fixed on the trenches of Western Europe, military operations in the Levant, with much justification, had been described as a sideshow.

NY). Also unlike Lawrence, Yale was slow to master the tradecraft of the intelligence game. The Jewish spy Aaron Aaronsohn once gave Yale a letter detailing British and Zionist negotiations concerning the future of Palestine. Yale, seeming not to recognize its importance, took more than three months to have it translated from Hebrew to English.  

Yale had supervised the construction of the highway from Jerusalem to Beersheba before the war and should have possessed considerable local expertise. However, it is not clear that British planning benefited in any way from this knowledge. In sharp contrast, the Americans, like the French, had excellent access to Britain’s considerable intelligence trove. Yale was one of only 33 people (30 high British officials and three allies) to get access to the British Arab Bulletin.

Yale promised not to quote the bulletin in his reports back to Washington, but he admitted in his memoir that he lied. It is less clear how much information about Middle East oil deposits he later shared with his employer, SOCONY. Like the French, Yale and SOCONY seemed more interested in what would happen to oil concessions after the war than in supporting the British, Jewish, and Arab efforts against the Turks.

“A Sideshow to a Sideshow”—The Arabs

With the world’s attention fixed on the trenches of Western Europe, military operations in the Levant, with much justification, had been described as a sideshow. Therefore, given the far greater scale of Allenby’s military operations along the Mediterranean coast, the inland Arab revolt against the Turks was, in T. E. Lawrence’s own words, “a sideshow to a sideshow.” The undisciplined Bedouin fighters did play an important role in the Gaza Campaign, but, one of the great dangers of relying on Arab allies was their fickleness. Although he was not the most objective observer, Aaron Aaronsohn might have been close to the truth when he observed that he was “still waiting for the first Arab who could not be bribed by the Turks.”

T. E. Lawrence enabled the British to tap into Arab tribal networks, with all their strengths and weaknesses. Numerous members of the Arab camp had intimate knowledge of the Turks. Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif Emir of Mecca, himself lived in Constantinople for 18 years as a hostage of the Turks. Moreover, his sons, including the revolt’s eventual Arab leader, Feisal, had been educated in Constantinople, thus giving them insight into the Turkish mentality. Indeed, as Lawrence noted in his memoir, Feisal embodied the traits of Arab leaders with whom Lawrence worked:

We on the Arab front were very intimate with the enemy. Our Arab officers had been Turkish officers, and knew every leader on the other side personally. They had suffered the same training, thought the same, and had the same point of view. By practicing modes of approach on the Arabs we could explore the Turks, understand them, and almost get inside their minds.

The Bedouin’s most famous raid took place across a seemingly unsurvivable desert, when they attacked the lightly defended rear approaches to Aqaba with horse- and camel-bound Arab warriors. Aqaba highlights Lawrence’s focus on identifying the enemy’s centers of gravity because it was the only significant non-Mediterranean port within 200 miles of Jerusalem. Its capture provided logistical benefits for the British, but it also gave the Arabs a secure base from which to threaten the critical Hijaz railroad station at Maan and support the Third Gaza Campaign.

In addition to ports, Lawrence also targeted telegraph lines and life-giving desert water wells. The well at Mudowwara was the major source of drinking water between Maan and Medina. Although the well was too strongly defended to be threatened by a small Arab and British raiding party, Lawrence almost instinctively sought out and destroyed an even more lucrative target—he had blown up...
Germany’s wartime alliance with the Ottoman Empire was principally based on a desire to draw Russian resources away from Germany’s eastern front.

The Opposition

“Herr Prufer’s Networks”—Germany

Germany’s wartime alliance with the Ottoman Empire was principally based on a desire to draw Russian resources away from Germany’s eastern front. The relationship had been built over the course of decades as German engineers contributed to the development of railroads in southeastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East. Of course, the Germans also would benefit from any difficulties the British experienced in their holdings in India, Mesopotamia, greater Syria, and Egypt.

The German Intelligence Bureau for the East (Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient) was created in the runup to the war with the aim of creating disruptions in the British Empire. Like their British opponents, the Germans understood the value academic experts brought to the intelligence game. Kurt Prufer, another archaeologist, grew up during Germany’s “Golden Age of Egyptology.”

Berlin considered Prufer to be a master spy, but what did he actually accomplish? A gifted Arabic linguist, his many contacts throughout the former Ottoman Empire allowed him to correctly assess the flaws in German wartime propaganda. Previously, the Germans had focused on British atrocities against Muslims in India and the righteousness of the German cause.

Prufer realized the need to highlight issues of more local concern and to more subtly inject German messaging. He created seven Turkish-language newspapers and set up propaganda rooms in major cities in which the locals could view this material. His goal was to incite jihad (holy war) against the British. The Germans naively conducted negotiations with Britain’s ally, the Sharif of Mecca, encouraging him to attack the British. Prufer evidently did not realize the Sharif was using their meetings in Damascus and Constantinople to cover clandestine sessions with Arab officers in the Turkish Army who might be sympathetic to the Arab Revolt.

Prufer’s track record as a spy master was not good. His network of Egyptian spies was fairly easily rolled up during the Turks’ first failed attempt to capture the Suez Canal. He then resorted to a Jewish spy network with dismal results. Prufer seemed blind to the possibility the Jews might also be working against him. His main Circassian spy in Damascus had also be working against him. His main Circassian spy in Damascus had incorrectly dismissed the possibility of an uprising in Palestine based on a belief in the stereotypical Jewish coward.

Finally, Prufer befriended and funded an Egyptian ex-Khedive (the Viceroy of Egypt during Turkish rule), Abbas Hilmi. Prufer believed Hilmi would be a powerful asset once Germany won the war, but German intelligence had grossly overestimated the Khedive’s influence in Egypt, which was almost zero. Based on the available evidence, it appears absurd that the commander of German forces...
The biggest gap in our understanding of military intelligence capabilities during the Palestine Campaign concerns Turkish intelligence.

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in Palestine told Berlin, “Kurt Prufer is indispensable as the leader of the intelligence service.” If true, Prufer’s intelligence triumphs have yet to be uncovered.32

German Technical Intelligence

At least initially, the Germans performed much better on technical intelligence issues. Before 1917, Germany had undisputed superiority in Levant aviation firepower and reconnaissance. Germans, and therefore the Turks, detected and readied themselves for both the first and second attacks on Gaza.33

Theoretically, before and during the Battle for Beersheba, German intelligence could have conducted both aerial reconnaissance and direct aerial bombardments of the British—a German combat air squadron was based at Beersheba. Had it been deployed to follow up on the Haversack Ruse, it might have spoiled the British deception plan, which was totally reliant on secrecy. In practice, the squadron did little of either. Prufer correctly assessed that by the fall of 1917 the British had finally achieved air superiority, if not dominance. The RFC’s recently arrived advanced fighter planes made German reconnaissance missions almost suicidal.

German Counterintelligence

Concerning counterintelligence, the postwar Germans were painfully aware English literature widely reported they had been deceived by the Haversack Ruse. However, General Kressenstein, commander of German forces in Palestine, claimed his intelligence officers had seen through the ruse. It is true Kressenstein did not shift his reserves towards Gaza, but he did not reinforce the defenses of Beersheba. Therefore, despite Kressenstein’s adamant claims of not being fooled by the ruse, perhaps the satchel created just enough doubt in his mind to keep the defenses at Beersheba relatively weak.

The Eyes and Ears of the Sick Man’s Son—The Turks

The biggest gap in our understanding of military intelligence capabilities during the Palestine Campaign concerns Turkish intelligence. Very little has been written in English on this subject. Few of the relevant Turkish documents have ever been translated into English. The topic is covered in a book entitled Yildirim, published in 1920. Written by a former member of the Turkish General Staff, it covers the involvement of the Turkish Yildirim (Thunderbolt) Army Group in their Levant Campaign, which was also called Yildirim. The unit’s headquarters was in Aleppo. The book proved to be a useful source for Yigal Shelly’s history of British intelligence in the Palestine Campaign.a

The scant existing evidence does indicate Turkish military intelligence was fooled by British deception at Beersheba. The Turks were almost totally dependent on German technical intelligence which, as discussed, had largely dried up. A surviving Turkish military intelligence order proves that less than 48 hours before the battle, the Turks still estimated that six British divisions were facing them at Gaza and that Beersheba was only threatened by one infantry division and one mounted division.

At present I am of the opinion that the enemy will make Gaza his main objective since the topography of the ground renders this part of our front the weakest part of our line.34

Based on this judgment, Turkish fortification activity in the Beersheba area actually decreased. Some forces were moved closer to Gaza and others were transferred to the reserves in the rear.

In contrast to its analytical capabilities, deception and counterintelligence (CI) were Turkish strengths and an Ottoman tradition. They were particularly good at camouflaging military locations such as artillery batteries, although that edge degraded as the allies increasingly relied on aerial imagery over the visual observations of pilots. By 1915, the Ottomans had already put a clamp on outgoing communications. The orders to Ottoman commanders explicitly stated:

Henceforth there is a total ban on relaying news from Palestine Egypt, both by land and by sea. Without your consent, no one is to set out for the coast, and no one is to cross the border or put to sea.35

a. Yildirim has been roughly translated into English but never published. In the preface, the author, Husayn Husnu Emir, said he was inspired to write the book because he previously could only learn about Turkish military history by reading the works of foreigners. Perhaps not too surprising in 1920, but today that remains the case.
The Turks caught and often executed Western agents inserted from the sea. This put a definite chill on British recruiting efforts. Moreover, clandestine Turkish reconnaissance forces on Cyprus were able to determine that the seaborne invasion force rumored to be supporting the third battle of Gaza was fictitious.

Finally, the Turks had a knack for intercepting the courier pigeons of Jewish agents, which had devastating consequences for the Semitic spy ring. However, their brutal handling of the ring members increased the Zionist sympathies of the heretofore largely apathetic Jewish community.

The Turks: Were They Spies? Yes—but for Whom?

The Jewish contribution to military intelligence was mainly old fashioned espionage—but for whom did they spy? The aforementioned Dr. Minna Weizmann, like many other emigre Jews, saw the Turkish-German alliance as a way to strike back against their former Czarist persecutors. As a female physician in the Middle East, she was a rarity for the time and place. Her notoriety and her family connections in London would have given her access to wounded British soldiers and the upper levels of Cairo society. What she accomplished is hard to discern, and as noted earlier, there is cause to believe she was actually spying for the British and working as a double agent against Prüfer.

On the British side, Aaron Aaronsohn and his sister Sarah ran a spy network based near Athlit (100 miles north of Gaza). Among other accomplishments, they were reportedly successful in surreptitiously contacting Jewish doctors and convincing them to defect from the Turkish Army. Their organization was called NILI (“Nitzach Israel lo Ishakari,” meaning “The Eternity of Israel shall not lie”). A clever deception by this Jewish spy network paid lasting benefits. During the second battle of Gaza, the Turkish Pasha decided to evacuate all civilians from the nearby coastal town of Jaffa. Being politically astute, Aaronsohn was mindful of the recent world press condemnation of Turkish atrocities against the Armenians.

Although no atrocities actually occurred at Jaffa, Aaronsohn used the evacuation to begin a media campaign concerning the “Pogrom of Jaffa.” Aaronsohn tricked the Western press into printing stories that the Syrian governor wanted to totally wipe the Jews out of Palestine. Although these accusations were quickly debunked by commissioners from neutral nations such as Sweden, the incident’s international condemnation continued to complicate Turkish leaders’ calculations.

The British military intelligence was initially heavily flawed, but it improved over time and eventually gave the Allies a decisive edge.

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With regard to human intelligence, military attachés, deserter debriefings, ground reconnaissance, and counterintelligence all appeared to be much more profitable than traditional spying. Bedouins occasionally produced excellent intelligence, but they were too easily bought and turned. Some Jewish spies were incredibly brave but did not seem to know much. True, Aaron Aaronsohn provided a wealth of knowledge on Palestinian leaders, water resources, and road networks, but most of that knowledge was acquired before he was employed by the British. Germany had even less success than the Allies at clandestine operations. Both sides in this confrontation made the mistake of thinking the quantity of their spies was more important than the quality and tradecraft of their agents.

Technical intelligence collection, both geospatial and SIGINT, had far more impact on the battlefield. The intelligence pivot point of the cam-
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...campaign appears to have been the British acquisition of air superiority over the Germans in the summer of 1917. In the months before Beersheba, the Allies extended the scope and quality of their air reconnaissance, while effectively denying Turko-German surveillance of Allied operations. Yet, any commander’s view can become muddied, or even grossly distorted, by inaccurate assessments. This vulnerability is magnified when any one intelligence discipline is overly relied upon. For example, crack British cryptographers decoded a Turkish order to withdraw 10,000 troops from Medina. Unfortunately, they were not able to decrypt the garrison’s subsequent message, in which they refused to leave.\(^\text{40}\)

Regarding all-source analysis, the Arab Bureau’s reporting was sometimes brilliant and prescient. Yet, the bureau had a fundamental flaw. It had no qualms about tailoring its reporting to support its own, as opposed to London’s, policy objectives. Similarly, Lawrence disclosed in his book *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* that he also frequently lied in his reporting. For example, he once assured London that the Bedouin Chieftain Auda abu Tayi was still totally loyal when he knew this to be false. The lie resulted partly from ego and a conviction that as the “man on the scene,” Lawrence and bureau members believed they always had the most accurate view of events.

Similar failures occurred in Tehran in 1979 and this problem persists. Modern field operatives are sometimes encouraged to believe in their own sagacity. Although their insights can be extremely valuable, operatives can be deceived, accidentally misinformed, or simply unaware of events (such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement) beyond their personal network of informants. Therefore, there are benefits to integrating all sources of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence.

Finally, we’ve seen that deception operations may provide strategic advantages from meager investments of resources. Their highly touted use in the Battle for Beersheba is an historical fact, but their impact and authorship are still disputed. What cannot be disputed is that deception operations are extremely dependent on excellent intelligence and counterintelligence. We must remain cognizant that these activities can also stray into very murky territory. The Kirke Papers in the British Intelligence Corps Museum concluded that the British had no qualms about “false reports being given to the press or drafted into prepared political speeches.” Both are illegal in the United States today.
Endnotes

1. The three maps used in this article were drawn from the online atlases of the History Department of the United States Military Academy, “Campaign Atlas to the Great War,” https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/WWI.aspx.
8. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 315.
9. In 1917, Counterintelligence was called contre-espionage.
11. In 1914, the Romanian Army was 50% larger than its American counterpart; see “The Romanian Army and the First World War,” Spartacus Educational, August 2014; available online at http://spartacus-educational.com/FWWromaniaA.htm.
12. Field Marshal Lord Carver, The Turkish Front, 1914–1918 (Sidgwick and Jackson, 2003), 190.
14. Sheffy, British Military Intelligence, 95, 275–82.
15. Ibid., 283.
19. Carver, The Turkish Front, 207.
22. Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 357; see also Janice Terry, William Yale (Rimal Publications, 2015).
23. Ibid., 354.
25. Ibid., 388.
27. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 377.
31. Ibid., 46.
32. Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 129.
35. Sheffy, 48
38. Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 299.
40. Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 278.
In March 1935, British and German officials scheduled a meeting of Adolf Hitler with several members of the British cabinet to discuss London’s continuing apprehension over German rearmament. Though Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had assured his government and the public that the arms restrictions imposed after World War I provided Britain an advantage in aerial capability over Germany, British concerns had exponentially grown as Hitler’s foreign policy became increasingly belligerent.

The meeting never took place. The release of a British Foreign Office white paper critical of German policies prompted Hitler to cancel, using the pretext that he had a cold. Shortly thereafter, the German government announced not only that military conscription in Germany had been reinstated, but that it had rebuilt a functioning and powerful air capability superior to the Royal Air Force. How could the Germans have built up an effective air force seemingly under the nose of the British Empire so quickly and so quietly?

The answer, apparent in hindsight, was that Germany had not. Germany’s airpower was neither as curtailed as chancellors of the Weimar Republic claimed in the 1920s nor as formidable as Hitler bragged in 1935. That both claims were plausible can be attributed to policies of deception pursued by successive German governments, beginning immediately after the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 and into the Nazi regime. Frequent public expression of British fears of growing German airpower had revealed to Berlin the vulnerability of its former enemies to such deception.²

Its effects were felt not only in intelligence analysis of German strength but also in the political debates and policy formation partially fed by that analysis. For example, as tensions between Germany and Britain increased with Hitler’s rise to power, the Germans repainted Ju-52 transports to appear as if they were newly built and had bomb bays, then flew them in massive aerial demonstrations.³ Joining the transports were impressive He-51 and Ar-65 fighters that exceeded the capabilities of British fighter technology. But unbeknown to British observers, these aircraft did not yet have suitable weapons.⁴

**Frequent public expression of British fears of growing German airpower had revealed to Berlin the vulnerability of its former enemies to deception.**

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² For a more in-depth discussion of frameworks to analyze long-term deception, as well as deception in German rearmament, see: Gordon, Brian J., Deception in Covert Nuclear Weapons Development: A Framework to Identify, Analyze, and Mitigate Future Long-Term Deception Efforts (RAND Corporation, 2016). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD370.html.

³ The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
Inflated estimates of German capabilities resulting from these deceptions may have made policymakers reluctant to contemplate the use of force to counter German actions. From the view of the historian, it appears British policymakers and analysts accepted low estimates of German air strength for years and then, seamlessly, accepted inflated estimates in just a matter of months.

As more recent events have shown, long-term deception of the type involved in masking and then exaggerating German military development continues to be common practice, having been seen in efforts to mask nuclear weapons programs, military research and development (R&D), and foreign policy initiatives by multiple governments over the years. This deception is often treated as a series of discrete events, matched to the deceiver’s policies and specific goals.

In his definitive research on the case of German rearmament, the late Barton Whaley, a foremost scholar on denial and deception, divided the period between the First and Second World Wars into three distinct phases, each with distinct German foreign policy goals and approaches to strategic deception. For the historian or researcher seeking to understand this period or the qualities of deception better, this is an entirely appropriate approach. But the intelligence analyst cannot afford to be so discriminating in evaluating evidence. A British analyst assessing German airpower in 1938 would have been unwise to look at information only as far back as Hitler’s installation as chancellor, because the actual story of German air force development stretches at least as far back as the Versailles Treaty. Though this type of deception may not always be a coherent or perfectly executed effort, its cumulative effect complicates analysis and can lure governments into incorrect or ineffectual action—or no action at all. Recognizing this long-term effort as a distinct type of deception builds upon the work of Whaley and other scholars and can help analysts identify, understand, and mitigate deception in long-term efforts.

Reexamining German Rearmament (1919–39)

The three periods of German rearmament Whaley proposed remain useful, however. But rather than survey broad policies and R&D initiatives in each as Whaley does, this article presents a very brief summary of one particular R&D thread, airpower development, to show how deception can evolve and continue independent of changes in government and foreign policy.

Intent on preventing the German aggression they held to have caused World War I, the Allies in 1919 imposed stringent restrictions on Germany’s military capabilities as part of the Versailles Treaty. Most were general in nature, including those limiting conscription and the manufacture of rifles and artillery. But the Allies were particularly concerned about German aviation, as evidenced by the prohibition of any possession of Fokker D.VIIs. These biplane fighters were the only category of equipment specifically mentioned in the Versailles restrictions, a testament to Allied fear of German airpower.

Arms Control Evasion (1919–26)

The new post-war government in Berlin was initially assisted in its airpower deception by private interests. Anthony Fokker, the Dutch manufacturer of several successful German WWI aircraft, including the D.VII, was among the first to aggressively circumvent Versailles restrictions. He and his company hid aircraft in barns and buildings throughout the German countryside, covertly put airframes on trains under tarps and rigging that hid the outlines of the aircraft, and created diversions as the trains crossed the German-Dutch border into Holland, all to save 120 D.VIIs, 400 engines, and an estimated $8 million of material. They also left a handful of airframes in Germany for Allied arms inspectors to find, to avoid the suspicion that anything had been removed. Fokker’s motivation may have been largely personal in ensuring he could continue his business, but after his departure for the United States in 1923, the German government continued to benefit in air R&D from both planes and design information that should have been destroyed under Versailles.

Those inspectors were from the Inter-Allied Control Commission (IACC), a group of military officers headquartered in Berlin, whom the Allies had designated to ensure German compliance with the treaty restrictions. The inspectors were not idle, conducting more than 800 inspections over a six week period alone between September and...
October 1924. Their efforts and frustrations would be familiar to any who followed arms control inspections in Iraq almost 70 years later. IACC inspectors spent a significant amount of time inspecting facilities that had been warned in advance of their arrival as well as chasing down meaningless rumors, such as that baby carriages were being manufactured that could be reassembled into machineguns.

The Army Peace Commission, a liaison group within the German Defense Ministry, was responsible for much of the work of undermining the IACC’s efforts. German officials and the commission’s commander, Gen. August von Cramon, had been shocked that the Allies had permitted the formation of such a liaison group, assuming the IACC would just travel and inspect whatever it wished and without warning. The Germans used the peace commission to obstruct and thwart the IACC’s efforts at every opportunity. Arguably, however, the real story the Allies were interested in was not in Germany at all, but in an unexpected place the IACC could not reach, the newly established USSR.

