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Cover: The two congressional oversight committee chairs, Sen. Saxby Chambliss (left) and Rep. Mike Rogers (center), conferring with President Barack Obama in the Roosevelt Room of the White House after an intelligence briefing on 9 January 2014. Photo © White House Photo/Alamy Stock Photo.
Mission

The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA's History Staff, CIA's Lessons Learned Program, and the CIA Museum. CSI also provides the curator of the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection of Literature. In addition, it houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

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*Studies in Intelligence* welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

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The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in *Studies*. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is available for other prizes.

Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of *Studies*’ purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded from the competition.

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Contents

**Historical Perspectives**

Remembering President George H. W. Bush (1924–2018) 1

**Overseeing the Intelligence Community**

An Interview with Former Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mike Rogers 5

Interviewed by Peter Usowski and Fran Moore

**The Perils of Covert Action**

Ricochet: When a Covert Operation Goes Bad 15

Bruce Riedel

**Student Essay**

Union Naval Intelligence in the American Civil War: Moving Toward a Global Intelligence System 21

By Matthew Edward Skros

**Intelligence in Public Literature**

Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence 35

Reviewed by David A. Foy and

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

President Carter: The White House Years 43

Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey

The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age 47

Reviewed by Jeffrey I.

The Secret World: A History of Intelligence 49

Reviewed by Leslie C.

The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983 51

Reviewed by David A. Foy

Spying Across the Centuries: Benedict Arnold and Donald Maclean 55

Two books reviewed by John Ehrman
Intelligence in Public Literature (cont.)

The Secret Twenties: British Intelligence, The Russians, and The Jazz Age
Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

59

Behind the Lawrence Legend: The Forgotten Few Who Shaped the Arab Revolt and Masters of Mayhem
Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

61

Transcription
Reviewed by John Ehrman

65

Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

67

Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence in 2018

85

Note to readers: On 26 July 2018, the Editorial Board received a submission from Dr. James E. Mitchell objecting to the review of his book Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America, which appeared in Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 3 (September 2017). Dr. Mitchell’s elaboration of his concerns about the review written by National Intelligence University Professor Erik Jens included assertions that the review was “based on false assumptions and flawed logic” and “misconceptions.” It also suggested the review had the “imprimatur of the CIA”—which, as an independent journal within the Intelligence Community, Studies does not. Dr. Mitchell further requested that a reference be included to his book’s website, EnhancedInterrogation.com, where he planned to post a longer form of his essay and official, redacted documents concerning his role in the interrogation program.

When the Editorial Board chose in 2017 to publish the Jens review, its members felt, and still feel, that Professor Jens’ submission met the Board’s standards for publication, though not all necessarily agreed with his conclusions. As it has not been common practice for Studies to publish responses to reviews authors may consider unfavorable—and while at the same time understanding the strong feelings surrounding this subject—the Editorial Board elected not to depart from its practice but decided instead to append this note to the digital versions of the review and to the full September issue to make readers aware of Dr. Mitchell’s critique and permit them to visit his website and draw their own conclusions.

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In Memoriam

Remembering President George H. W. Bush (1924–2018): The Model Consumer

Andres Vaart, Managing Editor, Studies in Intelligence

Over enough time, intelligence officers—at least this intelligence officer—might be inclined to mark epochs in their careers by the presidents they and the Intelligence Community have served. The death this past weekend of George Herbert Walker Bush brings to my mind, in both sadness and joy, a 12-year period in which intelligence was held in the highest regard by the most senior consumer in the land. Much of the flavor of this tumultuous period is nicely reflected in recollections of President Bush that were rolled out in www.cia.gov the weekend after his death on the night of 30 November.

For those of us fortunate enough to have served on the President’s Daily Brief Staff during the 12-years Mr. Bush—as vice president and then president (1981–93)—received the PDB, no labor was too intense to produce the needed story and no hours were too many or too late to make certain we—the authors, the day and night editorial teams, the designers, and the briefers—made it good and got it right. This may have been true with later presidents, but what stood out with President Bush was that we, thanks to his dedicated briefers, Charles A. Peters (usually addressed as “Chuck” or “Pete”) and Henry (Hank) Applebaum (a predecessor of mine in my present job), knew well that the effort was truly appreciated. We heard it in daily debriefings, and we frequently saw it in handwritten personal notes. As a staff editor, even I received one.

We also saw through those interactions, as though at first hand, the humor and personality of a man who deeply cared about the people who served him. The former is reflected in the opening passages of Chuck Peters’s Studies in Intelligence article in which he describes Vice President Bush’s thinking in 1988 about the PDB were he to win the coming election and succeed President Reagan.¹

When he had finished the briefing, the Vice President said, “Pete, assuming all goes well at the convention and if I win in November, I want to change President Reagan’s practice of receiving The President’s Daily Brief (PDB) from his National Security Adviser. I want to continue these daily briefings by you and the staff.” I was frankly flattered, but I reminded him that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who was by statute his intelligence adviser, might have something to say about the arrangement.

“The DCI is welcome to attend whenever he wishes,” the Vice President said, “but the PDB session should be handled on a regular basis by the usual working-level group.”

Of course, the convention came off without a hitch, and the Vice President won the election convincingly. On 21 January, the day after the inauguration, therefore, we gathered for the first time in the Oval Office. Present, as was the custom in the Bush presidency, were Chief of Staff John Sununu, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy National Security Adviser Bob Gates. DCI Webster also was there. (Image on the left.) And that led to the first of a long series of informal bits of byplay that were to mark our daily sessions.

When the President had finished reading, he turned to me and said with deadly seriousness, “I’m quite satisfied with the intelligence support, but there is one area in which you’ll just have to do better.” The DCI visibly stiffened. “The Office of Comic Relief,” the new President went on, “will have to step up its output.” With an equally straight face I promised the President we would give it our best shot. As we were leaving the Oval Office, I wasted no time in reassuring the Director that this was a lighthearted exchange typical of President Bush, and that the DCI did not


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have to search out an Office of Comic Relief and authorize a major shakeup.

What would follow during his presidency were the addition to the PDB of a section called “Signs of the Times,” which brought into the book the amusing, the idiosyncratic, or the uncommon that might lighten, for a moment, the mood of an otherwise challenging and potentially depressing period. A couple of examples from Pete’s article.

Libyan intelligence chief recently passed message via Belgians laying out case for better relations with US and expressing desire to cooperate against terrorism... even suggested he would like to contribute to your re-election campaign. (27 January 1992)

French company says it has won contract to export vodka to Russia... deal apparently stems from shortage of bottles and bottling equipment... no word on whether Paris taking Russian wine in return. (25 July 1992)

Though not a reflection of humor, but of President Bush’s interest in people, especially in his counterparts abroad, the PDB introduced another element, briefs on the public activities of the president’s counterparts. We would learn that from time-to-time the president was inspired to call one of those leaders and chat with someone doing something interesting.

President Bush’s personality also came through in his notes of thanks and in his expressions of concern to staff members when illness or tragedy struck. In reminiscing with Chuck Peters, he told me how he had written directly to Chuck’s son shortly after a family tragedy involving Chuck’s grandchild. Certainly President G. H. W. Bush knew of such tragedy and felt it for others. In years that followed his leaving office, I would, by virtue of still being on current intelligence, become involved in relaying sentiments from and to him from various officers he had concerns about and come to learn was in need of encouragement or congratulation. In this way, for example, Hank Appelbaum received the former president’s best wishes in 2010, when Hank was diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease.

While it became somewhat fashionable in recent years to downplay the president’s grasp of the issues of the day and his role in their evolution, the trend is hardly justified in the minds of those who worked with him and for him. In John Helgerson’s book about briefing presidential candidates, Getting to Know the President, the former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence made clear the seriousness with which President Bush took his relationship with intelligence and how important a contribution that relationship made to his presidency.

Thinking back on the transition from his eight years as Vice President to the four years as President, Bush volunteered that there had been no real changes in his intelligence requirements after he moved up to be chief executive. “The big difference is that you have to make the decisions—that makes you read a lot more carefully.”

On becoming President, Bush had sought no significant alterations in the format or composition of the PDB. He had become comfortable with it over the previous eight years. Looking retrospectively, he judged that the mix of items addressed had been well suited to his needs. He attributed that suitability to the presence of the briefer while he read the material, making the Agency aware that he needed more or less on a given subject. Bush was sensitive to the fact that his National Security Adviser and Chief of Staff would occasionally discuss with senior Agency officers the purported need to include more items on a specific subject in the PDB. Referring to the efforts of his aides to determine what was provided in the PDB, Bush offered the decisive judgment that “I felt well supported on the full range of issues. Don’t let anybody else tell you what the President wants or needs in the PDB—ask him.”

CIA’s relationship with Bush was undoubtedly the most productive it had enjoyed with any of the nine presidents it served since the Agency’s founding in 1947. Alone among postwar Presidents, he had served as CIA Director. Also uniquely, he succeeded to the presidency by election after receiving full intelligence support as Vice President. These circumstances were obviously not of the CIA’s making and may never be repeated, but they made the Agency’s job immeasurably easier at the time.

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a. Hank died of complications from the disease on 16 December 2018, and in Hank’s obituary, his family remembered the president’s kindness.
The good relationship was also a result of Bush’s deep personal interest in developments abroad and his experience as a diplomat representing the United States in Beijing and at the United Nations. More than any other President, he was an experienced consumer of national-level intelligence. Also of critical importance was the fact that he had a highly capable and experienced National Security Adviser in Brent Scowcroft, who was determined to see that he received good intelligence support.

Bush was candid in telling CIA officers when he thought their analysis might be flawed and equally quick to commend them when they were helpful or identified an approaching key development before he did. There were many such developments because his presidency witnessed the most far-reaching international changes of the postwar period: the collapse of European Communism, the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the USSR and the rollback of Russian imperialism, and the full-scale involvement of the United States in a ground war in the Middle East. On these, and on the lesser issues of Tiananmen Square, Haiti, Bosnia, or Somalia, President Bush was uniquely and extraordinarily well informed.

And those of us who helped in the process were truly enriched.

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The views, opinions, and findings of the interview subject expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

An Interview with Former Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mike Rogers

Interviewed by Peter Usowski and Fran Moore

Editor’s note: Congressman Mike Rogers (R-MI) served in the House of Representatives from 2001 to 2015. From 2011 to 2015, he was chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). The interview took place in Washington, DC, on 24 July 2018.

Getting up to speed in the work of HPSCI

I came to the chairmanship with background as a former FBI guy and Army officer. I just brought a different perspective. [Before becoming chairman], I had served on the committee for about six years. At the beginning, I just decided I was going to learn about all the things I didn’t know about coming into the committee. I spent a large amount of time going out talking to people who do specific work, both in the civilian and military side, just to make sure I had a good understanding. I did a lot of CODELS [congressional delegations] on my own or with one other member to get to places a little off the beaten path so I could have an understanding of what was happening in the collection posture of the US intelligence services. And I read just about everything that came through. I’m a ferocious reader anyway, and I thought it was my responsibility to try to read as much of that material as I could get through. And I think that helped me a lot.

“At the beginning, I just decided I was going to learn.... I spent a large amount of time talking to people who do specific work, just to make sure I had a good understanding.

Primary issues: Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Appropriations

Clearly, the terrorism/counterterrorism issue was pretty significant at that time. I spent a lot of time on those issues, including advocating for changes in certain programs within the CIA. I felt that certain programs were not being utilized to their full potential. One example involved our kinetic strike capability. There was a lot of talk about it within the White House, and I felt I could play a role in that discussion. I had gone forward a lot, and I understood the issue from the bottom up and believed it could make an impact.

I also brought back, in a more robust way, our counterintelligence oversight, which hadn’t really been there. It had drifted away.

I felt very strongly that no oversight committee can be a real oversight committee if [HPSCI] doesn’t do a budget [i.e, pass an authorization bill].
Every year we were there, we did an intelligence authorization bill, which hadn’t been done for six years. I felt it was very important to get back into the regular order of oversight.

I focused a lot on that, and I worked very closely with my Democrat counterpart, Dutch Ruppersberger (MD). We decided to run it as partners versus parties, and I think it had a significant advantage in getting through some thorny issues and recapture the committee’s responsibility for oversight.a

Every year we were there, we did an intelligence authorization bill, which hadn’t been done for six years before our arrival. I felt it was very important to get back into the regular order of oversight. We also brought back—at the time a little fortuitously—an effort to make sure we had a good understanding of where the Russians were at the time—that’s my old FBI background. You know I grew up shooting at Soviet targets when I was in the Army; some things you can’t shake. And so I had a personal interest in trying to understand where they were. I’m pretty confident the Russian intelligence services didn’t walk away from their efforts. I wanted to have a better understanding. I thought it was important for the committee to have a better understanding, and because

we were doing budgets, asset allocation became very, very important. We reinvigorated our counterintelligence oversight, we invigorated our Russian discussions, we spent a lot of time on the Iran issue, we worked on budget oversight, and spent a lot of time on some thorny issues on the counterterrorism side.

DNI, CIA Responses to a New Chairman: “Healthy Tension”

In the beginning, like anything, “Why are you here?” and “Leave us alone.” And I understand that. I think a healthy tension is probably a good thing. But over time, I think the community came to trust that I wasn’t there to run to the microphone, to cause trouble looking for a problem. I was there to say, “Hey, we have these resources, how do we apply these resources? Are there policy things we can help you with?” Because in my mind, as a member of Congress on the Intelligence Committee, it was my responsibility as much as anyone’s to make sure America is protected. And we were going to put demands on the Intelligence Community to do that. And if I’m going to put those demands on the Intelligence Community, I wanted to make sure it had the right resources, the right policy, and, candidly, the right moral support for doing a very difficult mission.

That’s the way I took it. Now, at least I would hope, other directors might tell you that if we found something that wasn’t working—and there was an honest disagreement—I was never afraid of applying, as Keith Alexander called it, “the Rogers wire-brush treatment.” Only in the sense that I thought I was following our responsibility. It was never to try to embarrass anyone or do anything like that. I think over time we developed a great relationship, and it got to where I wanted it to be.

My goal, as chairman, was to never issue a subpoena, which I had the power to do. And I said that upfront to the community. That was my goal. And luckily, we never had to use a subpoena, because we built up trust. If I asked, I got it. If they had something go wrong, they wouldn’t wait, they’d come up and talk to me about it. And to me, that’s the way you should do oversight. You don’t run to the Washington Post, you don’t run to phone in and say, “My gosh, I caught the intelligence agency doing X.” And by the way, I say “me” a lot, but Dutch Ruppersberger was right there with me. And that was really

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“The assignment comes after a committee-record 12 years serving on the House Intelligence Committee, including four as Ranking Member. Congressman Ruppersberger was the first Democratic freshman ever appointed to the committee, which oversees the collection and analysis of intelligence from around the world to ensure our national security and prevent potential crisis situations — especially terrorist activity. He traveled to more than 50 countries including Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, China and Venezuela during his time on the committee.”

“On the committee, he developed a reputation for bipartisan leadership with then-Chairman and Republican Mike Rogers. Beginning in 2011, the pair worked together to pass five intelligence authorization bills over four years — after a 6-year period without one—as well as bipartisan cybersecurity legislation. In 2015, they became the first dual recipients of the prestigious William Oliver Baker Award from the nonpartisan Intelligence and National Security Alliance for their pragmatic leadership.”
Before Jim Clapper, we saw all the infighting and the stealing of people and all the things that guys like me knew, or at least believed, was going to happen. Jim Clapper got there, settled it down, and focused on mission.

I think until Jim Clapper got there, the ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence) was in drift. I think because Jim Clapper had so much experience in the community, he didn’t go there to make his mark on operations. He’d been there and done that. I think that helped tremendously. He started focusing in a way I thought the DNI should focus: What are the strategic threats? As the guy putting together the billions of dollars and the 70-plus portions of the budget, Jim Clapper helped guide the organization through that.

In my mind, Jim Clapper remade Mike Rogers’ original position on the DNI. Before Jim Clapper, we saw all the infighting and the stealing of people and all the things that guys like me knew, or at least believed, was going to happen. Jim Clapper got there, settled it down, and focused on mission. I do believe that [because of him] the President’s Daily Brief is a better product. I think they get a more measured, multi agency view of the world, which I think is healthy. It’s not perfect. There are things we should change—I always fought about the size of it; I thought it was too big. But at the end of the day, I think that sums up my thoughts.

I would say the briefing caliber was mostly good, but then there were briefings when I scratched my head and wondered why they showed up. I would say they were on the positive side more often than not. Of the quality of professional we saw, phenomenal. I mean, just phenomenal. One of the things we were trying to do along the way was to try to bring in people from down the totem pole to come in to get experience for them and to hear their perspective on an operation or some [other aspect of intelligence]. I thought that was helpful. Some of those folks just blow you away. Gives you the feeling that you can sleep well at night, knowing the agency will be in great hands in five or six or eight years or whatever their leadership track is. Overall, it was impressive.

Every once in a while, we bumped into something adversarial, but that didn’t happen often. And even when it did, I thought [discussion] remained at a professional level because it wasn’t antagonistic. I always found if you offered professionalism, you’d get professionalism in return.

Advice to Briefers of HPSCI

Boy, look at the time. You know, the odd thing about the intelligence committee, it is a bit personality driven. It’s unavoidable. There is no set of rules that says, “Here are the five things you have to do every day, Mr. Chairman, to get through to the next day and make sure you’re preforming your mission.” It’s completely up to the chairman. And in this case, I didn’t do anything without consultation with my ranking member (Dutch Ruppersberger). He was a former prosecutor; I was a former FBI guy. We’d get how all that works, and it worked phenomenally well, and we could finally steer into things we thought were important for the committee. For example, what is our strategic picture of nations other than counterterrorism threat? There were some frustrations along the way about policy changes and things like that. But my advice to briefers is to

View of the DNI/ODNI

I think until Jim Clapper got there, the ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence) was in drift. I think because Jim Clapper had so much experience in the community, he didn’t go there to make his mark on operations. He’d been there and done that. I think that helped tremendously. He started focusing in a

Critically important, to have someone who equally believed that we should put the needs of national security before our partisanship. I really can’t stress that enough.

I think I would describe my relationships with each [DNI and DCIA] as very strong, with all of them. They all had their different styles. They all had different attitudes about what oversight meant to them, and I think we worked through all of that. I think Leon Panetta (DCIA, 2009–2011) and I had a phenomenal relationship as far as him understanding where I was coming from and understanding what I needed to do my job, and vice versa. I would put him at the top of that list. And with the other ones, we worked through it. David Petraeus had his way of doing things, and John Brennan had his way of doing things. Some were more guarded than others, and of course if you add a tension to the relationship, I’m certainly no wall flower. I’m happy to step up and make corrections and “attitude adjustments,” as my father used to say. But we didn’t really get into a lot of that. It was just more of “Yep, you know what I’m doing, I know what you’re doing, let’s get at it. If we disagree I’m going to be very honest and frank with you and I expect you to be honest and frank with me as well.”

Overseeing the Intelligence Community

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 4 (December 2018)
go in and be professional. Present your case, don’t let them [members] get under your skin. In that regard, and I hate to say it, but to be candid, it’s just not the same today as it was. I do think it’s a responsibility [to be professional].

A former employee reminded me of a story, I had almost forgotten it. I was so upset when I thought the Intelligence Community wasn’t fully briefing me on every sliver of a project the administration had said not to brief the committee on. I called in unit after unit and read them the law on the IC responsibility to keep Congress fully informed. They knew I was honked off. For me it was a good opportunity to meet units I hadn’t seen before. The employee laughed afterward and said, “You know some of the units loved it because they thought nobody knew they existed.” I just think if you come up and you’re professional and you do your business and don’t let what appears to be the politics of the committee influence your presentation, you’re going to be fine.

And I completely understand the reluctance of people to come up and participate in the committee process; I hear it a lot. But it’s disheartening to me. It’s disappointing to me. I think the IC has an obligation to show up. But be professional, give the members the information they need and require, and then go back to work and let the things happen at the [hearing room] podium that happen at the podium.

Thoughts on Quality of IC Intelligence Analysis?

I think good. I always pushed back to make sure that dissenting views got an airing, even with the committee. There was this natural fear that analysis could be skewed one way or another—I don’t mean this to sound like we believed every piece of analysis was skewed. But I always pushed back. I understand you need to be smart about that these days, but I always thought it was really important to hear some of those dissenting views. I don’t think the IC should feel bad about the notion that an analysis was not a slam dunk that there wasn’t unanimity in a position.

As policymakers ourselves, I just wanted to know. And if that [analysis is] the IC conclusion, I get it; really smart people helped make that decision, but there might be someone in the chain that thought something different. It’s okay to put that in there. It doesn’t mean that would change our decision any more than it would change the outcome of the analysis. In that respect, I think you have to treat members with the same kind of professionalism you do amongst yourselves. Like, yeah, we had four people disagree, whatever the number is, and 20 people said, this, and three people said that. That’s just the way it goes. Got it.

And so, I do think, the analytical product, to me, was very good. If I ever had a problem, I could bring people in and walk them through how they got there; I thought that was great, and my only pet peeve, if you will, is when they were reluctant to share the dissenting opinions. Other than that, I thought it was exceptionally good.

Most Controversial Issues?

Snowden happened on my watch. I somehow got the ticket to go to Brussels and try to explain things to the EU Commission. There’s about three months of my life I would like back. That was obviously thorny, and it brought programs that I had supported in classified settings out into the open, and I had to work my way through that to try to have a public dialog and make sure we weren’t disclosing things. That was a challenging time, no doubt about it. And candidly, we lost the public narrative on that before we got started. And I’m not sure we’ve gotten it put back in the can yet, about what the real facts were versus what people think happened, including our EU Commission friends. That was a big thorny one.

Iran issues were pretty thorny. Lots of consternation.

And I would argue the kinetic strike program also. And, as I was a proponent of it, I still, candidly to this day, believe it is one of the most effective, impactful things we have done to dismantle and disrupt terrorists operations around the world.

Oversight of Kinetic Strikes

I was a proponent of the program and took extraordinary steps to try to get it in a good place, including meeting with President Bush and
secondly the Obama administration. I reviewed every single strike—I doubt anyone else had done this. I did all the after-action reviews; on very sensitive targets, they would brief me ahead of time, “Hey our target’s in the window,” or not. You know that didn’t always work, but if I was available and had the wherewithal to get that information in a classified setting, I did, and I reviewed every single one because I was such a vocal proponent publicly for the program and I believed it was my job as a member and chairman to make sure that, if we’re going to do this—this is a big deal, you’re taking someone’s life—so if something did go wrong, I could honestly and in good faith go and defend the program, the people in the program, and why we were doing it versus saying, “Oh my gosh, this is awful.” And I saw that happen too many times.

**Quality of Relationships with the White House**

Excellent under George W. Bush, not so good under Obama, and I don’t mean that in a bad way. I mean, I had people I could reach out and talk to, but the circle of people they [the Obama administration] included in those discussions got very, very small. And they were very distrustful of anyone outside of their small circle. I continued to work with them, where I could, supported them on as much as I could, told them where I differed with them, and I never ran out to the microphone and said, “They’re doing X and America’s coming to an end!” I just didn’t believe that. Where we had a fight, we had a fight. When the door’s open, the door’s open, that’s it. And so, I would say it was a mixed bag under the Obama administration. Again, I think they looked at everything happening really in a distrustful way, even though I was helping them on some fairly major issues.

Another example, the Syrian issue, I coordinated, at significant political capital to myself, which again is not why I was chairman, I didn’t care about that. [My goal was] to bring people in from the administration, the Obama administration, [to talk] about where we were, and what kinds of things we were trying to do, and try to put the votes together to approve certain programs. And there wasn’t a lot of me around. And these kinds of things afterward, if they go well or don’t go well. If they don’t go well, funny, apparently I was the only guy for it. And so, in that regard, it was okay, it just was such a mixed bag, and that’s one thing I regretted.

I extended opportunities to come up and talk all the time; I gave them whatever information they needed. As I said, if I supported it, I supported it. I didn’t care whose party it was. And so, again, I think that’s just the way of a personality-driven White House. Just talking to people now, I think this new administration is equally isolated and segmented, and I think that’s not healthy. I hope this is not something that goes off into the future, because then you’ll have more contention. And I don’t care who the president is, you shouldn’t be there [in the HPSCI] to use those issues for political purposes.

I’ll start with the last one. I got along very well with Chairman Diane Feinstein (D-CA); we also had a great understanding and working relationship. Saxby Chambliss was the Republican (GA) ranking member; I got along fine, and we worked out our issues. One of the reasons we got our budgets passed is because we forged that relationship. I spent time over there, I went to see them, I talked to them often. Which you would think would happen a lot in Congress; it doesn’t apparently. And so, we worked out a very strong relationship. We didn’t always agree, but we could agree on the budget authorization piece, which would allow us both to go back and do the oversight that we felt was appropriate; the Senate for their issues, and the House for our issues. I thought that was good.

And the reason it worked, again, was personality—you have to work at it. You have to work at it. I used to joke with Diane Feinstein that we’re like an old married couple. We can’t talk about domestic politics, we’d be in an argument; but we can forge this relationship on national security. And I thought it was funny. So did she. I think she had a good sense of humor. And so we just worked it out. We just said, “Hey, this is not about whatever, your water issue in California, this is about national security. We’re going to work here, at that level of national
Secondly, we also said with every budget, we’re going to go through these budget briefs, and it’s going to be painful. We’re going to spend hours doing this.

security issues, and if we disagree on domestic issues, we’ll go to the microphones and fight it out.” And we had that kind of an understanding. Which I think is good and healthy, and I think it worked for both committees to their advantage.

With respect to the Appropriations Committee, the key to this is passing an authorization. I like to believe that we pulled a lot of that. What happens is, because these are so classified—more than your readers may want to know—what happens is that when they don’t do these budgets, when they [oversight committees] are not paying attention to these budgets, all of that authority and oversight drifts back over to the appropriators. And there’s a small number of people—and very few members have the ability, even on appropriations—to see what those programs are. A small number of staff folks get a lot of power, and I just don’t think that’s healthy. I was adamantly opposed to allowing that to continue. That’s one of the big, important reasons I stated from the first that getting an authorization is key to proper oversight. I have beat on my other members, “If you’re not reauthorizing your committee or going through this process, you’re not a real chairman.”

Yeah, it’s hard; it’s painful. Some days are really dry. I mean, we were going over numbers on fuel consumption for operations. Fuel consumption. Right? And you’re thinking, this is pretty rough. When you’re talking about 9,000 gallons of helicopter fuel, or some crazy thing, I just felt it was really important to do that. And when we did that, we wrestled back the authority from the Appropriations Committee, where I argued members on the intel committee can understand, get the programs, understand what the risks are. Whereas these folks on the Appropriations Committee didn’t get all that. Nor would they spend a lot of time on it, because in their world, it’s not very big. Right? You think about it, it’s just not that important. Well, we tried to wrestle that back. And I think we did a great job with that.

As to my relationship with House leadership, John Boehner appointed me and let me do my thing. He was great to work with in that regard.

The Majority and Minority Relationship

The first thing Dutch Ruppersberger and I did was to sit down [and talk]. We had watched the dysfunction of certain aspects of the committee. The reason those authorization bills got stalled was because people were throwing political amendments on the bills. If their big public debate was torture, then some political amendment on torture. Or, on the war, some political amendment got on the war. I pledged to him and he pledged to me in this meeting, that we were going to strip out any political amendment. I would not accept it as chairman if he didn’t accept it as ranking member, and we would clean the bill of all of the problems that had been the reasons those bills never went anywhere. You take a few arrows from your own team when that happens.

