Historical Perspectives

From the Studies Archive
Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

David S. Robarge

With all the attention paid of late to intelligence failures, it is easy to forget that sometimes the intelligence process has worked almost perfectly. On these occasions, most of the right information was collected in a timely fashion, analyzed with appropriate methodologies, and punctually disseminated in finished form to policymakers who were willing to read and heed it. Throughout those situations, the intelligence bureaucracies were responsive and cooperative, and the Director of Central Intelligence had access and influence downtown. One such example arose in 967 in a familiar flash point area—the Middle East—and put DCI Richard Helms in the position of making or breaking his, and the CIA’s, reputation with one of the most difficult and demanding presidents the United States has ever had, Lyndon Johnson.

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Posted: Jul 16, 2018 03:14 PM
Last Updated: Jul 16, 2018 03:14 PM