In 1922, Germany and the Soviet Union concluded secret military agreements. One agreement established an aircraft testing and training center in Lipetsk, Russia, where German pilots and plane designs would be developed away from the prying eyes of the IACC. The deceptive measures necessary to protect this effort were complex. German officers sent to train there were “discharged” for the duration of their training. A customs office was established at Lipetsk to clear parts and schedule shipments away from normal points of entry in Germany that might be under observation, and aircraft were flown to Lipetsk disguised as “mail planes.”

These efforts complemented bureaucratic actions within the Defense Ministry in Berlin that were not detected by the IACC. The aviation staff was designated the “Army Command Inspectorate of Weapons Schools” and immediately absorbed 120 former army and navy pilots into the newly established state-owned airline, Lufthansa, or into several “advertising squadrons.” It did so through false job descriptions and secret training pipelines.

After initial training at a newly established (1922) Commercial Flying School, the new pilots were brought to Lipetsk for specialized military training. The entire enterprise was financed through the state budget. Each year the chancellor’s office and Defense Ministry would submit budget requests with inflated estimates for items such as parts and labor. When legislators approved this budget, the excess funds were then diverted to secret programs such as air training and the Lipetsk facility. This effort, simple in description, must have involved significant work and coordination among the various offices and individuals responsible for budget formulation in the Weimar Republic.

Not all efforts to develop the German air force were so clandestine, and in fact some were taken with the concurrence of the Allies themselves. The Commercial Flying School was established publicly and eventually did feed into Lufthansa. German arguments that they should not be denied the benefits of aircraft for mail delivery, advertising, and sports led to a relaxation on restrictions of limited-performance aircraft. Perhaps even more significant, the Paris Air
Agreement of 1926 granted Germany the ability to build high-performance aircraft to compete in air shows and set speed records. These aircraft designs would be the foundation for aircraft tested at Lipetsk and other facilities throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

This period of German rearment came to a close on 31 January 1927, when the Allies officially withdrew the IACC. Any observation of German military development would now rest solely with military attachés, generally controlled and monitored in their travels around the country. The commission’s final report stated that Germany had never had any intention of disarming and had done everything in its power to circumvent the work of the commission. But with no “smoking gun” proving German deceit, the report apparently fell on deaf ears in London and Paris.

Rearmament (1927–35)

Though the commission was no longer a barrier to rearment, the German government continued to take steps to ensure its covert buildup would remain undetected. In 1932, the Defense Ministry classified its officer lists for the first time. Two secrets would have been revealed had the Allies been able to review these lists. The first was that the total number of officers in the army and navy exceeded the number permitted under the Versailles restrictions. The second was that through the secret training programs in Lipetsk, fed by the commercial training pipeline, the Germans had managed to train a sufficient number of pilots to man their rapidly expanding air force.

That air force would be built in factories and based at airfields almost completely unknown to the Allies. British and French officials had a good understanding of the location of German air facilities built during the war, and what little construction occurred immediately following was likely caught by the IACC as it toured the country. But following the disestablishment of the commission, the Germans were able to rapidly construct airfields and other facilities in parts of the country less frequently traveled and hence unlikely to be toured by military attachés. A budget of 10 million reichsmarks earmarked for the aviation office through what was known as the “blue” budget financed the construction. These funds were diverted from the Defense Ministry’s public budget in secret and administered by a special branch of the Reich Audit Office that dealt with these covert programs.

The rise of the Nazi Party brought about more aggressive deception to match this increase in activity. Two events are notable. The first is an announcement in 1933 that foreign bombers had flown over Berlin and dropped leaflets. Though no evidence was provided, the German Foreign Ministry insinuated that the bombers were Soviet. In fact, this incident was completely manufactured—no flyover had occurred. But Hitler used it to claim that aggressive and technologically superior adversaries...
surrounded Germany and that the country was completely, and unreas-
sonably, defenseless against them.\textsuperscript{18}

The second event, far less dramatic, was the quiet formation of the Central Bureau for German Rearmament in 1934. This group was formed to co-
ordinate what were by then numerous complex efforts throughout the De-
fense Ministry to increase Germany’s military capabilities in violation of Versailles restrictions.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Rearmament and Bluff (1935–39)}

Hitler’s 1935 announcement of the existence of the Luftwaffe is unlikely
to have caught the British and French completely by surprise, though they
were not certain of the strength of German airpower. The confusion
experienced in London and Paris was also felt in the Air Ministry in Berlin,
which, judging by its later actions, appeared not to have been ready to go
public. To reinforce Hitler’s sudden claims of aerial superiority, creativity
would be required.

Luftwaffe officials began to conduct large exhibition flyovers to impress both the German population and foreign observers. As previously
noted, these demonstrations included large numbers of deceptively paint-
ed transport aircraft and fighters that were actually still inoperable as wartime aircraft. Other aircraft were shown more selectively. The Do-17
“Flying Pencil” bomber concerned the Allies because it had outpaced
several foreign-built fighters during air trials and shows and presumably
would outrun any British or French fighter. But the Germans had con-
structed the demonstration model by hand, and mass production of that
quality was impractical. The follow-on aircraft had smaller engines and considerably less speed.\textsuperscript{20}

Allied military officials had more to fear from the He-111. This aircraft
had entered commercial service with Lufthansa and accommodated 10 pas-
sengers with a compartment amid-
ships used as a smoking lounge. The
lounge’s true purpose was to provide space in future military construction
for a bomb bay; the military version went into mass production soon after
the Luftwaffe announcement.\textsuperscript{21}

The German government sup-
plemented this selective showing of new aircraft by targeting certain experts to deliver the message.

Among them was Charles Lindbergh, who was granted special permission
to tour German facilities and even fly German aircraft. Lindbergh was
convincing the Germans had not only designed superior aircraft but
that they could mass-produce them. He reported to Allied officials that
Germany was strong enough to make any British and French military action
against it foolhardy. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain carried this
assessment to the Munich Conference in 1938.\textsuperscript{22}

The Luftwaffe continued its buildup of highly trained and skilled
personnel during this period as well, through training more realistic than
that conducted at Lipetsk. Despite the Versailles Treaty’s continuing
prohibition against committing forces to combat in foreign lands, Germany
sent a significant number of “vol-
unteers” from its armed forces to take part in the Spanish Civil War, providing them false papers, Spanish currency with which to travel, and
Spanish uniforms. While the particip-
ation of Germans in the conflict
was well known, perhaps the Allies
underappreciated the effects. By Whaley’s estimation, 32 months of
combat in Spain provided Germany with more than 14,000 pilots with
combat experience, validation of aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf-
109, and practice with such tactics as saturation bombing.\textsuperscript{23}

All this required resources. As in other periods, the German gov-
ernment was compelled to go to extraordinary bureaucratic lengths
to disguise the funding of Luftwaffe development. The Nazi bureaucracy
was similar to that of the Weimar Republic and in the years leading up
to World War II maintained a policy
of making budget data public. The publicized portion was known as the “white” budget, and it should have provided clues to attentive military attachés about German military R&D and procurement. The white budget steadily rose throughout the 1930s to reach approximately 340 million reichsmarks in 1936. But also mirroring Weimar-era budgets, there was more to the story. A “black” budget, which more accurately reflected government spending, totaled over three billion reichsmarks in 1936. The same office within the chancellery compiled and issued these budgets, meaning that numerous individuals were knowledgeable of this deception and likely working overtime to produce the required documents.

By the time of the Munich Conference, the British and French governments found themselves in a seemingly unsolvable policy problem. Having underestimated Hitler’s aggressive intentions, they now overestimated the armed force with which he could pursue his policies and deter any efforts to counter him. Their estimates during this period were driven by ignorance of German development in the years following World War I, belief in demonstrations carefully managed by German officials, and Hitler’s confidence that he had a force that could back up his policy goals. All of which were supported by long-term deception, albeit by different governments and with different short-term goals.

**Analyzing Long-Term Deception**

A significant amount of literature and doctrine is focused on the practice and effects of tactical and operational denial and deception. Some authors—including Whaley, Michael Mihalka, and Abrham Shulsky, among others—specifically address strategic deception. Others, such as Robert Jervis and Michael Handel, have addressed the effects and policy implications of government manipulation of information. But these studies are primarily theoretical and case-study driven. They provide agencies and analysts few tangible methods by which to organize the massive amount of data likely to result from investigation of deception efforts that span multiple governments and perhaps decades.

Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz propose a simple but effective way of categorizing such data using two aspects of deception. First, deceivers must take two types of actions: revealing information or concealing it. Second, there are two types of information: factual and fictitious. These categorizations form the matrix devised by Bennett and Waltz in figure 1, below.

Bennett and Waltz’s matrix can be modified in one key area to better address long-term deception. As shown in figure 1, “Conceal Fiction” actions pertain to actions that protect the deception itself. But in cases such as long-term R&D programs, there is an element of coordination that we must consider part of this effort. Though coordination is also

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 1: The Deception Methods Matrix</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reveal Fact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Release true information that benefits the deceiver (e.g., the double bluff ruse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Display real equipment or facilities (e.g., to build a source’s credibility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceal Fact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secrecy (clearance programs, physical security, and INFOSEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Withholding information to create a false or misleading impression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Camouflage, concealment, signal reduction (e.g., stealth designs and materials, spread spectrum communications), disguises, dazzling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nonverbal deceit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reveal Fiction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disinformation, which includes lying or providing information known to be untrue or dazzling (e.g., providing large volumes of information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decoys, diversions (feints and demonstrations), duplicates, disguises, dummy positions, equipment, and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nonverbal deceit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceal Fiction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Suppress a lie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hide a sham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
important in other types of deception, longer term programs such as Germany’s rearmament involve significant funds, numbers of participants, and bureaucratic entities. Managing such programs, and the deception protecting them, requires an organization with expertise and clout. The establishment or existence of such an organization, and the coordinating actions required for the deception, may provide vital clues to identifying long-term deception.

Using the sample of data points on German airpower development already presented, a matrix specific to this case might look like figure 2, below.

Employing this framework, the categorization of data points will often be matters of analytical judgment, which will depend on examining the preponderance of evidence for the enterprise as a whole and asking how each data point fits into that story. For example, the Luftwaffe aerial demonstrations were clearly intentional government revelations of information. An analyst would then need to judge whether that information was factual, and thus represented a previously undetected significant capability, or whether the German government had the means and motive to be deceitful about the number of strategic bombers it could field.

In application, this matrix would of course be of significant size and would likely need to be broken up into lines of effort such as diplomatic actions, budget and finance, etc. But sorting data in this manner and moving the data points around as new judgments are made will give an analyst an increasingly coherent picture of potential long-term deception.

Special attention should be paid to any information in the “Conceal Fiction” category. In the example of Germany organizations, the Army Peace Commission and Central Bureau for German Rerarmament were established to manage an inspection regime and coordinate illicit activity across the government.

These types of organizations have been seen in other cases of long-term deception as well. In Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, Saddam Hussein established the Oversight Committee ostensibly to coordinate with UN weapons inspectors following the first Gulf War, but in reality it was designed to interfere with UN efforts. The Iraqis also established organizations such as the Special Security Organization and elements within the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization to manage the nuclear weapons development effort, mirroring Berlin’s establishment of the Central Bureau in 1934.

Such information on the internal workings of a deceiver’s bureaucracy may be among the most difficult data to collect, but analysts should be vigilant for any such information and drive collection efforts to determine whether such organizations exist and how they function.
Recommendations and Conclusion

The recognition of long-term deception as a unique type of deception is of little value without proposing practices to mitigate its effects. Numerous analytic techniques, such as backcasting a or identification of scenarios and indicators, hold promise to help analysts categorize evidence and assess the likelihood that long-term deception is taking place. The “Reveal/Conceal Fact/Fiction” framework presented in this article provides another tool for analysts to assess the possibility of deception. But in addition to identifying the likelihood of such deception, these frameworks must also inform practices to mitigate its effects.

The first is the essential practice of intelligence professionals speaking truth to power. A conclusion that a long-term R&D effort is being pursued and concealed will often be a problematic development for a policymaker. The final report of the IACC, stating that Germany had consistently tried to undermine the commission and did intend to rearm, is an example of this. The warning went unheeded and perhaps, though it is difficult to find evidence of this, the practice of arguing that Germany was continuing to violate the Versailles arms restrictions to senior British policymakers was abandoned in subsequent years.

In her work on self-deception, Roberta Wohlstetter points out that British estimates of operable German aircraft were consistently low throughout the 1930s. She offers one very plausible explanation: that placing the estimates higher would have necessitated some form of action on the part of the British government that officials did not want to take. Intelligence professionals have no role in the formation of policy, and strategic long-term deception will likely be very difficult to “prove,” but using analytic techniques effectively will strengthen one’s case that such an effort is taking place. Categorizing and displaying data points to show how the determination was reached will present policymakers with a coherent roadmap of what is known about an R&D program and perhaps a more persuasive argument.

Second, analysts and organizations need to ensure that every available channel of information is utilized and must drive and synthesize the results of collection. The continuous nature of long-term deception means the deceiver will need to consistently coordinate a complex effort throughout a bureaucracy. This will both increase the number of individuals aware of such an effort and necessitate some form of coordinating mechanism, such as the Central Bureau for German Rearmament or Saddam’s Special Security Organization. Additionally, the expenditure of resources will need to be done in a surreptitious manner but will still likely result in some detectable signatures. Each of these necessities on the part of the deceiver is an opportunity for analysts willing to perform an exhaustive search of available information. Again, the framework presented in this article provides one way of categorizing information. But it also shows where expected information is not seen. If long-term deception is suspected, then analysts should be looking for evidence of coordinating organizations and actions. If no such evidence is seen, it may indicate no deception or it may indicate the need to drive collection towards suspected data points.

The final recommendation is less about analytic technique than approach. The deceiver is operating on a long-term schedule but is deceiving perhaps without a clear idea of the target’s level of attention. Therefore, though policymakers require timely and relevant assessments of the deceiver’s activity, there may be an opportunity to permit teams of analysts the time and space to undertake a systematic review of all available evidence. This is important for two reasons. First, a group—preferably made up of specialists in various intelligence disciplines—can better utilize analytic techniques to review the evidence, judge the likelihood of deception, and attempt to develop a cohesive picture of the effort. Second, temporarily removing analysts from any pressures of immediate production or quick turnaround tasking will permit the intellectual space to do the “deep dive” on the information necessary to see these patterns.

Developments such as international treaties, enforcement regimes, and improvements in intelligence gathering have complicated the effort required to pursue long-term R&D without detection. Programs to enhance military capabilities or develop weapons of mass destruction depend now more than ever on deception to conceal them, or at least make them plausibly deniable for the deceiver. Countering the deception that protects these long-term projects requires

a. Backcasting is an analytical technique to help identify prerequisites to reaching a given (desired or hypothetical) end state.
further research on historical examples of such activities, formulation of lessons learned and best practices, and organizational flexibility to give analysts the time and tools they need to detect and mitigate these efforts.

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Endnotes
6. Whaley, Conditions, 47.
7. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 9.
8. Ibid., 35.
9. Whaley, Conditions, 44.
10. Suchenwirth, 26–30.
11. Ibid., 26; Whaley Conditions, 53.
13. Mihalka, 45.
15. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 51.
16. Suchenwirth, 121.
17. Ibid., 20.
18. Whaley, Conditions, 63.
19. Ibid., 64.
20. Whaley, Conditions, 72.
21. Ibid., 56.
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The Origin and Evolution of the Joint Analysis Center at RAF Molesworth

Robert G. Stiegel, Col. USAF (Ret.)

Why Molesworth?

The story of how critically important US intelligence centers in Europe came to operate in a rural setting far from any major headquarters illustrates the many ways in which the fortunes of the intelligence profession can be affected by technology, fiscal conditions, expediency, and radical changes in the global security environment.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) station Molesworth hosts the US European Command’s (USEUCOM) Joint Analysis Center (JAC, now called the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytic Center, is most often simply referred to as “JAC Molesworth”), the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC); and US Africa Command’s (USAFRICOM) Intelligence and Knowledge Development Directorate, Molesworth Detachment (J2-M).

Each organization is the primary intelligence analysis and production center directly supporting two US geographic combatant command headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany and NATO supreme headquarters in Mons, Belgium. Such dramatic geographic separation of senior commanders from their intelligence capabilities is unique within the US military command structure.

The story of how and why these critically important intelligence centers came to operate in such a rural setting, far from any major government or military headquarters, speaks to an aspect of intelligence usually lost in histories that most often focus on covert operations, collection, collection systems, and analysis. The history of Molesworth as an intelligence installation illustrates the multiple ways in which the fortunes of the intelligence profession and those who labor within it can be affected by technology, fiscal conditions, expediency, and radical changes in the global security environment.

There are two major threads to the Molesworth story. The first is the military history of the site itself; the second is the evolution of US and NATO command and intelligence capabilities during and after the Cold War.

Bomber and Missile Base

The Molesworth story began during the Second World War, when the RAF and the US Army Air Force established numerous airfields across East Anglia and Lincolnshire to enable the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany and
Why Molesworth?

Nazi-occupied Europe. One of several Class A bomber airfields built in and around Cambridgeshire was called RAF Station Molesworth after a nearby small village.

After brief use by the British, RAF Molesworth became home in 1942 to the US 303rd Bombardment Group with B-17 Flying Fortresses. The unit compiled an impressive record of success in the 8th Air Force’s daylight bombing campaign over Europe (figure 1). The 303rd’s legacy includes having the first B-17 and its crew complete 25 combat missions in Europe and having two Medal of Honor recipients.¹ Not long after the end of the war, RAF Molesworth and the other airfields in the area were gradually reduced to caretaker status, as local agriculture reclaimed its land.²

During the Cold War in the 1950s, RAF Molesworth came back to life briefly as a base for an American special purpose air unit and then as a support site for other nearby US bases.³ Like many WWII airfields across England, Molesworth’s concrete runways were removed to provide hard-core for local road construction in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁴ The site gained significant attention during the mid-1980s when the United States invested $91 million to rebuild it as the second base for nuclear-armed intermediate-range BGM-109G “Gryphon” ground-launched cruise missiles in the UK⁵ (figure 2).

British antinuclear and peace protesters established a “peace camp” at the edge of the base and attempted to block deployment of the missiles.⁶ Just after Molesworth’s missiles achieved operational status, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty on 8 December 1987. This treaty soon eliminated the protested missiles and all intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Europe.⁷ Thus, RAF Molesworth became a base with brand new facilities and no mission.

US Intelligence in Europe, 1988

The full story of the development of US and NATO intelligence capabilities and organizations from the late 1940s until the late 1980s is beyond the scope of this article, but a short description of the intelligence architecture in Europe in 1988 provides context for Molesworth’s modern development. Since WWII, US national security policy focused command authorities, responsibilities, and, particularly, resources through the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, rather than through

Figure 1: US Army Air Force ground personnel observing flight operations from the control tower of RAF Molesworth during WWII. Parked at the side of the building is a B-17. Photo: © FOR ALAN/Alamy Stock Photo

Figure 2: RAF Molesworth in 1987, showing bunkers for ground-launched cruise missiles deployed there briefly that year.
The Air Force component was US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) with its headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, West Germany. Air Force intelligence capabilities were split among multiple locations in West Germany and the UK. A sizable Intelligence (IN) Staff with analysis and targeting functions was at Ramstein. The theater-level imagery intelligence (IMINT) processing, exploitation, and production center (497th Reconnaissance Technical Group) was at Schierstein, West Germany, near Wiesbaden, across the Rhine River from most USAFE bases. The 497th had a subordinate squadron (496th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron) at RAF Alconbury, UK, and a detachment at Ramstein.

The Army component was US Army Europe (USAREUR), with its headquarters at Heidelberg, West Germany. Army intelligence capabilities were also split among multiple locations in West Germany. The USAREUR Intelligence (G2) staff was at Heidelberg, but the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command managed theater-level intelligence capabilities in Europe through its 66th Military Intelligence Brigade (MI Bde) was in Munich. Army IMINT personnel were colocated with the Air Force at Schierstein. For exercises and in wartime, the USAREUR G2 and elements of...
During the 1980s, US military thinkers developed a more offensive strategy for the defense of Europe, which was described in the doctrinal concepts of AirLand Battle and Follow-On Forces Attack. The 66th MI Bde would deploy as a mobile unit with the Army headquarters.

- The Navy component was US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR), with its headquarters in London, but its commander was dual-hatted as the NATO commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, with a separate NATO headquarters in Naples, Italy. A small USNAVEUR Intelligence (N2) staff in London exercised operational control over the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center—London (FOSIC-L) and the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility—Rota (FOSIF-R), in Spain. The US Navy concentrated theater-level IMINT, ELINT, and analysis in regional fleet intelligence centers. USNAVEUR was supported by the US Atlantic Fleet’s Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia.14

At this time, NATO policy considered intelligence support to be the responsibility of each member nation. Thus, NATO headquarters had only very small combined intelligence staffs, with no real capabilities for analysis or production. Several key NATO military commands were led by dual-hatted commanders of US service component commands, with the expectation that these NATO commanders could receive US intelligence support through their US component command headquarters.