Secondly, we also said with every budget, we’re going to go through these budget briefs, and it’s going to be painful. We’re going to spend hours doing this. And, of course, the first one was always the worst because people didn’t understand why we were in there for hours talking about budgets. Right? It’s not exciting. Important, but not exciting. We directed that the staffs were going to brief together, at the same table. That was shock and awe. What? We can’t do that. You have a Republican staff and a Democrat staff, and half of them don’t like each other at that time, and I argued it was probably because they don’t know each other very well, and it’s “You’re my enemy so we’re going to fight about stupid things.” We both enforced the staffs briefing together, which was really important.

That fundamentally changed the way the committee operated. I would take briefings from Democrat staff all the time: “Come and tell me what you think.” We just started tearing down this notion that you’re a Democrat and I’m Republican, and, again, we understood there would be things we disagreed with. That’s great, but we came together to talk about it versus screaming at each at a committee hearing. Throwing paper at each other. That, I think, went a long way. And we worked with members who had issues about Program A, B, or C or D, and if they had personal issues about it, I tried to accommodate them—and the same with Dutch. Dutch would help accommodate it so that if I had a minority member who said, “Hey, I don’t like X,” I’d say, “How can I help you? If you want, I’ll bring the director in. You tell me what you need to understand, and I’ll get you anywhere in the world you
have to go if you think you need to do that.” And that proved to be very helpful. Nothing was antagonistic, no question was out of bounds.

I also thought I put together a better reading packet, and I made it available to members, “Come in, read through these packets, it’ll help you prepare if you don’t have tons of time for a hearing.” That was my other thing, “Please don’t come unprepared. When we’re asking these working intelligence officials for two hours or three hours of time, be prepared. Don’t ask a dumb question.” We forced people to prepare themselves. In the beginning, I had staff available the day before hearings and said, “Come down, and if you have a question, that’s where you ask your dumb question.” And it’s not dumb if you’re learning, clearly, but I don’t want you to do it in front of them. Just like you all practice before you got to us, I wanted us to practice before you all got to us as well. I think that was pretty helpful. Not every member took advantage; some members were more interested in it than others. But I do think it improved the level of the members’ smarts about tough issues and their questions. And I think all of that just helped to make a better committee. And again, we tried to take both Democrat and Republican staff in those pre-briefs, answering questions, offering help. It was “What do you need to know, can we help you? Can you phrase your question like this; it might be more beneficial to get what you need. Perfect.” Seemed to work.

If [staffers] came because they had experience and wanted to put that experience to work in the broader context of the Intelligence Community, great.

What Makes for a Good HPSCI staffer?

If you’re a person who comes there because you were frustrated with the Intelligence Community, bad idea. You’re going to hate that staffer very quickly. If they came because they had experience and wanted to put that experience to work in the broader context of the Intelligence Community, great. And they all come with passions, and understanding, and expertise. We tried to assemble people by that. I think we got it pretty right. And the other thing for me on my committee, you either had to buy into the program we were selling, or no thank you. You want to come there to be a partisan fighter? Don’t come to the Intelligence Committee; I just didn’t want you there. You just weren’t going to help. And we had some people come and go, and some people didn’t like that, and good on them, maybe there’s a better place for you in Congress somewhere else.

I wanted staffers who, even if they didn’t have tons of experience in the business, were academically qualified to come up and help us on certain things. They can learn a little, the Intelligence Committee can learn from you, and we can all put a better product together. I tried to have that mix of people. And I ended up having a lot of people who had experience doing something at some point in their careers: some from the CIA, some from the military side, I had a mix of everybody. And it balanced. And I had some folks from the former NSC. The former chairman, Michael Allen, was the NSC guy and brought that flavor to it. And to me, that makes the stew taste a little better.

Perspectives on Media

Relationship with the media. I had a different attitude on this than other chairmen, I admit it. Because of the level of controversy coming out of the committee at that time, I felt it was very important to go out and at least have a dialogue with the media. I was trying to take some of the mystery away—where they didn’t sit in the bar and on their third beer decide that every CIA officer is trying to steal their rights or whatever. I worried about that, because that was the only narrative out there. I took a pretty aggressive stance about trying to interact with the media and tried to explain—never compromising methods and sources—that we make policy decisions and why we were making them. And why that was important. And I do believe that helped when bad things happened. The media trusted me. It didn’t like everything I said, but they trusted me, knowing I wasn’t going to lie to them. I was honest about it.

Most of my chairmanship was with Obama. If I agreed with him, I said I agreed with him. If I didn’t agree with him, I said, “Here’s why I don’t agree with him.” But I didn’t use the classified portion of that to justify my argument. And so I think that was an important role. Some people have a hard time with that. I used to tell all my members, “If you’re not used to dealing with classified information, don’t talk to the press. If they come to you, take a year. Take 12 months or 18 months
Notwithstanding [some poor reporting], there are good, thorough, honest journalists. I think of the big, high profile guys: David Ignatius, always tried to get it right; the AP reporter, injured in Iraq, Kim Dozur; you know people like that. I always thought they were trying to get it right.

to learn the material. Learn what a classification is, because you can make a mistake that gets people hurt, and so you’ve got to be really careful about it.” You know I had been on the committee a while, I understood how to handle classified materials. By the time I was chairman, I think I was fairly well prepared to deal with the nuance of what you can talk about, what you can’t, and what you should be talking about when it comes to intelligence. And I told myself, “I get to see really positive, good things a lot, and they deserve a little defending in the public record, at least [they should get as much attention] as the folks who had done something wrong.”

Media coverage of the intelligence business? It was in frustration, honestly, that I took a more public role in trying to defend the IC. I don’t know if that’s the right terminology, but at least try to get the media to acknowledge there’s a whole other side that you don’t get to see, and when things go well, it’s like the firefighters, you know? If they never leave the firehouse, you start thinking that they’re awful people. But guess what, when your house is on fire, you’re pretty damn glad they’re there. I think a lot of media coverage is highly skeptical of the community. I think, in so many ways, the media think the community is just as eager to break the law as it is to follow the law. That was the one that used to get me the most because they did not understand the ethos and ethics and commitment to follow the law of 99.9 percent of the people in the Intelligence Community have.

I’ll never forget this. When there was the big disclosure on the telecommunication companies doing metadata, the reason we got behind on the narrative is that it wasn’t anyone involved in the program, even the contractors. It was a contractor about three rings out who thought something bad was happening in the little black room that they wouldn’t let him in. And so the media got spun up on that, and so they were convinced that everyone was lying before they opened their mouths. That was really, really frustrating to me, because the media had a great story. They had it wrong, but it was a great story. Oh, my gosh, they’re spying on you. The NSA is listening to every phone call and reading every email. No, that’s not the way it works.

Notwithstanding, there are good, thorough, honest journalists. I think of the big, high profile guys: David Ignatius, always tried to get it right; the AP reporter, injured in Iraq, Kim Dozier; you know people like that. I always thought they were trying to get it right. Ken Dilanian was pretty good, from the LA Times; he’s a national security guy; he was trying to get it right. They don’t always get it right, because of the information they get. And I worry about the reporters who only want to break the scoop about something bad happening, get their prize, their Pulitzer Prize. And so they’re very aggressive.

IC interactions with the press. I always said, when I’m all done with all of this, I want to be the press person for the Intelligence Community. It may be the easiest job ever: “No comment.” “Call me back tomorrow, I’ll have another statement for you. No comment.” I do think they’ve tried to get a little better. I never found it good that they were doing off-the-record briefings for reporters. I’ll tell you why. As chairman I used to go nuts when I found out they did it, because we have members who weren’t getting those kinds of briefings. And I’m like: “You can’t do that. You cannot do that!”

I do think the community needs to have a better public-facing arm of what they do, but that was not the way to do it. It still irks me to this day, because then I’d have members honked off, that somebody’s leaking to the press. Well, no not really, it was a briefing from the community. “Well, how come I couldn’t get that information?” I just thought it worked against the community’s or agency’s purpose.

I do think they need to find ways to be more transparent. They don’t have to give a lot. One of the reasons I really wanted to do the show “Declassified” was because I wanted to show positive stories. a I mean Charlotte was hard. It didn’t always work out the way we thought it would work out, but at the end of the day, it gave a positive spin on work in

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a. Declassified: Untold Stories of American Spies is a documentary series that details cases, missions and operations of the American intelligence community. It has appeared since 2016 on CNN.
the Intelligence Community. I know that sounds corny. Honest, I had no other reason to do that. I was frustrated that we couldn’t get those stories out, and I wish they could do better, but I understand why sometimes they don’t have the option to.

Addressing Whistleblower Incidents.

I took such incidents very seriously. I had a legal counsel or a special investigator in the committee assigned to review cases. Most of them had legal backgrounds. I don’t care if it sounded crazy, when the first phone call [from a whistleblower] came in, I took it seriously. If that [whistleblower] system is going to be a safety valve for people feeling like something bad is happening, we needed to take it deadly seriously—much to the chagrin sometimes of the community, which says “Really? That’s the craziest thing I’ve ever heard in my life.” Sorry, we’re going to go through this process. Let us determine if it is the craziest thing in the world. Again, I did that because I felt the [people in] the community absolutely needed to be able to pick up a phone and call us. I know every agency in the community has one [??an inspector general or ombudsman??]. We were just another [safety valve] outside of that. Plus, we have access to the material.

But I also treated it seriously in the sense that I respected the agents; I went into this with the idea of due process, as in an investigation. I mean, I’m not going to walk in and say, “Why did you kill John F. Kennedy? One of your employees told me that.” We went in and said, “Hey, there is this set of facts we’re operating on; we’re going to need to investigate this; we’re going to need a little information.” I never had a problem, honestly, all of that time, people handled it very professionally—as we did. Now, sometimes they’re not happy with our outcome, and they call someone else, that’s fine, too. But you have to have a functioning place for these people to call, or they’re calling the Washington Post or the New York Times and not getting the story right.

Evolution of Perspectives on Oversight, on the IC

On oversight itself, my perspectives haven’t changed, not really. I had a few years in the beginning, when [the committee] just wasn’t functioning very well, and it was disappointing to me. I remember one particular occasion, when the ranking member and a member, or the chairman, were basically screaming at each other in front of our panel of witnesses. To the point where they both got up and left the room. And the rest of us were sitting in our chairs waiting, in the classified setting, for the hearing to start. I was mortified that we would have that fight in a back room somewhere. In a way I appreciated that happening, because it really cemented my notion, “Boy, if I ever had the opportunity to influence this place, we are not doing that. And we are going to conduct ourselves in a way that I think both the Intelligence Community and we would say was professional.” And I think we accomplished that.

I think [for me] it was just constant growing. I know having members come out to places with clandestine operations is a pain in the ass, but to me they are great opportunities to show members the difficulties of what happens and what you actually do.
threats that we hadn’t been doing in the past. We were working on some of the problems in DIA at the time—and they had a lot of problems. We were focused on that because we could. I don’t know. I hate to give it a letter grade, because it’ll sound awful, but if we weren’t an A, we were dang close.

Public, Media, and IC Perceptions of Oversight

Well, I hear some things now that are just disheartening. I had someone tell me that their worst day is knowing that they have to go up and brief in front of the committee that day. And on a substantive issue, I’m not even talking about an investigation. That, I tell you, is, to me it’s just so disheartening. And I hate to say this, it’s well deserved. They’ve abandoned a lot of the things that we were doing that I thought helped benefit the community. And again, I started out by sitting down with all the directors, all the heads of all the agencies and saying “Listen, I know it can be tough, but you want strong oversight, because if something bad happens, a guy like me is going to know that I’ve gone through and looked under the rug, and I’m going to be with you. If you screw up, I’m going to be with you. But if I don’t know about it, I’m not going to be with you. And so let’s get over it.” And I think all of that stuff is gone, and that what worries me. [I’m also hearing] the same things I heard when I became chairman: “You should be distrustful, and it’s going to be bad.”

I remember when I first got in there, I heard from people I knew [in the IC] that [people] were apoplectic; they thought I was going to be Attila the Hun. I hope I dispelled that. But I get it. I understand why that happens, and so, that’s what worries me most, is if people don’t see it as a functioning, smart committee assignment, and people want to get on it now because it’s cool—like, “I want to know secrets.” And that, to me is the worst member to have on that committee.

Proudest (Earth-shaking) Moment(s)

I would say making the HPSCI bipartisan and then using that bipartisanship to actually accomplish real things in the committee. And, I’m fairly proud of all the hard things that we went through and how we worked together. I think, to me, that’s the way a committee should work when you are working national security issues. I’m most proud of that.

Here’s a true story for you: The very first time we sat down and we worked on this budget—and you know the first one is always the hardest one because everybody’s still looking at you like “Really? Are you really not putting something in there that I don’t know about?” We worked through this issue, and Dutch Ruppersberger and I are sitting in the little ante room on the side. We finally get it all done, and we had my chief of staff, and his chief of staff—who was great by the way, we are still friends, all of us, still friends to this day—literally we had gotten up to shake hands and said “This is it, this is our budget. Are we ready?” We shook hands, and literally the whole building [began shaking]. It was the day of the earthquake. I’m not kidding. We thought, “Oh my God, what have we done?” Like the whole building is shaking. We ended up going outside, but we still laugh about it to this day. Cause it was that: It was a monumental moment for us, knowing that hey, we could do this. And again, he put up with party guff, I put up with party guff, but we did it. We got the first one done, and the building shook. We walked outside. We laughed for two weeks after that, thinking, “My God, maybe we did that.” I thought it was funny.

Reflections on IC and CIA Workforce and Parting Advice

I was always impressed by their professionalism, commitment to mission, and patriotism—not the flag-waving parade-going kind of patriotism, which I like too, don’t get me wrong—the quiet patriotism of mission first and “I will accomplish the mission. This is my task, I will complete my task, and I will do it to the best of my ability, because I believe in what I’m doing and I believe in my country.” I mean this is that kind of a quiet strength and patriotism that I found inspiring, candidly.

My advice to them would be to focus on their professionalism: their professional development and their craft. Period. The rest of it will take care of itself. Don’t pay too much attention to what’s happening in the political sphere; this will come and go. There’ll be good years, and there’ll be bad years, but the work they will be doing will help protect and secure the United States of America, and the better they do it, the safer we are. And if every one of them focuses on their own personal development we’re going to be in great shape. And the Agency will be in great shape. And not every day is going to be a good day. Just accept it. Tomorrow will be a better day. Get up and try again.
The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. © Bruce Riedel, 2018
in January, when the Syrians first approached him, Nasser resisted the proposal to unite the two countries because they were separated by Israel. He realized that the physical separation was a major barrier to real unity. But the weak government in Damascus—a coalition of several groups, including Ba’athists—was determined that their survival was only possible if they aligned with Nasser and if Syria, in effect, went out of existence. The Ba’athists were especially worried by the strength of the Syrian Communist Party, which they feared would launch a coup and take power. It is an irony that the UAR was created in part by fear of communism, since Washington would come to portray the UAR as a veritable arm of international communism.

Nasser drove a hard bargain. He insisted that merger must come along with the dissolution of all political parties in Syria, including both the Ba’athists and the communists as well as any other, and the Syrian officer corps must quit playing politics. He would become president with a new parliament and a new constitution. The Egyptian flag, the Arab nationalist banner with horizontal bars of red, white and black would be the UAR flag but with two stars; one for Egypt and one for Syria. The Syrian politicians who had come to Cairo to ask for unity had no choice but to accept Nasser’s terms. He would move to oust many of them from power, arrest the communist leadership, and put Egyptians in charge of most Syrian decisionmaking.

The news of the merger on 1 February was met with massive crowds of Egyptians and Syrians chanting Nasser’s name. Crowds poured through Cairo and Alexandria at the news that an Egyptian was leading the Arab world. Huge crowds hailed the news in Damascus, Aleppo, and other Syrian cities. Tens of thousands of Lebanese flocked to Damascus to cheer too.

Elsewhere in the region there was fear and trepidation. The monarchs of the Arab world were the most fearful. One of their number, Egypt’s King Farouk, had already fallen to Nasser. Who was next? How to stop the tide of revolution from sweeping every king away? Were the Arab world’s monarchs going to tumble away like a line of dominoes?

The Hashemite monarchs in Baghdad and Amman were the first to react. On 14 February 1958, King Faysal II in Iraq and King Hussein in Jordan announced their own union, the Arab Federation, which would bring their two countries together in a confederation under Faysal. Baghdad would be the capital. King Hussein would continue to rule in Jordan but in a secondary position to his cousin in Iraq. The bureaucracies and armies of the two states were eventually to be merged but the time frame for that was kept open. The Arab world was split in two, Nasser’s UAR facing the Hashemite’s federation.

The house of Saud was just as worried as its old nemesis the house of Hashim. King Saud had good reason to be worried. He and his country were broke because he spent the kingdom’s oil wealth on his own entertainment and corruption. He was a notorious gambler. Much of the royal family had become disillusioned about Saud and that disillusionment...
had turned to active campaigning to
limit his powers or even depose him.
There was no precedent for doing so,
however, in the history of the Saudi
kingdoms going back to 1744. When
the royal family became divided, as
happened often in the late 1800s, it
fell into civil war. No one in the fam-
ily wanted that but pressure to clip
Saud’s power was building.

For President Dwight David
Eisenhower and Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, however, Saud
was their man. They hoped the king,
a charismatic pro-West figure, could
galvanize Arab nationalism and
become the answer to Nasser. Saudi
Arabia was America’s oldest ally in
the Arab world, American oil compa-

nies were dominant in the kingdom,
and the US Air Force had a base
in Dhahran that had its origins in
WWII. “The king could be built up,
possibly as a spiritual leader first,”
Ike, referring to the king’s status as
the defender of the two holy mosques
in Mecca and Medina, told his aides.2

Complicating the situation, the
Saudis were cool to the United King-
dom. There were outstanding border
disputes between the Saudis and the
British protectorates that hugged the
coast of the Persian Gulf. This was
particularly so over the Buraimi Oa-
sis that both Saudi Arabia and what
was then called the Trucial States
(today the United Arab Emirates)
claimed. The Saudis were also the
longstanding opponents of the Hash-
emites, whom the British had put in
power in Jordan and Iraq. Washing-
ton felt that the Saudis were a more
comfortable ally than the Hashemites
and that Saud was a more likely
leader of Arab nationalists friendly to
America than the Hashemites, who
were widely seen as British puppets.

Moreover, the Saudis had broken re-
lations with the UK during the 1956
Suez crisis and cut off oil.

King Saud visited Washington in
late January and early February 1957.
He was the first Saudi king to visit
the United States. Eisenhower met
the king on his arrival at National
Airport, an unprecedented sign of
the importance of the visit and the
visitor.3 The royal party exceeded
80 people, including some of Saud’s
wives and children. They were so
numerous that Blair House, the offi-
cial guest house of the White House,
could not manage the entire party and
some of Saud’s bodyguards pitched
tents on Lafayette Square. What had
been planned as a three-day visit
stretched to nine days. The king met
with Ike and Vice President Rich-
ard Nixon as well as many cabinet
members and members of Congress.
There were numerous official dinners
and lunches.

King Saud held a dinner in honor
of Eisenhower. As one American
diplomat present observed “the scene
was lavish in the extreme, with a
huge guest list and an ice sculpture as
the centerpiece of the extended ban-
quet hall.” The whole performance
was to build up Saud as the coun-
terweight to Nasser, “an idea that
proved to be a miscalculation.”4

The official communique at the
end of the visit noted that “Saudi
Arabia, by virtue of its spiritual,
geographical and economic position,
is of vital importance” to the Middle
East and world peace. While Saud
did not directly endorse the Eisen-
hower Doctrine—Eisenhower had
publicly proclaimed America’s com-
mitment to defend the Middle East
against international communism in
January 1957—he expressed support
for its objectives and appreciation
for the president’s “exposition” of its
purpose. The two countries agreed
to extend the lease for the Dhahran
airfield for an additional five years.
The United States would also provide
training for the Royal Guards and
two regular divisions of the Saudi
Throughout 1957, Ike regarded Saud as his alternative to Nasser. US diplomacy sought to portray the Saudi king as the true leader of the Arab and Islamic worlds

Army, and sell the Saudis tanks and aircraft.5

Throughout 1957, Ike regarded Saud as his alternative to Nasser. US diplomacy sought to portray the Saudi king as the true leader of the Arab and Islamic worlds, one who was pro-American and an enthusiastic opponent of international communism. The Saudis had no relations with Russia.

Plot and Fallout

On 3 March 1958 King Saud met with the US ambassador in Saudi Arabia. At the end of the meeting the keeper of the privy purse, Saud’s closest aide, took the ambassador aside and told him that the king wanted Eisenhower to know that “a successful military revolution would take place within a few days in Syria.” The king wanted this information conveyed to the president and Secretary Dulles in the shortest possible time and hoped for a response.6

A surprised and worried Eisenhower responded immediately to the king’s message, saying he appreciated the confidence the king was demonstrating in Washington on a crucial issue. It was a positive response. Behind the scenes, the US embassy in Damascus expressed “serious doubts” about the “bona fides” of the Saudi-backed plot. The US ambassador in Syria told Washington that he feared the plot was a provocation to discredit Saud.7 The CIA also told Eisenhower that Saud’s plot was probably compromised and that Saud “was falling into a trap,” as Eisenhower later wrote in his memoir.8

It was too late. On 5 March 1958, Nasser announced in a speech in Damascus that King Saud was behind a plot to assassinate him and break up the UAR by a coup in Syria. Nasser’s head of Syrian intelligence Col. Abdul Hamid al Sarraj confessed that the Saudis had given him 2 million British pounds to put a bomb on board Nasser’s plane to blow up the Egyptian leader. To prove its case, the Egyptian government gave to the press three checks the Saudis allegedly gave to the Syrian plotters. Nasser then labeled Saud an enemy of the Arab people and a puppet of the West.9 The Egyptian propaganda machine took off after the king. The supposed coup appeared to be a sting operation.

The next day DCI Dulles told the National Security Council (NSC) that “a dramatic development had occurred over the course of last night. Nasser was now fully engaged in an all-out battle with the remaining pro-Western Arab leaders.” More specifically Dulles warned that “King Saud’s position is gravely endangered by these developments.” Dulles told Eisenhower the king’s position was so weakened by the exposure of the Syrian plot that it constituted a trend that could lead to the collapse of the pro-Western regimes in Iraq, Jordan, and elsewhere in the Near East, “and we may find that the USSR will take over control of this whole oil-rich area.” The DCI concluded “the situation is extremely grave.”10

In an urgent message to Riyadh, Eisenhower expressed his strong support for King Saud in the face of the “attacks by [the] UAR against His Majesty” broadcast on Nasser’s Voice of the Arabs. The State Department, like the CIA, “had grave apprehensions concerning the possible results for Saud.”11

It was an extraordinarily bleak assessment that would have repercussions for the rest of 1958. The estimate formed the basis for a sense of alarm in Washington that would only get worse. In fact, inside Saudi Arabia Dulles’s warning would prove prescient. On 24 March 1958, the royal family convened in Riyadh and stripped Saud of his powers on internal, foreign and financial issues and gave them to his half-brother Crown Prince Faysal. Faysal had persuaded the family not to force Saud to abdicate but to give up control of the kingdom. Saud would remain king but Faysal would rule. Radio Mecca announced Saud was leaving for Switzerland.12

Washington was deeply alarmed by Saud’s departure and concerned about Faysal’s commitment to resisting Nasser. On 27 March, DCI Dulles briefed the NSC on the changes in Riyadh. He expressed concern that Faysal “will arrange some kind of tie-up with Syria and Egypt,” in effect joining the Nasser camp. But Dulles also provided a brief character sketch of Faysal that said he was not anti-American and “definitely anti-communist.” Vice President Nixon described Faysal as “pro-American and smart as hell.” Ike recalled that Faysal had been “extremely pleasant in his contacts in Washington.”13 The CIA was instructed to assess the
implications of the change in Saudi Arabia.

In April, the Intelligence Community provided a special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) entitled Implications of Recent Governmental Changes in Saudi Arabia to the White House. The SNIE reviewed the events of the so-called Sarraj affair, the coup plot in Syria named for the former Syrian intelligence chief who produced the checks implicating King Saud. The affair and its resulting de-motion of Saud were seen as a “victory for Nasserism and a repudiation of Saud’s open anti-Nasser, pro West policy.” Faysal was expected to take a more “neutral” posture in inter-Arab affairs and avoid open disputes with the UAR and Nasser. This would find favor in the Saudi “army officer corps,” which had become Egyptianized over years of cooperation with Egypt and with the “Hejazi merchant community.”

Nonetheless, the SNIE also noted that Faysal would be a “traditional Saudi prince” and determined to retain Saudi independence from Nasser. It noted Faysal supported the Dhahran airfield agreement of 2 April 1957, which kept the US Air Force in the kingdom. The chief impact of Saud’s removal would be on Jordan, where Faysal was cutting financial subsidies to King Hussein and withdrawing Saudi troops from the country. The SNIE predicted that Faysal would practice “intense antagonism” toward Israel. A few days after the SNIE was published, DCI Dulles told the NSC that Faysal had told the base commander at Dhahran to cease flying the US flag at the base.

The Syrian debacle was a turning point in 1958, a symbol of Nasser’s growing prestige and power. The conservative camp in the Middle East was weakened and Ike’s protégé, Saud, removed from the picture. It would be several years before Saud abdicated, by which time Faysal had turned dramatically against Nasser. Saud briefly moved to Cairo, where he made propaganda against his half-brother and for his old nemesis before living out the rest of his life in Greece.

The foiled coup strengthened Nasser’s grip on Syria and removed his most powerful Arab opponent. It is a classic example of a covert action that ricocheted against its backers. It further strengthened Nasser’s image as the preeminent Arab leader of the time who had vanquished America’s chosen alternative and pushed its oldest ally toward neutrality in the inter-Arab cold war.

A straw in the wind came from a most unlikely corner. On 8 March 1958, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen announced it was merging with the UAR as well. North Yemen was ruled by an almost medieval Zaydi Shia monarchy that was the very epitome of a corrupt, backward monarchy that Nasser allegedly sought to destroy, but Yemen was a useful ally against Nasser’s two enemies: Saudi Arabia and the British colony in southern Yemen around the port city of Aden. By creating a loose federation with the Yemeni monarchy, which kept its formal independence and its seat in the United Nations, Nasser had acquired a strategic arrow aimed at the Saudis if they became problematic and at the most important port for the British Empire in the Indian Ocean.
For the United States the 1958 crisis led to the first American combat operation in the Middle East, the Marine intervention in Beirut.

For the Yemenis, alignment with Nasser helped to buy off revolutionaries at home and provide some Arab nationalist legitimacy for the monarchy. The regime could appear more modern than it was. At the same time, Yemen acquired an ally against Saudi Arabia, with which it had fought and lost a war in the 1930s, losing several border provinces along the way.

The Egyptian-Syrian-Yemeni con federation was called the United Arab States because Yemen was clearly not a republic. It added to the pressure on the Saudi royals to put Faysal in real power and further cemented the impression that Nasser was on the march and that he was an irresistible force devouring the Arab states into one grand state and driving the West from the Middle East. The changes in Riyadh and Sanaa made Washington very nervous. In July 1958 the crisis came to a boil when a coup toppled Faysal II in Iraq and the US Marines landed in Beirut to keep the pro-Western government there from collapsing.

