American Candidate
US Intelligence and the Making of West Germany’s First President

Remembering Louis O’Jibway
A Native American Hero in the OSS and CIA

A Triumph in Intelligence
Fifty Years after "Black September" in Jordan
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The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA’s History Staff, CIA’s Lessons Learned Program, and the CIA Museum. In addition, it houses the Emerging Trends Program, which seeks to identify the impact of future trends on the work of US intelligence.

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Remembering Louis Austin O’Jibway
A Native American Hero in the OSS and CIA

By John Whiteclay Chambers II

Louis Austin O’Jibway served with an OSS amphibious unit along the Burma Coast and then won a Bronze Star for heroism with an OSS paratrooper operational group against Japanese forces in China. Later, as a paramilitary specialist, O’Jibway was one of the few American Indians in the CIA during the Cold War. After O’Jibway was killed in Laos in 1965, CIA posthumously awarded his family medals for his meritorious service in Southeast Asia.

Remembering a Triumph in Intelligence
Fifty Years after “Black September” in Jordan

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The Jordanian civil war in 1970, better known as Black September, was decided by an intelligence success led by King Hussein and his chief of intelligence. It was a mystery for years until revealed in the memoir of a former CIA officer serving in the region at the time. President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger took great credit for managing the Black September crisis, but in fact their role was marginal to the outcome of the biggest threat to Hussein’s survival.

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The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.
The Americans sought to rebuild Germany with the help of anti-Nazi and pro-democratic local officials. During the war, US intelligence officials had compiled so-called “White Lists” with the names of suitable candidates. When the occupation began, these lists served as points of reference for US officials who sought to appoint local administrators, politicians, and journalists. “Heuss, Theodor” is among the individuals found on such a list. An entry for the state of Württemberg describes him as a 60-year-old former journalist, liberal politician, and “Uncompromising Democrat.” The source of this information, probably a German émigré in the United States, told US intelligence that he was “not sure he [Heuss] would cooperate [with the Americans], but it would be worth trying.”

Heuss’s political background made him an attractive partner for the Americans. Before the Third Reich, he had served as a deputy for the left-of-center progressive party in the German parliament (Reichstag). He had repeatedly criticized the Nazis, and he warned of Adolf Hitler’s rise in his 1932 publication, Hitler’s Weg (Hitler’s Path). A psychoanalytical study of Hitler, commissioned by the Office of Strategic Services during the war, used this book as a reference.

In March 1933, the Nazis asked the parliament to vote for the Ermächtigungsgesetz (Enactment Law), which conferred absolute power to Hitler. Despite his opposition to this measure, Heuss bowed to pressure from his party and voted in favor of the law. During the Third Reich, he lost his seat in parliament and his job as a professor. The Nazis outlawed Hitler’s Path and in 1933 publicly burnt the book along with other banned works. While not openly challenging the regime, Heuss privately uttered his opposition to Hitler and met with members of the resistance. In 1943, he and his wife, Elly Heuss-Knapp, left Berlin to await the end of the war in Heidelberg, the picturesque university city in Heuss’s native state of Württemberg.

On March 30, 1945, the 63rd Infantry Division (“Blood and Fire”) of the US Army occupied Heidelberg. A few weeks later, in late April 1945, 1st Lt. John H. Boxer of the Psychological Warfare Division arrived at the Heuss home. The warfare division and its postwar successor, the Information Control Division, sought to promote a free press in Germany by enlisting democratically-minded publishers and journalists, and Boxer was to determine Heuss’s suitability. The encounter between the two men

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a. The Psychological Warfare Division—staffed by the British and Americans—was part of SHAEF—Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
serves as an apt metaphor for the trajectory of US-German relations after the war: awkward and fraught with misunderstandings at first but cordial and cooperative in the end.

His driver by his side, Boxer rang the doorbell only to find it out of service. He then climbed over the fence and knocked repeatedly at the door. After a while, Heuss cautiously opened it. Neither he nor his wife spoke much English, and both were initially reticent to engage with the visitors. Boxer, however, spoke some German, and soon the two men warmed up to each other. Eventually, Heuss turned to his wife and said, “Elly, I think the time has come.” He asked her to bring “the precious bottle of wine,” which they had kept in reserve for “the end of the Third Reich.” Heuss poured all four of them drinks, but when Boxer was about to take a sip from his glass, his driver grabbed his arm, yelling: “Don’t drink that—it’s poisoned!” Boxer dismissed the warning as ridiculous and downed the drink. Heuss and Boxer became lifelong friends.\(^6\)

In due course, Heuss attracted a steady stream of American visitors curious to meet him and learn more about local conditions—drawn to him despite his rudimentary English. Unlike many of his more formal German contemporaries, Heuss was witty, thoughtful, and courteous without being servile. A Heidelberg-based soldier wrote home in the summer of 1945, “Theodor has come to know the Americans pretty well—there is hardly a day, he tells me, when half a dozen don’t come and call on him. Apparently his name has gotten on a white list, so that everyone takes every possible opportunity to interview him on one thing or another, and they usually come back, too.”

Heuss’s new-found fame catapulted him into local politics. In July, the Americans appointed a friend of his, Karl Holl, as Landeskommis-sar (county commissioner) of the districts of Mannheim and Heidelberg. Like Heuss, Holl had come to the Americans’ attention through the White List. “Before 1933 liberal Democrat and attacked Nazis,” his entry reads.\(^8\) With US approval, Holl hired Heuss as his political adviser. The military government abandoned the office of county commissioner within a few months, but Heuss’s brief tenure offered him a window on the political landscape in American-occupied Germany and raised his standing with US officials.\(^9\)

Meanwhile, Boxer recommended Heuss as a newspaper editor to Maj. Shepard Stone, Boxer’s boss. Stone had studied in prewar Berlin and had attended some of Heuss’s lectures at the German Academy for Politics. Upon his return to the United States, he worked for the New York Times. During the war, he joined Army intelligence. In the summer of 1945, he returned to Germany as chief of intelligence of the 6871st District Information Services Control Command (DISCC), an operating agency of the Psychological Warfare Division, headquartered at the baroque Hohenbuchau Castle near Frankfurt. The mission of his unit included the establishment of “a new and democratic press and radio and book and magazine publishing houses free of Nazi influences and strong enough to carry on in the coming years.”\(^10\)

Heuss’s 1933 vote for the Enactment Law could have easily eliminated him from consideration for a newspaper license. His political opponents later used this vote repeatedly against him, but for US intelligence it was a non-issue.
Special Agent Edward W. Hoffer of the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) summarized the American take on this potential red flag in Heuss’s biography thus: “It is an unfortunate political custom in Germany, however, that the member of a political party which he represents in a legislative body such as the former Reichstag . . . cannot and does not vote to represent his personal opinion but must subject this opinion to resolutions taken by the governing body of his party leadership. HEUSS, therefore, had to follow his party chairmanship’s resolution and against his better judgment was forced to vote for the Enabling Act.”

Stone reached the same conclusion and became an enthusiastic supporter of his former professor’s return to public life. With Stone’s approval, Boxer revisited Heuss on June 21 and suggested he join the editorial board of a local newspaper. According to Heuss, he agreed only at the insistence of the Americans who were keen to add a liberal voice to the new publication. Within a few weeks, a group of four men led by Heuss submitted an application to the local branch of the Information Control Division for a license for a new regional newspaper, the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung.

Acquisition of a newspaper license involved a thorough vetting process. Initially, things went smoothly. On July 16th, the division’s “Chief of Inquisition,” Cedric H. Belfrage, interviewed Heuss and his co-applicants. Belfrage considered the group “capable of putting out a good paper,” and he recognized Heuss as the “strongest figure” among the men. Although Belfrage noted with displeasure the publication of several—albeit apolitical—articles by Heuss in a blatantly pro-Nazi weekly before 1945, he concluded that the applicant “is obviously a man of very superior quality and the fact that he is respected by active anti-Nazi groups in Heidelberg speaks strongly for him.”

The application hit a snag when it reached the desk of Alfred Toombs, the director of the Information Control Division’s Intelligence Branch. Toombs was responsible for weeding out former Nazis and had a reputation for applying the term rigidly. While acknowledging that Heuss “had a truly democratic background and . . . was willing to speak up in support of his principles to a certain extent even under the Nazis,” the intelligence chief pounced on the applicant’s publications during the Third Reich. “From a purely Intelligence standpoint, no firm objection can be raised against Heuss,” Toombs conceded, yet he would “not vote to approve his application, on the ground that by accepting the profits of the Nazi system, this man has compromised himself.”

Toombs’ verdict might have doomed Heuss’s fledgling post-war career had it not been for his ally and protector, Shepard Stone. Taking aim at Toombs’ purist approach to who was a Nazi and who wasn’t, Stone noted:

If one takes the attitude that only those Germans are good who are dead or who have been in concentration camps, then Heuss obviously must be eliminated. If, on the other hand, we assume that there are a few good Germans who were never in a concentration camp, then Dr. Heuss is a very good man indeed. His personal behavior and his books indicate that he was a courageous man who left no doubt that he was anti-Nazi. Dr. Heuss, in the opinion of the undersigned, is an outstanding man and we would commit a serious error, both in the accomplishment of our mission and in the eyes of anti-Nazi Germans, if we removed him from among the licensees.

Stone concluded: “It is recommended that Dr. Heuss be licensed.” Stone’s arguments carried the day, and on August 25, 1945, Robert D. Murphy, the political advisor to the
military governor, granted Heuss and his co-applicants the license.¹⁹

Stone left Germany the next year to rejoin the New York Times, but he and Heuss had become friends and remained in touch. In a letter to Stone in New York, Heuss described himself and other Germans supported by Stone as “your former foster children.” He also praised the Americans for providing much-needed food to their occupation zone during the winter and noted having mentioned this policy in “all his speeches.” The people, Heuss wrote, “know this and are grateful.”²⁰

The significance of the newspaper license for Heuss’s postwar career can hardly be overestimated. The Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung was only the third newspaper licensed by US authorities in occupied Germany. Heavily subsidized by the Americans, the paper started with a print run of 200,000 copies in early September. Without local competitors, it became the principal source of information for many in Württemberg-Baden. As a co-editor and frequent contributor, Heuss became a household name in southwest Germany. In the fall of 1945, the Information Control Division noted that the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung was on its way to becoming “a strong instrument for democracy in Germany.”²¹

The Americans continued to promote Heuss’s return to public life. In the summer of 1945, they appointed Reinhold Maier, another anti-Nazi politician identified by means of the White List, as the first German Ministerpräsident (governor) of Württemberg-Baden.²² Maier submitted a list of candidates for his cabinet to the military government, which agreed to all but one of Maier’s choices. In the case of the ministry of culture, the Americans wanted their own man—Theodor Heuss. When US officials visited Heuss in Heidelberg, they found him beating a carpet in his yard. “Yes,” he replied to the job offer, “if you get me a servant.”²³

Probably in the context of the military government’s approach to Heuss, the CIC once more reviewed his activities during the Third Reich. Unlike the Intelligence Branch of the Information Control Division, the Corps found no fault in his biography. In a summary of his career, the CIC pointed out the interference of the Nazi Gestapo (secret police) with his work and dismissed the payments he received for “historical articles” published during this time as “free-lance” writing. In conclusion, the brief biographical sketch praised Heuss as “a strong representative of South German Democracy” who “made no compromise with the Nazis.”²⁴ Four days later, on September 24th, the military government appointed Heuss as Württemberg-Baden’s minister of culture.²⁵

The appointment raised Heuss’s political profile from the local to the state level. According to a document from the East German secret service archives in Berlin, it may also have ushered in closer ties between Heuss and US intelligence. In January 1961, Soviet intelligence sent their East German colleagues the purported statement of an unnamed individual who appeared to have intimate knowledge of the CIC in postwar Germany. The document and its context suggest an American defector as the source. Due to its explosive content, the text deserves to be quoted at length. According to the East German translation of the Russian original, the Soviet source made the following statement:

"In December 1948, the civilian [CIC] employee John Seitz worked in Stuttgart/West Germany in the counter-intelligence sub-division. Seitz had been with the CIC in Stuttgart since June or July 1945. Seitz was born in Germany and went to elementary school there; later he immigrated to the United States. Seitz was known as the best employee we ever had in counter-espionage in the first [CIC] region Stuttgart. One time, Seitz and I attended an evening party. At the end of the event, Seitz suggested we visit a night club on the way to [local CIC headquarters at] the ‘Reiter Kaserne.’ Seitz was usually taciturn, talked little about his work, but this night he drank too much. He told me that a source recruited by him in 1946 was Theodor Heuss. Heuss provided Seitz with numerous reports on political conditions in the districts (Bezirke) of Stuttgart and Heidelberg in the period of 1946 to 1947. Seitz also told me that the CIC operational branch concluded that, while Heuss’s information was interesting, it had little value for headquarters. This assessment was issued at the end of 1947. As a result, the payments to Heuss for his information were terminated."

I must correct myself, Seitz told me that in December 1949, not in December 1948. He told me on the occasion of Heuss’s election as president [of the Federal Republic of Germany]. Seitz
explained that Heuss’s signed reports were deposited with us, and we could use them if at some point we wanted to put pressure on Heuss.

He received money when he worked as an informant for the CIC.26

The document defies a facile explanation. A CIC record, confirming Heuss’s work as an informant, would be the surest way to verify the Soviet-East German claim. The CIC kept two files on Heuss, covering the postwar years and his tenure as president, respectively, but neither references his alleged recruitment as an informant.27 Yet the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The first file is rather thin and gives the impression of being incomplete. The CIC investigation of Heuss’s background in September 1945 would have involved interviews and assessments by agents working the case, but merely one document survives, the above-mentioned biographical sketch absolving Heuss from the odium of having collaborated with the Nazis. It is entirely possible that CIC agents discarded documents considered unimportant at the time, including records pertaining to Heuss’s work as an informant.

Was the document part of a disinformation campaign to tarnish Heuss? The Soviets and the East Germans routinely spread malicious rumors about West German politicians, often by linking them to the Third Reich.28 As the president of the Federal Republic, Heuss would have been a worthy target of a disinformation campaign. The accusation of being an “American spy,” however, would have carried little weight in the staunchly pro-Western Federal Republic. If the Soviets or East Germans had wanted to damage Heuss politically, their weapon of choice would have been his vote for the Enactment Law.

Either way, the date of the East German document makes it an unlikely candidate for a Soviet Bloc disinformation campaign. After completing his second term as president in 1959, Heuss had retired from politics. By 1961, when the Soviets provided the document to the East Germans, he had ceased to be a valuable target for a disinformation campaign.

In all likelihood, an American intelligence defector told the Soviets about Heuss’s alleged recruitment by the CIC. Unfortunately, the document does not name this individual, but defections of Western intelligence officials to the Soviet Bloc occurred throughout the Cold War. Indeed, an unusually large number of such defections took place in 1959 and 1960, i.e., just before the East Germans received the interview transcript from their Soviet colleagues.29 The Soviet source on Heuss was probably among them.

An individual who may have known the truth was Edward Hoffer, the special agent who had dismissed earlier charges of Heuss’s support of the Nazis. Born and raised in Germany, Hoffer had left the country in the late 1930s due to his Jewish background.30 He immigrated to the United States, joined the Army, and trained for intelligence at Camp Ritchie in Maryland.31 In 1945, he returned to Germany, where he served for the next nine years. Hoffer monitored West German political leaders, such as Heuss, and he participated in Operation Campus, a CIC effort to penetrate the West German government in the early 1950s.32

In 1954, Hoffer’s intelligence career came to an abrupt end. Earlier that year, the director of the West German domestic...
security service, Otto John, had defected to East Germany. Hoffer and John had known each other since childhood, and Hoffer shot himself to death shortly after John’s defection. While not doubting Hoffer’s loyalty, US officials suspected a link between his suicide and John’s disappearance. Whether Hoffer played a role in John’s defection and whether he knew anything about Heuss’s affiliation with the CIC remains a mystery.

The information provided by the Soviet source testifies to his (most intelligence officials were male) familiarity with the CIC. For example, the Stuttgart CIC office was indeed located at the Reiterkaserne, which the Americans had renamed Wallace Barracks at the end of the war. The Heuss document was just one in a series of reports submitted by the Soviets to the East Germans, and at other times the same unidentified individual gives additional evidence of his familiarity with the CIC. Among other things, he correctly notes the civilian status of many CIC employees, the Corps’ liaison arrangement with the West German domestic security service, and the identity of “the most experienced” CIC special agent, Edward Hoffer. According to his own statement, the anonymous source had arrived in Germany at the end of the war and had left the country at the end of July 1956. During this timespan, he would have been able to learn all of this information.

If the identity of the defector remains obscure, the document is unambiguous about the ultimate source of Heuss’s link to US intelligence: a member of the CIC named “John Seitz.” A John H. Seitz did indeed serve with the CIC in southwest Germany at the end of the war; a CIC report from April 13, 1945, places him near Heidelberg. Seitz held the rank of staff sergeant and the status of special agent, i.e., someone authorized to conduct investigations and recruit informants. Otherwise, little information is available about Seitz, either during his tour of duty in Germany or after his return to the United States. The Soviet source states that Seitz was “currently” (around 1960) working for a large insurance company in the United States. Afterward, his trail peters out. Only officials working for the CIC in Stuttgart would have known Seitz at the time. His relative obscurity suggests the Soviet source was, in fact, who he appeared to be—a former CIC agent in postwar Germany.

The available evidence does not suffice to refute or confirm the Soviet Bloc allegation of Heuss’s recruitment by the CIC. Nevertheless, the East German document is consistent with the close and cordial relationship the future president had developed with representatives of the US military government and US intelligence. Heuss met frequently with US officials, freely dispensed political advice, and received ample support from the Americans. Whether he technically was an “American spy” is historically less important than his well-documented association with representatives of the occupation forces.

Paid informant or not, Heuss continued to enjoy US assistance. For example, in early 1946, the freshly minted Kultminister received an invitation from a cultural association to visit Berlin, but traveling to the former German capital from Stuttgart was easier said than done. Heuss needed logistical support and a permit for his trip. The Americans provided both. “I just returned from Berlin,” he subsequently wrote to a friend. “I was taken by American officers in a military train to and from the city; otherwise this would have been a rather questionable adventure, since zonal border crossings are always risky.”

Meanwhile, Heuss had entered the political arena by joining the re-established Liberal Party and gaining a seat in the regional legislature. The promise of Heuss’s political talent in combination with his access to voters in the traditionally liberal state of Württemberg-Baden was not lost on US intelligence. As a report from the Strategic Services Unit—the entity that bridged the gap between dissolution of OSS and CIA— noted, the liberals appealed to a large spectrum of the electorate in southwestern Germany. Heuss enhanced his party’s popularity through his contributions to the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung.
In late 1946, Heuss’s political career suffered a brief setback when elections reduced the Liberal Party’s representation in the parliament of Württemberg-Baden, and Heuss resigned his post as minister of culture. The US reaction, as Heuss described it, was telling: “The gentlemen from the military government regret my exit since we always had very pleasant interpersonal relations,” Heuss wrote to a friend in the United States. “[T]hey sent me, in the right moment of this low point, a large box of cigars as a farewell.” Cigarettes and other commodities had largely replaced money as a means of payment on the thriving black market, and a large box of cigars represented a small fortune in postwar Germany. The Americans needn’t have worried about Heuss’s political future. In fact, his exit from the Ministry of Culture turned out to be a blessing in disguise. Unburdened by local obligations, Heuss focused on his career in the Liberal Party, which was quickly coalescing into a supra-regional organization. In late 1946, he was elected chairman of the Liberal Party in the US zone. In March 1947, he became one of two leaders of the national party, representing the US and the British zones. His counterpart was the leader of the Liberal Party in the Soviet zone, Wilhelm Külz.

The short-lived liberal attempt to establish a pan-German party catapulted Heuss to the front line of the early Cold War. The Soviet-backed Communist Party in the eastern occupation zone sought to turn the local branch of the Liberal Party into a subservient tool, and Külz did nothing to fend off the communist takeover. Faced with the choice of either turning his back on the Western powers by collaborating with the spineless Külz or of moving the Western factions of the party firmly into the American camp, Heuss opted for the latter. In early 1948, he terminated the pan-German liberal project. At the end of the year, he was elected chairman of the unified Liberal Party in the Western zones.

Heuss had never been a communist sympathizer. Barely a year before Winston Churchill’s famous “iron curtain” speech, Heuss noted that Soviet-occupied Germany lay “behind a thick curtain.” Heuss’s decision to align his party with the West was his own. Nonetheless, this move cemented his standing with the Americans, who remained the ultimate arbiter in political affairs and increasingly viewed local politics through a Cold War lens.

Ferdinand Friedensburg, far right, looks on as Otto Ostrowski takes the oath of office as mayor of Berlin, November 26, 1946. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany

From left to right: Josef Müller in conversation with the social democrats Emil Bettgenhäuser and Erich Ollenhauer, July 1948. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany
office of the military government in Württemberg Baden took careful note of Heuss’s anti-communist rhetoric in the local parliament. In July 1948, the office reported approvingly on Heuss disparagement of the Communist Party in Württemberg-Baden.44

The fate of two other politicians reveals the political perils inherent in a different choice. Like Heuss, Ferdinand Friedensburg of Berlin featured on the American White List.45 He became the leader of the city’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and briefly served as mayor in 1948. After Friedensburg’s early run-ins with the Soviet occupation authorities, the US military government’s intelligence office in Berlin praised him as “absolutely clean” and one “of the most outspoken men among the democratic politicians.”46 Cleared for a political career by US intelligence, Müller assumed the chairmanship of the most powerful party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Like Friedensburg, he refused to commit unequivocally to the West. To the Americans’ dismay, he repeatedly met with Soviet officials at their German headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst.49 The CIC warned against the possibility of Müller’s becoming governor of Bavaria because “his government will probably have Eastern Zone sympathies.”50 The polarized atmosphere of the early Cold War left no room for a politician who, according to the CIC, “traveled along the center lane with feelers extended in both directions.”51 Müller’s career declined, and eventually he withdrew from politics.