**New Strategy, Doctrine, and Architecture**

During the 1980s, US military thinkers developed a more offensive strategy for the defense of Europe, which was described in the doctrinal concepts of AirLand Battle and Follow-On Forces Attack.15,16 This strategy leveraged the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, which asserted that new sensors and command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) technologies enabled much faster operational decisionmaking, and deeper attacks on enemy second- and third-echelon forces.17

As the AirLand Battle name implies, these concepts relied upon coordinated plans and operations by joint force commanders. The new intelligence, communications, and data-processing systems necessary to implement these new concepts were large, expensive, and required significant infrastructure. This made wartime survivability for these capabilities a vital concern. To be survivable, C3I capabilities had to be either in hardened or protected facilities or be mobile and deployable. They also required redundant, backup or reconstruction capabilities, preferably out of the enemy’s reach in the rear area of the theater.18

In 1986, to coordinate and synchronize the intelligence capabilities required by the AirLand Battle concept and the Revolution in Military Affairs, the USEUCOM J2 developed the Allied Command Europe Interface Architecture (AIA) as the centerpiece of its Theater Intelligence Architecture Program. The AIA goal was to provide timely US intelligence directly to NATO commanders by establishing the Joint Intelligence Support Center to integrate staff analysts and ELINT capabilities at USEUCOM with Air Force IMINT and targeting capabilities and Army analysts in a protected facility in the theater rear. The planners believed that centralizing advanced computers for processing, analyzing, and producing intelligence would achieve cost-savings, while recent advancements in communications technology would link such a center in the rear to forward-based collection systems and commanders in near-real time.

The AIA leveraged new direction and authority in the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act and JCS Pub 0-2 to centralize separate component command IMINT, ELINT, analytic, and targeting capabilities in a joint center, under joint direction and control. The new center would reduce duplication of effort among the component commands, and improve efficiency by centralizing major intelligence, communications, and computer capabilities.

Locating the center in a protected facility in the theater rear would improve security and survivability. The USEUCOM J2 and USAFE IN staffs expended considerable effort in 1986 and 1987 to identify a site for the new center at an existing US installation in the UK. At that time, USAFE had a sizable presence in the UK, with seven wing-level main operating bases, and several smaller installations.19 After performing site surveys at several installations, the USAFE staff recommended building the center at RAF Feltwell, an old airfield a few miles north of the USAFE.
bases at RAF Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall. Budget reductions and the collapse of communism in East Europe reduced planning for the new center to a low priority. Dropping the requirement for a protected facility reduced the cost significantly.

**Jointness and the “Peace Dividend”**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act drove efforts to strengthen the authority of joint commands to control all US military activities within geographic regions. Over the next several years, the DoD developed policies, doctrine, and procedures to implement and enforce jointness. For defense intelligence matters, the secretary of defense signed the “Strengthening Defense Intelligence” memorandum in 1991, directing implementation of the “Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence.” Among other actions, this plan directed the commanders of each unified command to consolidate “existing Unified and Specified Combatant Command and component intelligence processing, analysis and production activities into regional Joint Intelligence Centers.”²²

By 1991, the political and military situation in Europe had fundamentally changed. The Cold War had ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the beginning of German reunification. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty codified massive reductions in fielded military forces across Europe.²¹ The United States and other NATO member countries eagerly took a “peace dividend” from the situation, by cutting military forces and budgets while closing numerous military installations. Thus, the multiple pressures for considerable reductions in military forces in Europe and the consolidation of redundant and duplicative military service intelligence capabilities came together to drive major changes in the US intelligence architecture in Europe.

The USEUCOM J2 had to deal with two major policy directives in 1991—to greatly reduce the American military footprint (both installations and personnel) in Germany, while establishing a JIC as directed in the defense intelligence restructuring plan.²² Directed to produce a specific plan to establish the Joint Analysis Center by 1 July, USEUCOM was in a good position, having taken action since 1989 to implement an architecture proposal that consolidated elements from four locations in Germany into a single location at the newly constructed but now vacant ground-launched cruise missile base at Molesworth.²³

Several factors had played in Molesworth’s favor in this plan. As noted above, the base already had first-rate physical security measures and its isolated location reduced its profile to threats. Several new buildings existed that, while not built for intelligence activities, could be rapidly adapted for that mission. There was ample open ground at RAF Molesworth for any required new facilities. Local support capabilities and facilities (including such things as logistics, a new medical clinic, barracks and family housing, dependent schools, a base exchange, and a new commissary) had excess capacity since the withdrawal of the missile unit.

RAF Alconbury was the main US base in the area, and it was then projected to retain a robust flying mission. An Air Force IMINT unit (the 496th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron) was already at Alconbury, and it had established a strong relationship with the British Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre at nearby RAF Brampton.²⁴ Also, the then British prime minister, John Major, owned a home a very short distance from Alconbury, which was in his constituency. Local authorities did not want to lose the boost American personnel gave to the economy.²⁵

**Building the JAC**

Establishing the USEUCOM JAC at RAF Molesworth would involve moving the USAFE and associated Army IMINT processing, exploitation, and production capabilities and personnel, plus a supporting Air Force communications group from Schierstein and Ramstein to the UK. By this time, USEUCOM had established a JIC at USEUCOM Headquarters in Stuttgart by integrating existing ELINT production, collection management, and all-source analysis capabilities and personnel. This organization would also move from Stuttgart to the UK. Some additional Army personnel from Munich would join the Army IMINT personnel to form an Army detachment in

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The USEUCOM J2 had to deal with two major policy directives in 1991—to greatly reduce the American military footprint (both installations and personnel) in Germany, while establishing a JIC as directed in the defense intelligence restructuring plan.
the UK. These actions allowed the Schierstein compound to close and led to relocation of several hundred US personnel from Germany.\textsuperscript{26}

When USEUCOM and the Air Force requested approval from the British government to establish the JIC at Molesworth, the proposal was well received. The British government did request that the name of the JIC be changed. There are two versions of the rationale for this request. The first is that the British government had operated its Joint Intelligence Committee since WWII as the highest-level group to oversee and direct national-level intelligence activities, and it did not want a new organization within Britain using the same acronym. The other is that the UK government wanted to downplay the presence of a theater-wide US “intelligence” capability at Molesworth because memories of major antinuclear and peace protests at Molesworth were still fresh. In either case, USEUCOM J2 agreed to change the name of the new organization to the “Joint Analysis Center,” and thus “JAC Molesworth” was formally established on 1 October 1991 and primarily occupied by Air Force and Army personnel.\textsuperscript{27}

The JAC initially moved into buildings that had been built to support the cruise missile wing. JAC planners documented the need for construction of a new facility for a long-roll wet-film processing capability to support national- and theater-level U-2 IMINT missions flown from RAF Alconbury and for the major communications and computer systems required by the JAC. This would become the only building specifically constructed for the JAC.\textsuperscript{28}

At the outset, US Navy participation in the JAC was minimal. The Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic in Norfolk formed the basis of the US Atlantic Command JIC in 1991, while USNA VEUR retained control of its intelligence units at London and Rota. In 1995, USNA VEUR decided to shut down its intelligence facilities in London and Rota and integrated their functions and personnel into the USEUCOM JAC. This significant influx of Navy leadership and personnel had a major impact on the operations and culture of the JAC\textsuperscript{29} (figure 4 below).

### JAC Operations

The JAC was the only joint intelligence center geographically separated from its combatant command headquarters. USEUCOM planners in the 1980s had counted on having sufficient secure high-speed and high-volume communications capabilities available to ensure that intelligence analysis and production could seamlessly support the commander and the headquarters staff despite the geographic separation. The realignment also benefited from the experience of USEUCOM staff, which had been used to routinely

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**Figure 4.** The building of the US command and intelligence structure as it stood in Europe in 1995 took place over 8 years in five phases.
supporting NATO leadership in Belgium.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, JAC leaders consciously drew on Molesworth’s heritage to build unit esprit.

Because of the geographic separation from headquarters, the JAC had requirements for, and capabilities in, a number of areas unlike other JICs. The JAC had to build and operate its own information technology capabilities because it could not leverage the existing capabilities at USEUCOM headquarters. The JAC had to establish its own systems and communications directorate, with about 250 personnel, to operate and maintain computer, communications, and IMINT and ELINT processing and production capabilities.

This directorate was the theater lead for joint secure intelligence-data-handling systems across Europe, for both US and NATO organizations. To facilitate this theaterwide mission, the JAC established capable local planning, programming, budgeting, contracting, and implementation teams. Because support entities in Stuttgart did not provide services outside of Stuttgart and the host Air Force unit provided only basic facility and infrastructure support, the JAC had to establish its own specialized support services for facilities management, logistics, and personnel at Molesworth. These were essential to JAC operations but also absorbed a large portions of the JAC budget and manpower. This situation haunted the JAC during major resource cuts after 2010, because USEUCOM had more manpower at the JAC than did most other combatant commands at their JICs.

Significant numbers of individual augmentees became a normal feature of the JAC workforce, drawn from a wide variety of active and reserve component forces. The numbers fluctuated based on mission requirements, to a high of some 200 during the Operation ALLIED FORCE air campaign against Serbia in 1999.

Also affecting circumstances in the late 1990s was the Air Force decision to cease flying operations at RAF Alconbury. The local base support that had helped justify locating the JAC at Molesworth became excess to Air Force requirements. Successive Air Force commanders have tried to close down RAF Alconbury and RAF Molesworth several times since at least 1995.\textsuperscript{31} These efforts plus significant manpower and funding cuts to the local air base squadron or group created great tension between the JAC and its host base units. For many years, the Air Force could argue that it would reap significant savings by closing two (or even three, counting the USAFE medical clinic at RAF Upwood) bases. The counterpoint from USEUCOM and the Intelligence Community was always that they could not afford the high cost to build suitable facilities and infrastructure for the JAC elsewhere in the theater, a bill the Air Force was not willing to pay either.

Nevertheless, RAF Molesworth was proving its worth. The ability to remotely support the commander, in both his US and NATO roles, and multiple US and NATO headquarters staffs during combat operations was first put to the test during Operation ALLIED FORCE. While the JAC encountered several technical challenges, the overall impression after the operation was that remote intelligence support had worked\textsuperscript{32, 33}

**New Intelligence Missions—NATO and AFRICOM**

The JAC’s success in its intelligence mission plus its robust communications and computer infrastructure encouraged NATO and USAF- AFRICOM to establish their intelligence centers at Molesworth. There had been a small presence of personnel from a few NATO member nations at the JAC since the establishment of the Combined Peace Implementation Force in Bosnia in 1995. The Multi-National Intelligence Coordination Cell was a cooperative venture by six NATO member countries to assign intelligence personnel at Molesworth to facilitate sharing of intelligence among participating members and across the Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE) network to all NATO members.\textsuperscript{34}

NATO senior leaders recognized the need for a similar but enhanced capability to support the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) was established at Molesworth in 2006, with the United States as the framework (sponsoring) nation and the UK as the host nation.\textsuperscript{35} During the next 10 years, this organization grew to include more than 200 personnel from 26 NATO member states, plus one North Atlantic Council–approved non-NATO state.\textsuperscript{36} Colocating the NIFC with the JAC permitted it to
In 2012, another mission was added to Molesworth, when the National Intelligence University established its European Academic Center there.

...closely interact with JAC analysts, as well as access robust communications architecture. Incidentally, the US personnel assigned to the NIFC are officially carried within the JAC’s manpower documents, which again made the JAC appear much larger than other JICs.

With the establishment and presumably temporary location of USAFRICOM as a combatant command in 2008, its permanent location became a major political battle. The fight had two fronts. One was identifying an African country willing and able to host the headquarters. The second was addressing demands from multiple US congressmen seeking to locate the headquarters in their home districts. These battles played out throughout the first several years of USAFRICOM’s existence.

The resultant delay in selecting a permanent headquarters location resulted in eventually confirming the “interim” location at Stuttgart. A significant portion of the new command’s manpower was drawn from USEUCOM, in part because the bulk of USAFRICOM’s area of responsibility had previously belonged to USEUCOM.

The transition team that planned the organization, manpower, and processes for USAFRICOM’s J2 built the manpower requirements under the assumption the entire J2 organization would be colocated with the headquarters and be supported by the headquarters commandant. However, the US Army garrison in Stuttgart did not have the infrastructure to support all of the new personnel planned for USAFRICOM. The under secretary of defense for intelligence (USDl) then directed that most of the intelligence billets assigned to USAFRICOM be transferred from USEUCOM and located at Molesworth (in part to reduce USAFRICOM personnel numbers in Stuttgart, but also to save costs by keeping personnel in place at Molesworth).

USAFRICOM then had to redesign the J2 organization to have roughly 60 percent of its manpower located separately from the headquarters. The J2 decided not to repurpose intelligence billets for support functions, as USEUCOM had done with the JAC at Molesworth, but attempted instead to have the USAFRICOM Headquarters, the USDl, or the JAC provide on-site service support for the J2 detachment at Molesworth. The end result was fighting over support costs with USEUCOM and inadequate support for USAFRICOM Molesworth personnel.

Two additional intelligence-related organizations operate at Molesworth to support or enable the primary intelligence mission organizations. In 1996, the USEUCOM J2 established the European Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facility to provide joint intelligence training for personnel in Europe. In 2008, USAFRICOM personnel and resources were added to this effort.

In 2012, another mission was added to Molesworth, when the National Intelligence University established its European Academic Center there. The center provides opportunities for US personnel throughout Europe to earn Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence degrees on a part-time basis. USEUCOM and USAFRICOM volunteers serve as adjunct professors at both Molesworth and Stuttgart, with other sites linked by video teleconference.

With the establishment of the NIFC and USAFRICOM J2-M, it became clear that the existing buildings at Molesworth could not adequately support the intelligence operations of three commands. To accommodate the two new organizations, USEUCOM and USAFRICOM leased two temporary, modular, relocatable structures for the NIFC and J2-M. US public law requires that DoD actively plan to build permanent buildings to replace such leased structures. Additionally, the original cruise-missile buildings were 30 years old and in serious need of repair and refurbishment to meet the new requirements for power, communications, security, and heating/cooling. Thus, USEUCOM and the Air Force began serious planning to recapitalize the JAC, NIFC, and J2-M facilities during 2009.

The last known plan (ca. 2016) was to consolidate the JAC, USAFRICOM J2-M, and the NIFC in a new $240 million Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex at RAF Croughton, a US Air Force installation near Oxford, England. Such a move would enable the Air Force to return Molesworth and Alconbury to the British Ministry of Defence, which intends to sell the bases for commercial development.

In Sum

The colocation of the JAC, NIFC, and J2-M in an isolated former air base in the English countryside was
never the direct result of deliberate planning. It was more a case of expediently adapting existing facilities and capabilities in response to changes in the national security environment and to meet different purposes and requirements. All three organizations benefited from the out-standing professionalism and can-do attitude of assigned personnel, plus strong, mission-focused leadership. Their ability to provide top-quality intelligence for US and NATO combat operations has been consistently demonstrated in Kosovo, Afghanistan, off the Horn of Africa, Libya, and other African areas.

The author: Robert Stiegel retired as a US Air Force colonel. Colonel Stiegel has served in numerous intelligence assignments in Europe since beginning his career as an imagery intelligence officer in 1980. Among his duties was serving as the first USAFRICOM Multi-Service Commander for J2 personnel at Molesworth during 2009–2010. He is the head of the Cyber Intelligence and Analytics Department at the National Intelligence University.

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**Endnotes**

2. Ibid, 22.
Why Molesworth?

23. 497th RTG Homestead, “History Highlights.”
26. 497th RTG Homestead, “History Highlights.”
32. Mackrell, “Combined Forces Support.”
34. Mackrell, “Combined Forces Support.”

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CIA’s Office of Strategic Research: A Brief History

Robert D. Vickers Jr.

The mission of the Office of Strategic Research was to provide the DCI with an independent CIA assessment of foreign strategic military threats to US national security interests, primarily those from the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The Beginning

The year 2017 marked the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Strategic Research (OSR). The office was established by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms and Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) R. Jack Smith on 1 July 1967 to bring together analysts responsible for military analysis in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI—now called the Directorate of Analysis). These analysts were previously located in two DI components: the military division of the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), led by Bruce C. Clarke Jr., and the military economic research area of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), led by Roland S. Inlow. Clarke became the first head of the new OSR and Inlow was appointed his deputy. OSR’s mission was to provide the DCI with independent CIA assessments of foreign strategic military threats to US national security interests, primarily those from the Soviet Union and Communist China. A key exception at the time was analysis of the Vietnam conflict, which remained the purview of other CIA components.

R. Jack Smith has written the following about the creation of OSR in his book The Unknown CIA:

I picked Bruce Clarke Jr., a sharp, aggressive man, to study the feasibility and advantages of combining the separate groups into a single office, and on the strength of his report, I created the Office of Strategic Research under Clarke’s leadership. This was considered a bold stroke. By longstanding custom, and for a time, mutual consent, military affairs was held to be the exclusive province of the armed forces. Military intelligence was thought to be too specialized, too arcane for mere civilians. . . . Unfortunately for this concept, the military services throughout the 1950s and 1960s had consistently displayed an inability to make objective, dispassionate judgments regarding the strategic threat. . . . For reasons easy to perceive, military intelligence analysts invariably leaned toward the worst case, the maximum conceivable threat. . . . I knew that the President and the National Security Council (NSC) were ill-served by such work. It was time for CIA to assume the role in military affairs it had already established in international political and economic realms. The Office of Strategic Research constituted a statement to other intelligence agencies that CIA had a professional competence in strategic military affairs. Under Clarke, it soon became a strong voice in the field.

Eyes on the Soviet Bear

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During its 15-year existence, from mid-1967 to late 1981, OSR played a key role in providing in-depth military analysis and current intelligence reporting to senior policymakers on a variety of national security issues. These included the strategic military threats the Soviet Bloc and Communist China posed, arms control measures and treaty verification, and various regional military conflicts and crises such as the Czechoslovakia crisis in 1968, the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

The office grew to become one of the largest and most productive in the DI, and its leadership drew some of the best and the brightest. Many of its managers would go on to hold some of the highest positions in CIA and the Intelligence Community (IC), and the agency’s strategic military and military-economic analysis would continue to play key policy support roles to the end of the Cold War.

Bruce Clarke was a demanding and inspirational leader. He insisted on rigorous research and analysis and rewarded good intelligence production. Clarke knew all his analysts by name, along with their strengths and weaknesses, and he wanted his managers to do likewise. Clarke also supported regular training and rotational assignments to improve analytic expertise and promote career development. Finally, he insisted that all OSR analysts work closely with other components in CIA and the IC that contributed to OSR’s research.
OSR was able to hit the ground running because it was staffed with experienced managers and analysts from OCI and ORR.

Richard Nixon’s administration in January 1969 created a whole new set of demands for military intelligence support. Henry Kissinger, the new assistant to the president for national security affairs, wanted detailed military intelligence on a wide variety of issues in support of broader national security policy planning. These issues included the expansion of Soviet strategic influence in the Third World, the growth of China’s military capabilities, and the pursuit of new arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger created several new mechanisms to oversee national security policy matters relating to military decisionmaking. The first was the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) process, which involved detailed analysis of the military threats to US strategic interests around the world and the appropriate US force posture in response. Another was the Defense Policy Review Committee (DPRC), created to undertake detailed studies of US defense programs and future force levels. In addition, because this was a period of détente with the USSR, Kissinger created intelligence verification panels to support the new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Under Clarke’s strong leadership, OSR soon began to provide critical intelligence support to the Nixon administration’s new strategic policy planning process and arms control efforts. OSR also began to provide more detailed information to the Office of National Estimates (ONE) for new National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Soviet and Chinese military forces and capabilities. The Nixon White House had sharply criticized the 1969 NIE on Soviet strategic forces for lacking adequate intelligence input. A new format was established for the 1970 Soviet strategic forces NIE that included much more detailed intelligence and alternative outcomes. At the same time, DCI Helms decided to involve OSR and the DS&T more directly in drafting a CIA group contribution to the Soviet military estimates. As a result of these changes, a much more comprehensive NIE was issued in early 1971. President Nixon then sent a note to Helms commending him and the entire IC for a “particularly useful” estimate.

On 1 July 1972, OSR celebrated its fifth anniversary. Although Helms was not able to attend the event, he sent OSR officers a brief letter of congratulations. (See next page.) During this period, the office had grown by about a third to nearly 200 people. A special assistant to the Director for Strategic Arms Talks had been added to the front office staff to oversee OSR support to the SALT negotiations. The former Strategic and Theater Divisions had been combined into a new, large Soviet

and production efforts. In 1967, in CIA these included OCI, the Offices of Economic Research (OER) and Basic and Geographic Intelligence, the Imagery Analysis Service, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), and the Central Reference Service, all in the DI. The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center in the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) also were close OSR partners, as was the National Security Agency (NSA) in the Defense Department.

OSR was able to hit the ground running because it was staffed with experienced managers and analysts from OCI and ORR. It was initially organized into a small front office staff and four working divisions. (See graphic The Regional Analysis Division did current intelligence reporting on global military issues and crises. The Strategic Forces Division was led by Robert Hastings and Clarence Baier, and it focused on Soviet offensive and defensive missile and space systems. The Theater Forces Division was run by Eugene Leggett and W. Randolph Payne, and it covered Soviet Bloc air, naval, and ground forces as well as China. Finally, the Programs Analysis Division was under John Paisley and John Godaire, and it concentrated on the Soviet defense budget, including strategy and trends, military expenditures, and cost analysis.

