The Effort to Improve Intelligence in the 70s
Former CIA Officers Writing on Intel, Policy, and Politics
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Reviews
Spy Watching
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Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
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Cover: President Richard M. Nixon is shown here in March 1969 on his only visit to CIA Headquarters. He would have a strained relationship with intelligence. His national security team pressed Intelligence Community leaders to find ways to better evaluate and improve the quality of IC analysis.

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In Memoriam


In February 2016, with the death of Jack Davis, the community of American intelligence professionals lost a giant in the field of intelligence analysis. Jack was a senior CIA analyst and in 2013 was awarded a Trailblazer Award for his work in shaping and refining CIA’s analytical practices.

This past August, the community lost another giant in the field of analysis, Richards (Dick) J. Heuer Jr. In reflecting on Dick’s contributions, it is almost (but not nearly quite enough) to remind readers of the importance Jack Davis had personally placed on Dick’s teaching and mentorship, a subject Jack addressed in 1999 in his introduction to Dick’s most famous work, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.

Intelligence analysts, in seeking to make sound judgments, are always under challenge from the complexities of the issues they address and from the demands made on them for timeliness and volume of production. . . .

My short list of the people who have had the greatest positive impact on CIA analysis consists of Sherman Kent, Robert Gates, Douglas MacEachin, and Richards Heuer. My selection methodology was simple. I asked myself: Whose insights have influenced me the most during my four decades of practicing, teaching, and writing about analysis? (Emphasis added.)

Jack would continue:

Dick Heuer was—and is—much less well known within the CIA than Kent, Gates, and MacEachin. He has not received the wide acclaim that Kent enjoyed as the father of professional analysis, and he has lacked the bureaucratic powers that Gates and MacEachin could wield as DDIs. But his impact on the quality of Agency analysis arguably has been at least as important as theirs.

Heuer received a degree in philosophy in 1950 from Williams College, where, he notes, he became fascinated with the fundamental epistemological question, “What is truth and how can we know it?” In 1951, while a graduate student at the University of California’s Berkeley campus, he was recruited into Operations as part of the CIA’s buildup during the Korean War. . . .

In 1975, after 24 years in the Directorate of Operations (DO), Heuer moved to the DI. His earlier academic interest in how we know the truth was rekindled by two experiences. One was his involvement in the controversial case of Soviet KGB defector Yuriy Nosenko. The other was learning new approaches to social science methodology while earning a Master’s degree in international relations at the University of Southern California’s European campus.

Dick echoed the same themes in a memoir published digitally last year. He credited Williams College and a faculty mentor in the Philosophy Department for kindling his lifelong quest for understanding “truth” and the means to discern it. The quest drove his continuing education, even though he was fully engaged in a major overseas assignment. Dick also noted that a senior CIA contact put him en route to the fame he would have been highly unlikely to find in the DO. He wrote that with his European assignment nearing an end in 1975 and fearing that his position in the exceedingly contentious Nosenko affair was likely to prevent him from further advancing in operations, he contemplated retirement and entry into a PhD program at the University of Southern California. After returning from an exploratory visit to USC, he overnighted with a neighbor who was leading the Office of Political Research in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). The neighbor suggested Dick join the Analytic Techniques Group, a unit in the manager’s office dedicated to the development of methodologies for political analysis and forecasting.

a. Jack Davis in “Introduction” to Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), xiii and xix.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
The pitch landed in Dick’s wheelhouse, and one might say he hit it out of the park! Dick began with a quantitative content analysis of Soviet speeches to attempt to discern political divisions in the Soviet Union. Had he stopped there, Dick’s contributions would have been relatively modest, as the field was already crowded with such applications. But he quickly moved from that demonstration of methodological and statistical prowess to thinking about deeper processes, including the role of cognitive bias, the question of how much data is needed to come to judgment, and determining strategies to reach judgments.

It would not take Dick long to become the chief of the unit, renamed the Methods and Forecasting Division in 1976. In that capacity, he participated in academic conferences and in 1978 edited a collection of essays published under the title *Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence: The CIA Experience*. Dick’s work on content analysis appeared in that book. Perhaps as importantly, in his preface, he outlined the purpose of his life’s work from 1975 on:

> The common ground between scientist and government analyst has not been well developed. The studies collected together here are the fruits of a concerted effort by the CIA to apply modern social science methods to problems of concern to political intelligence analysts. By bringing together a number of examples of our work under one cover, I hope to demonstrate to the government analyst that systematic methods can be relevant to his needs, and to encourage the scientist to apply his skills to problems of direct interest to the foreign policy community.a

While most of Dick’s work was initially intended for use internally within the DI, much of it readily found its way into *Studies in Intelligence* and into the public domain (a bibliography follows). That work only continued with his retirement in 1979, after which he moved to the Monterey and Carmel Valley area of California. There he became engaged in local government, but he continued to work on a contract basis for a defense security firm for which he produced analyses on counterintelligence issues and insider threats. He would also continue work as a consultant in the field with the Center for the Study of Intelligence, the Defense Department, and the private sector. That work in 1999 led, as is now well known, to his groundbreaking book, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. He would follow up in 2010 as the coauthor of *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*.b

One unintended consequence of the reputation Dick acquired as a result of this book is that now nearly forgotten is Dick’s 24 years as a CIA operations officer. It was a period he spent largely abroad in traditional operational assignments. One of his last assignments in the States, however had him researching and teaching counterintelligence and the deception practices of opposition services, topics central to his later dissection of the Nosenko case.

Perhaps this forgetfulness is a reflection of a fading (hopefully) cultural perspective which placed “analysis” solely into the purview of the DI. The body of Dick’s work proves, I think conclusively, that methodical and orderly thinking and the thoughtful application of analytical methods has no single organizational home. In no work of Dick’s is that more evident than in the detailed and thoughtful discussion of the Nosenko case, the controversial espionage case that drove Dick from operations to the DI. This study, “Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment,” first appeared publicly in H. Bradford Westerfield’s collection of declassified *Studies in Intelligence* articles, *Inside CIA’s Private World*. As Westerfield introduced the article, he noted that the “Homeric” story had been told many times, “but never, I think, so well as in this meticulous logical and empirical exercise.” Heuer, he added, “has been one of CIA’s finest intellects.”c

Indeed!

Thousands of intelligence officers are indebted to Dick for the growth he fostered in the profession.

Thank you, Dick.

—Andres Vaart
Managing Editor

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Remembering Richards J. Heuer Jr.: A Brief Intellectual History

James B. Bruce

Before I came to CIA in 1982, I knew Dick Heuer only by reputation, having read some of his writings on quantitative methodologies and other ways to improve rigor and accuracy in intelligence analysis, including his insights on intelligence deception. While planning a major conference for CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence on deception in 1984, I invited Dick, then retired in California, to participate. There he made a solid contribution to the discussions that paved the way for some of his later work on the subject.

As both Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and the Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates had attended the conference, Casey directed several follow-up items, and Gates took the action on a key one, namely to initiate a new CIA course on deception analysis. I invited Dick back to Langley on contract to help develop the course and, along with OTE’s Tom Murray and myself, Dick became a course co-director and instructor for the inaugural running of the week-long deception analysis training course held at an off-site location. Dick taught it for several years afterwards. It was open to students from throughout the Intelligence Community as well as from CIA.

Early in the course, Dick alerted me to an unplanned two-hour gap in the syllabus and suggested that he could use that time to give a lecture on the deception aspects of the case of KGB officer Yuri Nosenko, the CIA’s most controversial Soviet defector. I readily concurred, and Dick became a course co-director and instructor for the inaugural running of the week-long deception analysis training course held at an off-site location. Dick taught it for several years afterwards. It was open to students from throughout the Intelligence Community as well as from CIA.

The controversy over Nosenko’s bona fides (too complex to elaborate here) had polarized the DO for a decade starting in the mid-1960s. Key issues that hinged on the call were related to a possible Soviet mole alleged to have penetrated CIA and to the credibility of the Soviet claim of non-involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy. Nosenko claimed to have insider knowledge of both issues. The “master plot” theory of Soviet strategic deception was at stake.

Nosenko’s case officer Tennent (Pete) Bagley believed Nosenko was a dispatched defector, sent to CIA by the KGB to support Soviet deception objectives. Bagley was joined in this assessment by other senior officers, Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff James Angleton. The opposing school argued that Nosenko was a bona fide defector with only self-serving but no nefarious aims. This side included the influential Bruce Solie from the Office of Security (which later took responsibility for vindicating Nosenko following DCI Colby’s guidance). Having returned from his posting abroad, Dick later read in to the major internal documents on the Nosenko case. At first, he found Pete Bagley’s “Thousand Pager” of evidence against Nosenko persuasive. But he was later persuaded by Bruce Solie’s exculpatory interpretation that the case for Nosenko’s bona fides was the better argument.

Dick began to wonder what was wrong with this picture, and why two such strongly opposing arguments—each seemingly evidenced-based—could seem so convincing. Surely one of them must be wrong. A philosophy major in college, he began to re-examine his own assumptions about the case and reflected on his own reasoning processes, including his susceptibility to cognitive bias. He decided that the key to unpacking the Nosenko controversy and to explaining the puzzling contradictory conclusions one could reach about it was fundamentally an epistemological problem. And that the most promising practical approach to resolution was, at heart, a methodological one.

On re-examining the key arguments, he concluded that both sides were merely polemical, each built like a lawyer’s argument, cherry-picking the evidence and “card stacking” the case to reach a desired conclusion. Bagley’s case, he decided, was nothing more than a prosecutor’s brief, while Solie’s major paper had produced a seeming defense attorney’s rebuttal. While fine for the courts, Dick found this approach to “analysis” fundamentally flawed, and much too weak for intelligence applications.
He reasoned that a better and more reliable approach would require both a repudiation of polemics and a more science-based understanding of how the human mind processes information to reach inferences. That is the foundation for what he later termed—and developed—the methodology of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.

The power of ACH, as it is commonly abbreviated, was demonstrated shortly after the first running of the deception analysis course by a fresh alumnus of the course from the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research in the Directorate of Intelligence. Applying this new approach to analysis, the analyst revealed that a multi-INT deception attempted by Libya had succeeded in fooling IC analysts into believing Libya had suffered the loss of a WMD capability in an accidental fire at its Rabta CW plant.

ACH emerged as a core methodology in post-9/11 and post-Iraq WMD failure-inspired emergence of Structured Analytical Techniques (SATs) and it became a staple in the deception course and in counter-deception analysis long before its inclusion in the SAT inventory as a core technique for tough analytic issues extending beyond the unmasking of deception.

Dick Heuer’s significant contributions to understanding analysis is exemplified in his most notable work, *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* and in his original contributions to counter-deception analysis. Foundational to his later stature as a seminal contributor to the analytic profession, Dick’s own intellectual growth inspired by the Nosenko controversy illustrates the genius of a successful intelligence officer in two directorates whose training began in philosophy and was refined in intelligence operations but whose biggest and most durable impact was in analysis.


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**Selected Bibliography of Richards J. Heuer Jr. Journal Articles**


“Strategies for Analytical Judgment,” *Studies in Intelligence* 25, No. 2 (Summer 1981)


“Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment,” *Studies in Intelligence* 31, No. 3 (Fall 1987); reprinted in Westerfield (379–414)
The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

Former CIA Officers Writings about Intelligence, Policy, and Politics, 2016–17

Peter S. Usowski

Editor’s note: This article is an adaptation of a presentation given to the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association in April 2018.

In recent years, a growing number of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers have joined in the public discourse on national and international developments that usually appears in popular media as opinion or commentary. While political pundits, so-called expert analysts, academic scholars, journalists, and other former government officials had taken up most of such space in media outlets, former CIA officers have nevertheless gradually emerged as voices to be heard, often offering timely insights and opinions on the business of intelligence, current foreign policy challenges, and even contentious political issues.

Given this trend, it is fair to ask: what impact have these officers had on the public’s understanding of the role of intelligence in government and to what extent have they helped shape the thinking of those who have more than a passing interest in national security interests? In our current politically polarized environment, it is also fitting to ask: what is the appropriate role for former CIA officers in the ongoing public discussions on national security and political issues?

The intent of this article is to review such work published by former officers during the 2016–17 period in order to form the basis for a conversation around the above questions, even if they are not fully answered here.

Scope

Literature Addressed

Covered in this review will be the writings of 90 former CIA officers. It will focus only on published work in the form of op-ed articles, short essays, and question-and-answer pieces appearing in print sources or online. These writings are timely, relevant, and, easily accessible to the public. They give former officers the opportunity to openly enter the ongoing discussion and the potential to influence the thinking of many readers.

Overall, this review encompassed nearly 500 articles from 40 different media outlets, 35 of which were online sites (see table on next page). Outlets include sites that typically cover national security issues—e.g., NYTimes.com, WashingtonPost.com, foreignpolicy.com, politico.com, and nationalinterest.com. Others—e.g., businessinsider.com, Ozy.com, and Vox.com—are less well known as national security-related platforms, although intelligence issues have been covered.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
Not addressed are books or peer-reviewed journal articles, which have already drawn sufficient attention.1 Also beyond the scope of this study were television appearances, personal blogs, and Twitter postings.

The Contributors

The group of 90 former officers who have published in the outlets I researched include professionals from all the major intelligence disciplines. They have ranged from the recently retired to those who have been out of government for some time. Among them are former directors and deputy directors of CIA, former directorate heads, senior and mid-level clandestine service officers and intelligence analysts, and attorneys. Some of the formers have served in other Intelligence Community agencies or other federal government organizations.

I should, however, note that while I tried to be as comprehensive as possible, I cannot claim to have uncovered every op-ed or essay penned by a former CIA officer, but I am confident I have reviewed a substantial and representative selection.

An Overview

The recent writings of former CIA officers build upon an extensive body of literature. Beginning with the publication of former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles’s book The Craft of Intelligence (Harp-er & Row, 1963), formers joined journalists, historians, critics, and other writers in beginning to build a vast library on the intelligence profession, covering all aspects of intelligence, from collection, analysis, covert action, science and technology, espionage, and counterintelligence to support to policymakers, organization and structure, and leadership and management. Some books have taken the form of personal memoirs. Some offer specific critiques of CIA’s missions and activities. Most cover important periods and episodes of agency history and, to the extent that can be revealed in an unclassified book, some have scrutinized the trade-craft behind intelligence practices, evidenced by the proliferation of “setting the record straight” books by CIA formers that has appeared since 11 September 2001.

Professional journals have also provided outlets for formers to share their knowledge, critiques, and recommendations. Studies in Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security, and The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence are all examples of scholarly, peer-reviewed journals that reflect the growth of the study of intelligence into a respected field of scholarly research and writing. The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), an educational association that supports and conducts public programs focusing on the role and importance of US intelligence for national security, publishes The Intelligencer, another journal whose major contributors often are former intelligence officers from across the Intelligence Community.

Motivations

Formers officers have gone on the record for various reasons. Many have found that, despite the available body of literature on intelligence, the public and even some government officials do not fully understand the role of the Intelligence Community in the United States. Some have been concerned about specific aspects of the intelligence profession.

Sources Examined

Print
Foreign Affairs
The New York Times
The Washington Post
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal

Online
Baltimore Sun
Business Insider
CNN
Counterpunch
Christian Science Monitor
Dallas News
First Look Media
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
Fortune
Fox Business
Free Beacon
Global Brief
Government Executive
History
Just Security
Los Angeles Times
Lawfare
Miami Herald
National Interest
National Review
Newsweek
New York Times
NPR
Overt Action
OZY
Politico
Politique Etrangere
Reuters
The American Conservative
The Cipher Brief
The Daily Beast
The Hill
Truthdig
USA Today
VOA News
VOX
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
Washington Times

For some, setting the record straight is the goal, and for these, writing can be a very personal matter. For example, in the aftermath of a wave of criticism over CIA’s ren-
otion, detention, and interrogation program, and the passionate objection on the part of many inside and outside government to the CIA’s interrogation techniques, former Deputy Director for Operations Jose Rodriguez published his effort to set the record straight in *Hard Measures*, which began, “What follows is the story of how my fellow colleagues and I came to take those hard measures and why we are certain that our actions saved lives.”

Formers have also offered public accounts, not to defend CIA’s actions but to question its mission and conduct. Victor Marchetti is an early example from this group. In the early 1970s, he saw reform as necessary, but he doubted that Congress, the president, or CIA would move to institute it. For some formers, a sense of duty and commitment to be as transparent as possible moves them to write. As former DCI George Tenet put it in his 2007 memoir,

*I have come to believe that I have an obligation to share some of the things I learned during my years at the helm of American Intelligence.*

Behind this feeling of obligation is a sense of pride in the work and contributions of the intelligence professional and the need to protect CIA’s reputation and work.

Their perceptions that the public is poorly informed about the profession and its place in US society. Also contributing to the questioning has been the felt need to respond to outrageous claims and lies related to CIA, its workforce, and the profession of intelligence.

In choosing to write or speak out, formers have had to weigh the conflicting forces that come with having served as a professional for a secret intelligence organization; their discernment process involves more than simply protecting classified information as called for in the secrecy agreements they all sign when they begin working at CIA (or other intelligence agencies). Hank Crumpton, a former senior clandestine services officer summarized this dilemma in his 2012 book: “I seek to strike a balance between a retired spy’s honorable discretion and an active citizen’s public responsibility.”

**A Question of Appropriateness**

The question then becomes whether it is appropriate to comment publicly on the intelligence profession, foreign policy, and political issues even when the comments do not contain classified information. Former Director of CIA Michael Hayden, an advocate of greater transparency in the Intelligence Community, also acknowledged that more openness does pose risks to intelligence operations. With this in mind, Hayden agreed with a position taken by Mike Leiter, former head of the National Counter Terrorism Center. Referencing Leiter, Hayden wrote in 2016:

...the American intelligence community owes the public it serves enough data so that people can make out the broad shapes and broad movements of what intelligence is doing, but they do not need specific operational details. The former should suffice to build trust, while the latter would be destructive of espionage’s inherent purpose.

This is not an unreasonable standard to use in assessing former CIA officers’ writings on the intelligence business.

**Publication Options Plentiful**

The increase in op-ed pieces and short essays by former officers has been made possible, in part, by the proliferation of available media outlets. Traditional hard-copy newspapers, such as the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Wall Street Journal*, continue to reach a broad audience and serve as effective platforms for writings on intelligence, but the online media has given formers additional readily available means of connecting with the public.

One real game changer with regard to national security issues in the world of online media is *The Cipher Brief*. Founded in August 2015 by former CNN national security and intelligence correspondent Suzanne Kelly, *The Cipher Brief* supports discussions on national security issues in a number of ways, from short essays and reports to podcasts and discussion forums. Though the site’s target audience is the government national security and policy official,
Former officers cannot be put into one general category or be seen as equally credible.

it is of growing interest to those in the private sector. The Cipher Brief has become the most popular outlet for former intelligence officers; no media outlet is even a close second to The Cipher Brief in terms of the number of articles published by formers.

Credibility: Not All Equal

The experiences, subject matter expertise, job responsibilities, and accountability for results of former officers separate them from those who write only from an academic perspective or as journalists or media commentators. Intelligence practitioners gain perspective and build up bases of knowledge that cannot readily be gained by outsiders who try to look inside a secretive field inaccessible to them. Intelligence professionals understand firsthand how intelligence can drive policy and affect policymakers’ decisions. DCIAs and DDCIAs, especially, by reason of direct interaction with the president and other senior policymakers, are uniquely positioned to see how intelligence was used—or not used—and how it was regarded. As former Deputy Director and Acting Director Michael Morell observed:

Greater experience gives one a breadth of perspective that you simply can’t have with only a few years on the job. When I was first made a manager at CIA, I thought I knew the other analysts on my team’s strengths and weaknesses. I could not have been more wrong. It was only when I was their day-to-day manager that I saw their actual skills and lack of skills. So be careful with folks with narrow experience drawing broad conclusions.

Clearly, then, former officers cannot be put into one general category or be seen as equally credible. Within their community, differences affect the content and value of their writings, including the nature of the jobs they held, their levels of responsibility, their areas of expertise, their lengths of service, the circumstances under which they left, the time that has passed since they left CIA, their post-agency careers, and whether or not they have a continuing association or contract with the Intelligence Community since retirement or resignation.

Elements that especially relate to credibility are the circumstances in which former officers left, lengths of service, and the time that has elapsed since a former last served. Some formers have admitted that they are not always in positions to comment on certain aspects or current developments in the business. Over time, their inside knowledge has become dated. For instance, CIA leaders who left while the agency was still organized in its historical four-directorate construct will not have firsthand knowledge of the leadership challenges that have emerged since the CIA’s 2015 reorganization into regional and functional mission centers.

On the other hand, certain lessons and best practices are just as applicable now as they were 30 years ago. For example, many case studies on intelligence successes and failures demonstrate the timeless truth that challenging prevailing assumptions behind analytic judgments is a vital part of the analytic process.

Most readers of articles by formers can readily weigh the credibility of the authors. More often than not, backgrounds of authors are included with articles, but if they are not, a little research will almost always uncover some information about an author’s service with CIA.

This context is in stark contrast to articles written anonymously. A frequent source for mainstream journalists is the “former intelligence official.” The phrase “according to current and former intelligence officials” is all too common in journalistic reporting. Given journalists’ commitment to protecting sources, readers have no way of using the factors noted above to assess the credibility of information provided by the “former intelligence official,” let alone know if sources have leaked classified information in violation of secrecy agreements.

The Issues Covered

Whatever their intrinsic differences in terms of expertise, past position, or post-agency career status, formers tend to focus on three main content areas: foreign policy, domestic policy, and the profession of intelligence. The following section will take these up in turn, offering various ways of looking at how discussion in these areas has shaped—and can continue to shape—the relationship of CIA and the Intelligence Community and its various constituencies, from the Oval Office to the US public.
on intelligence issues under certain conditions. This includes public discussion of active foreign policy issues.\footnote{See textboxes concerning the prepublication review and the “appropriateness clause” of the regulation.) However, once they are no longer employed, former officers are free to engage in the foreign policy debate. On such issues, the writings of former CIA officers over the years 2016 and 2017—encompassing topics as general as foreign relations and as specific as al-Qa'ida and ISIS threats, international trade, and North Korean weapons development—are much like those offered by former US government policy officials and policy experts: they are interesting, offer valid points, demonstrate the expertise of the writers, and shed insight on the factors that weigh on policymaking and policy decisions.}

Among the formers who wrote on foreign policy in 2016 and 2017, four stand out in terms of the volume of their writings, the degree to which their past roles conferred credibility to their perspectives, and the extent to which their work reverberated in the policy and intelligence communities: Michael Hayden, John McLaughlin, Michael Morell, and Paul Pillar. Each offered a variety of opinions on difficult, global, strategic challenges.

General Hayden, a career Air Force intelligence officer who, in addition to leading CIA, served as the director of the National Security Agency and the principal deputy director of national intelligence, presented observations and thoughts as an insider, someone who was front-and-center during the shaping of some of this country’s most important policy responses. McLaughlin and Morell rose through the ranks in CIA as analysts and managers of analysts. Their articles display the type of critical thinking, sophisticated analysis, and balanced judgments that one would expect from government officials with their experience and record of accomplishments. Given their stature and the quality of their writing, these three agency leaders have offered insights and advice worthy of consideration by those making policy decisions today.

Paul Pillar, also accomplished and formerly highly placed as a regional national intelligence officer in the National Intelligence Council, is distinguished from the others by being the first former senior CIA officer to criticize the Bush administration’s use of intelligence in the runup to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. In a 2006 *Foreign Affairs* article, Pillar argued that this use of intelligence was
The predominant practice of CIA leaders upon leaving office has been to publicly stay out of political discussions. Symptomatic of a more serious problem rooted in the intelligence-policy relationship. He would go on to write Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (Columbia University Press, 2011), in which he continued to criticize the Bush administration’s use of intelligence and found fault with the post-9/11 reforms. He has since taken strong positions on a spectrum of regional issues and key national security challenges of terrorism, proliferation, political Islam, and political instability. During the period of this study he contributed at least weekly to a blog of the journal National Interest for which he serves as a contributing editor.

In addition to these four, 39 other former officers of varying backgrounds and years of experience—including former directors R. James Woolsey, John Deutch, and David Petraeus—wrote on US foreign policy during 2016 and 2017, clearly believing they had something to contribute to the foreign policy debate.

Domestic Political Writings

Former CIA officers have not normally ventured into public discourse on domestic political issues. The common refrain—to “speak truth to power”—is one of CIA’s hallmarks; if CIA is to be effective in supporting the president, the agency must be objective in the way it presents intelligence analysis and carries out intelligence operations. CIA serves at the behest of the president—whether the occupant of the office is a Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative. Ideally, an intelligence organization in a democracy should be seen by the president as apolitical. Correspondingly, CIA professionals expect to carry out their mission free from political pressures or politicization of intelligence analysis and estimates.

The predominant practice of CIA leaders upon leaving office has been to publicly stay out of political discussions. But that changed in 2016, when prominent formers openly expressed their views during the 2016 presidential campaign and after the 2016 presidential election. In an unprecedented step for a top CIA leader, former DDCIA and former Acting DCIA Michael Morell on 5 August wrote an op-ed published by the New York Times entitled “I Ran the CIA. Now I’m Endorsing Hillary Clinton.” In that article, Morell stated that he was neither a registered Republican nor Democrat and that he had served presidents of both parties while at CIA. He also pointed to his prior silence on presidential preferences. Two factors drove him to endorse Clinton, he explained. First, he believed she was qualified to be president. Second, he asserted: “Donald Trump is not only unqualified for the job, but he may well pose a threat to our national security.”

Three days later, former DCIA Michael Hayden joined a group of 50 former national security officials in signing a letter stating that Donald Trump “lacks the character, values, and experience” to be president and “would put at risk our county’s national security and well-being.” Following the 2016 election, other former CIA officers joined Morell and Hayden in publicly expressing their opinions of the Trump presidency.

These political op-eds were written in the aftermath of something the president-elect/president said or did that the writer would argue could have an adverse effect on US intelligence activities and operations or was a risk to national security. Such trigger points included the president-elect’s reference to Nazi Germany in describing the CIA, the president’s speech at the Memorial Wall of Honor at CIA Headquarters on his first full day in office, and the president’s expression of doubts about the intelligence on Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. Formers pointed their criticism and outrage directly at the president.

When former officers decide to publicly weigh in on political matters, it is fair to ask what they hope to accomplish—whom are they trying to influence? In cases where the political issues touch upon the nature of intelligence, they add context and depth to discussions and may raise points that others did not consider. In other cases where intelligence is largely irrelevant to an issue at hand, they join an already crowded room of commentators, analysts, and pundits, and one can reasonably question whether another opinion adds value.