By contrast, Heuss’s partnership with the Americans flourished. In September 1948, John Boxer sought to arrange a meeting between Heuss and visiting British parliamentarians in Stuttgart.52 A couple of months later, Heuss asked the military governor of Württemberg-Baden for help on behalf of Heuss’s nephew whose house had been requisitioned by the US Army.53 Another time, Heuss asked an influential military government official in Berlin to intervene on behalf of the Liberal Party in a political squabble in the city of Bremen.54 In his reply to one of Heuss’s requests for help, a US officer summed up the official attitude toward the German politician: “Why, it is our duty to help our friends.”55

Heuss returned the favor by promoting the creation of a pro-Western German state and by defending US policy, especially through contributions to the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung. The intelligence section of the Information Control Division, which regularly surveyed local opinion on American-licensed newspapers, must have been pleased at the following comment: “A merchant
questioned about his opinion on the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung thinks it to be [a] paper which only brings those things which the Americans like to hear. The editors of the paper don’t show themselves as Germans of true character and personal value. They undermine the last bit of German national pride.”56

On 12 September 1949, Heuss reached the apex of his political career, when the West German parliament, the Bundestag, elected him president of the Federal Republic of Germany. Although largely ceremonial, the office carried a high symbolic value for a nation that was just beginning to emerge from the dark shadow of the Third Reich. His election was widely applauded. The Washington Post noted Heuss’s opposition to the Nazis and lauded his desire to make the new state a “living democracy.”57 The German news magazine Der Spiegel portrayed him as a centrist politician with the ability to mediate between the conservative and the social democratic parties. Swiss national radio heralded him as the embodiment of “the good Germany.”58

US intelligence, too, was pleased. Three days after his election, the CIC filed a “Personality Report” on Heuss. “Though Professor Heuss as such is not a target of counter-intelligence interest,” noted Special Agent Edward W. Hoffer, “it is felt that due to his eminent position in German public life, a reasonably complete personal history sketch should be available in the files of this headquarters.” Hoffer concluded his review of Heuss’s political career by judging his election to the office of president as “most probably the wisest choice taken by those who had to make this difficult decision, particularly in view of the fact that Professor Heuss is known to be friendly and open-minded towards Anglo-Saxon views of democracy. This should not be understood to mean that Professor Heuss simply prefers the American and British occupation to the Soviets and their occupation as the lesser of two evils but rather that he honestly believes that of the two worlds opposing each other at the present time, only the western one assures the ideals of freedom in which democracy can live.”59

In later years, Heuss joked that he “was discovered by the Americans,” just as Columbus had discovered America in 1492.60 This analogy contained more than a grain of truth: While Heuss always remained his own man, his meteoric rise would have been inconceivable without US support. He received this support because of US regard for him as a kindred spirit, who would help transform the new state into a liberal democracy aligned with the Western powers. Whether their efforts would bear fruit remained to be seen at the end of the military occupation.

In May 1950, Heuss invited “his old friend” Shepard Stone and the US High Commissioner to Germany, John J. McCloy, to the presidential residence in Bonn. In a cordial atmosphere, the three men reminisced about the past and discussed the future. Afterward, Stone told his family, “It is trite to say that Germany is a crucial place. The big problem is to make Germany a country upon which you can rely to be peaceful and anti-totalitarian. If that fact can be accomplished [in] the next ten years, it will be a major achievement.”61

A decade later, West Germany had made much headway toward this goal. As president, Heuss had played a big part in this endeavor. By steadfastly promoting and defending him, US intelligence had, too.

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A Native American Hero in the OSS and CIA

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Although little remembered today, Louis Austin O’Jibway, who served with an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) amphibious unit along the Burma Coast and then won a Bronze Star for heroism with an OSS paratrooper operational group against Japanese forces in China, was one of the few Native Americans to serve in the OSS in World War II.1 Later, as a paramilitary specialist, O’Jibway was one of the few American Indians in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Cold War.2 After O’Jibway was killed in Laos in 1965, CIA posthumously awarded this highly respected officer medals for his meritorious service in Southeast Asia.

A Michigan Chippewa farm boy whose father died when he was only three years old, O’Jibway had struggled for a better life, ultimately achieving prominence as an athlete and then as a decorated combat veteran in World War II and paramilitary officer in the Cold War. The story of this modest Native American hero is noteworthy in part because of his achievements and the roles of the OSS in Asia and CIA in Laos. His life also demonstrates the possibility that a Native American could achieve social mobility, on his own merits, through sports and military service.

Still, the years of secrecy that surrounded his death in August 1965 illustrate the challenges that the covert nature of the operations in which clandestine service members are involved pose in providing the full recognition they are due for their service to the nation.

O’Jibway’s Struggle for Success

Big, ore-loaded ships still ease through the locks connecting Lakes Superior and Huron near O’Jibway’s birthplace in Soo Township, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. His ancestors included chiefs among the Chippewa, also called Ojibwa, a Native American people praised by Longfellow in his “Song of Hiawatha.” O’Jibway’s grandfather, a landowning chief, married a French-Canadian woman, a fellow Roman Catholic, in 1880. Thirty years later, one of their children, Joseph E. O’Jibway, owner of a hay and dairy farm and skilled dredge operator, married a Scots-Irish baker, Helen (“Nellie”) Brander. Louis Austin, born November 3, 1918, was the fifth of the couple’s seven children.³ Although his mother and grandmother were white, O’Jibway identified throughout his life with his Native American heritage.⁴

O’Jibway was nine years old when his mother remarried, and a hostile white stepfather arrived at the family farm. Soon, Louis and most of the other children were sent away to Indian boarding schools.³ As he grew older, O’Jibway excelled at sports,
earning him scholarships that helped pay his way at Haskell Indian School in Lawrence, Kansas; Bacone Indian School in Muskogee, Oklahoma; and the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque. The six-foot, 195-pound Chippewa demonstrated his strength and agility, placing first in the shot-put and javelin at Bacone and starring as a football tackle in the days of leather helmets.

O’Jibway also became a champion heavyweight boxer. In 1937 and 1939, he won state and regional Golden Gloves amateur boxing championships, the first of the Bacone “Braves” to reach nationals. The New York Times called this “Indian from Bacone, Oklahoma” one of the “formidable entrants” in the heavyweight class. He also reached the national boxing finals in the Catholic Youth Organization. Sports writers tagged the tall, barrel-chested, copper-skinned fighter “Big Honey O’Jibway” and “The Battling Chippewa.” Perhaps because he lacked “a killer punch,” O’Jibway never won a national championship, but, as the press observed, he had “class” and “a fighting heart”—a “game, aggressive youngster who . . . never takes a backward step.”

Although sports won him scholarship money, boxing took its toll: he broke his nose, his front teeth, and his right hand. As for his other expenses, he worked summers as a “rough neck” in oil fields and steel yards.

The University of New Mexico recruited O’Jibway with a sports scholarship, and he spent two academic years there. O’Jibway’s agility and footwork helped make him the university’s star tackle in the fall of 1939 and 1940 and winner of the state Amateur Athletic Union heavyweight boxing title for the school in the winters of 1940 and 1941. The yearbook tagged him “New Mexico’s greatest lineman in recent years,” and NBC’s leading sportscaster of the day, Bill Stern, named him to Life magazine’s national “Little All-America” team in 1940, recognizing O’Jibway as one of the top college football players in the nation.

Boxing with Joe Louis

At the beginning of his senior year at the University of New Mexico in September 1941, the 22-year-old athlete and petroleum engineering major was drafted into the US Army. College was over for O’Jibway, but boxing and football were not. Arriving at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, he was recognized by a former West Point football coach, who convinced O’Jibway to extend his one-year commitment to three years in the regular Army. O’Jibway was quickly promoted to corporal and assigned to the physical training unit at First Cavalry Division headquarters. Predictably, he soon became a star of the division’s football and boxing teams. In 1942, after completing a 90-day course at officers’ candidate school, O’Jibway received a commission as a second lieutenant and an appointment as athletic director at the giant Cavalry Replacement Training Center at Fort Riley, Kansas.

In addition to physical training, the Army encouraged football, boxing, and other sports to help turn new recruits into hard-fighting soldiers and help instill pride in their service. O’Jibway, by now a first lieutenant, led the cavalry team to victory over the infantry footballers and Midwest Army champions in 1942 and 1943. Even more notably, O’Jibway headed the cavalry’s successful boxing training and exhibition program. Ring magazine called O’Jibway’s program at Fort Riley, “one of the outstanding service ring outfits of any army camp.”

Boxing brought O’Jibway a celebrity connection he would recount for the rest of his life—his ties to world heavyweight champion Joe Louis Barrow. The 28-year-old “Brown Bomber” from Detroit, a former Golden-Glove amateur champion himself, had enlisted in the Army and was assigned to O’Jibway’s boxing unit at Fort Riley from 1942 to 1944.
American worked together identifying and training Army boxers and taking exhibition trips. O’Jibway sometimes acted as one of Joe Louis’s sparring partners, he would tell friends and relatives.

**Enlisting in the OSS**

In 1944, O’Jibway volunteered for “hazardous duty with small combat teams” in what he soon learned was William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan’s clandestine Office of Strategic Services, which sent spies and saboteurs behind enemy lines. OSS, a predecessor of CIA and Special Forces, was looking for bright, able, and daring individuals for a new amphibious unit OSS planned for the Pacific. Major Lloyd E. Peddicord, Jr., an Alabamian who had risen through the ranks and had won a Silver Star in the North Africa landings in November 1942, was an expert in night amphibious reconnaissance and landings. He signed up O’Jibway as one of his first recruits.

On April 27, 1944, O’Jibway became the first member of the new unit to arrive at OSS Training Area F, the former Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland. A few days later, when Lt. John C. Hooker, Jr., an infantry officer from Atlanta, Georgia, arrived as the next recruit, the cavalryman was delighted: “Boy, am I glad to see that there is someone here other than me,” O’Jibway told Hooker. “I’ve been here for three days and am the only ‘secret agent.’ I was thinking that I was going to be on a one-man mission.”

When the rest of the 60 men arrived, they soon began the demanding testing and training for commando operations, including practicing ju-jitsu, learning how to overcome an enemy while unarmed, and handling seven-man rubber boats on the Potomac River. A month later the unit was down to its planned strength of 40 men, organized into six small-boat teams. One night in June, 1944, they moved to OSS Training Area A, a large, wooded area today known as Prince William Forest Park near Quantico, Virginia. There, they loaded, fired, and field-stripped weapons from a dozen countries, assembled and disarmed booby traps, learned how to use the latest explosives and fuses, live off the land, and engage in nighttime hit-and-run operations. Their training ended with a Fourth of July celebration, at which a boxing match became so brutal that O’Jibway had to step in and bring it to a halt. The next week, the group learned that Gen. Douglas MacArthur had refused to allow the OSS men into his South West Pacific Area Theater, and their mission was shifted to the China-Burma-India Theater/South East Asia Command. They left on 14 July 1944 for the West Coast, and then Asia.

Lieutenants O’Jibway and Hooker bunked together on board ship, as they had in camp. Both were former Golden-Glove boxers, but the strong, tall Native American, weighing more than 200 pounds compared to his 140-pound companion was, Hooker recalled, a man of quiet strength who was treated with respect, as an
Remembering Louis Austin O’Jibway

equal. Unlike many Native American enlisted men in the armed services, no one called O’Jibway “chief”; most of his colleagues called him “Jib.” He did not discuss his background more than needed. “[Talk of] our personal lives, if discussed at all, was very brief,” Hooker remembered. “Jib was very, very quiet, like many big men are.”

For several months in 1944 to 1945, the OSS waterborne Operational Group roared forth from bases on the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal on high-powered swift boats operated by the OSS Maritime Unit. From a home base named Camp Ritchie, they probed the islands, mangrove swamps, tidal creeks, and jungles of the Arakan coast of Japanese-occupied Burma, operating first under OSS Detachment 404 and subsequently under Detachment 101.

O’Jibway personally headed “Operation Rugby,” a successful landing that revealed the Japanese abandonment of a strategic island. He also led his amphibious scout- and raider-team as part of several other reconnaissance operations, some of which resulted in fire fights. At night on Ramree Island, OSS probes triggered fire from Japanese machine guns and heavy weapons, causing several casualties and revealing that the enemy was there—in force. It took an entire British Indian Army Division and British Marine Brigade to capture Ramree Island in January 1945, on the way to liberate Rangoon.

Yanking the Arakan Field Unit from coastal reconnaissance in the spring of 1945, OSS Headquarters flew the OSS commandos “over ‘the hump,’” the Himalayan Mountains, to China for a daring new mission. There they would join experienced OSS teams from the European Theater to train and advise the first Chinese paratrooper commando groups for raids behind Japanese lines. But first, the amphibious raiders had to become paratroopers themselves, earning their British parachute wings in India and their American parachute wings in China.

O’Jibway and Hooker joined the 10th Chinese Commando, one of 20 planned units, each to include nearly 200 Chinese troopers and their officers, plus their American OSS advisers. With little enthusiasm for the project, the Chinese Army sent many illiterate, malnourished, and reluctant Chinese peasants as recruits to the OSS experiment. O’Jibway, Hooker, and the other Americans did their best to build up, energize, and train them. At night in their tent, Hooker recalled, he and O’Jibway discussed “the failings of the Chinese troops, and how we could motivate them.”

When a major Chinese offensive began in July 1945, the six OSS-trained commando units deemed ready were sent into action to seize airfields and bridges to disrupt enemy communication and supply lines. The 10th, 9th, and 8th Chinese Commando units, grouped together as the “Blackberry Mission” and headed by Capt. Arthur P. Frizzell, who had led an OSS operational group in France, were sent to help the Nationalist Chinese Army’s 265th Regiment in the 89th Division. Their first mission was to capture a Japanese-held airfield in Southeast China that had been built on the grounds of a US Maryknoll (Roman Catholic) Mission.

But when the paratroopers attacked, most of the regular Chinese Army officers and enlisted men remained in position instead of
advancing. In the 10th Commandos’ sector, O’Jibway and his US sergeants, supported by Hooker’s mortar unit, led their Chinese paratroopers in storming a hill and then firing down on the Japanese. When they began to run out of ammunition after suffering from heavy enemy counter-fire for several hours without any reinforcement, O’Jibway and Hooker had to withdraw their units. Three dozen Chinese paratroopers had died in the action, but the Chinese and their OSS advisers had killed more than 160 enemy soldiers. During the night, the Japanese withdrew from the airport and the town, so US forces had achieved their objective, although without the help of the regular Chinese troops. The Maryknoll priests came down from their hiding places in the hills and welcomed the Americans, who hung a parachute in the mission’s chapel as a memento.39

With the Japanese surrender in mid-August 1945, O’Jibway and most of his colleagues returned to Washington, DC. Many of those, like O’Jibway and Hooker who had lived in the field in China, were underweight and debilitated from dysentery, malaria, or jaundice.30 Promoted to the rank of captain, O’Jibway received almost a year’s back-pay and was credited with 50 months of military service, including 15 months of combat duty in the Far Eastern Theater. At Donovan’s recommendation, the War Department awarded him the Bronze Star for meritorious service behind enemy lines in China from 21 July through 15 August 1945. Especially cited was his leadership of the assault on the Japanese airfield.31 Having served since September 1941, the 27-year-old hero declined an offer to remain in the service and left Army active duty for civilian life in December 1945. He retained his commission as a reservist and would continue to wear captain’s bars on his shoulders and numerous campaign ribbons on his chest, alongside the Bronze Star for bravery, as a member of the Army Reserve Officer Corps.32

OSS veterans were sworn to secrecy, and the clandestine organization’s records remained classified for more than half a century. Not until the 21st century were O’Jibway’s achievements in the OSS made public.33

After the War

Like many veterans returning from the war, O’Jibway looked for a job and a wife. He found the latter first: a fellow cavalry officer, former UCLA football star lineman Martin “Whitey” Matheson took O’Jibway home to Los Angeles and introduced him to Mary Louise Ratcliff, a vivacious, green-eyed, southern California beauty who worked at the Douglas Aircraft Plant in Santa Monica. They married in January 1946 and moved into an apartment in Pasadena, near his uncle. Her family welcomed him. Despite his large size and deep voice, O’Jibway was a kind and gentle man. “Austin was really wonderful. He was so sweet. Everybody loved him,” said Louise’s younger sister, Gladys. “You could feel it right away when you met him. You could trust him, rely on him. You would be safe with him.”34

As a civilian, O’Jibway first turned to sports to earn a living. In his captain’s uniform with cavalry breeches and boots, he strode unannounced into the office of a leading Los Angeles boxing promoter. Stephen H. “Suey” Welch was sufficiently impressed with O’Jibway’s record in the ring and his performance in the gym to send him to a training camp at Ojai and enter him in the Los Angeles Times Golden

OSS Operational Group in China: American officers and NCO’s who trained and helped lead the 10th Chinese Commando unit into action against the Japanese. O’Jibway is standing just behind the kneeling officer and the unit’s mascot, Trex. This photograph was taken in Kunming, China, in July 1945. Photograph courtesy of Troy J. Sacquety.
Gloves tournament in March. O’Jibway’s billing was, “Austin O’Jibway, 26, an Indian, former Army captain, at 215 pounds and recommended by Joe Louis.” At Olympic Stadium that spring, O’Jibway scored a TKO in the second round to win the tournament’s heavyweight championship.35

Professional football came to Los Angeles in the fall of 1946, and O’Jibway became one of the many returning veterans and former star athletes hired to play for the newly organized Los Angeles Dons in the fledgling All-American Football Conference, a short-lived rival of the National Football League, which brought the Cleveland Rams to Los Angeles that year. Unfortunately, O’Jibway suffered a serious injury during training with the Dons that summer and never recovered enough to play professional football or box professionally.

Sports would no longer be a means of advancement for O’Jibway; instead, he joined one of his wife’s brothers as a security guard at the Douglas plant.36 Louise went into labor three months early, and on August 7, 1946 delivered twins—Teresa Karen “Tee” O’Jibway and Louis A. “Buddy” O’Jibway, Jr.37 In 1949, the O’Jibways bought a house three miles from the ocean in Redondo Beach.38

Working for the US Army and CIA

As a student in the 1930s, O’Jibway had joined the Kansas National Guard while at Haskell, and the Oklahoma National Guard while at Bacone, in order to supplement his income.39

In the fall of 1951, in the middle of the Korean War and at the beginning of a major US military build-up as part of the Truman Administration’s policy of containing communism worldwide, O’Jibway left his job as a security guard and went to work for the US government as a clandestine paramilitary officer at CIA.40 O’Jibway was one of many special operations veterans of the OSS that CIA recruited for its operational component as new Deputy Director for Plans Allen Dulles, a former OSS desk officer himself, shifted emphasis from intelligence gathering to covert operations.41 When it could, “the Agency hired people who had already been trained,” said Caesar J. Civitella, a former member of the OSS, Army Special Forces, and CIA. “They hired from the OSS and from the military.”42

About working for the clandestine agency, O’Jibway only told his family that he had a civilian job with the federal government and that it required them to move east. Renting out the Redondo Beach house, they relocated to southern Virginia to be close to a CIA training facility. During 1952 to 1954, presumably on his first assignment, he was stationed in Taiwan.31 Louise, who did not like to travel, reluctantly joined him there with the twins. According to his family, O’Jibway met occasionally with Chiang Kai-shek.44

“My husband and I always suspected that he worked for the CIA, but he never said anything,” recalled Louise’s sister, Gladys Ratcliff Miller. “He was always being sent away to different places and then especially when he was sent to Taipei with my sister and the children, we

Newly Weds: Louis O’Jibway and his bride, Louise Ratcliff O’Jibway in early 1946 at a boxing training camp in Ojai, CA. The recently wedded Army and OSS veteran was training for a boxing match in Los Angeles. Photograph courtesy of Gladys Ratcliff Miller.
were told to write to him via an import-export company in New York City. Well, Life magazine exposed that company as CIA. Then we knew.”

Although he became a CIA officer in 1951, O’Jibway also remained an officer in the Army Reserves and was periodically called to active duty between 1952 and 1959, usually for relatively short terms. With his “top secret” clearance, he served in Army intelligence and operations and was sent several times to the Far East; CIA also sent him there.46 His daughter recalled that her father “was often away from home, often for some time. I knew he worked for the government, for the engineers or the Department of Defense, but I never knew [until later] that he worked for the CIA.”

Pressures on the Family

Working for CIA took its toll on the family. “Louise and the children could have gone on some of his trips,” Gladys Ratcliff Miller recalled, “but my sister did not want to go. She did go to Taipei, but she hated it. She was so happy to get back to Redondo Beach when they returned.”

Louise and the twins lived in Virginia during the school year, but the southern California native objected to living through the East’s cold and snowy winters. In the spring of 1955, when a smoky fire broke out in the attic and damaged much of their house and furnishings, Louise shouted, “That’s it! I’m never leaving California again!”

Pulling the eight-year-old twins out of school before the end of the term, Louise returned immediately to Redondo Beach. O’Jibway joined her but also rented an apartment in Arlington, Virginia, near CIA Headquarters in Langley. The couple remained together for several years. “I think it was because she was against his being moved around every couple of years,” her sister explained. “She was a California girl.”

As teenagers, the twins went to school in California but spent summers with their father and his relatives in Michigan and Texas. Their parents finally separated in the 1960s.

Periodically, O’Jibway served as an instructor on paramilitary operations and escape and evasion techniques, a job that would reveal qualities often hidden. “He was not very talkative, either in or outside the training sessions, but when he had something to say, we learned to listen carefully,” said James Glerum, who was one of his trainees in 1956. O’Jibway knew how to harvest wild foods and live off the land, and when he discovered Glerum was interested, he spent several weekends teaching him how. “On these field trips, I discovered that, hidden behind his ‘no-nonsense’ approach, he had quite a sense of humor. Across the board, I learned a great deal from him. For a young officer, just entering the service, Jib was someone to emulate.”

A powerful man in the ring, on the football field, and in combat, Louis Austin O’Jibway was a man of considerable empathy and deep religious faith. He was a Roman Catholic and a Democrat. “My father wasn’t very interested in politics, but he did vote,” his daughter said, adding, “and his religion meant a lot to him.”

A former CIA colleague who worked as his intelligence officer in Laos in the early 1960s agreed: “He was a very caring person. He was almost too nice to be in our line of work,” recalled Gary Erb. “When you get into intelligence [and paramilitary] work, you are asking people to possibly get killed. He was not that kind of guy.”

For a period of 18 months from 1957 to 1958, O’Jibway, then 39 and an Army major, served on active duty at US 8th Army Headquarters in South Korea. He spent most of his free time there assisting a Maryknoll mission project for homeless lepers run by Father Joseph A. “Big Joe” Sweeney, whom he had first met in China in 1945. More than just driving priests around on their visitations, O’Jibway solicited from his fellow officers money, food, clothing, and medicine for the lepers. When he returned home, he convinced the World Medical Relief organization to provide additional assistance for them. When the secretary of the Army learned about this, he awarded O’Jibway a citation praising his work, which reflected “great credit on yourself and on the United States Army.”

Participating in the American “Secret War” in Laos

In the early 1960s, CIA sent O’Jibway to help in what became known as the “secret war” in Laos. The initiative started small, but after O’Jibway was gone, it eventually became the largest covert operation in the agency’s history. The operation involved clandestinely arming and supplying thousands of Hmong and other indigenous mountain people in

“Across the board, I learned a great deal from him. For a young officer, just entering the service, Jib was someone to emulate.”
Laos, with the aim of helping them limit the control of North Vietnamese communist forces that had invaded the small but strategically important southeast Asian kingdom, much as the OSS had used indigenous mountain tribesmen in Burma against Japanese invaders during WWII.