During the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had wanted detailed intelligence from CIA on Soviet Bloc and Chinese military forces and expenditures in support of US defense budget planning. The advent of President
Little did Clarke know that major changes in CIA were about to take place during the next year that would result in his departure the following September.

and Eastern European Forces Division, and a smaller Asian Communist Forces Division had been added to meet growing demands from the Nixon administration for strategic intelligence on China and North Korea. Clarke produced an annual report for the DCI each year beginning in 1968. In his 1972 report, Clarke enumerated OSR's major tasks during the previous five years, showing the ways in which OSR supported national security policymakers with NSSMs and NIEs, provided direct support to the SALT and MBFR negotiations, and produced research reports and current intelligence items on foreign military programs and developments. Clarke tracked OSR intelligence production closely, and he noted that it had reached all-time highs as 1972 drew to a close.

Little did Clarke know that major changes in CIA were about to take place during the next year that would result in his departure the following September. In February 1973, newly reelected President Nixon asked DCI Helms to resign and become US ambassador to Iran. Replacing Helms was James Schlesinger, who had been assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget and then head of the Atomic Energy Commission. During Schlesinger’s brief tenure, Clarke oversaw the establishment of a new Military-Economic Advisory Panel (MEAP) of civilian economic experts, created in response to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s criticism of OSR’s analysis of Soviet defense spending. Although the first MEAP report in 1974 generally supported CIA’s assessment, this was only the beginning of a long series of

Pentagon and other outside challenges to CIA’s defense costing efforts that would last the next two decades.

President Nixon announced suddenly in May 1973 that he was making Schlesinger his new secretary of defense and replacing him with William Colby, who was then CIA’s deputy director for operations. The change took place in September 1973, and, soon after, Clarke left OSR at Schlesinger’s request to become his representative to the new MBFR talks in Vienna. One of Clarke’s last official acts was to create a new Strategic Evaluation Center (SEC) in OSR to do integrated analysis of the national security policy of the Soviet Union and other key foreign countries and to provide net force assessments to the NSC staff. The SEC was originally headed by Fritz Ermarth, whom Schlesinger had brought to his staff from RAND, and it was later briefly headed by Robert Gates, who went on to become both the DCI and the Secretary of Defense.

The Middle Years

Clarke’s departure from OSR ended a six-year span of sustained strong leadership. Many of the officers who worked for him during that time regarded him as one of the best CIA leaders they ever knew, both in substantive knowledge and personnel management. During OSR’s last eight years, it continued to provide strong strategic military intelligence and current intelligence support to national security policymakers and

to arms control negotiations and treaty verification efforts. However, it also came under powerful attack from Congress and critics inside and outside the government who believed that OSR was underestimating the strategic military threat the Soviet Union posed.

Until its demise in October 1981, OSR had four more directors and one acting director. Three of the new directors—Henry Knoche, Richard Lehman, and Sidney Graybeal—were experienced CIA managers who had held previous senior intelligence positions. The acting director, Noel Firth, and OSR’s last director, Robert M. “Rae” Huffstutler, were DI analysts who joined OSR at its creation and rose through the ranks. Including Clarke, these six heads of OSR served under five presidents—Johnson, Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan—and under six DCIs—Helms, Schlesinger, Colby, George H.W. Bush, Stansfield Turner, and William Casey.

Five of the six OSR directors moved on to more senior positions in CIA. Clarke became the director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) in 1979 after he returned to CIA under DCI Turner. Knoche served as the deputy DCI under George H.W. Bush in 1976. Lehman was the deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence under Bush and then chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) when Turner formed it in 1979. Firth became the first director of the Office of Imagery Analysis in 1977. Graybeal came to OSR after a distinguished career as an arms control negotiator, and after he retired from CIA in 1979, he was appointed to the Defense Policy Board. Huffstutler
became the director of the new Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) in the DI after OSR was abolished in 1981, then became head of NPIC starting in 1984, served as the deputy director for administration (DDA) in 1988, and finally became CIA’s executive director in 1992.

One of Knoche’s first official acts as director of OSR in October 1973 was to announce a reorganization that created two new divisions—the Soviet Strategic Forces Division to focus on SALT support, and the Theater Forces Division to address MBFR issues. Clarke had planned the reorganization before he left for Vienna to join the MBFR negotiations, and he had selected the managers for the divisions. He also created a new Asian Programs Branch in the Eastern Forces Division to expand OSR’s analysis of Chinese military strategy and doctrine in the region, and he added North Korea to the countries of interest. Clarke thus left Knoche with an expanded office and a strong team of experienced managers and new branch chiefs.

Knoche was called up to the DCI’s office in mid-1974 to do special tasks for DCI Colby in response to congressional investigations of CIA that occurred in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal. As a result, Firth, who replaced Paisley as the deputy director in July 1974, was required to run OSR for an extended period. Knoche never returned to the office and was replaced by Lehman in June 1975. Shortly after his appointment, Lehman—like Knoche before him—was also detailed to the DCI’s office for a special assignment and never returned to OSR. As a result, Firth ran the office unofficially beginning in mid-1975. In January 1976, President Ford replaced Colby with George H.W. Bush, and Lehman joined the new DCI’s staff. Firth was then officially appointed acting director of OSR, a post he held until Graybeal arrived in November 1976.

Firth had a background in CIA and OSR as a military costing expert, which served him well during his tenure as acting director. In early 1976, CIA announced that it had completed a major upward revision in its ruble estimate of Soviet military spending during the period 1970 to 1975. Not only was the Soviet defense budget significantly larger than previously estimated, but so was the percentage of Soviet GNP devoted to defense. The revision had been done jointly by a team of OSR and OER analysts based on new ruble price and cost data rather than the discovery of new Soviet defense programs. Firth strongly defended the revised spending estimate in his book on the subject, *Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950–1990* (coauthored with James Noren), but he acknowledges that the shock of the abrupt change created a lasting skepticism about the accuracy of CIA’s analysis of the Soviet defense spending.  

Unfortunately, the upward revision of Soviet defense spending in rubles came at a time when the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) was challenging the

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The competitive analysis on Soviet strategic objectives was by far the most contentious and had the most lasting political impact.

accuracy of all CIA Soviet strategic intelligence estimates done during the previous decade. In May 1976, DCI Bush agreed to a PFIAB request that the 1976 Soviet strategic estimate be done using competitive analysis from two teams: Team A from the IC and Team B from outside experts. Separate A and B teams addressed three key issues; two of them were technical, and one was political, on Soviet strategic objectives. It fell on the new National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic Programs, Howard Stoertz, and the former OSR deputy director John Paisley, to oversee the effort. The competitive analysis on Soviet strategic objectives was by far the most contentious and had the most lasting political impact. The Team B effort was led by a conservative Harvard professor, Richard Pipes, and they issued their final report in December 1976. It was a report that challenged the whole series of CIA Soviet strategic estimates for characterizing Soviet strategic intentions as defensive rather than offensive in nature.a

By the time Team B had issued its report, Sayre Stevens had replaced Ed Proctor as DDI in June 1976. Stevens had a strong technical background in the DS&T and had been its deputy director from January 1974 until May 1976. Stevens then appointed Graybeal to run OSR with Firth as his deputy in November 1976. Graybeal also came to OSR with a strong technical background and experience as an arms control negotiator with the State Department, and he was a logical choice to oversee OSR’s continued contributions to the SALT and MBFR negotiations. Lehman and Graybeal both criticized the Team B report as based not on intelligence but on the long-held political views of some of its members. DCI Bush agreed and noted that the competitive analysis effort had contributed little to the analytic judgments of the 1976 Soviet strategic NIE.

President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977 and replaced Bush as DCI with Stansfield Turner. During Turner’s tenure, OSR continued to provide extensive arms control intelligence support to the Carter administration and to contribute to key military NIEs. Stevens encouraged OSR to work more closely with OSI and the Office of Weapons Intelligence (OWI). Both OSI and OWI had been transferred from the DS&T to the DI in November 1976, and Evans Hineman, who had been the director of OWI before the move, remained as its head. Huffstutler, who had been the head of OSR’s Theater Forces Division, was then sent to OWI as Hineman’s deputy to help enhance cooperation between the two offices.

In April 1977, Graybeal reorganized OSR by enlarging the Programs Analysis Division to create a new Military-Economic Analysis Center. He did so in response to continued criticism of CIA’s assessments of Soviet defense spending. The change was designed to strengthen OSR’s research on Soviet and other communist military programs, including cost analysis of Chinese defense spending. Graybeal also altered the Strategic Evaluation Center to reflect a new emphasis on force effectiveness and on military policy and doctrine. One of his goals was to have OSR provide better support for special projects done jointly with other DI offices. Meanwhile, OSR continued to contribute heavily to NIEs on Soviet strategic capabilities and global goals and intentions.

The Huffstutler Transition

In late 1978, Graybeal decided to retire, and Huffstutler replaced him in early 1979. Huffstutler had a long background as a military and technical analyst in ORR and then in OSR and OWI. Huffstutler inherited an office that would soon become the largest in the DI and which continued to contribute heavily to the SALT and MBFR negotiations and to various military NIEs.

What was to have been Clarke’s one-year assignment in Vienna in 1973 lasted until 1978. By then, DCI Colby had abolished ONE and replaced it with individual NIOs who reported to a new deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence. DCI Turner

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subsequently created NFAC in October 1977 by combining the DI and the NIOs under a single leader, and he then appointed Robert Bowie, an academic, as its first director. Meanwhile, Clarke, after brief stints at the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and at the Department of Energy under Secretary Schlesinger, joined Bowie’s staff at NFAC in early 1979.

When Bowie retired in August 1979, Turner replaced him with Clarke, who inherited his former OSR division chief John Hicks as his deputy. Clarke had developed a close relationship with Turner years before, and, with DCI approval, he soon made two major organizational changes in NFAC. One was merging OSI and OWI into the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research in early 1980, with Wayne Boring as its director. The other was putting all the NIOs into the new NIC in late 1979 with Richard Lehman as its chairman. Clarke believed the NIOs needed a strong organizational structure and firm leadership to function as a corporate Intelligence Community body.

Turner took a strong interest in the strategic military NIEs that CIA prepared and believed he had the right to express his own views in them. He also believed CIA should have a strong independent voice in the estimative process, primarily because it was less influenced by policy bias and could be more objective in its analysis. As a result, in the 1979 NIE on Soviet strategic capabilities for nuclear conflict, Turner expressed his support of the CIA judgment that the Soviet Union had not achieved enough strategic military superiority for its leaders to risk provoking a nuclear conflict with the United States. DIA and the other military intelligence services strongly objected.\(^a\)

The 1980 NIE contained two sets of key judgments, the first representing the DCI and CIA and the second, DIA and those of the military services. The latter argued that CIA’s analysis was based on a net assessment of Soviet and US capabilities that was not a proper function of an intelligence agency and should be done by the Defense Department.\(^b\) As DCI, Turner rebutted this position, stating that he did not believe it was in the national interest for the Pentagon to control all comparisons of US and opposing military forces.\(^c\)

Soon after Clarke took over NFAC in 1979, Huffstutler and OSR began a major research paper on the development of Soviet military power since the fall of Soviet Premier Khrushchev in 1964. This was to be an in-depth project that

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\(^a\) See NIE 11-3/8-79, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the 1980s, in Intentions and Capabilities, 407–28, cited above.

\(^b\) Ibid, 429–65.

Casey took over CIA with a strong belief that the agency needed to be strengthened and improved if it was to have a prominent part in providing intelligence support to Reagan and his foreign policy advisors.

Casey took over CIA with a strong belief that the agency needed to be strengthened and improved if it was to have a prominent part in providing intelligence support to Reagan and his foreign policy advisors. The final presidential administration. The final product, titled “The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s,” took two years to prepare and drew input from every office in NFAC. It was a comprehensive survey that took into account political, economic, and technical factors as well as military ones, and was more deeply researched and balanced than the current national estimates. By the time it was issued in April 1981, Ronald Reagan had become president and appointed William Casey as his DCI.a

Casey took over CIA with a strong belief that the agency needed to be strengthened and improved if it was to have a prominent part in providing intelligence support to Reagan and his foreign policy advisors. Casey was the first DCI to become a member of the Cabinet, and he wanted CIA to concentrate on what he saw as a growing Soviet threat to US foreign national security interests, particularly in the Third World. Casey was also a vocal critic of CIA’s previous analysis of the Soviet Union, including the strategic forces estimates, which he thought were too benign. Thus, one of his first acts on taking office was to commission an update of NIE 11-4-78, “Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena,” which had been published three years before. It was delivered as a “Memorandum to Holders” in mid-1981; it, in effect, drew a new, more hostile, picture of Soviet intentions, over the objections of State’s INR and the the IC representative of the Treasury Department. b

Casey made no immediate changes to NFAC and kept Clarke as its director. However, Clarke did not have a favorable opinion of the new DCI, whom he believed had strong partisan political views. Clarke decided to retire in April 1981, and he was soon replaced as by John McMahon, the deputy director for operations at the time. Huffstutler stayed on as OSR’s director and announced another reorganization of OSR soon after McMahon took over. The reorganization was not a major restructuring, but it expanded the global focus of OSR’s military analysis by adding Latin America and Africa to its current intelligence and military research responsibilities.

The new OSR structure lasted only six months, when McMahon proposed reorganizing NFAC along regional rather than functional lines to better serve intelligence consumers, most of whom had a regional focus. By October 1981, with Casey’s approval, four former functional offices containing political, economic, military, and societal analysts were sent to SOVA, while others went to the Offices of East Asian Analysis (OEA), Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, European Analysis, and African and Latin American Analysis (ALA).

Once the reorganization was complete, and after NFAC was reconstituted as the Directorate of Intelligence, SOVA became by far the largest and most productive office in the directorate. Huffstutler was its first director, and he recalls that it was a strong, well-balanced unit. According to Huffstutler, SOVA produced about one-third of the current intelligence reports and drafted 40 percent of the national estimates CIA issued in the early years of the Reagan administration. SOVA got off to such a fast start because most of the existing OSR divisions, including Strategic Forces, Theater Forces, Military-Economic, and Strategic Evaluation, were transferred to SOVA almost intact. In addition to this large cadre, leaders added Soviet political, economic, and societal analysts from other DI offices.

As testament to the leadership skills and reputations Bruce Clarke had fostered since he first headed OSR, McMahon placed former OSR senior managers in charge of three of the five new regional offices.

OSR’s Legacy

Clarke’s departure in early 1981 and OSR’s demise later in the year marked the end of a vital era of military intelligence analysis in CIA,

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OSR’s legacy of strong leadership and rigorous analysis lasted well into the next decade. Clarke’s role as a mentor was marked by the extraordinary number of former OSR analysts and managers who rose to senior positions in CIA, including those of DDCI, DDI, deputy director for administration, and executive director, and office director.

Regarding OSR’s legacy of military analysis, SOVA continued to be the most productive DI office because of the high interest of the Reagan and Bush administrations in the Soviet Union up to and after its collapse. DCI Casey selected Robert Gates to replace McMahon in early 1982. Gates had a strong personal interest in the Soviet Union, and during his period as DDI and DDCI from 1982 to 1989, he reviewed virtually all of SOVA’s analytic products, including draft NIEs, on Soviet-related issues. Gates then became an avid consumer of SOVA’s intelligence output from 1989 to November 1991, when he moved to the White House to serve as deputy national security advisor under President Bush and Brent Scowcroft. In November 1991, Gates returned to CIA as DCI, where he remained until January 1993.

OSR made a major contribution to ensuring that CIA was able to provide policymakers with essential strategic military and military-economic intelligence support during the period of its existence . . .

Although critical of some of CIA’s shortcomings, Gates stated:

*The great continuing strength and success of the analysts of CIA and the Intelligence Community was in describing with amazing accuracy from the late 1960s until the Soviet collapse the actual military strength and capabilities of the Soviet Union . . . we located and counted with precision the number of deployed aircraft, tanks, ships, and strategic weapons. And the numbers and capabilities could be relied upon, with confidence, by the Executive Branch (including the Defense Department), the Congress, and our allies, both in arms control negotiations and in military planning.*

Perhaps the Intelligence Community’s greatest contribution was that during the last half of the Cold War, there were no significant strategic surprises—no more “bomber gaps” or “missile gaps” as in the 1950s. Further, our detailed knowledge of Soviet forces and capabilities after the middle 1960s made it virtually impossible for the Soviets to bluff us, and this helped prevent miscalculations and misunderstandings that could have destroyed the world . . . for a quarter century, American Presidents and the Congress negotiated and made decisions with confidence in our knowledge of the adversary’s actual military strength—a confidence that was justified. a

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The author: Robert D. Vickers was himself an analyst in the Office of Strategic Research. He served in a number of senior positions including as the director of the Office of Imagery Analysis and as National Intelligence Officer for Warning. He is now retired and serving as a CIA contract historian.
Commentary

To Resist Disinformation, Learn to Think Like an Intelligence Analyst

Preston Golson and Matthew F. Ferraro

The devious and sophisticated disinformation campaign Russia waged during the 2016 presidential election is a direct challenge to our citizenry’s ability to think critically, separate bad data from good, and avoid conspiratorial conceits.

It is an understandable challenge. Our social media feeds tend to be tailor-made to affirm our preconceptions. We usually have friend groups that share our opinions and post news stories that encourage them. Recommender algorithms suggest content based on our past selections, thus reassuring our predispositions. And, when most information sources appear equally legitimate on a smartphone screen, it is difficult to separate honest news from deliberate deception.

America’s adversaries know all this and will turn information against us. For example, as detailed in press accounts and the US Department of Justice’s 16 February 2018 indictment of 16 Russian organizations and persons, scores of full-time employees faked news articles, social media posts, and comments on mainstream websites with the intention of influencing public opinion within Russia and abroad. During the run-up to the 2016 US election, Russian social media bots reportedly helped drive mainstream media coverage of false stories and even influenced American stock prices.

The bad news is that these challenges are only going to get worse. Soon, technology will allow information forgers to produce fake news of a sophistication that will test the dispassionate faculties of us all. According to a recent report by Harvard University’s Belfer Center, “in the near future,” even amateurs will be able “to generate photo-realistic HD video, audio, and document forgeries—at scale” and share them just as easily as fictional tweets ricochet around the world today.

Technological fixes from Silicon Valley may help stem some digital disinformation. But the surest guardian against deception rests between our ears—in our abilities to resist confirmation bias, think independently, and assess information with rational detachment. When it comes to clear thinking, there just isn’t an app for that.

The good news is that critical thinking is a skill that can be taught like any other. And we know how. US intelligence agencies have been teaching analytical literacy successfully for decades to young officers charged with understanding global threats. Now, the front lines in this war against disinformation extend to the phones of all Americans. The skills that were once the province of a select few must become the ingrained habits of the many.

To that end, everyday citizens could benefit from the kind of analytic techniques that the CIA has honed for generations. For example, intelligence officers are taught “tradecraft”—structured analytic techniques designed to “challenge, refine, and challenge again” the mental models through which we all intuitively sift abundant information. Mental models save time but can confirm preconceptions even in the face of new evidence—the antithesis of worthy analysis. To surmount these mind-set challenges, analysts learn to identify relevant, credible information. They are taught to “pierce the shroud of secrecy—and sometimes deception—that state and non-state actors use to mislead.” They remain vigilant against fabricated evidence or false flags meant to divert their attention. From reliable information, they analyze competing hypotheses, draw reasonable inferences, and reach...
conclusions. Well-trained analysts then attack their own underlying assumptions and conclusions through purposeful contrarian techniques. And analysts remain well aware of their own fallibility.

Schools and academia should consider ways such rigorous analysis could be brought into curriculums. Ideally, just like every student learns the scientific method in STEM classes, every civics student should learn intelligence analysis techniques. The intelligence agencies could lead the promotion of this kind of thinking, but the impact of this initiative may be even greater if it were led by a nonpartisan NGO unaffiliated with the government. Such a group should take the initiative and meet the public where it lives: online. It could produce online videos that use well-established analytic techniques to promote critical thinking, without pushing a particular policy or political message. Think of an online Master Class taught by former intelligence analysts or respected elder statesmen and women. The goal would be to encourage Americans to be “self-conscious about their reasoning process,” as legendary CIA analyst and educator Richards Heuer, Jr., wrote. “They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.”

Does intelligence analysis sometimes come up short? Absolutely. The faulty judgments about Iraq’s WMD before the 2003 war are proof of that. But such errors—present in any human endeavor—only bolster the case for teaching good intelligence tradecraft to the public. If the public knew more about how intelligence analysts come to their conclusions, they may have asked different questions in the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003. In the years since, the Intelligence Community has recommitted itself to living its values: to fight groupthink, question assumptions, and ensure the credibility of evidence before making conclusions. These are lessons that can help us all defeat foreign propaganda.

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Endnotes

7. A Tradecraft Primer, 1.
One hundred years after the end of World War I, it is reasonable to ask whether the world needs another book on the writings of Thomas Edward Lawrence. Since the turn of this century alone, there have been books focused on Lawrence before WWI, Lawrence during WWI, and Lawrence’s role in the Middle East after WWI. The centenary of the end of the war and the coming centenaries of the 1919 Paris Peace Accords and Lawrence’s death will add to the list. There seems to be a never-ending demand for further details and new commentary on the actions of Lawrence and his contemporaries and their roles in the making of the 20th century Middle East.