In Saudi Arabia the events of early 1958, especially the Sarraj affair, were a turning point in the kingdom’s history. If Saud had remained in power it is likely the monarchy would have been overthrown. Under Faysal’s steady and wise leadership, it recovered its health and would prosper, especially after the 1973 oil price revolution.

For the United States the 1958 crisis led to the first American combat operation in the Middle East, the Marine intervention in Beirut. The Eisenhower administration had been badly rattled by the loss of Saud as its champion, grew more apprehensive as Lebanon deteriorated into a civil war, and then panicked when the coup came as a surprise in Baghdad. “I was shocked by the Iraqi coup,” Eisenhower later admitted, and “we feared the worst, the complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East.” Sixty years later Americans are still in combat in the Middle East; what began in 1958 has become commonplace.

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End Notes

5. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
10. “Editorial Note” (Document Number 307), FRUS XII, 715.
11. “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia” (Document Number 309), FRUS XII, 716–17.
12. Vassiliev, King Faisal, 216.
13. “Editorial Note” (Document Number 313), FRUS XII, 724.
14. “Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 30-1-58” (Document Number 315), FRUS XII, 726.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. “Editorial Note” (Document Number 316), FRUS XII, 728.
Union Naval Intelligence in the American Civil War: Moving Toward a Global Intelligence System
Matthew E. Skros

Editor’s Note: The following student essay was selected as the winner of the Walter Pforzheimer Award for best student essay submitted in 2018.

For the four bloody years of the American Civil War, the two sides slugged it out on the field of battle, pitting brother against brother and friend against friend in a conflict that would cost over 600,000 lives. Gettysburg, Antietam, Petersburg, and Chancellorsville are well known because these battles were keys in war’s outcome.

However, also important in the history of the Civil War are the naval engagements that took place both in American territorial waters and around the world. These engagements . . . were precursors to the global engagements that future generations would experience.

Vital to the outcome of many of these engagements was the collection of naval intelligence that would allow Union commanders to make tactical decisions and win victory. In this article I will examine two Civil War naval campaigns and the role intelligence played in them: the battle of Mobile Bay and the global hunt for the CSS Alabama.

I will detail where, when, and how intelligence was collected and how that intelligence helped determine the outcome of these battles in the Union’s favor. Finally, I will briefly look at how the decentralized methods of the Civil War morphed into the centralized Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882 and address the impact that centralization had on the US Navy.

My purpose is not only to offer a deeper understanding of the clandestine side of naval intelligence in the American Civil War, but to show lessons from the past that may serve modern day naval intelligence professionals in the vital work of our nation.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. © Bruce Riedel, 2018
**Intelligence at the Battle of Mobile Bay—Local and Technological**

On 19 April 1861, days after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, President Lincoln declared a naval blockade of southern US ports to restrict Confederate commerce. Keeping those ports closed, or seizing them, was an important component of Union strategy against the Confederate States. Without them, the South’s largely rural economy could not sustain a war that required the industrial wherewithal to sustain tens of thousands of troops in combat.

A Tennessee-born captain named David Glasgow Farragut would figure most prominently in the implementation of this strategy. Already a veteran of 50 years in the naval service, Farragut rose to prominence for his masterful capture of New Orleans in 1862, an action that earned him a promotion to rear admiral. He also was present during the assault on Mobile Bay, by 1864 one of the last Confederate ports the Union had not captured.

The commander of Mobile Bay’s defenses, Adm. Franklin Buchanan had had ample time since 1861 to fortify the entrance to Mobile Bay, making a naval assault an extremely difficult and dangerous task. Farragut, who arrived in the vicinity of Mobile Bay on 18 January 1864, knew he would need to thoroughly analyze the enemy’s defenses to enter the bay successfully. To do this, he needed intelligence.

**“Damn the Torpedoes”**

Admiral Farragut had to address three threats before he could breach Mobile Bay. One of the deadliest was the torpedo field. What today would be referred to as a naval mine, a torpedo in the 1860s was a submerged gunpowder-filled explosive device that could do serious damage to any ship that happened to collide with it. Prisoners, deserters, and other sources had all reported the torpedoes’ existence, but Admiral Farragut needed details on specifically the kinds of torpedoes he was facing, how they were laid out in the channel, and how long they had been submerged.

For this information, he turned to a Confederate deserter who claimed to be a citizen of the state of New Hampshire trapped in Mobile when the war broke out. To escape conscription into the Confederate Army or Navy, the man volunteered to assist in building Mobile’s defenses as a civilian; he surrendered himself to Union forces at Pensacola on 15 January after being granted temporary leave to visit his father. As a US citizen with Northern birth and with his intimate knowledge of the bay’s defenses, he proved a reliable and valuable source of intelligence for Farragut. His report on the torpedoes was very specific:

> From the end of the piles that cross the flats from Fort Gaines, about three months ago, thirty torpedoes were laid down on a line bearing S.E. by compass across the Main Ship Channel; they are shaped like can buoys, with a chamber in each and 75 pounds of powder. They are anchored with marlina rope, with about the third of a bar of railroad iron. A number of them broke adrift and floated up the bay.”

More intelligence on the torpedo threat was gleaned from a Swedish POW named William Ihlo, who had served in the Confederate Navy as a seaman. After his capture on 18 February, he volunteered to give testimony about his work on Mobile Bay’s defenses. Ihlo reported that the deployed torpedoes were made of sheet iron and many had sunk or rusted through, with seawater ruining the powder charges. However, he did report that new copper-sheathed torpedoes had been prepared in Mobile, but the Confederate navy was not going to deploy them unless a massing of Farragut’s ships indicated an assault was imminent; therefore, it was important that Farragut keep his assault plans secret.

Captured blockade runners became another important source of information about the placement of torpedoes. Because they regularly navigated the channel, the captains of these blockade runners had valuable insights into safe passages in and out of the bay. One such instance of this came on 30 April, when the USS *Conemaugh* captured the steam frigate *Judson*. The *Judson’s* captain, L.H. Thompson, gave the following details of the torpedo placement:

> A buoy is placed about 100 yards west by south at the end of the sand spit under Fort Morgan, and that between this buoy and the western channel bank of the main channel are placed 60...
Men on the ships could hear torpedo primers firing in the water—every single one of them failing to set off a torpedo.

Later, summarizing the torpedo threat, Farragut wrote: “We had been assured by refugees, deserters, and others of their existence, but believing that from their having been some time in the water, they were probably innocuous, I determined to take the chance of their explosion.”¹¹

History records that the fleet sailed through the torpedo areas with Farragut on the Hartford in the lead and passing the sinking Tecumseh. Men on the ships could hear torpedo primers firing in the water—every single one of them failing to set off a torpedo.¹² Without the intelligence about the deteriorating weapons, Farragut might have ordered his ships to withdraw or, stalled by the sinking of the Tecumseh, his squadron would have been subject to the firepower of Forts Gaines and Morgan, the second of his major obstacles to victory.

The Forts of Mobile Bay

The forts had been constructed by the US government and were further fortified by the Confederates after the war broke out. While the channel between the two forts was almost three miles wide, its many sand banks and shoals restricted ship movement to a series of deep, narrow troughs.¹³ With the added threat of the torpedoes, Farragut had to thread a needle to get his ships into Mobile Bay. To do this, he needed intelligence on the threats the forts posed to his assault.

Once again, he turned to deserters and prisoners for information; however, he also obtained the information through clandestine collection. As the intelligence on the torpedoes and other channel obstacles began to trickle in, it became clear to Farragut that Fort Morgan was the main obstacle. It was closest to the torpedo-free channel, and the its armaments were formidable. To gather more intelligence on Fort Morgan, Farragut ordered a detachment of sailors from the USS Oneida ashore on the evening of 22 July to capture a picket who had been seen pacing the beach on guard duty. The small party, led by Lt. Charles S. Cotton and Acting Ens. John L. Hall, was successful in capturing a single picket.¹⁴

Upon hearing from the prisoner that his unit was not far away, Ensign Hall led a party of sailors to the location, surprised and captured the detachment, and brought them back to the Oneida.¹⁵ Eugene Orr, a sailor on the Oneida, wrote of his personal recollections of the mission in a 1903 National Tribune article:

In the latter part of July 1864, Admiral Farragut wanted some information in regard to the rebel preparations for his reception in August, and the only way to get it was to go after it, as there were no rebel deserters or intelligent contrabands coming off to the fleet.”¹⁶

Orr then recounts what happened to the prisoners once they were brought back to the fleet:

At the time the party were taking to their boat, the fort had become alarmed; but they were too late. The prisoners were turned over to Admiral Farragut the next morning, and I presume that he obtained all the information that he desired from them.¹⁷
Farragut does not write in his official correspondence what he was able to obtain from them. However, one can assume the information regarding Fort Morgan was consequential enough that he arranged his battle plan to focus heavily on the fort’s guns. He planned to attack on a day when the winds off the bay would blow cannon smoke back onto the fort, thus obscuring his fleet from the view of Fort Morgan’s cannon spotters.\(^\text{18}\)

He also ordered his four ironclads to sail to the starboard of his line and cover its advance into the bay.\(^\text{19}\) Without the critical intelligence Farragut received about Fort Morgan, he could have drastically underestimated its strengths and allowed his fleet to sail unprepared to face the guns.

The Confederates had built an ironclad ram that could outmatch the famous CSS Virginia and that it would be put to sea in Mobile Bay by the end of the month. This ship would later be identified as the CSS Tennessee. Other Union commanders told Farragut that the Confederates had five such ships in Mobile Bay and were planning to use them in a grand attempt to retake New Orleans. Deserters and prisoners, however, provided information that contradicted these fantastical claims.\(^\text{20}\)

The aforementioned, unnamed deserter from New Hampshire also had much to say about the state of the Confederate fleet. His report noted that the Confederates had three lightly-armed small gunboats—the Morgan, Gaines, and Selma. They also had a small armored ram named the Baltic, which was little more than a modified tugboat and which the Confederate Navy considered “unfit for service.” There also were five floating armored turrets in the harbor. These were modified scows and could maneuver under their own power, but the New Hampshire man remarked that they “cannot withstand the shock of an 8-inch shell.”\(^\text{21}\) Farragut’s paramount concern became the whereabouts of the Tennessee and the other reported armored rams. Surely the 1862 battle of Hampton Roads, in which the CSS Virginia easily destroyed several wooden Union vessels, weighed heavily on his mind. Without armored reinforcements, his wooden ships would be no match for the heavily armored Confederate ram.

Farragut soon learned from deserters that the Confederate Navy was struggling to float the heavy Tennessee over a large sandbar in the Dog River along which she had been constructed. A deserter who arrived in Pensacola in early January provided the following assessment:

The Tennessee is on Dog River Bar, on her way to the Bay, and the camels’ made to float her over have to be made larger.\(^\text{22}\)

Farragut acted on this intelligence by writing to the Navy Department in Washington to procure some ironclad “monitor” type warships to counter the Confederate ram. He felt confident that the CSN would struggle for many more weeks in its attempts to float the Tennessee over the bar, and that his position at Mobile remained secure for the time being. Despite an early March “ram scare” in which Union forces supposedly spotted the Tennessee in the bay, the ram remained stranded upriver until 17 May, when she was finally floated over the bar.\(^\text{23}\)

On the morning of 5 August, after the sinking of the Tecumseh, Farragut’s fleet had to contend with the Tennessee without the assistance of the powerful Union warship. Farragut originally intended to pursue the Confederate warship with his remaining three ironclads and leave the rest of his ships in the safety of the bay, but Confederate Admiral Buchanan chose to launch a daring attack on Farragut’s whole fleet with only the Tennessee.\(^\text{24}\)

Since their guns had little effect on the heavily armored Tennessee, Farragut ordered his ships to turn their efforts to ramming the ironclad in hopes of causing enough damage to sink her or force the crew to surrender. While Farragut does not

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\(^{a}\) A “camel” is a flotation device designed to lift a ship with a deep draft over a sandbar it would not be able to pass over otherwise.
specifically cite the use of intelligence in informing this choice of tactic, information provided to him about the construction of the Tennessee may have influenced it.

Dated 7 July, a report from the US Army Department of the West Mississippi outlines intelligence from an unnamed informant that cast doubt on the seaworthiness of the Tennessee:

To close ports the shutters are allowed to fall back by their weight. The Tennessee with guns and stores on board floats very low, carrying her ports hardly 2 feet 6 inches above the water line. It is the opinion of the informant that she cannot endure serious collision. In his phrase, she has no bearings below her bearings, and would be very easily pressed under.25

It is reasonable to assume Farragut used this intelligence in his decision making, given that he ordered his ships to ram the Tennessee rather than engage in an artillery duel. After sustaining several hits from Union ships, Tennessee surrendered as the USS Ossipee bore down on her to strike another ramming blow.26 This final action concluded the Battle of Mobile Bay.

II. USS Kearsarge versus the CSS Alabama—Global Intelligence at Play

In 1861, the Confederate navy’s immediate—and Herculean—task was to build a force that could both defend the South’s vast coastline and harass Union commerce. In addition to domestic construction efforts, the Confederate Navy dispatched agents to other countries to acquire the necessary ships. One such agent was James Bulloch, who was sent to Liverpool, England, in July 1861. His orders from Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory were, blunt: “Get us some ships. Buy them, build them, or whatever you find necessary.”27

This task was by no means covert. Union newspapers reported Bulloch’s departure from America and even how much money had been allocated for his mission.28 When information reached Washington of his departure, State Department officials relayed the information to Thomas Haines Dudley, US consul for the port of Liverpool, who was assigned the task of reporting on Confederate activities in the port. Bulloch was carefully watched by Union intelligence sources, who then informed Dudley.

Dudley’s first report came in March of 1862. In it he wrote that a sloop-of-war called the Oreto was being armed in Liverpool. The first mention of the CSS Alabama, then known as Gunboat No. 290 (she was the 290th ship built by Laird & Co.), comes in this report:

Since [Bulloch] returned, he has taken an active part in superintending the building, equipment, and fitting out of another steam gunboat, known as No. 290, which has lately been launched by Laird & Co. of Birkenhead, and which is now lying, as I am informed and believe, ready for sea in the Birkenhead docks.29

Most of Dudley’s intelligence seems to have come from Matthew Maguire, a Liverpool-based British detective who testified to seeing Bulloch around the Laird & Co. shipyard and observing him giving orders to workmen outfitting the 290.30 US diplomats in England urged Washington to ask the British government to seize the 290 under the Foreign Enlistment Act, an act of Parliament that forbade British citizens from crewing, providing, or equipping ships for either the Union or the Confederacy.31 However, the State Department did not think Maguire’s evidence was enough to persuade the British government, so the 290’s construction continued unimpeded.

In May 1862, the 290 was launched from the Laird & Co. yard. Upon her launch, she was christened Enrica, in hopes that Union officials would believe she was a Spanish vessel rather than a Confederate one.32 The Laird brothers had initially assumed the ship was going to be a merchant steamer rather than a warship. When Bulloch insisted that openings resembling gun ports be cut into her sides and swivel sock-
ets added to the railing, the Lairds suspected they had been duped into violating the Foreign Enlistment Act.\textsuperscript{33} Bulloch, lying through his teeth, explained that she was indeed going to be a merchant ship, but that he hoped to sell her one day and that making her easily convertible to a ship of war would make her more valuable.\textsuperscript{34} While this claim seemed dubious, it was enough to protect the Laird brothers in court. Her sea trials were completed, minor repairs made, and the 290 was prepared to set sail on her mission for the Confederacy.

Detective Maguire, however, was watching the progress in the Laird facility and feeding intelligence to Dudley. Maguire discovered the number of guns the 290 was to carry and that some of her crew were to come from another Confederate warship named the \textit{Sumter}. With this information, Dudley wrote to Lord Russell, the foreign secretary, demanding that British authorities seize the ship. Lord Russell ordered the ship searched, but the search revealed no significant evidence of the ship being built for the Confederacy. Dudley would try several more times to have the ship detained but to no avail.

The 290 sailed out of Liverpool, escorted by the steam tug \textit{Hercules}, in August of 1862. The captain of the \textit{Hercules}, Thomas Miller, offered sworn testimony a few days after. He observed that the ship was loaded with coal supplies and that Laird & Co. workmen were outfitting her in the bay.\textsuperscript{35} He also reported that he had ferried some 25-30 of her new crew to the ship. He did not report the presence of any armaments or ammunition on board.

\begin{center}
\textbf{In late July of 1862, facing increased diplomatic pressure and overwhelming evidence that the 290 was indeed a Confederate ship of war, Lord Russell finally recommended seizure of the ship. However, it was too late,}
\end{center}

In late July of 1862, facing increased diplomatic pressure and overwhelming evidence that the 290 was indeed a Confederate ship of war, Lord Russell finally recommended seizure of the ship. However, it was too late, and the 290 moved farther away from Liverpool and into the Mersey River. She then sailed to the Portuguese Azores, where she met a Confederate steamer carrying her armaments and ammunition. A newspaper report from the islands also reported the arrival of the steamer \textit{Bahama}, which had departed Liverpool several weeks before.\textsuperscript{36}

The assistant collector of customs from Liverpool interviewed the sailing master of the \textit{Bahama} once the ship returned to port, and the sailing master gave their cargo list from the voyage (most of which was equipment for the operation of heavy cannon, such as sponges and ramming rods). The sailing master also gave the following information regarding the 290:

\begin{center}
\textit{Off the Western Islands he spoke to the Confederate gunboat Alabama, (No. 290 built at Mr. Laird’s yard, at Birkenhead), heavily armed, having a 100 pound pivot gun mounted at her stern, which he believes is intended to destroy some of the seaport towns in the Northern States of America.}\textsuperscript{37}
\end{center}

This report is the first mention we have of the \textit{Alabama} bearing her true name; from then on we see her referred to as such in reports. It also appears in this report that she had completed the armament rendezvous and was sailing out to begin raiding operations. This intelligence was relayed to Washington and the Navy Department via diplomatic correspondence—a communication that could take two weeks or more to arrive.

Once outfitted, the \textit{Alabama} began to prey on US whaling ships in the western Atlantic. Two Union cruisers, the USS \textit{Kearsarge} and USS \textit{Tuscarora}, arrived in the Azores in late 1862 to search for the \textit{Alabama}, only to find they were several weeks behind her and no one could tell for certain where the Confederate raider was heading. Almost every sail on the horizon or ghost ship in the distance was believed to be the \textit{Alabama}, and Gideon Welles soon found himself overwhelmed with reports of the Confederate raider (many of them false). The commanding officer of the \textit{Tuscarora} had come into possession of a letter indicating the \textit{Alabama} was going to meet a British merchant ship with a coal shipment.\textsuperscript{38}

Meanwhile, the commander of the USS \textit{San Jacinto} made inquiries on the island of Dominica but did not find any conclusive information on the \textit{Alabama}, as no one could identify her with certainty.\textsuperscript{39} More reports from the \textit{San Jacinto} indicated the \textit{Alabama} took on coal on the island of Blanquilla in the Caribbean, or so testified the captain of the Royal Mail steamer \textit{Trent}.\textsuperscript{40} Other Union ships scoured the oceans, boarding ships and making inquiries, usually to no avail. Reports would come in from...
survivors of the ships Alabama had destroyed, and Union ships would give chase, but the Alabama would disappear almost as quickly as she had arrived.

Over the next year and a half, the Alabama would cruise as far as China and India, burning Union commercial chips and evading capture. Meanwhile, as finding the Alabama proved to be difficult, the Kearsarge and other Union cruisers began to hunt other Confederate raiders. Oddly enough, what compromised the Alabama’s location was not the dedicated work of a Union intelligence informant, but open source reporting—namely, the writings of journalists in Dover, England. When Capt. John A. Winslow of the Kearsarge put into port there in late April 1864, he picked up a couple of newspapers. These papers pointed out the whereabouts of four Confederate cruisers, one of which was the Alabama. The paper reported that she was sailing from Cape Town for the English Channel, and Winslow gave chase in hope of finally running down the elusive cruiser. In his report to Gideon Welles, he stated:

Secret agents for a month or more asserted that the Alabama had orders to return to the English Channel or some place of rendezvous for her consorts, and it was contemplated to make an attack on some of the eastern towns.

Because the US Navy already had intelligence regarding the plans of these cruisers, the newspaper reports corroborated the intelligence and made it actionable. Unfortunately, the historical record does not give us information on the agents or how they obtained such intelligence.

Additional intelligence regarding the Alabama’s location came when the USS St. Louis arrived in Tangier Bay on June 16th. She received a packet of dispatches from Navy Department officials and diplomatic officials, with orders to rendezvous with Kearsarge and give them to Captain Winslow. One item is a newspaper clipping titled “nautical intelligence” read:

The Kent, from Melbourne, arrived in the English Channel 7th instant; reports that on the 24th of April, in latitude 15 degrees South, longitude 32 degrees West, she was boarded by the Confederate steamship Alabama, which had burned on the previous day the Rockingham, from Callao [Peru] to Queenstown [Guyana], laden with guano.

However, before this nautical intelligence could be given to Captain Winslow, a definitive report on the Alabama’s location came from the US consular agent in Cherbourg, France, who reported to the US minister to France that a Confederate steamer had just docked in the harbor. US Minister to France William Dayton, having been advised in late May that the Kearsarge would utilize

In the end, while the actual battle came down to gunnery—as battles usually do—the hunt for the Alabama succeeded thanks to a network of intelligence and diplomatic operatives the Union had spread around the world.
After the Civil War ended, according to US Navy Historian Wyman Packard, the US Navy underwent a rapid demobilization, and its strength was soon a shadow of what it had been during the war. Congress barely budgeted adequate funds for the upkeep of existing vessels, not to mention the advancement of naval research or the construction of new ships. Meanwhile, European navies—propelled by their own rivalries within Europe and for the expansion and defense of their distant colonies—actively sought new methods of ship construction, naval gunnery, and seamanship—developments of which US Navy officers were keenly aware.

The years immediately after the Civil War saw many advancements in technology, global commerce, global telecommunications, and colonization by European powers. It was also an era of the emergence of strategic thinking in Europe and the United States, especially in the US Navy. This meant that, while the US Navy could not compete financially with Europe’s growth, the Navy Department was nevertheless keen to monitor it and stay informed of developments in technology and global developments. Thus, as American warships cruised the world’s oceans, Navy officials instructed officers and personnel to gather information on the capabilities of other navies.

Although the wisdom of these efforts is, in retrospect, notable, the Navy’s initial organization for managing and coordinating them was problematic. In those early post-war years, multiple different entities within the Navy (including the secretary himself) dispatched officers on intelligence-gathering missions. Navy Chief Engineer James King, on the behalf of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, made visits to Europe to examine propulsion technology. Another officer, Lt. Theodorus Mason, became quite seasoned in the work of intelligence, even volunteering to tour Europe on his own time to gather useful information.

Mason saw the US Naval Institute—which had only been created in 1873 as a forum for addressing the concerns of a declining naval force and other naval matters—as a potential repository and collection center for naval intelligence. However, the institute was not an official Navy or government entity. Without a centralized organization and with several bureaus all running their own collection efforts, the naval intelligence business was a mess of bureaucracy and confusion. The Office of Naval Intelligence rose to fill the need to address this and to begin to efficiently collect, analyze, and disseminate a wide array of information.

By 1882, Secretary William Hunt had support in congress for a naval reconstruction project and included in his reconstruction plans was a new center for naval intelligence to handle all intelligence collection. On 23 March of that year, he issued an order creating an “Office of Intelligence” within the Navy’s Bureau of Navigation; this office would soon be known more explicitly as the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The death of President James Garfield led to Hunt’s removal as secretary and the appointment of William Chandler by President Chester Arthur. After he took office in 1883, Chandler rewarded Mason’s dedication by appointing him as the first director of ONI; Mason soon established a naval attaché network, recruited a staff of analysts, and created a system for managing and archiving collected intelligence. This intelligence was then accessed by the various Navy bureaus as the need arose. The centralized ONI provided streamlined collection, meaning that intelligence could be shared effectively with different Navy departments, and as Presidents Chester Arthur and Benjamin Harrison subsequently called for naval rearmament and modernization, ONI supplied the necessary intelligence to engineers to design new warships.

Through its growing network of attachés in Europe, ONI was able to organize collection and analysis to inform planners of new developments. For example, new armored ships were constructed and added to the fleet, to counter reports (supplied by ONI) of similar developments in South America.

Secretary Benjamin Tracy remarked in 1889 that ONI’s work had “been of incalculable assistance in the work of reconstruction.” Without the centralization ONI provided, naval engineers may have had a much more difficult time of navigating the Navy’s intricate bureaucracy, thus hampering their ability to develop the most technologically advanced ships.

The first combat test of the new ONI, came as an 1895 insurrection in Cuba threatened to spark war between the United States and Spain.
When it became apparent that the Cuban unrest might lead to war, ONI began to ensure that its files on Spain’s naval capabilities were as up-to-date as possible. It also forwarded regular reports on the Spanish fleet and other navies to US warships stationed around the globe. When war broke out in 1898, ONI’s staff of naval officers advised the Naval War Board on Spanish naval movements and Spain’s technological capabilities. The network of naval attachés provided valuable intelligence, not only because of their attachés’ expertise but because of the network of secret agents they often employed. ONI served as the aggregator of all the encrypted reports from these officers; it received some 800 reports from officers around the globe during the war and encrypted 300 outgoing messages. This network allowed the US Navy to effectively track the movements of the Spanish Navy and helped the secretary (at that time, former Massachusetts governor John Long) direct reconnaissance missions and dispatch warships.

Decentralized intelligence operations of the Civil War may have provided enough to win the day at Mobile Bay and Cherbourg. However, ONI’s establishment in 1882 allowed the US Navy to efficiently collect intelligence as well as utilize it. That intelligence served more than just squadron commanders and officers on the ground who managed to collect it—it was able to serve wider strategic initiatives through its centralization.

Without ONI serving as the central repository for naval technical intelligence, the US Navy’s engineers would have struggled to gather necessary information from various naval bureaus.

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The Battle for Mobile Bay and the Hunt for CSS Alabama

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Anyone who has spent more than five decades in a specific profession has stories to tell and is generally worth listening to. That is certainly true of James Clapper, the longest-tenured Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to date. His personal and professional story fills the pages of Facts and Fears, his autobiography co-written with DNI speechwriter Trey Brown. As Clapper notes in the introduction, his purpose in writing Facts and Fears was “to capture and share the experience of more than fifty years in the intel profession.” (4)

In the early chapters of this book, Clapper relates the personal history that leads, almost inevitably, to a lifelong career in intelligence. As an Army “brat” whose father was a signals intelligence officer, young James came to the profession naturally, though he cites a favorite story from his youth to explain the inquisitiveness that would make him a successful intelligence officer. During a summer stay with his grandparents, he was flipping radio channels when he accidentally discovered the Philadelphia police radio band and was soon riveted to the chatter, the gist of which he transferred to a map, learning police jargon, the boundaries of patrol districts, and gaining what the military calls “situational awareness” along the way. In engaging fashion, he also explains how a comic book collection unexpectedly led to meeting his future wife and why he still displays a model of a 1947 Cadillac, his first car, on a shelf.