All major regional parties had agreed to the neutralization of Laos and the withdrawal of foreign military forces there, but when North Vietnam retained 10,000 regular troops there and resumed the offensive in 1962, President John F. Kennedy authorized CIA to secretly launch “Operation Momentum” supporting a guerrilla army of mountain tribesmen to block the communist advance. From the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower to Ford, US policy sought to prevent collapse of the neutralist, coalition government in Laos while simultaneously avoiding direct and open US military intervention and full-scale war, in what Washington considered a theater of war secondary to Vietnam.56

CIA’s “secret war” involved expanding resistance to foreign communist forces by using primitive Hmong leaders by a charismatic Hmong leader, a young, French-trained officer named Vang Pao. The agency used helicopters and short take-off-and-landing (STOL), fixed-wing aircraft belonging to Air America and Bird & Sons, two thinly disguised, CIA-subsidized airlines, to fly in arms, food, medicine, and funds from Thailand to mountain villages in Laos.57 But in spite of the lifeline CIA represented, Gen. Vang Pao would not allow CIA officers to command his Hmong forces, which initially numbered fewer than 7,000.58

Some of CIA’s best officers were sent to Laos or neighboring Thailand, where the agency was directing operations.59 Among the senior case officers was Louis Austin O’Jibway.

O’Jibway arrived in Thailand in 1962, after completing a course at the US Army’s then-new Special Forces Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1961, and then helping to update paramilitary training for CIA’s new Special Operations division. Soon after his arrival in Thailand, he helped the US Army Special Forces Group run a six-month guerrilla warfare course for high ranking Thai and Laotian officers. He advised the Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP) commandos CIA had helped to create and was now supplying with helicopters, short-wave radios, and weapons. Since the Thai police commandos could not be as easily identified as foreigners, CIA sent numbers of them into the Laotian mountains to work with guerrillas there in support of the CIA effort.60

Primary focus had been on the northeastern area of Laos that bordered North Vietnam, but when President Kennedy decided to expand the guerrilla operation, CIA extended the area to include northwestern Laos and its borders with China, Burma, and Thailand. CIA officers James W. (“Bill”) Lair and Lloyd (“Pat”) Landry ran Operation Momentum out of a nondescript building on the huge, Royal Thai Air Force base at Udorn, Thailand, 50 miles south of the Laotian capital of Vientiane. They sent O’Jibway to manage the project in the northwest provinces, and he arrived in mid-1963 at his new station in Chiang Khong, Thailand, in the northwestern corner of Laos across the Mekong River.61 As the senior CIA case officer in the region, “Jib” or “Lou,” as he was known, was responsible for paramilitary
activities and intelligence collection in the area.

The assignment came with problems. His predecessor, William ("Bill") Young, a youthful UCLA graduate and son of local missionaries, had combined a freewheeling, independent operation with a hedonistic lifestyle, and he remained in the area. "In contrast, Lou O’Jibway was a very cautious and methodical individual," recalled Terrence M. ("Terry") Burke, a former Marine serving as a CIA paramilitary field officer in Laos, who came to know and admire the Native American supervisor. Burke described O’Jibway, by then 45 years old, as "very conservative, Roman Catholic, and older; he had a very difficult time with Bill Young."62 O’Jibway had learned Thai and used interpreters for the various dialects of Laos, but he also had to deal with bitter rivalries among the tribes, meddling by Lao generals, and increasing US military demands for more offensive-oriented guerrillas to help interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos.

Despite such problems, O’Jibway handled the situation well: "Jib was a quiet and reserved individual, not overly laden with ego, as some of the younger Agency paramilitary types were prone to be," recalled a senior pilot.63 "He was a nice guy, a typical American Indian kind of guy—calm, quiet, unflappable," said a helicopter crewman. "I never saw him drink or get excited or upset; he was well respected."64

Joy and Tragedy in California

In the summer of 1964, O’Jibway returned to the United States for his twins’ graduation from high school. After the graduation and celebration of their 18th birthday, on August 14th he left for the airport, to begin the long flight back to southeast Asia.65 As his flight made its way over the Pacific, O’Jibway’s wife (from whom he was by now separated) was killed in an automobile accident in Redondo Beach.66 "The car crashed at 6:30 [pm], only two-and-a-half blocks from our house," Teresa O’Jibway remembered. "I was taking a bath, and I heard the sirens. Someone came and told me not to go out to the accident . . . my mother died a week after my 18th birthday."67 Funeral services were held six days later.68

After Louise’s death, O’Jibway’s son Buddy started spending more time with him. Buddy ended up accompanying O’Jibway back to Thailand, taking a job at Udorn Air Base as a baggage handler for Air America.69 "He was a nice kid, like his dad,” recalled Gary Erb, O’Jibway’s intelligence officer. "He was well-mannered and well built."70 Buddy spent almost a year there.

O’Jibway made helicopter trips into Laos on payroll, inspection, and other missions, including, on some occasions, missions to save his people’s lives. Although the main battles occurred in northeastern Laos, there were also running gun fights with the communists in O’Jibway’s northwest region by 1965. On 21 May, he personally saved the life of paramilitary field officer Terry Burke. With the North Vietnamese regulars chasing Burke and the mountain tribesmen through the jungle, O’Jibway arrived in a helicopter and rescued Burke and the wounded, among whom were guerrilla tribesmen and a Thai Border Patrol Police commando—allowing the rest of the tribesmen to escape.73

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Recruiting and Training Guerrillas

O’Jibway and his field operatives continued to build and expand a guerrilla network among the mountain people in northwestern Laos and to help with a USAID program to implement health and hygiene improvements in the region. He enlisted recruits from various tribes and built a training camp near his headquarters. During the dry season in the winter of 1964–65, he established a forward base (L-118A) in Laos near the village of Nam Yu, in a tight mountain valley 40 kilometers north of his headquarters across the Thai border.

The small, rustic compound at Nam Yu, staffed by CIA paramilitary officers, an intelligence officer, and several Thai radio operators and English-speaking Burmese Shan bodyguards, was later expanded into a guerrilla training camp. “I stayed up there in a grass hut and established a cornfield landing strip,” Gary Erb, the intelligence officer, recalled. “He stayed at Chiang Khong and did the major support work. He handled the money, the payroll for the troops, supplies, and the like.”71 In addition to supervising the intelligence and paramilitary resources and operations, O’Jibway gladly followed CIA directives to help bring Western sanitary, health care, and agricultural techniques to the mountain tribes.72

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When President Lyndon Johnson began sending US ground troops to combat in South Vietnam in 1965, he also ordered CIA to increase Vang Pao’s guerrilla forces in Laos. Despite concerns voiced by Lair, Landry, O’Jibway, and others, the original operation of limited hit-and-run raiding would be supplanted by larger-unit ground offensives, run by the expanded guerrilla forces now supported by US airpower. Arriving in spring 1965 to assist enlarged paramilitary operations, Jim Sheldon was impressed by O’Jibway’s very presence, recalling later: “He was a very big guy, 220 to 230 pounds, with hands as big as Virginia hams.” Describing O’Jibway’s leadership, Sheldon explained: “He was an experienced leader, gave people the lead. Told them what to do and let them do it. He could be creative. Without authorization or funding, he set up a PX where tribal leaders could obtain little things that were valued back at the village—flip-flops, sarongs, combs, and brushes and things—and he paid for it by selling extra barrels of gasoline that our helicopters did not use. This kind of creativity also helped us upgrade the guerrillas’ weapons.”

Under new orders, O’Jibway in the early summer of 1965 moved beyond defensive village militias in his region and began to prepare an offensive force to be sent to join Gen. Vang Pao in the northeast. O’Jibway’s first 500-member Special Guerrilla Battalion, too large to be trained locally, was flown several hundred miles south to the major base at Hua Hin, Thailand, for three months, beginning training in July of 1965. Countrywide, such escalation of the “secret war” produced more casualties on all sides, including some US pilots and CIA operatives who were killed or captured.

In the initial phase of the new program, CIA’s guerrilla operation in northwestern Laos suffered a tragic, major setback on 20 August 1965: O’Jibway and several other important figures from the United States, Thailand, and Laos, were lost in a helicopter crash. Traveling from the forward base at Nam Yu to the CIA control center at Udorn, their chopper went down in the Mekong River, near the Laotian capital, Vientiane.

Down and Missing in the Mekong

Maintaining the façade of US non-intervention in Laos, CIA avoided any reference to itself and its role there in the information that was released after the helicopter crash. The first press report of the crash appeared as a small story two days afterward in the Bangkok Post, an English-language newspaper in the Thai capital. The article reported that a US Air Force helicopter had gone down near Nonghai, Thailand. Four days later, on 24 August, an Associated Press story printed in the Bangkok Post and picked up by the Washington Post and other newspapers cited the US embassy in Thailand as having identified two Americans missing in the crash: a “Lewis [sic] A. O’Jibway of Redondo Beach, California, and Edward Johnson of Washington, DC.” The Bangkok newspaper erroneously identified them as employees of the Bird & Sons airline.

A subsequent Associated Press report out of Vientiane was a composite of some accurate statements, some half-truths, and some outright falsehoods. It declared,

A helicopter carrying five Americans and a Laotian colonel fell into the Mekong River on Sunday. Three of the Americans managed to swim ashore, but the other two and the Laotian colonel apparently perished in the swift current. The copter was coming into Vientiane, Laos, on a flight from Thailand. US military officials in Bangkok said all Americans on board were civilians. Bangkok newspapers reported the helicopter belonged to the US Air Force, but officials there said it was a charter craft.

CIA and other US government agencies thus contributed to the obfuscation of the US role in Laos: there was, in this report, no mention of the Thai army captain; the helicopter was not coming in to Vientiane—it was actually heading in the opposite direction, from Laos to Thailand; the individuals named in the reporting were not civilians—they were working for CIA or its subsidized airline; and the helicopter did not belong to the US Air Force.

CIA policy in the region was to fly the bodies of dead employees out of the area as soon as possible, usually within a day or two, and also whisk any family members there back to the United States. No memorial services
A Monsoon Tragedy

From the Air America report and subsequent interviews, including some conducted by the author, a fuller picture of the fatal flight comes into view. It had begun as a routine flight by an Air America utility transport helicopter, a Sikorsky UH-34D, a former Navy/Marine (“Seahorse” or “Dog”) version of the Army’s more widely known UH-34 “Choctaw.” After delivering supplies to O’Jibway’s forward base (L-118A) at Nam Yu, the crew of the UH-34D started to return to the CIA facility at Udorn Air Base in Thailand, normally about a three-and-a-half-hour trip. Air America pilot Capt. Robert J. (“Bobby”) Nunez, 30, and crewmen Stephen I. Nichols, 24, were well on their way to Udorn when O’Jibway radioed them to return north to pick up a downed pilot whose small, fixed-wing aircraft had just crash-landed at another mountainous dirt landing strip.

After picking up the downed pilot, Nunez flew to Nam Yu to refuel. It was a Friday, and during the refueling, O’Jibway and several of his colleagues decided to go with the empty chopper to Udorn. “It was a spur-of-the-moment thing,” recalled Gary Erb, who was there. “Now Jib and the others said, ‘We’ll all go to Udorn and have a good meal at the club. Hell, we’ll all go back, have some good meals, sleep in a good bed, and talk to Bill [Lair] and Pat [Landry].’ Even though the weather was getting bad—it was the rainy season—they climbed aboard for their own reasons.”

When Nunez took off, he and the rescued fixed-wing pilot, George Calhoun, sat in the pilot positions in the upper level, forward cabin. Below and aft of the cockpit, in the cargo hold, were crewman Nichols, O’Jibway, Edward Johnson, and two close associates, leaders of the Thai and Laotian militaries, Col. Tiao Syborravong and Capt. Ruang Ramrut. As the craft proceeded, the sky darkened and it began to rain—first showers, then heavier and heavier, monsoon-season rain. By early evening the sky was black; fuel was running low and the windshield wiper was not working. Nunez put on his landing lights and began to follow the bank of the Mekong River, at what he thought was 50’ or so above the water, hoping to land at Vientiane. Around 7:30 p.m., just north of Vientiane, he strayed away from the riverbank. The chopper had descended to three or four feet above the river, which is approximately a mile wide at that point, but, unknown to Nunez, the helicopter’s altitude warning system was inoperative. When he banked the aircraft, its right wheel and rotor blades dug into the water, stopping the aircraft immediately and flipping it onto its side into the dark, surging waters of the Mekong.

The cargo compartment door was underwater and stuck, and the turned over helicopter was sinking fast. Nichols, the crewman mechanic, worked his way toward the back, squeezing through a small emergency hatch and bobbing to the surface. Nunez and Calhoun escaped through a sliding window in the cockpit. In the dark, the three heard two other persons surface, sputtering. Nichols testified later, “I believe I heard Captain Nunez call, ‘Jib!’ and was answered by, ‘Yeah.’” Whoever it was, two of the four passengers who had escaped from the cargo hold were quickly swept away.

As Nichols and Calhoun swam toward opposite sides of the mile-wide river, Nunez, who could not swim, grabbed driftwood and was carried 60 miles downriver. At daybreak, a major search-and-rescue operation began; all three Air America employees were found soaked but alive. The search for the four passengers and the wreckage went on for three weeks, involving Air America, the US Air Force, the Royal Laotian Army, Royal Thai Border Patrol Police, and CIA boat teams.

Several days after the crash, CIA officer Edward Johnson’s body was discovered on the riverbank near Vientiane. The corpse of Thai officer Ramrut washed up 20 miles downriver. Both had drowned. The bodies of O’Jibway and the Laotian prince, Colonel Syborravong, were never found, nor was the wreckage of the helicopter—all were presumed swept away. For a year, CIA carried O’Jibway on its rolls as “missing.”
were held in Laos or Thailand for CIA training officer Edward Johnson, an African American and former Marine, when his body was found the day after the crash. Johnson’s remains were flown back to Washington, DC, where his family lived and where William Colby, then chief of CIA’s Far Eastern Division, attended his funeral. Louis A. O’Jibway’s body was not found, nor was the body of the Laotian colonel. Both were presumed to have been carried down the Mekong, which also swept away the wreckage of the helicopter. There was no mention of the Thai army officer who drowned, but whose body had been found.

Terry Burke, O’Jibway’s friend and former subordinate, had returned from Laos to CIA Headquarters a month before the crash. When news of the tragedy reached the agency, CIA immediately flew him to California. It was 3:00 in the morning when he appeared at Teresa O’Jibway’s door to deliver the news. “We wanted to tell them fast,” Burke recalled, “because we assumed the press would be on it quickly. I stayed with them for a week; Headquarters was feeding me information as they received it.”

Because the helicopter crash into the Mekong had occurred during the escalation of the war in Vietnam where US aircraft were being shot down, many of O’Jibway’s friends and relatives thought that communists might have shot down his aircraft as well, and that he might be a prisoner. “We always thought that the official story of him drowning in a crash might not be the truth, and that he might be a captive somewhere . . . since he was never found,” said his sister-in-law. O’Jibway’s good friends, the Maryknoll priests in South Korea, certainly thought he had been shot down. Father Joseph A. Sweeney, the leader of the Korean leper project who had known O’Jibway since 1945, wrote a letter to hundreds of their mutual friends. Noting that O’Jibway had been doing a “hush-hush job” for the Defense Department, training the Thai Border Patrol “in tactics against the Reds,” Sweeney wrote, “He must have been a marked man by the Reds. Did they shoot him down?? . . . Please say a prayer for our best friend, who has gone to the Happy Hunting Ground.”

Even though O’Jibway was presumed dead, CIA listed him as missing for a year. Finally, in the fall of 1966, CIA Headquarters notified his two children that since all efforts to find his body had failed, the agency was preparing a death certificate and asked them to come and receive it. “We went to Washington and were given his medals and all,” recalled his daughter. In a private ceremony, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms handed them the certificates and their father’s medals, awarded posthumously: a gold Intelligence Medal of Merit, and a silver Exceptional Service Medal. An official photograph shows the slightly balding Helms handing over a small case of items to Buddy O’Jibway as Teresa O’Jibway looks on.

“That’s when I decided that Dad was dead,” she declared later, “although I still have some doubts about the truth. They didn’t tell us much.” O’Jibway’s two younger brothers, who had been fellow boxers and were WWII army combat veterans, were not satisfied, either. Philip, a banker in Lubbock, Texas, and Joseph, a worker in Barbeau,
During the secret war in Laos, CIA lost eight case officers and several other employees; four died in aircraft accidents and four were killed as the result of enemy fire.

A Within-House Legend

Within CIA, Louis Austin O’Jibway remained a legend both for his ability and reliability and for the way he died. “A number of us who knew and missed Jib later joked that, although he had undoubtedly died in the crash, he had pulled an old Indian trick,” recalled Mike Lynch, a CIA case officer and provincial adviser in Laos. “Since his body was never found, his heirs—his two children—continued to receive his pay for a full year, until he was officially declared dead, and then receive his death benefits, whereas Ed Johnson’s heirs only got death benefits.”

Tony Poe, the legendary ex-Marine and guerrilla trainer in Laos who considered O’Jibway a “true hero”...
was furious with Nunez for O’Jibway’s death. Still, Poe joked that “Jib was smart enough to carry a pocket full of rocks to make sure he sank on impact [instead of slowly drowning].”

A year after O’Jibway’s death in the Mekong, the river rose to an unusual 20 to 30 feet during the 1966 monsoon season, and the flood waters washed away the little bamboo house he had built at Chiang Khong. The local Thai natives, Buddhist animists, declared it was O’Jibway’s spirit, returning to claim his home.

CIA eventually honored O’Jibway, but privately. Historically, the covert operations branch deplored releasing any details about its officers even within the agency. But public criticism and a congressional investigation of CIA in the early 1970s led to reforms, one of which was a decision to create a memorial to fallen officers, and later an annual ritual of ceremonially reading each of their names.

In 1974, the agency ordered 31 gold stars etched into a white marble entrance at CIA Headquarters, accompanied in a nearby Book of Honor containing the names (when declassified) and year of death of CIA officers who had died in the line of duty. Louis A. O’Jibway’s was among those first 31 stars on the wall, and his name was among the first inscribed in the Book of Honor.

For many years, few outsiders knew of the memorial, since CIA Headquarters remains inaccessible to the public. It was not until 1990 that non-agency family members were invited to the annual reading of the names of the fallen. Joseph O’Jibway, the brother who had pressed for more information since 1966, was invited in 2000, but Teresa O’Jibway has never received an invitation.

Because the Directorate of Operations opposed the release of information, families were kept in the dark about details of the deaths of their loved ones, including any information concerning the clandestine activities that led to the death and sometimes even the loved one’s affiliation with CIA. “Families who lose loved ones who were covert not only had to endure the loss—they were also tethered to bogus stories for years and years,” wrote journalist Ted Gup, author of The Book of Honor: The Secret Lives and Deaths of CIA Operatives (Random House, 2000). “They had to raise their children without any details or specifics as to what their mothers or fathers gave their lives for.” Teresa O’Jibway agreed: “My dad was very patriotic, and he gave his life for his country. I think they could have told us more. It seems like he was used and then forgotten.”

In many ways, the Hmong and other mountain tribe people were also used and ultimately forgotten. In 1966, the year after the crash of O’Jibway’s helicopter, as the United States increased forces in Vietnam, it also expanded the size and offensive role of the guerrillas in Laos. Ultimately, Gen. Vang Pao commanded an airmobile force of nearly 40,000. But North Vietnam countered with 70,000 troops, and in 1975 after defeating South Vietnam, Hanoi achieved victory in Laos. For the previous 15 years, the mountain tribes, covertly aided by the United States, had restricted the North Vietnamese army and prevented communist control of Laos. But that achievement had been obtained at great cost to the mountain tribes, particularly during the escalation after 1965. By the end, perhaps 35,000 guerrillas had been killed and nearly a third of Hmong civilians had died from starvation and
disease. Refugees in their own land, the remainder fled, including some 200,000 who followed Vang Pao to the United States.112

**O’Jibway Barely Known Outside CIA**

It took 20 years for even cryptic references to begin to emerge about Louis A. O’Jibway in the secret war in Laos, and then only in highly specialized publications.113 Not until the dawn of the 21st century was his name mentioned in a few popular books—publications about the secret war in Laos, about CIA’s Book of Honor, and a history of CIA—but even then with simply passing references to his having been a CIA officer killed in a helicopter crash in 1965.114

Louis A. O’Jibway largely vanished from history. His alma maters—Haskell, Bacone, New Mexico—failed to list the champion athlete and war hero on their rolls of honor.115 Nor is his name among those on the Special Operations Memorial at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.116 Although it is included in CIA’s Book of Honor, the agency’s headquarters remains closed to the public. Only the unofficial Special Forces online roll of honor celebrates Louis A. O’Jibway—and then only briefly.117

Yet the story of the big man with the big heart is worth remembering. The fatherless youth’s struggle for a better life reads like a “Horatio Alger” story. Louis O’Jibway battled his way up, through achievements in the boxing ring and on the football field. His combat actions with the OSS against the Japanese in World War II merited his ribbons and medal. His humanitarian campaign to aid lepers in South Korea reflected his admirable character. Like these, his efforts with CIA in the early 1960s to improve the health and fighting efficiency of primitive mountain tribes in Laos against North Vietnamese invaders were noteworthy attempts to halt the aggressive spread of communism—an effort that cost him his life.

Scholarship on Native Americans in World War II has emphasized the major impact the war had upon American Indians and their society. Tens of thousands migrated from isolated reservations to serve in the military or work in the cities. Many learned to live and move ahead in mainstream America.118 Although not brought up on a reservation, Louis A. O’Jibway, a Chippewa from rural Michigan, certainly learned to live and succeed in mainstream American society. He did it through sports, the US Army, the OSS, and the CIA. The life and attainments of this modest but remarkable man, one of the few Native Americans in the OSS and in the CIA, are worth remembering and commemorating.

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**Endnotes**

1. Louis A. O’Jibway and Leonard Iron Moccasin, a Lakota/Sioux from South Dakota who served as a communications branch radio operator in the European theater of operations were the only two Native American Indians in the OSS the author has been able to identify in his research and via inquiry on the OSS Society discussion group, ossociety@yahooogroups.com. Furthermore, O’Jibway and Iron Moccasin were the only two obviously Native American Indian names in the nearly 24,000 names in the National Archives online roster of individuals in the personnel files of the OSS (Record Group 226). Although Lt. Donald V. Jamison, whose father was a Seneca-Cayuga from New York and mother was a Luiseno from the Rincon Indian Reservation in California, claimed to have been an OSS Special Operations saboteur in the Philippines in 1944 (Lillian Cox, “San Diego Paper Reports an OSS American Indian in Philippines,” OSS Society Newsletter, Fall 2005, 16), Jamison’s name is not listed on the OSS personnel records, and Gen. Douglas MacArthur refused to allow OSS personnel into his theater of operations.