The “Great Arab Revolt” started as a simple enough idea. As soon as the Ottoman Empire declared support for the German and Austro-Hungarian empires in WWI, the British government knew that the Ottoman caliph would be “encouraged” by his German allies to declare jihad against Britain and France. This was precisely what the caliph did on 14 November 1914. When this happened, German “agent provocateurs” as well as the Ottoman government, led by the “Young Turks,” used multiple networks to deliver messages to Muslims throughout the regions dominated by the British Empire, calling for good Muslims everywhere to rise up against the “infidel British.”

What British leaders in London, Cairo and New Delhi did not know was how Muslims inside the British Empire would respond. British diplomats and intelligence agents operating out of Cairo, New Delhi, Aden, and Kuwait City were tasked with determining whether the call for jihad would resonate with communities in their areas of responsibility. The reporting from agents on the Arabian Peninsula was clear: Proclamations from Constantinople had little bearing in the decisionmaking of tribal, ethnic, and sectarian leaders in the region; rather, alliances were made and broken based on far more practical factors, like success in raiding and the delivery these leaders of gold and guns from regional combatants. Given this perspective, British political and military leaders based in Cairo and New Delhi were determined to neutralize German and Ottoman activity in the region and expand the British influence campaign in the Peninsula through alliances with the various tribes—especially those tribes already hostile to their Ottoman overlords. If that also meant building a successful surrogate fighting force that might tie down some of the Ottoman forces in the region while British conventional forces conducted “real military operations” against the Ottomans, so much the better.

In 1914, Britain had an established tradition of using both formal intelligence professionals operating in the region and informal intelligence collectors in the Middle East. The professionals were most often based in British consulates throughout the region, and their activities followed the pattern of training, assignment, and supervision used with great success in British India. The intelligence professionals were based in British consulates throughout the region or, in the case of Egypt and the Sudan, serving as “political officers” supporting British proxy governments in the region. Members of the “official network” included Capt. William Henry Shakespeare, based in Kuwait; Col. Alfred Parker, based in the Sinai; and Col. Gerard Leachman, based in New Delhi and eventually in the Arabian Peninsula as “O.C. Desert” (officer in charge, desert).

In the book Spies in Arabia, Priya Satia begins the chapter “The Foundation of Covert Empire” with a de-
scription of the official nature of “consular” intelligence collection, as follows:

...consuls everywhere were responsible for producing commercial intelligence and protecting British citizens in their districts, but in the Ottoman Empire they were also entrusted with political functions, including collection of political intelligence, normally left to the more prestigious diplomatic service...

She contrasts the formal collectors with the informal collectors who were most often well known, well connected archaeologists or private travelers. These informal collectors included some of the most famous names in Middle East archaeology, including Leonard Woolley, Gertrude Bell, David Hogarth, and T. E. Lawrence. While conducting their own research in the area, these people were expected to also service collection requirements essential to the British government but inaccessible to formal collectors. Satia captures this role in her description of Gertrude Bell’s travels before the war:

Gertrude Bell’s friendships in the upper reaches of Whitehall allowed her to fuse polite travel and amateur archaeology with (unpaid) information gathering... The social world and institutions of this community extended abroad in the empire. In 1902, at the Delhi Durbar, Bell “met all the world.” It was there with Lorimer, Chirol, and Cox that she learned the latest news about the peninsular feud between the Houses of Saud and Rashid.

Formal or informal, these collectors shared a number of key skills: they lived in the environments of their targets, they had excellent Arabic (and French, and usually Persian), and they were anthropologists by training or habit. In sum, they knew their targets and could easily harvest intelligence from information, and ferret out fact from fiction.

Once the British forces were in the war and operating in the Middle East, the conflict needed these individuals to engage the locals and support the larger conventional army efforts in Palestine and Mesopotamia. These were complex military operations facing a determined Ottoman army with its own set of tribal allies. Neil Faulkner’s

2016 Lawrence of Arabia’s War (Yale University Press) provides the best single history of the conflict. Faulkner succeeds primarily because he does not focus exclusively on Lawrence’s exploits in the Hejaz and into Syria; instead, he describes in detail the complex nature of the two-pronged British attack on the Arab reaches of the Ottoman Empire—one set of operations designed and implemented from a Cairo-based headquarters, and a second set designed and implemented by the British Indian Army, headquartered in New Delhi and controlled from Basra, at the mouth of the Euphrates River.

Faulkner does not dismiss the importance of the Great Arab Revolt, but he does underscore the fact that tribal surrogates enhanced a conventional military success against the Ottomans. As with most special operations, surrogate forces in this conflict were necessary but not sufficient to defeat an occupying enemy force. Faulkner provides essential context and balance with other writings that portray the Great Arab Revolt as more than it was or that dismiss the revolt as just a creation of journalists like Lowell Thomas, who wanted at least one romantic battlefield in an otherwise horrible war.

What makes 27 Articles most interesting is that it is a printing of a single, handwritten note that Lawrence sent from the Arabian battlefield to British intelligence headquarters in Cairo (known as the “Arab Bureau”) for publication in the bureau’s regularly distributed Arab Bulletin.

Initially, Lawrence’s 27 Articles were incorporated into larger books of his writings, such as Malcolm Brown’s well edited book, T. E. Lawrence in War and Peace: The Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (Frontline Books, 2015) or archival material from the Arab Bulletin.

Many scholars have been critical of Lawrence’s two books on the Great Arab Revolt—The Seven Pillars of Wisdom and Revolt in the Desert. There is a cottage industry even today of scholars and amateurs who try to prove or disprove the events described in these two books. In one sense, the books reflect the thoughts of a soldier trying to manage his post-traumatic stress disorder, years after the war. As many veterans can attest, memory of combat operations is flawed, at best, and even with the as-

a. Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2008), 24.
b. Ibid., 36–37.
c. For additional information on the Arab Bureau, see Bruce Westrate, The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916–1920 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).
d. Archival material from the Arab Bureau is available at https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence.
sistance of notebooks and combat photography, there are always parts of a story that are not going to match “what really happened.” In 27 Articles, we see T. E. Lawrence trying to make sense of his role while he was still in it.

In this small, pamphlet-sized publication, we see a special operations leader giving advice on how to conduct unconventional warfare. Two examples demonstrate the practical nature of 27 Articles:

Article 8: Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work, you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds . . . (32)

Article 15: Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them . . . Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. (39)

There are many books that describe in detail the British war against the Ottoman forces in the Middle East, and these histories are essential reading for intelligence officers today. They describe “how we got to today” in the dynamic world of the Middle East and Southwest Asia. What 27 Articles provides, instead, is tactical advice for anyone involved in unconventional warfare. This very small book can and should be carried in briefcase or cargo pocket, and used by field officers for years to come.

The reviewer: J.R. Seeger is a retired operations officer. He is a frequent reviewer of works on paramilitary operations.
In 1929, the great powers of Europe met in Geneva to address issues related to handling both prisoners and civilians during any future war. The Geneva Convention, officially titled *The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, had 97 articles addressing every aspect of the treatment of captured warfighters, as well as civilians, in areas occupied by a hostile military force. The destructive power unleashed during World War I—the first modern war—surpassed the imagination of leaders on all sides of the conflict. Still, in 1929, European and US leaders had an almost chivalrous image of how the victorious should (and would) treat prisoners of war, best characterized in Article 5 of the convention, which states,

> Every prisoner of war is required to declare, if he is interrogated on the subject, his true names and rank, or his regimental number. If he infringes this rule, he exposes himself to a restriction of privileges accorded to prisoners of his category. No pressure shall be exercised on prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country. Prisoners who refuse to reply may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasantness or disadvantages of any kind whatsoever . . .

At the beginning of World War II, all of the European nations involved in the conflict and the United States were signatories to this convention, though the Soviet Union did not ratify the agreement and was therefore not obliged to follow it. When the conflict began, theoretically, the rights of prisoners of war (POWs) as well as those of non-combatant civilians were protected under international law. What the Geneva Convention did not address (and likely the signatories could not imagine at the time) was how complete and destructive “total war” would become by 1939. Europe witnessed a prelude to total war during the Spanish Civil War with the destruction of whole cities, but it was not until the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the 1940 German invasion of Holland, Belgium, and France that it became clear this conflict was unlike any other. It is no exaggeration to state that by the fall of 1940, the British government and people felt they were facing an existential threat from the Nazi war machine.

Further, while the full scope of the Nazi genocide against Jewish and other ethnic and religious groups in Germany proper and the areas Germany occupied were not immediately evident, it was clear by 1940 that the Nazi regime was not abiding by the Geneva Convention with regard to civilians. In July 1942, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt issued an order instructing all Allied parachutists to be turned over immediately to the Gestapo for interrogation and subsequent execution. In October 1942, the Nazi regime underscored their noncompliance with the Geneva Convention through a formal document known as *Kommandobefehl*, or “Commando order,” issued by Adolf Hitler. This order stated categorically that any time German forces captured “commandos” (i.e., special operations forces) regardless of whether they were in uniform, they were to be summarily executed; it also specified that any intelligence agents, saboteurs, or resistance forces not in uniform who were captured by the German military were to be turned over to the German Security Service (*Sicherheitsdienst*, or SD) for interrogation and execution.

This is the historical context for Dr. Helen Fry’s book, *The London Cage*. While the word “cage” in the title may sound barbaric, “cage” was the term the British used for the 12 POW camps in Britain that controlled prisoners and conducted interrogations. In addition to these locations, which were managed by a UK Army military intelligence unit known as MI19 (eventually renamed MI119), the British Security Service (MI5) maintained a separate facility—“Camp XX”—that focused on the interrogation of German intelligence agents captured after infiltrating into Britain. Battlefield POW facilities were also known colloquially as “cages.” The London Cage was the location for interrogation of prisoners thought to have important intelligence, including captured spies and/or POWs who were noncompliant with POW regulations.

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in other camps. Dr. Fry states that her review of war office records reveals that, from 1940 to 1946, approximately 3,000 German prisoners passed through the London Cage for interrogation.

The London Cage was located in No. 8 and No. 9, Kensington Palace Gardens. The gardens were royal property behind Kensington Palace where late-19th century mansions were built on grounds leased by the Crown to wealthy members of the nobility. By 1940, some of these properties had been abandoned and/or run down due to the loss of family fortunes or the tragic ends of family lines due to the casualties of World War I. In October 1940, the British military assumed control of these abandoned properties and created the “London Cage.” To run the facility, the military called back to service a WWII veteran British intelligence officer, 60-year-old Lt. Col. A. P. Scotland. Scotland had served as a British Army interrogator for the military intelligence in World War I, was fluent in German, and had actually served in a reserve capacity with the German army in the German colony of SW Africa at the turn of the century. In his memoir, also entitled The London Cage (Evans Brothers, 1957), Scotland describes his time as a German soldier in Africa and his work in Africa as an informant for British intelligence.

Fry establishes that without Scotland’s skill and experience the London Cage would never have become a productive intelligence collection facility: Scotland was an experienced interrogator, he was fluent in German, and was thoroughly familiar with German culture—including German military culture. Scotland managed the London Cage but also served as an advisor to other facilities. He designed training courses for other interrogators—contributions that led to the creation of an industrial-scale intelligence collection program across 12 facilities in Britain, as well as numerous initial detention and interrogation facilities closer to the battlefield.

Early in the book, Fry writes,

*It was largely due to Colonel Scotland’s expertise that by the end of the Second World War, British intelligence had an impressive and adaptable interrogation policy that produced intelligence of the highest quality, unequaled in any country...* (35)

As an example of the types of intelligence acquired at the London Cage, Dr. Fry points to the 1942 interrogations of prisoners captured in North Africa, which detailed the German rocket research at Peenemunde and provided some of the earliest accounts of German research on poison gas and its use in Nazi concentration camps. While intelligence reporting on tactical and operational material was certainly critical to the Allied commanders in the field, these strategic intelligence reports had significant impact both during the war as well as during the post-war trials at Nuremberg. At the end of the war, when the London Cage transitioned from intelligence collection to a focus on investigating war crimes, the skills of the interrogators—especially Scotland’s—were at their peak. From October 1945 to September 1948, interrogators at the London Cage handled 3,573 German military POWs and Nazi civilians, including commandants of the concentration camps, senior Wehrmacht commanders, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, and the aforementioned von Rundstedt. (123) The work of these interrogators was used in 15 separate trials at Nuremberg.

But Dr. Fry raises the question, “At what cost?” In the case of the London Cage, she was able to uncover very little hard evidence that interrogators at the facility ever abused prisoners, beyond the basic manhandling that was not uncommon treatment of enlisted Allied soldiers at the time. This lack of evidence may be in part because revelatory information in the British archives is still classified, or because it was long ago lost to the elements. Yet the lack of evidence may be because cases of abuse were, in reality, simply few and far between. Dr. Fry points to Scotland’s memoirs (which were classified for years), in which he denies any significant abuse of prisoners in the London Cage. But in her search for evidence of abuse, Dr. Fry did unearth sufficient anecdotal evidence to support her own view that the London Cage interrogators did, in some cases, probably violate the Geneva Convention rules for prisoners and the War Ministry’s official guidelines. That said, her research into British Army and War Ministry investigations did not reveal any proven cases of abuse in the London Cage.

*The London Cage* is most useful in the way it details Scotland’s papers and the War Office records that reflect Scotland’s description of what it takes to be a successful interrogator—fluency in the language of the target, a first-class memory, keen observation skills, infinite patience, knowledge of psychology, and the ability to act quickly on the previous four skills. To these, Scotland added his personal knowledge of how the German military treated its own soldiers, sailors, and airmen and how officers and non-commissioned officers delivered orders and expected obedience. Fry lists multiple examples of Scotland’s turning a failing interrogation into success simply because he understood how to deliver orders in fluent German, in the
right cultural context. The book also lays out how London Cage interrogators applied Scotland’s guidelines in their efforts to gain intelligence from some of the most serious Nazi war criminals and soldiers captured during World War II. While there are other major players in both Fry’s book and in Scotland’s memoir, it is clear that Scotland was the key to success at the London Cage. As Scotland stated in his own memoirs,

> It was not enough . . . to court the Germans, speak their language, join in their activities and study their techniques. You had to talk, think, and live like a German. You had to become one of them if you wanted to stay alive. You had to know the discipline of the soldier, and how to impose it. You had to understand the nature of the German military machine and the mental processes of the men who directed it. You had to learn how to take orders in true German fashion, and how to give them.  

While The London Cage is a history of a unit whose work ended almost 70 years ago, there are points in the book that will resonate with any intelligence officer or interrogator in a post-9/11 world. For example, in the concluding chapter, Dr. Fry states,

> . . . when dealing with die-hard fanatics, whether religious or political, history has shown that no results can usefully be achieved by being soft on them. A tough approach is necessary. But that approach must be within the boundaries of the Geneva Convention, to which all civilized countries adhere. Otherwise, how can such civilized societies uphold justice and deal with future war crimes?  

While Dr. Fry advocates “a tough approach” in this passage, both the Convention of 1929—and the subsequent Convention of 1949—make clear that any type of “tough approach” falls outside Convention covenants, and International Committee of the Red Cross inspectors are obliged to enforce them or report violations.

The interrogations in the London Cage took place 60 years before CIA interrogations began after 9/11, but the challenges were the same. How do interrogators make gains with prisoners who are “die-hard fanatics”? In the recent book Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Who Are Trying to Destroy America (Crown Forum, 2016), Dr. James Mitchell and Bill Harlow argued that the CIA did take a “tough approach”—but that the approach was approved by the president of the United States as well as lawyers at the Department of Justice, and this approach had been used in training military personnel at the Department of Defense Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape program (SERE). In his book, Mitchell, too, raises the question of whether the tough approach was the right one. He states,

> . . . I decided I had a duty to use what I knew to protect American citizens and our way of life. I was told that another deadly attack could occur at any moment, possibly involving a nuclear device or chemical or biological agents. I concluded that conducting coercive interrogations on a small number of Islamic terrorists who were actively withholding information that could disrupt a potentially catastrophic attack was justified, as long as those methods were lawful, authorized, and carefully monitored.  

Here, Mitchell is making essentially the same argument as the one with which interrogators at the London Cage, likewise, grappled. As Dr. Fry argues,

> Was what was done in the Cage justifiable? Between 1939 and 1945, as Britain was waging an existential war of possible obliteration, and democracy itself was placed at risk, what happened at the London Cage and other similar intelligence sites raise important moral questions. (219)  

Readers of The London Cage will have to draw their own conclusions to these important moral questions, as well as to the question of whether Colonel Scotland and his team were successful at balancing the demand for critical intelligence with the methods used to obtain that information. This is precisely the reason intelligence professionals should read The London Cage: it is they who will be tasked to build and run future interrogation programs, and Dr. Fry’s book offers an important historical analogue for the work.

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c. Mitchell and Harlow, Enhanced Interrogation, 49.
The Future of War: A History
Lawrence Freedman (Public Affairs, 2017), 227 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

Analysis of forces and operations is the bedrock of military analysis. How policymakers, military officials, and strategists think about war underpins how they organize and apply forces and operations. This also includes how militaries adopt and adapt new technologies and tactics to achieve victory. In his new book The Future of War: A History, Lawrence Freedman traces the thinking about warfare from the Western perspective, and although he touches on today’s new military technology and concerns about cyber warfare, his work is not about what future conflicts will look like. Rather, he warns policymakers to be wary of analysts and strategists who promise a fast track to victory though new technologies and tactics. He covers military theories about war among the major powers, humanitarian intervention and civil war, and counterterrorism.

As one might infer from the title, The Future of War: A History offers a short course on macro changes in thinking about war in the United States and the United Kingdom over the past 150 years. Along the way, Freedman harshly critiques American political science’s approach to studying war and argues against efforts to make predictions about war. A major flaw of the work is Freedman’s lack of attention to how intelligence fits into the thinking about warfare.

Freedman is an accomplished military historian. He has published works on war and strategy for more than 30 years. As Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, Freedman won accolades in 2013 for Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press), which comprehensively reviewed business, military, and political strategy and plumbed the depths of thinking about what strategy is and how it is executed. For The Future of War: A History, he takes a historian’s approach to how thinking about war and its execution has evolved, drawing on a wide range of sources, including fictional works by H.G Wells and in movies.

Freedman’s goal is to examine how different writers have thought about war during the times in which they lived. He aims to “explore the prevailing understanding about the causes of war and their likely conduct and course.” He focuses primarily on the United States and the United Kingdom because he knows these states best and because they “have been at the top of the international hierarchy for some time.” (xix) As such, he provides no insight into how Soviet, Asian, or African warfighters or policymakers have reflected upon war, let alone non-state actors such as ISIS, which is an invitation for other scholars to fill the void.

Freedman argues there is no dominant model for future war. In his view, from about the middle of the 19th century to the end of the Cold War, theories of war rested on an idealized model of decisive battles. Surprise and overwhelming force were the hallmarks of this thinking and drove a focus on first-strike planning and operations that would deliver a knock-out punch to the enemy. The adoption of technologies and tactics, such as improvements in guns, armored vehicles, aircraft, and missiles, and the targeting of civilian populations—in addition to warfighters—changed warfare’s character, but not theories of war. Freedman naturally starts with classic military theorists, such as Clausewitz and Jomini, and also weaves in work by futurists of the time. The development and prospective use of nuclear weapons fits within this first-strike, overwhelming force model, and Freedman points out that these weapons had the greatest effect on thinking about war because they had a chilling effect on the willingness of major powers to consider direct war with each other.

Western states, particularly the United States, stumbled into a range of conflicts following the Cold War. Freedman argues theories about military intervention—humanitarian, peacekeeping, nation-building, and counterterrorism—were underdeveloped, creating difficulties for pursuing goals in such conflicts. US intervention in Vietnam shows both Freedman’s point about major

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powers’ being cautious about direct confrontation and the
difficulties of intervention, despite being in the middle of
the Cold War. Oddly, Freedman does not focus much on
US strategic thinking about counterinsurgency warfare,
such as that of retired US Army general David Petraeus
or oft-published counterinsurgency expert David Kilcul-
len. Freedman spends some time reviewing how books
and movies on the US experience in Vietnam influenced
American thinking of engaging in such conflicts, but he
does not explain how this led to humanitarian interven-
tions or nation-building ventures.

Freedman harshly criticizes US political science ap-
proaches to studying war. He takes to task the Correlates
of War project and the democratic peace theory, focusing
on the flaws in quantifying war based on battle deaths
and applying quantitative methods to assess the potential
for war. Part of Freedman’s issue with coding conflicts is
that disaggregating conflict into discrete series of dyads
obscures the intertwined nature conflicts. For example,
as a historian, Freedman sees Iraq’s conflicts with Iran,
Kuwait, the United States, and ISIS as a stream of inter-
connected conflicts, not individual wars.

a. See J. R. Seeger, “Tracking the History of a Counterinsurgency
Expert: Four Books by David Kilcullen” in Studies in Intelligence

It is surprising that Freedman does not touch on the
role of intelligence in his review of thinking on war. The
United States’s adoption of a permanent intelligence ap-
paratus following World War II to guard against surprise
attack is a direct reflection of how US policymakers
thought about war at the time. Moreover, the focus on
surprise attacks, decisive battles, and military technolog-
ical advances drove US and Soviet intelligence services
to steal one another’s military secrets, conduct covert
operations, and undertake efforts to assess the potential
and viability for surprise attacks. Similarly, the use of
intelligence services to arm local allies in civil wars, as-
sess developments in humanitarian conflicts, and combat
terrorists all fed into the thinking about these kinds of
conflicts.