Clapper then turns to a review of his numerous military assignments, from a brief period in the US Marine Corps to the US Air Force, in which he would spend more than three decades. His path of military assignments led him from the Pentagon—“where fun goes to die” (57)—to Korea as a new brigadier general, to Pacific Command (PACOM), to Strategic Air Command (SAC), and back to the Pentagon. In his early days as an Air Force general officer, he dealt with such challenging issues as the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 shootdown, the Grenada assault, the tense situation along the DMZ in Korea, and the military campaigns of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, in which he was dismayed to see intelligence arrive too late to be useful, reflecting the assessment of ground commander General Norman Schwarzkopf, who was sharply critical of the intelligence he received during the campaign.

For most readers, however, it is the period after Clapper retired from the Air Force in 1995, after 34 years of military service, that is likely to be of greatest interest, and it is this portion that will prompt them to buy and read this book. In the public’s eye, Clapper’s time as the director of several IC agencies—and particularly his tenure as DNI—is most noteworthy. He describes his less-than-satisfying period as a defense contractor, in which he learned the invaluable lesson that he was “not good at helping to win contracts and expand the firm’s footprint.” (86) After bumping around a bit, he received a call from one of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s aides, wondering if Clapper would consider returning to government service. Over the objections of his wife, Sue, he accepted leadership of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), where he and CIA senior Joanne Isham set about integrating the diverse disciplines of imagery and mapping against the dramatic backdrop of 9/11. It took two years for the duo and many others to transition NIMA to NGA, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which improved IC-military relations and became a key element working with first responders in dealing with Hurricane Katrina. Ironically, Clapper expresses his belief that Rumsfeld’s irritation at NGA’s close working relationship with the Coast Guard at the time shortened his tenure as NGA Director.

With Rumsfeld’s departure, new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates then asked Clapper to serve as the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and end a running feud with ODNI. As he characterized it, Clapper made peace with DoD by serving as the DNI’s “director of defense intelligence.” Even then, however, Clapper was among those who openly called for a strong DNI to serve as the president’s chief intelligence adviser and lead the US Intelligence Community. In the book,
Clapper notes that, like all major legislation, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2005 that formally created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was “flawed.” He opines that the first DNI should have been a career intelligence officer rather than former ambassador John Negroponte but was content when the latter chose newly-promoted Gen. Michael Hayden as his PDDNI (Principal Deputy). He writes of similar misgivings about Vice Adm. Dennis Blair as DNI, though he carefully chooses his words when writing about his predecessor, simply wondering if he was “the right fit” for the job. (121)

In April 2010, with Blair still on the job, Secretary Gates called Clapper to his office and told him simply, “Jim, we need you to be the DNI.” After initially turning down the offer, he spoke with Sue, who stressed how different this job would be compared to being the director of NGA or the USD(I). So he wrote Secretary Gates a note saying he had reconsidered over the weekend and, if he and the president thought he was the right man for the job, he would accept. In reply, he heard nothing for weeks, only to be informed one day that he had an appointment with the president the next day—a job interview for the DNI position, as it turned out. The 15-minute interview went well, but Clapper was dismayed that he had not been able to explain what he proposed to do as DNI.

At Gates’s suggestion, he wrote President Obama a letter in which he provided seven observations, including the fact that he was a “truth-to-power” guy who avoided media attention whenever possible and who was “more interested in making the IC work than accumulating power.” (116) He also stressed “unwritten rule of intelligence number one—leave the policy making to policy makers” (143) and made the point to the president that this was, in his opinion, the last chance to make the DNI concept work before Congress created a “Department of Intelligence.” When his nomination was announced, President Obama commented to one of Clapper’s grandchildren, “I appreciate your grandfather’s willingness to take on the second most thankless job in Washington.” (132) Clapper thought he was joking but soon learned otherwise.

As Clapper discovered that President Obama read the President’s Daily Brief in advance and therefore a new briefing approach was necessary, he also learned that with each misstep, the press routinely called for his resignation. The first hue and cry came in response to the tragic loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three security officers in the September 2012 assault on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, a ripple-effect reaction to the “Arab Spring” movement that had begun in Tunisia in 2011. The second such clamoring occurred after Clapper’s highly-publicized response to a question from Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) about NSA surveillance practices. When Clapper replied that NSA was not monitoring average Americans, he was thinking of Section 702 of the FISA Act—vice Section 215 of the Patriot Act, as Wyden was. On the tense ride back to ODNI following his testimony, OGC attorney Bob Litt informed Clapper that he had been wrong in his answer to Senator Wyden, which Clapper acknowledged, though explaining that while he had made a mistake, he had not lied. Unconvinced, congressmen and citizens called for his resignation. However, President Obama, while acknowledging publicly that Clapper should have chosen his words more carefully, defended his DNI.

In a “perfect storm” of sorts, the DNI had to deal simultaneously with sequestration and its deleterious financial and psychological effects on the IC as well as the tidal wave of unauthorized disclosures former Booz Allen contractor Edward Snowden provided. Even though Clapper briefed President Obama within two days of the story breaking, he did not have a lot of hard information to provide. In the litany of embarrassing disclosures that followed and soured relations with many foreign partners, especially Germany and Brazil, Clapper decided to push the “transparency” initiative by releasing to the public declassified IC documents on the Tumblr “IC on the Record” site.

In the midst of this crisis, the IC learned that Syrian leader Bashir al-Assad was intentionally using chemical weapons against his own people, prompting the writing of a finely-crafted, hard-hitting National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Syrian use of CW. By early 2014, the avalanche of recent disastrous events left Clapper feeling so besieged that he offered to resign, but White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough refused to consider that. In September, at a professional organization meeting, Clapper introduced the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy, which included the “Principles of Intelligence Ethics” the ODNI had tried to implement two years earlier. In a display of “gallows humor,” he also described the situation facing the IC at that time:
We are expected to keep the nation safe and provide exquisite, high-fidelity, timely, accurate, anticipatory, and relevant intelligence; and do that in such a manner that there is no risk; and there is no embarrassment to anyone if what we’re doing is publicly revealed; and there is no threat to anyone’s revenue bottom line; and there isn’t even a scintilla of jeopardy to anyone’s civil liberties and privacy, whether US persons or foreign persons.

We call this new approach to intelligence: “immaculate collection.” (268-269)

His dramatic 2014 closed with his unexpectedly being dispatched to North Korea to negotiate the release of two Americans held there, a mission that amazingly remained secret, described in a chapter appropriately entitled “Not a Diplomat.”

The dawn of 2015 brought continued drama, both personally and professionally. While learning of the details of the North Korean cyber attack against Sony Pictures and characterizing the world threat situation as one of “unpredictable instability,” Clapper’s attentions were jolted away from his professional duties when Sue fell ill and spent three days in a coma in a Salem, Virginia, hospital. He again seriously thought of resigning to care for his wife but was concerned about the legacy of intelligence integration and especially the push to embrace transparency in the IC. As Sue’s condition gradually improved, he decided to remain at the helm.

The penultimate chapter of Facts and Fears is one of the longer and more awaited sections of the book, as it deals with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s re-election and the far-reaching Russian influence campaign during 2015–2016, which Clapper admits is one of the reasons he wrote the book. He balances his numerous criticisms of Russian actions with the reminder that, between 1946 and 2000, the United States also interfered in 81 elections, including one of our own—a reference to the Watergate break-in. He discusses the events and nuance surrounding the Clinton email controversy and his dismay at the ill-advised decision of retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn to appear at a December 2015 Moscow gala sponsored by leading propagandist media organization Russia Today, for which he received a $45,000 speaking fee. In May 2016, six months prior to the presidential election, Clapper announced to the public that Russian entities were interfering in the US presidential campaigns, and by August the IC assessed that Putin and his cronies were actively trying to get Donald Trump elected president or, in the more likely case of a Hiliary Clinton victory, undermine her ability to effectively govern the nation. On 7 October, Clapper and DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a joint statement concerning this Russian interference in the US democratic process, but other headlines swallowed up their announcement. As he notes, no one at the time believed a Trump victory was even possible, much less likely.

In the final chapter of Facts and Fears, Clapper explains more explicitly why he chose to write the book—a noteworthy topic, since he initially planned to never write about his experiences. Although he explains early on that he “doesn’t do well when unoccupied and bored” (65), he did not take pen in hand simply to keep busy in retirement. He has a specific, heartfelt message for the IC, which, he says, “cannot save our nation if facts are negotiable” (396), and for America in general, prompted by the 2016 presidential election and the subsequent behavior of the Trump administration. He wrote Facts and Fears because of his deep-seated and abiding concern for the future of the nation, to remind Americans that “the Russians are our primary existential threat,” and in hopes that it might help the public “regain awareness.” (400)

As is routine in Washington in advance of presidential elections, Clapper submitted his resignation as DNI, letting President Obama know that, at age 75, he would be leaving office effective at noon on Inauguration Day, 20 January 2017. In the meantime, he began working with the transition team for president-elect Trump, which included former colleague Mike Flynn as national security advisor. Now as a private citizen, Clapper watched from the sidelines as Flynn was fired in February, followed shortly after by the abrupt firing of his friend and FBI Director William Comey, a development Clapper describes as “truly reprehensible.” (393) Stopping just short of accusing the Trump administration of collusion with Russian influence peddlers, Clapper stresses the common interests of both parties and instead charges them with “parallelism,” the perhaps unplanned but mutually-beneficial campaign to sow lingering, pervasive doubts in the minds of the American populace about the democratic process and its results.

Clapper emphasizes several themes throughout the book—his view of public service as an obligation and
a privilege, his determination to root out discrimination in any and all forms, his intention to avoid dabbling in policy, and his mandate that he and his immediate subordinates leave the IC better than it was when they found it. Another theme Clapper addresses throughout is the importance of mentorship. While anyone who has worked for him recognizes how he has mentored them, Clapper reverses the optic and identifies several individuals specifically who helped him be successful, including IC seniors Joan Dempsey, Letitia (“Tish”) Long, Betty Sapp, and Stephanie O’Sullivan. In typically glib fashion, he asks them to “remember me kindly when they eventually take over the world.” (70)

_Facts and Fears_ is not only an engrossing read but also unique, in that no other DNI has written such a book about his experiences, and Clapper’s tenure and longevity in the IC lends the volume a special significance. The well-written book is very personal in nature, especially when Clapper briefly discusses family (primarily his wife and grandchildren) and friends and co-workers (in more extensive fashion). The droll sense of humor those who have spoken at length with him know so well comes through the pages clearly. Clapper proudly and openly wears his badge of patriotism, and the harsh critique of Russian actions and the whiff of collusion with the Trump administration accounts not only for the fact the book exists at all but also for the strident nature of the final two chapters. To get inside the head of the man who served as DNI longer than his three predecessors combined is a rare opportunity, as is hearing from a man who has spent more than a half-century finely honing the craft of intelligence. _Facts and Fears_ is a welcome addition to the IC literature, a volume that does not shy away from exposing the “hard truths” of the profession.

The Reviewer: **David A. Foy** is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews.
Intelligence in Public Media

Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence
James R. Clapper, with Trey Brown (Viking, 2018), 424 pp., bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Jason U. Manosevitz

Former Director of National Intelligence General James Clapper introduces his memoir, Facts and Fears: Hard Truths From A Life In Intelligence, by describing his shock over the election in November 2016 of President Donald Trump (1) and recalling the official IC warnings issued during the campaign about Russian influence operations and cyber threats. (2–3) He laments that these warnings, contained in “a landmark product—among the most important ever produced by US intelligence,” were never adequately explained to the American public. (4) It is a failing he returns to in his concluding chapter, “Facts and Fears.”

General Clapper’s book is a must-read (see CIA historian David Foy’s excellent summary appearing on the pages just before this one), because the memoir provides the insights of a most senior and experienced practitioner of intelligence on collection, analysis, and the role intelligence plays in policymaking. Clapper’s life story as an intelligence professional with military and civilian experience serves as his bona fides. Like other senior intelligence professionals who have written memoirs, he explains the role he played in national security events that occurred during his watch and shows a deep sense of pride in intelligence work. The leadership tips Clapper sprinkles throughout his book are also particularly valuable and should not be overlooked. Readers will pick up on the DNI’s struggle with the intelligence officer’s job of informing policy decisions—“telling truth to power”—while remaining apolitical. It is a theme that emerges repeatedly and brings the book to a close.

The memoir does not go into intelligence operations in detail, but it does contain a six-page discussion of the deliberations surrounding the decision to take out Usama bin Ladin. In that discussion Clapper goes over the various assessments of the likelihood of Bin Ladin’s actually being present in the compound in Pakistan and reviews the range of opinions the president’s senior national security team held concerning the likelihood of Bin Ladin’s presence and how to proceed. (151–52) In observing how President Barack Obama left the Situation Room to consider his decision privately, Clapper provides the source of the title of this memoir, recalling George Patton’s advice to battle commanders before a battle: “The time to take counsel of your fears is before you make an important battle decision. That’s the time to listen to every fear you can imagine. When you have collected all the facts and fears and made your decision, turn off the fears and go ahead.”

One of the most interesting aspects of Facts and Fears is how Clapper’s view of how intelligence analysis evolved during his career as an intelligence officer. He writes that analysis is about hard work and persistence and underscores that it is difficult to draw inferences from spotty information, all of which is true. Looking back at his early years as a young military intelligence officer in Vietnam, Clapper bitingly recalls that intelligence was “largely historical, telling people what had happened, not what was happening and certainly not about forecasting what was going to happen.” (22) This is fascinating and a bit jarring for most intelligence analysts today, who tend to see analysis as anything but history. This experience may also help explain why he signed an update to Intelligence Community Directive 203 on analytic standards and integrity. The revision laid out specific probabilistic language to express likelihood and requires analysts to be clear about their underlying assumptions.

The general’s take on what intelligence can and cannot do adds to the age-old debate about intelligence success and failure and what we can reasonably expect from analysis. Sometimes as DNI, Clapper felt compelled to remind President Obama and Congress that the IC is not clairvoyant. Most intelligence analysts and managers will agree with Clapper’s belief that the goal of analysis is to “reduce uncertainty for decisionmakers as much as possible.” (49, 311)

Chief among the analytic limits that Clapper calls out is the difficulty with assessing an actor’s intent. His first taste with this problem came the mid-1980s when he discovered he could not come up with a system for un-
Clapper’s argument about intangibles, like intent and will, may not satisfy all. When recounting Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Clapper states that assessing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions is difficult and that even though the IC had warned for days that Russian soldiers without insignia were positioning themselves around Crimea and that Russian troops were massing near the border, the IC “never expected Russia to actually seize control, much less formally annex the peninsula.” (261) Part of the strategic warning function is to extrapolate intentions from actions and capabilities, and many analytic techniques have been developed and used since 9/11 to help analysts think creatively about such problems.

Clapper is not simply aiming to explain away his role in miscalls or missteps. He forthrightly points out his own role as the head of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in getting assessments about Iraq’s WMD program wrong in the months before the US entry into Iraq in 2003. (99) Similarly, he points out the mistakes the IC made when it unwittingly drafted talking points for the Obama administration about the Bengazi attack, particularly since he was aware that initial reports in crises are often wrong. (179) He does not linger over these failures, however. Clapper highlights a few successes, but he does not hype them. For example, he matter-of-factly points out that the self-immolation of a fruit seller in Tunisia would touch off the Arab Spring. (159–61). The former DNI points to the difficulty with assessing an actor’s will—a close cousin of intent—which is, for example, why the IC was unable to assess that the Iraqi Army would flee Mosul when ISIS attacked, even though the Iraqis’ had several years of US military training and possessed superior weapons. (81)

Clapper’s memoir provides a sober view of the role of intelligence in policymaking. He argues that intelligence can provide policymakers with a decision advantage but that ultimately it is up to policymakers to decide what action to take. Clapper’s first dose of this plain truth came when he was a briefer for Gen. William Westmoreland in 1966 and realized the general was simply not listening to his briefs. Clapper describes this as “probably the darkest moment” of his career. (24) In a somewhat similar vignette, he retells how, after he had become DNI, the Obama administration kept raising the evidentiary bar for proof that Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad had used chemical weapons, showing some frustration that the president chose not to act on its own “red line” for action, even when the intelligence unambiguously showed that Asad had used such weapons. (239) Although not explicit, Clapper seems to arrive at the conclusion that facts are the basis of intelligence and that vision is the basis of policy. And while facts feed into policymaking, in the pursuit of a vision, policymakers sometimes set facts aside.

The general does not explicitly provide a list of leadership tips in Facts and Fears, but he provides several lessons learned throughout his memoir. This helps set his book apart from many other memoirs from intelligence professionals. The tips he provides are about workforce engagement, knowing when to end a program, the value of diversity, and navigating the public record of intelligence. For example, Clapper mentions that when leading DIA through a reorganization, he failed to engage the workforce enough, making the task more difficult than it needed to be. (73) In making changes to the office of the DNI, he put that experience to good use, which made for a smoother transition. (146)

The lesson Clapper offers on navigating public attention to intelligence is that intelligence professionals should correct the public record when they can, but not at the expense of compromising intelligence programs. This lesson comes from Clapper’s long running fracas from a gaffe he made during congressional testimony. Clapper mistakenly answered a question he thought was about actions the IC was conducting under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, when in fact the question was about the Patriot Act. Though repeatedly chastised, he refrained from correcting the record until the program in question was exposed by Edward Snowden’s unauthorized leaks. (208–10)

On sustaining or cutting programs, Clapper is fond of saying “when riding a dead horse, it is best to dismount.” By this he means leaders should avoid running the IC on
bureaucratic momentum and herculean efforts to save pet programs if the programs have outlived their usefulness. Rather, IC leaders need to be clear-eyed about priorities and the most effective means of achieving those goals, particularly in the face of budget cuts. In this vein, the memoir’s discussion of the IC budget cycle and the long-term damage that government shutdowns and continuing resolutions have on program development will not be of interest to all, but the section is a must read for anyone who aspires to IC leadership.

During his career, Clapper struggled at times with “company policy” to leave policy decisions to policymakers. For example, he describes giving his private input to President Obama on Afghanistan after an NSC meeting, consciously aware he was stepping beyond his objective role and explaining to an irate Obama that it was inappropriate for him raise his points during the NSC meeting. (147) He similarly recounts that he got more involved than he should have in discussions with senior policymakers on the US response to China’s theft of Office of Personnel Management data. Specifically he strayed into the policy discussion by arguing that the US response would set a precedent that might come back to “haunt” the United States in the future. (297)

As promised, Facts and Fears returns in its lengthy final two chapters to the subject of Russian involvement in the 2016 election and cyber warfare—and the multiple congressional hearings and meetings surrounding the subjects and the president-elect’s reaction to them. Throughout, readers will see growing personal commitment to continuing to “speak truth to power”—in this case, to the American people.” (400) For this reviewer, General Clapper’s desire to raise public awareness of intelligence issues carries with it considerable risk of straining IC ties to current policymakers (or others) who may take his perspectives as official—and political—IC points of view, notwithstanding the disclaimer that appears behind the title page: “All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US government, specifically the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the US Intelligence Community.” Such a statement accompanies the published work of every author subject to an IC prepublication review, just as it does on the first page of this review.

★★★★

The Reviewer: Jason Manosevitz is an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis and a member of the Studies in Intelligence Editorial Board.
President Carter: The White House Years
Stuart E. Eizenstat (Thomas Dunne Books, 2018), 898 pp., notes, index.

Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey

Editor’s note: In 2018, soon after the publication of President Carter: The White House Years, reviewer Thomas Coffey interviewed author Stuart E. Eizenstat, who served as the chief White House Domestic Policy Advisor during the Carter administration. Eizenstat also served on the White House staff of President Johnson, as US ambassador to the European Union, as undersecretary of state, and as deputy secretary of the US Treasury under President Clinton. For President Obama, he served as special adviser to Secretaries of State Clinton and Kerry on issues concerning the Holocaust. During the Carter years, Eizenstat participated in policymaking on several foreign policy issues, including the Israel–Egypt peace talks, and sanctions policy against Iran and the Soviet Union. Some of his reminiscences and insights from that era are interspersed within the book review below.

A common defense of poorly regarded past presidencies is that bad politics negated good policies. At its most palatable, this defense blames weak presidential leadership; at its least, the citizenry takes it on the chin for being shortsighted and uninformed. Stuart Eizenstat, former chief domestic policy advisor to Jimmy Carter, keeps much of his aim squarely on the president. Part memoir, history, and testimonial, President Carter: The White House Years is a balanced and credible, if not altogether convincing, revisionist look at this much maligned presidency. Readers may not buy Eizenstat’s argument that Carter had “one of the most consequential one-term presidencies in modern history,” but they will come away with a better understanding of the man and his policies. (1)

Research for the book started in 1981. Eizenstat interviewed 325 individuals from the administration, including President Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale as well as outside observers, Republicans and Democrats alike. He also took 5,000 pages of notes covering every phone conversation and meeting he attended to stay on top of the issues, many of them involving foreign affairs (4). At roughly 1,000 pages in length, the book reads like one long, though quite compelling, reference aid for the many controversies surrounding the Carter administration. This exhaustive quality (e.g., the index even flags the “killer rabbit episode,” recounted below), however, gives the book a defensive tone.

A major aspect of any revisionist history is debunking some of the negative stories that comprise the conventional wisdom about its subject. Some of the false claims about Carter were legendary:

- The “malaise” speech given in July 1979 never used that word and, contrary to the morale-sinking reputation it gained, actually boosted Carter’s approval rating by 17 points. (691)
- Carter did not micromanage the White House tennis court schedule. Kindly permitting all his staffers to use it, he only asked that they contact his secretary before playing. Otherwise, he was put in the awkward position of having to kick staffers off the court when he walked out there with the intent of playing. (711)
- Carter never was attacked by a “killer rabbit” during a fishing trip. The president told a down-home story about splashing pond water to scoot away a swimming bunny, which press secretary Jody Powell exaggerated to a small circle of his acquaintances for fun. Each press retelling of the story was embellished to make Carter look jumpy and weak. (712)
- Carter did not skimp on the number of helicopters used in the disastrous Iran hostage rescue mission. The plan called for six; the military added one extra as a contingency, and Carter told them to add another helicopter—for a total of eight. (797)
Part of the reason these stories have stuck in people’s minds is that few people were willing to give the benefit of a doubt to the irksome Carter. Eizenstat notes the president could come across as a “public scold, who disdained politics.” (2) He’d rather bone up on the minute details of a policy than sell it to Congress. Carter, who regarded the Democratic Party as an “albatross,” expressed relief when the SALT II treaty was pulled from congressional consideration, noting, “Now I don’t have to kiss every senator’s ass.” (652) Mondale described his boss as a “domestic recluse” who needed to get out and understand people’s real concerns. (676) Carter confided to an aide that he was “antisocial” and preferred fishing and hunting. (679) He also admitted to Eizenstat that he could be “awfully stubborn. A cause of my success. May also be a cause of my political failures.” (498)

The stubborn drive to secure a peace accord was very much in evidence during the triumphant Camp David summit in September 1978. That and the personal touch so lacking with Carter on domestic politics surfaced repeatedly in these negotiations. To get Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel to give up land conquered in the Sinai Desert in exchange for diplomatic recognition and peace with Egypt, Carter pulled out all stops—from sending heartfelt messages to Begin’s relatives to taking both Begin and Sadat to the battlefield at Gettysburg, where the message about “the costs of war and the rewards of peace to two countries that had repeatedly fought each other” for years was sure to resonate. (510)

Carter became heavily involved in drafting the accord and presenting the changes to the two Middle Eastern leaders for approval, a job normally tasked to a lower-level functionary. “The two leaders never actually negotiated face-to-face. Their relationship was so poisonous Carter quickly realized he had to keep them separated and work through their delegations.” Eizenstat notes that Carter read CIA profiles on both leaders to prepare for the Summit. (432–43) Carter got along quite well with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, but there was only so much of Begin’s pedantry the president could take. Eizenstat concluded that Begin and Carter “brought out the worst in each other.” (528)

The accord was the high point of Carter’s foreign policy, which also included the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty in September 1977, the normalization of diplomatic relations with China in December 1978, and the Bonn economic summit in 1978 that secured commitments to boost worldwide growth while conserving energy. The following year, 1979, was to prove Carter’s undoing, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the taking of the American hostages in Iran.

After the invasion, the Carter Doctrine drew a line in the sand stressing that “any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.” (10) The doctrine reflected Carter’s “assuming the worst” even though his CIA director cautioned the invasion was probably not the start of a bigger Soviet land-grab. The development of a Rapid Deployment Force, strengthening of alliances in the region, and support to the Afghan resistance were part of an overall boost in defensive measures to counter the Soviet Union.

Robert Gates, who served in Carter’s National Security Council, has always maintained the president was much more of a Cold War hawk than depicted, and that “Reagan reaped the harvest sown by Nixon, Ford, and Carter.” (615) Still, the notion Carter was naïve about Soviet intentions, which was exacerbated by his admission that “his opinion has changed more drastically in the last week [i.e., since the invasion of Afghanistan] than even the previous two and a half years,” would plague him. (639)

The CIA played a small but very consequential role in Carter’s presidency, first as a major impetus behind his sweeping reforms to address the energy crisis that Carter characterized as the “moral equivalent of war.” (166) A dire assessment based on the subsequent CIA report, The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985, was

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b. See, for example, Robert Gates, From the Shadows (Simon & Schuster, 2007), 147.

c. Eizenstat shared in the interview that, though the alarmist CIA energy assessment stirred Carter to move early in the administration on reform, “Energy was not a major campaign issue for Carter . . . [and was] not particularly urgent, but Carter saw a need to deal with our country’s growing dependence on OPEC oil imports.” Eizenstat asserted that “not having a chief of staff to set priorities was behind this early emphasis on energy policy, which collided with other priorities.”

briefed to him as president-elect. The report predicted that world demand for oil would substantially exceed capacity by 1985 and this would lead to sharp price increases “no matter what Saudi Arabia does.” (147) The analysis was wrong, as higher oil prices led to greater production and less consumption—by the mid-1980s, the market was experiencing a glut. It’s hard to know whether, forewarned by overly alarmist intelligence, Carter and his reform program actually contributed to the subsequent fall in oil prices. The CIA report galvanized the president, and helped convince Carter to move energy issues to the top of his agenda. The battles Carter fought for energy reform lasted two years, at great political cost. Carter told Eizenstat the focus on energy “sapped our strength.” (239)

The fall of the shah of Iran and the taking of American hostages in Tehran probably doomed Carter’s presidency. Eizenstat is strident about CIA’s failure on three aspects of this two-year long crisis. “One could fill an ocean with what the United States did not know about developments in Iran.” (726) The first failure was not recognizing the strength of the opposition and its leadership. The second was the failure to judge that the shah would refuse to clamp down, in part because he was terribly weakened by cancer. And, finally, the Intelligence Community failed to warn of Ayatollah Khomeini’s intent to create a fundamentalist religious state—not to simply serve as some outside spiritual influence. Eizenstat saw this information as being “there for the taking” in France, where Khomeini was exiled. A visiting academic and future US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, visited the ayatollah and immediately discerned Khomeini’s true intentions. (734)

In the fall of the 1978, Brzezinski complained to the president about the poor intelligence from CIA and recommended Carter send a note to Director Turner.† Carter said he was “dissatisfied with the quality of political intelligence” on Iran. (725) Eizenstat shed additional light on this fraught relationship, observing that former DCI Stansfield Turner (whom Eizenstat interviewed twice), felt cut out of major foreign policy deliberations by National Security Advisor Brzezinski, specifically by being excluded from regular Friday breakfasts with top foreign policy officials and being initially shut out of planning for the hostage rescue operation—until he demanded a role. Eizenstat described his own participation in one of the first National Security Council meetings to explore options after the hostages were taken: “I suggested we could effectively shut down the Iranian economy by blockading Kharg Island, from which Iran exported the bulk of its oil.” Carter, Eizenstat said, feared this step might lead to the killing of the hostages, and that failure to consider a blockade or a mining of Iranian harbors meant “Carter was negotiating with an almost empty hand.”