2. On O’Jibway’s being one of the few Native Americans in the CIA, see Keith Quincy, *Harvesting Pa Chay’s Wheat: The Hmong and America’s Secret War in Laos* (Eastern Washington University, 2000), 321.

4. On his and his children’s self-identification and formal registration as members of the Chippewa Indian nation, Teresa O’Jibway Cook interview with the author, September 14, 2014.


6. Bacone College High School Department, diploma, Louis Austin O’Jibway, May 30, 1938, diploma in Louis A. O’Jibway papers, box 2; and his civilian education record included in his officer qualification record, form DD 66, November 6, 1964, in his military records file, obtained October 2, 2009, by his daughter and the author from the National Personnel Records Center (hereafter NPRC), St. Louis, Mo.; currently in O’Jibway papers, packet No. 3.


9. Louis Austin O’Jibway, transcript, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 1939–1941. I am grateful to Prof. Aaron Taylor at the University of New Mexico’s Spanish Department for obtaining O’Jibway’s transcript from the registrar and for also sending me the link to the UNM yearbooks below.


16. Completed OSS Requisition by Name Form, April 3, 1944, Louis A. O’Jibway personnel file, OSS Records (Record Group 226), Entry 224, Box 570, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. On the OSS, see, for example, Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency (Central Intelligence Agency, 2000) and Patrick K. O’Donnell, Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII’s OSS (Free Press, 2004). Although the US Army Center of Military History does officially recognize OSS, a civilian organization, as a direct precedent to Special Forces, the OSS is widely considered a forerunner of today’s Special Operations Forces; see Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941–1952, rev. ed. (University Press of Kansas, 2005), 23–25.

17. On Peddicord, I am grateful to Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, a historian with the US Army Special Operations Command, for sharing information about this officer from his forthcoming book on OSS Operational Groups. See also Robert W. Black, The Battalion: The Dramatic Story of the 2nd Rangers Battalion in World War II (Stackpole Books, 2006), 28.


22. Camp Ritchie was initially located at Cox’s Bazar, India (today Bangladesh), and then Akyab, Burma (today Myanmar). Troy J. Sacquet, The OSS in Burma: Jungle War against the Japanese (University Press of Kansas, 2013), 192.


25. Possible additional identities of others in the photograph: the black-shirted officer in the left front may be the unit’s commander, Maj. Lloyd E. Peddicord, Jr.; the officer squatting behind him to his right, may be his operations officer, Capt. George H. Bright; directly behind them are an unidentified British naval liaison officer and a tall American naval officer, possibly Lt. Cmdr. Derek Lee, Petticord’s deputy.

26. “Parachute Training for Operational Group,” April 19, 1945, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 190, Box 45; Sacquet, OSS in Burma, 198; and Hooker, “Biography,” chapter “1945.” Britain and the United States used different parachute arrangements; the British did not use secondary chutes.


30. “Citation” for Bronze Star for Louis A. O’Jibway in his personnel file, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 224, Box 570, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

31. Louis A. O’Jibway, Separation Qualification Record, Army of the United States, effective February 16, 1946, in his military record binder, Louis A. O’Jibway papers. Service in the US Army Reserves began February 17, 1946, USAR service record, Capt. DD. Shultz to Commanding Officer, US Army Records Center, January 12, 1965, in Louis A. O’Jibway military record file, NPRC, St. Louis, Missouri. O’Jibway’s achievements were later noted in two histories of aspects of the OSS (see Chambers, OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Overseas, 400–401, 453–60; Sacquet, “The OSS . . Detachment 404, 1944–1945,” Vertias 49; and Sacquet, OSS in Burma, 195. Although O’Jibway’s name is not included among the donated black tiles at the Special Operations Memorial created in 1999 at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, it is included on the electronic Special Forces Roll of Honor created in 2009 (see www.specialforcesroh.com).


33. Gladys L. Miller (nee Ratcliff) interview with the author, June 29, 2014.


36. Teresa K. O’Jibway birth certificate; and Teresa O’Jibway Cook, interview with the author, August 2, 2014; Gladys L. Miller, interview with the author, July 26, 2014.

37. Teresa K. O’Jibway birth certificate; and Teresa O’Jibway Cook, interview with the author, August 2, 2014; Gladys L. Miller, interview with the author, June 29, 2014.

38. National Guard Service, 114th Cavalry Regiment, Kansas National Guard, February to September 1936; 180th Infantry Regiment, 45th Division, Oklahoma National Guard, September 1936 to September 1939, Record of Assignments Louis A. O’Jibway’s officer qualification record, DD 66, form, Nov. 6, 1964, in his military record file, NPRC, St. Louis, Missouri.

39. Although O’Jibway’s record with CIA remains classified in the agency’s files, the initial year of his employment can be deduced from an entry in his officer qualification record, form DD 66, which O’Jibway filled out on November 6, 1964. After listing his years of service as an officer in the Army of the United States in World War II and the US Army Reserves since 1945, he then wrote, under entry Number 28 —“Main Civilian Occupation: Title and Industry”—the word “Classified,” under “Principal Employer,” “U.S. Govt.,” and under “Months Employed,” he wrote “156.” Louis A. O’Jibway, officer qualification record, form DD 66, November 6, 1964, in his
military records file, NPRC, O’Jibway papers, packet no. 3. The entry of 156 months of employment suggests O’Jibway’s CIA employment began in the fall of 1951.

41. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (Doubleday, 2007), 11, 24, 53–60. Frank Wisner, former OSS chief in Romania, was chief of covert operations. During the Korean War, the agency began major operations to train and infiltrate Korean and Chinese paramilitary agents for missions into communist China and North Korea, most of them unsuccessful.

42. Caesar J. Civitella (former member of OSS’s Italian Operational Group, and officer in Army Special Forces from 1952 until retirement in 1964, and with CIA from 1964 to 1983), interview with the author, April 25, 2008.

43. I am grateful to Kenneth Conboy for confirming the years that O’Jibway spent in Taiwan and that O’Jibway had not been connected with CIA’s projects in Tibet or Indonesia. Ken Conboy, email to the author, October 14, 2014.


45. Gladys L. Miller, interview with the author, June 29, 2014.

46. Louis A. O’Jibway, record of service with NGUS, AUS, USAR, 1936–1964, Capt. D.D. Shultz to Commanding Officer, US Army Records Center, January 12, 1965, Subj: Request for Information, O’Jibway file, NPRC, St. Louis, Missouri. See also certificate of training, survival training, December 13, 1952, at a USAF base in Japan; certificate of honorable discharge from the Army of the United States, April 1, 1953; orders for active duty training, January 10, 1957; promotion to reserve commissioned officer, grade of major in the Army of the United States, effective July 13, 1957, O’Jibway papers.


49. Teresa O’Jibway Cook, interview with the author, April 5, 2009; Gladys L. Miller, interview, June 29, 2014.

50. Gladys L. Miller, interview with the author, June 2, 2014, who remembers that her daughter, Suzanne, had not finished the school year when Louise and the twins returned to the Redondo Beach house the Millers had rented from the O’Jibways.


52. Jim Glerum, email to the author, June 30, 2009 and July 1, 2009. On Glerum’s role with the agency, see William M. Leary, “Foreword” to James E. Parker, Jr.’s memoir, Codename Mule: Fighting the Secret War in Laos for the CIA (Naval Institute Press, 1995), xix; See also Jim Dunn email to the author, June 30, 2009, for similar praise by another 1956 trainee.


60. Louis Austin O’Jibway appears as having completed 15 day course at US Army Special Warfare School, 1961, officer qualification record, November 6, 1964, military service record from NPRC; Terrence (“Terry”) Burke, a former Marine who had joined the CIA for paramilitary work, saw O’Jibway during Burkes’s training from1961 to 1962; Terry Burke, interview with the author, June 29, 2009; Lt. Col. Laurence S. Browne (team chief), to Mr. Louis O’Jibway, US Operations Mission, Bangkok, Thailand, January 14, 1963, Subject: Token of Appreciation, located in packet with photographs of the training sessions, O’Jibway papers; Conboy, Shadow War, 135.

61. Authorities differ over when O’Jibway arrived at his new job. Conboy, Shadow War, 135, contends it was in the summer of 1963; Terry Burke, in an interview with the author, June 29, 2009 believed it was 1963; Gary Erb, in an interview with the author, August 11, 2009, thought it was late 1964. O’Jibway probably arrived in Chiang Khong in mid-1963.

62. Terrence M. Burke, interview with the author, June 29, 2009; for more on the differences between Young and O’Jibway, reference John Wiren (Air America pilot), interview with the author, June 29, 2009.

63. Wayne Knight, email to the author, June 29, 2009.

64. Stephen I. Nichols, interview with the author, July 1, 2009.

65. Teresa O’Jibway Cook, interview with the author, August 2, 2014; Gladys L. Miller interview with the author, June 29, 2014.
68. Newspaper clipping of paid obituary for Mary Louise O’Jibway and a copy of the memorial service program, August 20, 1964.
70. Gary Erb, interview with the author, August 11, 2009.
71. Ibid.
72. This directive came particularly from William E. Colby, head of the CIA’s Far East Division; see Woods, Shadow Warrior, 232.
73. Terrence M. (“Terry”) Burke, interview with the author, June 29, 2009. Burke later received the CIA’s Intelligence Award for Valor for saving the two wounded members of his team. As a result of another mission, he also received the Intelligence Star for his attempt to rescue downed pilot Ernie Brace. Burke later became deputy and then acting director of the US Drug Enforcement Agency. I am grateful to Terry Burke and to Judy Porter, general secretary, Air America Association, for helping me contact people who had known Louis A. O’Jibway in Thailand and Laos. Burke later recounted the rescue episode and included O’Jibway as one of the persons to whom he dedicated his memoir, Terrence M. Burke, Stories from the Secret War: CIA Special Ops in Laos (La Plata Books, 2012), v, 134–35.
75. Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 255.
76. James D. (“Jim”) Sheldon interviews with the author, July 30–31, 2020. At the time, Sheldon was a major in the US Army detailed to CIA.
77. Conboy, Shadow War, 136.
80. John Wiren interview with the author, June 29, 2009, on CIA and Air America practice and no services for Johnson or O’Jibway in Southeast Asia. Tom Fosmire, interviewed by Prof. William M. Leary of the University of Georgia, February 8, 1993, for the unfinished second volume of Leary’s study of the CIA’s airlines, Box 58, Folder 5, “Leary’s notes,” 21, CIA [Air America] Corporate Records, History of Aviation Archives, Special Collections and Archives Division, Eugene McDermott Library, The University of Texas at Dallas.
82. Terrence M. (“Terry”) Burke, interview with the author, June 29, 2009.
83. Gladys L. Miller, interview with the author, June 29, 2014; Teresa O’Jibway Cook, interview with the author, September 1, 2014.
84. Father Joseph Sweeney to Friends, undated typed letter, with handwritten note “This is the letter I sent to hundreds of our mutual friends upon learning about your brother.” Sweeney also called O’Jibway, ‘the greatest friend I ever had.’ See Father J. M. McLoughlin (a Maryknoll priest in South Korea), to Mrs. Delmar [Ruth O’Jibway] Muir, November 16, 1965, copies of both from Laverne (Mrs. Joseph L.) O’Jibway in Louis A. O’Jibway papers, packet no. 1.
85. Teresa O’Jibway Cook, interview with the author, September 1, 2014.
87. Official photograph of the ceremony at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, negative and glossy photograph, in possession of Teresa O’Jibway Cook.
89. Joseph I. O’Jibway to Mr. O’Neil, October 4, 1966, carbon copy, the O’Jibway family papers, packet no. 1, from Laverne (Mrs. Joseph L.) O’Jibway via Teresa O’Jibway Cook. “Sam O’Neil” was the alias of CIA officer George Cave, who was a Middle East expert during that period, according to Richard Secord with Jay Wurts, Honored and Betrayed: Iran gate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos (John Wiley, 1992), 295.
91. Handwritten, unsigned letter, undated original in Joseph I. O’Jibway papers. The letter was later sent by Joseph’s widow, Laverne O’Jibway, to Teresa O’Jibway Cook, and included in Louis A. O’Jibway papers, packet no. 1. The letter provided the name (slightly misspelled) and address of the flight mechanic, Steve Nichols. Years later, Nichols told the author that he had received a letter from the family, but since the then 24-year old mechanic had signed confidentiality papers for Air America, he turned it over to the base manager at Udorn. Stephen I. Nichols, interview with the author, July 1, 2009.
93. Helicopter pilot Richard (“Dick”) Casterlin used the term “unhappy” in an email to the author, June 29, 2009; but William Leary quoted Casterlin as telling him that the agency was “pissed” over the loss of the two case officers. Box 58, Folder 5, “Leary’s notes, 20, CIA [Air America] Corporate Records, History of Aviation Archives, Special Collections and Archives Division, Eugene McDermott Library, The University of Texas at Dallas.

94. “Aircraft Accident Investigation Report, H-23, Accident at T407/Vientiane, Laos, August 20, 1965,” September 16, 1965, 4, Box 58, Folder 5, CIA [Air America] Corporate Records, History of Aviation Archives, Special Collections and Archives Division, Eugene McDermott Library, The University of Texas at Dallas. H-23 was the aircraft number of the UH-34D that was lost.


99. Gary Erb, interview with the author, August 11, 2009; the crewman confirmed the spontaneous change in plans, but said it had not yet started to rain when they left, Stephen I. Nichols, interview with the author, July 1, 2009.

100. Local [Air America] Board of Review, “Aircraft Accident Investigation Report, H-23 [Helicopter Number 23] Accident at T407/Vientiane, Laos, August 20, 1965,” Box 58, Folder 5, CIA [Air America] Corporate Records, History of Aviation Archives, Special Collections and Archives Division, Eugene McDermott Library, The University of Texas at Dallas. I am grateful to Thomas Allen, PhD, then curator in the History of Aviation Collection for providing me with a pdf of the 48-page report on the crash. This collection contains documents, notes, and interviews obtained by Prof. William M. Leary, University of Georgia, for uncompleted second volume of his projected two-volume history of the CIA’s Air America. I have also used Stephen I. Nichols, interview with the author, July 1, 2009.


102. Daniel Arnold, email to the author, June 28, 2009; Marius Burke, email to the author, June 27, 2009; E. Wayne Knight email to the author, June 26, 2009. Knight was told they were using “state of the art, US Military MAD gear”; undated, unsigned, handwritten, highly detailed account in pencil of the ill-fated flight of August 20, 1965, in the O’Jibway family papers, courtesy of Laverne O’Jibway, widow of Louis A. O’Jibway’s youngest brother, Joseph I. O’Jibway.

103. Mike Lynch, in an account Lynch gave, June 10, 1993, to William Leary, Box 58, Folder 5, “Leary’s notes,” 21, CIA [Air America] Corporate Records, History of Aviation Archives, Special Collections and Archives Division, Eugene McDermott Library, The University of Texas at Dallas. Since the twins were still legally minors, O’Jibway’s paychecks apparently went to Joseph I. O’Jibway, who seems to have noted the amounts in pencil.


105. “Aircraft Accident Investigation Report, H-23, Accident at T407/Vientiane, Laos, August 20, 1965,” September 16, 1965, 4, Box 58, Folder 5, CIA [Air America] Corporate Records, History of Aviation Archives, Special Collections and Archives Division, Eugene McDermott Library, The University of Texas at Dallas. H-23 was the aircraft number of the UH-34D that was lost.


110. Teresa O’Jibway Cook, interview with the author, September 1, 2014.


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113. Quirk, CIA Photographic History, 217; Conboy Shadow War, 135, 136, included half-a-dozen references to his work at Nam Yu and the crash; Leary, “The CIA and the ‘Secret War’ in Laos,” 517, simply notes O’Jibway’s death in the crash.


115. There is no reference to Louis Austin O’Jibway at the American Indian Athletic Hall of Fame at Haskell Indian Nations University (www.haskell.edu/athletics), Bacone College (www.bacone.edu/alumni/famous-alumni), or the University of New Mexico Athletic Hall of Honor and Alumni Chapel Memorial Wall. My thanks to Prof. Aaron Taylor of UNM for personally checking the memorials at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, in August 2014.


118. On the Impact of World War II on American Indians, particularly those on or from the reservations, see, for example, the classic work by Alison R. Bernstein, American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era In Indian Affairs (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 112–17; and more recently Kenneth William Townsend, World War II and the American Indian (University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 215–28; plus the chapter on Navajo code talkers in Noah Riseman, Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers In the Pacific War (University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 169–231.

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The Jordanian civil war in 1970, better known as Black September, was decided by an intelligence success led by King Hussein and his chief of intelligence. It was a mystery for years until revealed in the memoir of a former CIA officer serving in the region at the time. President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger took great credit for managing the Black September crisis, but in fact their role was marginal to the outcome of the biggest threat to Hussein’s survival, the Iraqi army in eastern Jordan.

King Hussein, then only 33 years old, was at his nadir in early 1969, when Nixon was inaugurated. In the 1967 war with Israel, he had lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem with devastating effects on the Jordanian economy. At least 300,000 refugees had flowed across the Jordan River into new camps around Amman and other cities. The Palestinian fedayeen had become an armed state within the state, controlling much of Amman and ignoring his rule. He was the target of multiple assassination plots. The Iraqi army occupied much of eastern Jordan and was hostile to the king. At the same time, the situation for US personnel had become precarious, with the fedayeen threatening to capture and hold hostage senior US officials.

The king had met with Israeli officials clandestinely on several occasions since the June war to try to get his land back and make peace with Israel. He got no response to his requests for what Israel wanted in territory on the West Bank and East Jerusalem in return for peace. The Israelis were stalling, they had no desire to give back the West Bank and certainly not Jerusalem. Sometimes they would raise the so called Allon plan, which would annex the Jordan Valley to Israel, a proposal the king rejected adamantly. But even when the Israelis discussed the Allon plan, they did not suggest it was the total amount of territory they wanted to keep.

In May 1969 Hussein invited Jack O’Connell, a senior CIA Middle East expert, to accompany him to his palace in Aqaba. There he told O’Connell that he was going to meet Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and her top aides on a small island in the Gulf of Aqaba to discuss peace. He wanted O’Connell as a witness back in Aqaba if he did not return the next day. When he did return, the king told O’Connell that it was a pleasant evening with a lovely dinner. Did anything get accomplished, O’Connell asked: “No, not really,” the king’s replied. It was just a way to drag things out. Nixon had no interest in the peace process either. He assigned it to Secretary of State William Rogers, who had no importance in the administration.
Washington was deeply divided on Hussein’s prospects. Much of the national security bureaucracy wrote Hussein off.

Fortunately, American and British arms were arriving to rebuild the Jordanian army and air force. By 1970, the army was a force of four divisions: two infantry, one armored and one mechanized. The Bedouin core of the army was fiercely loyal to the king and angered by the fedayeen’s arrogance. The small Royal Jordanian Air Force had been completely destroyed in the 1967 war; now it was reequipped and back in the air. The army also benefited from a team of experts from Pakistan that helped reorganize the army, improve its training, and prepare it for battle. Among the experts was a young Pakistani officer who would eventually become chief of Pakistan’s army and president, Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistan had long been close to Jordan, being one of only two countries that had formally recognized the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan (the United Kingdom was the other). Crown Prince Hassan was married to a Pakistani, Princess Sarvath.

Ironically, Egyptian President Gamal abd al Nasser was now fully behind Hussein. Nasser had tried to oust Hussein several times in the 1950s and 1960s. The old antagonist had been very impressed by Hussein’s decision to go to war in 1967 to help Egypt. He also preferred a Pakistani, Princess Sarvath.

For the next eighteen months Hussein tried to avoid a showdown. He did not want a civil war. He did not want the blood of thousands of Palestinians on his hands. He also knew the Iraqis could easily tilt the balance of power against him in a showdown. So, he dithered. Endless negotiations with Arafat followed as they tried to work out a modus vivendi that both sides could live with. This angered the army which wanted to restore order on its terms. The fedayeen were badly fractured. Fatah was relatively moderate, but other groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by George Habash were far more radical and committed to international air piracy to terrorize Israel. Iraq and Syria each sponsored their own fedayeen groups. It was a chaotic situation.

Washington was deeply divided on Hussein’s prospects. Much of the national security bureaucracy had written Hussein off. He had too many enemies, most Jordanians were Palestinians, the Iraqis were going to join the fedayeen, and Syria might intervene as well. O’Connell was one of the few who believed the king would prevail. He told the CIA that the king and the army would get the upper hand. Another senior CIA officer, Robert Ames, disagreed and argued the Palestinians would win, therefore it was wise to start a dialogue with them.2 Ames was already in contact with one of Arafat’s key deputies, a move that had been approved explicitly by CIA Director Richard Helms and by Nixon.3 O’Connell had better connections with the army which proved to be the decisive factor given its monopoly on tanks and air power.

Hussein went to the United States in April 1969 to see Nixon for the first time in the White House. He presented a six-point peace plan which Nasser had also endorsed. It would end the state of belligerency and acknowledge Israel’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure and recognized borders. In return, Israel would withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. Hussein and Nasser would sign the agreements. The Israelis immediately rejected the plan. Nixon did nothing.4

The relationship with the United States hit rock bottom a year later. In April 1970, the fedayeen supported a large demonstration around the embassy. The mob turned nasty and started throwing rocks at the building, and they set embassy cars on fire. One protester cut down the US flag. The Jordanian authorities did not react; no troops or armored vehicles arrived to defend the embassy.

Ambassador Harrison Symmes protested to the government. In Amman since 1967, Symmes was a 30-year veteran of the State Department and a skilled Arabist. He asked for an apology from the king, but none was forthcoming. Symmes then said that, given the unstable situation in Jordan, he would recommend the cancellation of an upcoming visit of Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs Joseph Sisco. The royal court protested vociferously that postponing the visit would be seen as a lack of confidence in the king’s ability to protect foreign guests. Sisco canceled anyway.

That evening Symmes was summoned to the prime minister’s office, where he was informed that he had become persona non grata, and would have to leave the country immediately. It was an unprecedented
step to PNG a US ambassador in a country receiving millions in aid from the Washington.5 It was one in a series of episodes in which the king found the State Department weak and vacillating, which led him to prefer communicating with Washington and the president through alternative channels, including through CIA. The crisis with the fedayeen came to a head a few months later.