Freedman laces The Future of War with side commen-
tary against making predictions about war. He is abso-
lutely right to warn that we should be wary of those who
advocate technological advances or new tactics as quick,
clean, “silver bullets” to military victory. But Freedman
seems to confuse advocacy with analytic prediction.
Cyber warfare, the use of drones, and other military ad-
ances certainly add new aspects to war, and we need to
think through whether or how these change war and how
we should think about war. Rather than throw prediction
out the window as Freedman suggests, we need to explore
predictive assessments about war to gain greater insight.

The reviewer: Jason Manosevitz is an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis. He is a member of the Studies in Intelli-
gence Editorial Board.
Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam


Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey

Hue 1968 is a book on a mission, refusing to be just another war story. Instead of simply chronicling the plight of those caught up in it, Bowden is bent on convincing the reader that the battle was not only very consequential but overseen by a foolish top leadership. And so the book is a mixed bag. As a war story, Hue 1968 is a quite compelling and moving account of its participants—the US Marines and Army, the communist fighters, and the Hue citizens in the middle of the fight. As a larger history of the Tet offensive and Vietnam War, the book is flawed and facile.

The battle for Hue was part of the Tet offensive begun in late January 1968, in which communist units attacked 39 of South Vietnam’s 44 provincial capitals, five of six autonomous cities, 71 of 242 district capitals, some 50 hamlets, virtually every allied airfield, many other military targets, and Saigon itself.1 But whereas the enemy, failing to ignite a general uprising in support of the attacks, was forced to retreat from most places in a matter of days, the fighting in Hue lasted for 25 days. The communists saw control of the former capital and still cultural center of all Vietnam as a prime goal and devoted massive resources to achieve this end—10,000 North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong troops. The US military and its South Vietnamese counterpart (ARVN) retook the city, but at a heavy price. Two hundred and fifty US Marines and soldiers were killed, and 1,554 wounded. Another 458 ARVN soldiers were killed and an estimated 2,700 wounded. Estimates of communist losses run from 2,400 to 5,000. As for the civilians, Bowden calculates about 8,000 died, including those the communists put to death in political reprisals. More than 80 percent of the city’s structures were either destroyed or seriously damaged.

(495)

Bowden constructs the narrative around the three battles within a battle for Hue: one in southern Hue to retake the Triangle, using the MACV compound there as a base. Another in northern Hue for the Citadel (the iconic, old, walled city center that contained the historic seat of government) consisted of ARVN soldiers holding on at their base until the US Marines could assist them. The last part of the fight for Hue involved a US Army move down from the northwest to overtake La Chu, a key command and supply center for communist forces in Hue. Each battle had its heroic leaders: Lt. Col. Ernie Cheatham in the Triangle, Maj. Bob Thompson in the Citadel, and Col. James Vaught on the road to La Chu. For the enemy, the battle strategy was originally to take the city, prepare for the impending counterattack, and triumph with support from the general uprising of the residents. When no uprising took place, the strategy simply became one of exacting a tremendous toll on the Marine and ARVN attempts to retake Hue. The best way to do that was to stay close—“hold the enemy by the belt” (266)—so the US military could not bring its superior firepower to use without endangering its own troops.

The learning curve required to understand how to fight an enemy in close contact, as well as one entrenched in an urban setting, is one of the most compelling parts of the story. Given that the last experience the US military had had with urban warfare was the battle for Seoul during the Korean War, Cheatham looked for field manuals on the topic, finding two relevant ones, Combat in Built-Up Areas and An Assault on a Fortified Position. (239) He also chose older, more powerful weapons to blast holes, such as the 106-mm recoilless rifle and bazookas. The often maligned—but still popular with the troops—Ontos, a small armored vehicle mounted with six recoilless rifles, played a paramount role during attacks on entrenched enemy positions. (207)

Much of the power of Hue 1968 comes from what happened to the Marines when they did not—or sometimes when they did—do what the manuals said: Stay off the streets. Go through walls, not around or over them. Avoid going through doors and windows. Blast your way forward, through anything that stands in your way. Clear the ground floor on the way to the top. For rooms, toss in a grenade, then have one soldier fire left of center, another-

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er right of center, and another aim at the ceiling, in case more enemy are upstairs. Bowden’s detailing these tactics and his accounts of soldiers doing this painstaking and dangerous work is superbly rendered—it’s even amusing at times, as when he recounts a Marine captain’s visiting an abandoned Esso gas station looking for a proper map of the city . . . or when some Marines changed tactics and conducted a night assault on a building, only to find it abandoned. The enemy found the Marines’ predictable focus on day fighting allowed them to rest in safer spaces at dusk.

The plight of the citizens is also well covered. Many of them tried to lay low, or when discovered, just go along, most of them unenthusiastically, with communist attempts to whip up their support for the cause. Citizens pressed into service to help with Viet Cong and NVA defenses worried about being mistaken for the enemy when the seemingly inevitable US military and ARVN counterattack came. When the tide of battle started to turn, many residents tried to get behind Marine lines for protection. Some citizens, however, went along quite enthusiastically with political reprisals for those on enemy lists, which were so sweeping as to include “the law faculty of Hue University.” (299) Bowden notes the difficulty of sorting out whether those found in the mass graves were assassinated for political reasons, victims of score settling, or simply people killed during the fighting. (393)

As the rather extensive collaborators list suggests, the communists planned meticulously for taking and holding the city. They distributed new uniforms to boost the morale of the troops and show the citizens the communist forces were not some ragged force but a respectable outfit. Instead of raising the North Vietnamese flag above the royal palace, a new, gigantic one was created that would underscore that the battle was one of liberation—not conquest. Its design and color scheme were chosen to pay respect to the city’s major factions—Buddhists, Catholics, and intellectuals. Even when the battle increasingly looked less like liberation and more like a losing cause, a leading general outmaneuvered his political overseers, who were seeking permission to withdraw from the city; the general saw much gain in prolonging the battle and inflicting damage on the image of United States, abroad. (341)

The book gives brief mention to the ARVN’s heroic defense of its base at Mang Ca in the Citadel—and that’s about it, for the South Vietnamese Army’s perspective. Bowden suspects that the presence of a Vietnamese government translator during some of his interviews may have had a chilling effect on those considering whether to participate—too dangerous, even today. Bowden is not alone here: the perspective of the South Vietnamese is sorely missing from most accounts of the Vietnam War. In addition, scant mention is made of the civilian US government personnel (Department of State, US Agency for International Development, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.) who were in Hue. A rough count from the book puts fewer than 20 US officials in Hue, of which seven were killed or executed; four were captured, with two of those dying along the Ho Chi Minh trail while being moved north; and five who made it to safety after a week.

The harrowing experiences of those fighting or trapped in the embattled city should be material enough for a powerful story without having to oversell it, but Bowden seems conflicted about intelligence’s role in warning about the Tet offensive, coming down on the side of judging it the “worst intelligence failure of the war.” (525) As CIA historian Harold Ford makes clear in CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, CIA’s Saigon Station in November and December 1967 drafted three major cables, each of which warned that a powerful, nationwide enemy offensive was coming. And though Headquarters poured cold water on these assessments, the US military command in Vietnam (MACV) did act on the warnings, redeploying some troops to Saigon.

A particularly flawed attempt to make for a better story is Bowden’s noting what American soldiers had supposedly told themselves about the war. “The enemy was weak. He had little or no popular support. He had no significant presences in South Vietnam beyond the small bands of rebels capable of minor raids in rural areas.” (90) However, it was these very soldiers who provided input into 1967 estimates of the Viet Cong strength alone, with Defense putting the total at 300,000 and the CIA at 430,000. Either estimate shows a very formidable and capable enemy. The biggest unknown about the communist forces was intent, not capability. As for enemy presence in

South Vietnam, a 1967 CIA map shows most of the country as either controlled by the enemy or up for grabs.3

Part of the problem was Bowden’s initial concept for the book. He agreed with his publisher’s idea of chronicling the Battle for Hue as a “way of writing about the entire Vietnam War.” (541) This explains where an otherwise absorbing book goes wrong, with the author, who has never written anything about the war except for this book, making sweeping judgments for which he lacks established expertise. Bowden is less equipped to assess the larger landscape of one battle than authors who have written voluminously about the same war, such as Stephen Sears writing about the Civil War, and Antony Beevor writing about World War II.

So, the further away from the battlefield Bowden goes, the more assertive, even polemical, *Hue 1968* gets. A case in point is the initial missions the Marines were sent on to recapture territory including the Truong Tien Bridge linking northern and southern Hue. Given that the enemy was entrenched and vastly outnumbered the Marines, these attacks were suicidal. Bowden powerfully details how the Marines fought bravely against all odds. He rightly places blame all the way up the military leadership chain for its stubborn refusal to acknowledge the enemy’s strength and control of the city.

When the story gets to Gen. William Westmoreland, though, the narrative gets looser. Besides tiresomely referring to him as “Westy,” Bowden draws the general as a caricature, some clueless and hidebound military leader who paled next to his more astute successor, Creighton Abrams. However, as Vietnam historian Dale Andrade points out, both generals faced the same quandary: devote a significant share of US forces to keeping enemy conventional units away from the population, and only then would pacification stand a chance. “Whether the operation was called ‘search and destroy’ (under Westmoreland) or ‘one war’ (under Abrams) made little difference.”4

The book’s epilogue does not add much, and includes oft-repeated formulations, such as the Vietnam War “ought to have taught (but has not) Americans to cultivate deep regional knowledge in the practice of foreign policy, and to avoid being led by ideology instead of understanding . . . Beware of men with theories that explain everything.” (526) In the end, Bowden admits the book is “mostly the work of a journalist, in that it is primarily based on interviews.” (564) *Hue 1968* worked best when Bowden stuck to this modest understanding.

Notes:

2. Ibid., 86.

The reviewer: Thomas G. Coffey has served in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis. He is currently a member of the Lessons Learned Program of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.
Cold War Games: Spies, Subterfuge and Secret Operations at the 1956 Olympic Games
Harry Blutstein (Bonnier Publishing, Australia: Echo imprint, 2017), 348 pp., notes, bibliography, photographs, index.

Reviewed by Kevin Davies

Several books regarding Australia have made a welcome contribution to the intelligence and espionage literature recently. Books and articles on Australian contributions to COMINT and ELINT during World War II provided valuable insights to the intelligence war. Even topics like Australia’s WWII contribution to camouflage and deception are beginning to receive attention. The trilogy of official history of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO—Australia’s MI5) detailed ASIO’s role in shaping and responding to events during the Cold War and beyond. Mark Aarons’s The Family File (Black Inc, 2010) is an important adjunct to the official ASIO histories, presenting intelligence history from the perspective of one of its targets—leading Australian communists. Finally, Lance Collins and Warren Reed’s Plunging Point: Intelligence Failures, Cover-ups and Consequences (Fourth Estate, 2005) provides a much-needed Australian perspective on intelligence theory, practice, and ethics.

The release of Cold War Games: Spies, Subterfuge, and Secret Operations at the 1956 Olympic Games by freelance journalist and adjunct professor at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology Harry Blutstein is well-timed, coinciding with revelations of the systemic, state-sponsored doping of athletes by the Russian government. Comparisons between the past and the present are inevitable and justifiable. Readers of this book will quickly find that there is much more.

While 1956 Melbourne Olympics were called the “friendly games,” this term, however, was but a thin veneer that covered a cauldron of international intrigue, crisis, and gamesmanship. Commencing in November, just weeks after the Suez invasion and the crushing of the Hungarian Uprising, the friendly games became an athletic battleground for countries to assert their superiority over one another, or to seek revenge for past (or present) injustices. Australia was not completely immune to this, as Blutstein points out, providing no more than a “bare ripple of applause” to Japanese athletes entering the Melbourne Cricket Group during the Opening Ceremony (xvi).

Blutstein provides an excellent account of how many nations used espionage and propaganda at the Games. Both the capitalist and communist nations saw them as an opportunity to display the inherent advantages of “their” sides and both attempted to exploit the opportunity for propaganda purposes. This occurred on multiple fronts—the United States vs. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), East Germany and West Germany (even if they competed under the same flag), and, briefly, between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC, i.e., Taiwan)—and at all levels. An example of this is a small-scale and unplanned operation done by PRC journalist Zhang Chaoling, when he tricked an Australian soldier into raising the PRC flag during the 29 October 1956 flag-raising ceremony to honor the arrival of the Taiwanese advance party. (139–43) Fortunately for the organizers, the PRC’s eventual boycott (one of

d. The Official History of ASIO is comprised of three volumes, all of which are published by Allen and Unwin: David Horner, The Spy Catchers (2014); John Blaxland, The Protest Years (2015); and John Blaxland and Rhys Crawley, The Secret Cold War (2016).

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several) spared them of any further PRC-ROC antics. But there remained plenty of other opportunities for mischief.

Early chapters on the international events leading up to Games provide the reader with background that accounts for why the Games transpired the way they did, without getting bogged down in too much minutiae. Blutstein also provides political and personal perspectives—for example, he describes specific matches at a length appropriate to their relevance, and by doing so ensures that readers with more of an interest in the sporting aspect of the book are not left feeling unsatisfied.

There is an ample supply of intelligence operations and antics to keep the reader interested. Intelligence historians will invariably note that the name “Vasili Mitrokhin” appears occasionally, albeit not in an especially complimentary light. Those interested in Australian intelligence history will also be pleased to see that Eric Nave, a legend of cryptography, makes an appearance. The alcohol-induced headache given to ASIO by Vladimir Petrov—the KGB lieutenant colonel who defected to Australia in April 1954 after he was arrested for being drunk and disorderly while the Games were underway—provides an amusing example of the unexpected problems intelligence agencies have to face when dealing with defectors. (239–43) Continuing on the propaganda front, Blutstein recounts the United States Information Agency’s debacle that was Sport in Art, which unexpectedly found itself a victim of McCarthy-style smears. In this chapter, Blutstein provides a useful insight into the danger that ideologues pose to a democracy when they see the enemy everywhere or, worse, cynically exploit fear for their own base ends, to the detriment of the very rights that democracies claim are inalienable.

Amongst the intrigue, the book takes a refreshing detour into one of the enduring tropes— forbidden love. Taking the concept of the “friendly games” to the next level, the relationship between Czechoslovak discus thrower Olga Fiktová and American hammer thrower Harold “Hal” Connolly is treated with respect and dignity. Blutstein details the sort of obstacles people from different countries, different ideologies, and, in this case, different religions, face when they simply want to marry the person they love. The story of Olga and Hal would likely qualify as a modern fairytale, had the marriage not eventually ended in divorce in 1974.

The book has an easy-to-read journalistic style. The opening chapter, recounting the famous “blood in the water” polo semifinal between Hungary and the USSR draws the reader in with clear, concise language and the occasional droll one-liner that provides comic relief to the conflict and angst that surrounded the Games. While the book is well-referenced in the endnotes, the lack of direct links to specific sources is frustrating if the reader wishes to trace historical sources. Rather than a full bibliography, the book offers a selected reading list and web-link.

In conclusion, Blutstein deserves high commendation for Cold War Games. The book expands the study of Australia’s intelligence history beyond a parochial treatise on Australian intelligence agencies or operatives, and places these against a backdrop of fierce international competition and intrigue that only the Olympics can bring. It is a well-researched and well-told story that provides readers with a fascinating insight into international relations and the world of intelligence in the 1950s. The fortunate timing of its release makes the book a wonderful complement to the current intersection of the world of sport and espionage, and serves as a none-too-subtle reminder that history does tend to repeat itself.

The Reviewer: Kevin Davies holds a Master of Arts Degree in Defence Studies from the Australian Defence Force Academy.
Of all the spymasters who have ever practiced the art, few have started as an auto mechanic and embalmer, but Donald Nichols did both and was able to parlay his latent talents into his own postwar Korean spy organization, complete with his own base, secret army, and rules. The fascinating but profoundly disturbing story of how he did that is the theme of Blaine Harden’s new book, *King of Spies*.

Nichols did not have the most auspicious start as an intelligence star. Raised in poverty, with a loose-living mother who left him and his siblings at an early age, he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. His salvation appeared in the form of the military—in the spring of 1940 he joined the Army and received orders for Karachi, British India. He would serve in the region throughout WW II. In this environment Nichols learned a foundational lesson—“If you make the bosses happy, they won’t question your methods.” (21)

In 1947, Nichols transferred to the US Air Force and received orders for Korea, an undesirable assignment for most airmen but a godsend to Nichols, given his dysfunctional life at home. He arrived in Seoul in late June 1946 in the midst of a bloody civil war between the anti-Communist government of strongman President Syngman Rhee and anti-government forces inspired by the young, charismatic, popular leader of North Korea, Kim Il-Sung. Although anti-US feelings in South Korea were rampant, where others saw chaos, Nichols saw an opportunity to conduct “positive intelligence,” i.e., infiltrating leftist organizations and sending agents behind enemy lines to find targets and recruit informers.

In his new-found venture, he had a powerful natural ally—President Rhee—with whom he had a “father-son” relationship. The 71-year-old Rhee apparently first met the 23-year-old Nichols in 1946, and each was suitably impressed with the other. More than that, each needed the other—the information that Nichols provided to Rhee via his agents would help the president stay in power, and the patronage that Nichols received from Rhee would make him a celebrity and key power broker in South Korea.

In the meantime, Nichols continued to build his intelligence empire and satisfy his customers, who rewarded him with unrestricted funding, equipment, and promotions. From Army master sergeant he was quickly promoted in the Air Force to chief warrant officer, then to lieutenant, captain, and finally major. By 1949, the then low-ranking US Air Force NCO had amazingly become the chief air advisor to a foreign head of state—Rhee. That same year, the last US troops left Korea, and Nichols and his six agents who remained became part of the Korean Military Advisory Group, or KMAG.

Also in 1949, Nichols met the one man most responsible for the longevity of his Air Force career—the Fifth Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. Earle Partridge, who saw much of his past self in the portly, undisciplined non-conformist. As Harden notes, throughout his career and life, Nichols had the disarming ability to befriend older, powerful men such as Partridge, who went to great lengths to defend, reward, and keep him happy. When Nichols managed to make what Harden refers to as “an exceptionally powerful enemy” in the person of Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur’s chief intelligence officer, Ambassador Muccio—for whom KMAG worked—defended Nichols, and Partridge kept Nichols under the shelter of his wing for years to come.

Nichols quickly gained some measure of intelligence fame for providing US authorities with the projected date of the North Korean invasion of the South, which occurred on 25 June 1950. As Harden notes, however, Nichols’s report has never surfaced, and the author posits that it might have been imaginary, as Nichols had a lifelong history of making things up, according to family and friends—a trait that would eventually undermine his career. Nonetheless, a jealous rather than vengeful Willoughby then tried to hire Nichols away, as did CIA, but Partridge and the Air Force continued to pamper and

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King of Spies

David A. Foy is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews.

He also proved his worth by feeding bombing targets to the Fifth Air Force, using his network of agents to glean relevant information. In grateful appreciation, Tokyo-based Far East Air Forces commander Gen. George Stratemeyer promoted Nichols, then a lieutenant, to captain. President Rhee, meanwhile, had taken advantage of the invasion to slaughter tens of thousands of South Korean communists in a brutal example of political cleansing that remained largely unknown for 50 years. Nichols, an eyewitness to the largest such massacre, near Taejon, said nothing about it until he wrote his autobiography 31 years later, and even then he purposely changed the venue to disguise his peripheral involvement.

Nichols expanded his operations to include codebreaking after he obtained a North Korean People’s Army codebook from a North Korean defector. Nichols set up a unit to monitor the unchanged codes and had the translated intercepts immediately delivered to Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force headquarters, both then in Taegu, by jeep—the gold standard in providing intelligence support to the battlefield. Such actions caused observers to dub him “the King of Codebreaking,” although such inside information did not enable him to foresee the Chinese invasion of Korea in November 1950; as Harden points out, President Rhee, meanwhile, had taken advantage of the invasion to slaughter tens of thousands of South Korean communists in a brutal example of political cleansing that remained largely unknown for 50 years. Nichols, an eyewitness to the largest such massacre, near Taejon, said nothing about it until he wrote his autobiography 31 years later, and even then he purposely changed the venue to disguise his peripheral involvement.

In early 1951, Maj. Gen. Partridge proposed to his boss, Gen. Stratemeyer, the creation of a special unit for Nichols and his men, the innocuous-sounding Special Activities Unit #1, changed four months later to the even murkier Detachment 2 of the 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS), which became much better-known in theater as “Nick’s outfit,” or just “NICK.” As Harden writes, “Nichols was given open-ended authority to gather intelligence, conduct sabotage, demolition, and guerrilla operations behind enemy lines.” (99–100) By late 1952, Nichols controlled a vast empire. NICK consisted of 50 sub-detachments and 52 Air Force personnel and 900 Korean agents and fighters reported to him personally. His personal salvaging of a then-revolutionary T-34 tank and the daring recovery of two downed MiG-15 jet fighters (though South Korean eyewitnesses downplayed his role in both), combined with his extension in Korea, prompted his promotion to major in late 1951. The official US Air Force history of the Korean War described him as “the

Nicholas would earn one more positive fitness report, including a promotion recommendation in 1956, before he would be engulfed in accusations of fraud, mishandling of official funds, “irregularities” in the handling of sources, homosexuality, and pedophilia. Eventually diagnosed as schizophrenic, he was in and out of psychiatric care, he was medically discharged in 1962. He continued to be accused again of sexual misconduct, including the rape of a teenaged girl, but he managed to stay out of jail, meeting his end under psychiatric care in a VA hospital in 1992.