Turner described the president’s note as a “hard blow,” but wondered if the CIA was being made a scapegoat, for there was plenty of blame to go around. Intelligence analysts did misjudge the strength of the opposition, the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism, and the shah’s grip on power. However, the analysts were working from a restricted information base, given a US policy understanding to limit embassy and station reporting on internal politics in return for the shah’s permitting collection on the border against the Soviet Union. (726) Many policy officials did not know this. The analysts’ failure to make plain the lack of reporting on internal politics gave their judgments a false sense of certainty. As Eizenstat notes, the shah’s cancer was a closely guarded secret, known to very few in his inner circle. This secrecy contributed to the backlash and taking of hostages when the shah visited the United States for treatment. Having no inkling of the shah’s cancer when he was head of state, many Iranians assumed Washington was lying about the purpose of the visit and was instead making plans with the shah to put him back in power (764). Better intelligence analysis may not have met a receptive audience. The US ambassador’s more accurate warnings about the shah’s doomed rule was disputed by Brzezinski and got him sidelined. (735)

To be of any actionable policy use, Turner thought that three-to-four years’ prior warning was needed to get the shah to change course. Interestingly, intelligence analysts did warn in the early-to-mid-1960s of political upheaval that would be “revolutionary in nature . . . that it remains uncertain whether Iran will make the ultimate transition to modern life without experiencing a violent revolution.”

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† Eizenstat shared that Carter’s approach to the CIA could be “traced back to campaign speeches that focused on not repeating the policies that had come under criticism under the Church committee while pressing for greater oversight [and that] Carter put in place the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court system, setting the rules of surveillance inside the United States.”

Yet this line of analysis was dropped. The shah’s longevity in office probably suggested he would continue to weather the political storm created by his modernization program.

Worth contemplating is a President Carter who might have been amply warned about a superficially stable Iran. Eizenstat stresses the president liked to aggressive-
a. Eizenstat believed that accurate intelligence on Iran would have made a difference with Carter. In the interview, he recalled, “Turner admitted he and the CIA had not served Carter well on Iran.” Carter and Brzezinski disagreed with Ambassador Sullivan’s recommendation to abandon the Shah of Iran and reach out to Khomeini given his more negative view of the Shah’s prospects. “Now, if Stan [then-DCI Stansfield Turner] had given the same message,” Eizenstat said, “the president might have listened, but would still have sought ways to bolster the shah.”

ly tackle challenges other presidents had “sidestepped and ignored.” (3) Perhaps these types of issues—energy, Middle East peace, airline deregulation, the Panama Canal—gave Carter the initiative and the luxury of time to be at his stubborn best. However, as with other presidents, Carter was less sure-footed when reacting to breaking developments—the fall of the shah, hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This flaw was especially apparent in Carter’s reaction to the early and breaking news of a landslide victory for Ronald Reagan during Election Day 1980. Wanting to “get it over with,” Carter made his concession speech 90 minutes before the polls closed in the western part of the country. This risked discouraging turnout for Democrats on the ticket and led Speaker Tip O’Neill to fume, “You guys came in like a bunch of jerks, and I see you’re going out the same way.” Representative Tom Foley complained this was “vintage Carter at his dead worst.” (891)

The reviewer: Thomas G. Coffey is a member of CSI’s Lessons Learned team, His work and frequent reviews focus on the relationship between intelligence and policy.
Intelligence in Public Media

The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age
Adam Segal (PublicAffairs, 2016), 320 pp., notes, index.

Reviewed by Jeffrey I.

The year between the June 2012 New York Times publication detailing an alleged Western cyber operation targeting Iran and the Guardian’s June 2013 publication of the Snowden leaks marked a significant shift in the international order. In these 12 months, the illusion of the internet as an ungovernable information utopia was shattered.

A less romantic vision took its place. Far from being an anarchic asylum guided by nationless hackers and idealistic entrepreneurs, the internet was revealed to be a place where security services and intelligence agencies had thoroughly penetrated, another arena for old international rivalries to play out. By the end of the summer of 2013, the world came to understand it was organs of state power—with mundane monikers like Tailored Access Operations and Unit 61398, not teenage super-hackers or technology adept activists—who were the most powerful actors in cyberspace.

Public denials and rebukes aside, undoubtedly many foreign governments knew the broad outlines (at least) of America’s activities in cyberspace prior to the summer of 2012; however, the revelation of these activities to their constituents caused a swell in domestic pressure for leaders to address issues of privacy, sovereignty, and the role of information technology as an instrument of national power. What had been a niche national security or counterintelligence concern (or opportunity for intelligence sharing) was now a mainstream political issue and a matter of foreign policy. Cyberwarfare and computer aided espionage had left the shadows and become an overt tool of diplomacy and subject of public debate.

In his book The Hacked World Order, Council of Foreign Relations chair Adam Segal explicates the impact of these 12 months—what he refers to as “Year Zero”—on the international order, and the role computer network exploitation and cyber-operations have since played in foreign policy. Beginning with “Year Zero,” Segal creates a well-thought-out strategic map of cyberspace, contrasting the different perspectives, motivations, and justifications of the various players. Throughout his book, Segal pegs his analysis to established foreign policy narratives: the rise of non-state actors, the decline of American power vis-à-vis China, and the shifting of economic and political centers of gravity to the Global South. These familiar narratives will serve to help orient readers new to cyberspace issues. They also suggest one of the central themes of the book: conflicts in cyberspace today are largely an extension of conflicts playing out in traditional foreign policy arenas. The role of cyber power has so far been limited in international conflicts, though its importance is rapidly increasing and will continue to be a source of significant strategic uncertainty.

Segal spends considerable time emphasizing the unpredictability of cyber weapons. They may fail to execute properly, spread to untargeted systems, or wreak significantly more havoc than intended. Furthermore, cyber weapons are difficult to use as a deterrent. As Segal puts it: “You cannot march cyber weapons in a parade or detonate them over a Pacific atoll.” (108) Finally, many cyber weapons have a short shelf life as well as an erratic development schedule, compared to traditional munitions. “Exploits,” the heart of most cyber weapons, can be patched at any time and there is no guarantee that a newly discovered exploit will have the same capability as one on the shelf.

The strategic advantage presented by new cyber weapons is often a “use-it-or-lose-it” proposition. All these factors make applying traditional theories of use of force difficult in cyberspace. They also make this a particularly dangerous time—as norms for use of cyber weapons continue to be established—for misunderstandings and unintended escalation. “Policymakers have lost a sense of strategic stability, predictability, and control,” Segal explains. (265) From Segal’s perspective, the ongoing lobbying by the American private sector for legal authority to retaliate against, or “hack-back,” intellectual

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
property thieves, state-sponsored or otherwise, will only make this situation more precarious.

Because they pose significantly fewer risks for the attacker than cyber weapons, psychological warfare operations in cyberspace constitute a realm in which some actors feel much more comfortable aggressively operating. The author cites Russia as a particularly aggressive user of the internet as a medium for influence operations. According to Segal, however, the Russians don’t believe they started the information war: “Russian politicians and military leaders see themselves as victims of information attacks from Western media, NGOs, and the internet itself.” (81)

A weakened Russia, feeling threatened by NATO encroachment and increasingly reliant on what it feels is a Western-dominated internet may be fighting back the only way it can. Russia’s well-publicized use of automated social-media posting (“bots”) and paid commenters (“trolls”) is designed not to present a counter-narrative, but to crowd out thoughtful conversation and spread confusion. Psychological warfare and influence operations have been used against a wide variety of Russian rivals. A coherent strategy on how to respond to these operations, which don’t reach the threshold of armed conflict, has yet to be established. These operations are integral to Russia’s war-fighting strategy and have been used in conjunction with cyber weapons in its military campaigns in the Ukraine and Georgia.

In addition to the military use of cyberspace, Segal covers the ongoing conflict over the future of internet governance. America’s position, logically and physically, at the center of the internet has given it unique economic and military advantages. International rivals like China and Russia perceive that the motivating force behind America’s efforts for a free and open internet is protecting those advantages. Our adversaries counter the American push to maintain an open internet with insistence that cyber-sovereignty be respected. While acknowledging the economic advantages of an open internet, China and others view domestic stability as the higher priority. What the United States sees as efforts to limit internet freedom and restrict the flow of information, others view as de-Americanizing it and claiming their cyber-sovereignty. Segal posits that some Europeans, who would have been sympathetic to US arguments, were dissuaded by the Snowden revelations, interpreting our calls for internet freedom—much like China and Russia—as the cynical defense of a hegemonic status quo.

Despite some shortcomings (a distracting, inconsistent style usage suggests the book could have used another pass by the editor, and the assessments of US capabilities seem to be largely taken from news media analysis of Greenwald-curated leaks), this is worthwhile read for any intelligence officer looking for a primer on strategic cyber issues. The information in this book will serve as a solid foundation for regional- or target-specific research and help put more focused information in perspective. Approaching cyber from a foreign policy perspective with a wide aperture makes this work accessible to a diverse audience; both the technically inclined intelligence officer and his better dressed colleague across the river will find something useful here.

The reviewer: Jeffrey I. is a consultant supporting the National Security Agency. His work focuses on understanding emerging technologies.
Christopher Andrew is the dean of intelligence historians, and in *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence*, he has undertaken the ambitious task of producing a global history of clandestine operations. His purpose is prescriptive, as he professes that long-term perspective is required to deal with present intelligence challenges. Synthesis of this magnitude is a complicated business. Beyond mastery of myriad sources, successful execution requires effective framing of issues so that a meaningful narrative structure emerges; it highlights the centrality of choice, what to include—and, as important—what to omit; and it demands of the author no small degree of craftsmanship in writing, lest the work descend into pedantry.

The book features carefully intertwined themes. One traces antecedents of present institutions and practices. To offer one example: the Russian SVR—at least culturally—predates the KGB, its Soviet predecessors, and even the Tsarist Okhrana, back to Ivan “the Terrible” and the Oprichniki, whose chief, Maliuta Skuratov, Andrew describes as, “against strong competition, probably the most loathsome figure in the entire history of Russian intelligence.” (142) Similarly, the KGB’s countersubversion campaign would have been familiar to the Spanish Inquisition, whose *autos da fe* Soviet show trials consciously aped.

What we would recognize as modern intelligence bureaucracies have waxed and waned over time. No such apparatus existed in the ancient world. The Greeks placed far greater emphasis on seers, oracles, and the intervention of the gods, than on HUMINT. The Romans attached similar importance to divination, and commanders who acted in contempt of omens were believed responsible for their own misfortune. After Julius Caesar, emperors employed informers to warn of plots. The practice, however necessary, was unsuccessful: three-quarters of them suffered assassination or overthrow.

Another theme is the persistence of amateurism. The 12 operatives Moses sent into Canaan circa 1300 B.C. were chosen for their social standing, not because they had any skill, and 10 of them gave distorted reports. In 19th century Europe, intelligence, counterespionage, and countersubversion were secondary duties for police forces. Scotland Yard’s Special Branch, for example, was founded to counter Fenian terrorism in London. From an Edwardian England paranoid about the rising German threat, Robert Baden-Powell suggested, “The best spies are unpaid men who are doing it for the love of the thing” (450). And when CIA was in its infancy, Sherman Kent feared the profession lacked a serious literature.

Andrew salts the narrative with turning points in global history that influenced the craft of intelligence in sometimes surprising ways. These include:

- The dissemination of the printing press, which enabled, for the first time, open source collection.

- The golden age of exploration was instrumental in the rise of official secrecy. Renaissance Venice was obsessed with using official secrecy to protect lucrative trade routes; Venetian ambassadors became models in the use of embassies as platforms for running agent networks; and the Venetian Council of Ten recruited foreign merchants to report on commercial developments and established the first European code-breaking agency.

- The emergence of the nation state and modern diplomacy were a boon to the intelligence business. The earliest ambassadors were expected to collect foreign intelligence as well as represent their sovereigns, though their requirements were unlike ours: Spanish agents at the court of Louis XIII were required to verify that the teenaged monarch had consummated his marriage to his equally young queen, Anne of Austria. Similarly, Sir Francis Walsingham was both secretary of state and intelligence chief to Elizabeth I. There was minimal distinction between these roles until the 20th century, when intelligence bureaucracies developed and SIGINT became a discipline.
The rapid spread of the telegraph and the wireless, in turn, enabled SIGINT. Before, it consisted of what the French called cabinets noir for intercepting and decrypting private or diplomatic correspondence. Intelligence from such operations put Mary Queen of Scots and Charles I on the execution block. Unsurprisingly, SIGINT enjoys prominence here due both to its implementation by recordkeeping bureaucracies, and the significance—if not the fame—of its impact across centuries, not least during the Second World War. Indeed, Andrew observes that intelligence studies as a discipline had its origins in the declassification of ULTRA and Double Cross in the 1970s.

Though this is a global history, Europe is the predominant presence, due to the lack of available documentation on other geopolitical entities. Andrew acknowledges Asian antecedents—Art of War and the Indian Arthashastra—asserting the latter was the first book anywhere to call for the establishment of a professional intelligence service and the first to envision a fully organized surveillance state. (61) Mao Zedong studied Sun Tzu more closely than did any previous emperor, even as Andrew argues that the book promises more than it delivers; successive dynasties neglected intelligence just as they ignored the outside world. Like the Romans, most Chinese rulers were more concerned with assassination and covert action against internal rivals.

Andrew does relatively little with intelligence analysis in its own right, though he addresses notable analytical failures that tended to be failures of imagination, as when he shows that, before Japan peaked in 1942, most Western analysts could not conceive of “Orientals” being so capable; or when he observes that, “Western intelligence agencies at the end of the Cold War suffered, though they did not realize it, from a serious lack of theologians,” (701) leading directly to the events of 1979 and 2001. Intelligence professionals steeped in Curveball, the “surprise” Soviet collapse, and the like, will be interested to learn that Lord Nelson’s failure to detect Napoleon’s Egypt-bound invasion fleet triggered the first documented official query into an intelligence failure, despite his subsequent annihilation of that fleet at Aboukir Bay.

Across the scope of this chronicle, Andrew identifies leaders he regards as effective intelligence practitioners and consumers, from Hannibal to Frederick the Great, from Walsingham to Washington. He likewise criticizes those who ignored intelligence, and does not spare the biographers of the great and the good for overlooking the pivotal role it has played in politics and international affairs. Andrew is a Cambridge don, so we should not be surprised at a touch of Anglophilia. Walsingham—who emerges the hero—was the first to integrate espionage, counter-espionage, code-breaking, and countersubversion into a cohesive system to protect his sovereign from unprecedented internal and external threats. His practices, including recruiting agents among hated ideological opponents (161), doubling the financiers of plots against their masters, penetrating Jesuit seminaries in Europe training agents to penetrate England, and feeding disinformation through known foreign agents, are utterly modern. Other chapters on British topics are among the best written. And while Andrew praises George Washington for confounding his foes during the Revolution, one senses bemusement in his account of how easily the British manipulated a naïve US government during World War One.

American readers are advised to heed Andrew’s admonition about the long view. In 760 pages of text, only the penultimate chapter directly addresses the Cold War and CIA, with the last reserved for the age of sacred terror. This is, however, beside the point. As synthesis, The Secret World is an unqualified success. The text is rich with fact and anecdote alike, engagingly written, and marbled with shrewd observation and judgment that intelligence professionals might consider—or debate—with equal benefit.

The reviewer: Leslie C. is a career CIA Directorate of Operations officer who has an interest in intelligence history.
For policymakers, senior military leaders, and intelligence officers around the globe, the ultimate nightmare is the outbreak of nuclear war, making the avoidance of such the highest concern of all sane world leaders. The American public is generally aware of how close the nation came to nuclear war with the Soviet Union over strategic missiles in Cuba in 1962 but much less so of the prospect of a similar threat again just over two decades later, in 1983. Journalist, producer, and educator Marc Ambinder discusses the near-outbreak of the unthinkable in his new book, *The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983*. Ambinder notes that he interviewed 100 people, including a dozen former intelligence officers with direct knowledge and eight participants in the Able Archer war game that concluded a regularly scheduled military-civilian exercise—and convinced Soviet observers that the United States was about to unleash a nuclear holocaust.

The author begins with the flowery and vague generalization that “a nuclear priesthood gave order to the earth after World War II,” (7) before focusing on his leading man, President Ronald Reagan, who was convinced early on that the only way to win a nuclear attack. Perhaps to the surprise of no one, they found them, prompting their making plans to strike the first blow. During this period of “brittle brinksmanship” (11) in the early 1980s, misunderstandings and faulty information on one or both sides meant that the two superpowers lived in a fragile peace, neither trusting the other. Reagan was convinced that the Soviets had spent the 1970s honing their ability to not only deliver but also survive a nuclear strike, a conclusion that convinced US authorities that US Continuity of Government (COG) plans were too vulnerable to Soviet attack; the Pentagon estimated that the president might have only three minutes between attack notification and missile detonation.

As Ambinder notes, two facts complicated the US response to any fears of Soviet pre-emptive strikes. First, Reagan’s faith and apocalyptic worldview (supported by frequent conversations with Billy Graham), which affected his foreign policy decisions, and second, his attempted assassination in 1981, which not only brought succession-related discussions but also pointed out the need for a designated Command Authority for the release of nuclear weapons should a decapitating first strike occur.

Even before the watershed year of 1983, Soviet authorities were making strategic decisions based on the presumption that the United States was actively planning a first strike. In May 1981, General Secretary Yuri Andropov announced that for the first time ever, the KGB and the GRU would cooperate in a worldwide intelligence operation known as Operation RYAN, a Russian acronym of sorts formed by the words for “nuclear missile attack.” Andropov made clear to Soviet residents worldwide that normal intelligence operations were to be temporarily set aside in favor of closely watching Western nuclear exercises, which in turn would affect the Russian nuclear alert status. Once KGB Deputy Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov made the East Germans aware of RYAN, they began closely watching a bellwether location for warnings of a US/NATO nuclear attack—the small US Army 501st Army Artillery Detachment in the strategic area of the Fulda Gap, West Germany, site of nuclear warheads for wartime release to the West Germans. Meanwhile, US authorities warily watched for any signs that Soviet ground forces might move into Poland to crush dissent there and perhaps to serve as an entree to force-on-force combat in Europe. The tightly-held information provided by CIA source Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, assigned to the Polish Peoples Army and familiar with Warsaw Pact war plans convinced the few US personnel in the know that such was not the Soviet plan.

During the Ivy League 82 exercise, as he watched Army Chief of Staff General William Rogers play him, President Reagan gained a true appreciation for US nuclear war strategy, known as the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), and learned about the “biscuit,” the small plastic card he carried in his wallet, that served
as a nuclear authenticator for missile launch purposes. According to the White House Emergency Plan at that time, if the national alert level went to DEFCON 3, the president would be evacuated from the White House; Reagan, however, made clear that he would not leave the White House and would die in any surprise attack. He was stunned to learn how fragile and unreliable the entire nuclear warning and response system actually was and that “if the Soviets wanted to decapitate the government, they could.” (93) Reagan’s policy was to engage in deterrence first; if that failed, to engage in a winning war.

By June 1982, when Reagan made his first trip to London as president, to meet with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, both the Soviet and US sides in the nuclear struggle had begun to harden. In January 1983, pursuing deterrence, Reagan discussed with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin the possibility of talking face-to-face with Andropov, unaware that defector KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, a British SIS source, was telling the KGB rezidentura to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin the possibility of talking face-to-face with Andropov, unaware that defector KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, a British SIS source, was providing the latest information on Soviet intentions to Thatcher. But the Soviets remained cautious and suspicious, their concerns not alleviated by Reagan’s famous description of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” or by his announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the Soviets believed afforded the United States a golden opportunity to conduct a first nuclear strike. Ambinder describes the controversial strategic defense apparatus as an “instance of exceedingly expensive technology sold privately to an uninformed leadership by a tiny group of especially privileged outsiders.” (129) Indicative of the charged atmosphere at the time was the US exercise FleetEX 83, in which US Navy warplanes purposely flew over a Soviet naval base to collect antiaircraft radar information. The cavalier conduct of this exercise reflected the attitudes of Navy Secretary John Lehman, proponent of a 600-ship Navy and a man who took pride in scaring the Soviets.

A 1983 meeting between Andropov and former US diplomat Averill Harriman, now a private citizen, held promise in de-escalating the tensions between the two superpowers. But this positive development founder in the wake of the Soviet shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which killed all 269 persons aboard. CIA assessed that the Soviets knew it was a civilian airliner when they shot it down. The Air Force was not so sure, pointing out that it could have been a simple matter of misidentification, especially since the RC-135 COBRA

BALL reconnaissance aircraft the Soviets thought they were shooting down had crossed the path of KAL 007. Reagan urged a cautious response, and a 2 September 1983 NSA intercept confirmed that the Soviet fighter pilots had misidentified the aircraft and that “it was an accident.” (174)

Some three weeks later, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov was alerted by an emergency klaxon going off at the Russian Ground Command and Control Center at Serpukhov-15, some 70 miles southwest of Moscow. A quick look at the red-and-white warning flashing on the screen also showed five blips that might just be American ICBMs, the initial volley of the long-fear US surprise attack. If the attack were real, the two Soviet leaders whose concurrence would be needed to launch a counter-strike would have at most 16 minutes to decide what to do. Despite being a well-trained Soviet officer, Petrov was also an intelligent and experienced Soviet engineer who had designed the algorithms supporting the Okos (Eye) system that had detected the blips—and who suspected this was a false alarm, as it proved to be. A hasty Soviet general staff investigation would later determine that reflections from high clouds passing over F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, an ICBM base, had accounted for the blips. A near-nuclear exchange had been averted in large part by Petrov, who soon became known as “the man who prevented World War III.”

In early November, US forces were engaged in Able Archer 83, intended to rehearse nuclear release procedures, and the final segment of an annual exercise. The Soviets and East Germans remained unsure of how to interpret recent events, but the Soviet military had increased its readiness level several weeks before the beginning of Able Archer. The fact that B-52 strategic bombers were involved in the exercise for the first time ever prompted the conclusion that the US was about to launch nuclear strikes. In London, Gordievsky and the KGB rezidentura received a Flash message from Moscow advising that the American exercise could be a cover for a nuclear attack. When President Reagan returned to the United States from Asia in mid-November, he was unaware of the potential for war, despite numerous indicators of increasing Soviet preparedness. Although he indicated he wished to start a meaningful dialogue with the new General Secretary, Konstantin Chernenko (Andropov had died in February 1984), Reagan was surprised to learn that the Soviets...
had responded to recent US exercises by dispatching 200 Soviet naval vessels from the Northern and Baltic fleets.

Thanks to a lack of traditional pre-attack indicators and the successful disguising of Gordievsky's inside information, a May 1984 Special National Intelligence Estimate, entitled “Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities,” concluded that “Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.” In September 1984, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited the United States and talked at length with President Reagan. Although the meeting was not substantive in nature, it was important nonetheless, paving the way for talks between Reagan and Gorbachev, who had met with Prime Minister Thatcher earlier and characterized him as “a man with whom I could do business.” (266) That nascent relationship grew into closer talks between the two world leaders, a situation described by NSC member Jack Matlock in the words, “And the world breathed a sigh of relief.” (279)

Several features of The Brink make it attractive to readers. Ambinder gets kudos for including a “Cast of Characters” section at the front of the book, which helps readers keep the personas straight, and for writing an easy-to-read account of a critical though largely unknown period in the history of US-Soviet relations. The book is also extensively researched, especially with interviews with knowledgeable principals, and includes several interesting photographs.

Unfortunately, the book is marred by numerous typographical errors that become increasingly frustrating for readers. Often words are clearly missing from the text (e.g., “and” on pages 145 and 220), phrases are oddly constructed (e.g., “to with which to deal” on page 127), and—most annoying and inexplicable of all for a professional product—the consistent use of “ordinance” instead of “ordnance” (e.g., pages 144 and 183). A book discussing nuclear weapons should at the very least understand that those two words are not the same and should know which one to use. Readers should also be aware that the picture of President Reagan that emerges from these pages is not generally laudatory—at times Ambinder portrays him as naïve, disconnected from reality, and as a chameleon, influenced most by whoever spoke with him last.

Ambinder’s book appeared almost simultaneously with Taylor Downing’s 1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink, making a comparison irresistible. Of the two volumes, Downing’s is the more expansive and includes both preceding events (an account of the Hiroshima bombing) and subsequent events (the espionage of Rick Ames and Robert Hanssen). Also, Downing’s book notes the significance of former CIA chief historian Ben Fischer—author of A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations—to the discussion, a source Ambinder does not even cite. Downing spoke at length with Fischer about his research and seems to agree with Fischer that, to the Soviets, the 1983 war scare was real. In contrast, The Brink discusses in greater detail the impact of the scare at the tactical level, particularly concerning the angst of US Army Capt. Lee Trolan, commander of the strategically-placed 501st Army Artillery Detachment. Ambinder’s book also focuses on the minute details of the communications links and their fickleness and fragility, critical when so much is at stake. Finally, The Brink ultimately fails to deliver the same sense of suspense, anxiety, and impending doom that readers will find in such recent books as the volume by Casey Sherman and Michael J. Tougias, Above and Beyond: John F. Kennedy and America’s Most Dangerous Cold War Spy Mission, about the Cuban Missile Crisis, perhaps because the 1983 war scare was less publicized at the time.

Thus, while Ambinder’s The Brink is an adequate study of the subject, readers looking for a deeper immersion into the nuclear crisis of 1983 will find Downing’s book the more satisfying of the two.

**The reviewer: David A. Foy is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of reviews.**
It is hard to imagine two spies more unalike than Benedict Arnold and Donald Maclean. Even allowing for the fact they lived some 150 years apart, the two were completely different—one was a classically ambitious American who sought wealth and military glory, while the other was an upper-class Englishman who worked in the shadows of modern bureaucracy; one was impulsive and reckless, the other was restrained and methodical; one embraced his role, the other was repelled by it. Their motives, too, were as different as can be imagined but, at the same time, they had one important thing in common—both got away with it. Arnold and Maclean both, too, are the subjects of new biographies, and looking at them side by side makes for an interesting look at spying across the centuries.

In *Turncoat*, independent historian Stephen Brumwell paints a fascinating portrait of Arnold. He was born in 1741 to a prominent and prosperous Connecticut family that, by the time Benedict was in his teens, had fallen on hard times. Determined to restore the family fortunes, by his early twenties Arnold was an established shopkeeper in New Haven. Expanding his interests, Arnold soon owned a small flotilla of trading ships that sailed from Canada to the West Indies, often with himself at the helm. The early 1770s found Arnold married, with a family, and becoming a strong opponent of British rule over the colonies. As a prominent and respected citizen of New Haven, he joined a newly-formed militia company in early 1775 and in March, just before the start of the Revolution, was elected captain.