**Black September**

The conventional wisdom about the crisis in Jordan in September 1970, called Black September by the Palestinians, is that the United States and Israel did a masterful job of crisis management to save King Hussein’s throne. This version of history has, of course, been vigorously hyped by Nixon and Kissinger in their memoirs.

The facts do not support this interpretation. The Americans and Israelis consulted extensively with each other, but aside from a bit of the normal saber rattling, they did almost nothing to help the king and his army. The king emerged from the greatest challenge to his throne almost entirely because of his own smart decisions, his excellent intelligence service, and the loyalty of the army. A helping hand can be attributed to Zia. Luck played its part as well.

A month after Symmes removal, a senior Iraqi government delegation visited Amman to see Arafat. Iraq was already run by Saddam Hussein, although officially he was only head of the ruling Baath Party. The party also ran Syria, but the two branches of the party were bitter enemies. The Iraqis told Arafat in May 1970 that Baghdad was ready to support any move to oust Hussein.6 The more extreme Palestinian leaders, including the PFLP’s Habash and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine leader Nayef Hawatamah, were already calling for Hussein’s overthrow and for turning Amman into the “Hanoi” of the Palestine revolution. The fedayeen even included a small group of Islamists who often fought against Marxists like the PFLP.7

The Iraqis were an existential threat to the king, not only did they already have at least 20,000 troops and 200 tanks in Jordan, they had a large army ready to move from Iraq with an air force that greatly outnumbered the RJAF, and they had excellent relations with the fedayeen.

The Jordanian army totaled around 65,000 troops, but many of them were Palestinians whose loyalty was questionable in an all-out war. Estimates of the number of armed fedayeen are shaky, but they were thought to number between 15,000 and 20,000, mostly in urban areas.

On June 3rd, the Palestinians rocketed the Israel town of Beit Shean in the Jordan valley, Israel responded with an air strike on Irbid, the largest city in northern Jordan near Syria and a Palestinian stronghold. The Jordanian army in turn shelled the Israeli city of Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee. It was an extremely dangerous escalation in the conflict, which Washington sought to defuse.

Hussein was the target of an assassination attempt on June 9th, when his motorcade came under sustained attack. In retaliation, the army shelled the Palestinian refugee camps around Amman, killing civilians as well as fedayeen. The fighting escalated in the second half of June. The PFLP took 68 foreigners’ hostage in Amman. Holding them in two hotels, they demanded Hussein fire two senior military aides known to be hardliners: his uncle Sharif Nasser and his cousin Sharif Zaid. To get the hostages released, Hussein removed them, and in the process antagonized his loyalists in the army.8

Events elsewhere in the region added to the tension. Egypt and Israel had been fighting a war of attrition along the Suez Canal for months, with Russia actively assisting the Egyptians with advisors and even pilots. On July 24, Nasser accepted an American proposal for a ceasefire. The king endorsed Nasser’s decision. The Palestinians condemned the ceasefire and focused their animosity on the king. The ceasefire took place in early August.

A second assassination attempt on the king took place on September 1st as he was riding to the airport to see his daughter, Princess Alia. The PFLP was responsible. Fighting erupted again, and the Iraqis, on alert and in control of much of eastern Jordan, publicly threatened to intervene to support the fedayeen.9

**US Navy arrives in Force**

The PFLP then took the precipitous step of simultaneously hijacking
In this building crisis, it was crucial to neutralize the 20,000 Iraqis, an endeavor in which the Americans were not involved.

four commercial jetliners and landing three of them at a remote airfield in Jordan called Dawson’s Field near Zarqa. The aircraft were evacuated and blown up in front of journalists and cameras. Some of the passengers were released, but 54 were kept as hostages. The PFLP demanded the release of Palestinians in prison in Israel, Switzerland, Britain, and Germany. A fourth jet liner was hijacked to Cairo, where it was also blown up. And on a fifth flight, an El Al jet, the hijackers were foiled by the security. In the White House, Kissinger began crisis meetings of the National Security Council in the Situation Room. The aircraft carrier USS Independence and its accompanying task force was moved to the Eastern Mediterranean in a show of force. It could launch 200 sorties a day.

Into the chaotic situation, a new US ambassador arrived, Dean Brown, to whom the king appealed to have Washington take steps to restrain the Israelis from aggravating the situation. He also advised that he might need outside help. Communications between the royal palace outside Amman, and the Americans was difficult. Only the British intelligence service, MI6, had reliable and secure communications with the king over a radio they had previously, and presciently, installed in the palace. O’Connell, the most experienced American on the scene by far and the one Hussein trusted the most, offered the most authoritative account of the situation on the ground and how the king saw it.

On 15 September, the fedayeen took control of Irbid. The king formed a martial law government with a loyal Palestinian in nominal command. The king’s uncle and cousin were reinstated in the military. The king decided it was time for “recapturing” his country, as he later put it. He postponed action on the 16th because the fortune teller of his sister-in-law in London said the day was inauspicious, Hussein ordered the army to attack on September 17, 1970. The 60th Armored Brigade attacked the fedayeen headquarters in the refugee camps in Amman. Kissinger moved another carrier battle group, the USS Saratoga, to join the Independence. Other navy assets moved to join the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Hussein was at great personal risk. The Basman Palace compound came under heavy fire from the fedayeen, and the commander of the Royal Guard discovered that one of the palace cooks was signaling Hussein’s whereabouts to the PLO in order to kill him.

In this building crisis, it was crucial to neutralize the 20,000 Iraqis, an endeavor in which the Americans were not involved. But Nixon and Kissinger were aware of how important the Iraqi connection was to the fedayeen. Indeed, the Jordanians discovered when they arrived at Dawson’s Field after the hijacking that the Iraqis had already been there. The Iraqis had colluded with the PFLP in staging the hijackings. The king told the Americans he believed the Iraqis were working with the PFLP to overthrow him. Moreover, DCI Helms told the NSC working group on the crisis on September 10th that the Iraqis were providing the fedayeen its ammunition.

An elaborate Jordanian job
The Jordanians had a complex intelligence operation underway long before the September crisis to keep the Iraqis from actively fighting on the side of the fedayeen. The central figure in this operation was an Iraqi defector, Abud Hassan, who had flown a MIG fighter out of Iraq to Jordan in the 1960s. Hassan then spent some time in Cairo with other Iraqi exiles. He had been a roommate of Saddam Hussein’s and became friends with the future dictator. Returning to Jordan, Hassan went on to become the head of Jordanian military intelligence.

Led by Hassan, Jordanian intelligence recruited a European military attaché in Amman who would be stationed in NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, where he stole some planning documents. The Jordanians used these to fabricate a US plan for intervention in a crisis in the Middle East. These forgeries were then given to another Iraqi agent, who sold them to the Iraqi embassy in Turkey. The forged plan foreshadowed the buildup of US military assets in the Mediterranean before a lightning air attack on Iraqi troops in Jordan and their bases inside Iraq.

Having carefully set the groundwork, when the crisis came, Abud had the commander of the Jordanian army, Zaid bin Shaker, call in the Iraqi military attaché. He told him the Jordanians were fully informed of the Iraqis involvement with the fedayeen, had detailed information on their deployment, and were ready to work with the Americans to destroy them. The Americans allegedly had
a team in Amman preparing for the attack. In fact, the Americans knew nothing about the fabricated plan. Jack O’Connell only learned about the elaborate con job from Abud Hassan years later. As he noted, “Abud succeeded through this grand deception in paralyzing the Iraqis.” The gravest danger to Hussein never materialized.17

In Amman, the Jordanian attack quickly put the fedayeen on the defensive. With tanks in the lead, the Jordanian army got the upper hand in fierce house-to-house fighting. The Jordanians also controlled the south and quickly isolated the fedayeen in Irbid and a few other northern towns and cities. The Iraqis were now isolated in the east around Mafraq.

**Indecision in Washington, Israel, and Jordan**

On September 18, a small number of Syrian tanks crossed the border and entered Jordan with the insignia of the Palestine Liberation Army on their turrets. The 40th Jordanian Armored Brigade engaged the Syrians. The crisis in the north got worse as Syria deployed a large number of tanks into the engagement. This was the crisis the Nixon administration focused on, and it consulted closely with Israel on how to respond. Nixon wanted any outside intervention to be that of the United States; Kissinger was more favorably disposed to having Israel fight the Syrians.

The Israelis hesitated to act. Some thought air power alone would not be enough. This raised the prospect of Israel using ground troops to occupy northern Jordan, the so-called Jordanian Golan. Would they ever leave if they went in was the question. Others were not enamored of the idea of saving Hussein. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban told the US ambassador to the UN, that “the world would not come to an end if King Hussein departed the scene.”

In the Nixon narrative, the threat of US and Israeli intervention played the crucial role in deterring Assad. In short, the buildup of US naval assets and Israeli overflights on the battlefield for reconnaissance purposes scared him.

Looking back in hindsight, after watching Assad in power for three decades after 1970 and negotiating with him on a possible peace deal with Israel, I think it is easier to believe he was not interested in advancing the cause of Yasser Arafat or the fedayeen in general. Assad used military force against the PLO on more than one occasion after he took power later in 1970, including often in the Lebanese civil war. Assad was a ruthless dictator who wanted to control the Palestinian movement, and he was quite prepared to sell them out in 2000, when he tried to get the Syrian Golan back in a peace conference in Shepherdstown, West Virginia.

Moreover, Assad’s immediate objective was to humiliate his rival in the Baath Party to take complete control of Syria. The decision to send armor into Jordan was that of Salah Jadid, a far-left party member who...
supported the concept of a people’s war against Israel. By leaving Jadid’s forces alone in Jordan, Assad fatally weakened his rival, who he ousted later that fall.

Crucial to the king’s success was the army’s loyalty. Only 300 soldiers and one senior officer defected to the fedayeen.22 The Palestinian prime minister in his martial law government later defected to Libya, but he was a figurehead anyway.

Nasser played a key role in the denouement of the civil war. He summoned Hussein and Arafat to Cairo on September 26 to agree to a cease fire. Nasser witnessed its signing on the 27th and then died of a heart attack the day after. The cease fire cemented Hussein’s gains on the ground, and Nasser’s involvement helped to keep Jordan from being completely isolated in the Arab world, which sympathized with the fedayeen.

The 1970 crisis was the darkest moment in Jordan’s history. The country barely survived intact. It was the brilliance of Hussein’s intelligence chief in bluffing the Iraqis into staying on the sidelines that saved the monarchy.

The civil war transformed the king. He matured greatly during the crisis. He dithered and procrastinated for months but then acted decisively in September. He came to grips with the fact that the West Bank was lost forever and that the Israelis were only stalling in meeting with him. He had gained the loyalty of his people even as he used force against some of them. It was his defining moment.25

The civil war also transformed Hussein’s marriage. The bitter outcome of the 1967 war and the long months of preparing for the showdown in 1970 took their toll on his relationship with Princess Muna. An English woman, the daughter of a British officer stationed in Jordan. Named Antoinette “Toni” Avril Gardner, she met Hussein while working on the film set for Lawrence of Arabia. She and the children spent most of their time in England for security reasons, so they were apart during the king’s toughest hours in 1970. She is the mother of Hussein’s oldest son, today’s King Abdallah. Their divorce in late 1972 was cordial. The couple remained friends, and Muna stayed in Amman, as she does to this day. Interestingly, queen mother Zayn opposed the divorce and urged the king to stay married to Muna. His decision to go ahead with the divorce over Zayn’s objections was another sign of his coming of age as his own man.27

The new love in Hussein’s life was Alia Toukan, who was from a prominent Palestinian family from Nablus. Born in 1948 in Cairo, she was the daughter of the then Jordanian ambassador to Egypt, Baha Uddin Toukan. Alia was one-year old when she first met Hussein, and he was a frequent visitor to the family home while he studied in Alexandria. Her father went on to be ambassador to Ankara, London, and the United Nations in New York. She got a M.A. in Business and Public Relations at Hunter College in New York City.

Beautiful and sophisticated with world travels, Alia was lively and outgoing. When she returned to Amman and took a job with Royal Jordanian Airlines, Hussein was
smitten. They married on December 24, 1972; he was 37 and she was 24. She became Queen Alia al Hussein. It did not hurt that she was Palestinian at a time when Hussein desperately needed to heal the wounds between his Palestinian subjects and the East Bankers. Alia was immediately popular and greeted warmly. She lobbied her husband to extend the vote to women and to allow them to be elected to the legislature. In 1974 women were enfranchised.

The 1970 crisis was the darkest moment in Jordan’s history. The country barely survived intact. It was the brilliance of Hussein’s intelligence chief in bluffing the Iraqis into staying on the sidelines that saved the monarchy.

Endnotes

2. Ibid., 99.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 107.
24. Ibid., 107.
Having read Gladwell’s *The Tipping Point* and teaching conflict analysis at National Intelligence University (NIU), I picked up *Talking to Strangers* in anticipation of another thought-provoking treatise for generalists from this widely acclaimed thinker. Little did I realize that nearly one-third of this volume is devoted to major US counterintelligence and counterterrorism cases.

It begs to be read by a wide array of IC practitioners, including, but not limited to, those in the education enterprise. Gladwell, in my estimation, is onto something that spy masters, counterintelligence professionals, interrogators, and even polygraphers would do well to consider in reflecting on their crafts. Not everyone in the business of intelligence will necessarily agree with all of his findings and they may analyze his chosen cases differently, or at least from a different perspective, but his observations are worthy of our attention.

Gladwell builds his argument on three basic premises. First, as he points out in the cases of Aldrich Ames and Ana Montes among others, we as humans have, as our default position, a basic inclination to believe that people we meet (and even investigate at times) are truthful. As he lays out, in sometimes lurid detail, we would have identified and zeroed in on Ana Montes as much as five years earlier had investigators, colleagues, and coworkers not wanted to believe her until fully convinced she was lying. In the broader Cuban context, Gladwell—relying on sources he names as credible and who are first-hand reporters with IC experience—also claims that virtually all of CIA’s Cuban penetrations had been doubled by Cuban intelligence and that Havana was feeding what Fidel Castro wanted the United States to hear and believe. Gladwell insists that we “are so bad at the act of translation” in part because we misread strangers and are over-confident in our ability to take the measure of someone based on a personal encounter; we fall prey to the false assumption that they mean what they say and that their tone and demeanor vouch for that. How often have world leaders, at least in the West, claimed to have “looked into another leader’s soul” and found him or her to be genuine. Gladwell goes to some length to illustrate this in the tragic case of Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler, whose belligerent intentions and faked honesty the British prime minister thoroughly misconstrued. In her day, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was among the first to claim that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was “someone we can deal with.” In her case, however, she proved to call it correctly. The 45th US president claims that he can read other leaders’ mindsets and intentions from a distance, be they a Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Un, or Xi Jinping. Of course, Gladwell’s finding of our widespread misreading of strangers is not without precedent. Recall, for instance, the seminal work of Richards Heuer in his *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, in which he cautions against mirror imaging others as being “just like us.”

Gladwell’s second key conclusion is that we all too often fail in the area of transparency. How often do we interpret someone’s expression or behavior incorrectly? We misread the signals of strangers much of the time, it would seem. In his words, “Transparency is a seemingly commonsense assumption that turns out to be an illusion.” (239) That fallacy’s impact can range, as he notes, from the Italian police seeing guilt in the eccentric behaviors of Amanda Knox, whom they wrongly charged for the capital murder of her roommate, to campus and other sexual encounters in which implied or explicit consent is in question.

This big issue gave rise to the #MeToo movement across the United States. Those two cases, in the middle of his book, have less to do with IC-specific instances, but their focus belongs in IC discourse nonetheless. How accurate are our human signal receptors when it comes to persons or situations we have not previously encountered?

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Is a smile a sign of congeniality, openness, agreement, dismissiveness, implicit rejection, or something else? Even if we speak the other’s language, can we read their sincerity, mood, intentions, or deceptions?

In a further surprise to this reviewer, Gladwell then examines the interrogation of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed in “What Happens When the Stranger is a Terrorist?” While he details the interrogation methods and intensity inflicted on KSM, his key point is trying to understand when a subject is totally committed to his chosen cause—come what may. This dichotomy, which many in the IC know first-hand, is what Gladwell terms a conflict between someone totally committed to keeping his secrets and interrogators going to great lengths to pry them out of him. Add to that the critical question of how, then, to analyze the credibility of the statements coming from a sometimes talkative, devious, major terrorist planner, who has been subjected to brutal questioning for weeks on end. Here we should also dust off our copies of Eric Hoffer’s *The True Believer* and *The Nature of Mass Movements* (1951). Whether the believer in question is a malevolent like KSM or Usama bin Laden, or the woefully mistreated, heroic POW Senator John McCain, armchair philosopher-analyst Hoffer still offers applicable insights.

Gladwell concludes this thoughtful assessment with what he calls “coupling,” i.e., causal factors that account for events and trends. Curiously, he examines suicide rates in England as related to the presence or later absence of gas ovens in British houses. His overall point is that we assume that when people seem intent on killing themselves, they will find alternative methods when their first choice either fails, is unappetizing, or is unworkable. His data in the British case strongly indicate otherwise. Suicide rates were coupled directly to the removal of such “primitive” gas ovens from homes. Indeed, their number were cut in half. So, we can also err in assuming that causal coupling is not a factor in our analyses.

In short, Gladwell has given us a lot to think about in a highly readable, conversational book. Students, educators, and, especially, case officers and IC analysts will do well to pay attention to what he has to say. Above all, this best-seller features some of the most devastating cases of espionage, terrorism, fraud, wrong-headed policing, and mixed messaging that the United States and we all have experienced—most of them in our lifetimes—but viewed from a perspective not informed by his insights.

The reviewer: Dr. Bowman Miller teaches graduate courses at NIU. He had served 36 years in Air Force counterintelligence and in the Department of State (INR) doing all-source foreign affairs analysis.
Intelligence in Public Media

Russians Among Us: Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories and the Hunt for Putin’s Agents

Reviewed by J. E. Leonardson

With Russian intelligence and espionage in the news so much these days, general audiences and specialists alike could use a good primer on Moscow’s operations. Fortunately, British journalist Gordon Corera’s new book, Russians Among Us, provides just such a survey.

Corera’s theme is that Russian President Vladimir Putin, driven by what he views as Russia’s humiliation in the 1990s, has an insatiable hunger to strike back at the United States and the West. Just as powerful, Corera further notes, is that Putin is determined to rebuild Moscow’s global power. For Putin, having strong intelligence capabilities are a critical part of this project, and he therefore has worked relentlessly for 20 years to rebuild, modernize, and weaponize the Russian services.

With this in mind, Corera begins by focusing on Ghost Stories, the case of the 10 US-based SVR illegals who were arrested in 2010 and swapped for four prisoners in Russia. He provides an up-to-date description of how the SVR’s Directorate S, the home of the illegals, works and how illegals train and operate. He then uses this to document the threats they pose to the security of their target states. The “natural progression of an illegal’s career,” he points out, is to spend “years building their cover and working their way into influential circles.” (230). Donald Heathfield and Cynthia Murphy worked to do exactly that by completing degree programs at Harvard and Columbia Universities, respectively, and then finding jobs in Cambridge and New York that enabled them to mix with academics, think-tankers, and political types to spot and assess potential recruits.

Corera’s description of the case and the investigations relies almost entirely on publicly available sources and, while his account is well researched and generally accurate, one suspects that in spots it would have benefitted from access to the full records of Ghost Stories, which are likely to remain under wraps for decades. Until then, Russians Among Us will stand as the standard open-source account of the case. His analysis of the illegals’ movements and efforts, too, is a useful corrective to the view that the Ghost Stories illegals were outmoded and hapless.

In his last 100 pages, Corera moves beyond Ghost Stories to discuss the evolution of Russian espionage since 2010. As effective as illegals have been for a century, he notes that the SVR is moving away from a traditional model of such operations because the laborious process of creating and backstopping their false biographies now is easily undone by instant searches of digital records and other large data sets.

Corera cites several recent US cases to show how Moscow has refined a new method for illegals—first used experimentally in Ghost Stories—that uses large numbers of amateurs, who are given cursory training and then sent to the West in their true identities to collect information as well as to infiltrate and influence political processes; at the same time, he points out that Moscow is undertaking enormous cyber operations to steal information and wreak political havoc. As if that’s not enough, Putin has also authorized the services to undertake assassinations, including operations using chemical weapons, regardless of the consequences for innocent bystanders. Given Putin’s goals, Corera warns, none of this is going away anytime soon.

In providing a clear explanation of how Russian intelligence operations are evolving and placing them in geopolitical context, Corera has given us a timely and well-written wake-up call. Highly recommended.

The reviewer: J. E. Leonardson is the penname of an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis.

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Intelligence in Public Media

House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution

Yuri Slezkine (Princeton University Press, 2017), 1104 pp., illustrations, maps

Reviewed by Leslie C.

In *The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution*, University of California at Berkeley historian Yuri Slezkine has conjured an 1,100-page multidisciplinary slab of a book that defies easy categorization. To stretch a biblical metaphor, it is a house of many mansions, and in its pages Slezkine does many things. Ostensibly the history of the House of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars—an elaborate, self-contained community for the Soviet nomenklatura built on the banks of the Moscow River in an area called the Swamp—the book is also an examination of the familial and social worlds of the revolutionary generation, a study of Bolshevik literature and those who created it, a treatise on Soviet architecture and urban planning, an extended essay on the philosophical underpinnings of the revolution, a cautionary tale of how that revolution consumed the people who spawned it, and much else besides.

Slezkine’s work features prominently in numerous “best of 2017” lists, and critics were effusive in their praise of a book they regarded as monumental in scale, tragic in effect, and “Tolstoyan” in vision. While the domestic lives, loves, and obsessions of a generation of Bolshevik revolutionaries may fascinate historians and sociologists, they are not our purpose here. More relevant to this audience is how this author’s vision informs our understanding of a still-intransigent adversary.

Violence likewise persists as an integral part of the creed, and as various of Putin’s enemies have learned, a threat. Slezkine writes, “The Bolsheviks emerged victorious . . . because their sociology was all-encompassing, their apocalypse inescapable, their leader infallible, their ‘address’ unquestioned, their record-keeping unmatched, and their commitment to violence by numbers absolute.” (161) More specifically, commitment to violence was a sine qua non of the Chekist ethos. On the eve of Stalin’s infamous purge of the Red Army, NKVD department head Sergei Mironov, addressing the officers who were to carry it out, said: “You will have to forget about your families, drop everything personal. There will be some whose nerves will prove too weak. Everyone will be tested. This is a battlefield. Any hesitation is tantamount to treason. . . . I am sure we will get it done quickly. . . . Comrades, your life as a true Chekist is about to begin.” (759)

If you detected a whiff of religious zeal in the above, I once read that Marxism was a Christian heresy, on its
face an odd claim given communism’s militant atheism and reflexive contempt for organized systems of faith—perhaps not so odd when one realizes that the party’s faithful did not welcome the competition. Significantly, for all the wide-ranging erudition of Slezkin’s work, the theme that underpins it is the striking similarity of Bolshevism’s philosophical structure to that of the millenarian religious sects, and the consequences of that worldview.