King of Spies is a well-written page-turner, as one would expect given such a colorful, outrageous life as that of Donald Nichols. Much to the chagrin of historians, journalists often write more readable books, and Harden, a past Washington Post bureau chief and author, is no exception. The map and selected photographs are welcome aids to the reader, and the story is an important and neglected one that needs to be told frankly.

By the same token, readers need to be aware of comments the author makes in the book that raise eyebrows if not hackles. For example, he describes the MiG-15 as “blazingly fast” (98), which leads the reader to believe that it completely outclassed the F-86 Sabre Jet, yet the maximum speeds of the two fighters are only one mile-per-hour apart. Perhaps more disturbing is Harden’s thinly-disguised role as North Korean apologist, arguing that it is activity such as Nichols’s that explains why Kim Jong-Un so intensely hates the United States today, a specious conclusion that warps historical perspective to express a political opinion. The most compelling lesson that readers should take away from this story is that, despite his intelligence accomplishments, Nichols was an aberration, not even remotely the norm. Finally, being a consummate spymaster does not necessarily make one a “king of spies,” and even a cursory reading of intelligence history will suggest other individuals more deserving of the book’s title.

In a sense, reading King of Spies is like getting an inoculation—the experience is going to hurt initially but ultimately will be beneficial.

The reviewer: David A. Foy is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews.
“Espionage, like rugby, is a ruffian’s game, played by gentlemen.” (267)

The quotation above, from author Larry Loftis, is an appropriate commentary on the life and times of double agent Dusko Popov, whose incredible career is the focus of Into the Lion’s Mouth and the model for the fictional James Bond, the creation of a man with whom Popov was somewhat acquainted, Royal Navy Commander and intelligence officer Ian Fleming. Popov, described by the author as, “above all, a showman,” (3) was born into a well-to-do Serbian family in 1912 and seemed destined to enjoy a lucrative and luxurious career as a lawyer. However, his penchant for speaking his mind, paired with his hatred of Nazism, resulted in a temporary stay in Freiburg prison courtesy of the Gestapo, followed by expulsion to Switzerland.

Returning to his law practice in Dubrovnik in 1937, his subsequent life was dramatically changed by a telegram from his closest friend and fellow member of the elite, Johnny Jebsen, who informed Popov that he had decided to join the Abwehr, German military intelligence, which he considered the best alternative available for him at the time.

Love for his friend prompted Popov to help Johnny—and thereby German intelligence—with an operational tasking, but his fondness for democracy prompted him to simultaneously inform British foreign intelligence, MI6, which encouraged Dusko to play along with German intelligence, feeding them information the British service provided. As an Abwehr agent, Popov was assigned to Lisbon, Portugal, a key neutral allied with the British since 1373. The chief of MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service), Maj. Gen. Stewart Menzies—better-known as “C”—also sought information on his opposite number, Abwehr Director Adm. Wilhelm Canaris. Furthermore, Popov’s linguistic capabilities, law degree, wealth, and highly-placed contacts made him invaluable to MI5 (Security Intelligence Service) as well, enabling him to travel freely. Thus, in a smooth, brief transition, Popov simultaneously became a double agent—TRICYCLE to the British, SKOOT to the Germans—while also parading as a Yugoslav businessman genuinely preoccupied with the fate of his family members.

By the end of 1940, Popov had flown to England and met his MI5 handler, Col. T.A. “Tar” Robertson, head of the Double Agents section. He also had a memorable, if disturbing, private meeting with Menzies, who provided a brutally frank assessment of his new agent, telling Popov, “You have too many devices on your banner.” (45) The author never fully explains this bizarre comment, presumably a reference to the fact that Popov was too flamboyant a character to be successful at the deadly game of intrigue and espionage—as Loftis describes him, Popov was “an incorrigible playboy who dated enough women to make even Bond blush.” (85–86) Once again by helping Johnny, Popov backed his way into one of the great intelligence coups of World War II, tragically appreciated only after the fact.

In November 1940, the British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy launched a nighttime, pre-emptive raid on the Italian naval base at Taranto, the world’s first aerial assault against a defended port. Japanese military strategists were interested in how the attack occurred, and Popov’s German minders opined that the Japanese would enter the war by attacking the United States in similar fashion. Intent upon helping their Pacific ally and themselves as well, the Germans tasked Popov with getting the answers to a host of questions on US defensive measures, including a page-long list on Pearl Harbor defenses alone. They conveyed the questionnaire to Popov using the latest technique in espionage, the microdot.

Finally convincing the British Double-Cross (XX) Committee that he was not a triple agent, Popov was dispatched by his Abwehr handlers to the United States to set up an agent network there, a proposal which the British and the American FBI were willing to accept. The change in his life was dramatic, as was the result...
of venue for Popov prompted FBI demands to control him while in the United States, to which the British only warily agreed; as Popov soon learned, the Bureau wanted him to help catch German spies, not conduct espionage while in the country. Dusko arrived in New York in August 1941 and set about answering the questions he had memorized, sharing the information with the Bureau. He thus acquainted US officials with the high-level German and Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor four months before the “Day of Infamy” attack; however, no warning of this interest was ever passed to the US military.

This failure, combined with FBI chief Hoover’s irascibility and Popov’s determination to go toe-to-toe with the law enforcement legend, resulted in what Loftis accurately characterizes as “a scandalously dysfunctional relationship” (93) between TRICYCLE and the Bureau. Of the eight formal investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack, not one mentions either Popov or the questionnaire. When the captain of the ship on which Popov was traveling on 7 December announced the Pearl Harbor attack, Popov felt proud—but only until he heard the tragic results, wondering how such a disaster could have occurred when he had already provided the critical defense information.

With his relationship with the FBI worsening, he was recalled to London, where he continued to feed false information to the Germans, including in two famous deception operations—misleading the Germans into believing a planned Allied landing in southern Europe was to take place in Greece and Sardinia and that the Western Front would be opened well north of Normandy. Such acts helped earn him the Order of the British Empire. After the liberation of France, he went to Paris to establish a new British intelligence network. After the war ended, he lived there and prospered and eventually acquired British citizenship.

In the estimation of Loftis, Popov’s greatest accomplishments during his astonishing life as a double agent consisted of the information that he provided on Pearl Harbor and his involvement in the D-Day deception. He also characterizes Popov as “Britain’s greatest World War II double agent and perhaps history’s best spy.” (261)

While the first assertion will likely go unchallenged, the second could engender heated discussion over many years. It is worth noting, however, that most biographers are enamored of their subjects, and Loftis is no exception in that regard.

Into the Lion’s Mouth is generally well-written and is aided greatly by the Dramatis Personae section—which readers will be consulting often—and by the helpful appendices, particularly the one that lists all the intelligence operations in which Popov was involved. The volume reflects the wide use of primary source materials, in various foreign languages, as well as standard US sources. Although Loftis does his best as a lawyer and accomplished writer to explain the tangled web of intrigue that characterizes the life and operations of TRICYCLE, portions of the narrative are challenging to follow, such as the British laundering of German funds to support their intelligence operations. Besides providing details of German and British intelligence activities during the war, Loftis also provides important, albeit disturbing, information about J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI, their general missteps in the unfamiliar larger world of intelligence, and their particularly misguided assessment of Popov and his motives. Bureau champions will find little to cheer about in these pages.

On the other hand, Into the Lion’s Mouth—the title taken from Montagu’s description of Popov’s career—is the able telling of an important and generally overlooked story, as the only other book-length survey of Popov’s life is that by British journalist Russell Miller, author of Codename Tricycle (Pimlico, 2005). Readers who pick up Loftis’s work will be impressed anew with the dexterity, daring, and skill needed to be an intelligence operative, much less a double agent.
In Destination Casablanca, Meredith Hindley has produced something rare, a non-fiction book that can serve as a vital companion piece to a classic fiction movie—in this case, the Ingrid Bergman, Humphrey Bogart film of 1942, Casablanca. The book will enhance any viewer’s knowledge and understanding of the film and of history, and it will provide the modern-day intelligence officer with operational insights into tradecraft of 75 years ago that remain valid today.

Doubtless, many have asked when viewing Casablanca, as Hindley did, “What is going on at Rick’s Cafe American? What are letters of transit? Why so many refugees in Casablanca? What became of them, what lay behind the complex American-German-French relationships in North Africa, and how did they evolve and conclude? Are these events real?” This well written, readable, and thoroughly researched history answers all. Dr. Hindley has conducted exhaustive research in archival and published sources, accomplishing what so many historians seek but so often find difficult to achieve—producing a scholarly history with broad popular appeal. In addition to her historical work, Dr. Hindley writes for the National Endowment for the Humanities, the New York Times, Salon, and Christian Science Monitor.

In the opening chapters, in what may seem overly long to those seeking a quick account of wartime intelligence and military activities, Dr. Hindley provides a travelogue-like description of the history of Casablanca and Morocco. Established as a French protectorate in the early 20th century, Morocco and its premier city, Casablanca (literally “white houses”—as those approaching from the sea described the skyline), developed into a bustling and dynamic economic powerhouse as the only major Atlantic port in Northwest Africa. In a seemingly idyllic setting that US Army Maj. Gen. George S. Patton later described as “a city which combines Hollywood and the Bible,” (326) Jews, Moslems, and Christians, traders, businessmen, and entrepreneurs, foreigners and North Africans intermingled in Casablanca’s cosmopolitan old and new towns.

Events in Europe seemed far away until war erupted in 1939. What had been a trickle of refugees fleeing the Nazis became a flood in June 1940 with the fall of France. The establishment of the collaborationist Vichy French regime under Marshall Henri Petain significantly complicated matters as the defeated and much-weakened yet proud rump nation struggled to protect colonial holdings in Africa and Southeast Asia. The influx of tens of thousands of refugees, swelled the pre-war Casablanca population of 350,000 with men, women, and children of all means, ages, and nationalities, including Jews, escaped soldiers, and anti-Nazi resisters—all in need of safe haven, food, housing, and support while seeking letters of transit out of Morocco, first to Lisbon, and then the Americas.

Restrictive immigration policies of the day, however, required refugees to have sponsors in receiving nations before issuance of visas or even letters of transit (hence the value of blank letters of transit in the film). Foreign consulates in Morocco remained lightly staffed, sponsoring groups and individuals were only then organizing, and wait times could last months or years without any guarantee of success. Thousands languished in desert refugee camps impatiently awaiting relief or in overcrowded dwellings in the city. French officials sought to maintain order and stability to avoid giving the Nazis any pretext for establishing a military foothold, a frequent demand from Berlin deftly ignored in both Vichy and North Africa. The Nazis were present, however, in black uniforms and civilian clothes as part of an Armistice Commission meant to insure French compliance with surrender terms, but also as a cover for Gestapo agents seeking to intimidate or apprehend anti-Nazi refugees or reveal nascent resistance groups. The Casablanca movie scene of dueling anthems where those passionately singing “La Marseillaise” win out demonstrates how Frenchmen, anxious refugees, Nazis, and neutral Americans existed daily in wary and begrudging proximity.

Complicating the humanitarian crisis, wartime disruptions of trade and Nazi expropriations of European
resources, especially food, meant that famine soon threatened French North Africa. The United States maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy through Charge d'Affaires Robert D. Murphy and promised food assistance in the Weygand-Murphy Agreement of March 1941. The only caveat was that a handful of State Department officials, soon known as “Murphy’s 12 Apostles,” would travel to Morocco to insure that the aid arrived, that it stayed in North Africa, and that it remained out of Nazi hands. Col. William Eddy of William J. Donovan’s Office of the Coordinator of Information (predecessor to the Office of Strategic Services) soon joined the Apostles, and in 1942 with a growing OSS team, took control of the entire network.

Together they supervised relief efforts but more important was that they functioned as an intelligence organization. Free to roam the country, although often tailed by German and Vichy agents, they recorded arrivals and departures of Allied, Axis, and neutral warships and commercial shipping, inventoried port facilities and military fortifications, compiled order-of-battle statistics, and observed logistical and communications systems and power grids, while also tracking movements of Vichy and German officials. Further, they identified and contacted anti-Vichy and anti-Nazi resistance groups, began caching arms, and dutifully reported all to the State and War Departments.

As the author shows, this timely intelligence figured into Anglo-American war planning then under way. Although he had been pressed by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin to open a front against the Germans in the West, President Roosevelt sided with the Brits, who preferred a southern front, decided that on a North African invasion (Operation TORCH). Animosity between the French and the British, stemming from the Royal Navy’s devastating surprise attack on the French fleet anchorage at Mers-el-Kebir in July 1940, led to US domination of the landing forces.

Secret US efforts to solicit local Vichy cooperation or non-resistance failed before the TORCH landings commenced in Oran, Algiers, and at three locations in Morocco, including Casablanca, on 8 November 1942. Vichy forces resisted, killing over 500 Americans. US naval, air, and ground units responded ferociously with overwhelming firepower, killing and wounding some 3,400 Frenchmen. Within days, the commander of French Forces in North Africa, Adm. Jean Darlan, agreed to a ceasefire as Anglo-American forces quickly established a foothold and began to engage German and Italian forces in Tunisia.

The author’s final chapters treat the high-level Anglo-American military, diplomatic, and political events of the 16–21 January 1943 Casablanca Conference attended by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and their top military leaders. Underlying the summit was the nagging question of French leadership as the Nazis had occupied mainland Vichy, North African Vichy leaders had lost legitimacy and credibility (as Casablanca Police Inspector Renault commented to Rick, his loyalties “blow with the wind . . . And the prevailing wind happens to be from Vichy,” (426), and Frenchmen everywhere remained divided between followers of Petain, Gen. Henri Giraud, and the upstart Free French leader Charles de Gaulle.

While Roosevelt and Churchill left the matter unresolved, more and more Frenchmen began to rally to de Gaulle as the only leader unsullied by collaboration, treachery, or defeat.

In closing, the author describes the history behind the movie *Casablanca* and its impact. Scheduled for release in early 1943, producers accelerated filming to premier in mid-November 1942 to coincide with the TORCH landings. The film had entertainment value surely, but also the intent to provide the American public with some needed reassurance and pro-Allied propaganda at a time when the Axis powers appeared nearly invincible and had only begun to suffer significant military setbacks. The film raised morale and provided hope and optimism that humanity and goodness, through self-sacrifice and selflessness (as in Rick’s giving up the letters of transit to his true love Ilsa and her husband Lazslo), would ultimately triumph over brutality, darkness, and evil. Although not entirely factual as the author notes, and “even with the discrepancies, the core of the film’s story holds true. The morality play that unfolds perfectly captures the real choices that real people faced in Casablanca.” (426)

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GENERAL
(Each title is hyperlinked to the review.)
The Character of a Leader: A Handbook for the Young Leader, by Donald Alexander
Spy Chiefs: Intelligence Leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, Volume 1, edited by Christopher Moran, Mark Stout, Ioanna Iordanou, and Paul Maddrell
Spy Chiefs: Intelligence Leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, Volume 2, edited by Paul Maddrell, Christopher Moran, Ioanna Iordanou, and Mark Stout

HISTORICAL
Code Girls: The Untold Story of the American Women Code Breakers of World War II, by Liza Mundy
Double Agent CELERY: MI5’s Crooked Hero, by Carolinda Witt
Foxtrot in Kandahar: A Memoir of a CIA Officer in Afghanistan at the Inception of America’s Longest War, by Duane Evans
Maverick Spy: Stalin’s Super-Agent in World War II, by Hamish MacGibbon
Trotsky’s Favourite Spy: The Life of George Alexander Hill, by Peter Day
The Secret Anglo-French War in the Middle East: Intelligence and Decolonization, 1940–1948, by Meir Zamir

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

During more than 40 years as a CIA officer, Donald Alexander, a penname, served under leaders at all levels of the agency and the organizations with which it cooperates—intelligence, military, and civilian. He also held a variety of leadership positions at CIA Headquarters and overseas. In all cases, he concludes, success or failure depended “very much on the quality of its leaders.” (xvi) In The Character of a Leader, Alexander discusses the amorphous nature of leadership as a concept and suggests some “anchor principles” that officers, especially aspiring young officers, can learn and apply to “craft yourself into the best leader you can be.” (viii)

The Character of a Leader promotes two central themes: “character counts” and “effective leadership is necessarily predicated on the consent of the led.” (xxi) As to the former, Alexander stresses that character, integrity, and personal values are key components of leadership. With regard to the latter, he points out that while one can be appointed to a position of leadership, it is only the men and women serving with you that can confer the “honor of the title ‘leader.’” (xxiii) Alexander develops these themes throughout the six chapters in the book, offering examples and often referencing others who have written on these and related topics.

After a detailed discussion of what leadership is from various points of view, Alexander considers selected definitions and elements of character. He then probes each of the 17 leadership traits he has identified, giving examples of what is expected of a leader. In one example, he quotes William Donovan’s biographer, Douglas Waller, who wrote that Donovan was “by any measure a bad manager . . . but a remarkable leader . . .” with “charisma . . . intelligence and open-mindedness, personal courage and a vision for the future.” (66)

In the chapter “Becoming a Leader,” Alexander ponders the inscrutable question, “Are leaders born or made?” That others have also found the question perplexing is captured by the quote that “Leadership flows from the core of a personality and cannot be taught although it may be learnt.” (79) (How one can learn without being taught in some form is unexplained.) Alexander presents his own views on the matter: among other considerations, he identifies four prerequisites, “without which you cannot excel as a leader.” He does not maintain that they must be possessed at birth, but he insist they be acquired “before you report for leadership duty.” (80)

The problems of collaboration that challenge a leader are dealt with in a chapter on what Alexander terms tribalism, a kind of bureaucratic turf war that every leader will encounter. “Unless you can master tribalism across organizations and in yourself, your undertaking is doomed to mediocrity.” (104)

In his concluding chapter Alexander raises the rhetorical question, “Why should the reader accept [this] concept of leadership through integrity?” (108) He provides some interesting answers, and three other leaders add support to his arguments. George Tenet, former director of central intelligence; Adm. Bill Studeman, former director of NSA and deputy director of central intelligence; and LTGEN John Sattler, USMC (Ret.), each contributed to the foreword of The Character of a Leader.

This stimulating and worthwhile contribution to the literature of intelligence will benefit those early in their careers, cause those still serving to question whether they got it right, and leave some retirees wishing they had possessed its insights.
In the introduction to volume 1 of *Spy Chiefs*, the editors present six interesting questions that are “at the core” of both books and should be kept in mind when reading the 23 contributions:

- How do intelligence leaders operate in different national, institutional, and historical contexts?
- What role have they played in the conduct of international questions?
- How much power do they possess?
- How secretive and accountable to the public have they been?
- What qualities make an effective intelligence leader?
- Does popular culture (including the media) distort or improve our understanding of intelligence leaders? (2)

Volume 1, Part 1, contains eight articles. Four are about former directors of central intelligence, William Donovan, Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and William Casey. The fifth concerns William Odom, a former NSA director (or DIRNSA), and the sixth is an assessment of all former NSA directors. The articles about the CIA directors discuss selected aspects of their careers, though in some cases with questionable objectivity. For example, the article on Helms, subtitled “Secrecy Stonewalling and Spin,” is overly concerned with Helms’s keeping secrets.

Two articles hint at religious connections, fuzzily implying relevance. The first, “A Jesuit in Reagan’s Papacy” is saved by its subtitle, “Bill Casey, the Central Intelligence Agency, and America’s Cold War Struggle for Freedom.” It is impossible to say anything to commend the second, “Studying Religion with William Donovan and the Office of Strategic Services.”

The other two contributions in Part 1 are devoted to heads of lesser organizations. One concerns the so-called “Pond,” a would-be mirror image of the CIA. The Pond was headed by John Grombach, a maverick Army colonel who opposed the CIA. Curiously, Grombach ended up as an agency contractor before his demise. The author, Mark Stout, is the leading authority on “The Pond.” The second deals with Gen. Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, and his efforts to control its security and enforce secrecy. Characterizing Groves as a “Spy Chief” is, at best, charitable.

Part II of Volume 1 presents five articles on British intelligence notables—sort of. Two concern the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). The first explores the life of Eric Welch—little known in America—an SIS officer who was the British link between intelligence and atomic science during and after World War II. The second examines the role of “C,” in this case Sir Stewart Menzies, and covert British action. The third article discusses the leadership of Patrick Dean, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee during the Suez Crisis.

The final two articles are literary non sequiturs in that they are devoted to Ian Fleming’s “M” in one case, and to British television spy series in the other. They reflect a misplaced tendency expressed from time to time in both volumes to suggest that solutions to real world intelligence problems may be found in the fictional adventures of popular espionage heroes and organizations.