Three former officers in a jointly written article justified their reasons for speaking out on political matters. They emphasized that the oath of office they took as CIA officers to protect and defend the constitution is a commitment that, in their view, did not end when they left CIA. Accordingly they asserted: “We believe we have a responsibility to call out when
our leadership is not doing enough to keep America safe.” They insisted that they will speak out against threats to national security “even if they come from within.”

From the time he retired from CIA in 2004, former DDCIA and Acting DCIA John McLaughlin has been one of the most reasoned and thoughtful voices on foreign policy and intelligence issues, but rarely did he weigh in on political matters. In July 2017, however, he shared his thoughts on the president’s speech to the Boy Scouts of America in a Washington Post op-ed called, “Why Trump’s Boy Scout Speech Was So Disturbing.” This was not about a foreign policy decision or an intelligence activity, therefore, McLaughlin’s experience and expertise were not directly relevant to the topic. Instead, he wrote only as a concerned citizen.

Nevertheless, his stature and former positions at CIA drew attention. On MSNBC, McLaughlin shared his reasoning for speaking out:

“For most of us, throughout our careers, we maintained a neutrality. But if you have a genuine conviction that the country is endangered, you can’t help but speak out about it. No one from the Intelligence Community who speaks out about Trump does it with joy or satisfaction. It’s against the grain of the culture we’ve grown up with.”

Michael Morell, likewise, asserted his responsibility to speak out. He argued that it was important for the public to distinguish Michael Morell the private citizen from Michael Morell the CIA leader. Asked how people should think about that separation, he explained:

“I think that’s exactly what they have to do. This is Michael Morell, private citizen and this is Michael Hayden, private citizen, who are talking about what we think is best for the country. It’s completely divorced from what the job of the CIA is, and it’s a pretty simple line: We don’t work there anymore; we don’t work for the government anymore. We’re not bound by that same responsibility that anybody who works for the agency has. . . . We’re talking about our own country for once in our lives. That’s the distinction, and people shouldn’t be confused by that.”

During the period of this survey, the former senior officers so far discussed represented a relatively small subset of the larger population of formers who have gone on the record, but these are prominent intelligence leaders, and there are repercussions and possible unintended consequences when they speak out on political issues.

Morell has admitted that he did not fully appreciate the downside of taking a political position when he endorsed Hillary Clinton: in retrospect, he was able to see what his political position must have looked like from the candidate and then president-elect Donald Trump’s point of view. As he explained:

“. . . he (Trump) sees a former acting director and deputy director of CIA criticizing him and endorsing his opponent. . . . And he must have said to himself, ‘What is it with these intelligence guys? Are they political? . . . Is this a political organization?’”

There is no easy answer here, and former officers who chose to write or speak out must weigh their responsibility to protect the intelligence profession’s reputation for objectivity and discretion against their own constitutional right to free speech.

**Writings on Intelligence Issues**

If the ultimate goal of former intelligence officers who go on the record is to contribute to a more informed public, the most insightful and valuable articles are those that cover intelligence history, intelligence tradecraft, and the role of intelligence in supporting policy.

The topics covered during the 2016–17 period could form the contents of an anthology on intelligence. They touch on the intelligence-policy relationship, analysis, foreign intelligence collection, counterintelligence, covert action, reorganization, leadership, congressional oversight, briefing presidential candidates and the president-elect, the President’s Daily Brief, employee morale, workforce demographics, technical innovations, liaison relationships, foreign intelligence service operations, insider threats, leaks, and espionage.

The remainder of this paper will focus only on the three issues that received the most media attention and were arguably the most important issues to emerge in the context.
Former officers drew on their experiences from previous campaigns and elections to attempt to shed light on 2016 candidate and president-elect briefings.

of domestic and international developments during 2016 and 2017: intelligence briefings to the presidential candidates and president-elect, the intelligence and policy relationship, and Russian intelligence service operations.

Intelligence Briefings for the Candidates and President-elect

Every four years during the presidential election and transition, the media turns its attention to the intelligence briefings given to the presidential candidates and the eventual president-elect. Such briefings have a history dating to the 1952 election and the Truman-Eisenhower transition. The definitive work on this topic was first published by CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1996 in an unclassified book called, Getting to Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates 1952–1992. A second edition that included the two George W. Bush elections was published in 2012, and a third edition is nearing completion.

Written and updated for each edition by former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence and Inspector General John Helgerson, Getting to Know the President draws upon interviews with former presidents, presidential candidates, campaign staff, Intelligence Community seniors, unclassified documents related to the briefings and the briefing processes, and the author’s own experience in briefing presidents and presidential candidates.

In 2016, David Priess added to the literature on this topic with his book, The President’s Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America’s Presidents from Kennedy to Obama (PublicAffairs, 2016). Priess, a former CIA officer with experience in writing, editing, and briefing PDBs, addresses the historical evolution of the PDB and past administrations’ practices of using the PDB. He also expounds on the CIA briefings of the PDBs during presidential transitions.

Taken together, Getting to Know the President and The President’s Book of Secrets provide an inside account of the briefings, demonstrating how each candidate and president has taken advantage of CIA’s support in different ways, depending on their own background and needs.

The 2016 Clinton-Trump election featured scenarios not seen in previous elections and transitions. Former senior officers drew upon their own experiences in briefing presidents to offer insights and context to the dynamics of the election. While briefings to candidates and president-elect each have unique aspects, there are common themes throughout the history of this program. One raised at the outset of the 2016 campaign by some quarters was the idea of suspending intelligence briefings for both candidates—Clinton because of the classified email controversy and Trump because of opposition assertions that he could not be trusted to protect classified information. Denying a candidate the intelligence briefings would have been unprecedented.

Management of the briefings—and the decision to brief candidates, or not—has since 2008 rested with the ODNI, although CIA has always provided the most assistance in the preparation and delivery of the briefing material. In response to calls to withhold the briefings, DNI James Clapper put an end to the uproar and affirmed publicly that both candidates would be extended the opportunity to receive intelligence briefings after the candidates’ formal nominations, saying, “Now is the appropriate time since both candidates have been officially anointed . . . it is not up to the administration and not up to me personally to decide on the suitability of presidential candidates. The American electorate is deciding on the suitability of the next commander in chief.”

Key points of interest to emerge in the 2016 candidate and president-elect briefings were content and frequency, the briefers, other participants, and the arrangements for the briefings. Former officers drew on their experiences from previous campaigns and elections to attempt to shed light on these points.

Of course, formers without regular access to fresh intelligence were not in a position to know the content of briefings during the 2016 sessions but they knew enough from experience to make suppositions about the subject matter.

• John McLaughlin suggested, “Usually they [the briefings] include most of the issues occupying the sitting president, often supplemented by specific interests of the candidates.”

• Michael Morell pointed out that candidates do not receive a daily briefing and they do not get the PDBs. After the election, the
The need for mutual trust was a consistent theme in writings of the period, as formers responded to critical comments aimed at the IC and its leaders . . . .

Not all former CIA officers agreed that president-elect Trump had no reason to distrust the IC. One former—a 25-year veteran of intelligence with 19 years as an analyst—argued that CIA officers in the past tried to undermine the DNI and the president, citing as examples efforts against William Casey and Ronald Reagan for their Cold War policies and measures taken against George Tenet and George W. Bush because of the war against Iraq.

In the public’s eye, the relationship between intelligence and policy (and the president) has at times been tainted with charges of politicization or the IC’s failures. As complex as the intelligence-policy relationship is—involving individuals and organizations across the intelligence and policy communities—the president is the cornerstone of the overall relationship, the “First Customer.” In that respect, the 2016–17 period presented a particularly challenging stage in the development of a working relationship with a White House inexperienced in national intelligence.

After the Election

Indeed, this evolving relationship would become the center of former CIA officers’ writings immediately after the 2016 election through the weeks following the 2017 inauguration. During this period, there was very little reference to President Obama’s last year. The issues that sparked flurries of commentary were President-elect Trump’s reaction to the intelligence supporting the conclusion that Russia interfered in the election, the nomination of Congressman Mike Pompeo to be CIA director, the president’s visit to CIA Headquarters on his first full day in office, and the new president’s continued criticism of the Iranian nuclear agreement.

In addition to providing context and perspective on the relationship and the fundamental challenges that both sides faced in establishing the appropriate level of engagement, many of the formers offered very specific recommendations. In most instances, the intended audience for these recommendations was the incoming president.

A Matter of Building Trust

Among the many challenges for policymakers new to government is understanding and fully appreciating the vast and complex Intelligence Community. Former CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Jamie Miscik noted that the IC provides the president with invaluable resources to support him in his policy goals. She emphasized: “For the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers to work effectively, however, each needs to understand and trust the other.”

The need for mutual trust was a consistent theme in writings of the period, as formers responded to critical comments aimed at the IC and its leaders by the president-elect prior to his inauguration. In expressing their concerns, several formers addressed the potential consequences of this distrust, the most consequential being that the president would ignore or not
Throughout the history of US intelligence, presidents have at times been skeptical of intelligence reports and judgments, but it is their prerogative . . .

fully use his valuable national security resources.32

Access to the president and the policy discussions informed by intelligence is a privilege enjoyed by senior intelligence officials. Accordingly, those who interact with the president during these sessions must demonstrate discretion and an unwavering commitment to secrecy if there is to be a trusting relationship. As a former senior official explains:

From the Intelligence Community’s perspective, the impulse to enforce this confidentiality doesn’t spring from dogged faithfulness to past presidents, but to that ‘persistent and conscious effort’ to build and maintain a trusting relationship with current and future occupants of ‘the Oval.’33

Michael Morell, President George W. Bush’s briefer, also addressed the importance of trust, emphasizing that a president must be able to ask tough questions and feel free to comment on the intelligence, confident that his remarks don’t end up in the media.34

Throughout the history of US intelligence, presidents have at times been skeptical of intelligence reports and judgments, but that is their prerogative, as writers pointed out. Paul Pillar explained that the president’s feedback is important to the community: “What the agency hears from these interactions constitutes valuable guidance in keeping their work relevant to the needs of the president and his administration.”35 But most of the formers argued that the president should not publicly criticize CIA or the IC, even when he disagrees with the intelligence. As Morell warned: “…it undermines that trust . . . it undermines the Agency’s ability to do its job.”36

Former officers have also pointed out the difference between a president’s honest skepticism and disagreement, and politicization. They acknowledge that policymakers in the past have crossed the line and pressured analysts to alter their judgments to fit policy objectives.37 This concern was raised in light of President Trump’s doubts about Iran’s compliance with JCPOA.4 Former DDCIA David Cohen wrote: “The reason it’s a concern is that it corrupts the intelligence process. . . . If you bake into that process the answer the policymaker is looking for, it stands the process on its head and undermines the integrity of the intelligence.”38

Recommendations for President’s Team

A number of former leaders offered thoughts for the president’s security team. Some were written with the new DCIA Mike Pompeo in mind. One former emphasized that it is important for the DCIA to stand up for CIA and its mission and people, especially given the prevailing partisan environment in Washington.39 The challenge for the DCIA is to maintain the trust of both the president and the agency workforce. Doug Wise, a former senior CIA clandestine services officer and former deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, offered the new DCIA practical advice in leading the people and mission of the CIA. He emphasized the importance of taking time to fully understand the institution and trust the agency’s leaders and followers. With an allusion to the CIA culture, he advised that the workforce will expect him to treat the agency well and respectfully before he is fully accepted by them.40

Russian Intelligence Operations

As the new administration and the Intelligence Community began to develop a working relationship, the controversy surrounding Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and allegations of the Trump campaign staff’s collusion with Russia took on a life of its own. In this case, the focus of attention was not the US government’s intelligence capabilities but rather Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Kremlin itself.

Several former senior clandestine service officers who chose to address this topic collectively brought extensive knowledge of Russian intelligence services and Russian espionage tradecraft into the conversation. They drew upon their direct experience in dealing with the Soviet and Russian intelligence services to introduce historical precedents, describing how the Russians carried out influence operations and cultivated assets, and speculating on how the recent Russian efforts were planned and executed.

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On the Record

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a. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), colloquially known as the “Iran nuclear deal,” was signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the European Union.
They pointed out that Moscow’s attempts to spread disinformation, interfere in the US political process, and attack US interests with asymmetric tools were not new and dated back at least to the 1940s. Their historical accounts are rich with examples and explanations of methodology, but as a 30-year clandestine services veteran stated: “Whereas the KGB relied on press placements and agents of influence, the KGB’s successor intelligence services, FSB and SVR, as well as Russian military intelligence GRU, have added offensive cyber operations to their spying took kit.”

Several formers joined in the public debate regarding the overall objectives of the putative influence operations. Were the Russians trying to get Donald Trump elected, or to seed an asset among Trump’s associates, or simply trying to disrupt the US democratic process? A few also speculated about who in the Kremlin ultimately was behind these actions. Most settled on Vladimir Putin, although one former characterized some of the Russians’ efforts as low level operations.

These formers provided further insight into Russian intelligence operations and shared their knowledge of the purpose and techniques of such engagements. Their descriptions of Russian techniques provided a framework from which readers could analyze and assess the incomplete and, at times, somewhat confusing media accounts of the Russian operations.

Amidst the prevailing nationwide outrage over the Russian interference, two formers rebutted attempts to draw similarities between Russia’s actions and CIA’s past efforts to influence elections or support political groups’ attempts to overthrow democratically-elected foreign governments. They argued that attempts to establish moral equivalency between Russia’s efforts and historical CIA activities is misplaced.

They acknowledged that US covert action programs have tried to influence the political outcomes abroad and, although there have been abuses, they stressed that oversight measures have been introduced to prevent such activities. The biggest differences between Russian and US intelligence operations are not found in specific operational tactics but in the processes by which such actions are initiated and implemented in a democratic form of government, as compared to the conduct of similar operations by authoritarian regimes.

In Sum

The two-year period (2016–17) covered in this study featured prevailing themes and consequential episodes that drew the attention of formers and prompted them to go on the record. The scope of my research did not include data from previous years that might have served as a baseline for comparison to earlier periods. Nevertheless, I was surprised by the number of articles written by former senior officers, the number of different writers, and the number of media outlets used.

The former intelligence officers contributing to this literature included officers of varying ranks, experience, and expertise, which covered almost all aspects of the intelligence profession and the CIA’s mission. Collectively, the formers did not speak with one voice. Nor were they always apologists for CIA and its missions. However, general agreement on the fundamentals of the intelligence business did appear to exist, though on particulars, such as in organizational structure, differences were common.

Given the existing body of literature on intelligence, no one article during this period stands out as a singular contribution, but these recent treatments provided value in terms of topicality and timeliness and in bringing in relatively fresh experiences. Thus many of the formers were able to shape discussions in the context of today’s evolving national and international environments and draw on experience and expertise to help explain and clarify complex matters in dynamic domestic and international environments.

The value of well-crafted memoirs, histories, case studies, and tradecraft analyses as published in books and professional journals is unquestioned. But op-ed pieces and short essays published in today’s innumerable media outlets have given formers many more opportunities to offer timely commentary and analyses as issues arise. As national security policies take shape, these writings offer interpretations and recommendations within the decisionmaking cycle of government policymakers.

The more controversial writings of the formers were those that crossed over into the political arena. Those who wrote these pieces emphasized that they were not speaking as government officials but as private
citizens, who do not live in isolation from national and international developments, and that they were merely exercising the freedoms allowed by having transitioned from government service into life as private citizens.

Readers, however, may not always be able easily to distinguish between the former senior government intelligence official and the private citizen. It is, after all, because of their previous service that their writings are published and receive attention. Thus there are political consequences when formers publicly enter political debates. As noted earlier, the objectivity of senior CIA leaders and the agency itself can come under scrutiny.

While this study has focused on former intelligence officers who have chosen to go on the record, the vast majority of former CIA officers have not spoken out publicly. Nevertheless, the old-school code of silence among formers has been steadily eroding, an erosion that seems unlikely to slow appreciably, if at all.

Finally, today’s level of transparency about the intelligence business has never been greater. Many of the myths of intelligence have been dispelled thanks to the steady stream of releases of previously classified documents and studies by CIA and the writings of former CIA officers. Public discussions and debates on the intelligence business are more informed. In going on the record, formers have added to a body of literature that continues to serve the public well.

The author: Peter Usowski is the director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence and the chairman of the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board.
Endnotes

3. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (Harper Collins, 2007), xxi.
6. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
21. David Priess, The President’s Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America’s Presidents from Kennedy to Obama (PublicAffairs, 2016).
24. McLaughlin, “Is Trump Fit for an Intelligence Briefing?”
28. Morell, “Intelligence Briefings for the Presidential Nominees.”

31. Jamie Miscik, “Intelligence and the Presidency,” *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 3 (May/June 2017): 57-64.


34. Kelly and Morell, “Former CIA Acting Director Michael Morell: ‘This is the Political Equivalent of 9/11’.”


36. Kelly and Morell, “Former CIA Acting Director Michael Morell: ‘This is the Political Equivalent of 9/11’.”

37. Miscik, “Intelligence and the Presidency.”


42. Hoffman, “Vladimir Putin and the Art of Intelligence.”


46. Ibid.
Monitoring Community Work

Review of National Intelligence: An Idea That Has Come of Age, Again?

James Marchio

More than a dozen years after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) initiated a program to systematically evaluate and improve the quality of Intelligence Community (IC) analysis, voices inside and outside the IC are questioning the value of those efforts and even the efficacy of the post-9/11 IC Analytic Standards established originally in 2007 and updated in 2015.

The ODNI’s most recent focus on tradecraft has ample precedent, with allusions to standards evident in the literature of intelligence as long ago as the 1950s.¹ But it was not until the early 1970s, when faced with White House criticism of its analytical performance, that Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby and his IC leaders adopted a systematic program of evaluating community intelligence products. Under the aegis of Colby’s Deputy DCI for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC) Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson and his Product Review Division (PRD), headed by a CIA senior intelligence analyst and manager, Richard Shryock, the effort may have been ill-fated from the start, surviving only 20 months. The institution of centralized community management methods, including evaluation of its performance, had frustrated Colby’s predecessors, and Wilson and Shryock would suffer the same fate.² Still, the experience represents a lost opportunity for the IC to benefit from an integrated and systematic approach to the evaluation and improvement of the quality of intelligence the community provides to its customers.

This article examines the factors that spurred the Colby and Wilson initiative; how product evaluation fit into the larger Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) program to assess and improve the quality of IC intelligence; and the role of the Review of National Intelligence (RONI), the vehicle through which the PRD’s findings were disseminated. The publication’s reception and the factors that led to the DCI’s decision to end the RONI’s publication provide insight into the IC’s reaction to the evaluation effort.

The article then explores how the focus and nature of the IC’s product evaluation efforts changed following the ICS reorganization in April 1976 and the RONI’s demise. Finally, lessons gained from the PRD’s experience are considered in light of the ODNI’s recent and potential future efforts to evaluate and improve the quality of IC intelligence analysis.

¹ The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

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The dissatisfaction of the Nixon administration with the IC is well known—Nixon having believed that his narrow defeat to John F. Kennedy in 1960 was at least partially due to the actions and inactions of intelligence agencies.

Impetus for Efforts to Improve the Quality of Analysis

The dissatisfaction of the Nixon administration with the IC is well known—Nixon having believed that his narrow defeat to John F. Kennedy in 1960 was at least partially due to the actions and inactions of intelligence agencies on the “Missile Gap” issue. But clashes with the IC over other issues, such as capabilities of the new Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile, contributed as well.3

Nixon was not alone in his dissatisfaction. Andrew Marshall, a key member of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s staff, told a senior CIA Directorate of Intelligence officer in 1972 that there was a “sense of general dissatisfaction with the level of ‘sophistication’ of intelligence production.” In fact, Marshall said that Kissinger once told him that “analyses and commentaries in the newspapers were superior to anything he read in intelligence publications.”4 Marshall was, in effect, echoing a March 1971 Office of Management and Budget study prepared under the leadership of future DCI James Schlesinger, titled “A Review of the Intelligence Community,” which addressed a number of these problems. In particular, the report asserted that the IC’s analysis and production had failed to improve in pace with gains in technical collection.5

Nixon moved to address these perceived shortcomings in November 1971, issuing a directive covering the organization and management of the US foreign intelligence community and noting “the need for an improved intelligence product and for greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to intelligence is urgent.”6

The directive drove IC actions and programs for the next five years and shaped the environment in which the discussion of analytic quality emerged. The directive laid out multiple objectives for the IC, including improving the “quality, scope and timeliness of the community’s product.”7 To advance these efforts, the directive established the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC), which was to “give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer.”8,9 For his part, the DCI was given additional community responsibilities and an augmented staff to discharge them.9

More detailed guidance was contained in a 23 November IC planning document, which directed the DDCI for National Intelligence Programs and Evaluations to set up a separate entity to handle what hereafter was called “the Product Improvement function.”10 Named the Product Assessment Group (PAG), it would focus its initial efforts in four areas:

a. The NSCIC’s members were the attorney general, undersecretary of state, deputy secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI. The president’s national security advisor was its chairman. According to historian Roberta S. Knapp, the committee rarely met. —The Central Intelligence Agency: The First Thirty Years, (CIA History Staff, 1990), 306.
(1) product evaluation; (2) study of production functions; (3) study of pilot or prototype production analysis; and (4) preparation of intelligence objectives and priorities.11 PAG was to be staffed by personnel who were “relatively senior with both considerable production and analytical experience as well as a good grasp of the community.”12

**Product Review Group and Product Review Division: Missions and Challenges**

By early 1972, the DCI had created the Product Review Group (PRG) with a small staff assembled from CIA resources13 to undertake studies and conduct surveys to evaluate the quality of the community’s intelligence product and its worth to consumers.14 In talking points offered to Bronson Tweedy, the first deputy to the DCI for community management, the PRG chief said the group had, among other things, undertaken a historical review of past attempts to elicit consumer reactions to intelligence products.15

By March, according to a memorandum for the record of a conversation with Marshall about the PRG, the group had at least two studies under way. One was a study of the 1971 India-Pakistan War, which had been requested by the NSCIC; the other was a reexamination of analysis of the aforementioned thorny issue of the Soviet SS-9 missile. The possibility of undertaking studies of other crises was also raised.16 The PRG also was asked to survey IC resources devoted to production activities and to determine whether and to what extent there was a need for products different from those then being produced.17 In conjunction with these efforts, PRG was directed to use data to analyze the linkage between target priorities and the use of resources.18

Even as its work was under way, the PRG was developing the group’s mission—terms of reference (TORs)—a draft of which was circulating in the IC Staff in May.19

The TORs assigned PRG “staff responsibility for studies, analyses, and recommendations which will support the DCI in execution of his assigned responsibilities to improve the US intelligence product.”20 They emphasized that PRG would focus on two areas:

- (1) promotion of a meaningful interface between the IC and its consumers to improve the responsiveness of the intelligence product to national security and policy needs; and
- (2) preparation or supervision of studies and reviews as necessary for a comprehensive DCI program of product improvement.21

Such studies, the TORs stated, should explore how consumer needs were identified and communicated to the IC and include “evaluations of intelligence products by principal customers.” The studies also should examine the IC production process, including “its inputs and outputs, division of responsibilities, extent of duplication, coordination involved, and resources used.” Lastly, PRG assessments should investigate “analyst motivations, analytical techniques, tools for analyst support, and other factors involved in an effort to improve the quality of analysis applied to intelligence production.”22

The record over the next 18 months suggests the PRG adhered to the TORs, although they appear never to have been formally approved. An early 1973 status report on six projects under way in 1972 listed them in three categories: Product Evaluation, Production Improvement, and Consumer Needs.23 Memoranda during this period provide examples of these efforts, such as an analysis of CIA, INR, and DIA finished intelligence on Southeast Asia published between April 1972 and March 1973, which seemed focused principally on the question of who should be analyzing what. INR, the report deemed, was “the worst offender” in reporting on subjects thought to fall into the purview of either DIA or CIA.24


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**The TORs assigned PRG “staff responsibility for studies, analyses, and recommendations which will support the DCI in execution of his assigned responsibilities to improve the US intelligence product.”**

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a. At the time, James Schlesinger was midway through his short tour as DCI. Colby was serving as the executive secretary of Schlesinger’s Management Committee, whose job it was to follow through on Schlesinger’s decisions.
PRD talking points . . . identified five projects the office was engaged in and opined “the objectives of these projects are much broader than the name Product Review implies.

summarized the results of two areas of evaluation—“Current and Crisis Intelligence Support to the White House and NSC” and “Estimates and Other In-Depth Analyses”—and offered strategies on addressing shortcomings in both.4 More importantly from the point of view of the PRG’s functioning, the memo addressed PRG’s challenges and needs:

Over the long haul, we want to be in a posture to review and critique all national intelligence products as they are produced to insure responsiveness, quality, etc. Meantime, we operate in ad hoc task groups to solve known problems. I need personnel sufficiently grounded in the several areas to wind up in the long-haul posture. Also, I need representation from all the production agencies to ensure the proper inputs to our reviews and recommendations.26

This apparent appeal for resources, a more structured organization, and greater IC participation drew a handwritten note from Colby to Graham on 29 May observing: “It’s a big bite—maybe too big at one gulp. . . . Shouldn’t we select a few nibbles to start.”27

Though the public record doesn’t confirm it, the talking points may have led to an enlargement of the effort with the creation of the Product Review Division early in 1974. Consisting of 13 people—including 10 area and topical review officers—PRD carried on its predecessor’s mission and faced many of the same challenges.28 One such challenge was the continuing lack of a formal charter—as the terms of reference the PRG had developed earlier either were not approved or didn’t lead to a more formal document.29

On 15 May, the PRD’s deputy proposed the creation of a formal charter. In his proposal, sent to the D/DCI/IC, the deputy wrote that the lack of a charter was “something of a handicap.” His explanation is worth quoting at length because it presaged the kind of reaction actual evaluations would get:

Because much of our mission is inherently difficult and unpopular—we are about as welcome in some quarters as tax collectors—we should make an extra effort to define our role in the Community. . . . The notion that PRD searches without warrants and proposes without proper credentials is not uncommon; it can probably best be refuted by revealing the existence of both—as issued by the DCI and elaborated by his Deputy for the Intelligence Community.30

The proposal went on to acknowledge that the PRD’s mission had not been defined in any one document and reviewed the sources of the PRG’s and PRD’s roles, going back to the president’s November 1971 directive and subsequent DCI and D/DCI/IC documents up to December 1973.31 Although not mentioned in documents directly related to the review, it is hard to imagine that the IC’s spectacular failure to warn of the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 did not affect PRD and IC Staff thinking at the time, as by December the staff had prepared and issued a “preliminary post-mortem” on the IC’s performance before the war.32

The draft review proposal defined three primary functions: “product review,” “product improvement,” and “structural improvement.” Each of these included numerous—and ambitious—subtasks. (See table on facing page.) Moreover, each contained elements present as recommendations in the post-mortem on the October failure, including improving warning mechanisms and development of a “family of national products.”33

Systematic Product Evaluation—PRD’s Main Business

Apparently the charter proposal went nowhere that spring, but PRD pushed on. By September 1974, the division’s leadership had begun to question whether they were doing what they should be doing. In a memo drafted for PRD’s chief, his deputy bluntly stated: “I believe the main business of the Product Review Division should be the review of finished intelligence production. I do not think we have been attending to that business properly and systematically except for the postmortems on the Middle East and the Indian nuclear test.”34

PRD talking points prepared for a meeting a week later identified five projects the office was engaged in and opined, “the objectives of these
projects are much broader than the name Product Review implies. They are designed to review and improve the performance of the community generally—particularly prior to and during crises. The emphasis is on management adjustments and bureaucratic mechanisms. Product review, per se, forms a relatively small part of the total effort.”35 The paper forcefully argued PRD should “address more systematically the specific function of reviewing the finished intelligence product. Such reviews should have as their main purpose the assessment of responsiveness to KIQs and to consumer needs.”36

Support for focusing PRD’s mission grew over the next month. A note attached to the initial 17 September proposal commented: “Dick, I like this idea, particularly . . . the concept that PRD should concentrate primar-
the pertinence, adequacy, timeliness, and general quality of coverage on a given topic, as viewed in the main through a Key Intelligence Question prism.” PRD then would issue a periodic review (tentatively titled the National Intelligence Review) drawn from daily assessments. The memo argued that a regular KIQ-oriented daily review of published intelligence and periodic PRD assessments would serve multiple purposes, including providing data and background for special PRD studies and postmortem reports. The review also would identify gaps (and perhaps redundancies) in finished intelligence production, and be “a regular source of information and assistance to the NIOs [national intelligence officers] in their responsibilities associated with the KIQ/KEP [KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP)] enterprise.” The memo concluded by recommending that PRD test the procedures and concepts outlined in the proposal by conducting a one- or two-month trial.