A variety of traditions from Islam to Buddhism to Judaism to diverse Protestant denominations and heretical cults retain a millenarian strain, but Slezkin finds the parallels with Christianity most apt. Both it and Marxism foretold and anticipated the end of history, the one with Christ’s Kingdom of Heaven, the other with Marx’s Utopia on Earth. Slezkin was not the first to notice. Just before the Soviet Union collapsed, the social historian Paul Boyer wrote, “Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, with its vision of a classless utopia emerging from successive cycles of social upheaval and revolutionary violence, is the last great apocalypse of the Western intellectual tradition.” The first, of course, was the subject of The Revelation of St. John. Derek Leebaert was pithier when he defined the Soviet Union as “a ghastly hybrid of seventeenth century quasi-oriental despotism, nineteenth century messianic radicalism, and twentieth century total war.” And no less an authority than Robert Conquest detected this tendency, noting, in a dismissal of Marx, that “outside his sect few serious philosophers accepted his philosophy; few economists accepted his economics; few historians accepted his theories of history.” For Slezkin, the bottom line is this: “The head of the Party was the head of the state, whatever his formal title. The state itself was the Russian empire run by a millenarian sect.”

Slezkin rewards the reader’s patience by gradually revealing, as the book unfolds, the myriad ways the Bolsheviks resembled such a sect. At root, they were “a fraternal, faith-based group radically opposed to a corrupt world” (552), whose faith resided in Marx’s vision of the future, and who shared with Christians the goal of “aligning one’s thoughts and desires with eternal truth.” (624) The sacred foundations of the Soviet state were the October Revolution and the Civil War—composed of the Civil War proper and War Communism (“the war on property, market, money, and the division of labor”). These were the “heart of Bolshevism (the transformation of a society into a sect).” (209)

By the 20th century, however, Christianity had in many ways become largely a moral movement. The Bolsheviks, by contrast, were in earnest. “In a millenarian world, whatever is necessary is also desirable, and whatever is desirable is also inevitable.” (421) Such was the party’s mindset, and its justification for the staggering human cost of collectivization and the destructive face of the five year plans. But the end of the Soviet Union did not necessarily mean the end of this mindset. As the Chekist ghost endures, so too do some aspects of the sect. As Slezkin notes, “Millenarian sects, or sects living on the eve of the apocalypse, are in the grip of a permanent moral panic. The more intense the expectation, the more implacable the enemies; the more implacable the enemies, the greater the need for internal cohesion; the greater the need for internal cohesion, the more urgent the search for scapegoats.” (710)

While a tendency to scapegoating is not particular to Russia, it is inherent in millenarianism generally and in Bolshevism specifically. Why? What happens when the prophecy is not fulfilled? Someone, or something, outside of the faith, must be responsible. “For the Bolsheviks, the most popular early explanation . . . was the failure of the world outside Russia to carry out its share of the world revolution. . . . Other commonly cited reasons for the postponement of the end were the recalcitrance of evil . . . the peculiarity of the Russian situation . . . and the tendency of the proletariat to prostitute itself to foreign gods.” (272) We can see this not just in Bolshevik dogmatism but also as a manifestation of Russian xenophobia, which existed before the revolution and has clearly survived its demise. It served also as a further justification for violence. As Slezkin writes, “All millenarians who do not burn in the fire of their own making adjust themselves to a life of permanent expectation in a world that has not been fully redeemed. . . . As the new regime settled down to wait, its most immediate tasks were to suppress the enemy, convert the heathen, and discipline the faithful.” (273) And with such a statement, Slezkin renders banal the massive apparatus of Soviet repression at home and subversion abroad.

b. Derek Leebaert, The Fifty Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory (Little, Brown, and Company, 2002), xii.
Though this review has focused on certain traits of the Russian experiment with Bolshevism enduring into the 21st century, it is worth remembering that the author used the House of Government as a lens to examine a very broad horizon of Soviet life. And his approach was not without humor. Ironies abound, for example, in the book’s portrayal of Bolsheviks at home or on holiday at their dachas or resorts; all are described here, and here we may even get glimpses of humanity, as in one young girl’s recollection of Stalin’s foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, as a normal person. (551) Similarly notable was Slezkine’s observation that Soviet reading preferences did not tend to include Soviet literature: “the Bolsheviks did not realize that by having their children read Tolstoy instead of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, they were digging the grave of their revolution. The house of socialism—as a residential building with family apartments—was a contradiction in terms. The problem with Bolshevism was that it was not totalitarian enough.” (953) Or, even better, he echoes Robert Conquest when concluding that “One reason for the fragility of Russian Marxism was Marxism. The other was Russia.” (955)

If knowing one’s enemy is a virtue, then one might approach The House of Government with a certain degree of piety. Reading it, and engaging with its myriad themes and subjects, is a commitment, and one recognizes a degree of audacity in the author for attempting such a project. But the book is rich with insight into the mindset and worldview of an adversary that, sadly, remains an adversary even in the wake of the failure of the House’s residents to engineer the “End of History.”

The reviewer: Leslie C. is a CIA Directorate of Operations officer.
Washington Post journalist Steve Vogel has done a service for everyone interested in the history of intelligence and the Berlin Tunnel, in particular, with his recently published book, *Betrayal in Berlin: The True Story of the Cold War’s Most Audacious Espionage Operation*. Putting aside a discussion about how Vogel could know that the tunnel was the “most audacious espionage operation” the United States undertook between 1945 and 1991, the book, at 530 pages and with photos, maps and diagrams of the tunnel, reads like a thriller, reaches sources previously untapped, and revisits with clarity and insight aspects and individuals already known. Chapter 16, for example, paints pictures of many of those involved in Berlin, London, and Washington and is a page-turner, yet is but one of many chapters that read easily and impart accurate information. *Betrayal in Berlin* is reliable, exciting, well-sourced, and fair.

The Berlin Tunnel, a CIA-led operation, involved the digging in the mid-1950s of a tunnel 1,476 feet in length and six feet in diameter, from the western sector of Berlin across, or rather beneath, the dividing line and into the communist sector, where a CIA team tapped three communications cables that after extensive investigation with the help of CIA assets in East Berlin had been identified as the most lucrative. The collection operation lasted 11 months and 11 days during 1955–56 until it was discovered—accidentally, or so the KGB made it appear—on 22 April 1956. In fact, a KGB asset, British MI6 officer, George Blake—the “betrayer” in the book’s title—had passed detailed information to the KGB about the tunnel long before it was operational.

Vogel regales us with the stories of CIA Headquarters meetings and decisions and with the engineering and building of the tunnel and the team’s battles below-ground with noise, heat, clay, sewage and, later, with the danger of snow melting above tunnel-warmed soil. The story of the tunnel’s construction has been told many times, but this one may be the most riveting to date.

Vogel does not stop with a good retelling of the construction. His most significant contribution in *Betrayal in Berlin* is the addition of many new personal stories to the record of the planning, the dig, the processing, the collection, the KGB’s handling of Blake and the high-level decisions about the tunnel. While earlier books and articles about the Berlin Tunnel have included a number of interviews or been written by participants, Vogel gave particular attention to seeking out first-hand accounts. He interviewed about 40 participants in more than 60 separate interview sessions in the five years from 2014 through 2018.

Vogel conducted new interviews with key players George Blake and CIA officer Hugh Montgomery, who for decades has stood in as the CIA “voice” of the operation because its manager, Bill Harvey, was never interviewed. Vogel spoke with Montgomery on five separate occasions. Both Montgomery and Blake have spoken before, but Vogel gives each of them one last opportunity. Montgomery has since died and Blake, still living in Moscow where he fled after escaping from prison, is in his late 90s. One dares hope that Vogel will make available to researchers complete or edited versions of these transcripts because, both for those previously interviewed by earlier authors and those who spoke to Vogel for the first and perhaps only time, this collection of interviews is voluminous, unique and authoritative.

In a great many vignettes Vogel transports the reader back in time into rooms and meetings that, at the time, were extraordinarily sensitive. Though anecdotal, there is little reason to doubt the essential accuracy of Vogel’s accounts of what it was like to work as a transcriber of tunnel intercepts in Berlin or as an analyst in Washington DC. See in the index, for example, a subheading under “Berlin Tunnel project” the pages for “processing units.” (520) This reviewer delighted in traveling into once-sensitive rooms to watch them work (207–10) and would like more detail about what transpired in those sensitive spaces. The reader also attends the meetings between Blake and his KGB handler, Sergei Kondrashev, and

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experiences the KGB’s HUMINT tradecraft. This is powerful material, and the book is filled with such stories that carry the narrative forward.

Between a third and a half of Betrayal in Berlin is about George Blake. Blake even dominates the book’s title, assuming one does not read “betrayal” as what the tunnel team did. The book’s title may carry a double meaning but that would not be an accurate characterization of the American activity. The tunnelers worked against an enemy; Blake betrayed his own, although he disingenuously always maintained that he could not have betrayed Britain because he never “belonged” in the first place. Counterintelligence professionals and psychologists may learn something new from this book about Blake’s personality and rationalizations.

Vogel explores Blake’s early life, his capture by the North Koreans during the Korean War, his turn against his country, his espionage activity, eventual exposure, arrest, trial, time in prison, and escape to Moscow. This story has been told before, including by Blake himself, but Vogel reveals many new details, such as the large volume of material Blake handed to the KGB that had nothing to do with the tunnel. The book does a good job explaining the Soviet imperative to protect Blake and explains how the Soviets decided that they had to allow the tunnel to operate to avoid a premature exposure that would bring suspicion on Blake.

The three best treatments of the tunnel before Vogel’s were Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War, by David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey in 1997; Spies Beneath Berlin, by David Stafford in 2002; and Flawed Patriot: The Rise and Fall of CIA Legend Bill Harvey by Bayard Stockton in 2006. Murphy and Kondrashev, as well as Stockton, were deeply involved in operations at the time, with Kondrashev providing the Soviet view. Retired CIA officer Tennent Bagley also published Spymaster: The Astonishing Story of a Soviet KGB Officer in 2014 with more of Kondrashev’s memories about how and why the KGB protected Blake. Although these books were significant improvements on what was known about the tunnel prior to 1997, Murphy et al. devoted only a limited number of pages to the tunnel in their book. Stafford’s book was slim, and Stockton’s book saw the tunnel through Harvey’s eyes in not many pages. Vogel’s essential message about the tunnel does not differ markedly from these but greatly expands on them.

Readers should be aware also of the excellent article about the tunnel by Joseph C. Evans in 1996, just a year before Battleground Berlin was released. Evans, yet another CIA officer who worked the operation, corrected a number of earlier errors in his article, “Berlin Tunnel Intelligence: A Bumbling KGB,” published in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in its spring 1996 issue. The above-mentioned authors and Vogel all concur with Evans’s brief review of the operation. Also worth reading are Vogel’s acknowledgments (469–71) which reveal a host of reliable sources he knows and consulted.

In retrospect, it is remarkable that the first relatively complete and accurate treatment of the tunnel did not appear until 1997, 41 years after the tunnel was revealed to the world, and that a definitive version, if Vogel’s can be called such, not until 2019, 63 years after the tunnel’s exposure. Certainly, the tunnel was mentioned numerous times in earlier decades and articles were penned about the tunnel’s engineering, but nothing before 1997 addressed all of the tunnel’s aspects and did so free of the many factual errors seen earlier.

It is important to highlight—it may be that nobody has ever noticed or clearly stated this—that all four of these books on the tunnel rely for some of their information on the operation and almost all of their information about the “impact” and value of the tunnel’s collection on an internal CIA history. The Berlin Tunnel Operation 1952–1956, published as a contributions to the Clandestine Services History Program (CSHP) history number 150. This only makes sense. CIA created and controlled tunnel-related records and the author of CSHP 150 had access to those records when writing the history. CSHP 150 was first released in 1977, with many redactions. Murphy et al. appear to have profited from a much less-redacted version in 1997, a version upon which Stafford may also have relied. Vogel will have read carefully Murphy et al., but he also had a more recently released version of CSHP 150. Vogel cites a version released in 2012.

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a. The CIA released another slightly less redacted version in 2019, likely too late for Vogel. If anyone is keeping track, each time CIA released CSHP 150—1977, 1997, three times in 2007, 2012, and 2019—it did so with fewer redactions. Before 2007, only Murphy’s 1997 restatement of CHSP’s overview of the impact of the tunnel collection was available to public researchers, and it informed most published evaluations of the operation’s value.
Among many small but important details in the book, Vogel correctly repeats Battleground Berlin’s contention that no “echo effect” existed that allowed CIA to read encrypted Soviet communications as if they had been transmitted in plain-text; Vogel simply does not mention it because it never happened. Vogel also appears to dismiss, again by its absence, the notion that Reinhard Gehlen, head of West German intelligence, was the instigator of the operation. In fact, he was not. Beyond not mentioning Gehlen, though, Vogel gives only a high-level view of how the tunnel operation originated. (20–21, 60–62)

More importantly, and beyond the many first-hand accounts Vogel offers, he agrees with and amplifies the arguments of most of the authors writing since 1996 that the Soviets did not deceive CIA with disinformation sent along the tapped circuits. Vogel, following Evans, Murphy et al., Stafford and Stockton, conclude that the Soviets did not attempt to send disinformation through the tunnel circuits because anything they tried would have alerted the Western listeners. Vogel discusses in several places the likelihood that the Soviets did not pursue a disinformation strategy because they wanted to protect Blake. (229–31)

For much of the 20th century following the arrest of George Blake in 1961 and the ensuing revelation that Blake had betrayed the tunnel to the KGB before the digging had even commenced, many authors assumed that the information collected had to have been disinformation because, of course, the Soviets would never have allowed accurate information, especially in such large volumes, to have been taken by the CIA. Critics saw the entire operation as folly. Vogel offers a brief and selective review of the Berlin-Tunnel-as-failure literature on pages 446–47 and captures the mood well while omitting many references to the tunnel in other works.

In fact, none of the 20th century authors knew whether or not the Soviets had used the tunnel to feed disinformation. They simply assumed it—or believed what the Soviets had Blake proclaim—and published it despite not having any declassified information from either the US or Soviet side to guide them to those conclusions. To this reviewer, such assumptions always stood out as red flags: How did the authors know? Did they understand the difficulty the Soviets would have encountered had they attempted wholesale disinformation over high-capacity communications circuits? Did authors not understand enough about espionage and counterintelligence to realize the risks to Blake that such an effort would have entailed? Such apparent “publishing failures” appear to say more about the lack of understanding of intelligence on the part of those authors than they do about what transpired. Disinformation may well have been transmitted, the recently released records and Kondrashev’s testimony that the Soviets did not attempt disinformation notwithstanding, but, lacking more details, the final word on this may not yet have been written.

For the moment, the presentation by most recent authors, including Vogel, that the tunnel collected accurate information and not Soviet disinformation is a sea change from earlier decades when authors assumed the Soviets had outwitted the Americans. The current understanding is that the Soviets did not believe the tunnel’s collection was significant. They believed, probably incorrectly, that allowing the tunnel to continue to collect would cost them little. They underestimated both the volume of communications the tunnel intercepted and the organizational and analytical skills within the CIA and NSA. Nevertheless, while the Soviets likely lost a massive amount of important information by allowing the tunnel to operate for almost a year, they kept suspicion away from Blake, as they intended, and gained five additional years in which Blake supplied the KGB large amounts of information from his post within MI-6.

Vogel is to be commended for using not only what primary source records he can find but for also knowing of and citing histories written by historians at CIA and NSA, who not only had the original primary source records to consult but understood how intelligence is practiced day-to-day, something too many observers...
and critics of the Intelligence Community (IC) lack. Not only does Vogel cite the declassified CSHP 150, but also other histories by NSA historians that address the tunnel, although in each case, he might have used them more thoroughly, particularly the monograph by NSA specifically about the collection: *Operation REGAL: The Berlin Tunnel Operation*. Vogel also cites *American Cryptology During the Cold War* (by former NSA historian Thomas R. Johnson); and “Beyond BOURBON – 1948: The Fourth Year of Allied Collaborative COMINT Efforts Against the Soviet Union” (by former NSA historian Michael Peterson. Vogel also consults other less well-known but important IC sources. (478) When writing intelligence history, it is wise to read those who know with certainty what happened. Granted, REGAL and “BOURBON” were only declassified recently so were not available to earlier authors, but Vogel found them. He even located and cites a declassified NSA Cryptologic Almanac article about the careful tracking NSA undertook of East German police communications encrypted with the old Nazi Enigma machines. (211) This obscure newsletter item shows how SIGINT was used to alert the tunnel operators of police activity near the tap chamber and demonstrates how intelligence was practiced. His book is the better for the use of such internal IC sources.

This book is weak in only two places, the setup in chapter 1, “Black Friday”— the day in 1948 when the Soviet Union, thanks to William Weisband, another singleton KGB asset operating a decade before Blake, implemented numerous encryption changes and physical movements of channels and lines across almost all of its vast communications network to deny collection to US antennas and cryptanalysts—and in the discussion of the “impact” and value of the collection. Vogel follows other authors in declaring that VENONA was the primary casualty of Black Friday. In fact, VENONA was but a single collection program that intercepted, decrypted, and analyzed Soviet intelligence messages for primarily FBI counterintelligence activity. In addition to VENONA, lost also were most other encrypted Soviet communications—far more voluminous and more important than VENONA.

The US Army Security Agency (ASA) had developed access to Soviet communications after the Second World War, including the ability to decrypt several important and widely used Soviet cryptosystems. ASA’s successes had the potential to equal in value the intercept and code-breaking successes against the Germans and Japanese during the war—a new or second ULTRA was within reach in the late 1940s and might have endured for years.

After Black Friday, NSA and CIA were no longer able to write reports and analyze communications because they could no longer collect the traffic, or if they could, they were no longer able to decrypt it. Vogel rightly describing it as “the worst intelligence loss in US history,” (16) something that may surprise readers of this periodical, and analysts, policymakers, and warfighters never benefited from what could have been a long-running SIGINT collection effort against multiple Soviet communications sources. But Vogel might have lingered a little longer over Black Friday to drive home the importance to the West of the tunnel collection in replacing what had been lost. He could have examined what else was lost beyond VENONA—declassified sources are available for that study—and emphasizing more what made the tunnel necessary in the first place. In those years, US leaders were essentially blind about Soviet plans and intentions. The tunnel resolved that, to a degree, but then it, too, was lost. For a hard hitting technical review of the damage Black Friday caused US intelligence, see *Code Warriors* by Stephen Budiansky (2016, pages 109–13).

The second weakness of *Betrayal in Berlin* is its incomplete examination of the “impact” and value of the collection. This is no fault of Vogel’s because the records only took him so far. Also, as with Vogel’s coverage of whether or not the Soviets used the tapped circuits to feed disinformation to CIA, this reviewer found it somewhat difficult to locate details and summaries of the value of the collection to US analysts and customers of intelligence. Vogel folds into his narrative all discussion about “impact.” For general readers, this works well but does not result in a detailed examination of what was collected and how it was used. That story remains to be told.

Steve Vogel has written the best book to date on the Berlin Tunnel. He stood on the shoulders of previous authors and brought all the pieces together, used the latest declassified sources, and added many new voices to the story. Readers will be grateful to him for capturing those voices. They are permanently memorialized in *Betrayal in Berlin*.

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The reviewer: Gary Keeley is a member of CIA’s History Staff.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

The first of a 14-volume series, these four books provide unprecedented insight into the life of Sheikh Mujibur (“Mujib”) Rahman (1920–75), the founding president and later prime minister of Bangladesh. Each volume contains more than 200 intelligence reports about Mujib from Pakistan’s Intelligence Branch (IB). More than just primary sources on Mujib’s life, the documents reveal Pakistani intelligence methods and tradecraft shortly after independence. The IB in East Pakistan recorded Mujib’s activities and speeches daily, intercepted letters, and interviewed his associates, tracking his movements and sending the reports to West Pakistan. Mujib’s daughter and current prime minister of Bangladesh since 2009, Sheikh Hasina, is listed as editor of the volumes because she was instrumental in preserving and publishing the records.

During the 20th century, South Asia’s borders were redrawn several times, causing shifting citizen loyalties and massive population migrations. The changes are important context to understand these books and why Pakistani authorities were so concerned about internal threats to the government. When British India was partitioned in 1947, it gave birth to two countries, India and Pakistan. Yet, Pakistan was a country geographically divided into West Pakistan and East Pakistan, the two separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Gary J. Bass explained, “People joked that only three things kept Pakistan united: Islam, the English language, and Pakistan International Airlines—and PIA was the strongest.” By 1970, Mujibur was the de facto leader of East Pakistan and his Awami League won enough seats to govern all of Pakistan, but leaders in West Pakistan refused to recognize the election results. Following a devastating civil war in 1971, the Bengalis in East Pakistan achieved independence, and East Pakistan became Bangladesh in December. After his release from a Pakistani prison, Mujibur was elected Bangladesh’s first president and then prime minister, leading the country until his assassination in 1975 by Bangladesh Army officers.

The books are part of a wider public relations effort to promote among Bangladeshis Mujib’s life and ideas, which will include the publication of his unfinished autobiography. The first of these four volumes was released in Bangladesh with much political fanfare in 2018. Hasina said the documents were released so “people will know each and every activity, move and speech of the Father of the Nation from 1948–71.” In early 2019, when Hasina inaugurated a monthlong book fair, she also announced the release of the second volume in Bangladesh. In late December 2019, Routledge started publishing the volumes for a worldwide audience.

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Each volume contains the same preface, written, in Bengali and English, by Hasina and dated November 2017. It describes how she originally collected the files in 1997, after becoming prime minister in 1996, by having Bangladesh’s Special Branch (SB) make three sets of copies, which were declassified, with one sent to the Bangabandhu Memorial Trust—the trust sponsored the original publications in Bangladesh.a In the years since, Hasina lost power but recovered it in 2009. She then “assigned the SB to type out these documents and make arrangements to publish them, and scan and preserve the main documents digitally” with the team working “day and night.” (Vol. I, p. xiv) She explains the documents were “preserved in the same way as they were prepared,” including errors and older spellings of locations and people. (Vol. I, p. xv) The volumes credit 22 Bangladeshis with compiling the books and include brief abstracts of the contents and photographs of Mujib taken at the time the intelligence reports were written.