War revealed Arnold to be a talented soldier. He participated in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga and then quickly proved himself an aggressive commander, organizing and leading troops in the invasion of Canada, and gained a well-deserved reputation for bravery on the battlefield. Wounded at Quebec, Arnold soon recovered and put his nautical experience to good use fighting the British on Lake Champlain. His greatest moment, however, came in 1777 at Saratoga, where he played a crucial role in the American victory that convinced France to enter the war against Britain. Arnold was badly wounded in the battle—surviving two wounds was little short of miraculous, considering the quality of 18th-century medicine—and his lengthy recovery relegated him to secondary roles. The highlight of the next two years was his service as military commandant of Philadelphia after the city was retaken from the British. It was during this time that, widowed since the summer of 1775, he met his second wife, Peggy Shippen.

Mere recognition of his successes was never enough for Arnold, who craved the acclaim he believed was his due. In addition, Arnold had a powerful streak of self-righteousness and never could admit he might be in the wrong. In his business career he had been known for, on the one hand, not paying his debts while, on the other, pressing anyone who owed him, and these traits became even more pronounced during the war. Arnold demanded not just promotion but seniority, and quarreled with other generals (he and Horatio Gates feuded constantly). On top of that, he was angry with Congress, which failed to support the army adequately, and engaged in profiteering, which led to a drawn-out court martial that he demanded to clear his name.

Overall, Brumwell’s portrait is of a greatly talented man who was astonishingly vain, completely lacking in self-awareness, and always cash-strapped. Little wonder, then, that Arnold became more and more alienated from his colleagues and superiors. The alliance with Catholic France—the historic enemy of Protestant England and its colonists—and Congress’s failure to respond to a British overture for talks, Brumwell argues, pushed Arnold over the edge. These “converging grievances that alienated Arnold from the Patriots,” moreover, came at a low point in American fortunes and so led him to justify his defection as a noble act. The war had become futile, Arnold convinced himself, and therefore his espionage was a

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
step toward reconciliation with the mother country and healing the “gaping fratricidal wound between Crown and colonies.” (163–4)

Arnold volunteered to the British in May 1779. From then until September 1780, he provided intelligence on American military plans and negotiated to hand over the fortifications at West Point. Anyone who has handled a difficult asset will appreciate Brumwell’s account of this period; Arnold’s information generally was only of marginal value, in part because of slow communications, but he kept asking for more money and promising the British he would make it all worthwhile. In the event, of course, he sent his son to Gresham’s, a boarding school with a strict honor code centered on “purity in thought, and word, and deed.” It was the kind of place that sewed shut the pockets on the boys’ trousers to prevent impure explorations and where normal adolescent behavior was cloaked in shame and secrecy. Donald impressed his teachers with his brilliance but learned, too, how to “hide any duplicity and resentment behind successful conformity.” (16)

From Gresham’s, Maclean went to Trinity Hall, Cambridge. This part of the story is painfully familiar to anyone who has read about intellectuals or spies during the 1930s—Maclean had been an undergraduate during the depths of the Depression and as Fascism gained power in Europe and, when he finished Cambridge in 1934 with honors in French and German, turned to Communism as the world’s only hope. Moreover, Sir Donald died while Maclean was at Cambridge, which freed young Donald to reject his father’s Presbyterianism in favor of the alternative religion of socialism. In August 1934, as Maclean was preparing to apply to the British diplomatic service, Kim Philby—he and Maclean knew each other from the Socialist Society at Cambridge—pitched him to spy for Moscow. Maclean accepted with a speed that stunned Philby, and began a 17-year espionage career on the spot. (The titular “Orphan” was Maclean’s first crypt, though he is best known as “Homer,” his crypt in Venona.)

It was, by any measure, a remarkable run. Maclean was an immensely talented bureaucrat, with an enormous capacity for work, excellent organizational and writing skills, and a talent for pleasing his superiors. He rose quickly, serving in London and Paris—in Paris, he met an American woman, Melinda Marling (whom he told of his espionage), and they married there on the day the British embassy evacuated ahead of the invading Nazis. Maclean was posted to Washington from 1944 to 1948, and it was there that his career reached its peak. During this time, the United States and Britain negotiated their postwar policies, alliance, and atomic weapons cooperation, and his talents and tireless work made him indispensable to the ambassador, who ensured that Maclean saw all embassy traffic. Reflecting the importance of his work, he was promoted to first secretary and provided with unrestricted access to the headquarters of the Atomic Energy Commission as the United States and United Kingdom worked out their early nuclear weapons plans and strategies. Through all of this time, of course, Maclean was meeting his Soviet handlers and providing them with sheaves of documents and inside information on British and Anglo-American policies.

From Washington, Maclean went on to Cairo. There, he was promoted again, becoming the youngest counselor in the Foreign Service and thus marked as a man on his way to the top. But in Egypt it became clear that Maclean was an alcoholic wreck, and his life unraveled. He had long been a heavy drinker, and the strain of his double life—beyond the risks, he never liked the deceit inherent in clandestine work—combined with an aggressive streak of self-righteousness, made for frequent binges and outbursts in which he loudly denounced the US and British governments. Even worse, in a stunning display of ineptitude, the Soviets stopped meeting him and thereby deprived Maclean of support when he needed it most. The Foreign Office no longer could overlook Maclean’s
increasingly violent behavior, as it had for a decade, and he was sent home for treatment. Appearing to be on the road to recovery, he was appointed head of the American Department in September 1950. With the Korean War raging, he was again in the perfect spot to spy for the Soviets.

By then, however, Maclean was living on borrowed time. In Washington, the Venona intercepts had revealed the presence of a Soviet spy in the British embassy during the war, and investigators were closing in on Maclean. Philby, now the SIS representative in Washington, had access to Venona and the details of the investigation; in the spring of 1951, he sent Guy Burgess to warn Maclean, and the Soviets then exfiltrated the pair from Britain in May. Life in the Soviet Union at first was hard—arriving in the paranoid late-Stalin period, Maclean was kept isolated in Kuybyshev and not allowed to move to Moscow until 1955. Maclean, joined by the long-suffering Melinda and their children, worked as a writer and political analyst. His life was mostly contented, though marred by Melinda’s affair with Philby after the latter defected, and then in the 1970s the departures of his children for the United Kingdom and Melinda for New York. Maclean died alone in Moscow in 1983.

Both Turncoat and A Spy Named Orphan are engaging and informative books about espionage, intelligence, and the personalities of spies, and each is well worth reading. Philipps is especially good on the pathetic dynamics of Donald’s and Melinda’s marriage, Britain’s ossified class system and its assumption that no one of Maclean’s background could be a traitor, and the colossal ineptitude of MI-5’s investigations. Still, if you have time for only one, Turncoat is the choice. Brumwell is the better stylist and, more important for today’s readers, provides a great deal of information about the people and events in the Revolutionary era (of which most modern Americans, alas, know nothing about) that set Arnold’s actions in context. Intelligence practitioners will especially enjoy Brumwell’s sympathetic portrait of Major John Andre, the talented and personable British staff officer who served as a combination desk officer/analyst/handler for the operation, only to be hanged by the Americans.

Brumwell, too, has much better material to work with. Arnold remains one of the great villains in American history, but he was clearly a man of many talents and Brumwell, while not excusing his treason, does much to humanize him. In particular, one comes away respecting his abilities and somewhat sympathetic to his frustration. Reading Turncoat, it is easy to believe that, had Congress not been so feckless, Arnold might have stuck with the Patriot cause and played a major role in the campaigns of 1780 and 1781. Alternatively, one can view Arnold simply as having been born too soon. Had he been born, say, in 1820, he could well have become a Civil War hero like Joshua Chamberlain, another civilian who turned out to have unexpected military talent and flourished in the service of a well-organized and supportive government.

Donald Maclean, in contrast, is a completely unattractive character. Other than pointing out the effects of Maclean’s rejection of his father’s religiosity and time at Gresham’s, Philipps wisely avoids psychologizing his subject. Instead, he provides a straightforward, understated account and leaves Maclean’s behavior to speak for itself. It gradually adds up to a damning portrait of a man who was universally considered, on the one hand, among the most gifted of his cohort, and on the other, a man so self-centered and blindly dedicated to his cause that he seems to have given no thought to the enormous damage he was inflicting on those around him.

It is hard to understand, however, why Philipps agrees that Maclean was so brilliant. Philipps portrays Maclean as a master bureaucrat, and so he may be been, but his main talent seems to have been doing what others told him to do, whether at school or in the Foreign Service. Philipps gives no evidence that Maclean ever took the initiative on anything or once had an original thought. Other than his atrocious behavior when drunk, he was completely bland, with none of Philby’s love of intrigue for its own sake or Burgess’s flamboyance. His political sophistication, too, was nil—he stuck with the Soviet Union through the purges, the pact with Hitler, and the crushing of the Hungarian revolt, though he did have some misgivings about the repression of the Prague Spring—and his ideology never advanced beyond repetition of the platitudes he had learned as an undergraduate. Perhaps it was less the strain of spying that drove Maclean to drink than it was the realization his life was a waste.
If Arnold is more likable than Maclean, it may say something about how the world has changed in the past 250 years. Arnold was a product of the premodern era, when loyalties were not considered absolutely linked to the state and for him, treason was just another sketchy commercial transaction. Arnold had to rationalize his treason, to be sure, but it required no deep ideological commitment. Maclean, in contrast, came from a far more regulated and bureaucratized world, where talent for staff work had become a safe path to the top, albeit at the cost of losing opportunities for heroism or excitement. Perhaps espionage filled this need for Maclean, offering a cause that brought meaning to his life in the humdrum world of a government office. His commitment was total, and so was his ruin.

The reviewer: John Ehrman is a frequent and award-winning reviewer for *Studies in Intelligence*; his primary job is to serve as an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis.
Picture this scenario: A previous government recognized a security threat from the Russians, but chose to minimize its response to the warnings of the intelligence and security services. This government, while no friend of the Russians, still saw no good reason to be as openly hostile as had its previous administrations. A few years later, when the putative current administration comes into power, its leadership completely dismisses the Russian threat and is privately hostile to the intelligence services themselves. The administration’s leader is so disinterested in the threat that he refuses to take detailed briefings. Another election occurs, and the new government decides to accept the recommendations of the intelligence and security services. Meanwhile, in a period of limited resources, the leaders of the intelligence and security services compete with each other for primacy in addressing the threat.

While this might sound like a contemporary discussion, it’s actually a description of the complex set of problems faced by two Tory governments and one Labor government in the United Kingdom during the 1920s. In a well written book by Timothy Phillips, the reader is exposed to the challenges intelligence services faced in their efforts to convince elected leaders that the Russians (more accurately, the Bolsheviks) were conducting both espionage and subversion inside the United Kingdom. The book also reveals the resource commitment the British Security Service (BSS) and the British Metropolitan Police Special Branch levied against the Bolshevik intelligence infrastructure in the 1920s.

The specific details of Bolshevik and, eventually, Soviet intelligence operations in the West have been covered in great detail by a number of books over the past 20 years. After the fall of the Soviet Union and, most especially, after the publication of KGB archival and declassified Venona material, there have been multiple books published on the Soviet efforts to undermine Western governments almost immediately after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty ushered in peace with the German Empire. The Bolshevik leadership created the “Communist International” (COMINTERN) to expand the successes of the Russian Revolution to both Western Europe and Central Asia. At the same time, the newly established government in Moscow created the first security organization, the “Extraordinary Commission,” (CHEKA) which was responsible for destroying counter-revolutionary organizations and collecting intelligence. The CHEKA was eventually replaced in 1922 by a more formal intelligence and security service, the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU). The revolutionaries in Moscow understood that their survival was dependent upon subverting their enemies and expanding the roles of their political allies in the West. The CHEKA/OGPU and the COMINTERN were conducting recruitment operations in the United Kingdom by 1918, and by the 1920s were using the Communist Party of the United Kingdom (CPUK) and the Soviet Trade Commission as their primary headquarters for these efforts.

The difference between Phillips’ book and recent books on the history of the British Security Service such as Christopher Andrew’s Defend the Realm (Knopf, 2009) is that Phillips is more interested in capturing personal vignettes from both sides of this game of cat-and-mouse, and he is very interested in the complex relationships between the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), the British Security Service (BSS or MI5), and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. His primary source material comes from the UK National Archives at Kew where he found detailed, declassified reporting from the BSS and Special Branch covering the entire decade of the 1920s. The material included tactical reporting of surveillance operations, “mail cover” campaigns (letter opening and tracking), and agent reporting. He also found memoranda between service chiefs, Whitehall, and No. 10 Downing Street covering strategic discussions on the Russian threat. Phillips is far more interested in the tactical side of the equation and his chapters are filled with both successes and failures in the United Kingdom that easily could parallel the plot lines of John Buchan or Eric
Ambler. At one point, Phillips covers in great detail an investigation of a COMINTERN agent traveling throughout the United Kingdom attempting to foment revolution among unions and the CPUK. This agent decided to pick the unimaginative alias of “Mr. Brown.” It is perhaps more than a coincidence that the sinister figure in Agatha Christie’s 1930 novel *The Secret Adversary* operates under the same alias. Unfortunately, Phillips either did not know of the story or simply could not make the connection.

Phillips reiterates two points multiple times in the book. First, the British intelligence and security apparatus were well aware of Soviet efforts through the COMINTERN and the CHEKA to undermine the United Kingdom. Second, UK elected officials were at best disinterested in the threat and, at least during the Labor government, dismissive of the threat. Phillips writes:

> . . . Britain’s spies were limited in what they could achieve on their own: the real levers of change tended to be in the hands of the elected government or senior departmental officials. So, a major part of British Intelligence’s job was to brief the government and advise civil servants and politicians about how best to respond to hostile threats. It is clear that Special Branch, MI5, and SIS all briefed government officials and ministers frequently in the 1920s, arguing typically that the threat level in the country was too high . . . . Frustratingly for British intelligence chiefs, however, their words of advice often fell on deaf ears or otherwise led to no discernible action. (130)

This frustration was especially the case after January 1924 when the Labor Party took charge of Parliament and Ramsay Macdonald became the prime minister. The intelligence services had hard evidence that the COMINTERN and CPUK were working to infiltrate the Labor Party with their own loyalists. Rightly or wrongly, the party was viewed by the intelligence and security services as “ . . . a kind of Trojan Horse—surreptitiously bringing a radical ideology into the country. . . .” (171) Ramsay Macdonald did not help in reducing these concerns during his first meeting with the chief of Special Branch and received a dressing-down from the prime minister at his first meeting on internal security. Macdonald refused to discuss or use the Special Branch material. Phillips continues,

> News of the Labor leader’s treatment of Childs quickly did the rounds at Whitehall. Some who heard of it doubtless just rolled their eyes, but others felt the discourtesy contrasted starkly with Labour’s renewed determination to extend the hand of friendship to Moscow. (172)

As a result, the intelligence and security chiefs decided not to brief the Labor prime minister on their successes in decoding the Soviet cable traffic that demonstrated, in detail, the level of COMINTERN subversion in the UK.

Phillips is a very good writer, and he knows how to keep the reader in suspense. His research is excellent and he weaves the multiple strands of Soviet espionage and subversion into a single plot line that helps the reader understand the complex nature of the time. If there is a single criticism, it has to be that Phillips periodically chooses to editorialize about the actions of the various security services. He questions why Special Branch and BSS/MI5 would worry about Soviet efforts to gain access to well connected, high status individuals in London when they had no direct position in the government. An intelligence officer reading these parts of the book understands full well the Soviets were attempting to build an access agent and/or support agent network for future espionage operations. It would make sense for the security services to be watching with concern. In his concluding chapter, Phillips argues that much of this effort bordered on irrationality and was due more to moralist views of the members of the intelligence services than true efforts to ferret out Soviet spies. Any professional intelligence officer would argue that was not the case.

In sum, Phillips’ book provides excellent insight into the tactics, techniques, and procedures of both the British security apparatus and the nascent Soviet apparatus in the 1920s. The details he offers underscore his commitment to primary source research. Equally important, Phillips is an excellent storyteller, so the book is a pleasure to read. If the book resonates today for an entirely different reason as we face new challenges from Russia and China, it also provides useful commentary on how the security and intelligence apparatus in a democracy should—and should not—deal with a complex story of political warfare, subversion and espionage.

The reviewer: J. R. Seeger is a retired CIA operations officer. He is a frequent contributor of reviews.
The centenary of the end of the Great War has generated a number of excellent books on UK and ANZAC forces in their fight against the Ottoman Army in the Middle East, but the focus on T.E. Lawrence and his role in the Great Arab Revolt has eclipsed the importance of other operations that occurred there between early 1915 and the final defeat of the Ottoman forces in the fall of 1918. This new scholarship, overlaid with existing memoirs and official UK documents, demonstrates the value of special operations to the overall success in what was known as the Egypt and Palestine Campaign.

The two books reviewed here provide an especially useful roadmap for intellectually navigating the complex, irregular warfare campaign managed by British forces. The first, Behind the Lawrence Legend, offers a strategic perspective on joint Special Operations efforts and details the roles and responsibilities of dozens of British and ANZAC officers and non-commissioned officers, while the second, Masters of Mayhem, delivers a well-written, exciting report on the campaign from the perspective of the various units involved. Together, the books capture the synergistic, interoperable workings of combined Special Operations during World War I and underscore the fact that, while Lawrence’s efforts in the Great Arab Revolt were important and certainly heroic, he did not single-handedly bring about the success of the overall campaign.

In his memoir Hard Lying—Eastern Mediterranean, 1914–1919 (H. Jenkins, 1925), intelligence officer L.B. Weldon describes in detail his work along the Sinai Coast, initially in a captured German coastal trawler named the Anne Rickmers, and later on a seagoing yacht christened the HM Yacht Managem. Weldon had strong Arabic language skills and he debriefed agents either on board or by rowing to shore to hold nighttime meetings. While Weldon was executing these operations, another British officer was leading raids into the Ottoman-occupied Sinai Peninsula to collect intelligence and harass Ottoman forces there. In editing the diaries of Col. Alfred Chevalier Parker (aka “Parker Pasha”), H.V.F. Winstone details raids Parker led into the Sinai with small groups from the Gurkha battalion. Parker had been the senior British officer responsible for the Sinai Peninsula and he used his familiarity with both the terrain and Bedouin and Christian monks of the Sinai to lead these successful raids behind the lines.7


b. “Hard lying” service is British Navy terminology that identifies serving on ships with less-than-adapted accommodations.

As the British Army focused on the threat to the Suez Canal, Turkish and German commands initiated their own unconventional warfare campaign in the North African desert vis-à-vis a surrogate force of Senussi tribesmen. While the Senussi were nominally under Ottoman control, they were in fact an independent tribe under the command of their religious leader, Sayyid Ahmed al Sharif. In *Masters of Mayhem*, James Stejskal describes the Ottoman plan as follows:

*The Turks and the Germans brought advisors, weapons, ammunition, and other supplies needed to fuel the uprising. This external support was an essential ingredient to the uprising—both to insure its launch as well as maintain the movement’s will, training, and logistics. Their plan was to conduct a classic guerrilla warfare campaign.* (xxxv)

To counter this uprising, the British command in Cairo used ANZAC cavalry; the Egyptian Army Camel Corps; and a newly established unit, the Light Armored Motor Battery (LAMB). The LAMB was made up of 12 armored Rolls Royce vehicles mounted with machine guns and small artillery pieces; the LAMB also had multiple support vehicles known as “tenders.” These armored cars were used as a shock force in the Libyan Desert in support of other British units and in independent operations—including a raid in March 1915 that rescued Allied prisoners held by the Senussi. By early 1917, the Senussi campaign was over, and the armored cars would be moved to support operations in the Hejaz.

**The Great Arab Revolt and The War in Arabia and Syria**

The year 1916 saw a stalemate in the Middle East Campaign against the Ottoman Empire. British and Ottoman troops were skirmishing in the Sinai Desert but the trench lines along the Suez Canal were nearly as static as those in Europe’s Western Front. British and ANZAC forces had withdrawn from the Dardanelles. The Gallipoli Campaign was acknowledged to have been a disaster for the Allies and a victory for the Ottoman forces and their German advisors. British civilian and military leaders in Cairo and in London insisted on the creation of a new joint intelligence and propaganda apparatus, which became known as “The Arab Bureau.” Focused on political and cultural intelligence in the Arabian Peninsula and Syria, the Arab Bureau produced intelligence reports from operators in the field and initiated multiple unconventional warfare (UW) programs that coalesced into the Great Arab Revolt during the summer and fall of 1916. Both the MID and the British Indian Army commanders responsible for the Mesopotamian Campaign were hostile toward what they saw as “amateurs” who were gaining some degree of traction in the already-complex bureaucratic battles between the two commands. In addition, the British Indian Army Command was concerned that the Arab Bureau would produce reporting that supported the Hejaz tribal leaders, rather than the candidate for British support they preferred, Ibn Saud, who was based in Riyadh.

The focus of the Arab Bureau was to gain a better understanding of complex tribal structures along the Western edge of the Arabian Peninsula, in an effort to prevent Sherif Hussein, leader of the Hashemite Arabs and “Protector of the two Holy Cities” in the Hejaz, from siding with the Ottoman caliph, who had declared a “jihad” against the Allies in 1915. Hussein had his own reasons to break from the Ottomans and assert his independence, but these reasons were ambiguous at best. Finally, in the summer of 1916, Hussein officially declared his independence from the Ottoman caliph.

The Arab Bureau also designed, produced, and delivered political warfare material designed to exacerbate the wedge between Turkish leaders in the Middle East and their Arab counterparts, especially between the Turkish regional leaders and Syrian military and political leaders in Damascus.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 62, No. 4 (December 2018)

Col. Cyril Wilson and his small team of officers working very clear throughout the book that, without the stalwart of logistics throughout the entire theatre. Walker makes it operating bases on the Red Sea Coast, and the importance agents-of-influence in Jeddah and in multiple forward-op behind-the-scenes "political" operations carried out by most important lessons of Walker’s book have to do with supported the 1916–1918 Great Arab Revolt. Perhaps the two political and social infrastructure that created and sup The most famous British officer involved in this program was Thomas Edward Lawrence: one of the first to conduct combat operations with Arabs in the desert, “Lawrence of Arabia” served as an advisor to both Prince Feisal and multiple tribal leaders. But while Lawrence may be the most well-known participant, he was only one of several British and non-commissioned officers working “by, with, and through” Arab tribesmen in the BMM. Walker’s book identifies dozens of these men, but he focuses on 15 figures on the British and ANZAC side who played key roles, similar to Lawrence’s. Walker’s view is that, while there is no doubt Lawrence’s actions in Arabia at the time were heroic, there were many other players in the same campaign who were equally crucial to the eventual Allied victory against the Ottomans.

Walker’s exceptional research—using archival material, memoirs, and diaries—offers intricate detail on the political and social infrastructure that created and supported the 1916–1918 Great Arab Revolt. Perhaps the two most important lessons of Walker’s book have to do with behind-the-scenes “political” operations carried out by agents-of-influence in Jeddah and in multiple forward-operating bases on the Red Sea Coast, and the importance of logistics throughout the entire theatre. Walker makes it very clear throughout the book that, without the stalwart Col. Cyril Wilson and his small team of officers working in Jeddah and along the Red Sea Coast, the entire British effort to support the Arabs would have collapsed under the weight of internal tensions among the local leaders of the revolt.

Logistics in warfare can mean the difference between operational success and failure, but in a desert campaign, logistics can mean the difference between life and death for fighters before, during, and after combat. As the Arab tribesmen and their British counterparts moved further and further north, their operations were sustained by a progressively longer and more complex supply chain managed by a small cadre of British officers. It was the work of a British Army veterinarian, Capt. Thomas Goodchild, who conducted his own special “covert action” to find and acquire healthy camels that would otherwise have been available to the Ottoman Army, and then to ship the camels to the Arab forces. Regarding supplies, the integration of deliveries by the Royal Navy Red Sea Patrol1 (under the command of Capt. William Boyle), management of the warehouses in Aqaba (by Maj. Robert Scott), and, ultimately, delivery to Arab forces using camel trains remains a model of logistics support in unconventional warfare.

Unconventional warfare was only one aspect of the British Special Operations campaign in the Middle East during the war’s final two years. As the Arab Revolt expanded and moved north toward Damascus, joint land, sea, and air raids provided support to indigenous fighters. In 1917, General Allenby assigned the armored squadron from North Africa to the Hejaz. The newly named Hejaz Armored Car Section would serve both as an independent mobile force focused on raids deep inside Ottoman lines and also as a mechanized support element to Lawrence and his Arab raiders. This support significantly enhanced the capability of the Arab fighters at a time when they were building sufficient military capability to transition from raiding and attacking the Hejaz railway to formal, planned direct assaults on Ottoman fixed positions. The Royal Navy Red Sea Patrol conducted operations along the coast, delivering and recovering British and ANZAC raiding forces as well as providing supplies to irregular Arab forces. Finally, Allenby also authorized an air squadron from the Royal Flying Corps to provide close air support to the British-guided Arab unconventional forces operating behind Ottoman lines, where they collected

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Legend, properly starts with Wilson’s arrival in Jeddah. Referring to Wilson, Walker writes,

“The doughty officer’s job was to liaise with Hussein on diplomatic and military matters, supply him with what he needed, discreetly persuade him to do what was in British interest, and maximize the impact of the revolt on the Turks.” (7)

Wilson was the key to operations for the next two years as his job expanded to include more than managing a diplomatic relationship with a very problematic Arab leader. He conducted intelligence operations using a number of British handlers and local sources, and he managed the logistic support for the entire Arabian operation. Using Wilson’s position in Jeddah as the book’s central theme, Walker details the efforts of dozens of different British and ANZAC members of what became known as the British Military Mission (BMM).

The best-known of the Special Operations was British support to Arabian Desert tribes engaged in raiding operations against Ottoman troops defending the Hejaz railway. The most famous British officer involved in this program was Thomas Edward Lawrence: one of the first to conduct combat operations with Arabs in the desert, “Lawrence of Arabia” served as an advisor to both Prince Feisal and multiple tribal leaders. But while Lawrence may be the most well-known participant, he was only one of several British and non-commissioned officers working “by, with, and through” Arab tribesmen in the BMM. Walker’s book identifies dozens of these men, but he focuses on 15 figures on the British and ANZAC side who played key roles, similar to Lawrence’s. Walker’s view is that, while there is no doubt Lawrence’s actions in Arabia at the time were heroic, there were many other players in the same campaign who were equally crucial to the eventual Allied victory against the Ottomans.

Walker’s exceptional research—using archival material, memoirs, and diaries—offers intricate detail on the political and social infrastructure that created and supported the 1916–1918 Great Arab Revolt. Perhaps the two most important lessons of Walker’s book have to do with behind-the-scenes “political” operations carried out by agents-of-influence in Jeddah and in multiple forward-operating bases on the Red Sea Coast, and the importance of logistics throughout the entire theatre. Walker makes it very clear throughout the book that, without the stalwart Col. Cyril Wilson and his small team of officers working

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a. For more on the role of the Red Sea Patrol, see John Johnson-Al len, T. E. Lawrence and the Red Sea Patrol (Pen and Sword, 2015).
intelligence and worked to recover British agents. This strategy gave General Allenby greater situational awareness of the full battlefield and allowed him to communicate with the unconventional forces in a manner that was superior to the basic wireless communications capabilities of the time. Stejskal’s personal experience in Special Forces and his participation in the Great Arab Revolt Project (2006–2014) may account for his unique ability to capture this nuanced web of operations, drawing the reader in to the intricacies of desert warfare a century ago.