General Wilson approved the trial beginning in October. A 7 October memo disseminated to all PRD officers provided a “review sheet” to guide their actions and ensure “uniformity of approach and some standardization of records.” The review sheet was intended to “serve both as a methodological guide and as a standard form for filing.” Evaluators used the review sheet to record the KIQs the paper addressed, notable highlights, and their overall evaluation.

PRD action officers filed critical reports covering several geographic regions during October and November, which began to reveal the lens through which review was to take place. A reviewer of NIB and DIN products covering Latin America, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey touched on the KIQs, utility, and efficiency: “current intelligence has not focused on the KIQs... [and] there is too much production for production sake... [and] analysts do not often tell the meaning of the facts they are reporting.” He concluded: “It is clear to me that under the right circumstances a systematic product review can help reshape community production into a more efficient form.”

A summary produced at the end of November 1974 concluded that more than half of the 99 current intelligence products published that month were “marginal” or “filler.” The report singled out multiple shortcomings in tradecraft, including contradictions of previous publications, titles not supported by text, dubious sourcing, overstatement, and incomplete analysis. While November findings for other areas—such as current intelligence on the USSR and Eastern Europe—were more positive, even there deficiencies were noted.

The two-month trial led to several recommendations. One PRD officer urged that the division produce a pilot product entitled The DCI’s Quarterly Report on National Intelligence Production. This report, he suggested, would be provided to a “very limited audience” to include the DCI, the NIOs, and the principals of the major production agencies. As envisioned,

... each chapter of the quarterly report would examine the quality of intelligence products provided the national consumer in a specific geographic or topical area. Where appropriate, products would be reviewed in terms of their contribution to the satisfaction of a KIQ.

Also suggested were the addition of annexes containing data that might help managers identify problems in coverage, redundancy, and the use of sources.

Another PRD action officer offered a separate proposal, suggesting the creation of a report to be called...
be effectively responsive to the DCI’s mission to guide the work and the allocation of resources of the entire community.55

The Review of National Intelligence (RONI)

The PRD staff moved quickly to create a sample issue of the Review of National Intelligence. In December, they circulated one for limited staff and IC review and comment.56 The RONI’s “Statement of Purpose” read:

PRD’s findings have hitherto been presented only in special surveys (e.g., postmortem reports) and in informal reports to individual addresses. This new publication, The Review of National Intelligence, brings the work of product review to bear on a broader set of interests and concerns and periodically presents PRD’s findings to a larger, community-wide audience. Our fundamental purposes in this enterprise are wholly constructive: to develop a series of extensive—and unique—files concerning various aspects of intelligence and intelligence processes; and to provide the kind of critical appreciation of published intelligence which will be of value to the DCI, to the USIB, and to the actual producers of intelligence.57

The trial issue, covering products published during November 1974, as well as excerpts from the preliminary ICS postmortem report on the July 1974 Cyprus crisis and several other “special studies,” received mixed reviews from the small test audience.a The director and deputy director of CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), the producer of two of the current products the RONI would review, were said to “have no major problems.” CIA’s deputy director for intelligence (DDI) had no “specific criticisms” but argued to limit distribution and to be “diplomatic” in the writeups. A letter from DIA’s director, the recently promoted Lieutenant General Graham, was characterized as “the most critical.” He took issue with the tone of the evaluations and the review of the DINs because he did not regard them as national intelligence.58

In any event, the first formal issue of the RONI went out with a covering memo from D/DCI/IC Wilson, initially to about 75 recipients in February 1975.59 Wilson’s memo advised its recipients, “We are seeking through this medium to provide the community with a systematic review and evaluation of finished intelligence products.”60 A second distribution went to a wider audience in March. Greeting readers on the first page of front matter was a statement from DCI William Colby (see next page), followed by a statement of purpose from General Wilson, which resembled the statement in the December 1974 issue. One change appeared on the cover of the issue: the journal’s expected periodicity. The sample promised a bimonthly journal; the February issue promised that it would appear “several times a year.”

For the most part, however, the February issue closely adhered to the

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a. By the time the first issue appeared in December, the postmortem on Cyprus was complete.
format and content of the December sample. The tone and nature of some of the critiques were similar as well. For example, the issue noted, “We plan for each period of review to announce the anonymous winners of certain unofficial contests sponsored by the reviewers of the PRD war-ren.”

The enthusiasm for the product General Wilson expressed in his cover memo was not shared by all of his IC colleagues, as was evident in notes of a 28 February USIB meeting that addressed the journal. Lines of criticism called into question the qualifications of the RONI’s reviewers and raised questions about who actually should be providing feedback. Implying that too much of CIA’s influence was present in the reviews, Treasury’s William Morell viewed the February issue as “too self-congratulatory.” State Department’s representative, implicitly calling into question the qualifications of reviewers, recommended they be better identified. So, too, did the chief of DIA’s China/Far East Division, who asked: “Who are all these anonymous people?”

In response, PRD chief Shryock expressed reluctance to be too specific about the identities of his reviewers, but he suggested to General Wilson that he include in the next RONI a survey of the qualifications and experience of his staff members. That survey found that

all but one have had at least eight years professional experience in intelligence; four officers have had more than 23 years experience each . . . . Academically, the Division can count 12 bachelor’s degrees, 7 Masters, and 3 doctorates, awarded by a host of diverse institutions (Notre Dame, Brown, the Naval Academy, Oxford, Johns Hopkins, South Carolina, Cornell, etc.). As is appropriate for a Community enterprise, PRD officers currently in place have joined the IC Staff from DIA, NSA, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps intelligence organizations, and from three Directorates (DDI, DDS&T, DDO) and the E Career Service of CIA.

Wilson accepted the recommendation, and the qualifications were included in a note published in the June 1975 issue.

The participants in the 28 February USIB session seemed to reach a consensus that “evaluation of the intelligence product should reflect the consumers’ views rather than merely the opinions of intelligence officers.” But members were divided as to whether reviews should be vetted through NIOs or the NSCIC. CIA’s DDI argued for using NIOs for that purpose, while Morell urged that the RONI presents “candidly” the criticisms and proposals of policy-making officials” gathered through the NSCIC Working Group rather than the NIOs.

Putting the critique in perspective, a senior PRD member observed in commenting on USIB critiques:

The aim of the RONI is improvement of product through constructive criticism (and praise). Improvement is a gradual process, never completed, and there are bound to be several minds about the process itself. The RONI is an instrument of continual dialogue, not a definitive, perfected statement.”
Engagement of NIOs in the review of the RONI was a sensitive matter, both needed and problematic. As the IC’s most senior analytic authorities, NIOs had their own responsibility for encouraging and evaluating the IC’s performance in addressing KIQs and improving its analysis in their areas of responsibility. Thus, some in the IC saw NIO engagement in prepublication review as “incestuous,” a problem compounded by the fact that NIOs were housed within a CIA structure at Langley and tended to be CIA officers. Thus PRD took care to establish its primacy in its call in May 1975 for NIO review of draft commentary to be included in the next RONI:

We would appreciate the pinpointing of any factual errors and the identification of any major judgmental differences between our accounts and your perceptions. . . . It is understood by all concerned . . . that while we will give careful attention to all NIO comments, the final authority and responsibility for the contents of the RONI must rest with us.  

The second RONI (Vol. 1, No. 2) appeared in June 1975. It reflected some revisions in structure, coverage, and approach to content.

The June 1975 RONI and After Action Comments

The second RONI (Vol. 1, No. 2) appeared in June 1975. It reflected some revisions in structure, coverage, and approach to content. The first section was changed from “Highlights of the Review” to “General Commentary on Matters of Interest.” This section contained six sub-topics: “Mayaguez,” “A Curious Footnote to the Mayaguez Incident,” “False Alarms,” “Indochina,” “The Defense Intelligence Notices,” and “The CIA Weekly.” All other sections maintained the same titles. The issue included, as had been promised in the February table of contents, letters from readers.

USIB discussed the second issue at its 29 July 1975 session. A point paper prepared for General Wilson for this session summarized comments received from IC elements. The paper highlighted a generally positive reception, citing State Department’s INR director at the time, Bill Hyland, who said “he likes it very much and finds it useful.” Comments provided by CIA’s Collection Guidance and Assessment Staff were likewise complimentary. The staff’s 22 July memo to CIA’s representative to USIB noted that “this issue is an improvement over its forerunner [with] more balance in the substantive presentations.” However, echoing observations about the first issue, the memo suggested that more input from consumers was needed.

Shryock’s point paper again raised the issue of who should receive the RONI, which was central to resolving the criticism that consumer views were not being sought:

We still need to make the decision about RONI’s dissemination outside the Community. This prospect creates real concern, but we think the members of the NSCIC Working Group should receive it. A common complaint about RONI is that it does not adequately represent the consumer’s views; one good way to solicit such views would be through the further dissemination of RONI.

The point paper also promised a third edition in October 1975. It would not appear until August 1976, after which it would not appear again.

In part, explanations for the delay could be found in the ongoing debate over fundamentals—what form, how to include consumer comments, and who should receive the RONI—which continued into the fall of 1975. General Wilson continued to address such concerns related to earlier editions and revisited fundamental questions about the journal’s content. In responding to a 7 October 1975 letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth, Wilson stated:

We are currently reappraising the form, content, and purpose of the RONI. . . . We believe, as you do, that RONI should pay greater attention to in-depth intelligence analysis (and relatively less to current intelligence) and our next issue will do so.

Wilson ended by remarking:

I should mention that we heartily concur with your notion that RONI might serve as an ‘ideal place to communicate what the consumer feels about the Community’s performance.’ We have hoped all along that, inter alia, RONI might ultimately serve this function.

In fact, effort had been expended to increase consumer involvement.
in evaluation during this period. For example, in June 1975 a member of the NSCIC Working Group proposed creation of an NSCIC Sub-Committee on Evaluation. By fall, consumers were engaged in limited product evaluation, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) having offered an evaluation of National Intelligence Assessment Memorandum (NIAM) 35/36-2-75: “Arab-Israeli Hostilities,” 13 June 1975. The evaluation acknowledged that the published draft was a “substantial improvement over the previous draft,” but it noted that the NIAM was “experimental in approach” and “relies on a subjective mindset that was concerned about “getting too close to the consumer.”

Knoche may have had some other principle in mind, but for the RONI there would be neither onward nor upward.

RONI’s Future and Its Swan Song

By December 1975 and well beyond the hoped-for October publication of the next edition, PRD’s Chief Shryock expressed hope in a memo to his boss that, with USIB approval the previous July to continue, his unit could return to producing the next issue of the RONI, offering a March 1976 publication date. The reason for delay, he indicated, was the work of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (the “Pike Committee”), which had by December essentially completed the investigatory phase of its inquiries into CIA and intelligence in general. That investigation included examinations of analysis as well as the better known supposed abuses of collection and covert action. Though the memo didn’t say so, doubtless the IC staff had been heavily committed to providing material to both the Pike and Church investigations, which took place simultaneously in 1975. Were it not for the House demands, the chief wrote, “issues No. 3 and 4 would now be a part of history.”

Unmentioned in the memo was the probability that William Colby, a prime sponsor of the RONI, was on the way out—George H. W. Bush replaced Colby on 30 January 1976.

In his December memo, once again, the chief took up existential questions about the RONI: “What should the next RONI look like, i.e., what changes should we make in its form, content, and objectives? Clearly some changes should be made.” He pointed to a number of factors necessitating revisions, including changes in IC attitudes, leadership, and structure. He also noted that “outside interest in the IC’s performance, and in evaluating that performance, is growing, and RONI should reflect (and capitalize on) this particular development.”

Lastly he acknowledged that PRD’s “own perceptions—formed by experience and by reactions to the first two issues” were changing. The chief then outlined his vision for the revised RONI:

We envision, in general, a RONI that would be more responsive to the DCI’s interests, broader in scope, open to more contributors, and slanted more toward the concerns of Community consumers. It would be less particular in approach, placing less emphasis on current intelligence, statistical breakdowns, and individual regional and topical commentaries. . . . All in all, the new book would be less ‘picky,’ more concerned with problems of broad scope, more of an IC Staff (vice PRD) publication. It would not discourage candor; nor would it shun controversy. But its overall tone would be, by design, more clearly constructive than in the past. RONI, in short, could serve consumer and DCI alike and become a strong and positive force in the Community at large.

Shryock’s effort to resurrect and restructure the “long dormant” RONI was successful, although it was not in March but in August 1976 that the next, and final, issue appeared. By then an IC Community Management Staff reorganization had taken place and General Wilson and Shryock, the journal’s chief advocates, had departed. The change put senior officer Fritz Ermarth—a future director of the National Intelligence Council—in charge of the assessment enterprise, and clearly, as his preface to the August issue explained, his unit had other priorities and insufficient resources to generate the publication.

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a. Eileen Roach Smith—who served as the Executive Secretary for the NSCIC Working Group in 1975 and later in the IC Staff—made this point in a telephone interview with the author in March 2018. She cited her experience at NSA in the early 1970s, when she was part of an office that provided products to and sought feedback from deputy assistant secretary-level customers. She noted some IC elements held a mindset that was concerned about “getting too close to the consumer.”

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Following the preface that Ermarth used to announce the reorganization and the demise of the journal, the August issue reflected a number of the changes Shryock proposed in December. The first section—“Matters of General Interest”—was similar in title to the June 1975 RONI, but it covered broader topics; four of them were:

- **Intelligence Community principles**—presaging what would be incorporated in the 2004 Intelligence Reform Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) and ultimately Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203; 82
- **The Practice of Intelligence Analysis**;
- **A National Sitrep**; and
- **DIA’s Experiment with Uncertainty**. 82

The August issue’s other sections reflected similar changes in focus. Section II—Specific Commentaries—was broader in coverage and did not make use of the statistical summaries that had been prominent in the first two issues. The August RONI also included an article dedicated to the collection community and summaries of a staff study addressing the IC’s use of new analytical methods and CIA’s intelligence support for foreign and national security policymaking. 83

The issue received very positive feedback from some quarters. Hank Knoche, then the deputy DCI, wrote to Ermarth,

> *This is a first-class piece of work in terms of both scholarship and ingenuity. I wish something like it could have been identified with my short tenure on the IC Staff, though I now feel a little better deep down because it was something along this line that I tried very hard to get the old Product Review Group to turn out.*

Almost as though he had not noticed the issue was the last, Knoche capped his note with the cheerful phrase, “Onward and upward.” 84

Knoche may have had some other principle in mind, but for the RONI there would be neither onward nor upward. Ermarth nevertheless promised that “assessing the quality and relevance of Intelligence Community production will continue to be a most vital part of this job” and that this function would be performed by the PRD’s replacement organization, the Production Assessment and Improvement Division (PAID) within a new Office of Performance Evaluation and Improvement (OPEI). 85

The job, he advised, however, would place greater emphasis on “performance assessment that comprehends the entire intelligence process, from program inception through requirements definition, collection, information processing, analysis, and production, to impact on national policy.” He stressed that “to do this job well, even on selected major issues, will be an enormous task. It does not appear that our manpower will allow substantive review of national intelligence for these purposes to be efficiently accomplished and effectively communicated through a journal like the RONI.”

He concluded: “The RONI helped to cultivate a self-critical spirit within the Intelligence Community. Its many authors and contributors are to be commended for their efforts. This office will enlarge on those efforts in future product and performance assessment projects.” 86

**The Aftermath**

What factors led to the cessation of the RONI and systematic product evaluation? Fritz Ermarth’s preface in the August issue had focused on resources and other responsibilities to a new D/DCI/IC and Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) to explain his decision. But signs of disaffection were clearly evident in the 20 months in which the RONI existed, and these undoubtedly played important roles.

One factor was the mission itself. Evaluating the quality of intelligence analysis was hard and not welcome by many, as PRD’s deputy chief had summarized in urging in May 1974 the establishment of a charter for the journal. The fact that PRD’s draft charter—like the PRG’s terms of reference—was never approved speaks to the strength of IC opposition. 87 Pushback from some elements on the types of products evaluated 88 and questions concerning the qualifications of PRD’s evaluators similarly...
highlight the frosty reception the PRD received in some quarters.89

Another element undermining PRD’s systematic product evaluation efforts and the RONI was the larger political environment that emerged by the mid-1970s. Congressional investigations and exposure of CIA’s “Family Jewels” contributed to a larger IC sentiment that there were enough problems without highlighting shortcoming in analytic quality in the RONI.90 In fact, no intelligence postmortems had been requested or produced since the 1975 congressional leaks and the associated unfavorable publicity had surfaced.91

Personnel and organizational changes within the IC staff were other contributing factors, among them Colby’s departure. Although DCI Bush strengthened the IC Staff and the final RONI was published during his short tenure as DCI, he did not share the stake that Colby did in its creation.92 General Wilson left his position as the deputy director for IC affairs in April 1976 to become DIA’s 5th director. Wilson had championed systematic product evaluation throughout 1974 and 1975. Wilson’s replacement, Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, had neither Wilson’s IC staff background nor a strong commitment to follow through on his predecessor’s effort. In addition, the prime manager of the RONI, Richard Shryock, retired in June 1976.

If Not RONI, What?

With the last issue published, PAID tried to carry out some of its predecessor’s functions, but those were scaled back and concentrated in fewer areas with new or added emphasis, such as IC-wide production resources and planning, while product evaluation, postmortems, and KIQs diminished in importance.93 For example, an October 1976 PAID point paper questioned whether postmortems should be produced in the future:

Postmortems were once PAID’s (PRD’s) principal product but are they now a thing of the past? Have we moved into a new, less controversial era (the NSC review, etc.)? Should the ICS continue to conduct postmortems and other special reviews of IC performance and, if so, should they be limited to reviewing only the operational aspects of the IC performance (how well did the system function?) and not the Community’s analytical judgments which always draw heaviest fire.94

Ultimately, PAID decided to conduct postmortems but only as required.95 PAID made one attempt to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the quality of IC intelligence as part of the Semiannual NSC Intelligence Review. However, unlike the RONI, the review overwhelmingly was based on interviews with users and producers of intelligence. The insight the RONI had provided through product evaluations, the identification of the collection sources used, and the linkage to KIQs was absent. The semiannual review program was discontinued after only one review.

A further reevaluation apparently took place late in 1976 or early in 1977. A point paper dated in January addressed what its unnamed author or authors saw as the key issues in the RONI. It noted concerns voiced by General Wilson and Knoche in December 1975 over “the amount of time PAID staffers had to give to producing the RONI—time taken away from other priorities.” The paper went on to discuss what a product like the RONI should and should not be used for. It argued that it should not assess the adequacy or inadequacy of intelligence products involving only one community element. Echoing General Graham’s comments from two years earlier, it noted that . . . assessments of this sort, which are often generated to initiate corrective actions, would not serve a constructive purpose if “washed” before the entire Community. Indeed, such exposures could be unnecessarily counterproductive because institutional hackles would inevitably be raised, bureaucratic trenches built, and a lot of otherwise useful counter-battery staff time expended.

The paper also asserted that the RONI should not be used as a vehicle to provide “macro-assessments relating to the adequacy/inadequacy of national intelligence products,” e.g., material that could be included in the Semi-Annual NSC Intelligence Review, or “as simply a journal containing articles of intelligence nature prepared by contributors from various Community elements.”96

If the RONI was to have any role, the paper went on, it would have to provide a “serious evaluation of the
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The closest the IC has come to such a product was AIS’s annual report to Congress. Perhaps it is time to consider recreation of such a vehicle. . . .

PRD examined tradecraft and drew on surveys to incorporate feedback and insights from consumers.

ODNI’s Mission, Priorities, Analysis, and Collection (MPAC) Group is currently considering steps that in many ways resemble PRD’s holistic efforts, trying, for example, to integrate separate evaluation efforts by its collection, requirements, and analytic tradecraft groups. Such an initiative is becoming more important given new product formats, sources, issues, and consumers served by finished intelligence in the 21st century.

Regular feedback to IC members highlighting best practices as well as shortcomings on a broad range of issues affecting analytic quality continues to be important. The RONI was a vehicle for such feedback. It addressed multiple elements, from collection challenges to postmortems and the latest developments in analytic methods. There has not been a publication like the RONI in the years since the last issue in 1976.

The closest the IC has come to such a product was AIS’s annual report to Congress. Perhaps it is time to consider recreation of such a vehicle—published regularly—to communicate integrated evaluations to those in and outside the IC. Such a publication would aid in capturing and injecting valuable lessons learned into IC training and work processes.

Perhaps the most important lesson provided by PRD’s 20-month effort to evaluate the quality of IC analysis and publish the RONI is to remind us of their end objective—product
improvement. As PRD’s chief noted in 1975:

There is . . . no particular reason why this unit is called the Product Review Division . . . rather than (somewhat more accurately) the Product Improvement Group, other than the unfortunate acronym formed by the latter. This matters little, but does serve to make the point that, obviously product improvement must proceed from a basis of product review.100

Acknowledgements

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The author: James Marchio retired from the Air Force after a 26 year career. He has served since then in the Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He is presently on the faculty of the National Intelligence University.

Endnotes

Editor’s note: Wherever possible, sources are hyperlinked to locations at which they can be retrieved. The redacted and declassified documents can be found through the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), though here they are directly linked to CIA’s electronic reading room.


6. President Richard Nixon, memorandum to the US Secretary of State; Secretary of the Treasury; Secretary of Defense; Attorney General; Director of Central Intelligence; Director, Office of Science and Technology; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chairman, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, “Organization and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community,” 5 November 1971, 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP73B00296R000400010003-4.pdf.

7. Ibid., 5.

8. Ibid., 2.

9. Ibid.


12. Ibid., 6.


15. Chief, PRG, memorandum for Mr. Tweedy, “Possible NSCIC Query re Activities of the PRG/NIPE.”


17. Chief, PRG, memorandum for Mr. Tweedy, “Possible NSCIC Query re Activities of the PRG/NIPE”.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


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31. Unknown or redacted author, memorandum for the record, “Charter of the Product Review Division (PRD) of the Intelligence Community Staff.”


33. Director of Central Intelligence, The Performance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab Israeli War of October 1973, i and 22–23.


36. Ibid.

37. Unknown or redacted author, memorandum for C/PRD, “PRD = Product Review.”


41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
60. Samuel V. Wilson, memorandum for USIB principals, “Review of National Intelligence.”
61. Ibid.
62. Intelligence Community Staff, Review of National Intelligence, February 1975.
65. Unknown or redacted author, memorandum for chief, Product Review Division, “Talking Paper on Preparation and Dissemination of the RONI.”
66. Ibid.
70. Samuel V. Wilson, memorandum for NSCIC Working Group, “RONI.”
72. Samuel V. Wilson, memorandum for NSCIC Working Group, “RONI.”
73. Ibid.
77. Chief, Product Review Division, memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, “RONI’s Future.”
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
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94. Memo, “Tentative Work Program for CIPIB.”
97. Ibid.
First Days

When the public thinks about the Central Intelligence Agency, it is natural to think about espionage and covert action. Stories about spying and daring missions around the world capture peoples’ imaginations and make their way into books, movies, and television programs. The more well-informed might add science and engineering and will think of the gadget designer “Q” in the James Bond series.

Medicine does not usually come to mind. But medical professionals have played and continue to play vital roles in CIA operations. Their functions begin with the evaluation of applicants, who must be physically healthy enough and psychologically and emotionally fit to work in high-pressure and sometimes dangerous environments. Medical attention continues throughout the careers of all employees, as doctors and nurses provide vaccinations and checkups, counsel employees with health and family challenges, and attend to job-related medical crises.

CIA medical professionals also play a vital role in helping intelligence assets with medical issues and the psychological challenges of living dual lives. A CIA paramilitary team rarely deploys to a hot spot without a nurse, physician’s assistant, or highly trained medic as a key member.

In spite of all that CIA medical professionals do, their stories are not widely told—and given the nature of their assignments, understandably so. This article is offered to highlight the roles of World War II medical professionals who blazed the trail for today’s medics in intelligence: the people who created ways to assess applicants, the doctors who deployed to war in places most Americans could not have found on a map, and the many medical professionals who took on any task, in any climate, and helped make the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) a success. These individuals would go on to build CIA’s Office of Medical Services (OMS).

Beginnings in OSS

The earliest recruited OSS physicians were assigned to support the Coordinator of Information (COI—the immediate predecessor of OSS) and OSS training areas near their Washington, DC, headquarters. Among these was Sylvester Missal, a 33-year-old otolaryngologist, who arrived in May 1942, a month before COI became OSS. In March 1943, Missal became the first OSS chief surgeon. As such he was responsible for policy and advisory oversight of medical issues in OSS activity and...
for the management of a growing Medical Services staff and the Headquarters dispensary.