The volumes have a one-page introduction—without a byline—that situate the documents in Mujib’s life, for example, years spent in school, his arrests, and roles in organizing demonstrations. In the front matter of the first volume is an image of the original cover of Mujib’s file, while the books are organized in chapters with each year, such as 1948, being its own chapter. The records reveal Mujib’s life by detailing his daily activities, speeches and correspondence, reports about searching his property, and interviews with associates. Additionally, the books include internal government memorandums about arrests, summaries of interrogations with Mujib, messages about officers “shadowing” him, and correspondence on sharing that information within the government. Most of the reports include an image of the original file as well as the typed English reproduction or translation. Furthermore, intelligence officers who authored many of the reports or memorandums are named and the text has footnotes with further information about places, people, or intelligence terminology.

While Mujib’s life in these documents is significant to understanding his role in shaping the political geography of South Asia, these volumes provide important primary sources about intelligence in early post-colonial Pakistan. Though containing much information about meetings, speeches and arrests, the records contain little analysis. For example, a July 1948 report about his activism opposing a Pakistani effort to make Urdu the official language of the country, Mujib complained “that he along with other Muslim workers did tremendous works [sic] at the risk of their lives to achieve Pakistan, but now they were called ‘Fifth Columnists’ and that they had now been deprived of the privileges of becoming Muslim League members.” (Vol. I, p. 37)

Some records reflect police interrogations of Mujib. For example, in February 1951 the police officer who interviewed him reported, Mujib “was sure that [the] Awami Muslim League would defeat the Muslim League by an overwhelming majority if there would be any general election in East Bengal.” Furthermore, “He was not willing to execute any bond for release even if the detention would cause him to face death. His attitude was very stiff.” (Vol. II, p. 13) By 1953, reports included details that his speeches described preparing for a “countrywide agitation for the inclusion of Bengali” as an official language as well as the “release” of “political prisoners” and forcing particular West Pakistani politicians from power. (Vol. III, p. 41) In later volumes, the Intelligence Branch also included open-source intelligence, making use of newspaper articles that quoted Mujib’s criticizing West Pakistan’s “undemocratic act” in July 1956 that banned “public meetings” in response to efforts to protest food shortages. (Vol. IV, p. 470)

Price and specialized subject matter will limit the market for these books, the release of Pakistani intelligence documents by a major publisher marks a significant contribution for scholars seeking intelligence records from South Asia.

There are some problems with the books, notably the font style and size are inconsistent and some of the introductions and explanations are not credited. Those aside, these books are—and the series will be—a primary source treasure for scholars of the region and Mujib.

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The reviewer: Ryan Shaffer is a writer and historian. His academic work explores Asian, African, and European history.

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Intelligence in Public Media

Japan’s Spy at Pearl Harbor: Memoir of an Imperial Navy Secret Agent

Reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado

Secrets can take decades to surface. In 1953, the year after the Allied occupation of Japan ended, a local newspaper broke the news to the Japanese public that an intelligence officer of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), operating from Japan’s consulate general in Honolulu, had gathered intelligence on Pearl Harbor and other US military facilities in the Hawaiian islands in the months leading to the IJN’s surprise attack in December 1941. Nearly 20 years after the raid, Marine Lt. Col. Norman Sanford, an assistant naval attaché at our embassy in Tokyo, interviewed at length the former intelligence officer, Yoshikawa Takeo. The US Naval Institute published the result, “Top Secret Assignment,” in the December 1960 issue of its monthly Proceedings. One year later, CBS aired an episode of its series The Twentieth Century, “The Man Who Spied on Pearl Harbor,” starring anchor- man Walter Cronkite and featuring Yoshikawa, to mark the 20th anniversary of the attack. In December 1963, a prominent Japanese company published the intelligence officer’s memoir; Best-selling author John Toland interviewed him at length his monumental history of the Japanese empire, The Rising Sun, published one year shy of Pearl Harbor’s 30th anniversary. This year, nearly eight decades after the Japanese Navy’s attack, Yoshikawa’s memoir is at last available to an international audience with its publication in English translation.

Yoshikawa Takeo, commissioned an ensign following his graduation in 1933 as a member of the IJN Academy’s 61st class, suffered early in his naval career a serious ailment that led to a long convalescence and his placement on the reserve list. Yoshikawa returned to duty in late 1936 as an intelligence officer in the 8th Section (British Empire) of the IJN Third Bureau (Intelligence). For several years, he followed developments in the Royal Navy through intelligence covertly gathered as well as such sources as British naval publications, radio broadcasts, Foreign Ministry reports, and information gleaned from cooperative Japanese trading companies, ships’ crewmen, and residents living abroad.

In 1940, NGS 5th Section (Americas) ordered him to go under diplomatic cover to the consulate general in Honolulu to gather intelligence there. His assignment was part of an IJN effort to strengthen its intelligence network in the United States. Yoshikawa recalls without details one unidentified staff officer leaving NGS around that time for the West Coast of the United States, following another one already there.

Yoshikawa arrived at the consulate general in Honolulu in March 1941, identified as Vice-Consul Tadashi Morimura, his real identity known only to Consul-General Kita Nagao. His putative consular duties involved handling cases of Japanese-Americans

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c. Yoshikawa Takeo, Higashi no kaze, ame: Shinjuwan supai no kaiso [East Wind, Rain: Memoir of the Pearl Harbor Spy] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1963). Another publisher reprinted the book in 1985 under the title Shinjuwan supai no kaiso [Memoir of the Pearl Harbor Spy], which I have used to review this book. Finally, the publisher Mainichi Wanz re-issued the book in 2015 and again in 2018 under the title Watakushi wa Shinjuwan supai datta [I Was the Pearl Harbor Spy]. This third publisher was the source for the English translation under review.
d. These publications included London’s Navy List and three publications of the Jane's series: Fighting Ships, Merchant Ships, and Aircraft. Oddly, the translation omits reference to the Jane’s publications, all found in the Japanese original.

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Japan's Spy at Pearl Harbor

renouncing their Japanese citizenship.\(^a\) When not at the
office, Yoshikawa was touring Oahu and other Hawaiian
islands to gather intelligence. He would take taxis on
roads that passed by military facilities en route to some
supposed tourist destination, fly over bases on aerial
tours, attend a local air show to assess pilot skill, ride on a
glass bottom boat to assess Kaneohe Bay’s suitability for
naval operations, and swim at various beaches to conduct
hydrographic surveys. His favorite observation post was
on Alewa Heights at the Shunchoro Tea House, run by
a Japanese immigrant couple, from the second floor of
which he enjoyed a clear view of the warships at Pearl
Harbor. Returning to the consulate general, he would
report his intelligence by diplomatic telegram to Tokyo.\(^b\)

In addition to direct observation, Yoshikawa would
obtain military information from close reading of the
local press. He would also elicit details from sailors on
liberty, buying them drinks to loosen their tongues. He
also sought collaborators among the large community of
Japanese immigrants and Japanese-Americans. Although
many were willing and eager to help, Yoshikawa found
them lacking in military knowledge and discretion. He
claimed, fearing compromise, not to have recruited any
of them as agents. Nevertheless, members of the Japanese
community played supporting roles. The Japanese lady
who ran the tea house suspected Yoshikawa for spending
so much time observing Pearl Harbor from her establish-
ment’s second floor but never reported him.

Yoshikawa often took the young Japanese-American
women from the tea house with him on his trips around
Hawaii, calculating that the dates at this side would
make him appear less suspicious. He made regular use
of a Japanese-American military veteran, a driver in the
employ of the consulate general for over 20 years, whom
he valued for his being “trusted by the Americans.”\(^c\)

Another Japanese-American working at the consulate
general bought at least one airplane ticket in his own
name for Yoshikawa, who wished to avoid suspicion by
buying too many tickets himself. He also turned often to
a favorite taxi driver, an immigrant with Japanese mili-
tary experience, who on at least one occasion hid his taxi
outside the consulate general to help Yoshikawa avoid
surveillance at the beginning of his route.

Yoshikawa took various actions to avoid or shake off possible tails. One technique was to enter a shop,
purchase clothing and change into it before exiting the
store with a new look. On at least one occasion, having
taken time to darken his skin by extensive sunbathing and
dressed in casual clothing, he attempted to enter a sen-
tive area disguised as a Filipino. Yoshikawa also took
various routes to detect or escape surveillance, at times
departing the consulate general by hopping over a com-
 pound wall, crossing a stream, and reaching the main road
before catching a taxi. He would also use multiple modes
of transportation on a single trip, hailing a cab outside the
consulate general and then hopping a bus before taking a
second taxi on the way to his destination.

After IJN pilots attacked Pearl Harbor in December
1941, Yoshikawa was immediately taken into custody
with the rest of the consulate general staff. Not informed
of the raid’s timing, he was unable to execute his planned
transfer to Mexico. There followed a nerve-wracking
period of interrogation in Arizona and a cross-country
trip before he sailed from New York in June 1942 with
Japanese diplomats from throughout the United States in
a prisoner exchange conducted by Washington and Tokyo.

Following his return to Japan, Yoshikawa returned to
NGS Third Bureau’s 5th Section, working under Rear
Admiral Takeuchi Kaoru. Part of his intelligence work
involved interrogating American prisoners of war held
at the IJN’s secret detention site in Ofuna,\(^d\) near Tokyo.

\(^a\) Tokyo recognized the children of Japanese as Japanese citizens, no matter where they were born. According to US law, persons born on
American soil were citizens of the United States, although their immigrant parents were denied citizenship. Some Japanese Americans, in
joining the US military or generally seeking to counter suspicions regarding their loyalty, went to consular offices in Honolulu or elsewhere
in the United States to renounce their Japanese citizenship.

\(^b\) Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having destroyed its files in advance of the Allied Occupation, Yoshikawa wrote his memoir relying
on the translations of the communications intercepted in Washington’s MAGIC program. Yoshikawa in his memoir’s preface, untranslated,
thanked Tominaga Kengo, a IJN officer who served as a historian after the war in the Self-Defense Forces War History Section, for provid-
 ing him the MAGIC materials.

\(^c\) The translation, oddly, renders the original as “highly respected by US officials.” This is one of numerous instances of the original text
being rewritten, rather than translated.

\(^d\) One of the prisoners at Ofuna was Louis Zamperini, a former Olympic runner who served as a bombardier in the US Army Air Corps.
Laura Hillenbrand told his story in the best-selling biography Unbroken (2010), which then became a popular movie (2014) directed by
Increasingly frustrated by the difference between what he knew as an intelligence officer and the unbelievable front-line military reporting and Tokyo propaganda he encountered, Yoshikawa left NGS before the war's end to work in war production.

With Tokyo's surrender and the arrival of Allied occupation forces, Yoshikawa realized he was again in danger of detection and prosecution for his intelligence activities in Honolulu and the prisoner interrogations at Ofuna. He soon went into hiding, disguised as a Buddhist monk. As such, he evaded arrest until the danger had passed near the end of the occupation period. By 1951, Yoshikawa felt secure enough to accept the invitation of Gordon Prange, historian at MacArthur’s General Headquarters for an interview there on his operations in Honolulu. In 1961, he returned to Honolulu and joined Walter Cronkite for the filming of the story of his intelligence gathering for the CBS series *The Twentieth Century*.

It is gratifying for this student of Japanese intelligence history to see at last an English translation of Yoshikawa’s memoir. Japan has an abundant intelligence literature, almost none of it available in languages other than Japanese, so let us hope that more translations appear. If publishers are seeking candidates, here are two recommendations:


Less gratifying for this reviewer was discovering the numerous errors, omissions, and substitutions in the English translation. Among the errors, a good many are simply sloppy. One example is Yoshikawa’s reference to the “imposing aiguillette,” the ornamental braided cord worn from the shoulder on the uniform of each naval staff officer. In translation, it becomes a “shiny badge.” Among the omissions is the cutting of Yoshikawa’s boast about the many foreign women with whom he had slept. Finally, some sentences are less faithful translations than substitutions of new text not found in the original. For example, Yoshikawa wrote of the Western colonization of North Africa and countries along the Indian Ocean, with each subject population “suppressed by the military power of the metropolitan state.” The phrase is embroidered and expanded in the translation as: “yet all were in awe of the power of the occupying armies and feared their repressive force.”

Knowing that the translation suffers from such problems, students of intelligence history can still profit from reading this book. Let us hope for more Japanese intelligence memoirs and more rigorous editing in future publications.
Intelligence in Public Media

At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (Penguin Books, 2nd edition, 1991), 889 pp., maps, diagrams, appendices, selected bibliography, index

Reviewed by Michael J. Hughes

Nearly 40 years after its publication, At Dawn We Slept remains the single best scholarly study of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) massive air raid on US naval and military bases in Oahu on December 7, 1941. The work covers in detail the meticulous IJN planning and preparation for the “Hawaii Operation,” the debate in Tokyo over the feasibility and wisdom of the proposed raid, and the IJN’s execution of the assault. It also examines the deficiencies of US planning for the island’s defense, the gaps in US intelligence, the US military response to the assault, and the numerous US postmortems to investigate the disaster, some of which were controversial and political divisive. Prange concludes with a judicious evaluation of just what went wrong for the United States and why.

What accounts for the enduring value of Prange’s magnum opus? His exhaustive research is one factor. The author spent 37 years studying the attack, starting with what Prange called “a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to gather material directly from the source.” (814) In an essay included in the book that was written months before he died in May 1980, Prange described his unique access as a junior Navy officer in early postwar Japan, where he served on and eventually led the Army’s G-2 Historical Section. From that position, the author was able to interview many surviving Japanese commanders, planners, and military personnel who executed the attack. These interviews—many conducted within a few years of the attack—enabled the author “not only to spice up [his] narrative . . . and take the reader behind the scenes but also to give the story a really intimate and authentic stamp. These interviews can never be duplicated because many of the individuals, both on Japan and in the United States, have since died.” (821) [Author’s emphasis] Prange also directly interviewed many US civilian and military officials who played roles in the events before the attack.

Prange also scrutinized the nine US government inquiries into the Pearl Harbor disaster. In doing so, he not only reviewed the official record but read the extensive transcripts from hundreds of interviews with US officials at all ranks. He interviewed many of the staff personnel on the various investigative bodies. (818) Prange mastered the proceedings and testimonies of the 1945–46 Joint Congressional Committee Investigation into Pearl Harbor and examined private papers, other unpublished sources, and a wide sampling of US national newspapers at the time.

Prange also brought the judiciousness and intellectual humility of a trained historian to the task. After his postwar naval service in Japan, Prange spent most of his career as a history professor at the University of Maryland. There he honed his craft in meticulous research, patient sifting of data, broadmindedness, and sound judgment. As his collaborators, Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon—distinguished scholars of Pearl Harbor in their own right—note in the introduction, Prange approached this controversial topic “with as nearly an open mind as any American [of that era, in particular] could bring to the subject.” (ix) Prange was fascinated by the dynamic interaction at all levels—political, strategic, diplomatic, and military—between the United States and Imperial Japan as the Japanese

a. One of Prange’s interview subjects, Takeo Yoshikawa, was an intelligence officer assigned to reconnoiter the islands in the months before the attack. He published a memoir in 1963, which was recently translated into English. A review of the translation follows this one.

b. US Government investigations of the Pearl Harbor disaster include: a hasty inquiry by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox immediately after the Japanese strike, a commission led by Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts from December 1941 to January 1942, the Inquiry led by USN Adm. Thomas C. Hart in February–June 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board from July to October 1944, the Navy Court of Inquiry from July to October 1944, an investigation led by VAdm. Kent Hewitt in May–July 1945, an investigation conducted by US Army Maj. Henry C. Clausen from November 1944 to September 1945, another probe led by US Army Col. Carter in September 1944 and resumed during July–August 1945, and the Joint Congressional Committee Investigation, from November 1945 to July 1946. (See Part III “Aftermath” and Appendix “The Pearl Harbor Investigations” in At Dawn We Slept, 551–738, 841–42).

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onslaught approached. Prange saw no villains or evil conspirators on either side. At the same time, he notes some personnel on both sides were brilliant while others were mediocre, some strategic and others narrowly tactical, some capable and others incompetent—“and every single one fallible, capable of mistakes of omission and commission.” (x)

The book also benefitted from Prange’s choice of collaborators. The author died in 1980 at age 70, a year before the first edition of the book was published. In accordance with Prange’s desires, two of his former students, Dr. Donald M. Goldstein and Chief Warrant Officer Katherine V. Dillon, USAF (ret.) pared Prange’s massive multivolume work of more than 3,500 pages down to a manageable one-volume book.

Prange and his posthumous collaborators included photographs and maps, including one that plots the course of the IJN carrier task force to and from Pearl Harbor. (418) The book also includes an extensive set of appendices that

- review the source material,
- identify the major personnel involved in the Pearl Harbor attack and defense,
- list the Pearl Harbor investigations,
- provide a bibliography, and
- explain and rebut the various camps of Pearl Harbor revisionism.

So is this work still advisable reading for intelligence officers or military personnel in 2020? (Copies seem easily obtainable and it is available in a Kindle edition.) Is it worth the investment of time to read a book of 889 pages prepared more than 40 years ago about a surprise attack that occurred nearly 79 years ago? A skeptic would note that vastly different strategic conditions, economic realities, military technologies, and intelligence capabilities reduce studies of Pearl Harbor to almost purely historical interest. New cyber weapons, the existence of invulnerable nuclear deterrent forces, system “learning,” and modern means of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance suggest the odds of a modern-day Pearl Harbor-type surprise are very low. Pearl Harbor as a modern-day case study is therefore deceiving, according to this skeptical view.

But the skeptic’s view overlooks the enduring lessons of the Pearl Harbor disaster for modern-day intelligence officers and military personnel. Those lessons include:

- **The desperation of proud national leaders who resent US “arrogance” and feel trapped in a strategic quandary that will only worsen with time, unless bold measure are taken.** Imperial Japan during 1940–41 was mired in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign against China as US economic sanctions were starting to hit on the home front and US naval rearmament was kicking into high gear.

- **The allure of surprise as a feasible option for weaker powers mired in an enduring strategic rivalry with stronger adversaries.** Admiral Yamamoto and the Japanese Army and Navy staff knew Imperial Japan could not win a grinding war of attrition with the United States and Great Britain. But this knowledge, rather than fostering caution, instead made the prospect of a sudden demoralizing knock-out blow against Pearl Harbor all the more attractive as the opening coup in Japan’s quest to overrun, occupy, and exploit Western colonial possessions in Southeast Asia.

- **The skill, nerve, and grit of the adversary’s operation- al planners, commanders, and military personnel.** At Dawn We Slept goes into meticulous detail about how Japanese military planners identified, grappled with, and overcame a daunting series of challenges before December 7th: ensuring secrecy, gathering accurate intelligence, adapting existing weapons, forging a massive carrier strike force, training aircrews, refueling at sea, transiting safely to and from the strike area, and ensuring military confidence and morale.

- **The passivity, inertia, compartmentation, and red tape that impede the victim state’s vigilance and preparedness for sudden hostile action.** In passages whose collective effect is akin to that of a Greek tragedy, Prange details the failures of the US War and Navy Departments to rise to the occasion and bolster the alert posture of US military forces on Pearl Harbor. Time and again, warnings dispatched to Pearl Harbor were ambivalent, vague, misunderstood, or late. Commanders in Pearl Harbor failed to institute a rapid alert system so that even initial reports of enemy action a

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• Failures of imagination and status quo bias that prevent the target-actor from taking prudent countermeasures. Time and again, US military personnel told US investigators (and in many cases, Prange himself) that they simply did not expect the Japanese to initiate war with the United States with a massive attack on a supposedly impregnable US island fortress so far from Japan. The author demonstrates that the Japanese were counting, in part, on the very audacity of their bold plan to keep the United States asleep.

• The hard tradeoffs and competing crises facing US political leaders and senior military commanders. Contrary to decades of revisionist assertions, Prange convincingly demonstrates that the Roosevelt administration did not goad the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor or turn a blind eye to incontrovertible evidence of an impending attack. Instead, US leaders sought to avert war with Japan, confront the menace of Hitler’s Germany, support US allies worldwide, and accelerate US defense rearmament and mobilization. In Hawaii Admiral Husband Kimmel was focused on training the Pacific Fleet for offensive operations, while Army General Walter Short was obsessed with the threats of sabotage and an outright invasion.

From nearly eight decades out these realities should still resonate with US intelligence officers and military personnel. If they do, then Prange’s epic work remains a useful starting point for thinking in concrete terms about how disaster could strike and how to avert it.

The reviewer: Michael J. Hughes is course director of the Surprise & Warning Workshop at CIA’s Sherman Kent School of Analysis.
In an age when intelligence so often is blamed when things go wrong, it is a pleasure to reminded of what may be accomplished when someone does it right. This is the case with UK historian Helen Fry’s new book, *The Walls Have Ears*, which tells the story of how British intelligence in World War II monitored and interrogated high-ranking German prisoners of war (POWs) and exploited the resulting take.

The story is straightforward. In 1939, as it became clear that war was coming, MI6 began to prepare for the arrival of prisoners and the need to extract information from them. Under the command of Maj. Thomas Kendrick, who by then had some 30 years of intelligence experience, the British set up holding and interrogation facilities first at the Tower of London and, soon after, at requisitioned estates outside London. In each, listening devices and recording systems were installed in the prisoners’ living quarters on the theory that, even if they said nothing during formal interrogations, they would be relaxed and unwary in conversations among themselves.

Kendrick’s system expanded quickly. Starting with the capture of a handful of prisoners—survivors of sunken U-boats and downed aircraft—in September 1939, thousands of POWs passed through his facilities. Most, especially after the numbers grew exponentially when the British began winning major victories in 1942, quickly moved on to standard POW camps. For others, especially high-ranking officers or those with specialized technical knowledge, Kendrick’s facilities became their homes for the rest of the war.

The system worked brilliantly. Just as Kendrick had forecast, from the start prisoners who said nothing during questioning returned to their quarters and boasted to their comrades details of the secret information they had withheld. The British were only too happy to record, transcribe, and translate these conversations, and turn them into intelligence reports filled with details of communications and encryption systems, weapons, tactics, and politics. The information often became the foundations of subsequent interrogations, used to pry additional information out of the POWs. Over time, as Fry documents, the reporting made significant contributions to Britain’s codebreaking effort at Bletchley Park, knowledge of German weapons systems, and understandings of the Nazi regime’s strategy, tactics, and internal political dynamics. In perhaps the most important example, Fry documents how loose talk among the Germans led the British to identify, and then bomb, the V-1 and V-2 facilities as Peenemünde. The Germans’ conversations also provided early documentation of the Holocaust and other German war crimes.