Conclusion

Authors Philip Walker and James Stejskal provide excellent, authoritative source material that is as useful for intelligence and Special Operations practitioners as it is for historians of the Great Arab Revolt. The books identify some of the ways Special Operations practices in the WWI Middle East theatre would reappear in World War II—and continue in use long afterward: intelligence cells to collect and deliver tactical and cultural intelligence for the command; propaganda materials to be delivered by agents behind the adversary’s lines; intelligence operations conducted deep inside enemy lines, using periodic infiltration and exfiltration by sea and air; jointly managed raids from the sea, focused on both direct action and capturing enemy troops for intelligence purposes; and direct action raids, reconnaissance, selective bombing operations, and enduring methods of agent delivery and recovery.

In addition to making these many parallels visible, the two books add significant depth and breadth to the complex story of the Great Arab Revolt, which has often been told through a narrower, usually Lawrence-centric lens. The books bring to life over 100 new, interesting characters—British and ANZAC—who were essential to the overall success of the campaign, and reveal not only the role the Special Operations campaign played within the larger effort to defeat Ottoman forces in Palestine and Arabia during World War I, but also the many ways in which operations begun then would reshape the way modern warfare is conducted.

The reviewer: J. R. Seeger is a retired CIA operations officer. He is a frequent contributor of reviews.
I’ll start with a confession. Reviewers are supposed to be at least somewhat informed about the authors whose books they set out to assess. Until now, however, I had never heard of Kate Atkinson and, with a Kindle’s lack of cover blurbs, it wasn’t until I did some Googling that I learned she is an English writer of prize-winning literary novels and best-selling detective stories, a Big Name in the worlds of both high-class and popular lit. Next, a check of Proquest revealed that Atkinson has built enough of a reputation to become the subject of unreadable scholarly analyses. Finally, a look at her bio revealed that in 2011 the queen made her a Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire for her services to literature. Does it get any better than this?

I did none of this research, however, until after I finished Atkinson’s first effort at spy fiction, Transcription, and can therefore say, with all the honesty that comes of ignorance, that this book is a treat, and well worth your time.

Transcription is the story of Juliet Armstrong, a young woman hired by MI5 as a clerical at the start of World War II. Soon she is assigned to a listening post next to an apartment where a case officer meets and debriefs pro-German Brits—would-be fifth columnists who believe they are providing information to a genuine Gestapo officer. (This is loosely based on a true MI5 operation.) Juliet’s job is to transcribe the recordings of the meetings, and the point of the operation is to keep their information from going to the Germans. “Let them flourish—but within a walled garden from which they cannot escape,” her boss, Perry, tells her. By the spring of 1940 Juliet has moved up again, working in the alias of Iris Carter-Jenkins to infiltrate a group of pro-Nazi women, with the goal of obtaining a list of their contacts and other would-be traitors. Then, suddenly, something goes badly wrong.

In the second half of the book—considerably darker, as it takes place in 1950, in the dreary near-poverty of postwar Britain—Juliet is working at the BBC as a producer of educational radio programming and occasionally lending her apartment to MI5 as a safehouse. She runs into the case officer from the wartime apartment, but he pretends not to recognize her, which sends Juliet on a quest to resolve mysteries left lingering at the end of the war and come to grips with the past. There is, of course, a twist at the end that comes as a complete surprise—it’s not entirely believable, but it works well enough.

The plot, I should note, does not move as linearly as the above summary suggests, but that matters little as atmosphere and characters are where Transcription shines. Atkinson does a fine job of conveying the amateurism and improvisation of MI5 in the early days of the war, and in Juliet, she gives us a memorable personality. On the surface, she’s an Everywoman—18, from a modest background, on her own following the deaths of her parents, and trying to adjust to life in a service where her peers and new friends are far more worldly than she (one is the daughter of a duke). At the same time, however, Atkinson draws Juliet as a complex, multilayered figure, one who grabs the reader’s interest and affection from the start.

Juliet is smart and keenly observant of people and her surroundings. She looks at the world with skepticism and a sly sense of humor that makes her perfectly suited to intelligence work. Dolphin Square, the apartment block housing the listening post, Perry tells Juliet, is “quite Soviet in its conception and execution,” leaving her to wonder if the “Russians would have named their housing towers after legendary British admirals . . . Beatty, Collingwood, Drake, and so on.”a At another point, Juliet is sitting in an aristocratic home, listening to Mrs. Scaife, the head of the group she’s been sent to infiltrate, drone on about how the Jews and Bolsheviks, not the Germans, are England’s true enemy. “It seemed unlikely to Juliet that the Jews were brewing ‘world revolution.’ Although really, why wouldn’t you? It seemed like an excellent idea

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a. Dolphin Square was the site of the true MI5 operation and figures as well in two of John LeCarre’s novels, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold and Legacy of Spies.
from where Juliet was, drowning amongst the salmon damask cushions.”

Juliet also has an innocent charm. Virginal and knowing no more about men than what was told in a brief school lesson on female anatomy or picked up from romance novels, Juliet longs to be seduced. She develops a crush on Perry and desperately hopes that he will see she is “ripe for the plucking . . . the apple beckoning on the tree.” Alas, in a hilarious passage Perry turns out to be uninterested (yes, for exactly the reason you think) and the disappointed Juliet concludes that while “sex was something you had to learn and then stick at until you were good at it . . . an initial lesson would be helpful.”

The fifth columnists are lesser players in Transcription, but Atkinson draws them, too, as complex people. Rather than caricature the wannabe Nazis, she portrays them as sad cases, isolating themselves in a bubble of their own illusions and talking treason with no idea of what the consequences truly could be. Mrs. Scaife, Juliet notes, was “doing what Englishwomen did best wherever they were in the world—taking tea and having cozy chats, albeit . . . the topic of conversation . . . was treason, not to mention the destruction of civilization and the British way of life, although no doubt Mrs. Scaife would have claimed to be a vigorous defender of both.” MI5’s operation is nothing if not effective, and Juliet gradually realizes that almost everyone in Mrs. Scaife’s circle is, like her, either an MI5 officer or informant. When Mrs. Scaife is arrested and learns the truth, Juliet sees that she looks “suddenly old and helpless,” and is not entirely without sympathy.

Amidst the spy games, Atkinson has some serious points to make. The fluidity and ambiguity of identity is her main theme, which she explores through the double-agentry and deceptions at the heart of the story. “The mark of a good agent,” Perry tells Juliet, “is when you have no idea which side they’re on.” One rather mysterious character tells her that nothing is as it appears; rather, “there can be many layers to a thing,” like in the spectrum of light, and that he exists “you might say, in one of the invisible layers.”

From there, Atkinson moves on to consider what intelligence work does to the sense of self. As Juliet prepares to work as Iris, Perry tells her that her false biography (which includes a fictitious fiancée, Ian, serving as an officer on HMS Hood) has been designed make Iris appealing to her target but that she needs to avoid identifying too closely with her avatar. “Iris isn’t real, don’t forget that,” he says as he warns her not to “get the two confused—that way madness lies, believe me.” As it turns out, Juliet finds it liberating to be Iris—the new identity brings adventure and relieves her of having to put up with people throwing Romeo and Juliet quotes at her—but eventually does begin to confuse her two identities and, when the Hood sinks in 1941, finds herself saddened by the thought of Ian’s death.

Flexible identity merges with another theme, that no one leaves the intelligence world once they are in it. In 1950, Juliet faces off with the man who brought her into MI5, telling him that she’s finished and walking away. “Oh, my dear Juliet,” he tells her. “One is never free. It’s never finished.” A few pages later, Juliet realizes “she would never escape from any of them.” It turns out that she’s right, and disillusion follows. Juliet admits that she used to believe in something, “and that, for once, was the truth. And now she no longer believed, and that was another truth. But what did it matter? Really?”

None of these musings about identity, the impossibility of escape, and lost ideals are new territory for a spy novel—Graham Greene, Len Deighton and, especially, John LeCarré, have worked it for decades—and Atkinson, to be honest, makes the points a couple too many times. Juliet, however, saves Transcription from descending into cliché. Through her protagonist’s shrewd observations and rich interior life, Atkinson freshens these familiar ideas, making them lighter and more enjoyable than in most such tales.

Ultimately, this is Transcription’s strength. Atkinson takes her story and characters seriously, but not so seriously that they (or the reader) lose sight of the humor and absurdities of their lives and work. It makes for a book that is fun and thoughtful, and sure to leave the reader hoping for more spy stories from Atkinson.

The reviewer: John Ehrman is a frequent and award-winning reviewer for Studies in Intelligence; his primary job is to serve as an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis.
CURRENT TOPICS

The Assault On Intelligence: American National Security in An Age of Lies, by Michael V. Hayden

The Skripal Files: The Life and Near Death of a Russian Spy, by Mark Urban

HISTORICAL

Before Intelligence Failed: British Secret Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya, by Mark Wilkinson

Beirut Rules: The Murder of a CIA Station Chief and Hezbollah’s War Against America, by Fred Burton and Samuel Katz

Best of Enemies: The Last Great Spy Story of the Cold War, by Gus Russo & Eric Dezenhall

Bureau of Spies: The Secret Connection Between Espionage and Journalism in Washington, by Steven T. Usdin

Cold War Spymaster: The Legacy of Guy Liddell Deputy Director of MI5, by Nigel West

Double Agent Victoire: Mathilde Carré and the Interallié Network, by David Tremain

Hitler’s British Traitors: The Secret History of Spies, Saboteurs and Fifth Columnists, by Tim Tate

Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR, by Bruce Riedel

Section D for Destruction Forerunner of SOE: The Story of Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service, by Malcolm Atkin

The Spy and The Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story of the Cold War, by Ben MacIntyre

The Spy Who Changed History: The Untold Story of How the Soviet Union Won the Race for America’s Secrets, by Svetlana Lokhova

The Woman Who Fought An Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her NILI Spy Ring, by Gregory J. Wallance
CURRENT


Following the precedent set by William Colby’s book, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1978), several former CIA directors have written memoirs that included their service in the Intelligence Community. Richard Helms, Robert Gates, George Tenet, Leon Panetta, and Michael Hayden come quickly to mind. Colby added a second volume that focused on intelligence in the Vietnam War. These accounts offered firsthand perspectives on the intelligence profession; the always challenging, often controversial operations undertaken; and the relationships with other government agencies. In at least three respects The Assault on Intelligence departs from that tradition.

First and most important is General Hayden’s deep concern “with the question of truth,” (3) not within the Intelligence Community (he assumes with good reason that truth is not a casualty within the profession), but from without. In a hint of what is coming, General Hayden invokes the Oxford English Dictionary word of the year for 2016, “post-truth,” defined as “Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” (3)

The second departure, following directly from the first, is the broad perspective of Hayden’s outlook. The Assault on Intelligence is about “global and domestic developments and the role that American intelligence plays in identifying and responding to them.” (4) The developments to which the general refers are not those concerned with collection methods or privacy issues though they remain important factors. He is worried that decisions may be based on intuition even when the decisionmaker is presented with objective truth. The third departure is Hayden’s inclusion of the influence of the media and the views of many other senior former intelligence officials who share his anxieties.

The substance of the general’s narrative is topically chronological, consistently critical, and at times even philosophical. Beginning with the 2016 presidential campaign, he cites instances he sees as potentially damaging to the relationship between the intelligence profession and its mission to “speak truth to power.” Along the way he includes insightful observations from colleagues, for example former deputy CIA director John McLaughlin’s observations on the four phases of a president’s relationship with the Intelligence Community. (80, 254–55)

Hayden does not find all presidential decisions wanting. The general gives the administration good marks on cyber security, (240) the selection of Mike Pompeo, and the appointment of Gina Haspel—“an inspired choice” (90). Nevertheless, his criticisms on many of the president’s comments on national security matters that conflict with the Intelligence Community consensus strike at the risks they pose to a positive relationship with intelligence generally and with the professionals specifically.

In the end, General Hayden writes that “American intelligence remains steadfast . . . in its commitment to objective truth” in an often contentious atmosphere. (257) The Assault on Intelligence documents one of the strangest periods in American intelligence history, while stressing adherence to the basics of the profession.

a. Some of these perspectives are discussed in Peter Usowski, “On the Record: Former CIA Officers Writings about Intelligence Policy and Politics, 2016–17” in Studies in Intelligence 62, no. 3 (September 2018).
On 4 March 2018, retired GRU Colonel Sergei Viktorovich Skripal, 66, and his daughter Yulia, 33, were found semiconscious on a park bench in the British town of Salisbury. Doctors soon realized they had been poisoned and placed the two in induced comas while they searched for a curative therapy. With government help, the poison was identified as a rare nerve agent, Novichok, known to have been developed in Russia. At this point, the potential of a Russian role was discussed in Parliament and with the Russian government.

Meanwhile, both patients slowly improved. On 9 April 2018, Yulia was released from the hospital; her father remained until 18 May. Long before their release, the media had reported that Sergei was a former MI6 agent given citizenship in the United Kingdom as part of Operation Ghost Stories which had exchanged 10 Russian illegals in the United States for four Russians, two of whom went to England. At the same time, writers speculated about why the Skripals were targeted, how and by whom the poison was administered, the nature of government involvement on both sides, and what the future held for the Skripals.

BBC diplomatic and defense editor and author of a book on British intelligence, Mark Urban was one of those in the media monitoring the Skripal poisoning—but he had an edge. He had been interviewing Sergei Skripal during 2017 for a book. Thus, Urban already had answers to many of the pre-poisoning questions and the first part of The Skripal Files covers Skripal’s 1996 recruitment in Madrid by MI6. Then he flashes back to Skripal’s origins, his steady advancement within the GRU, and his service as an MI6 agent. Urban reveals a dedicated officer and family man—no extramarital affairs or casual encounters in this story—who gradually became disillusioned with the Soviet system. MI6 handled him carefully; he was its first penetration of the GRU since Oleg Penkovsky. Between 1996 and his arrest in December 2004, Skripal met with his MI6 case officer directly when serving in the West. While stationed at GRU headquarters in Moscow, he sent reports in secret writing via his unsuspecting wife, when she traveled on vacation. His experience with GRU illegals, and the knowledge gained while head of the personnel department provided MI6 with valuable intelligence even after retirement in 1999 when he started a consulting business and traveled to the West to meet MI6 himself.

Urban describes the circumstances that led to Skripal’s arrest by the FSB and identifies the likely source of the betrayal, although he acknowledges that uncertainties remain. After two years of periodic interrogations—no physical force—in Moscow’s Lefortovo prison, Skripal is tried and sentenced to 13 years in a Siberian penal colony. While Skripal was there, Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned in London. Urban describes the uproar that ensued while using the Litvinenko case to establish the Putin regime’s precedent-setting policy for dealing with traitors; he gives several other examples. He also speculates about why Skripal had been spared the ultimate penalty at trial and what caused a change of mind.

In June 2010, four years into Skripal’s sentence, Operation Ghost Stories erupted in New York City. Urban recounts these events and tells how they led to Skripal’s selection as part of the exchange handled by the CIA. By July 2010, Skripal was undergoing a friendly interrogation by MI6. He was eventually resettled in Salisbury, under his own name. Surprisingly to some, he was allowed visits from his children with whom he communicated via the internet. To others, Urban suggests, the relaxed policy benefited Russian counterintelligence (FSB) more than it did Skripal.

The Skripal Files ends when Sergei and Yulia are resettled after the poisoning in another home under guard and the British government has formally named the Russian as the perpetrators. Numerous Russian diplomats were expelled, but those responsible have yet to be identified.

Urban does not provide source notes, although he does name some of his sources, besides Skripal himself whom he did not interview after the poison-
Intelligence in Public Literature

It is a fascinating story, well told, that leaves readers wondering if there is more to come.

HISTORICAL

Before Intelligence Failed: British Secret Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya, by Mark Wilkinson. (C. Hurst & Co., 2018) 229, endnotes, index.

Mark Wilkinson, a former British Army officer, is now an independent consultant on security matters. In Before Intelligence Failed he examines the relationship between intelligence that is provided decisionmakers and the resultant foreign policy that justified the United Kingdom’s decision to participate in the Iraq War in 2003. He assumes from the outset that the Blair government made its judgments on the basis of flawed intelligence; then he asks whether that was because the intelligence services shaped their product to agree with the government’s desires or whether it was merely the result of poor analysis following established methodology.

To answer these questions, Wilkinson first examines the “controversy surrounding the use of intelligence by the Blair government in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War.” (9) Here he draws on the reports of several official investigations that addressed the subject. In successive chapters he analyzes case studies involving chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs in the Soviet Union, South Africa, and Libya. Then he considers whether the UK intelligence–foreign policy interface applied in those cases was different from what occurred during the build-up to the Iraq War. It is no surprise that he identifies differences, the time to gather CBW intelligence being a principal one. This is a somewhat artificial result, however, since it was known from the start and did not emerge from comparative analysis (i.e., the time constraints for the Iraq War decisionmaking were shorter than the case study situations where the imminence of war was not present).

In the end, the case studies are informative and make the book worth reading, especially the South African study. And Wilkinson’s analysis of them shows that British intelligence was not capable of providing the required CBW data in time to contribute to the pre-Iraq intelligence take. One is left with the impression that what was provided was, at least in part, “intelligence-to-please.”

In an effort to assure that readers lacking intelligence background will grasp his message, Wilkinson provides a discussion of what intelligence is and how it is intended to function. Toward this end, he reviews various definitions of intelligence and other basic concepts. But in the process he raises questions about his own understanding of the subject. For example, when discussing the official UK definition of intelligence, he notes surprisingly, that “Perhaps most significantly, it omits to mention that intelligence by definition is not secret.” (12) Later, when discussing intelligence obtained from human sources (HUMINT), he adds, astonishingly, that HUMINT “does not always require corroboration from other sources.” (169)

Before Intelligence Failed is an interesting study of the important relationship between intelligence and policymaking that confronts all nations. But it should be accepted as a challenge for further study, not as gospel.
A blurb is a comment written for promotional purposes and is customarily found on the dust jacket. Unvaryingly positive, blurbs are easily overlooked by prospective readers. Those found on *Beirut Rules* are an exception. The highly regarded former chief of CIA counterintelligence, James Olson, compliments the quality of writing and research while praising the authors for telling an important story. Retired CIA case officer Milt Bearden echoes those thoughts while commending its depth of coverage and its value as a historical document. The late President George H. W. Bush added that the book will “show a new generation the value of a life well lived in the service of country.”

The subject of their praise is William Francis Buckley. Kidnapped by Hezbollah on 16 March 1984, while serving as chief of station Beirut, “he died in a south Beirut dungeon, alone, tortured, savaged, and neglected” 444 days later on 3 June 1985. (185) *Beirut Rules* portrays the life stories of Buckley and his principal terrorist kidnapper as they are influenced by competing factions and intelligence services, in the turbulent Middle East.

William Buckley began his unusual government service career by enlisting in the Army, attending officer candidate school, and serving in Korea, where he earned a Silver Star. He then left the Army and attended Boston University. Graduating in 1955 with a degree in government and proficient in French, German and Russian, he was accepted soon after by the CIA. His initial assignments have not been revealed, but after a short period he left the agency to take a job as a librarian and pursue his interest in Revolutionary War history. He would later become a private investigator for F. Lee Bailey, before returning to the Army, where he joined the Special Forces and did a combat tour in Vietnam. There he received a second Silver Star. In 1965, he rejoined the CIA, while remaining in Vietnam until 1972.

The determinant event in Buckley’s CIA career was the 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Beirut where many of the 63 dead were CIA officers. A new chief of station was required. Buckley, then serving as deputy to Richard Holm, first chief of the Counter Terrorism Group, was selected, after securing Holm’s recommendation.

The risks associated with the assignment were well known, and *Beirut Rules* deals with them in depth. The authors also devote considerable space to acquainting the reader with the modus operandi of the terrorists, especially the Iranian backed Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad, led by Imad Mughniyeh. By the time of the kidnapping, efforts to track down Mughniyeh had been under way for years by various actors in the region including the Israelis. At the same time, other hostages held by Hezbollah placed demands on the same agencies.

In February 1985, the Hostage Location Task Force (HLTF) was formed under the auspices of the CIA’s now-Counterterrorism Center (CTC) with members from the FBI and DIA. Its sole mission was to find William Buckley, and it debriefed other hostages when released, looking for clues. Co-author Fred Burton, then serving in the State Department Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), was a member. But the terrorists’ security was effective and the former hostages could only confirm Buckley’s torture and eventual death, but not the location of his grave.

Then on 5 October 1985, the Islamic Jihad publicly announced Buckley’s death, but nothing more. It was not until December 1991, when the Islamic Jihad for its own reasons decided to cooperate, that his body was finally recovered and returned for burial in Arlington National Cemetery.

*Beirut Rules* describes the hunt for Imad Mughniyeh and his eventual assassination by unnamed forces, an event that may have brought closure to some, but was only a catalyst for continued terrorism for others.

William Buckley was honored with the 51st star on the Memorial Wall at CIA Headquarters.
**Best of Enemies: The Last Great Spy Story of the Cold War**, by Gus Russo and Eric Dezenhall. (Twelve, 2018) 342, bibliography, photos, index.

The epilogue to the 2003 book, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB*, co-authored by retired CIA operations officer Milt Bearden and James Risen (Random House, 2003), comments on events in the careers of officers with whom Bearden served. These include CIA case officer Jack Platt and his friend, KGB colonel Gennady Vasilenko, both having retired in the late 1980s. Platt became “a partner in an international security company and works closely with his old adversaries assisting American businesses in Moscow.” Vasilenko, having “survived his interrogation at Lefortovo prison . . . was reduced in rank and fired without pension for misconduct in his association with Jack Platt . . . and now works on private security investigations in Moscow, when he is not hunting in Russia’s birch forests.”

As can be inferred from their retirement occupations, their relationship did not end there. *Best of Enemies* begins when Platt learns in 2005 that Gennady has been rearrested and, write co-authors Russo and Dezenhall, “it was Jack’s fault again.” (14) The authors return to that perplexing statement and the unusual relationship between Platt and Vasilenko that began in 1979 in Washington, DC. It was there that Platt—known as “cowboy,” in part because he always wore cowboy boots—first met Vasilenko with the aim of recruiting him to spy for the CIA. (16) Based mainly on interviews with those involved (no source notes are provided), *Best of Enemies* presents an account of the careers of both colorful, competent, bureaucracy-abhorring intelligence officers that explains why neither recruited the other and how they became friends instead.

After their first meeting, Platt concluded there was no possibility of a “coerced recruitment.” (62) Thus a long term approach ensued that included the FBI since the two were functioning in the United States. For several years, despite frequent meetings and veiled suggestions to Gennady that he would be happy if he stayed in America, Gennady was not interested. But the KGB began to think otherwise, and in 1988, he was sent back to Moscow and interrogated in Lefortovo prison for the first time. Platt wondered then whether he had somehow been responsible; Gennady wondered the same thing. (171) And, despite having no evidence and ignoring the outspoken support from his KGB colleagues, Gennady was cashiered without a pension and started his security business. Platt, on the other hand retired voluntarily and returned as a contractor to train officers in field operations and consult with actor Robert De Niro—with whom he became friends—on De Niro’s film *The Good Shepherd*. b

The period of prolonged attempted recruitment had coincided with some momentous counterintelligence operations—Edward Howard’s defection, the Ames and Hanssen betrayals, the Yurchenko revelations—in which Platt and Vasilenko were involved to varying degrees even after retirement. *Best of Enemies* discusses the impact of these cases on both men. In Vasilenko’s case, one—he had handled Ronald Pelton, the former NSA officer—contributed to his second arrest and his being sentenced to the Gulag for “helping the CIA.” (261)

Whether Jack Platt bore any responsibility for Gennady’s second imprisonment would not be resolved until 2010, when they met again in Washington. This remarkable event followed a counterintelligence investigation that led to the exposure of 10 Russian illegals living in the United States. *Best of Enemies* tells how Operation Ghost Stories, conducted by the FBI and CIA, resulted in the exchange of the illegals for four Russians, one of whom was Gennady Vasilenko.

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b. A team of historians reviewed the movie in some detail in this journal. See David Robarge et al., “The Good Shepherd” in *Studies in Intelligence* 51 no. 1 (March 2007).
**Best of Enemies** is a tribute to both men and their families and a story well told, with one exception. From time to time the authors begin chapters with Gennady’s recollections while undergoing interrogation in 2005 and then flash back to previous events. This can be confusing but the reader is encouraged to persevere.

Jack Platt and Gennady Vasilenko remained friends until Jack’s death from esophageal cancer in January 2017. Gennady lives in Virginia and has “made clear his wish to be buried beside Jack someday.” (312)


Use Google to search the phrase “national press building” to get a view of the modern edifice that is home to the National Press Club at 14th and F Streets, in Washington, DC. Although a much modified version of the original building built in 1925, the Club still serves journalists from around the world. In *Bureau of Spies*, Steven Usdin records its origins and the role of some of some Club members as agents or proxies of foreign and domestic espionage organizations—and in one case of the White House itself.

Few were ever household names. The first Soviet agent to operate out of the Press Building for the OGPU (a KGB predecessor) in the 1930s was Robert S. Allen (codenamed Sh/147). A gregarious risk taker, he served the Soviets for money (22ff), as did many of his successors. These would include radical journalists Louis Wolf, Ellen Ray, and William Schaap (who was also a lawyer), all of whom worked Press Building offices. They produced *CounterSpy* and its successor, the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, in cooperation with CIA defector and KGB agent Philip Agee. These periodicals contained anti-CIA tirades and lists of serving CIA officers. They also mentioned the location of their offices in the National “Press Building . . . to bolster [claims] to protection under the First Amendment.” (294)

Not all of the espionage was conducted for foreign entities. The case of J. Franklin Carter is exemplary. Working out of the National Press Building, he was hired by and worked directly for President Roosevelt, who financed Carter’s operations from a slush fund. Carter had no experience with espionage though he had written fictional accounts of the *Bureau of Current Political Intelligence* (CPI) that received favorable attention. “FDR kept Carter and his agents immensely busy . . . in the months before Pearl Harbor,” writes Usdin. (88) Often the missions assigned focused on his political opponents, Charles Lindbergh being a prime example. Another task concerned the possible threat from indigenous Japanese; Carter concluded there was little to fear and that most were loyal Americans. (98)

Before and after World War II began, British intelligence employed volunteer journalists based at the National Press Building to write articles that “infused American newspapers and radio programs with fake news” aimed at shaping American public opinion. In some cases the news was legitimate though exaggerated, as with the coverage of William Donovan’s trips to Britain for the president prior to the war. (109)

It will not surprise readers to learn *Bureau of Spies* discusses NKVD (another predecessor of the KGB) espionage operations in the Press Club during World War II and the Cold War. Vladimir Pravdin (true name: Roland Abbiate), who had paid his NKVD dues as an assassin, is just one of the interesting characters mentioned; others include I. F. Stone and Oleg Kalugin. Usdin tells how Pravdin transformed “the TASS bureau in the Press Building from a news-gathering organization that did some spying on the side into an intelligence organization that used journalism as a cover.” (204)

Not far from the TASS offices in the Press Building, journalists with the Continental Press Service
worked against world communism in conjunction with overseas correspondents. Unfortunately, its operations were exposed as a CIA front, according to Usdin, by E. Howard Hunt during the Watergate investigations. Congress soon made such relationships illegal, though that hasn’t stopped some intelligence services from suspecting journalists are spies. (258)

Bureau of Spies concludes with the comment that the National Press Club is no longer a center for international and domestic espionage; the building just isn’t big enough, and news services today have their own facilities. But the stories about its espionage heyday make good reading, and Usdin tells them well.