*Spy Chiefs: Intelligence Leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, Volume 2*, also seeks “to identify what intelligence leadership is” (1) and that objective is met by

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Sir Richard Dearlove, retired chief of SIS. His foreword on leadership in general—and on intelligence services in particular—is the most incisive short essay on the topic in the intelligence literature and contains some forthright opinions.

The first of the 10 contributions in Volume 2 is also on leadership in intelligence. But besides relying too heavily on a corporate leadership model, there are two additional statements that must be read with great caution: (1) “an intelligence chief cannot be a charismatic leader” and (2) “the authority of intelligence chiefs is derived entirely from their position.” (6–7)

Of the remaining nine articles, two consider spy chiefs in ancient intelligence systems—one in Renaissance-era Venice, the other in 16th century Istanbul. A fourth article asks whether Feliks Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Cheka, was “a perfect spy chief.” (97) While the question answers itself, the author’s analysis is interesting.

There are two contributions on the former East German intelligence services, one about Erich Mielke, head of the Stasi, and the other about his subordinate, Markus Wolf, longtime chief of the HVA, the East German foreign intelligence service. The latter repeats the story that Wolf considered himself “the man without a face,” since he believed he had never been identified. In fact, he was unaware that the CIA had identified his photograph with the help of an East German agent in the late 1950s.

There is also an article on the West German foreign intelligence service (BND) that focuses on its first president, Reinhard Gehlen, and how he kept dossiers on West German politicians and dignitaries—a “Hooverian” style of leadership.

The final three articles are interesting, both because of their content and the countries involved. One is about India’s struggle to create its Intelligence Bureau (IB) after gaining independence. The other two cover the Lebanese Sûreté Générale and the General Intelligence Service (GIS) of Egypt. The former focuses on the contributions of Emir Farid Chehab, the longest-serving chief of the Sûreté Générale (1948–58). The article on the GIS covers the three most influential former chiefs, from Nasser to the present.

Returning to the questions raised by the editors above, the articles do not answer them directly. Moreover, the terms “power,” “operate,” “secretive,” “accountable,” “effective qualities,” and “leadership” go undefined—or in the case of “leadership,” defined in different ways. Thus the Spy Chiefs volumes are a subjective and qualitative assessment of selected intelligence leaders by a group of academics and former intelligence officers, many of whom have written extensively elsewhere on intelligence. Their contributions are interesting, stimulating, challenging, and worthy of serious study, but remain subject to other interpretations.

**HISTORICAL**


American industry and military services recruited women for many occupations during World War II. Besides being available, they had special qualifications and inherent risks: “women were better equipped for boring work that required attention to detail . . . lower level calculations . . . (21) bad at keeping secrets . . . [but] less problematic at least when it came to drinking and bragging.” (28) One recruiter qualified his request for engineers with the admonition to “select beautiful ones, for we don’t want them on our hands after the war.” (29)

The British codebreaking establishment at Bletchley Park recruited men through the “old boy network” in 1940, but by the end of the war 75 percent of the staff was female. Its American counterparts in the Army and Navy began later but at war’s end “nearly 70%” of the Army’s codebreakers were female.” The figure for the Navy was close to 80 percent. (30) *Code Girls* tells how they were recruited, how they performed, and how they overcame deep-seated social prejudices in the process.

It was standard procedure for WWII codebreakers to sign secrecy agreements that prohibited them from
ever revealing the details of their work. Thus their story remained untold until recently, when the records were declassified and made available in the National Archives. After journalist Liza Mundy began studying these materials, she filed additional requests that resulted in the release of oral histories conducted with women codebreakers. She also conducted interviews with “twenty surviving code breakers” and members of their families. 

(xiii) The result is the most complete account of the role women played in this vital intelligence function during the war.

Unlike Bletchley Park, which centralized cryptological functions, the US Army and Navy had their own wartime code-breaking and code-making units. For most of the war, the Army facilities were housed in Arlington Hall, Virginia, a former girls’ school just outside Washington, that today houses the State Department School of Foreign Service. The Navy eventually settled in quarters on Nebraska Avenue in Washington, DC.

Mundy explains how each went about recruiting, training, and utilizing female code-breakers. Initially, both sought college graduates—often school teachers, who exhibited mental skills Mundy describes—thought to be necessary. Later, female candidates were allowed to join the Navy and Army, albeit with some restrictions and serve as code-breakers.

*Code Girls* is much more than the story of organizational elements. Mundy discusses individual cases describing their background and recruitment experiences, as well as their on-the-job performance. The Navy’s Dot Braden is a good example. Mundy follows her career from school teaching, which she didn’t like, to code-breaking which she did. She was one of the few hired to remain after the war. Another example was Ann White, who worked in the Enigma unit, where she translated decryptions of communications with German naval units that threatened Allied shipping in the Western Atlantic. And then there was the controversial Agnes Meyer Driscoll, who became “one of the great cryptanalysts of all time,” (74) though she despised William Friedman, whose team solved the code generated by the Japanese diplomatic cryptographic machine, codenamed “Purple.” Friedman was several grades higher than Driscoll—a discrepancy she found grossly unfair.

On the Army side, Mundy includes Elizebeth Friedman (née Smith), William Friedman’s wife, who had a distinguished career as a code-breaker and manager with the Treasury Department. Perhaps best known today, Army cryptanalyst Ann Caracristi “was in a class by herself.” (221) She later become the first woman deputy director of NSA. Lesser known but also of great importance was Gene Grabee, who started the Venona Project, where “90% of those involved were women.” (343)

Each of the female code-breakers contributed a great deal in a variety of jobs while battling regulations, living quarters problems, unequal pay and male colleagues while sometimes supervising them. Mundy conveys their dedication, patriotism, and accomplishments that until now have remained hidden in the archives. *Code Girls* is a fine book, well written and documented, and a major contribution to the intelligence literature.


In late 1945, John Masterman wrote an internal MI5 history of the Double Cross Committee that he had chaired during World War II. By the late 1960s, Masterman concluded it was time to inform the public of the Double Cross Committee’s wartime successes and suggested to MI5 that they declassify the report. When they declined, he submitted his copy of the manuscript to Yale University Press, where it was promptly accepted for publication. Alerted that Masterman had kept an illicit copy of the report, MI5 was forced to either prosecute or negotiate deletions of material deemed still classified—mainly names of agents and MI5 officers. They chose the latter option, and *The Double-Cross System, 1939–1845* (Yale University Press) was published in 1972.

Masterman’s now classic book reported many operations and identified most double agents only by their code names. The little he had on CELERY noted that he was sent on two missions to Europe and “subsequently entered the business world and disappeared from our ken.”

CELE, however, would reappear in the ken of author Carolinda Witt as a result of complicated and sur-
prising research into her family history. One unexpected product was the discovery of a cousin she had not known existed. As she pursued details of that family branch, she would discover CELERY’s declassified MI5 file, which identified him as Walter Dickets: her grandfather. One relative described him as a “spy, a crook, a hero, a conman, a bigamist, and the father of four children” (227)—including the author’s mother. *Double Agent CELERY* tells the story of Walter Dickets’s life.

Dickeets had been an intelligence officer during World War I and had worked briefly for MI6. At the start of World War II, he tried to rejoin the military and had been rejected due to “some fraudulent activities in his past.” (1) When he met Arthur Owens by chance at the Marlborough Pub in London, their conversation led him to suspect Owens was a German agent, and he reported him to MI5. Owens was indeed an agent but he worked for MI5 and was the first of their double agents, codenamed SNOW.

MI5 didn’t tell Dickeets about SNOW’s MI5 links for two reasons. First, they were suspicious of SNOW and second, they had to be sure Dickeets was genuine. Accepting Dickeets after a lengthy and unusual background investigation, MI5 sent them both to Portugal, where SNOW had German intelligence contacts. Dickeets, by then codenamed CELERY, was tasked to keep an eye on SNOW and to be recruited by the Germans; he succeeded in both. Under the constant threat of discovery, CELERY was introduced to the Germans as SNOW’s new recruit. He was then sent to the Hamburg station for debriefing and weeks of training. After convincing the Germans of his authenticity, he went on to Berlin and other German cities before returning to London via Lisbon.

After an extensive debriefing, SNOW’s often contradictory account of their operations raised suspicions about whether he had betrayed CELERY, and he was “retired” as a double agent. CELERY was returned to Lisbon on one more assignment concerning the possible defection of a German officer. After that, it was considered too dangerous to return again. His file shows he worked again briefly for MI6 before returning to the business world.

CELEY’s final years were anything but successful. Desperate for money, he reverted to his conman skills and spent time in prison. Witt recounts these stories and those of his four marriages and two mistresses, throughout the narrative constructing a picture of a talented, patriotic man whose desire to live above his means led to his suicide in 1957.

*Double Agent CELERY* tells the complex, often convoluted story of a Double Cross agent who bravely served his country behind enemy lines and the families he left behind who only learned about him and each other after his death.


In *Directorate S,* author Steve Coll makes a single reference to “Team Foxtrot, another Pentagon-commanded Special Forces-CIA collaboration” unit that was incorrect in one detail: it was commanded by CIA officer Duane Evans. *Foxtrot in Kandahar* is the story of how that came about and what the team did in Afghanistan.

After 9/11, Evans immediately volunteered for duty in Afghanistan. An operations officer and former chief of station in Latin America, (1) Evans did not have the language skills sought by the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) as it worked to put people in the field to defeat the Taliban and find Osama Bin Ladin, but he did have compensatory qualifications that included six years in the Army, Ranger experience, and Special Forces service with the 83rd Airborne Division. Convincing the CTC to accept him for an overseas mission took time. He encountered unexpected bureaucratic and leadership issues that he handles skillfully in his book. In the end, it was his case officer skills working with an Afghan source in Washington that made the difference.

By the time Evans received an assignment in October, the first team sent to Afghanistan—headed by Garry Schroen, a Dari speaker and former station chief in Pakistan—had been in Afghanistan since 26 September and was functioning in the north. Evans was to go first to Pakistan and then southern Afghanistan. Attached to Team
Echo, he became Hamid Karzai’s aide and got to know him well.

One of Team Echo’s missions was to assist Karzai, purportedly in Afghanistan, but actually in Pakistan, to return to Kandahar without alerting the Taliban. Unfortunately, the secretary of defense announced Karzai’s whereabouts during a press conference. That increased the risk and changed the schedule. When Team Echo left for Afghanistan, Evans remained behind, but his flak jacket did not: he had given that to Kazai. While waiting to follow in the second lift, Evans received a call from Headquarters: he was to lead Team Foxtrot and “infiltrate into Kandahar province and link up with Gul Agha Shirzai,” and see him safely to Kandahar, where he would once again be governor.

At this point, Evans ran into a turf tussle with the local station that wanted to replace him with one of its officers. Evans’s account of how he overcame that challenge makes interesting reading.

Team Foxtrot went to Kandahar overland and were resupplied by airdrops one of which included horse feed. The cable informing Headquarters they did not have horses was uncharacteristically forthright.

They fought several battles along the way to Kandahar and Evans found his leadership skills challenged in several instances. On this point he has some kind words for CIA Headquarters—not a common occurrence—for refraining from “dictating actions from thousands of miles away . . . allowing the team leaders to call the shots as each saw fit.” (151)

In Kandahar, Team Foxtrot was reunited with Team Echo and Hamid Karzai. Now there were Taliban safe-houses to inspect, boxes of captured documents to examine, tribal conflicts among the Afghans to settle, and Afghan agents to debrief. One of the agents reported the Taliban had mined the roof of the Governors Palace, “2500 lbs of explosive, it turned out”—where a conference of leaders was going to take place. An explosive ordnance team (EOD) team was sent to neutralize that threat. (150)

It was now December 2001—time for Evans to return to Headquarters, an order he accepted with mixed feelings, since much remained to be done.

In his new assignment, he began to have concerns. He found the “lack of our in-depth understanding of Afghan culture and history [was making] it difficult for us to achieve positive results . . . for the long term.” (168) Looking back he asks, “Was it worth it?” (170)

Foxtrot in Kandahar is a well written, firsthand account from memory. It has the ring of truth and fills a gap about the Afghan war that illuminates the problems that continue there to this day.


It may be reasonably inferred that the British intelligence services find little continuing interest in the historical record of the Cambridge spy cases. Not so the scholars, readers, and publishers who have generated the more than 750 volumes that deal with the subject—with no end in sight. Maverick Spy is a recent contribution to the genre. The principal subject here is James MacGibbon, the author’s father.

Born in 1912, James attended an English public school, joined a publishing firm, traveled to Germany to work for a printing house, and married in 1934. Returning to his publishing duties in London, he soon became enamored of the good life that included travel and sailing. Politically, reports of Nationalist atrocities during the Spanish Civil War motivated the young couple to join the Communist Party in June 1937, (24) while at the same time the Soviet show trials and executions were dismissed “as so much anti-Soviet propaganda.” (36) Less than a year later, James and his wife came to the attention of MI5 (the party headquarters was bugged) and were subjected to sporadic surveillance for the rest of their lives.

When the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was announced in August 1939, James resigned his party membership and when the war started he joined the army, where he was promptly commissioned. When questioned about his party membership, the army accepted his word that he was “for us,” not Stalin. James was assigned to the intelligence corps and posted to the War Office, where he
soon became convinced that not enough was being done to help the Soviet Union. He then volunteered his services to Soviet intelligence and was given the codename DOLLY.

James told his son, Hamish, about his espionage for the Soviets shortly before he died in 2000. Hamish pursued traces of his father’s treason—though he does not call it that—in the British archives and in Moscow, where he found additional material that showed that James had provided ULTRA decrypts, the plans for OVERLORD (the D-Day invasion) and details about the “Big Three” Tehran Conference to his Soviet masters. After being transferred to New York, he served on the Joint Staff Mission and continued supplying material to the Soviets.

Demobilized in 1945, James rejoined the Communist Party and soon MI5 renewed its interest during the early 1950s. The original bugs in party headquarters, removed after Cambridge spy Anthony Blunt informed the Soviets of their existence, had been replaced. James’s phones were tapped again, his mail intercepted, and he was placed under surveillance from time to time. After a call to the Soviet embassy, MI5’s principal interrogator, William Skardon, talked to him but was unable to extract a confession. In 1956, after the Soviet invasion of Hungary, James again resigned from the Communist Party.

James MacGibbon spent the balance of his life in publishing and as a literary agent. At one point he formed his own company, MacGibbon & Kee, the firm that would publish Philby’s memoirs in 1968, though James had left the company by then. His son covers these events in detail.

MacGibbon’s espionage was finally revealed publicly in a 2017 *Times* article. When queried, Hamish replied that his disclosure “was exactly the right thing to do.”

*Maverick Spy* is hardly an account of a super-agent, but it does further document the extent of Soviet success recruiting British agents and, perhaps more importantly, shows that not all of them were Cambridge graduates.

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**Trotsky’s Favourite Spy: The Life of George Alexander Hill,** by Peter Day. (Biteback Publishing Ltd., 2017) 291, endnotes, bibliography, photos, glossary, index.

Question: what do the tall, slender, handsome, and polished British actor Hugh Fraser (Poirot’s sidekick) and George Hill have in common? Answer: It was Fraser who played the 5’6”, plump, unsophisticated George Hill in the 1983 made-for-TV movie *Reilly, Ace of Spies* that starred Sam Neil. In *Trotsky’s Favourite Spy*, with one exception (noted below), author Peter Day avoids any hint of artistic license and portrays Hill as he was: a pilot, army officer, MI6 agent, SOE officer, linguist, philanthropist, author, playwright, and father.

Born in Czarist Russia, Hill acquired his linguistic abilities traveling throughout Europe and the Balkans with his British merchant father. Schooled in England, he returned and entered his father’s business in Riga before joining a firm north of Vancouver, Canada. At the start of World War I, he lied about his age and enlisted in the Canadian infantry. Sent to France, he was wounded at Ypres. In short order, after recovering, he married, was commissioned, and assigned to the intelligence staff at the war office. Trained in counterespionage, he also learned Bulgarian in four weeks and was sent on a secret mission to Bulgaria. Upon his return, he joined the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and learned to fly at a base near Cairo. He was then assigned to serve with the RFC in Russia, where he did indeed meet Trotsky—and this is where the exception noted above comes into play.

The book’s title asserts Hill spied for Trotsky and the chapter entitled “Trotsky’s Troubleshooter,” implies a close relationship. But in fact, the narrative makes no mention of spying for Trotsky and in the “Troubleshooter” chapter, they are never shown to have met. Subsequently, Day writes that Trotsky, then minister of war, was grateful for Hill’s support for the Bolshevik air force, and for his efforts to get the railroads functioning. (57)

But that didn’t make him Trotsky’s spy.

It was during this same period of 1918 that Hill joined forces with MI6’s agent, Sidney Reilly, and Day tells of their adventures in Moscow recruiting agents, their role in
the failed Lockhart plot to overthrow the Bolsheviks, and their eventual escape.

Shortly after Hill and Reilly returned to London, MI6 dispatched them to southern Russia to report on the activities of White Russians attempting to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Eventually Hill was given other assignments to help the anti-Bolshevik armies, but all failed in the end, and Hill returned to London.

During the interwar years, Hill struggled to make his mark in business and writing. His plays were not sensations, but his memoirs did better. Day notes that “spies were not supposed to write their memoirs and Hill encountered strong opposition from MI6.” (139) Day does not mention that Sir Paul Dukes had been allowed to publish his memoir of the same period in Moscow, and that may be why Hill persisted and published Go Spy The Land and later Dreaded Hour, which Day describes as embellished. He was then paid for three articles on sabotage that were published, further infuriating MI6.

When World War II began, Hill, then 46, applied to rejoin MI6 but was rejected. But his sabotage articles had come to the attention of the unit that would become SOE, and he promptly accepted an offer of employment. He was assigned initially to training at the same school as Kim Philby, who mentioned “jolly George Hill,” in his memoir.\(^b\)

When the opportunity arose to place an officer in Moscow to liaise with the NKVD, Hill was an obvious choice and, to the surprise of the Brits, he was accepted despite the Soviet knowledge of his experiences with Reilly during the revolution. He was posted with the rank of colonel.

The chapters covering Hill’s WWII service in the Soviet Union are among the most interesting in Trotsky’s Favourite Spy. Hill was promoted to brigadier and had many fascinating experiences, often controversial. Toward the end, almost as an aside, Day includes a chapter that summarizes Hill’s view of the espionage profession and his role in it and what the Soviets thought of his memoirs, which had been translated into Russian. The Soviet authors’ views “were by no means unreservedly hostile,” he writes. (242) It is an analysis worth reading.

Hill’s post-war years were spent in business and reporting to MI6 about his various ventures. “He had become respectable,” Day concludes. (252) He died of leukemia in 1970.

Trotsky’s Favourite Spy is based on interviews with Hill’s survivors and recently released government reports of his work. It adds much to what was previously known about a colorful secret agent, whether or not he was Trotsky’s favorite.

\(^a\) Sir Paul Dukes, Red Dusk and The Morrow: Adventures and Investigations In Red Russia (Doubleday, 1922); George Alexander Hill, Go Spy The Land: Being the Adventures of I.K. 8 of the British Secret Service (Cassell, 1932); George Alexander Hill, Dreaded Hour (Cassell, 1936).

\(^b\) Kim Philby, My Silent War (MacGibbon & Kee, 1968), 8.


Professor Meir Zamir is a scholar at Ben-Gurion University’s Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy. *The Secret Anglo-French War in the Middle East: Intelligence and Decolonization, 1940–1948*, analyzes how the British and French intelligence services, while cooperating in the European and Asian theaters during World War II, battled each other in the Middle East in what he terms a secret war. Each employed espionage, covert action, and clandestine and conventional diplomacy.

Throughout the 1940s, official British government policy was aimed at preserving a British presence in the Middle East. They were successful, initially, by evicting France from its competing mandates in Syria and Lebanon in 1945. But official British policy, argues Zamir, was actively and secretly opposed by elements of the Secret Intelligence Service and political “British Arabists” in Palestine. With the creation of Israel, they even supported the Arab revolt on the newly formed state (164) while the French collaborated with the Zionists. (409)

These are serious charges, and Professor Zamir provides extensive documentation—most of which he discovered in French archives—to support his conclusions.
The archival records contained “hundreds of Syrian and British documents. These included top-secret reports on covert activities of British agents, and private and official correspondence between Syrian leaders and Arab heads of state . . . [and] documents from the files of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” (xi) Of particular interest are documents that describe the failed British intelligence conspiracy, thwarted by Ben-Gurion and his associates, from July 1947 to May 1948. (165)

The book is divided into parts, the first of which covers the events summarized above in three chapters, each with its own endnotes. The focus is on the intelligence rivalry—the so-called secret war, especially chapter 3. Part two contains translations of 346 documents, many of which are Syrian intelligence reports. The index contains the number of the document(s) linked to the topic concerned. Most, however, are concerned with political exchanges that describe official positions.

Professor Zamir has contributed much new material on a subject heretofore primarily understood from Western sources. Those unfamiliar with these events may find it useful to read the epilogue first to get an overview of the events.

*The Secret Anglo-French War in the Middle East* provides new critical detail for intelligence aficionados and historians unfamiliar with the unusual French-British clandestine relationship in the Middle East during World War II with Arab views factored in.

Hayden Peake has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” since December 2002.