After the arrival of eight medical professionals in 1942, the number rose by more than 100 in each of the remaining three years of the war. By war’s end in August 1945, 340 medical personnel had joined OSS—79 physicians, 11 dentists, nine Medical Administrative Corps (MAC) officers, 236 medics, and five nurses. Initially, however, most were not assigned to Medical Services, but to one of two OSS components: Operational Groups (OG) and Special Operations (SO). If one includes the psychologists and psychiatrists the CIA eventually aligned with the medical office, the third largest concentration was in Schools and Training.

Ultimately, however, virtually all medical personnel not in Schools and Training were assigned to the Medical Services Branch, a more elevated organizational placement established in early 1944.

**Functional Overview**

OSS physicians, psychologists, and other medical personnel assessed staff and agent candidates, supported and provided their training, staffed the major overseas bases, and deployed behind enemy lines, mostly as part of SO and OG operations. They eventually handled the medical supply program essential for partisans and guerrillas and in-place OSS agents; monitored their medical evacuation (medevacs), when needed; and provided technical support to sensitive special projects. Those who went behind the lines often parachuted to their destinations; some did so without any jump experience.

Once in place, they handled serious trauma cases, performed major surgeries in primitive settings, accomplished heroic medevacs, and treated a range of illnesses rarely seen in the United States...
of Merit; and an OSS psychologist received the Silver Star.

**OSS China-Burma India**

The first physician to join COI was Hawaiian born, Chinese-speaking Army Capt. Archie Chun-Ming, who was recruited from a reserve unit in Hawaii in the spring of 1942. He was brought on to be part of the first planned field team, which was expected to go to western China. At age 37, he would be one of the oldest physicians to serve with OSS. The 20-man field team, which designated itself Detachment 101 (Det 101), trained for only a few weeks before beginning a several-month trip to New Delhi, the rear echelon headquarters of the China-Burma-India Theater. There they learned that their mission had been changed: Det 101 was going to northeastern India to orchestrate and support tribal guerrilla warfare behind Japanese lines in the jungles of northern Burma. Operating out of the bungalows of an Assam Tea Company plantation in Nazira, Assam, Det 101 set about recruiting and training Kachin tribesmen, and over the next two years led what is generally considered the most successful OSS paramilitary operation of the war.

Had Dr. Chun-Ming been in Nazira for medical research, he would have found it to be a fruitful location. In addition to the usual diseases endemic to the tropics, smallpox, cholera, and malaria all erupted into epidemics during his tour there, and throughout the entire time Det 101 was in operation. Preventive measures, therefore, were always a key element in Dr. Chun-Ming’s medical program.

In Nazira, Dr. Chun-Ming had much more wide-ranging responsibilities than caring for the health of his 19 teammates, however. He also provided medical support to what ultimately numbered 27 trainee camps spread over a 40-square mile area. He taught first aid, worked as a translator, provided small arms and demolition instruction, and served as the Det 101 postal censor.

Dr. Chun-Ming found that the medical and ancillary demands were too much for him alone, and the team sent a request to the US Naval Group, China—the primary intelligence group in the region—for medical help in serving the forward bases being established in Burma. In October 1943, the group sent a Navy physician, 31-year-old LCDR James C. Luce, who, after recovering from injuries sustained on the battleship USS Maryland at Pearl Harbor, was about to be sent to China.

Dr. Luce arrived at the beginning of November 1943—aft...
he oversaw construction of a rudimentary bamboo hospital, dispensary, and surgery, all of which were ready by the time his medical supplies were air dropped to him on Christmas Eve 1943.

Dr. Luce came quickly to learn the history of the Kachin and to develop a rapport with them. This quality so impressed the FORWARD base commander that, upon the commander’s transfer only a few weeks after Luce’s arrival, he recommended Luce be his successor, even while continuing his work as the base physician. This was approved, and for the next 15 months Luce ran the operations of the base and the surrounding area, including oversight of a guerrilla force that eventually totaled 3,000. All the while, he continued to see both base and native patients, including the families of his guerrilla troops.

This workload soon led Luce to request additional help. That assistance came in the form of 12 Navy pharmacist’s mates (now termed corpsmen), most of whom were initially assigned to Nazira, to be prepared for insertion into the operations in Burma. One of these, Bernard Bauman, immediately volunteered to parachute into Ngumla to work with Luce, even though he had never jumped from an airplane. Unfortunately, he flew in on a supply plane that was shot down over the camp, and he was killed—one of the two OSS medical personnel to be killed in action during the war. Most of the other newly arrived corpsmen later infiltrated by foot and were replaced at Nazira by an infusion of Army medics.

Among his many accomplishments, Luce is particularly known for having successfully performed brain surgery on a Kachin warrior, in his primitive bamboo shack operating room. The man had been carried by litter for more than three days to reach Luce. Among other injuries, the man was found to have a gaping hole in his forehead, through which destroyed brain tissue was oozing. The Kachins built a fire to boil water in which one of the Det 101 officers sterilized towels and instruments; another officer supervised a hand-cranked generator for lighting. Also helping Dr. Luce was a recently arrived corpsman. Luce preformed a 90-minute operation—under local anesthetic—during which he successfully cleaned and repaired the injury. He later wrote, “As each step was completed, a report in native jargon was relayed outside to the small group who had collected and the exclamations were somewhat like those heard amongst the more sophisticated audiences at home.”

When Dr. Chun-Ming’s tour ended in July 1944, Dr. Luce took his place in Nazira, supervising a medical staff which eventually numbered 47, including seven physicians and a dentist, and overseeing construction of a 50-bed hospital and 20-bed “convalescent camp.” This included responsibility for all the medical personnel and supplies that supported Det 101’s campaigns through March 1945, after

a. Luce’s handwritten history, physical, and operative report adds that the local anesthetic was Novocain, that the 2x4 cm “compound comminuted fracture of frontal bone” involved the frontal sinus, which, upon probing, exuded a purulent odor. The patient also had generalized scabies. After completing the debridement, Luce placed “sterile sulfanilamide powder” in the wound, and left a drain in place.
which Dr. Luce was reassigned to Naval Group, China.a

Many of Det 101’s medical personnel distinguished themselves in action. For example, Dr. Sam Woolington, a 27-year-old medical officer responsible for a 1,000-man Kachin Battalion and 20–30 Americans, was awarded a Bronze Star for his exceptional care of the wounded, often under fire. He devised a portable field hospital that could be carried by coolies and mules and permitted him to stop, perform surgery, and quickly move on. On one occasion, he did brain surgery (the third Det 101 physician to do so) with a flashlight for illumination, despite the fact that it was a blackout situation and the light made him a target for the surrounding Japanese; the patient survived and was later flown out. Woolington would later play a crucial POW role in Saigon after he had been reassigned to South East Asia Command.5

Dr. Charles Hutter parachuted into Burma following a particularly costly battle during the final push against the Japanese, bringing medical supplies and performing emergency surgery over a two-day period while an airstrip was cleared to evacuate the wounded. As an undergraduate at Harvard, Hutter was the 1936 NCAA 100-yard freestyle swimming champion and was an alternate who participated in the 1936 Berlin Olympics. He was known for his relatively formal dress, even at remote jungle bases—“the only man in Burma wearing a tie.”6

The corpsmen and medics did some of the most heroic Det 101 work, retrieving wounded while under fire and occasionally personally leading attacks. One of the most interesting medics was Bill Brough, a British and Quaker conscientious objector with the St. John’s Ambulance Service supporting “Burma Surgeon” Gordon Seagraves hospital in northern Burma. In late 1944, he abandoned his objector status and became a Det 101 medic. During an attack a few months later, he raced 100 yards across a clearing under fire—carrying only dressings, morphine syrettes, and his pistol to treat and drag out wounded Kachins. He was awarded a Silver Star for this action. Just a month later, when his temporary field “hospital” site came under intense artillery fire, Brough worked through the night to dig foxholes and build shelters for 40 litter cases in his care. This earned him a Bronze Star. A month later, having been promoted to lieutenant and assigned command of a combat company—albeit while still functioning as the company medic—he repeated his daring rescue of two months earlier to retrieve two of his men who had been shot. He was again recommended for a Silver Star. After the war, he used the GI Bill to become a psychiatrist.7

In the final tabulation, Det 101 guerrillas were credited with derailing nine trains, destroying 51 bridges and 277 military vehicles, capturing or destroying an estimated 3,700 tons of supplies, and killing or seriously wounding 15,000 Japanese troops. This was at a cost of 22 American lives (almost a third of whom died in the plane lost over Ngumla, in

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a. Dr. Chun-Ming left India on 23 July 1944, a day before his 40th birthday. As one of the older physicians to serve with OSS, Dr. Chun-Ming may have left Nazira with some medical problems; nonetheless, he was able to resume a medical practice in Hawaii and continue service as a US Army reservist, retiring as a full colonel. He died on 26 January 1973.
which the medic was killed) and 184 Kachins killed (and another 86 captured or missing). Of 122 agent groups infiltrated into Burma, 38 agents were lost. The official OSS War Report, compiled soon after the war, described Det 101 as “the most spectacular OSS activity in the Far East,” and one in which the medical staff played a “significant, if not vital [role], from the earliest days of the Detachment.”

OSS Operational Groups, Special Operations, and Special Intelligence

As early as December 1941, General Donovan wanted COI to have British-style commando units with language-qualified soldiers skilled in sabotage and small arms who could be parachuted behind enemy lines to harass the enemy. The concept was approved the following August, but for a variety of reasons an OSS Operational Groups (OG) Branch was not established until May 1943. Initially, there were five major OGs: Italian (Company A), French (Company B), Yugoslavian or Balkan (Company C), Greek (later also included in Company C), and Norwegian (with no company designation). Each had its own surgeon and about a dozen medics. A Chinese OG was organized late in the war, staffed largely by former French

OGs. Unlike its predecessors, the Chinese OG was conceived primarily as a training and advisory unit, tasked with building a large number of Chinese-manned commando units.

Dr. Pedro Souza

Among the first OG physicians was 41-year-old Cuban-born Pedro (Pete) Souza, who not long before had been an ear-nose-throat (ENT) specialist in Havana. Comfortable speaking Spanish, Italian, and French, Souza had recently joined the US Army, and become a US citizen. He was recruited into OSS in July 1943 and was assigned as a surgeon to the Italian OGs, the first OG group to be organized. The OG medics faced most of the live-fire situations, which included hand-to-hand combat. The French OG physician, however, was accidentally shot in the leg by a partisan while eating at a hotel in France, after parachuting in to work with French resistance (maquis) medical personnel as the Germans were retreating across France.

Special Operations (SO) was a cornerstone of the OSS mission. Beginning with the work of Det 101, its work spread rapidly into all the theaters in which OSS was present. At least initially, the Medical Staff’s primary contributions came through the lectures, training, and treatment provided during SO training before the men were sent to the field, and by providing medical supplies. The SOs operated as civilians, either individually or in very small groups. Two significant SO operators were Robert Moyers and Justin Greene.

Dr. Robert E. Moyers

Dr. Robert Edison Moyers, at age 24, was said to be the youngest dentist in the Army when he was assigned to Cairo, Egypt. There he

a. As in the case of the OSS medic killed on the way to Burma—Pharmacist Mate Bernard Bauman—the second lost medic, Robert Anderson, died en route to his unit, in Norway. The flight taking his team into Norway ran into a mountain near the drop zone, killing all on board.
was recruited by General Donovan, who was looking for a physician and missed or failed to recognize the “D” for Dental Corps on Moyers’s caduceus insignia. Moyers was sent to provide medical support to the Allied Military Mission in the mountains of northern Greece. After some parachute training, Dr. Moyers jumped in at the beginning of December 1943, nominally to oversee supply and handle liaison with the leftist ELAS guerrillas (Andartes). When the British medical officer was transferred a few weeks later, Moyers assumed command despite barely being back from a remote trip during which he was completely bedridden with hepatitis and cared for in a peasant hut occupied by a man, his wife, four children, chickens, and a herd of goats.10

Initially Moyers’s staff included a British executive officer, a Greek nurse, a Russian nurse, a Greek medical student who served as translator and anesthetist, and a few Greek and Italian kitchen help and runners. Moyers soon added a Russian Cossack to handle the hospital mules and, according to Moyers, to calm the “histrionic” Russian nurse. Eventually, a second Cossack joined the staff to assist with the stables and hospital relocations and to serve as Moyers’s personal bodyguard. In early April, the staff was enlarged by the arrival of an OSS medic, TSgt Robert DeWeese, and in June by two OSS “orderlies,” Sgt Frank Weber and T/4 Alfred Borgman, all of whom parachuted in.11 Moyers also was assisted by two Andarte physicians, an ophthalmologist and a hematologist.

In addition to providing sick call, and performing what eventually totaled 300 operations (despite being a dentist by training), Moyers also visited Andarte “hospitals” and published a medical journal, The Medical Periodical of Free Greece, with typescript copies in both Greek and English. It included articles on drugs being supplied to the partisans, sanitation, and unusual cases. A local celebrity of sorts, he also was asked to speak to various groups, once on “American Youth Movements,” which he decided were the YMCA and Boy Scouts.

Moyers went on major missions to provide medical support and once, while serving as the senior Allied representative, called in air strikes when the partisans were about to be overrun by a large German column. From August 1944 onward, a major responsibility was providing relief to Greek villages following a German scorched-earth operation. With the help of two OSS men flown in from Cairo, Moyers’s group took over the clothing, feeding, and housing of 100,000 displaced villagers and dealt with the ensuing epidemics by providing Greek doctors with “800 pounds of typhus and typhoid vaccines, sulfa drugs, Atabrine, bandages, etc.”

What probably was the most medically dramatic episode that Moyers faced occurred when a Greek OG unit was ambushed.

What probably was the most medically dramatic episode that Moyers faced occurred when a Greek OG unit was ambushed in September 1944, and the unit’s commanding officer was critically injured in the perirectal area by a mine explosion. In response to a call for help, Moyers and a medic made a 12-hour hike to the village where the officer was being treated by the OG medic. It was another two days before they could transport the patient to the hospital area, near a hidden airfield from which he could be evacuated.

Meanwhile, Moyers had borrowed a horse and ridden back to the hospital, arriving at 1:00 a.m. to perform emergency surgery on a wounded Russian soldier, then to the airfield, where the patient was put in a small, makeshift tent. Poor weather barred rescue flights for the next four days, during which time Moyers twice performed emergency surgery to stop renewed hemorrhaging. With transfusion not an option, he administered tea, every ten minutes.

Finally, a young RAF pilot in Italy volunteered to risk a dangerous daylight extraction. Descending blindly through the clouds, he landed successfully. The plane, a Lysander, had only a single, cramped passenger seat, located behind the pilot, which could not accommodate a reclining patient. There were head and foot supports, but nothing

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a. The 22-year-old DeWeese was one of the OSS medics with some college education—three years at the University of Minnesota. Assigned by the Army to the Middle Eastern Theater of Operations (Cairo), he had
for the midsection, so the medic squeezed in under the patient to hold him up and attempt to control a rectal hemorrhage which had recurred just before the plane landed. He remained in this configuration for the four hours back to an Army hospital in Italy. Remarkably, the patient eventually recovered.11

After the Germans had withdrawn from Greece, civil war erupted in December 1944. Soon, over 1,000 British soldiers were taken prisoner by ELAS. Because of his personal credibility, Moyers was able to negotiate care and then release of these POWs. He also handled medical intelligence reporting until his departure from Greece in April 1945.

Back in the United States, Moyers set up a dental clinic at an OSS training site. When Moyers left OSS at the end of the war, he was said to have become the most highly decorated dentist in the history of the US Army. Among his awards were the Bronze Star, Legion of Merit, Purple Heart, Order of the British Empire, and Order of the Phoenix (Greece). He would go on to a highly successful career in his field.

Dr. Justin Greene—POW

When psychiatrist Capt. Justin Greene joined OSS in April 1943, he was 33 years old and one of only two psychiatrists in the organization. The other served on the Planning Staff. Greene had trained in France and was fluent in the language. Apparently eager to take on intelligence work, he was immediately sent to Algiers to head a Special Intelligence (SI) unit, where he recruited, trained, and deployed French agents. Committed to being close to the action, he landed on the southern coast of France on 15 August 1944, where he worked with his agent networks and maintained close contact with the French resistance.

Over the next several weeks, as the Germans retreated ahead of advancing Allied troops, he moved northward until he had reached St. Die, near the German border, just north of Switzerland, which was one of the first direct avenues of retreat from France into Germany. There, on 28 October 1944, Greene’s luck ran out. He and three others were attacked by a German patrol; he sustained a bullet wound through his foot and was captured.

Greene’s captors took him to a German field hospital, from which he was evacuated to a POW hospital in Ludwigsburg.

men well behind German lines, came upon the POW camp. Greene was freed, then carried southward before being dropped off with a carbine and some ammunition, still about 50 miles behind the lines.

Greene did not get far before again becoming the target of German attack. This time felled by a bazooka round that exploded nearby, he suffered a concussion and multiple abrasions. He was returned to a POW camp, but his stay was brief. Just a week and a half later, on 6 April, the camp was overrun by advancing US troops. After returning home, he was hospitalized at Walter Reed and at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for almost two months, primarily for a post-concussion cephalgia (also known as cluster headache or migrainous neuralgia).a He also was awarded a Bronze Star and the Purple Heart.

OSS Maritime Operations

Christian Lambertsen

In November 1942, a young medical student at the University of Pennsylvania, Christian J. Lambertsen, approached OSS about an underwater breathing device he had been developing since 1939, his first year in medical school. His Lambertsen Amphibious Respiratory Unit, or LARU, was a revolutionary, closed

a. On Greene’s return to Washington in June he was unexpectedly found to have a strong resentment toward his handling by OSS and was uninterested in an onward assignment in China, which mystified the interviewing psychologist. He thought he might like to work in the Assessment Program, where other psychiatrists were located. He eventually went into treatment for the cephalgia. This account is based on the records contained in Greene’s OSS personnel file: National Archives II, RG 226, Stack Area 230, Entry 224, Box 291.
circuit oxygen system that did not emit telltale bubbles, and largely eliminated the risk of the bends, even with rapid surfacing. The device, dubbed “Lambertsen’s Lung,” became the cornerstone of OSS maritime operations. Although still in medical school, Christian Lambertsen became a civilian consultant to the program; after graduation and a year of internship he entered the Army and joined OSS.12

Lambertsen, who now is considered the father of combat swimming, deployed to Ceylon, where OSS’s South East Asia Command was based, and carried out an extensive program to prepare swimmers to attack deep water ports from Bangkok to Singapore. In practice, however, these attacks were not carried out, as progress of the war in the area made them unnecessary. The operational work was mainly along the shallow, muddy coastline of Burma, where the principal maritime work was infiltration into klongs via kayaks and fast boats, in operations supported by OSS medics and physicians.

Dr. Jack Taylor

Among the best of known of OSS medical personnel is Dr. Jack Taylor, who was a 33-year-old dentist in Los Angeles when he joined OSS in August 1942. Because of his extensive experience racing yachts, he was assigned to the new OSS Maritime Unit to teach navigation, seamanship, sailing, rowing, and nighttime skills. One of his early assignments was to test the underwater breathing device developed by Lambertsen in the pool of the Shoreham Hotel in Washington, DC. In a Shoreham follow-on test, Taylor swam a mile underwater, covering the distance in just 48 minutes.

In June 1943, Taylor was assigned to Cairo, Egypt, and successfully built a clandestine ferrying service to the Aegean. That November, he opened a new office in Italy, just above the heel in Bari, which handled dozens of missions to Yugoslavia and Albania, 14 of which he personally conducted. On what probably was his last such mission he led a three-man reconnaissance into Albania, which was stranded when German gunfire blocked the exfiltration boat. This group then spent three months evading German troops and Albanian sympathizers before reaching a location from which they could be extracted.13

Back in Italy, Taylor volunteered for a Special Operations mission in Austria. He and three Austrian deserter-volunteers parachuted, without contacts, into an area south of Vienna, but arrived without their radios. Taylor therefore planned an overland return to Italy to report, obtain a radio, and return. On the night before his departure, the Gestapo burst into his hideout, beating him with blackjacks and dislocating his elbow before carrying him to their Vienna headquarters.

After four months in the Gestapo prison there, Taylor was moved to Mauthausen concentration camp, and, unknown to him, scheduled for execution. Pending this, he was assigned to a work detail on a new crematorium. Three days before his execution date, a friendly Czech
Instead of making the five-day hike, Hurley opted to parachute in. He had never parachuted before and was dismayed that those who took him to the airplane did not even know how to put on a parachute.

working in the administrative office removed Taylor’s name from the death list. Just over a week later, a US Army reconnaissance team looking for roadblocks and destroyed bridges unexpectedly came upon Mauthausen. The guard force had fled and Taylor, who had lost a third of his weight since capture—he was down to only 114 pounds—declined evacuation so he could help document the war crimes at the camp. His meticulous and voluminous record was described by military lawyers at Nuremberg—at which Taylor would later testify—as “the best war-crimes evidence” produced in the European Theater. It is also the subject of numerous websites dedicated to special warfare units.

OSS Pacific
As the war in Europe moved to conclusion, OSS shifted its primary focus and resources to East Asia. Personnel, including the medical staff, were transferred from Europe and Burma to western China, and plans were put in place for Operational Group and Special Operations missions. As in Europe, OSS physicians and medics played important roles in these missions.

Dr. William Loomis and Others in China
The first OSS physician sent into China was 29-year-old William Farnsworth (“Farnie”) Loomis, a person of some previous fame because in 1936, as an undergraduate in the Harvard Mountaineering Club, he was part of a five-man team that first reached the summit of 25,624-foot Nanda Devi, at the time the highest mountain ever climbed. Loomis was also an accomplished skier; on entering the Army he was assigned to the Camp Hale Mountain Group in Colorado.

He was recruited into OSS from Camp Hale in May 1944 to serve as the physician for a planned mission under socialite adventurer Count Ilia (“Bill”) Tolstoi, which was to be sent into northern China to link up with communist guerrillas. Tolstoi was well known for a pioneering, two-man, overland crossing from India to China via Tibet during 1942–43 that sought to identify landing sites for an alternative air route to the Hump.a Loomis prepared by training with Det 101 in India, but after his hurried onward travel to Chungking, China, the Tolstoi mission was displaced by a similar mission being launched by the Army.

Although still attached to Tolstoi, Loomis became the first OSS China Theater surgeon (though in an acting capacity) in February 1945. In this role, he oversaw the medical aspects of the massive OSS buildup which saw in-country personnel grow from 144 in January to 800 in April and finally to 1,900 by war’s end. Ultimately, 18 OSS physicians, two dentists, two MAC officers, and at least 53 medics supported OSS in China, and several others provided indirect support from supply bases in India. More than 30 additional medics and a third dentist were en route or being prepared for assignment as part of a major new program when Japan surrendered in August, 1945. Altogether this was the largest medical manpower commitment made by the OSS to any theater during the war.b

In addition to the medical personnel being transferred from Europe, OSS recruited several young physicians who had been raised or worked in China or Korea, and therefore had local knowledge and language skills. Two examples are Captains Robert Lynn and Wilmot Boone. These doctors also played important roles in China, from leading an intelligence mission requiring 650 miles of overland travel, to hurriedly organizing a field hospital and training uneducated Chinese troops to become medics when a major Chinese Army unit was about to be overrun.c

One of the more thrilling accounts from this group was provided by then-27-year-old Frank Hurley, who was just a year out of medical school when he arrived in China, and who later handled the just mentioned field hospital crisis. Soon after arrival in China, Hurley was asked to help a Chinese radio operator who was

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a. Tolstoi was the grandson of Russian novelist Leo Tolstoi. While his expedition was in Lhasa he had delivered gifts and a letter from President Roosevelt to Tibet’s then-seven-year-old Dalai Lama.


c. The lengthy reconnaissance mission was undertaken by 31-year-old Robert Lynn, who had been working at a Presbyterian mission hospital in China when the war began.
gravely ill some 110 mountainous miles away. Instead of making the approximately five-day hike, he opted to parachute in. He had never parachuted before and was dismayed that those who took him to the airplane did not even know how to put on a parachute. After some hurried instruction on the flight, and having finally satisfied himself that his chute was adequately attached, he jumped—but his descent was complicated by twisted lines, a temporary backward drift as he approached the ground, close encounters with city walls, and a final landing in a shallow well.

Once on the ground, he found his patient, moribund, in a home converted to a military headquarters. He was being treated with Atabrine and with needles inserted under the fingernails. The man turned out to require an appendectomy, which Hurley performed in front of an invited audience of pipe-smoking Chinese doctors who had come to see the their first operation. Several days later, with the patient well-recovered, Hurley began the five-day mountain hike back to his base, only to suffer heat exhaustion on the second day. He treated himself with sweat from his shirt until he could buy some salt, and made it safely back. All-in-all, he wrote to Theater Surgeon Loomis, the experience was likely to stand “as the greatest thrill of my life.”

Perhaps the most well-known of the China Theater missions was that of the Deer Team, which parachuted into a rice paddy near Hanoi to work with Vietminh guerrillas against the rail lines being used by the Japanese. Medic Paul Hoagland, recently with Det 101, was on this mission. He was responsible for taking care of the team and selecting and training Vietnamese medics. Soon after arrival, Hoagland was taken to a nearby village to see what he could do for a gravely ill “Mr. Ho”—Ho Chi Minh himself, assessed by Hoagland as at least suffering from malaria and dysentery. He gave Ho the standard, all-out medic treatment—quinine, sulfa drugs, and vitamins—and over a 10-day period, Ho slowly recovered. Thereafter, Hoagland was to become known as the medic who saved Ho Chi Minh. While the war ended before the joint Deer Team-Vietminh operations were launched, the joint work led to the team’s reception as Ho’s special guests when it arrived in Hanoi later in September.

Mercy Missions
As the war in the Pacific moved to its close, there was fear that Japan might kill or abandon the vast number of debilitated POWs held in China and Southeast Asia, leaving them without food or other means of self-preservation. To deal with this possibility, small “humanitarian teams” or “mercy missions” were assembled to fly to known POW camps as soon as the war ended to ensure the safety of the inmates until more definitive support could be sent in. These teams were staffed by OSS volunteers, and most included an OSS physician or medic. Nine teams initially were organized, all but two within China or Manchuria:

- CARDINAL, to Mukden (Manchuria)
- DUCK, to Weihsen
- FLAMINGO, to Harbin
- MAGPIE, to Beijing
- SPARROW, to Shanghai
- ALBATROSS, to Canton
- PIGEON, to Hainan Island
- QUAIL, to Hanoi
- EAGLE, to Seoul, Korea

Three additional teams were organized later:

- CANARY, to Formosa (now Taiwan)

a. For more on this episode in OSS history, see Bob Bergin, “The OSS Role in Ho Chi Minh’s Rise to Political Power,” Studies in Intelligence 62, no. 2 (June 2018): 7–22.
SEAGULL, to Hankow
RAVEN, to Vientiane (Laos)

The first of these missions flew off within a day of Japan’s 15 August 1945 announcement of surrender. Their destinations were well inside Japanese-occupied territory, and some were in the hands of hostile units unaware of or unwilling to accept Japan’s surrender. Despite prior leaflet drops announcing mission goals, one team did receive anti-aircraft fire; three teams were at least temporarily taken into custody after landing; and two teams were compelled to leave without any contact with POWs.