Cold War Spymaster: The Legacy of Guy Liddell, Deputy Director of MI5, by Nigel West. (Frontline Books, 2018) 262, endnotes, bibliography, index.

WALLFLOWER is the codename given to the 12 volumes of documents comprising the dictated diaries of former MI5 officer Guy Liddell. Begun in September 1939, when he was director of B Division (counterespionage), they provide a nearly continuous account of MI5 operations and bureaucratic matters through May of 1953, when he retired as deputy-director general. Two edited volumes of the wartime chronological diary entries were published in 2005. The present volume departs from that format in two respects. First, the entries included are concerned with postwar events. Second, they deal with six specific cases, with background material added by author Nigel West. In varying degrees, each case had links to US military or civilian intelligence agencies.

The first chapter discusses MI5’s role in the recovery from captured German files of compromising prewar correspondence between the Nazis and the Duke of Windsor. Under the Four Power Agreement, copies should have been provided to France and the Soviet Union. The diaries explain why Britain and the United States agreed to keep their copies secret and not inform their allies.

Subsequent chapters discuss Gouzenko (CORBY), Klaus Fuchs, Konstantin Volkov, Burgess and Maclean, and Philby cases. Gouzenko revealed the Manhattan Project had been penetrated by the Soviets, and mentioned a British penetration named ELLI—never identified, who, according to Liddell, was thought by the FBI to have been Philby. The VENONA decrypts led to the exposure of Fuchs and Liddell, and deals with the exposure of other Soviet agents that surfaced during the subsequent investigation.

The Volkov case (the NKGB officer in Istanbul who offered to defect to the British and reveal penetrations) is of particular interest, since it has so often been misinterpreted in the literature. Liddell explains Philby’s role and the official response to the offer. Then West identifies the errors made by previous authors, and for the first time reproduces the letter from Volkov to the British that resulted in various published misconceptions.

The chapter on Burgess (BARCLAY), whom Liddell knew well both socially and professionally, and Maclean (CURZON), whom Liddell had met only once in Washington, tells what MI5 knew about each before he defected. The diary entries also track the MI5 and MI6 efforts to identify a Soviet penetration of the British embassy in Washington indicated in a VENONA decrypt. Burgess is never suspected. As the search narrows, Philby contributes suggestions that, in retrospect, some thought pointed to Maclean in an effort to protect himself. Once Maclean becomes the primary suspect, negotiation to interrogate him settled on a date in June 1951. Burgess and Philby, as he wrote in his memoir, assumed the date was 28 May and Burgess and Maclean defected on the 25th. Most authors accepted Philby’s judgment, expressed in his memoir, and only now Liddell has made it clear that they did not have to hurry. As Liddell attempted to locate the missing diplomats, he consulted his former personal

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assistant, Anthony Blunt, whose involvement was substantial—but he played innocent and Liddell doesn’t suspect his complicity. Finally, in the aftermath of the defections the diaries record the inevitable bureaucratic turmoil that resulted and led inexorably to Philby’s recall.

One of the most interesting disclosures in the diaries is MI5’s report that addressed suspicions about Philby. (152–54) The report was based in part on three interviews with Philby and at least two statements he submitted, mentioned here for the first time. It also reviewed indications of his guilt from Soviet defectors to which he could be linked and which had been disregarded. Although there was no evidence that would support a prosecution, Liddell records the decision was made to present the case to Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill ordered a formal interrogation, which was conducted by the MI5 lawyer Helenus Milmo. Though Milmo did not secure a confession, he agreed with most MI5 officers, as the lengthy quotation from his report attests. Liddell stated that the CIA and the FBI thought Philby was guilty. Curiously, the new chief of MI6 stood in strong opposition to those views, and the diaries document the extraordinary extent to which he continued to protect Philby. In the end, as is well known, MI6 prevailed, and the foreign minister exonerated Philby in Parliament in 1955.

By that time, Liddell had taken early retirement, as his close links to Burgess and Blunt had prevented his advancement to director-general.

Cold War Spymaster adds significant detail to the Cambridge Five cases and, in the process, records how MI5 resolved questions about many others who had been Soviet agents. Guy Liddell’s diaries contain a valuable legacy of answers.


In his fine 1987 book on the basics of counterintelligence, former CIA officer William Johnson wrote, “No term is more misused by amateurs and greenhorns than ‘double agent.’” Most journalists and authors writing since then have done nothing to cast doubt on the truth of that statement; “Gordievsky was a double agent . . .” is a recent example. But independent researcher David Tremain has got it right—Mathilde Carré, codename Victoire, was that—and then some. M. R. D. Foot, said she was a “treble agent.”

Double Agent Victoire tells the story of an ambitious, well-educated young woman with “degrees in science, mathematics, philosophy, and law” from the Sorbonne. (27) When the war started, she volunteered as a nurse in Paris and it was there that she met Roman Garby-Czerniawski (WALLENTY), a Polish intelligence officer who was setting up a resistance network named Interallié. He recruited Mathilde Carré, codename Victoire, that—and then some. M. R. D. Foot, said she was a “treble agent.”

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By mid-1941, Interallié had become a large, effective operation and was in contact with both the Polish exile government and Special Operations Executive (SOE) in London. Mathilde learned the names of most of the key members as she encoded their reports for transmission to London.

In November 1941, things began to fall apart. The Abwehr had penetrated Interallié, and Mathilde along with many others was arrested. During her interrogation by Hugo Bleicher, an Abwehr NCO posing as a colonel, she betrayed her colleagues in return for her life while

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continuing to report to London false information supplied by the Abwehr. She also betrayed the *Autogiro* network whose leader, Pierre de Vomécourt (LUCAS), after his arrest, came to suspect she was working for the Germans. After feigning cooperation with Bleicher, de Vomécourt convinced Mathilde she should join him in a proposal to deceive the Abwehr. Amazingly, he then persuaded Bleicher to send both him and Mathilde to London where they would work as Abwehr double agents.

When they arrived in London, de Vomécourt explained the truth to MI5 and both were run against the Abwehr; it was at this point that Foot branded her a triple agent. SOE gave Mathilde the codename *Vic-toire*. After a time the Abwehr began to suspect the truth and MI5 found she was still cooperating with the Germans, *Vic-toire* was arrested and jailed until the end of the war. She was then deported to France where she stood trial and was sentenced to death. Her sentence was commuted for health reasons, and she was released in 1954. After publishing her memoir—written in jail and denying all guilt—and giving some interviews, she found religion, changed her name, and died in obscurity in 2007, “aged 98 and eleven months.” (385)

Several books about *La Chatte* appeared after her very public trial. Garby-Czerniawski’s *The Big Network* was a firsthand account but without documentation. Journalist Gordon Young wrote her biography and he was the only one to interview her. Others published fanciful variations of her story based on secondary sources. In each case, none had access to official records until Tremain found them in the British, French, Polish, and US archives. And that is both the strength and the weakness of *Double Agent Victoire*. Its strength is in the extensive quotations that clarify issues about which others could only speculate. Examples include how operations were conducted in France and England, the MI5 and MI6 officers involved, and the Abwehr counterintelligence techniques employed. In addition, agent communications and personal relationships are clarified, the consequences of inadequate training and lax security procedures are noted, and the names of agents *La Chatte* compromised are included. Finally, Tremain comments on what happened to the principal characters. The book’s weakness is that the amount of detail provided borders on overkill; some of the content could have been more effectively consigned to the source notes.

Beyond its value to history, *Double Agent Victoire* offers some useful lessons on the risks and practices associated with agent recruitment and handling. Still, a valuable contribution to the literature.

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**Hitler’s British Traitors: The Secret History of Spies, Saboteurs and Fifth Columnists**, by Tim Tate. (Icon Books Ltd., 2018) 454, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

At the start of World War II, questions were raised in the London press and Parliament about the potential threat from British fascists spying for the Nazis and making preparations to support them in the event they invaded Britain. Historians F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins addressed the issue in the fourth volume of *British Intelligence in the Second World War,* noting that “interrogations and other intensive investigations carried out . . . produced no evidence of any preparations for sabotage by Fifth Column elements, let alone the existence of, an organized Fifth Column movement.”

British investigative journalist Tim Tate challenges that conclusion and similar claims by other historians. One argued that “the Fifth Column was a ‘myth’” and “became a means by which MI5 came to justify its growth, existence, and importance.” Another, the authorized history

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of MI5, stated that, “None of the reports sent to MI5 led to the discovery of any real fifth column or the detection of a single enemy agent.” Hitler’s British Traitors presents substantial evidence that contradicts these views.

Citing recently released MI5 files found in the National Archives—presumably not available to earlier historians—Tate writes that “between 1939 and 1945 more than 70 British men and women were convicted . . . of working to help Germany win the war.” (xx) Some were executed, George Armstrong being a case in point. (270) Others, for example, Dorothy O’Grady, who acted on their own initiative, served years in prison. (276) Still others, including several members of Parliament, were briefly interned and then released to resume their seats. Members of the upper class who exhibited fascist views openly, were allowed to resume their normal lives even when that included plotting in support of the Nazis. In every case, Tate provides a detailed account of their actions that documents what they did and at the same time leaves the impression that they were never considered by the government to be serious threats to national security.

On the subject of organized movements supporting the Nazis, Tate discusses the British Union of Fascists and the Right Club, among similar organizations, citing MI5 files that describe their plans (and how MI5 learned of them) to cooperate with the Nazis before and after an invasion. In most cases, Tate argues, the Home Office and the committee established to recommend action declined to recommend prosecution. Tate describes at length the bureaucratic tensions that resulted with MI5 and its supervisory elements from this approach.

Hitler’s British Traitors refutes previous scholarship on the subject of a British Fifth Column myth and thus fills an historical gap. But it leaves unanswered the question of whether the British fascists were ever a serious threat.

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Not since 9/11 has Saudi Arabia been so frequent a topic of media attention as it was after the disappearance of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The talking heads asked their guest pundits why the United States, a superpower democracy, considered Saudi Arabia—an absolute monarchy and a theocracy—an important ally? In Kings and Presidents, a “prescient” former CIA officer and presidential adviser on Middle East matters, Bruce Riedel, answers that question and provides essential historical context— notwithstanding that his book was published a year ago.

Riedel tells the story of a “conflicted partnership” that began with a meeting between President Roosevelt “and King Abdul Aziz al Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, on Valentine’s Day 1945.” That meeting, aboard the cruiser USS Quincy, “forged the American-Saudi entente” in the sense of an understanding between the two leaders, despite obvious political and religious differences. (xiv) FDR advocated “the creation of a Jewish state,” a position the king “adamantly opposed.” Still, “they established a personal bond” that resulted in a relationship based on security assistance from the United States in exchange for access to Saudi oil, an arrangement that exists to this day. Roosevelt also promised not to take any “action harmful to the Arabs,” which he later backed up in writing. (26) Kings and Presidents recounts how the relationship, with its inherent tensions, has been managed by succeeding presidents and Saudi monarchs.

After a discussion of the Kingdom’s origins, its founding relationship with Wahhabism, and the succession of its
kings until Ibn Saud—the king who met Roosevelt—Riedel turns to contacts with American presidents beginning with Truman. The latter did not go well, from the Saudis’ perspective: Truman’s decision to support the creation of Israel was viewed as a violation of Roosevelt’s written commitment. But reality politics prevailed, since “they were too dependent on America to do anything about it” beyond beginning active support for the Palestinians. (26)

With each succeeding king and president, the mutual dependency remained although varying in degrees depending on military, economic, geopolitical and even social factors. Sometimes a president made a difference, as when Kennedy succeeding in persuading Saud’s successor, Feisal, to abolish slavery. But reforms were resisted internally; Feisal himself was later assassinated after introducing television.

But the rule, as Riedel explains, was continual diplomatic tension as the Kingdom struggled to modernize and develop relationships with its Arab neighbors while supporting the Palestinians. At the same time, the presidents sought to bring peace to the region and mediate the Palestinian-Israeli wars that erupted from time to time. Thus, when President Nixon, the first president to visit Saudi Arabia, requested the king’s help in finding a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem, the Saudi response merely stressed the need to restore Arab sovereignty in Palestine. King “Faisal was confident that the oil weapon gave him leverage for the first time to achieve these goals.” (54)

Riedel describes the sometimes cooperative, sometimes contentious relationships that resulted with succeeding administrations during the continual Middle East strife. The Iraq-Iran War, the Iraqi invasion Kuwait, the wars in Afghanistan, the horrors of terrorism, and Iran’s support of anti-Saudi interests in Syria and Yemen are just a few examples. He also includes instances of Saudi quiet interaction with Israel. (192)

Throughout much of the period covered in the book, Riedel participated in many of the events discussed. His firsthand insights greatly strengthen his account, particularly when analyzing the implicit ironies of Saudi religious, social, and political life. Bound to Wahhabism, the kingdom employs Western technology—the clerics have popular Twitter accounts, is slowly expanding the rights of women, and works closely with Christian nations. Yet it remains a “police state that allows little or no dissent” (199) while it seeks to ensure the survival of the absolute monarchy.

Kings and Presidents doesn’t predict the future of Saudi Arabia but it does provide a solid assessment of the nation as it is today, how it got there and the basis for its actions. A most valuable and timely contribution.


On 16 July 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill “invited” Hugh Dalton, his minister for economic warfare, “to take charge of the Special Operations Executive” (SOE), or as Churchill called it, the Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare (MUW). The new organization would not be publicly acknowledged but would undertake sabotage, subversion, and propaganda operations against the Nazis. Having accepted the invitation, Dalton wrote, Churchill famously exhorted him, “And now, set Europe ablaze.”

Before Dalton could execute his marching orders, the new organization had to be created. This was accomplished in part by absorbing “elements of exiting organizations” such as Section D of MI6 that had been undertaking clandestine warfare operations, with


b. Ibid.
mixed results. Typically, authors have referred to Section D in passing before going on to discuss SOE."

In Section D For Destruction Forerunner of SOE, however, historian Malcolm Atkin looks the other way and presents a reassessment, based on recently released archival material, of Section D’s “impact on the development of irregular warfare.” In the process he also describes “the machinations and rivalries of the British government and its intelligence services in the early years of the war” that led to the creation of SOE. (xii)

Section D was created in 1938 under Maj. Lawrence Grand and undertook its first operations in Europe in 1939. Prohibited from collecting intelligence except for its own needs, Section D eventually conducted sabotage and subversion operations in more than 20 countries. (214) These often created difficulties for local diplomats and MI6 officers who considered the Section D ethos or way of doing business, “un-British.” (1)

Atkin summarizes Section D’s track record in Europe, the Balkans, Scandinavia, the Middle East, Britain itself, and even the United States—the latter being largely propaganda designed to develop support for Britain. (196)

Many of the difficulties encountered by Section D were the consequence of an area of operations too large for its capabilities and the use of untrained personnel—there was no precedent for its mission or methodology. These factors were compounded by bureaucratic resistance and personality conflicts that persisted throughout its existence. Atkin covers these topics and discusses their treatment by other historians, adding perspective not previously recognized.

Section D for Destruction fills a historical gap in the evolution of irregular warfare that has heretofore placed too much credit with SOE. It is a valuable work and important contribution.


His father was KGB, so was his brother—and Oleg Gordievsky followed in their footsteps. But his career would end rather differently. The Spy and The Traitor tells how he became a British patriot while serving MI6 for 11 years. Ben Macintyre is not the first to tell the story: Gordievsky did so himself in his 1995 memoir, Next Stop Execution, that for unknown reasons was never published in the United States. Macintyre draws on many hours of interviews with Gordievsky and his MI6 colleagues to add fascinating details to an extraordinary career.

For example, Gordievsky mentions Standa Kaplan, a KGB friend with whom he spent many enjoyable hours before Kaplan defected. Macintyre adds that it was Kaplan who suggested to MI6 that Gordievsky might also be so inclined. But it was Gordievsky who set the events in motion while serving in Denmark by intentionally expressing his displeasure with the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia over an open phone line that led to MI6’s sending an officer to Copenhagen. Macintyre’s account of the resulting recruitment and subsequent handling is instructive.

After his reassignment to Moscow, Gordievsky put his career in administrative jeopardy by divorcing his wife and marrying a Russian comrade he had met in Denmark. Macintyre explains how he survived resulting controversy—the KGB did not favor divorce—all the while angling for another foreign assignment. To the delight of all, he was sent to London. His preparation for the new post included familiarizing himself with current extant cases at the London rezidency and in other areas, thus, Macintyre writes, acquiring extensive knowledge of KGB operations of possible interest to MI6. Much of this information would later be used in a book co-authored with Christopher Andrew, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Intelligence Operations From Lenin to Gorbachev (HarperCollins, 1990).
At the London residency, Macintyre writes that Gordievsky had professional conflicts with his colleagues and walked a fine operational line as he conveyed Soviet secrets to his handlers. His assessments were so valuable that he briefed Margaret Thatcher on the Soviet positions prior to her meetings with Gorbachev, and then briefed Gorbachev on what he knew about the British. He would later brief President Reagan and explain why the Soviets were convinced the United States was planning a pre-emptive nuclear attack. It was during this time also that a dissident MI5 officer tried to expose Gordievsky, and Macintyre reveals how that was avoided.

Then, suddenly, Gordievsky was called to Moscow to discuss his pending appointment as London resident. MI6 sensed something was not quite right and recommended he not go. Gordievsky went, and when he arrived in Moscow realized immediately he was under suspicion. After a drugged interrogation that didn’t produce the desired confession, he was allowed to return to his Moscow apartment. He quickly activated PIMLICO, an escape plan prudently prepared years previously in case it was needed; it was.

Macintyre discusses the obvious question: how had Gordievsky come under suspicion? It was a question that troubled Gordievsky for years afterward. In Macintyre’s view, although Aldrich Ames claimed he had never revealed Gordievsky’s name, it appears that he learned enough about the anonymous source sending intelligence to the CIA to alert the KGB of a leak in London.

The successful execution of PIMLICO adds considerable detail to Gordievsky’s own account and is a tribute to all involved, despite some unexpected complications. Efforts to reunite him with his family were successful only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but by then the relationship was beyond repair and divorce was the result.

The Spy and The Traitor concludes that Oleg Gordievsky was Britain’s most important Cold War agent. Few disagree. In 2007, he was appointed Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George (CMG) for his services to the Crown.

At 80, Oleg Gordievsky still lives quietly in England.


After the fall of communism, Svetlana Lokhova moved to England to work in banking. She soon decided to expand her interest in history and was accepted at Cambridge University where she acquired an MPhil and BA (Hons). Studying under Professor Christopher Andrew, she developed an interest in Soviet espionage operations in the West. She is presently a By-Fellow of Churchill College where she is translating the unpublished portions of the Mitrokhin Archives.

While her web page states that her book, The Spy Who Changed History, contains information on a “previously undetected network of Soviet spies that infiltrated American universities in the early 1930s,” that is only partially accurate. Several of the principal figures Lokhova discusses appear in the book Spies, by John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev (Yale University Press, 2009). Others (for example, the Soviet military intelligence officer, American Raisa (Ray) Bennett) appear in her book for the first time.

The Spy Who Changed History seeks to show that Stalin initiated an espionage operation in the early 1930s designed to “learn from scientists and entrepreneurs how to industrialize the American way” with the long range objective of improving Soviet war making capabilities. It was not intended, Lokhova claims, “to undermine its system of government.” (xiv) She does not note that during that period Soviet intelligence had parallel networks of agents that penetrated the American government for subversive purposes.
The principal character in her story, “the spy who changed history,” is Stanislav Shumovsky. While a soldier, he “helped fight off the world’s great powers who sought to strangle communism in the cradle.” After his military service, Shumovsky turned to science and became “the most successful and audacious aviation spy in Soviet history.” (xv) Codenamed BLÉROIT, Shumovsky attended MIT and, through the contacts and recruitments he made there, helped the Soviet Union acquire essential aviation technology. He also paved the way for more than 20 other Soviet intelligence officers to attend the school. Some would later be involved in Soviet atomic espionage handled out of New York City. Lokhova asserts that without Shumovsky’s contribution, “there would have been no Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, no Klaus Fuchs.” (8)

In addition to her treatment of the agents recruited and handled, the American aviation firms involved, and the technology they provided, often openly—Russia was, after all, “a friend”—Lokhova adds biographical details and information on how the Soviets selected and prepared personnel for service in America. Of particular interest is the role of Ray Bennett and her unusual links with both the KGB and GRU.

Shumovsky’s major accomplishment, in Lokhova’s view, was his acquisition of design data on the B-29 bomber that enabled the Soviet Union to produce an aircraft capable of delivering an atomic bomb. She acknowledges the fact that the Soviets possessed three B-29s, confiscated after running out of fuel over the Soviet Union during the war. They were, it is assumed in the West, copied in detail. She argues that Shumovsky’s role was critical and that Stalin rewarded his contributions.

The Spy Who Changed History cites Soviet sources, though not precisely identified. And what is somewhat troubling is that her means of access is not specified. Nevertheless, it is an interesting account of Soviet industrial espionage that echoes events in today’s world.

The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her NILI Spy Ring, by Gregory J. Wallance. (Potomac Books, 2018) 293, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The subtle irony that Mata Hari, “a nude dancer and courtesan who had no espionage achievements,” has come to “define the image of a female spy in the public imagination” is not lost on author Gregory Wallance. It is an image, he writes, “that must be discarded.” (1) The Woman Who Fought An Empire makes a strong case that Sarah Aaronsohn is a much more deserving candidate.

Wallance is not the first to tell Aaronsohn’s story, only the most recent. Based on his access to letters and other materials not available to his predecessors, his purpose is to convey a more balanced assessment of her espionage contribution to Middle East operations against the Ottoman Empire during World War I and her often stressful yet rewarding personal life.

What came to be called the NILI spy ring (NILI is an acronym from the Hebrew phrase Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker, which translates as “the Eternal One of Israel will not lie”) was an ad hoc organization formed by Sarah’s brother, Aaron, and a colleague, Avshalom Feinberg. It operated out of a Jewish settlement in Palestine and learned tradecraft on the job. Its immediate purpose was to provide the British in Egypt with tactical intelligence about the Turkish Army operating in Palestine. Its long term objective, however, was to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine under the British—the unacceptable alternative being Turkish control.

Initial efforts to convince the British that the NILI had something to offer were rebuffed, and it was only after Aaron Aaronsohn, a world-renowned agronomist, met with British officials in Cairo that links were established. Even then difficulties remained. Not all Jews

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a. For a discussion of the role of intelligence in the British campaign in the Middle East during WWI, see James Noone, “The Role of Military Intelligence in the Battle for Beersheba in October 2017,” in Studies in Intelligence 62, no. 1 (March 2018)
in Palestine supported the decision, and the NILI was forced to operate in secrecy within its own community.

Wallance explains how Sarah came to head the NILI, the difficulties she experienced in an all-male network, and the various communication methods established with the British. It was the need to end nighttime meetings with British ships offshore and turn to relying on homing pigeons that led to NILI’s downfall. The Turks intercepted a pigeon, deciphered its message, arrested the ring, and tortured Sarah. She committed suicide before talking.

The glowing though not excessive admiration Sarah receives in *The Woman Who Fought An Empire* was not shared by the Jewish community of the day. Wallance notes that “the NILI spies were regarded as reckless and irresponsible,” (241) a reputation that endured well after the state of Israel was created in 1948. Research by British military historians produced a different view and Wallance cites much of their work. Only in 1967, with the help of local Bedouins who had no love for the Turks, was the NILI reputation avowed by Israel. (239–45)

*The Woman Who Fought An Empire* reaffirms with solid documentation Sarah Aaronsohn’s espionage contributions in World War I. In this curious world, however, it is unlikely she will replace the iconic Mata Hari in the public’s image.

The reviewer: Hayden Peake has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf” since December 2002.
Books Reviewed in

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2018


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The Future is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia, by Masha Gessen (62, 2 [June 2018] John Ehrman)*


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The Selling of the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy, by David Shamus McCarthy (62 3 [September 2018] Bookshelf)

The Skripal Files: The Life and Near Death of a Russian Spy, by Mark Urban (62 4 [December 2018] Bookshelf)


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GENERAL

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*The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, by Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (eds.) (62, 2 [June 2018] Bookshelf)


*Spy Chiefs: Intelligence Leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia*, Volume 2 edited by Paul Maddrell, Christopher Moran, Ioanna Iordanou, and Mark Stout (62, 1 [March 2018] Bookshelf)


*Principled Spying: The Ethics of Secret Intelligence*, by David Omand and Mark Phythian (62 3 [September 2018] Bookshelf)

HISTORICAL

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*A Brotherhood of Spies: The U-2 and the CIA’s Secret War*, by Monte Reel (62 3 [September 2018] Bookshelf)


*The CASSIA Spy Ring in World War II Austria: A History of the OSS’s Maier-Messner Group*, by C.
Turner (62, 2 [June 2018] Bookshelf)

**Churchill’s Spy Files: MI5’s Top-Secret Wartime Reports**, by Nigel West (62, 2 [June 2018] Bookshelf)


**Cold War Spymaster: The Legacy of Guy Liddell Deputy Director of MI5**, by Nigel West (62 4 [December 2018] Bookshelf)


**Double Agent Victoire: Mathilde Carré and the Interallié Network**, by David Tremain (62 4 [December 2018] Bookshelf)


**The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA’s Heart of Darkness**, by Howard Blum (62, 2 [June 2018] David A. Foy)*


**In the Enemy’s House: The Secret Saga of the FBI Agent and the Code Breaker Who Caught the Russian Spies**, by Howard Blum (62, 2 [June 2018] David A. Foy)


Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR, by Bruce Riedel (62 4 [December 2018] Bookshelf)

King of Spies: The Dark Reign of America’s Spymaster in Korea, by Blaine Harden (62, 1 [March 2018] David A. Foy)


Misdefending the Realm: How MI5’s Incompetence Enabled Communist Subversion of Britain’s Institutions during the Nazi-Soviet Pact, by Antony Percy (62 3 [September 2018] Bookshelf)


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A Political Family: The Kuczynskis, Fascism, Espionage and the Cold War, by John Green (62 3 [September 2018] Bookshelf)


The Secret World: A History of Intelligence, by Christopher Andrew (62 4 [December 2018] Leslie C.)


The Spy and The Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story of the Cold War, by Ben MacIntyre (62 4 [December 2018] Bookshelf)


The Spy Who Changed History: The Untold Story of How the Soviet Union Won the Race, for America’s Secrets, by Svetlana Lokhova (62 4 [December 2018] Bookshelf)

Taking of K-129: How the CIA Used Howard Hughes to Steal a Russian Sub in the Most Daring Covert Operation in History, by Josh Dean (62, 2 [June 2018] Bookshelf)


The Woman Who Fought An Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her NILI Spy Ring, by Gregory J. Wallance (62 4 [December 2018] Bookshelf)


MEMOIR

Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence, James R. Clapper, with Trey Brown (62 4 [December 2018] reviews by David Foy and Jason Manosevitz)

Foxtrot in Kandahar: A Memoir of a CIA Officer in Afghanistan at the Inception of America’s Longest War, by Duane Evans (62, 1 [March 2018] Bookshelf)


INTELLIGENCE ABROAD


FICTION

Need to Know, by Karen Cleveland (62, 2 [June 2018] John Ehrman)

Transcription, by Kate Atkinson (62 4 [December 2018] John Ehrman)

FILM

Beirut, by Radar Pictures, Screenplay by Tony Gilroy (62 3 [September 2018] Brent Geary)

The Death of Stalin, by Main Journey and Quad Productions (62, 2 [June 2018] John Kavanagh)