The six-man CARDINAL Mission to the Hoten POW camp near Mukden had the highest priority of all the mercy missions and received the greatest subsequent publicity, both because the camp housed more American POWs than any other camp and because the highest ranking Allied POWs were known to be held nearby. Robert Lamar, then 31 years old and the most experienced physician-parachutist in OSS, was a ranking officer on this team. After jumping safely into a field about two miles from the camp, four members of the team, including Lamar, began walking toward the camp. A half-mile down the road, they were taken prisoner by a Japanese patrol, which took three members of the team toward town while allowing Lamar to return to the point where the other two team members were watching the supplies.

Lamar found the two in a nearby shack, stripped and kneeling on the floor, surrounded by Japanese with bayonets; then he, too, was grabbed, slapped around, bruised by the flat side of a bayonet, and his clothes torn off. Blindfolded, the three were led to town to join the other, also blindfolded, members of the team. The entire group was transported to the Japanese Secret Police (Kempeitai) Headquarters, where an apologetic colonel explained that word of the war’s ending had not been received before the team had parachuted in. So, they were no longer prisoners, but rather guests, with rooms in the quasi-palatial Yamato Hotel.

Over the next few days, the team worked to identify the inmates in most serious need of evacuation, provide treatment, and ensure adequate diet for the nearly 1,700 prisoners (80 percent American) held in the camp. They also collected war crimes reports. Lamar traveled by train to another camp and, with difficulty, arranged the transfer of the senior POWs back to Hoten. Among these was Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, captured in 1942 when he surrendered the Philippines, the most senior American POW in the war. He is remembered for asking Lamar, “Do the American people censure me for surrendering at Corregidor?” Lamar, famously at the time, replied, “General, the American people look on you as one of the heroes of this war.” Wainwright later received the Medal of Honor.

Medical personnel on several other mercy mission teams also had notable experiences. Fontaine Jarman, then 27, jumped onto a military airfield in Beijing with the MAGPIE mission, which was immediately surrounded by armed Japanese who insisted that the war was not over. Forced into a truck, the team was taken to Japanese regional headquarters, where the officer-of-the-day also denied the war had ended. Lt. Gen. Takahashi finally arrived and acknowledged that he was aware of Japan’s capitulation but said he was not yet authorized to release prisoners.

This team unexpectedly found, among over 600 Allied POWs in the area, Commander Winfield Scott Cunningham, who headed Naval and Marine forces on Wake Island and was captured when that island was attacked immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Four of the famous Doolittle fliers also were found. Captured after their one-way, April 1942 raid on Japan, these were the only survivors of the eight crew members originally taken prisoner. Treated as

a. Others notable prisoners included Gen. Arthur Percival, former British Commander at Malaya, who had surrendered Singapore, and Benton Thomas, former Governor of Malaya.
war criminals, they had been tortured, starved, and kept in solitary confinement. Three were executed, and a fourth died of starvation and disease. Of the four who remained, one was so near death from beriberi that he couldn’t be included in the first group of POWs flown out. Lapsing in and out of consciousness, and becoming increasingly psychotic, he was treated by Jarman in a hotel room converted to hospital use until he became sufficiently stable to be moved to Kunming.15

Among the last of these POW missions was the small EMBANKMENT mission to Saigon. The team was headed by Lt Emil Counasse, and included Dr. Sam Woolington and medic Sgt Ralph Nardella, in addition to a Sgt Hejna and a Thai radio operator. Both Woolington and Nardella were recent arrivals from Det 101, and technically Captain Woolington was by rank the senior member of the team. However, as rank was important to the Japanese, Counasse assumed a “temporary rank” of major, while Nardella and Hejna became captains. This mission was complicated by the development of violent anti-French rioting.

There were several episodes involving the team’s medical personnel. One evening, for example, as Woolington and two others escorted 10 French women to their homes to retrieve their children, they were told that two American citizens (or British, depending on the account) were being held in a Vietnamese jail. They went to investigate and found hundreds of French men, women, and children, many having been tied up, beaten, and held in deplorable conditions. Woolington angrily lectured the jailer about the mistreatment, threatening that unless the women and children were released immediately, he would notify the American, British, Russian, and Chinese governments and “troops of the United Nations would intervene.” As impressed as the jailer may have been with this argument, he also was concerned about the secret ray gun Woolington appeared to brandish, and soon agreed to his demands. Woolington’s weapon was actually a Signal Corps Air-Ground Signal Gun, i.e., a light with a stock and sites, which he had carried to supplement his flashlight. When Woolington was asked what it was, he casually replied that it was “an atomic gun, just sent over from the States, which would destroy anything within five miles on a direct line of fire.” Woolington was then allowed to bring 200 women and children back to the hotel where the team was staying. There they were fed and lodged for the night.

Given that atomic bombs had only recently been dropped on Japan, Woolington’s gun was taken quite seriously in Saigon and, as the team leader reported, “we had no need of any other weapons. On the few occasions when we carried the ‘atomic gun,’ people cleared off the streets in a hurry. The last time we carried it we had two GIs walking in front of us, clearing the people out of the way of the deadly weapon.”16

The OSS was abolished on 1 October 1945, just a month after Japan’s surrender. This was far too early for all personnel due to be discharged to return to the United States. At the time, OSS had about 10,000 personnel (or about half its maximum strength), of whom about 6,000 were overseas. These remaining personnel were transferred to the War Department (9,000) or the State Department (about 1,000 analysts from the Research and Analysis Branch). Although those at the War Department were designated the Strategic Support Unit (SSU), most were en route to release from the service.

By the end of the year, SSU numbered fewer than 2,000. Emerging Cold War tensions led to
systematic review of national intelligence needs and eventually the creation of the Central Intelligence Group [CIG]—the SSU was absorbed by the CIG and abolished in October 1946.\(^7\) The CIG, in turn, was replaced a year later by the new Central Intelligence Agency.

At the time OSS was abolished, about two-thirds of the medical and psychology personnel who had been present in early summer were still on board, and all became part of SSU. As elsewhere in SSU, their numbers declined rapidly. Only a third of those present on 1 October 1945 remained at the end of the year, and a proportionately greater drop occurred in 1946.

Several OSS physicians were still in the field when SSU was created, serving in locations like Biebrich (near Wiesbaden), Vienna, Rome, and Trieste in Europe, and Shanghai in China. Biebrich and Rome had closed by the end of the year, and Vienna and Trieste by the end of summer 1946. Excluding the large numbers of medical personnel simply awaiting transportation home, more than 20 medical personnel—including at least two physicians—were on active assignments in Asia when SSU was established. Most were in the China Theater, but some remained in the SEAC area—at dispensaries in Ceylon, Rangoon, Singapore, and a China Theater supply base in Calcutta. Most of these were closed by the end of the year, and all by the following summer, which left only those still in China.

China Theater surgeon Jackson Bostwick (successor to Farnie Loomis), and about a dozen medics were still in country on 1 January 1946.

Bostwick had moved from Kunming to Shanghai in November 1945, when SSU China Headquarters relocated there. For a time, medics also operated new dispensaries in Canton and Qingdao, but these had closed by the end of 1946.

Unlike the situation in Europe and SEAC, the departure of the last of the former OSS medical personnel did not end the SSU-CIG medical presence. Postwar replacements were sent out to staff the small medical unit in Shanghai. One of these was Army detailee Ross Jung, who succeeded Bostwick as theater surgeon in June 1946. The 33-year-old Jung was Canadian by birth and had served as a combat/paratroop surgeon in the Canadian Army during the war. He entered the US Army in 1945, becoming a US citizen, and joined SSU-CIG. Ethnically Chinese, he was fluent in Cantonese. A replacement dentist and medic also were sent to Shanghai. After October 1946, these three were the only SSU-CIG medical personnel in the field.

Organizationally, the SSU Medical Services Office was placed in a newly established Office of the Assistant Director-Services (OAD-S). In December 1945, OAD-S was replaced by the Services Branch (under a Chief of Services), and the Medical Services Office was redesignated the Medical Division, within the Services Branch. Medical Division functions were formally transferred to the new CIG in April 1946 and remained there until the establishment of CIA in September 1947.

OSS Chief Surgeon Sylvester Missal left the service when OSS
was abolished, and his deputy Willis Murphy became SSU’s first chief surgeon. At the end of November, Murphy also left, and was succeeded by Pedro (Pete) Souza, the former OSS Italian Operational Group surgeon. Dr. Souza had returned from Italy in June 1945 and eventually became Headquarters Dispensary surgeon. He remained the chief surgeon into CIA’s earliest months.

At SSU-CIG headquarters, the medical staff generally numbered about 18, including two physicians, a dentist, a MAC officer, several medical technicians, a dental technician, two civilian nurses, and a small administrative staff. With the exception of the nurses, all were active duty Army personnel who would be replaced by other Army detailees at the end of their tours. Replacement physician John Tietjen, who later led CIA’s medical office for almost three decades, arrived in 1946.

Most OSS physicians had joined while they were young and just beginning postgraduate training. Their wartime service averaged less than two years, and afterwards they resumed training and went into private practice as internists, pediatricians, surgeons, orthopedists, otolaryngologists, radiologists, family practitioners, and psychiatrists. Although many eventually published professionals articles, only a handful had careers in academia. Several of this latter group had become psychiatrists after the war, with one—Herbert Waldhorn—eventually serving as editor of the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*. Christian Lambertsen had a long and distinguished career at the University of Pennsylvania. Dentist Robert Moyers, of the clandestine hospital in Greece, later published the *Handbook of Orthodontics*, a professional standard through four editions, spanning 40 years.

Unlike the medical staff personnel, a large majority of the psychologists and psychiatrists were drawn from university faculties and graduate programs, with many already established figures in their field. After the war, they virtually all returned to academia. Collectively, the 40 assessment psychologists and 12 assessment psychiatrists achieved stunning professional success as nationally recognized professors at leading universities, with over a thousand publications among them. Many lived to retire as professors emeritus, with two serving as presidents of the American Psychological Association.18, a

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*a* This digital version of the article contains several corrections and additional pieces of information offered by Dr. Jonathan D. Clemente, a practicing physician working on a history of the roles of medical professionals in intelligence since the beginning of WWII.
Endnotes

1. Dr. Bush’s account draws heavily from his research into OSS archival material housed at the National Archives. It was also informed by Col. Sylvester C. Missal’s 2 August 1945 draft, “[OSS] Medical Services History [up to 1 September 1944],” a copy of which (with a few of Missal’s papers) is found in CIA archives; and Special Support Unit War Report: Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (US Government Printing Office, 1949). Also contributing to Dr. Bush’s account were conversations with OSS physicians John Hamblet (surgeon to both French and China Operations Groups), Walter Carpenter (Mediterranean Theater of Operations chief surgeon), OSS dentist James Harrison (China Operations Group), and Dr. Troy Sacquety, an authority on the history of OSS, author of a doctoral dissertation on the topic, “The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–1945” (Texas A&M University, 2008) and a 2014 book, The OSS in Burma: Jungle War Against the Japanese (University Press of Kansas).


7. Bill Brough, To Reason Why (Hickory Tree Press, 2001). Some details relating to the Silver and Bronze Stars are included in Brough’s OSS personnel folder. Most Det 101 histories claim that in the first of these rescues, two Kachin were shot while Brough was pulling them out, an experience that led to his relinquishing his conscientious objector status. Brough makes clear in his autobiography, however, that this decision preceded his joining Det 101; in fact, the first recommendation for his Silver Star stated that, as Brough ran to the wounded men, he shot and killed a Japanese soldier he encountered along the way—“without pausing in his advance.”

8. Dr. Bush drew heavily on Lt Cmdr. James C. Luce (MC) US Navy, “Report on Tour of Duty With Office of Strategic Services Detachment 101, North Burma and Assam, November 1, 1943 to April 1, 1945,” and James C. Luce, “Report of Activities of U.S. Naval Group China Medical Personnel Attached to OSS SO Detachment 101,” (5 pp, undated, ca. May 1945), both unpublished accounts provided to him by Troy Sacquety. There are many firsthand accounts of the Det 101 experience, e.g., the above noted Peers and Brelis, Behind the Burma Road; Thomas N. Moon and Carl F. Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel (Vantage Press, 1975); Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines; Tom Moon, Grim and Savage Game: The OSS and U.S. Covert Operations in World War II (Burning Gate Press, 1991); Brough, To Reason Why; Vion, “Booms from Behind the Line,” which includes interviews with nine Det 101 personnel. The Detachment 101 Association Newsletter also contains useful information. The most extensive collection is held by Troy Sacquety.

9. This section was informed by War Reports 1:223–25; 2:77–79; 87–124; 128–29; 204–207; 454–57; an early CIA study without specified author; “Some Aspects of the Activities of the Office of Strategic Services Operational Groups in World War II: II. Origins and Use in the European Theater, and II. Operational Groups in the China Theater,” 1945; and the detailed mission synopses found on-line at OSSOG.org. A degree of guesswork is required in allocating OG medics to the various Operational Groups. There were cross-over assignments among French, Norwegian, and Italian OG medics, and between Greek and Yugoslav medics. Often they were listed simply as OG-NA, referring to their initial assignment to the North African Theater, which could encompass all Mediterranean-based groups.

10. Discussions of Moyers and his hospital are taken from his detailed, almost 100-page, final report and his personal diary covering the period from November 1943 to late summer 1944, both of which are at National Archives II: RG 226, Stack Area 190, R8 C17 S7; Entry 144, Box 77, Fld 751; RG 226, Stack Area 190, R8 C17 S7; Entry 144, Box 100, Fld 1049.

11. The story is told in Robert E. Perdue, Jr., Behind the Lines in Greece: The Story of OSS Operational Group II (Author House, 2010).


14. This account is based on multiple sources, including Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright’s Story (Doubleday, 1946; Greenwood Press reprint, 1970); and Hal Leith, POWs of Japanese, Rescued!—General J. M. Wainwright (Trafford Publishing on Demand, 2004). Leith was a member of the CARDINAL team.

15. A report of this mission is found in the memoir of team member, Dick Hamada, in “The Hawai’i Nisei Story: Americans of Japanese Ancestry During WWII,” at http://nisei.hawaii.edu. Also see Ford, Donovan of OSS, 298. The Soldier’s Medal citation in Jarman’s OSS personnel file (Box 370) includes only the broadest statement of his involvement with MAGPIE. Doolittle POW Barr tried to commit suicide at Letterman, though within a year he had recovered psychiatrically, reportedly following a personal visit by Doolittle. In 1947, Barr retired from the Army on physical disability and pursued a successful career as a management analyst. He died of a heart attack in 1967, at age of 50.

16. This summary is taken from the mission reports, found at National Archives II, RG 226 190, R7, C8, S04, E 110, Box 25, Fld 284 (Nardella and Hedja), and R8, C27, S02, E 148, Box 124, Fld 2151 (Counasse), and the OSS personnel files of Woolington (Box 852) and
Nardella (Box 551). Some of this also appears in Dixee R. Bartholomew-Feis, *The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War against Japan* (University Press of Kansas, 2006), 269–73, 384.
18. The two who served as presidents of the American Psychological Association were O.H. Mowrer (1954) and Donald Campbell (1975). One OSS officer, Edward Tolman, had been president before the war, in 1937.
The Intelligence Community (IC) is again being encouraged to take more risks and lean forward against our adversaries. Ensuring and enhancing intelligence oversight must go hand-in-hand with this effort. Now is an excellent time to review the oversight system and consider strong proposals for improving it, before a major scandal erupts. Unfortunately, Professor Loch K. Johnson’s new book, Spy Watching, largely fails to advance our thinking.

This is surprising because Johnson, now a major figure on the faculty of the University of Georgia, has been researching and writing on intelligence oversight for some 40 years and should have a wealth of insight to offer. Johnson has been among the cadre of activist academics who have seriously examined national intelligence, and he has been a leader in the field since serving as a special assistant in 1975 and 1976 to Senator Frank Church, who chaired the 16-month investigation of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Since that investigation, Johnson served on a number of other congressional committees, including the Aspin-Brown Commission about which he wrote for this journal in 2004 after he joined the faculty at Georgia. His university profile credits him with many awards and some 30 published works on intelligence. In addition, he is a senior editor for the renowned academic journal, Intelligence and National Security.

Spy Watching suffers from several failings, including weak argumentation, a lack of focus, and, most importantly, a shortage of compelling reasons for the reforms it offers. Johnson’s goal, he wrote, was to be theoretical; historical; contemporary in his policy recommendations; and autobiographical, with personal observations mixed in throughout. But his product is too wide-ranging to be cohesive. Johnson’s idea to probe “the manner by which the United States has endeavored to keep espionage activities within the boundaries of law and propriety” is also marred by how he describes the IC. His use of journalistic terms like “dark arts,” “shadowy world,” “black hole,” and “dark corridors” to describe intelligence activities, individuals, and institutions gives his work a pulp fiction feel and makes it difficult to take seriously.

Spy Watching begins with hearty praise for the great strides in IC accountability made since the mid-1970s. Johnson highlights key reforms that he helped foster, including the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), as well as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment that removed presidential “plausible deniability” for covert action (CA) and enhanced the role of Congress in CA. Johnson then devotes some 200 pages to describing IC organizations, how they function, and how they fit into democratic societies, and the balance between liberty and security—all with the purpose of establishing the complexity and scale of the challenge.

This discourse gives Spy Watching, in its eye-straining nine point font, a dense, meandering feel. The overview of the IC adds little to what is already known, while other parts of Spy Watching read like a memoir or a collection of lecture notes. For example, Johnson recounts engagements with James J. Angleton on counterintelligence issues in the 1970s and devotes a chapter to capturing snippets of interviews he has had with former CIA directors from Helms to Tenet. Although these excerpts touch on intelligence oversight, Johnson doesn’t use them to advance his arguments. Moreover, his epilogue on intelligence in the early days of the Trump administration adds little of substance to the book.
Notwithstanding his praise for IC oversight, Johnson calls for further enhancements to IC accountability because of what he sees as several analytic and operational transgressions. These include the Iran-Contra affair (1985–1987), failure to predict the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq WMD analytical debacle (2002), and the National Security Agency’s bulk collection of metadata of American telephone calls abroad (2001–2015). These choices seem dated, as they have already been addressed through IC oversight and serve more as examples of how oversight works well rather than as a litany of its shortcomings.

These examples also show how the book drifts from a focus on accountability—“activities abiding by the law and propriety” (2)—to the age-old problem of intelligence successes and failures, which have nothing to do with questions of lawfulness, propriety, or budgets—the very heart of IC accountability and oversight. (31) Johnson spends no time probing the possibility that the reforms he championed have produced unintended consequences that now need to be addressed.

Johnson’s assessments of covert action, which are on topic, suffer from a paucity of data and flawed application of data. For example, the book includes a chart supposedly depicting the ebb and flow of covert actions from 1947 to 2015 (335) While it suggests ups and downs, the chart provides no insight on the number of CA programs—the Y axis ranges from “low” to “high” with no values in between—the cost, the number of people involved, or how many violated US law or were inappropriate missions. In any event, nothing in this data supports his calls for revamping oversight.

Also absent—and Johnson might be forgiven for this, given the justifiable secrecy surrounding covert operations—is discussion of how the operations were authorized, how well they adhered to their original intent, and how effective they were. Johnson curiously asserts that “the best single predictor of an administration’s emphasis on covert action...seems to be the amount of spending it devotes to overt military budgets.” (350) He then overlays his covert action chart on a graph of US military spending since WW II to show how the peaks and valleys [conveniently drawn to match the budget highs and lows] coincide with major US military actions, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam Era, the Persian Gulf War, and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

This should be obvious; intelligence budgets, including CIA’s, are embedded in the Defense budget, and why in time of war would anything else be expected? But even in this graphic, an absence of rigor is evident—no reference, for example, is made to the basis of the budget numbers (2015 dollars)—nor does the correlation stand up to scrutiny in the case of the peak of expenditures seemingly attributed to the first Gulf War (which didn’t last two months—mid-January–28 February 1991). The peak expenditures at that point were a function of increases in defense spending under Ronald Reagan, not the war, as suggested by the captions on the graphic the book offers. Expanded intelligence expenditures can be explained in many ways, but a simple correlation chart says nothing about the nature of oversight.

Spy Watching attempts to put the oversight issue into the context of the balance of power relationship of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches of government. Johnson too quickly dismisses the Executive and Judiciary Branches as ineffective, however. He cites the Iran-Contra affair as proof that the Executive Branch lacks interest in oversight. And he adds another example, the production of classified information in 2001, which rose some 44 percent from the previous year. Somehow he concludes that this is proof of efforts to withhold information from Congress (8, 438)—never mind that a war was on with a substantial increase in reporting, analysis, and planning based on classified information and the need for operational security.

As to the courts, he portrays them as sycophants of the Executive, arguing they tended to side with the Executive’s intelligence organizations and deferred to intelligence officials because judges “believe that it is better to be safe than sorry.” (47) This belies evidence, shown in declassified documents, that several of the FISA court’s opinions were highly critical of IC surveillance requests and that the IC had to significantly revise the requests before they were issued.2

After additional, debatable assertions about the nature of congressional behavior and oversight—Congress does far too little “police patrolling” of the IC and primarily responds to “fire alarms”—Johnson offers his own oversight formula, which mainly puts the burden on Congress. He calls for concentrating this effort into the specific congress-

sional intelligence committees, the HPSCI and SSCI—nothing new there. He acknowledges the complications of engaging other committees, such as the Senate’s Armed Services Committee and the Judiciary Committee, and suggests they give up some oversight authority. (455). He also proposes creating dedicated HPSCI and SSCI subcommittees to specialize in certain areas and expand congressional resources devoted to IC oversight. HPSCI already has four subcommittees—CIA, the DOD Intelligence and Overhead Architecture, Emerging Threats, and the NSA and Cyberspace—and adding more resources and staff (457) would not address the partisanship that has seeped into intelligence oversight. Additional subcommittees would also fail to prevent IC oversight from becoming unwieldy, as it did in when investigations into Benghazi led to eight different subcommittees examining different parts of that tragic event.

Johnson’s suggestion that the SSCI exercise its authority to unilaterally declassify intelligence without presidential authorization (458) would certainly permit the Senate to be more aggressive on intelligence issues, but the suggestion completely fails to recognize the inherent difficulty of making classification decisions, which today occupies a large number of professionals familiar with the sensitivities—sometimes matters of life and death—these decisions involve. At the same time, the approach would be likely to signal a sharp increase in partisanship on intelligence activities, which I think could have chilling effects on IC cooperation with Congress.

Johnson offers two novel ideas for reform that bear examination, if only to ensure we avoid them. One is creation of a “Citizen Intelligence Advisory Board” to aid HPSCI and SSCI with intelligence oversight. Johnson points out that other democracies—the UK, Australia, and Canada—have adjunct boards helping the legislature with oversight. In Johnson’s vision, such a board would have nine members selected by the HPSCI, the SSCI, the Supreme Court, the president, and high-ranking universities (however those are defined). This board, he argues, would be less political and would hold its own hearings and issue annual reports. (464–66). Such a board would almost certainly face the same political problems Congress now has and thus would be challenged in contributing to IC accountability. Moreover, there is no reason to think that Congress or the Executive would pass legislation to provide the legal backing a board would need to be effective. Johnson also seems to have ignored that we already have the President Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and its advisory committee on IC oversight that serves to advise the president.

Johnson’s other novel idea is to create computer algorithms for oversight purposes. This seems like a fanciful, quick elixir and a potential talking point for proponents of IC reform. Developing such an algorithm and compiling data sets for it to assess, would be a huge undertaking fraught with counterintelligence risks. Linking multiple systems designed to be separate to protect sources and methods almost certainly would have unintended consequences and lead to data spillage. As most know, algorithms are only as good as the parameters and assumptions that coders establish and the errors woven into algorithms might very well lead in wrong directions rather than sniffing out true problems.

Johnson addresses IC oversight at an incredibly important time, but his recommendations are buried in dense and poorly supported argumentation. Even so, the history he has provided helps to show what won’t work or where not to look for answers. More fruitful ideas for reforming oversight might come from further research and analysis into budget tracking, business analytics, training for intelligence officers, and measures to better insulate national security issues from politics. Thinking these issues through now, free from the stress of crisis, is an excellent idea.

The Reviewer: Jason Manosevitz is an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis. He is also a member of the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board.
Lever of Power: Military Deception in China and the West
Ralph D. Sawyer (CreateSpace, 2017), 468 pp., notes, index.

Reviewed by Arturo Muñoz

Ralph D. Sawyer’s self-published Lever of Power: Military Deception in China and the West is an extraordinary work that brings together a vast array of primary sources on the subject of military deception with insightful analysis of the content and relevance of each work. Sawyer, an expert on Chinese military and intelligence issues, has translated classic texts and written several books, including The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China. In Lever of Power, he revisits concepts presented earlier in The Tao of Deception (Basic Books, 2007), providing new details and commentary. Lever of Power builds on The Tao of Deception to refine our understanding of Chinese thought. Both works are worth reading in sequence. Additionally, Lever of Power makes comparisons with Western history to show that both China and the West have relied on deception and have employed similar practices in order to deceive. A major difference, however, is that the West lacks the extensive body of theory on deception the Chinese have developed, and that deception “is not yet as integrated into military thinking and planning as it is in China.”

Sawyer’s deep expertise is evident in concise explanations of ancient Chinese aphorisms, legends, and allegories that are alien to most Western readers. His frequent use of examples and lessons learned enhances the narrative. However, this voluminous tome would have benefited from a concluding chapter clearly summarizing the main elements of classical Chinese theory and highlighting major similarities and differences between China and the West. Apparently, the last chapter entitled “Impressions and Speculations” is intended as a summation, but it contains so much new information and so many new “musings” that the main points fail to stand out.

The book follows a chronological structure initially and then switches to thematic chapters that focus on specific techniques, such as concealment, disinformation, feints and misdirection, feigned retreats, false treaties, pseudo-peace initiatives, disguise, and “pseudo-vulnerability.” (ii) This approach results in some repetition of quotes and data provided in previous pages. Because of the pervasive gap in our knowledge of the Chinese tao (way) of deception, this review focuses on China.

Ancient traditions of military deception spill over into other spheres of thought and behavior in contemporary China:

Articles in Chinese military and political journals, unrestricted PRC [People’s Republic of China] books on strategy, postings on websites, open PLA [People’s Liberation Army] online discussions, and anecdotal reports indicate that deception remains a focus of contemplation in contemporary China . . . Chinese military and political think tanks continue to assiduously study the theoretical formulations preserved in the classic military writings . . . [that] currently enjoy far greater readership among the general public than at any point in Chinese history. (iii-iv)

Given that the Chinese hold these writings in such esteem and read them avidly, it behooves Western analysts to at least be aware of them. Sawyer’s list of most popular works—including a sampling of thought from each—follows the conclusion of this review.

The highly developed Chinese body of doctrine on deception is particularly relevant today because of China’s long-term strategy to expand its influence worldwide through a well-integrated mix of diplomacy, propaganda, intelligence, technology acquisition and innovation, and commercial trade. Deception continues to play an under-


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
lying role, increasingly augmented by an unprecedented expansion of overt military power, as in the establishment of de facto control over disputed waters in the South China Sea, in violation of international law.\textsuperscript{a}


\textsuperscript{a} The United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled in August 2016 that China’s building of fortified islands (by dumping thousands of tons of sand and concrete on what were previously uninhabited reefs) constituted an “unlawful occupation,” particularly pertaining to the military-grade runway and port facilities built on Mischief Reef. China rejected that ruling in favor of the Philippines, whose coastline is adjacent to the disputed area, in contrast to the distant coastline of China. In the absence of a viable international law enforcement mechanism, it appears that China’s imperialistic claims of sovereignty, based partly on Ming Dynasty documents, will prevail. The creation of a formidable military infrastructure in this zone, in the absence of any comparable effort by China’s rivals, puts them at such a disadvantage that China will be in a position to fulfill Sun Tzu’s advice—to achieve victory without fighting a battle. See Euan Graham, “The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence,” Council of Councils, 18 August 2018, https://www.cfr.org/council-ofcouncils/global_memos/p38227.

\begin{itemize}
\item Finally, it should be emphasized that many Chinese thinkers in the past themselves questioned the morality of the practices they espoused, but concluded it was more immoral to lose a war because of “stupidity” or lack of will to do what needed to be done. [source?]
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Sampling of Popular or Noteworthy Readings Relating to Deception in Contemporary China}

\textbf{Art of War (Sun Tzu; written circa 500 BCE; first known and most-widely recognized formulation of deception in war.)}

\begin{itemize}
\item “Warfare is the Tao of deception”—repeated in various forms for the next two thousand years by numerous Chinese military and civilian thinkers.
\item Sun Tzu did not limit himself to deception; he counseled the ruthless practice of efficient warfare, as opposed to the efficient practice of ruthless warfare, which implies needless bloodshed contrary to moral values.
\item Espionage and secrecy were paramount: “In employing the army, nothing is more important than not being knowable.” (20)
\item Sun Tzu advocated the use of intelligence, deception, and psychological operations to confuse and demoralize the enemy, ideally achieving victory without fighting a battle.
\end{itemize}

*Many translations of this work of Sun Tzu’s exist. Ralph Sawyer’s was published by Westview Press in 1994.

\textbf{Tai-pai Yin-ching (Li Ch’uan, T’ang Dynasty, 618–907 CE)*}

\begin{itemize}
\item “Military strategy must be kept secret and not promiscuously transmitted.” The reason the author wrote down “unorthodox plans and deceitful Tao and discussed mental techniques that produce disastrous cruelty is that without them, the army could not be effective.” (33)
\item “When your mind is planning to seize something, feign being about to give it away.” (307)
\end{itemize}

*Sawyer has translated portions of this work in his \textit{Strategies for the Human Realm: Crux of the T’ai-pai Yin-ching} (CreateSpace, 2012)

\textbf{Hundred Unorthodox Strategies (Sung Dynasty, 960–1126 CE)}

\begin{itemize}
\item “Whenever about to engage an enemy in battle, first dispatch some emissaries to discuss a peace treaty . . . Whenever engaging in battle, if the enemy comes forth to surrender, you must investigate whether it is real or feigned . . . treat an enemy’s surrender as you would an attack.” (306)
\item “Whenever engaging an enemy in battle during daylight, you must set out numerous flags and pennants
\end{itemize}
to . . . prevent the enemy from determining your troop strength.” (161)

*Sawyer’s translation appeared as One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare (Westview Press, 1996)

_Tso-chuan_ [The Commentaries of Tso] (unknown authors; written during Warring States Period, ca. 403–221 BCE but it chronicles the Spring–Autumn Period, ca. 771–478 BCE.

- Describes deliberate manipulation of peace treaties and feigned covenants of alliance, including breaking non-aggression pacts.
- Most famous example is the attack on Yu territory after it had given permission to Chin’s army to cross its territory to attack neighboring Kuo. This treachery led to the often-repeated _ch’eng-yu_ aphorism: “Having a nearby objective, yet making it appear distant.” (7–18) This also appears in the later _Thirty-Six Stratagems_ as “Borrow a Road to Attack Kuo.”

- Documented first known cases of “feigned retreat,” which became a major strategic ploy used repeatedly over the centuries to ambush pursuing forces, discussed in many of the classic texts.

- Commanders were warned to scrutinize whether the enemy retreat was orderly or chaotic, and whether or not enemy officers shouted/drummed orders.

*The _Tso Chuan_ is one of the classics of Chinese literature and possibly the earliest Chinese history ever assembled. It served as a prime text in the education of Chinese officials and intellectuals into the 20th century. It was first translated into English in the late 19th century by James Legge. Arguably the most accessible version is by Burton Watson (Columbia University Press, 1889).

_Thirty-Six Stratagems_ (unknown author, Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644 CE)

- Compilation of earlier works “considered the very embodiment of deception and final theoretical formulation.” (98–99) Contained 36 strategies of deception, subdivided into six categories, each marked by internal ying and yang progression, for example, advance and retreat, attack and defense.

- Enjoys “enormous popularity” today; numerous reprints; illustrated formats, even cartoon features in newspapers and television serializations dramatizing such ploys as:

  - “Make a Sound in the East, Strike in the West” 聲東擊西 / 声东击西 [Shēng dōng jī xī];
  - “Throw Away a Brick to Gain Jade” 抛磚引玉 / 抛砖引玉 [Pāo zhuān yǐn yù];
  - “Feign Stupidity, not Lunacy” 假痴不癲 / 假痴不癫 [Jiǎ chī bù diān]; and
  - “Empty City” 空城計 / 空城计 [Kōng chéng jì]. (101)

  The “Empty-City” ploy deliberately fabricates the appearance of weakness by “making the vacuous (more) vacuous and spawning doubt amid doubt.” (356)
Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been known for its successful intelligence and special operations, beginning with the dramatic kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann in Brazil in 1960, through the 1976 special operations raid to free the hostages in Entebbe, Uganda and continuing well into the 21st century. As with every major intelligence service, most of the successes in Israeli intelligence have been hidden from the public through secrecy laws and an unwillingness on the part of members of the various Israeli services to speak to the press or to write tell-all memoirs. Balanced against this shroud of secrecy has been an effective effort on the part of multiple Israeli governments to carefully leak stories of their own ingenuity to gain political support for the state of Israel at home and abroad. The government of Israel also selectively leaks material—especially on their assassination programs—as a deterrent, so the enemies of Israel know they face an implacable foe. At the same time and for the sake of international audiences, Israel maintains “plausible deniability” in their most enterprising intelligence and special operations.

While Israeli military history is filled with audacious conventional air force and army operations in their various wars against the Arab states, the best known of Israeli military operations have been counterterrorism operations. By the early 1960s, the Israelis were defending against a series of Palestinian terrorist organizations—well funded by hostile Arab states and well trained by those same states, as well as by Warsaw Pact countries, most especially the German Democratic Republic. Palestinian terrorist groups including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) started out conducting small scale raids into Israel, followed by bombing campaigns, hijacking aircraft, and, the most public of all Palestinian terrorist efforts, the murder of members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich in September 1972.

Palestinian terrorist organizations continued to threaten Israel during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

By the mid-1980s, though, Israel was facing yet another terrorist foe—the Lebanese Shia organization known as Hizballah (the Party of God). Funded by the Islamic Republic of Iran and trained and advised by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hizballah became a worldwide threat to Israel and Israeli citizens. The end of the Cold War reduced (but did not eliminate) the Palestinian threat to Israel as the radical, secular terrorist networks lost their funding and support and international counterterrorism operations expanded and improved. In April 1994, the Islamic Resistance Group (HAMAS) conducted its first suicide bombing in Israel. Palestinian terrorism took on a new face, with young recruits willing to commit suicide to attack Israeli citizens inside Israel itself.

In this century, Israel continues to face the HAMAS Palestinian terrorist enterprise, an organization that shares religious and political doctrine with the hardline factions of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the former Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The threat to Israel from Hizballah has never ended and, arguably has become much more serious. Over the last two decades, Hizballah transformed from a simple terrorist/guerrilla group with small arms and bombs to a hybrid warfare adversary with sophisticated weapons and electronics. In sum, Israel has suffered from terrorism, suffers from terrorism, and likely will continue to suffer from terrorism in the future until and unless there is a dramatic change in both the terrorist enterprises of the region and the regional players who remain Israel’s adversaries.

There are certainly political choices that successive Israeli governments have made over the last quarter century that have exacerbated the hostilities with the Palestinians and the Lebanese Shia, and have had the unintended consequence of assisting and expanding terrorist

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
recruitment in the region. However, even without these decisions, any unbiased analysis would argue that terrorist attacks in Israel and against Israelis on the world stage would have continued even if the Israelis had done everything possible to end the conflict with the Palestinians and the Lebanese Shia.

The two books in this review address in detail the Israeli intelligence and special operations responses to the threat of terrorism. In Harpoon, Nitsana Darshan-Leitner and Samuel Katz outline the efforts of the Israeli intelligence and special operations services to disrupt the financial infrastructure of terrorist groups. The book focuses the greatest attention on early work against the Palestinian terrorist groups who were focused on the destruction of Israel, and the subsequent, expanded work in disrupting Hizballah and other terrorist financial efforts.

According to the authors, at the center of this effort was an Israeli named Meir Dagan. He began his career in the special operations community as the leader of an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) element known as ZIKIT (Chameleon) and built a reputation for conducting lethal “direct action” raids against Palestinian targets. Dagan moved up the chain of command in the IDF to a position in the counterterrorism office of the Chief of Staff and, eventually to the commander of the IDF General Staff’s Operations Brigade; in this role, he was responsible for special operations and counterterrorism. Ultimately he became chief of Mossad, shifting his focus from conducting lethal special operations to attacking the terrorist financial infrastructure. As Darshan-Leitner and Katz state,

Meir Dagan read the intelligence reports from Gaza and Hebron, and from outside Israel’s frontiers. He understood that regardless of intentions, cash was vital for continuing terrorist attacks. Dagan understood that if Israel focused on the money that fueled the organizations that dispatched suicide bombers, it could achieve long-term tactical and strategic results.

(41)

In 1995, Dagan began to create an Israeli intelligence and special operations capability to disrupt and destroy terrorist finances. That capability was codenamed Harpoon.

In Rise and Kill First, Ronen Bergman focuses on the integrated Israeli special operations effort to conduct lethal operations against any and all enemies of Israel. He begins his history with a dramatic account of the assassination of a British Criminal Investigations officer named Tom Wilkin in the last days of the British occupation of Palestine. Bergman expands the first chapter to address the assassination programs of other Jewish groups, such as the Haganah, the Irgun, and Lehi (aka the Stern Gang), who engaged in resistance against Palestinians and British political and military leaders in Palestine. He draws a straight line from the efforts of these Jewish terrorist organizations to the use of assassination by the Israeli state using whatever means necessary. In the 1950s and early 1960s, this might have included a secret air-to-air attack to shoot down a plane carrying the Egyptian general staff (Operation ROOSTER) to letter bombs against known Egyptian military officers supporting Palestinian resistance groups.

Bergman takes the reader through a very detailed discussion of the various organizations involved in Israeli assassination operations. These organizations include IDF surveillance elements associated with strategic reconnaissance; IDF special operations forces such as ZIKIT; the Mossad organization Caesarea focused on sabotage, assassinations, and intelligence collection in Arab countries; and KIDON (Bayonet) focused on direct action worldwide. Bergman states clearly that targeted assassination is a part of the larger mission of Israeli defense and has always been managed by the Israeli prime minister.

Since World War II, Israel has conducted more state-sanctioned assassinations than any other country in the world. On innumerable occasions, its leaders have weighed what would be the best way to defend its national security and, considering themselves without other options, have time and again decided on clandestine operations—with assassination the method of choice. This, they believed, would solve difficult problems faced by the state, and sometimes change the course of history. In many cases, Israel’s leaders have even determined that in order to kill the designated target, it is moral and legal to endanger the lives of innocent civilians who may happen to find themselves in the line of fire. Harming such people, they believe, is a necessary evil.

The two books offer a very clear image of the Israeli perspective on counterterrorism. They also point to friction between the intelligence and special operations communities in Israel and between Israel and the Western world. On the one hand, there is a longstanding tradition in Israeli counterterrorism of decapitating terrorist leadership. On the other hand, there is a different effort—that
Two Books on Israeli Intelligence: Harpoon and Rise and Kill First

takes more time and is less exciting—which attacks the funding that pays salaries and underwrites terrorist operations. The two books make it clear that both tactics have had strategic value to Israel as the state and its citizenry have confronted terrorist threats over the 70 years of its existence. Both books underscore that these tactics have not been without cost—both to Israel’s standing in the world and to its relationship with the United States.

The two books are very different in their approach. In the case of Harpoon, the authors are determined to convince readers of the brilliance and righteousness of the Israeli counterterrorism effort and, specifically, the effort to destroy terrorist financial networks. Along the way, Harpoon often crosses the line, becoming polemical when some of the main players are characterized as “heroic” or “legendary,” while others are depicted as “feckless” and presenting both European and Americans as reluctant counterterrorism allies or, at times, working against the “righteous” Israeli effort. This is a valid, unvarnished description of the Israeli sources’ views on counterterrorism operations and—given Nitsana Darshan-Leitner’s own role as a litigator in US courts—likely an author’s perspective as well. A more even-handed approach might have taken at least a brief look at US, UK, and European finance efforts supporting counterterrorism and counterproliferation operations which were ongoing well before Harpoon was established and continue to this day.

In Rise and Kill First, Bergman does not subject the reader to polemics; in fact, he spends considerable time both on Israeli failures (such as when innocents were killed in the wake of an assassination attempt) and the strategic consequences of counterintelligence mistakes (as in the case of the assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in 2010, an otherwise successful operation undermined by several small security-related mistakes). He isn’t afraid to use the term hubris, and makes no attempt to present the individuals involved in these operations as anything other than human beings who are capable of brilliance and heroism, but also prone to mistakes and jealousy. In fact, both in the introduction and the conclusion, Bergman leaves it to the reader to decide if these techniques, on balance, are worth the cost.

In sum, the two books offer a modern view of Israeli intelligence and special operations in the 21st century—and that makes them valuable. Given the nature of the US Intelligence Community relationship with the Israeli intelligence services, these books should be a must-read for anyone in the US counterintelligence or counterterrorism fields. Previous books on Israeli intelligence apparatus such as Every Spy a Prince (Houghton, Mifflin, and Harcourt, 1990), Gideon’s Spies (Thomas Dunne, 1995), or even Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University Press, 1998) are decades old and were limited by available research material. Harpoon and Rise and Kill First are topical and well written. They provide insight into the terrorism threat we share with the Israelis and how the Israelis have used their own set of tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter that threat.

The reviewer: J.R. Seeger is a retired CIA paramilitary officer and a frequent reviewer of books for Studies.
Capt. Jerry McIlmoyle, a U-2 pilot, was near the end of his 25 October 1962 reconnaissance mission over Cuba and was turning for home—McCoy Air Force Base, near Orlando, Florida—when two nearby explosions rocked his aircraft. An experienced flier, McIlmoyle realized he had experienced a near-miss from Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAM) recently installed in Fidel Castro’s Cuba. As expected, he reported being fired on as soon as he landed, only to be informed by a gruff Air Force lieutenant general freshly flown in from Washington, DC, that he most assuredly had not been fired on and that was to be his story, period. McIlmoyle, who later became a brigadier himself and carried the nuclear launch codes for President Reagan, asked imagery analysts at CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to confirm that he had been targeted by SAMs—which they did.

Thus begins the recent book by prolific authors Casey Sherman and Michael Tougias that intertwines the U-2 program, the Cuban missile crisis and, especially, the president and man John F. Kennedy. Early on, the authors introduce readers to McIlmoyle and two other U-2 pilots who play key roles in the story, Chuck Maultsby and Rudy Anderson. They also introduce the famous commander of PT-109 and review its 1943 encounter with a Japanese destroyer that resulted in the deaths of two crewmen, which powerfully affected John F. Kennedy, both at the time and during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the course of discussing the familiar background of the U-2 program, the authors provide good biographic details on Lockheed Martin engineer Kelley Johnson—not often a part of the Cuban missile crisis story.

After discussing the well-known shootdown of the U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers, the authors shift their focus to President Eisenhower’s $13M plan to oust Castro, approved in August 1960, which CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell was to accomplish by planning a “low-key” invasion. They chronicle the “immediate and spectacular failure” that was the 17 August 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the dangerous and nerve-rack-
logic decision to accept the terms of the first letter, which offered to remove all the nuclear missiles and return them to the USSR in return for a promise of no US invasion. If the blockade failed and there was no or a negative response to Kennedy’s counteroffer, the invasion would proceed. As the authors note, with the appropriate level of drama, “The Russians’ response on Sunday would determine whether war began on Monday.” (271) At 10:00 Sunday morning, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Bobby Kennedy that the Soviets had “blinked” first and had agreed to remove all the nuclear missiles from Cuba.

The authors thankfully provide readers with “the rest of the story,” at least concerning some of the primary actors. On 5 Nov 1962, the Cubans released the body of Rudy Anderson, who was thereafter buried in his South Carolina hometown. His wife Jane never forgave Kennedy for getting her husband killed, as she expressed it, and died in 1981, at the young age of 46. Chuck Maultsby retired from the Air Force in 1977 and died of lung cancer in 1998, at age 72. In terms of “how do we avoid this situation in the future,” the authors note that the crisis prompted the immediate installation, on the US side, of a Moscow-Washington “hot line,” both in the White House and at the Kennedy family compound on Cape Cod.

In Above and Beyond, Sherman and Tougias provide a number of interesting tidbits, likely unknown to many readers, in what is otherwise a familiar tale. For example, they talk of President Kennedy’s suffering with Addison’s disease and the side effects of the cortisone shots and other drugs he was taking when he first met Nikita Khrushchev at the 1961 Vienna summit meeting, where the Soviet leader dismissed “Jack” as “inexperienced and weak.” (112) They also deserve credit for documenting how close the two superpowers came to a nuclear exchange underwater—unknown to most was the fact that among the Soviet vessels wending their way toward the blockade line were four nuclear submarines, each carrying a nuclear warhead-equipped torpedo. It was not until 2002 that Secretary of Defense McNamara learned about this near-nuclear exchange of 40 years before. The short chapters in the book make for easily-digested chunks of reading and the volume is well-written and engaging, as one would expect from a pair who have written 40 books between them. They also excel at capturing and relaying to readers the inherent tension of the ExComm meetings, the intense debates that occurred there, and the colorful and conflicting personalities and interests of those in the room.

In at least two instances, the authors reveal their lack of familiarity with DoD jargon, which has the potential to either confuse or irritate readers. In one instance they refer to “intercontinental-range ballistic missiles” (IRBM) (153), when the context makes clear that what the authors are referring to is “intercontinental ballistic missiles,” for which the standard acronym is “ICBM”—“IRBM” is generally understood as “intermediate-range” vice “intercontinental-range” ballistic missiles, which differ markedly in range and lethality. Although a minor criticism, it is an error that would not be made by the most junior intelligence analyst. A similar order-of-battle gaffe is a reference to imagery shot by Navy F8U Crusader low-level recon flights over Cuba, which the authors state revealed “nuclear-tipped SAMs, or FROGs” (203); again, an OB analyst worth his or her salt knows that the two are very different weapon systems rather than synonyms, the latter being a “free rocket over ground”—an unguided artillery asset.

While the amount of new information in this book is limited, Above and Beyond is nevertheless a very satisfying read overall and is a worthwhile addition to the more scholarly literature on an event that brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war.

The Reviewer: David A. Foy is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews.
Varying levels of tension between the USSR and the United States existed throughout the Cold War as strongly held beliefs and interests drove a global political competition and thousands of nuclear weapons cast an ever-present shadow of potential destruction. Periods of eased tension came and went, but so too did moments of crisis when the risk of war came to the fore.

This book, written by a British television producer advertised on the dust cover as a writer of “vivid and fast-paced” history books, says it aims “to create a new and accessible narrative” of a period of heightened US-Soviet tension in 1983. And that is precisely what it does. Much of it re-tells known events: President Reagan’s evil empire rhetoric, his advocacy of a strategic defense initiative (SDI), US military probing along Soviet borders, the Soviet shootdown of a South Korean airliner, Soviet concerns about new US missiles in Europe, and a NATO military exercise called Able Archer. The book draws on relevant sources, including interviews generated for a 2007 British Flashback television series produced by the author as well as memoirs, scholarly analyses, and declassified documents. Unfortunately, apparently for Downing, creation a compelling “story of the time when fingers really did hover over the nuclear button” (16) took precedence over analysis.

The book goes beyond history for dramatic effect in painting a scene for which no sources are cited. Soviet leader Yury Andropov, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, and General Staff chief Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov are depicted as sitting out the night of November 9 as Able Archer comes to a head, “trembling” over the possibility of reluctantly having “to push the nuclear button.” (255) It also goes beyond available mixed evidence to declare that “the entire Soviet nuclear arsenal” (242) was placed on maximum combat alert.

Apparently encouraging the author in this direction are reminiscences and studies reflecting US intelligence about a range of Soviet intelligence and military activities observed during 1983. The climactic chapter closes with a quotation from a 2007 Flashback television interview by former DCI Robert Gates: “We may have been at the brink of nuclear war and not even known it.” (256) Also quoted is a 1990 study by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), declassified in 2015 and characterized in the book’s acknowledgments as “the jewel in the crown of recently revealed evidence on the November war scare,” (349) which claims that Able Archer “may have inadvertently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger.” (224)

Disregarding the careful use of “may” in these speculations makes for a clearer story but does not serve accuracy. The current public record on Able Archer leaves unanswered the question of what related actions, if any, were taken by Soviet leaders. It is tantalizing to wonder what Politburo member Grigory Romanov had in mind when he charged in a speech two days before Able Archer began that “the international situation is at present white hot, thoroughly white hot.” (238) But at this time we simply do not know, and other statements by Soviet leaders strongly expressing concern about tensions during the early 1980s also remain subject to interpretation as to the degree of danger they may reflect. Former ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and former KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov have said that Andropov stood out among Soviet leaders as the most fearful of a US nuclear attack, but even if accepted as fact that does not translate to a finger closer to a button more than, say, occasions when missile warning systems went awry (one of which, recounted in the book, occurred shortly after the 1983 Korean airliner incident).

The book’s treatment of intelligence is uneven. It notes accurately that anger expressed by US leaders over the airliner incident disregarded cautions raised by US intelligence about the knowledge of Soviet air defense commanders, and also that President Reagan was told about Soviet fearfulness and took it to heart. It highlights the importance of human agents on both sides (e.g., Oleg Gordievsky, Rainer Rupp) and accords attention to the
extraordinary Soviet intelligence program begun in 1981 that monitored closely any indicators of a sudden US nuclear strike, although attributing Andropov’s rise to the top to his recommending it is another imagined fact. The book’s more general comments about US intelligence are shallow. It wrongly implies that inadequate intelligence led to White House surprise at Moscow’s unhappiness over SDI, and blaming US intelligence for not predicting the end of the USSR repeats a perennial complaint better addressed elsewhere.

Scholars will find nothing new in this book to advance analysis of issues such as whether the tensions of 1983 rival those of 1962 as the most dangerous moment of the Cold War, or whether US intelligence assessments of the time interpreted available data to best advantage (the target of the PFIAB study). One could argue, however, that a story about an important Cold War moment that melds research and imagination to portray the continuing weight of nuclear age fears on leaders and citizens alike performs a valuable service, particularly for the growing number of readers who have no memory or knowledge of the Cold War.

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**The reviewer:** Douglas Garthoff served in three CIA directorates and the DCI’s Community Management Staff. After retirement, he researched and wrote Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946–2005. It is available on cia.gov.
Michael R. Fenzel examines decisionmaking inside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) before and during the Afghan War, with attention to decisions made as the Soviet military encountered increasing losses from tactical and operational problems. Fenzel, a brigadier general in the US Army and former director of the National Security Council Staff, explores why Soviet leaders “persisted” as the planning and strategy began “unraveling” (1) and it became unlikely they would achieve their strategic objectives. Fenzel is not interested in recounting all the reasons for the Soviet failure or analyzing the actual fighting, but focuses on three issues: poor civil-military relations, rapid Soviet leadership turnover, and the Soviets’ belief that global power was linked to success in Afghanistan. Fenzel draws from translated Politburo meeting minutes between 1978 and 1989 “as a basis for evaluating the interaction between key members of the Politburo over the issue of Afghanistan [which] provides a critical perspective on how the Soviet-Afghan War began, how it was fought, and how and why it was ultimately lost.” (4) He argues that “[t]he primary responsibility for Soviet failure begins at the center of power in Moscow” and that “Soviet failure at the political level was attributable to a civil–military divide, the rapid succession of leadership, and a persistent fear of damaging the USSR’s international reputation.” (5)

The book’s eight chapters are organized chronologically. Fenzel describes preparations for the war and the historical evolution of Communist Party–military relations, noting that the invasion “occurred at a time when the USSR appeared to be at the height of its military power and international influence, and at a time of generally friction-free civil–military relations.” (11) He writes that there is no evidence the Soviets were involved in the 1978 coup against Mohammad Daoud, but Moscow helped the communist government as a way to stop US encroachment and expand Soviet influence. Moving to Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) and the deliberations for invading Afghanistan in late 1979, Fenzel explains the motive as blocking “American meddling” and preventing an Iranian-style revolution that could destabilize Soviet Muslim populations. (29) Dramatic reforms from the Afghan communists antagonized the Muslim population, prompting concerns in the Politburo and calls by the Soviet military to appease Afghan government critics, which was ignored and led to a unilateral Soviet invasion to take control of the country. Fenzel argues that in this process the decisionmakers never considered “protracted war” was possible and the Soviets’ previous success caused them “to overestimate both the value of what their interventions had achieved and the ease and efficiency with which effective assistance could be provided.” (57)

The book’s second half explores decisionmaking during the war, from 1980 until the 1989 withdrawal. Fenzel describes the fundamental disagreement on the war strategy between civil and military figures, which was characterized by the Politburo’s seeing Soviet military leaders as “underlings” who would obey orders without question and quickly produce a victory. A small group on the Politburo made key decisions in secret and received mounting doubts from military leaders, but group members were overwhelmed by selective positive reports about the ground situation improving. The policies changed little after Brezhnev’s death in November 1982, when Yuri Andropov (1914–1984) escalated the war and “he involved himself in military operations.” (74) Following Andropov’s death, Konstantin Chernenko (1911–85) also failed to change course and the civil–military divide grew. The military’s receiving more munitions to increase force only unified the resistance in Afghanistan against foreign intervention.

Turning to Mikhail Gorbachev’s desire to withdraw in 1985, Fenzel explores how Gorbachev gave military leaders one year to settle the “Afghan problem,” as he consolidated his political power. During the year, fighting intensified and Gorbachev announced his desire for a withdrawal, which needed ratification from the Com-
v v v

The reviewer: Ryan Shaffer is a writer and historian. His academic work explores Asian, African and European history.

v v v
It must be terribly difficult these days to finance and produce an intelligent film that tracks closely to complicated historical events while remaining both plausible and entertaining. It probably was never exactly easy to thread that needle—with studio chiefs demanding more explosions, car chases, and gratuitous sex and violence—and the instant gratification of smart phones and on-demand entertainment: our shortening attention spans have undoubtedly made things worse for serious filmmakers. However, smart, sophisticated and enjoyable films do occasionally make it to the big screen and while far from a classic, Beirut is a refreshing example of how good writing and directing combined with solid performances can still deliver strong historical dramas that many will pay to see in the theater.

A taut political thriller short on the kind of cheap “jump scares” common to its genre and long on dialogue, Beirut is not for everyone. Its narrative may be difficult to follow for viewers who know little about the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90), the Middle East, or the businesses of intelligence and diplomacy. It would also have benefitted from more character development for the principal antagonist, an emotionally conflicted young terrorist seeking the return of his terrorist brother. But if you pay close attention and have enough patience, Beirut delivers.

The movie’s strengths are found in the mature ways the writers and directors have approached the story’s characters and context and the excellent work by its actors, especially Jon Hamm and Rosamund Pike. The filmmakers largely get out of the way and let the realities of the time and place be the primary sources of tension driving the story, and Beirut is the better for it. There are also a few twists that are neither contrived nor implausible—a rare and welcome feat.

Beirut is set primarily in 1982 and is centered around the kidnapping of the local CIA station chief, mirroring real events from 1984 when Lebanese Hezbollah ab ducted and later killed CIA officer William Buckley. In an opening sequence from 10 years earlier, US diplomat Mason Skiles (Hamm) and his Lebanese wife host a cocktail party for a visiting member of Congress at their beautiful home in the hills overlooking Beirut. This scene, occurring three years before the outbreak of the civil war, features guests who are all well-dressed and well-fed as they peer down on a city bathed in sunshine, lined with palm trees, and cooled by sea breezes. Everyone is having a fine time and differences are secondary to the partying at hand. To illustrate the point, Skiles tells his wife he has “the Christians in one corner, the Muslims in another, and Jack Daniels in between.”

In an ominous, foreshadowing moment, though, Skiles is asked by the visiting congressman to “sum up Lebanon in one minute.” Skiles says that Lebanon is like a boardinghouse with no landlord, where all the inhabitants share a talent for betrayal but usually find a way to make it work. To illustrate, Stiles tells a story: one stormy night, there came a knock at the door. No one wanted to answer it, but finally someone did. It was the Palestinians, looking for a place to stay. Again, no one wanted to let them in, but quickly some saw an opportunity to use the Palestinians against their rivals to reshape the local balance of power. What no one understood, according to Stiles, was that all the Palestinians wanted was to burn down the house next door, where the Israelis lived.

One Beirut reviewer writing for a prominent newspaper interpreted Stiles’s vignette as evidence of the way US diplomats in the film are depicted as “dismissive” of the complexity of the situation on the ground. I disagree: as a career intelligence analyst, I thought it was exactly the kind of story that policymakers would remember and reference long after they had read an intelligence or policy paper that told them the same thing in more words.

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Unlike the case of Bill Buckley, the CIA officer in *Beirut* is kidnapped not by Lebanese Shias but by a Palestinian splinter group—the same group responsible for killing Skiles’s wife at the cocktail party that, 10 years earlier, had begun so auspiciously.

Skiles, long since having departed the State Department and working as a labor-management mediator in Boston, is requested by name when the terrorists holding the CIA station chief want him to serve as the negotiator for the station chief’s release. The White House arranges Skiles’s return—to a very different Beirut from the one he left. Both Skiles and the city he once loved are shells of their former selves. Skiles, by this time an apathetic alcoholic, witnesses a shooting just steps outside of the airport—an event that passersby hardly acknowledge. Hamm, made famous by his role as Don Draper in the acclaimed TV drama, *Mad Men*, gives a strong performance, deftly managing the story of a seasoned expert and former player—established early in the film, vis-à-vis a photograph of him alongside Henry Kissinger—who has come unmoored and struggles mightily to salvage a terrible situation.

The view from Skiles’s dilapidated hotel is of buildings ravaged by years of artillery barrages and bombings, and the dimly lit hotel lounge features thick cigarette smoke, drawn curtains, a third-rate cover band, and large amounts of cash changing hands between armed men. A drunken Skiles plays poker with a senior Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) member, and his local handlers have to traverse open-air checkpoints manned by teenagers with assault rifles sitting on tanks and living room furniture, listening to reggae music. Later on, Skiles wanders through a no-man’s land neighborhood in search of a meeting with the hostage takers and stumbles upon a couple—in a tuxedo and wedding gown—having their portraits taken amid the rubble. These images felt as thought they were lifted directly from Thomas Friedman’s classic account of the Lebanese Civil War during these years, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1990), right down to the nonchalance with which the city’s dwellers had grown to accept their situation by 1982 and their efforts to get on with their lives.

We learn that the kidnapped station chief was once Skiles’s good friend and that the two had parted on bad terms following the death of Skiles’s wife, a side story that injects Skiles’s mission with enough meaning to lead him to work around the acting CIA station chief—and a representative from the National Security Council (NSC) sent to manage the crisis—and to take major risks to ensure his friend’s release. Additional context and tension is provided by the NSC official, Gary Ruzak, an Army colonel portrayed by Shea Whigham who viewers of a certain age will associate, probably by design, with Oliver North, the Marine colonel who spearheaded the disastrous Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan years.

Though ostensibly leading the effort to safely return the station chief, Whigham’s character—like the financially corrupt deputy chief of station Donald Gaines, played by Dean Norris—may be conflicted about his mission. Through contemporary news reports and subtle cues, we learn that the Israeli government by this time was seeking a pretext to invade Lebanon and eliminate Palestinian terrorist organizations operating there, and though it is not stated plainly, Ruzak appears to favor an Israeli invasion and may see the kidnapping—or even killing—of a CIA officer by the Palestinians as the pretext Tel Aviv desires.

In reality, Israel eventually did invade Lebanon later that year, as actual news reports from that period attest at the film’s end. Whigham’s depiction of Ruzak, like Norris’s of Gaines, is refreshingly subtle where other films might have made them outright villains. They appear to want to free their man from captivity and do not actively plot his demise, but both may not lose any sleep either way. It is a credit to writer Tony Gilroy (*The Bourne Trilogy*) and director Brad Anderson (*The Machinist*) that such nuance is allowed to flower, adding to the intrigue without dumbing it down.

As Skiles’s primary CIA contact, Sandy Crowder, Rosamund Pike delivers an excellent portrayal of a level-headed and highly professional intelligence officer that brings to mind Joan Allen’s character from the Jason Bourne franchise. She speaks both French and Arabic with confidence, is brave but not reckless, unwaveringly loyal to her colleague, and possessing just enough hope to keep doing a dangerous job with no guarantee of success. In short, she is what we should all hope for in CIA operations officers.

In addition to providing a nuanced depiction of the time and place, Gilroy and Anderson deserve credit for including details that make this film even more enjoyable as historical fiction. For example, elements of the film are based around the American University of Beirut (AUB),...
depicted accurately as struggling to maintain operations in the midst of war. In 1982, Professor Malcolm Kerr—father of American basketball player and coach Steve Kerr—became AUB’s president. Two years later, Lebanese Hizbollah assassinated him in his office, and Beirut provides viewers a scene that highlights AUB’s fraught existence at the time. Another side story in the film, about Israeli involvement in Beirut’s intrigues, could have been excerpted from Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman’s recent, excellent book, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations (Random House, 2018). In his biography of CIA Middle East expert Robert Ames, The Good Spy (Crown, 2014), journalist Kai Bird highlighted the ways in which the PLO was willing to work with the Americans in the late 1970s and early 1980s in ways that would have been unthinkable to most outside observers at the time. It is a credit to Beirut that its filmmakers appear to have taken the time to learn from such accounts and incorporate them into this memorable thriller.

The reviewer: Brent Geary is a member of CIA’s History Staff.
CURRENT TOPICS

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The Selling of the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy, by David Shamus McCarthy
The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace, by A. S. Dulat, Asad Durrani, and Aditya Sinha

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In Secrecy’s Shadow: The OSS and CIA in Hollywood Cinema 1941–1979, by Simon Willmetts
Secret Pigeon Service: Operation Columba, Resistance and the Struggle to Liberate Europe, by Gordon Corera

Three books on Intelligence in World War I by Heribert von Feilitzsch:
    Felix A. Sommerfeld and The Mexican Front in The Great War
    The Secret War Council: The German Fight Against the Entente in America in 1914
    The Secret War on The United States in 1915: A Tale of Sabotage, Labor Unrest, and Border Troubles


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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Four of the seven former FBI directors “wrote” books. J. Edgar Hoover’s Masters of Deceit (Henry Holt, 1958), written in the third person by staff colleagues, described the seriousness of the communist threat. The memoirs of Clarence Kelley and Louis Freeh had co-authors; their books covered their backgrounds plus key FBI cases of the time. James Comey’s A Higher Loyalty—no co-author or ghost writers—is a first-person narrative that culminates in a series of unique personal confrontations with the president.

Comey establishes his approach to life and leadership with a discussion of his upbringing, his decision to become a lawyer rather than a doctor, and his first job in the legal profession—under Rudy Giuliani, whom he eventually succeeded. His learning experiences involved the Mafia, insider-trading violations, and most prominently, the Martha Stewart lying-under-oath case.

His strict application of the law in the Stewart case didn’t endear him to the public at large and his analysis of the legal rationale probably won’t change any minds. But among other effects, it raised his profile in the attorney general’s office, and he was offered (and accepted) the position of deputy attorney general in 2003.

In Washington, Comey explains, he learned law at the presidential level. The Valerie Plame and Scooter Libby cases are examples. But the most challenging battles concerned the legal aspects of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program and issues relating to NSA’s surveillance program. Comey concluded the earlier authorizations were not, in fact, legal and proposed adjustments. Opposition from the White House and then-Vice President Cheney, and the well-known encounter with White House lawyers in the attorney general’s hospital room, make interesting reading. Comey deals with these issues at length, leaving little doubt as to his position relative to those who disagreed. In the end, he didn’t win the day—but he gained respect.

In 2005, Comey left the Justice Department for industry and in early March 2013, joined the faculty at Columbia Law School. It was there, a few weeks later, that Attorney General Eric Holder surprised him with an offer to interview for the FBI director position. The final third of A Higher Loyalty is devoted to his FBI service.

Assuming the mantle of Bob Mueller was an awesome task. But it occurred at a time when many others were retiring, new staff and special agents were joining, and diversity was changing decades old FBI policies and traditions. Comey explains how he dealt with these issues by applying the leadership and ethical concepts that he describes throughout the book.

The national and international events that consumed Comey’s time as director will be familiar to anyone who watches TV or has a Twitter or Facebook account. And while they are treated at some length, Comey adds details about his relationship with colleagues and members of Congress, and his one-on-one conversations with Presidents Obama and Trump he has not discussed before.

A Higher Loyalty is at once a memoir of a devoted family man and a dedicated public servant. Its respectful candor and many insights are a valuable legacy.


The annual threat assessment prepared by the Pentagon for Congress now places cyber threats first on its list of threats. (xii) The first-strike contingencies that worry the Pentagon most no longer concern nuclear warfare: they are cyberspace related—offensive and defensive. Offensive cyberwar refers to paralyzing cyberattacks against the adversary to prevent an attack that would “fry power grids, stop trains, silence cell phones . . . overwhelm the internet,” and create national chaos. (xii) Defensive cyberwar is concerned with monitoring potential adversaries’ actions and acting to protect domestic targets—government owned and commercial—wherever located.
It is generally agreed that the United States possesses the capability to conduct both types of cyberwar at varying levels of intensity. But questions remain, writes New York Times national security correspondent David Sanger: “What constitutes appropriate actions?”; “How will these actions influence adversary retaliation?”; “What is the role of commercial entities?”; “Who makes the decisions?”; and perhaps most importantly, “What is the strategy for success and the doctrine for action?”. The Perfect Weapon is a clarion call highlighting the need for a public discussion of these issues.

By public discussion, Sanger implies congressional, think-tank, and media involvement, that would create an understanding of the threats and would result in the funding and passage of legislation necessary to protect the nation. At the same time, a doctrine of success should be articulated, he suggests, that will be accepted, as was massive nuclear retaliation during the Cold War.

To justify this position, The Perfect Weapon demonstrates the seriousness of the cyber threat by offering examples; some are familiar, others less so. The North Korean hacking of Sony Studios shows how a then-relatively low-tech nation achieved very damaging results before most had realized what they had done. The Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities illustrates sophisticated capability and how very simple errors can create complications. The story of how the Russians penetrated classified Pentagon files is attention-getting, as is the method that was used to do it. (20)

Sanger also discusses the Snowden leaks, their influence on the privacy debate, and the damage they caused. Of even greater concern, he suggests, was another NSA breach by a group called the Shadow Brokers. They were posting NSA code on the internet “designed to exploit vulnerabilities in Microsoft systems.” (229) Sanger explains what happened.

Part of Sanger’s approach to these and the other cyber security problems he describes, including the Russian meddling in the 2016 elections, is a concomitant discussion of how various elements of the bureaucracy—political, military, and industrial—react when alerted to the threats and actual attacks. Those that emphasize the “folly of going on the offense unless we have a good defense” risk ignoring that “the best way to deter attack—and counterattack—is deterrence by denial.” Equally important, he argues, is the recognition that the government can’t do it all: private institutions have a major role. Sorting out the roles and responsibilities, Sanger concludes, “will take presidential leadership.” (302)

The Perfect Weapon is a persuasive wake-up call that must be answered.

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The Selling of the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy, by David Shamus McCarthy. (University Press of Kansas, 2018) 215, endnotes, bibliography, index.

I met Elvis once—when he was alive. Only a few weeks out of the Army, he was making GI Blues (Paramount Studios, 1960) in Hollywood. The storyline paralleled his own service in the Third Armored Division, West Germany, and he was in the uniform of a sergeant—the rank he achieved on active duty. The Army, in which I then also served, provided technical assistance to the film that included assuring correct terminology, uniforms, and, in this case, some tanks with crews filmed on location. (Many years later, similar technical assistance from the Department of Defense was given to the movie, Bridge of Spies.) While neither film elicited media or congressional charges that government cooperation was provided only to enhance its public image, others have not fared as well.

For example, in 1971, a CBS documentary entitled The Selling of the Pentagon, based in part on a book by Senator J. William Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine, charged that the Pentagon’s public relations ac-
McCarthy does discuss secrecy agreement cases in which classified data was at issue and then goes on to allege that these agreements were not enforced equally. His prime example is that of then-DCI Stansfield Turner for not punishing former DCI William Colby when he failed to submit the French version of his memoir for review before publication. That Colby “received no punishment” (48) is incorrect; he was fined $10,000. Error aside, this instance and the others presented are not examples of a poisonous relationship between public relations or an attempt to manipulate history; they are administrative issues.

With three significant exceptions, Selling the CIA argues that operations the agency portrayed as successes were mostly not, that its openness programs were less than open, and that it fought FOIA legislation on secrecy grounds. He does acknowledge that the FOIA release that became the CREST files at the National Archives was a positive contribution for researchers, but he suggests that the initiative came from the White House—not the CIA. Whether the CIA’s behavior in these matters was a blind application of its “culture of secrecy,” as McCarthy asserts, or the legitimately occasionally flawed implementation of its mandate to protect sources and methods is a judgment the reader must decide.

The first exception concerns McCarthy’s commentary on the movie Three Days of the Condor (Paramount Pictures, 1975). The plot involves the murder of six CIA employees by a renegade CIA hit squad. The six had stumbled on to a rogue plan to invade the Middle East and are assassinated to maintain secrecy. The hero, played by Robert Redford, figures out the scheme and leaks it all to the New York Times, but the deputy director of CIA calmly informs him that CIA will have the story spiked. McCarthy implies this is a justifiable characterization of the CIA, since it had once engaged journalists in its work and had been involved in assassinations. (21) What he doesn’t grasp is that the film was Hollywood, not CIA-generated fiction, though less colorful than James Bond. The CIA contributed nothing.

The other exceptions are more important to McCarthy’s thesis. One involves congressional oversight of the CIA’s so-called black site detention program. The other deals with the agency’s role in the movie Zero Dark Thirty (Columbia Pictures, 2012). In the former instance, McCarthy views CIA efforts to present the facts of the program correctly and counter media misconceptions.

when they occurred as self-serving manipulation of reality to the CIA’s benefit, guided by the “culture of secrecy.” No evidence is provided.

In the case of *Zero Dark Thirty*, McCarthy sees CIA’s extensive cooperation with the production as a means to influence public opinion, in particular, to reinforce the view that enhanced interrogation contributed to finding Usama Bin Laden. That any Hollywood production would permit such a precedent is whimsical: Hollywood presents its own version of history, as Oliver Stone can attest.

In the end, McCarthy writes that “this study contends that the Office of Public Affairs has helped to maintain the CIA’s image even during crisis situations. By focusing on the positive and diverting the public attention from the negative, CIA officials have protected both covert operations and the ‘culture of secrecy.’” (129) The idea that the CIA has the power to “divert public opinion” is deeply flawed. The “culture of secrecy”—a term the author never defines—is better seen as a foundation principle of the best intelligence organizations.

*Selling the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy* is an interesting book about an imperfect agency. But it does not demonstrate that CIA “has implemented a public relations strategy that directly threatens American democracy.”


Amarjit Dulat was secretary (chief) of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian foreign intelligence agency, during 1999–2000. General Asad Durrani was director-general of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate during 1990–1991. Aditya Sinha is a journalist who co-authored an earlier book with Secretary Dulat. This book was Dulat’s idea, and he convinced Durrani to participate. At the suggestion of the publisher, he employed a dialogue format to tell the story. Peter Jones of the University of Ottawa’s Center for International Policy Studies hosted a series of meetings of the two principals outside India and Pakistan, during which a number of topics were discussed. Sinha edited the exchanges. *The Spy Chronicles* is the result.

The initial exchanges explain that they met after their active service at a conference in Bangkok that was part of the Track II, or backchannel diplomacy, program. Track II permits non-governmental, informal, and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals. They then jointly authored two papers, before deciding on this book.

The topics covered in the exchanges include the intelligence profession and the “deep state,” their very forthright views on each other’s former agencies, other services they worked with or against, the Kashmir quandary, terrorism, political leaders around the world, and their hopes for the future. Of special interest are their comments in the chapter entitled, “The Deal for Osama bin Laden.”

The level of candor is robust, if not always on point. For example, when asked whether the ISI is a deep state, general Durrani replies that “many intelligence agencies have been called the Deep State.” He then adds, “The Deep State in America can even scuttle presidential policy. . . . The CIA, State Department, Pentagon, and the military industrial complex make the political leadership helpless.” (23) Returning to the topic later, Durrani notes “I never rated CIA assessments highly. Never.” (54)

On the subject of a Bin Laden deal, Dulat says, “I felt Pakistan cooperated in some way.” In Durrani’s lengthy response, he comments, “I don’t know, but I think Pakistan cooperated.” Then, replying to press accounts that he said Pakistan was “harbouring bin Laden,” he added that he had said only that “we probably found out at some stage and cooperated.” (230)

*The Spy Chronicles* makes clear that India and Pakistan, at least from the perspective of two former intelligence chiefs, understand their many long unsolved problems and agree on what should be done, though not how. Concerning the United States, they share a rather cynical view of its motives and are uncertain about its current foreign policy. While it is impossible to know whether they reflect the views of those now in power in their respective countries, the book provides an interesting informed outlook well worth considering.
GENERAL


In the final volume of *The Official History of the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization (ASIO) 1975–1989* (Allen & Unwin, 2016), historians John Blaxland and Rhys Crawley barely mention the relatively recent concept of an Australian Intelligence Community (AIC). In their contribution to *Intelligence and the Function of Government*, however, they provide a detailed history. This is just one of the 12 informative articles assembled by editors and written by academics and practitioners.

The book aims to explain how the AIC functions at home, abroad, and as a member of the Five Eyes partnership. It begins with a review of intelligence studies in Australia. To establish a baseline of intelligence studies available, it presents an interesting content analysis of articles found in two journals—one private, one US-government sponsored: *The Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* and *Studies in Intelligence*. As a practical matter, it recognizes that academia resists granting equivalent value for courses in intelligence—a problem common to most Five Eyes countries.

Other topics discussed include Australian military intelligence, open source intelligence, and issues involving dissemination. Of particular interest is the article on FININT [financial intelligence] and the case for structural and legislative reform, by Ashton Robinson, an honorary fellow at the University of Melbourne University. Robinson makes a strong case for increased use of FININT by the AIC.

On the subject of secret friends, intelligence scholar Siobhán Martin and Carl Ungerer, a former visiting scholar at Georgetown University and senior analyst in the Australian Office of National Assessments, respectively, present a sobering assessment of Five Eyes cooperation. This is followed with contributions on leadership development and comparative lessons in risk management in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The two final articles deal with metadata issues and cyber warfare threats, cyber space, and the internet. Both examine how Australian intelligence views these issues and what needs to be done in preparation and risk mitigation.

For those interested in intelligence in general and Australian intelligence in particular, *Intelligence and the Function of Government* will be a positive addition to your library.

**Principled Spying: The Ethics of Secret Intelligence**, by David Omand and Mark Phythian. (Georgetown University Press, 2018) 285, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Intelligence officers know the regulations, rules, and legal limits within which they must function. They are also aware of the dilemmas that arise when the methods necessary to acquire intelligence challenge the ethical norms that apply in a democratic society. *Principled Spying* presents a thoughtful discussion of these dilemmas as they are influenced by “norms of right conduct for intelligence activity.” (4) The result is guidance that officers can apply when seeking to obtain essential intelligence while complying with all the constraints.

Both authors have already made impressive contributions to the intelligence literature. Sir David Omand, a former director of GCHQ and the first Permanent Secretary and Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office, is the author of *Securing the State* (Columbia University Press, 2010), an imaginative account of the relationship between national security and civil liberties. He is also well known for his puckish wit. When asked by the BBC for his views on the relationship between GCHQ and NSA, he replied, “We have the brains. They have the money. It’s a collaboration that’s worked very well.” Mark Phythian is a professor of politics at the University of Leicester, the co-editor of the journal *Intelligence and*

National Security, and co-author of a number of valuable books, including one on intelligence theory. In general, Principled Spying recognizes that intelligence practices are a necessary part of international relations; the book does not find spying or espionage, per se, unethical. It is concerned with the quandaries that arise in practical implementation. These include how to deal with penetration of terrorist groups, in which members are required to commit illegal acts; whether agents should be recruited through coercion and blackmail or for ideological reasons; the importance of honoring the commitments made to agents; and the obligations analysts and managers have to “speak truth to power.”

In a separate chapter, the authors address digital data collection. While in this area there are no technical historical precedents, ethical choices remain relevant, due to tensions between the public’s desire for near-absolute protection of personal data and the need intelligence agencies have to acquire the data necessary to protect those very citizens. While stipulating that there is no easy answer, the authors discuss how secrecy, oversight, and leaks—with some disagreement on the latter— influence public awareness and raise important legal issues. Their exchanges regarding the ethical issues posed by the Dark Net are of particular interest.

In their conclusions, the authors assert the expectation “that sound ethical thinking and good intelligence practice are not contradictory concepts, (215) despite inevitable tensions. As a test of relevance in any particular case, they recommend applying a slightly modified version of DCI Turner’s measure of acceptability: “whether those approving them feel they could defend their decisions before the public if the actions became public . . .” Any convincing ethical justification, the authors’ modification asserts, “genuinely has to include the sentiment, it was the right thing to do.” (emphasis in original, 226)

Principled Spying is a thoughtful, provocative, and valuable contribution to the intelligence literature.

A Brotherhood of Spies: The U-2 and the CIA’s Secret War, by Monte Reel. (Doubleday, 2018) 342, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The Soviet shootdown of the U-2 piloted by Gary Powers on 1 May 1960 is a story so well known that one immediately wonders what another book about the event can possibly contribute. The short answer is “very little,” and A Brotherhood of Spies meets that expectation. But for those looking for answers to questions like,
“Who conceived the U-2 in the first place?”; “Why was it a CIA—not an Air Force—program?”; “Who were the key players and what happened to them after the shoot-down?”; and, “Was it a political as well as a technical success?”, author Monte Reel provides a good overview.

Of the key players discussed, the contributions from the innovative Edwin Land—the inventor of Polaroid photography—are the most impressive and least well known. It was Land who suggested the U-2, putting cameras in satellites, and creating the National Reconnaissance Office to manage the program. The role of Richard Bissell, the U-2 program manager is well told, as is his later conduct as CIA director of operations and his responsibility for the Bay of Pigs disaster. The contributions of the dynamic Kelly Johnson, designer and builder of the U-2 and its follow-on, the A-12 (forerunner of the SR71), were critical to the program’s success.


*A Brotherhood of Spies*—a questionable title since none of those involved in the U-2 program—including Powers—viewed themselves as spies—also covers the role of President Eisenhower and his scientific advisory team as they created the bureaucratic structure necessary for success. Those actions included dealing with a skeptical Air Force, and an initially reluctant Allen Dulles and Congress. Reel also includes an equally valuable discussion of Eisenhower’s admission of responsibility for the U-2 shootdown following his public recounting of the cover story that he acknowledged was untrue.

Thus for a good review of the U-2 program, its impact on the intelligence operations of the time, and its influence on subsequent operations, read *A Brotherhood of Spies*.

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**The London Cage: The Secret History of Britain’s World War II Interrogation Centre**, by Helen Fry. (Yale University Press, 2017) 244, endnotes, photos, index.

A clandestine interrogation center where prisoners who refused cooperation after routine questioning were subjected to “special intelligence treatment” is not a post 9/11 phenomenon. (1) During World War II, there was the so-called London Cage, where harsh interrogation methods were used. (1) Its commander, Lt. Col. Alexander Scotland, published a book with that title in 1957. A review by former CIA officer George Constantinides commented that “for those interested in interrogating methods used to acquire intelligence . . . the book will prove disappointing.” An accurate assessment—but it wasn’t Scotland’s fault. The new version of *The London Cage* explains why.

Scotland’s original manuscript was confiscated by MI5 in 1954, but the prospective publisher kept a copy. The book “described life inside the secret wartime interrogation centre” that functioned until 1948. (2) The 72-year-old Scotland, a nephew of George Bernard Shaw, dismissed the government’s argument that “Methods of interrogation by British intelligence in any theater of war could not be disclosed because the same techniques might be used in a current conflict.” (3) Scotland threatened to publish in America unless, at the very least, a redacted version was allowed. MI5 capitulated; the published version omitted names and techniques. Nevertheless, “rumours continued to surface about irregularities at the London Cage.” (7)

Some of the London Cage files were released recently by the British National Archives and intelligence historian Helen Fry acquired a copy of the unredacted Scotland manuscript plus related memoranda and reports. She then pieced together a more accurate account of what took place in the London Cage.

The purpose of the London Cage itself was secret until “complaints of ill-treatment emerged at the end of the war, from Nazi war criminals held there.” (22) While Scotland wrote that “No physical force was ever used during interrogations to obtain information, no cold water treatment, no third degrees, nor any other refinement,” (207) Fry cites two sources that refute that contention. One was Scotland himself, who wrote elsewhere admit-
ting that, provoked, he had used “violence against a pris-

For reasons not clear, Fry later digresses to the subject

The second source concerning harsh treatment at the

M isdefending the Realm: How MI5’s Incompetence Enabled Communist Subversion of Britain’s Institutions during the Nazi-Soviet Pact, by Antony Percy. (University of Buckingham Press, 2017) 363, end of chapter notes, bibliogra-

Historian Antony Percy read German and Russian at Christ Church, Oxford. Misdefending the Realm is based on his PhD dissertation at the University of Buckingham. It has a clear but flawed objective: “to show that, even though Soviet espionage was more penetrating and more patient than has traditionally been portrayed, MI5 failed to counter it because of severe flaws in policy, organization, and leadership.” (13) It is hard to conceive of any aspect of British espionage history that has been more thoroughly analyzed in the intelligence literature than its penetration by Soviet intelligence. Nothing more need be said on that point here.

That both MI5 and MI6 failed to identify most of the penetrations is also well documented. And contrary to the subtitle, they went undiscovered well beyond the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact. The only remaining question is whether the reasons given for the failure by Percy are correct.

Percy asserts that MI5 “misjudged the intentions of those British citizens it regarded as ‘harmless’ intellectual communists, making reckless decisions between the theory of communism and its destructive practice . . . and allowed the fact that Stalin was a temporary ally to blind it to the dictator’s permanent objectives . . . and allowed itself to be swayed by so-called ‘agents of influence.’” And even after “senior officers belatedly discovered their negligence, they adopted a strategy of cover-up and disimulation that attempted to bury their misdemeanors, a deception that has influenced official, authorized, and independent histories of British intelligence ever since.” (13) Except this one, he implies.

This harsh judgement is not the only interpretation suggested by the evidence provided in the more than 300 pages that follow. During the period of interest, the Brit-

theory in Public Literature
minimal government cooperation. Percy concludes this was a cover-up; protecting sources and methods is an alternative explanation.

Complicating matters while containing many interesting details, Misdefending the Realm also has too many needless errors of fact, weakly supported judgments, and pervasive speculation. For example, the source given for the Modin quotation on page 39, endnote #93, doesn’t contain the quote. In another instance, Percy states that the proposed visit to Moscow by Guy Burgess and Isaiah Berlin “has been ignored for some reason by all historians.” (81) In fact, Berlin’s biographer, and historians Andrew Lownie and John Costello, each mentioned the story.\textsuperscript{a, b} The discussion of Philby’s recruitment—location and person—with comments like “could surely have” are typical of Percy’s speculative analysis.

For those interested in British counterespionage in the Cambridge Five era, Misdefending the Realm offers alternative propositions that conflict with other historical explanations of the events discussed. It is a revisionist account that deserves attention but also fact checking. Caveat lector.

\textsuperscript{a} Michael Ignatieff, \textit{Isaiah Berlin: A Life} (Henry Holt, 1998), 96–8.


The pie chart, bar chart, graphs of statistical data, and trend lines so common today were invented by William Playfair. His book, \textit{The Commercial and Political Atlas of 1776} was the first to contain statistical charts. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry for Playfair summarizes his life as inventor, businessman, banker, economist, writer, land speculator, and serial failed entrepreneur—in a single page. The handful of other writers who have written about Playfair have described him in less charitable terms: “fraudster, extortionist.” (7) None of these, however, mention that he was a secret agent for the British government. Former CI analyst Bruce Berkowitz has remedied that in Playfair.

It was while conducting research into Playfair—the “statistician with a roguish reputation” (239)—that Berkowitz found documentary indications of Playfair’s espionage for the crown in the form of memos and reports submitted while traveling in France. (180–81) But the most important discovery was that Playfair had counterfeited French assignats, the paper money used during the French Revolution to pay for its war with England. In a once secret memorandum that Berkowitz eventually found, Playfair proposed (and the British government sanctioned) the operation to wreck the French economy. In modern terms, this covert action was an early, if not the first, example of economic warfare. While evidence for the counterfeiting is solid, the question of success is circumstantial, as Berkowitz shows using a graph depicting the collapse of the assignat during the period concerned. (197)

To convey how all of this came about, Playfair tells the life story of its protagonist, beginning with his Scottish upbringing. Berkowitz shows how Playfair’s apprenticeship with the Boulton & Watt firm—half owned by James Watt—that produced steam engines, led to his involvement in the French revolution on both sides, and the many disastrous business ventures he concocted to sustain his livelihood. A prime example of the latter is his role in the Scioto Affair of 1790 that, with the innocent support of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton among other founding fathers, sold phony deeds to land in the Scioto Valley in Ohio to would-be French settlers in France, sight-unseen. Only when the prospective settlers landed in Alexandria, Virginia, did the scheme start to unravel. The ultimate result for Playfair was his narrow escape to England to avoid a French prison.

In England, Playfair turned to writing for a living. Bookshops were the publishers of the time, and Playfair worked with Stockdale’s Bookshop on Piccadilly. Berkowitz reviews Playfair’s writings on business and economics, both pamphlets and books, and hints that some were government-backed, though remuneration was poor. (214) To overcome the deficiency, Playfair started
his own bank that, after a brief period of success, failed and he went to prison, the first of several times. He would die penniless in London’s red light district (what is now the fashionable Covent Garden), in 1823.

The life of William Playfair is at once a tribute to an innovative thinker, and an object lesson in the futility of dodgy business practices and poor judgment in entrepreneurial endeavors. Except for his creation of statistical graphics, about which he wrote at length, his only success was a covert action for the government—about which he never wrote a word. Only after Bruce Berkowitz’s extensive archival research is his story finally told.

A most unexpected and unusual contribution to the intelligence literature.

A Political Family: The Kuczynskis, Fascism, Espionage and the Cold War, by John Green. (Routledge, 2017) 355, end of chapter notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Agatha Christie once lived there. So did Philby’s recruiter, Arnold Deutsch, and Soviet agent Edith Tudor-Hart. George Orwell visited friends there. The Lawn Road Flats apartments were also home to many of the Kuczynski family (parents, one boy, five girls) after they emigrated to Britain to escape Nazi Germany before World War II. All but one of the family joined the Communist Party and at least two were active Soviet agents before, during, and after the war. A Political Family is a politically sympathetic family biography that gets their espionage story mostly right.

The oldest child, Jurgen, studied in Berlin and Heidelberg, where he completed his doctorate in economics by age 20. He then continued his studies in the United States at the Brookings Institution, where he became friends with Oliver Wendell Holmes and circulated among leftist labor leaders of the late 1920s. It was also at Brookings that he met and married Marguerite Steinfeld, also from Germany and studying at Brookings. They returned to Germany in 1929 and worked there until 1936, when they began their exile in Britain.

An open communist, Jurgen worked for the British government as an economist during the war. He also became a source if not an agent of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. It was Jurgen who put Klaus Fuchs—later a convicted “atomic spy”—in contact with the GRU. (183) In 1944, OSS recruited Jurgen to assist with selecting personnel for missions behind German lines. After the war— with Moscow’s approval—he worked for the United States Strategic Bombing Survey alongside Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith. Green writes that he was hired as a lieutenant colonel (LTC), but more likely it was as a civilian contractor at an LTC’s equivalent pay grade. (194)

Jurgen’s sister, Ursula, also served the GRU before and after the war, where she was known as Sonja. Green reviews her career from recruitment in China while working with Richard Sorge, to her assignments with the Red Orchestra network in Switzerland, and to Britain where she handled Fuchs during and after the war. Ursula also serviced another so-called “atomic spy,” Melita Norwood—though for reasons not mentioned, Green does not discuss the case.

The activities of Jurgen, Ursula, and to a lesser extent, their sister Brigitte, did not go unobserved by MI5. They were known and active communists but no prosecutable evidence of espionage was ever collected. Green devotes a chapter to MI5’s monitoring efforts that mentions Ursula’s identification by a defector. Her subsequent interview by MI5 was inconclusive but it precipitated her departure to East Germany. Throughout the book Green comments on books written about the family, mainly Jurgen and Ursula, and points out many inaccuracies. Ursula would publish her memoir—Sonjas Rapport (meaning “Sonja’s Report”) in retirement in East Germany.

A Political Family is an interesting account of a communist family whose safe-exile in Britain was repaid by loyalty to the Soviet Union at their host’s expense. Green finds that difficult to understand.

Simon Willmetts is a cultural historian of the United States at the University of Hull. His book, In Secrecy’s Shadow, argues that the cinematic depiction of American intelligence, especially of the CIA, from the end of World War II to the present (the subtitle notwithstanding) is the reason “American citizens stopped trusting their government.” (6) This transformation of opinion can be seen, he suggests, in the changes in public perception that occurred between the production of the films 13 Rue Madeleine (Twentieth Century Fox, 1947) and Oliver Stone’s JFK (Warner Bros., 1991). He characterizes the former—a fictionalized story about OSS—as the “authoritative and unified vision of America’s past” although he admits former OSS director William Donovan was so displeased with the script’s departure from the facts that he refused to allow OSS to be mentioned in the final version. The JFK film, he suggests, “is sullied by the debilitating effects of classification upon the authority of the national historical record”—the National Archives. (4) Put another way, its secrecy limits “Americans’ understanding of their history.” (6)

To develop his position, Willmetts discusses the influence of four categories of films: semi-documentary (13 Rue Madeleine), ironic romance (Get Smart, The Man From U.N.C.L.E.), tragic realism (Le Carré) and thrillers (Three Days of the Condor, The Manchurian Candidate, Scorpio). After dismissing the realism examples since they were mostly British, his attention devolves to the fictional cinematic and TV portrayals of espionage and covert action; his list of titles is two pages long. It is this that forms the substantiation of his assertion that public disapproval of American intelligence is ever increasing.

Along the way, Willmetts does mention the Church Committee hearings, congressional oversight, CIA Office of Public Affairs, FBI, and related international events that no doubt influenced public opinion. But it is the fictional stories that he attempts to correlate with the deterioration of American public opinion, trust in government, and excessive secrecy. For many with knowledge of the era concerned, it will be a hard-sell. While the appearance of the fictional movies and TV series may correlate closely in time with various public events, he fails to make the case that there is a cause-and-effect relationship.

In Secrecy’s Shadow may be fairly characterized as an academic account that is not easy reading; that is not to say it is not worth reading. It is a fine example of persistent misconceptions.


A pigeon with a small camera strapped to its chest often surprises visitors to the CIA’s online museum. An internet search for the phrase “Operation Columba” provides some detail about the use of pigeons for intelligence purposes in World War II. BBC journalist Gordon Corera, the author of several fine books on intelligence, encountered Operation Columba in an entirely different way. He was assigned to cover a story about a dead pigeon’s leg found in a chimney. Attached to it was a small canister containing a coded message GCHQ was unable to break. Curious about the origin of the message, he consulted the British National Archives, and among the unexpectedly large volume of pigeon files he found there, Corera noticed one marked “SECRET’ Columba” (Columba is short for Columba livia or rock dove, the formal name for pigeon). Its detailed contents clearly documented an operation, and he wanted to know the details. Secret Pigeon Service is the result.

The Columba file contained original written reports folded into the size of postage stamps. One, message #37, contained 12 pages of data—including hand-drawn maps from Belgium that identified locations of German army units and orders of battle. No names revealed the sender, but it was signed with the codename Leopold Vindictive. Armed with the country clue and the codeword, Corera went to Belgium and gradually discovered the answers in archives and from surviving relatives of those involved.

The files in the British archives indicated that there was a military organization working with Leopold Vindictive in Britain. Corera learned it was the Pigeon Service, which was subordinated to the Royal Corps of Signals.

The story that emerges in Secret Pigeon Service is not a simple one. Corera explains how the service was formed, the difficulties it had establishing resistance contacts in Europe and Britain, and how the German military
intelligence worked to shut down the operation while protecting its own pigeon service. *Leopold Vindictive* eventually made contact with other resistance groups and they provided much intelligence before the *Leopold* network was penetrated, and some involved paid with their lives.

On the British side, the Pigeon Service was staffed with a mix of military and civilian pigeon fanciers (that is how pigeon owners addressed themselves). Corera found records of frequent and intense controversy over resources and personnel. The RAF wasn’t always ready to help drop pigeons where and when desired, and the fanciers fought over authority and recognition among themselves and their superiors. The recipients of the intelligence the pigeons helped to produce—Churchill, R. V. Jones, and military intelligence among them—thought the effort worthwhile. By war’s end, 16,000 pigeons had been dispatched; only one in 10 returned.

*Secret Pigeon Service* is an interesting and unique account of long unrecognized war service; the book fills a gap in the history of intelligence, and is a treat for pigeon fanciers.

**Three Books on Intelligence During World War I by Heribert von Feilitzsch:**

*Felix A. Sommerfeld and The Mexican Front in The Great War* (Henselstone Verlag LLC, 2014) 346, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.


*The Secret War on The United States in 1915: A Tale of Sabotage, Labor Unrest, and Border Troubles* (Henselstone Verlag LLC, 2014) 354, endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

Historian Mark Benbow’s review of *In Plain Sight: Felix A. Sommerfeld, Spymaster in Mexico 1908–1914* by Heribert von Feilitzsch, appeared in *Studies in Intelligence.* The book covered the early exploits of the little known German spy, Felix Sommerfeld. Subsequently, von Feilitzsch published three additional books about Sommerfeld and his fellow spies that discussed their activities during various periods prior to World War I.

The first, *Felix A. Sommerfeld and The Mexican Front in The Great War,* deals with German efforts to keep the United States out of the European war by “fomenting troubles along the Mexican-American border” (xx) that would result in military intervention in Mexico. If successful, the Germans reasoned, the US army would be tied down and forced to expend arms and materials that would otherwise be sent to its allies.

In what was called “the Punitive Expedition,” commanded by Brig. Gen. John Pershing, US forces did invade Mexico, from March 1916 to February 1917. The precipitating event was the attack on Columbus, New Mexico, by Francisco “Pancho” Villa, with whom Sommerfeld had a very complex arms-dealing relationship. But Pershing was not sufficiently tied down to prevent US entry into the war. In this book, von Feilitzsch examines whether Sommerfeld manipulated Villa’s attack or whether the expedition was the result of internal political conflicts within Mexico—or some combination of both.

Felix Sommerfeld was no ordinary secret agent. He had emigrated to New York, served in the US Army, deserted, and went to China on Germany’s behalf. There he was involved in the Boxer Rebellion. Returning to the United States, he somehow avoided arrest, and by 1910, at the start of the Mexican Revolution, he had been recruited by the German secret service and was working undercover as a reporter for the Associated Press in Mexico. At the same time, he was recruited by the US Bureau of Investigation and reporting to it and his German masters.

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By 1915, he had established contact with Pancho Villa and was Villa’s primary arms broker, while also serving the German Naval and Military attachés in Washington as an agent. For most of the period under consideration in this book, he was based in the elegant Hotel Astor in New York City. Well known as an arms dealer, he had made many high level friends in Washington, including the Army chief of staff, the secretary of war, and several senators. None of his American friends suspected his true allegiance.

Von Feilitzsch describes these relationships and shows the role they played in Sommerfeld’s operations. Strategically, he views Sommerfeld’s dealings in Mexico as an action arm of Germany’s initial efforts to keep America out of the war, an effort that would only end with the Zimmermann telegram in 1917. He provides details of German efforts—financial, political, and economic—plus Sommerfeld’s skillful maneuvering in Mexico’s revolutionary politics and his complicated relationship with Villa. The evidence that he influenced Villa’s Columbus attack is circumstantial but persuasive.

In the end, Sommerfeld and the other German agents on American soil were arrested by the Bureau of Investigation. Sommerfeld was detained for less than a year and eventually returned to work in Mexico. In 1942, at age 63, he volunteered for the US Army, but von Feilitzsch found no details concerning his duties or his ultimate end.

The Secret War Council: The German Fight Against the Entente in America in 1914 is an account of a semisecret German agency in the United States during the early years of World War I. The Council’s overt mission was to coordinate blockade running, handle financial matters, and promote trade and propaganda while Washington was putatively neutral. Its secret mission was to organize clandestine activities throughout the United States and Canada that would limit support to their European allies. Council members included diplomats, businessmen, and secret agents. The Council was headed by Heinrich F. Albert, who limited the future effectiveness of the council in July 1915, when he left his briefcase on an elevated train in New York and it was recovered by a secret service agent. Others took over Albert’s secret duties, and operations continued, the most well-known being the ammunition explosion at Black Tom Island the following year.

In The Secret War Council, von Feilitzsch describes the intelligence collection and related activities of the military attachés—and some of their agents—noting that at the time they were not illegal since the Espionage Act would not be passed until 1917. Their efforts to blow up the Welland Canal in Canada, however, were acts of war, but they failed and the perpetrators were not caught. Von Feilitzsch concludes that, overall, these efforts “had virtually no impact on the war effort.” (206)

Equal emphasis is devoted to the administrative problems dealing with Germany and logistical issues associated with attempts to corner the market on ammunition—Sommerfeld’s idea—and other items needed at home. It was during this time that initial contacts were made with Pancho Villa, and von Feilitzsch discusses the agents and relationships involved in efforts to keep America out of the war.

Some of the agents mentioned in the book wrote memoirs—usually undocumented—after the war, and von Feilitzsch assesses several. Most receive poor marks due a tendency to embellish—he gives examples—for publication value.

The Secret War Council is the most detailed and well documented account of the early clandestine and public efforts by German agents in America to date.

The Secret War on the United States In 1915: A Tale of Sabotage, Labor Unrest, and Border Troubles continues the rough chronology begun in the previous volume, but the focus here is on the sabotage operations undertaken to slow the shipment of supplies (mainly munitions) and the steps taken to obtain critical commodities for the homeland and to assist German citizens stranded in the Americas at the start of the war.

The best-known sabotage operation involved the use of “cigar” or “pencil” bombs placed by agents aboard 35 ships bound for Europe from east and west coast ports. Von Feilitzsch adds new details about their design and implementation. An appendix lists each ship and the nature of the damage caused. Less well known was an attempt to produce bombs designed to be attached to ship’s rudders; that project never got off the ground, and those involved were arrested by the secret service. (151ff)

These operations were not confined to the United States. The Secret War Council received orders to sabotage “oil production in Mexico,” but they were never implemented. (188) Instead, the German naval attaché, Franz Rintelen, became involved with a series of complex and
unsuccessful plots to stabilize the Mexican revolutionary government. Sommerfeld was involved here, informing both the Germans and the US Bureau of Investigation.

In parallel with the sabotage operations, a propaganda campaign was undertaken to “convince the US public of the German righteousness” (121) of its efforts. The campaign also argued “German cultural superiority” and attempted to justify Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality. (123) While the message resonated with German Americans, it didn’t convince anyone else, including the British—who responded with a more effective propaganda campaign of their own.

It was also in 1915 that German agents attempted two biological warfare schemes to kill horses being shipped to Europe. The first failed. The effects of the second, conducted by Anton Dilger, a German born American citizen educated at Johns Hopkins University, are uncertain. It was a difficult operation involving the use of anthrax, and von Feilitzsch tells it well.

Throughout the discussion of operations in The Secret War on the United States, von Feilitzsch describes the personnel involved and the problems they encountered dealing with local colleagues and headquarters personnel in Germany on both personal and official matters.

As in the previous volumes, von Feilitzsch comments on accounts written by others who did not have archival material available. Overall, the result of these three volumes is a comprehensive, scholarly assessment of German espionage that reflects a high level of effort and complexity and that will be of genuine value to historians.


Herbert Yardley’s “Black Chamber” codebreaking facility in New York City was abolished in 1929 after the probably apocryphal, but now memorable, exclamation by Secretary of State Henry Stimson that “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.” But that did not end the government’s codebreaking capabilities. In the finest bureaucratic tradition only the location and the cover were changed. The Black Chamber staff (with the exception of Yardley) and records were absorbed by the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) in Washington. The new commander was William Friedman, a civilian, who was joined by his wife Elizebeth (sic). Both were experienced cryptographers. His salary was $4,500.00; hers was $2,200.00, annually, “equal to $58,000 and $28,000 in today’s dollars,” Fagone writes. (120) William’s story is well known, Elizebeth’s not so much, but journalist Jason Fagone gives her the long overdue recognition her amazing contribution deserves.

The Woman Who Smashed Codes doesn’t record Elizebeth’s reaction to the salary disparity, but it does tell how the Friedmans met, worked together, and married before World War I at the Riverbank Laboratories outside of Chicago, which were owned and operated by the very eccentric philanthropist George Fabyan. Elizebeth was hired in 1916 at age 23 to verify research that claimed to confirm two theories: (1) that Francis Bacon had written the works commonly attributed to Shakespeare, Christopher Marlowe, and Ben Johnson, among other Elizabethan authors; and (2) that Bacon had included secret enciphered messages in the works that she was to help decipher. Fabyan had publicized this research widely and celebrities frequently visited to examine the “nearly conclusive” results.

It was while getting settled in her new job that Elizebeth met William Friedman, Fabyan’s geneticist. He showed interest in her work and over the succeeding months they discussed the details. Though neither had a background in cryptanalysis—a term William invented—they discovered they had an aptitude for the work. They gradually reached a very unpopular conclusion: “There are no hidden messages in Shakespeare.” (62)

While Fabyan was most displeased, America’s entry in the war intervened. Aware of the government’s lack of codebreakers, Fabyan offered to set up a facility at Riverbank, and the Signal Corps accepted. “For the first eight months of the war [after America joined] . . . William and Elizebeth and their team did all the codebreaking for the US government . . .” They still found time to marry in May, 1917. A year later, William was commissioned in the Army and left for France. Fabyan did not behave himself while William was overseas, though Elizebeth deflected his unwanted advances. (107) They never returned to Riverbank.
The Friedmans entered the postwar world with greatly enhanced reputations as cryptanalysts, and both worked for the nascent Army Signal Intelligence Service in 1921. William remained for the rest of his professional career; Elizabeth left after a year to write books and, as it turned out, to start a family. (126)

By 1925, having hired a nanny, she was receptive when the Coast Guard—then part of the Treasury Department—came calling with a challenge she didn’t refuse. Bootleggers were communicating by radio and encrypting the traffic, and there was a two-year backlog; allowed to work from home, she reduced it to zero in three months. (136) By 1930, the traffic had reached 2,000 messages per month, and Elizabeth was assigned a clerk to help. By 1938, her duties had expanded to support Treasury agents working against smugglers, and she had testified in open court on many occasions. This made her, writes Fagone, “the most famous codebreaker in the world, more famous than Herbert Yardley . . . and her husband.” (169)

But as *The Woman Who Smashed Codes* makes very clear, it was her WWII service (1940–45) when she contributed the most. She was detailed briefly to “the tall”—he was 5’9”—William Donovan, the Coordinator of Information, to help set up his cryptographic section. (240) Other tasks included monitoring traffic from enemy ships off the coast. That led her, using pencil and paper, to break the output of the commercial version of the Enigma machine. (194ff) Perhaps the most challenging, certainly the longest assignment, was her support of the FBI that followed that agency’s reluctant request for help. (203, passim) Much to the chagrin of J. Edgar Hoover, whose FBI had no codebreaking capability, she and her wartime team broke counterespionage traffic concerned with its most famous wartime cases and at the same time trained its first codebreakers. (205–206) In two then-typical FBI gestures, all traces of non-Bureau organizations were removed from decrypt copies, (232) and after the war, Hoover’s public accounts of FBI exploits never acknowledged non-Bureau support. (339)

Immediately after the war, the Friedmans devoted themselves to writing histories of their wartime service that would remain classified for years. William suffered serious health problems but continued as an advisor to the Army and then NSA. Elizabeth retired from government service for good. They traveled some, and she gave an occasional talk about her pre-war work. Their last encounter with the government occurred when NSA appeared, unannounced, at their home and collected their books and papers concerned with codes, which had been, up until then, unclassified. Elizabeth never forgave them. (328)

William Friedman died on 2 November 1969, having stated computers are “mostly nonsensical . . . nitwit gadgets.” (332) Elizabeth followed him on 31 October 1980, having concluded “computers are a curse.” (338) The NSA auditorium, originally named in honor of William, was renamed the William F. Friedman and Elizabeth S. Friedman Memorial Auditorium.

*The Woman Who Smashed Codes* finally gives Elizabeth Friedman the recognition she earned and deserves. A valuable contribution.

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**The reviewer:** Hayden Peake has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” since December 2002.