Fry’s account provides a number of lessons for anyone interested in collecting intelligence from uncooperative subjects. First, this was no amateur operation. Kendrick knew his target well, having worked on prisoner interrogation during World War I and against Germany between the wars. He carefully picked his subordinates, always for talent and ability above all else. As the growing number of prisoners overwhelmed the limited number of UK-born personnel with adequate language skills, for example, he turned to the pool of German refugees in Britain—many of them Jewish—who had been consigned to labor units and other duties that made no use of their capabilities. In addition, Kendrick never resorted to force or abused the prisoners. Instead, he and his interrogators always took a soft approach—taking German generals on outings to fine restaurants in London built rapport and also showed them that British society was not collapsing, as Nazi propaganda claimed—and waited for the POWs to become comfortable and let down their guard. Kendrick also was fortunate in his consumers, who understood that collecting intelligence was a long-term project and had the patience to wait for the tidbits to be assembled into actionable information. Such professionalism and appreciation for experience served Britain well.

Kendrick was lucky, too, in his enemies. From the start, the Germans realized that their quarters might be bugged but believed that the English were too stupid to pull off such an operation, a conclusion that was reinforced by their civilized treatment. Underestimating the opposition is as old a mistake as there is, and the
(presumably) sophisticated German generals made it day after day as they chatted in their rooms.

As valuable as Fry’s account is, however, the unfortunate fact is that the reader will learn almost all of this in the first 60 or 70 pages. Fry previously has written a biography of Kendrick and a book on British prisoner interrogations (*The London Cage*), and *The Walls Have Ears* has all the hallmarks of a collection of leftover notes and research materials quickly slapped together. Much of it is dull—reading details of the squabbles among generals after they had been locked up for three or four years starts to give a sense of the tedium they must have endured—and repetitive, a 150-page book padded and stretched to 270. It seems that the editors may have nodded off at some point as well, thus missing the strange statement that the fall of Norway in the spring of 1940 was the start of a six-year German occupation.

Despite these flaws, much of *The Walls Have Ears* is worth a read. The first third of the book is as a good a primer as any on how to set up a system for collecting intelligence from POWs, and the chapter on Peenemünde is a good case study of how such information can be exploited. The remainder can be skimmed, unless you need an extended refresher course on the need to watch what you say.

The reviewer: J. E. Leonardson is the penname of an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Analysis.
After nearly 18 years of asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, press reporting and books detailing joint and/or coalition tactical operations are commonplace. Readers in the Intelligence Community would not think it in the least bit odd that US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and UK Special Forces (UKSF) work on raids together with a fully integrated command structure. These assault forces are supported by joint aviation units as well as a fusion of intelligence and surveillance operations that will likely include the US and UK civilian intelligence communities as well as sophisticated military intelligence operations. Barriers and bureaucratic obstacles remain, but at the tactical level, joint operations, especially joint special operations, are accepted as the norm.

This was not the case in World War II. At the strategic level, the Allies and, most especially US and UK military forces, worked together in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO), China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre, and Pacific theatre. Below the level of grand strategy, military units at army and corps level and lower were under the complete control of their own chain of command. While General Eisenhower was the overall commander of Operation Overlord, the allied forces on D-Day landing on Omaha, Utah, Sword, Gold, and Juno were commanded respectively by US, UK, and Canadian general officers.

Exceptions in World War II to this structure of single-country command and control are few. Small units of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) worked closely in both Europe and the CBI. The best example of the high degree of integration of OSS and SOE operations was in work of JEDBURGH teams, composed of one OSS officer, one SOE officer, and one Free French officer worked in Occupied France. The book reviewed here outlines another rare example of joint tactical operations: The 1st Special Service Force (“The Force” as it is called in this book). It is a superbly researched and well written story of a special operations unit that was unique in World War II.

The Force had its origins in the early days of 1942, when the US was just beginning to assemble forces to be used in the ETO while US Army soldiers and Marines fought in the Pacific. Beginning in 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was determined to fight back against the Nazis occupying Europe. In those early days, when Britain and the British Commonwealth stood alone against the Nazis, the Churchill forced the UK military and civilian bureaucracy to support the creation of several unconventional military organizations: the SOE and a number of small raiding units identified as numbered “assault forces,” eventually known collectively as “the Commandos.” To support the assault force units inside the Imperial General Staff, Churchill created a joint forces command called simply “Combined Operations.” By 1941, the commander of Combined Operations was Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten.

The idea for the Force came out of Mountbatten’s offices. It focused initially on the creation of a unit that could operate successfully in the severe winter conditions common in Norway and in eastern Europe, most especially in Romania. Named “Project Snow Plough,” it was the creation of an eccentric British engineer named Geoffrey Pyke. All of Pyke records suggest that he was an annoying egomaniac, but he was also a well-respected inventor and engineer with access to Mountbatten. Pyke was convinced that the only way to defeat the Nazis in Norway would be to use small, tracked troop carriers carrying small commando companies. These small tracked vehicles would traverse winter snow fields, where snow and ice impaired the mobility of standard wheeled and tracked vehicles. Pyke offered both a design and an operational plan that required a new type of military unit with special skills in winter, mountain, and airborne warfare. Pyke convinced both Mountbatten and Churchill that his plan would be a significant addition to the established assault forces inside Combined Operations. In the spring of 1942, Mountbatten and Pyke briefed the chief of Army staff, Gen. George Marshall, and eventually, the Canadian Armed Forces chief, Lieutenant General Kenneth Stuart. Marshall agreed to the plan and tasked his Plans Division...
to make it happen while Stuart promised to provide a Canadian contingent of highly qualified soldiers.

Meanwhile, the War Department tasked US automobile company Studebaker to design and test Pyke’s vehicle. While the created tracked vehicle eventually did arrive in Europe, the US and Canadian joint force started training immediately and used their skills well before the vehicle, known as the Weasel, reached the front.

This joint force served under the direct control of the US War Department rather than under a single combatant commander. This emphasized both that it would serve as a special missions unit and that it was in the best interest of the Army to support the program. The structure of the new unit included a headquarters detachment and three combat regiments and would be a blend of US Army and Canadian Army volunteers. The training program for this special force began on 9 July 1942 at Fort Harrison, Montana where the 1st Special Service Force was born. The goal of the training was to create a force of 133 officers and 1,821 enlisted men from the United States and Canada who would be “arctic-ski-demolition-paratroop-mountain climbing commandos” (49). The Force would be combat ready in under a year and conduct operations first in the Aleutians, followed by the Italian campaign, the invasion of southern France and the final push towards Germany. The Force was disbanded in December 1944 and the US and Canadian troops reassigned to their respective national commands.

David takes the reader through the selection, training and first two deployments of the Force. His focus is on individual soldiers and their thoughts and deeds along the way. In this format, he is returning to the style of the first history of the Force, The Devil’s Brigade by Adleman and Walton.a Unlike this earlier work or the post-war memoirs that preceded it, David chooses to focus almost a third of his book on a single operation: the successful capture of German positions on a pair of Italian mountain peaks, Difensa and Remetanea. The multi-day operation against these positions required all the mountaineering and close combat skills of the Force, led by the 2nd Regiment and commanded by Canadian Lt. Col. Don Williamson. This operation was “the mission impossible” identified in the title of the book, and David gives the reader a real understanding of the courage of the Force soldiers and the horror of those three days of combat on the ridge line.

The battle of Difensa and Remetanea quickly created the Force’s reputation for close combat excellence and intrepidity that continued for the rest of the Italian campaign and then into Southern France. However, David’s book ends with this battle and before the other battle honors of the 1st Special Service Force begin. For those interested in “the rest of the story” and in more detail on the role of the Force as it transformed US, UK and Canadian understanding of how special operations forces could be used concurrently with conventional military units, Kenneth Joyce’s book, Snow Plough and the Jupiter Deception follows the Force from inception to disbandment.8 Joyce is a Canadian and, not surprisingly, focuses more on the Canadian contingent inside the Force. His book should be considered an essential complement to David’s work.

In World War II, special operations units were often given impossible missions in part because the soldiers, sailors, and Marines assigned to those units were trained far beyond the skills of conventional troops. They were known for exceptional courage under severe conditions and, in honesty, suffered from a larger than life reputation created by the Allied press as part of the larger propaganda effort against the Axis powers. More often than not, they accomplished these missions regardless of how impossible they might have seemed, while suffering exceptionally high casualty rates. Today’s Special Operations Forces in NATO, and especially Joint Special Operations Task Forces, owe much to the legacy of these early units and their ability to complete seemingly impossible missions.


The reviewer: J. R. Seeger is a retired CIA paramilitary officer and frequent reviewer of books in the field.
Monash’s Masterpiece: The Battle of Hamel and the 93 minutes that Changed WWI
Peter FitzSimmons (CPI Group (UK) Ltd, 2018)

Reviewed by James Noone

If any Intelligence Community member is lucky enough to be invited to Friday night “Prayers” at the Australian embassy, definitely attend! The moniker “Prayers” is actually non-religious. According to Air Vice Marshall Alan Clements—former Dean of the Washington, DC Defense Attaché Corps—“Prayers” reflects the casual way Australians like to both entertain and socialize with mates. It is an opportunity, particularly after a hard week’s work, to relax, meet new friends, share tall stories and learn from each other. You will almost certainly enjoy an evening of genuine “Mate-ship” with our Aussie cousins, and perhaps a frothy libation or two. During the evening, the “Hamel” protocols and General Sir John Monash will be reverently invoked. Modern Australian military officers invariably mention, with more than a bit of pride, that the WWI Battle of Hamel in France was the first (and only) time US forces have served under the direct command of an Australian General in a combat zone. This is quite true, but there is so much more of significance about Sir John.

Monash was a master military tactician. He eschewed the horrific infantry casualties resulting from en masse assaults across “No Man’s Land.” His synchronization of new combat technologies such as biplanes, tanks, and radios revolutionized warfare and minimized military causalities. Logistically, he was the first to airdrop resupply to advancing troops and “let the tanks do the heavy lifting” when pushing loads of ammunition, medical supplies, and food forward in a combat zone.

Of note for Studies in Intelligence readers is Monash’s elaborate intelligence deception plans to cover the advance of his tanks without warning the enemy. Monash also understood the importance that foreign language fluency and cultural awareness had on the interrogation of German prisoners. Yet, his greatest intelligence innovations also involved the exploitation of new technologies and techniques. “By the aid of sound ranging devices and spotting from the air of gun flashes, and the aerial photographs we took every day, it was possible to locate the positions of a great number of enemy (artillery) batteries.” In addition, sound ranging was a new technique which involved positioning army monitors at various angles and distances from the front lines and then measuring the time it took for the sound of the German artillery blasts to reach each point. Cross-referencing this information enabled accurate triangulation of the enemy’s artillery positions.

Peter FitzSimmons’s account is enlivened by colorful Australian soldiers (nicknamed “diggers”), the seemingly crazy, yet audaciously heroic Sergeant “Two Guns” Harry Dalziel. I also found myself fixated on the meandering, yet I knew inevitable, march of the US doughboys toward their first blooding in the trenches of WWI. This included Monash’s integration of American combat troops at Hamel in defiance of orders from the legendary General Black Jack Pershing. Pershing is one of only two Americans to ever reach the 5-star rank. Happily, Monash judiciously used the green American troops since he valued the doughboys’ lives as much as he did those of his own beloved “diggers”.

Monash’s Masterpiece is clearly written from the Australian perspective and some of it delves in Aussie political bickering that may be difficult for American audiences to follow. Yet the insights it provides on Monash’s innovative use of emerging technologies to provide both a tactical combat and intelligence advantage are totally relevant to today’s intelligence environment.

Readers not familiar with WWI, might consider watching one or both of two movies about the war that have recently been produced. One is New Zealander Peter Jackson’s documentary “They Shall Not Grow Old,” film put together with WWI camera footage (cleaned up and colorized) and oral history interviews of war veterans recorded decades ago. The other is the 2019 Oscar-nominated movie “1917.”

The reviewer: Jim Noone is a retired senior DIA officer.

a. The Australians pronounce this French town to rhyme with “Camel.” In French, it is pronounced “Ah’-mel”

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
CURRENT TOPICS

The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics, by Ben Buchanan
The Russians Among Us: Sleeper Cells, Ghost Stories, and the Hunt for Putin’s Spies, by Gordon Corera

HISTORICAL

Kim Philby and James Angleton: Friends and Enemies in the Cold War, by Michael Holzman
Mapping The Great Game; Explorers, Spies and Maps in Nineteenth-Century Asia, by Riaz Dean
The Zinoviev Letter: The Conspiracy That Never Dies, by Gill Bennett

MEMOIR

The Unexpected Spy: From the CIA to the FBI, My Secret Life Taking Down Some of the World’s Most Notorious Terrorists, by Tracy Walder

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

ASSASSINS: The KGB’s Poison Factory 10 Years On, by Boris Volodarsky
The State of Secrecy: Spies and the Media in Britain, by Richard Norton-Taylor

Anyone who has suffered identity theft or encountered a “zoom bomb” while participating in a web-based discussion, has experienced hacking at the personal level. In The Hacker and the State Georgetown University School of Foreign Service professor Ben Buchanan argues, with good reason, that hacks are also “a persistent part of geopolitical competition. They happen every day. . . . This is a new form of statecraft.” But he is quick to point out that while hacking is a suitable tool for shaping elements of statecraft, it is in most cases “ill-suited for signaling a state’s position and intentions.” (3) Examples of the latter include military mobilization, Russian May Day parades, sanctions, and summit talks.

The Hacker and the State maintains that the shaping elements of cyber statecraft are mostly clandestine. Thus, government hackers “wiretap, alter, sabotage, disrupt, attack, manipulate, interfere, expose, steal and destabilize.” (7) The book provides instances of these techniques from several nations, including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the Five Eyes countries. Two sabotage digital worms, Stuxnet and Wiper are attributed to the United States and Israel. The former attacked Iranian centrifuges and the later wiped Iranian oil production computers clean. (142–44) Besides China’s well documented thefts of intellectual property, Buchanan describes North Korea’s attacks on South Korea’s critical infrastructure in 2011 and Sony Pictures in 2014, (169–70) among other examples.

Not all hackers have been positively identified, however. The most prominent example is The Shadow Brokers. Somehow they acquired what were said to be NSA’s most powerful hacking tools and offered them for sale online, complete with user guides. No body bought. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to enrich their coffers, The Shadow Brokers gave the powerful tools away for free. (250) Some were quickly used against computer systems in the United States. Although Buchanan does not identify the targets or the damage, he raises important questions: Who was responsible, why did they go public, and what are the implications of such power.

The short answer to the “who” is we don’t know for sure, at least publicly, though Russian involvement is suspected. (256) As to the “why they went public” when they could have raised havoc with NSA with little fear of being caught, there is no definite answer. Buchanan speculates that a warning signal was being sent, but if so, to what purpose?

The most detailed example of the havoc that can be produced by hacking is found in the story of Russia’s attack on Ukraine which achieved its goal of “pervasive damage.” Dubbed “NotPetya,” it damaged “everyone doing business in Ukraine and everyone paying taxes to the government.” Then it spread all over the world damaging corporations like FedEx and Merck chemical among others. “NotPetya ranks as the costliest and possibly the most important cyber attack in history. It caused more than $10 billion in quantifiable damage.” (289) Hopefully, writes Buchanan, it served as a wake-up call to install updates promptly.

The Hacker and the State covers several decades of cyber hacking operations. Based largely on secondary sources, it is perhaps a second draft of hacking history, but it nevertheless offers some valuable insights on the state of the hacking art, a practice, Buchanan suggests, that most policymakers do not understand. And he observes, “the harm that hackers can do is expanding faster than the deterrence or defenses against them.” (313) As a remedy he recommends a strategy of aggressive “persistent engagement” because “hacking makes a difference in geopolitics.

It is a sobering account that highlights the need for the Cyber Command and the potential vulnerabilities of the national intelligence agencies.
When Alexander Kouzminov, a former member of the SVR illegals Directorate S, wrote in 2005 that “The Western world can’t bring itself to believe to what extent it is transparent and vulnerable to Russian illegal intelligence,” (7) he received little attention in the media. But the FBI, CIA, MI6, and of course, the SVR knew he was spot on. In The Russians Among Us, BBC security correspondent Gordon Corera, tells their story.

As Corera explains it, the FBI, following routine monitoring procedures for Russian intelligence officers assigned to the United States, was able to recruit a source in 1999 who was serving in Directorate S. Gradually during the next 10 years, he revealed at least 10 Russian illegals living in the United States under false identities. The Bureau put them under surveillance and thus was born operation Ghost Stories. The CIA was involved when targets traveled overseas and when operations in Moscow concerning SVR officers became an issue. MI6 joined the program when some of the illegals became British citizens before coming to the United States.

“The illegals’ mission was to subvert America from within, infiltrating deep into its society and in doing so identifying and helping recruit people who could aid Moscow.” (66) Drawing on sources in Russia, England, and the United States, Corera establishes that Ghost Stories involved two generations of illegals, both of whom took their work seriously. The Russians Among Us discusses the officers in both categories to varying degrees as well as those who supported them.

The older, or traditional, generation is typified by Donald Heathfield (Andrey Bezrukov) and his wife, Ann Foley (Elena Vavilova). After finishing their SVR training they went to Canada, where they had two children while establishing cover. Ann joined a Catholic church, took computer courses and worked as an accountant. Donald ran “Diapers Direct,” a home diaper delivery business and attended York University. After nearly 10 years, including a detour in France, they moved to Boston—in their target country—where Donald attended Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. (66) Corera describes how they got their fictitious names, their professional and family lives in America, their contacts with their SVR handlers, and the FBI’s counterintelligence (CI) that documented their behavior without alerting them they were under suspicion.

Richard Murphy is another example of the traditional approach. It is also another good example of FBI CI diligence. Posing as an American with a Russian accent, he fooled everybody but his faculty adviser at the New School in New York City. That adviser happened to be Nikita Khrushchev’s great-grand daughter. She couldn’t understand how an Irishman with a Russian accent couldn’t speak Russian, but she took no action. No matter, in the end, Corera reveals how Murphy gave up his position of principal operator to his wife and how the Bureau acquired the keys to his covert communication system with the SVR and learned of his illegal status.

The second generation of illegals, the so-called “true name illegals,” are personified by Anna Chapman (Ana Kuschenko). (134) Such spies operated under different rules because security checks were tightened after 9/11. In addition, finding and using names of the dead in the era of easily searched digital databases and the use of biometrics in identity checks had increased the risks of using such false identities. Then too, true name illegals were cheaper to field and to maintain. In Chapman’s case, her business acumen combined with her seductive skills applied with sound tradecraft made her a potentially valuable officer. But her arrest came before she had time to prove herself.

The decision to arrest the illegals when they did, balanced several operational and political issues. Operationally, the SVR source wanted to defect and at least two illegals were planning a family trip to Russia. If the defection occurred while the illegals were gone, they would never be caught. On the political side, Russian president Medvedev was visiting Washington and the Obama administration did not want to embarrass him. Corera explains how CIA director Leon Panetta ‘coordinated’ with the SVR chief to arrange a spy swap that exchanged ten Russian illegals and four Russian prisoners—two former KGB officers, one GRU officer, and a Russian scientist. The latter was not a former agent but was included because he was wrongly convicted.

In explaining why they were selected for the swap, Corera summarizes the background and current status of each one. Thus, the comments on Sergei Skripal,
the former GRU officer and MI6 agent, includes his subsequent poisoning and that event is contrasted with the Litvinenko poisoning in London in 2006. Corera sees causal links to the Russian FSB and thus to Putin’s involvement.

As for the former KGB officers, Gennady Vasilenko and Alexander Zaporozhsky, both ran afoul of Alexander Zhomov an experienced FSB officer. Corera explains why CIA gave him the code name PROLOGUE when he became a player in their search for Aldrich Ames. Zhomov was also linked to the Robert Hanssen case when he arrested and tortured Gennady Vasilenko on suspicion of revealing the source that exposed Hanssen. And it was Zhomov, the CIA worried, who might detect the FBI source before he could defect.

The closing chapters of *The Russians Among Us* deal with the aftermath of Ghost Stories. In the United States and Britain, Corera suggests, there is increased concern with terrorism and cyber warfare. In Russia he reemphasizes the shift to true name illegals citing the Maria Butina case but doesn’t neglect cyber operations. Likewise, traditional illegals have not been forgotten, as Putin made clear at a “gala to celebrate ninety-five years of illegals . . . [and] directorate S a legendary unit.” Corera concludes “there is no reason to think that Moscow Center will give up on illegals that they have run for a century. At least while Vladimir Putin is in power.” (397)

*The Russians Among Us* is a fine espionage story and a cautionary tale that demands our attention.

**Historical**

*Kim Philby and James Angleton: Friends and Enemies in the Cold War*, by Michael Holzman (Chelmsford Press, 2019) 464, end of chapter notes, bibliography, appendix, index.

Independent scholar Michael Holzman has written two other books on Cambridge students recruited by Soviet intelligence in the 1930s and one on the late James Angleton, a career CIA counterintelligence of officer.a And while each one has included Kim Philby to some degree, this is the first time he is a principal character.

At the outset, Holzman notes that the usual questions raised about Philby are those about the cause he served: “How could this intelligent, civilized, charming man devote his life to the Moloch of Stalinist Russia?” As to Angleton, the question most often raised is, according to Holzman: How could such an intelligent charming man “destroy so many careers?” And indeed, these are the issues that have plagued many of the authors who have written about these men. But Holzman then adds a surprising comment: “Those are the wrong questions.” (18) He never explains why, but he supplies a hint when he states that their “biographical narratives . . . were for the most part created and kept in place by their enemies.” (12) Surely Yale historian Robin Winks, Oxford historian Hugh Trevor Roper, Harvard historian Timothy Naftali, author Graham Greene, former CIA officer William Hood, and current CIA historian David Robarge would challenge Holzman’s assessment, and readers should do so as well.

Perhaps a more germane question about this book is whether it contains anything new about two intelligence officers about whom so much has already been published? With one exception, the answer is no. Even Holzman’s methodology supports that conclusion. He sums up his approach as follows: “We must now gather the used bricks of discredited historical narratives, chip off the mortar of earlier interpretations, and attempt to assemble what remains in ways less predetermined by conflicting ideologies of the time.” (11) The use of “discredited historical narratives” in any way is not desirable and a review of the secondary sources cited makes clear that is what he has attempted. The exception is in the appendix, “Philby’s Articles in *The Observer* and *The Economist*, where Holzman provides lengthy comments on Philby’s writings from Beirut in the years before his defection. Although the articles have been alluded to, extracts and commentary about them have seldom appeared in print since they originally appeared.

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a. Michael Holzman, *James Jesus Angleton: The CIA and the Craft of CounterIntelligence*; Guy Burgess: *Revolutionary in an Old School Tie*; Donald and Melinda Maclean: *Idealism and Espionage*;
In the unsuccessful hunt for new material, a number of errors were discovered. Some examples follow. The first is the statement that Angleton and Philby “were friends for six years.” (12) Their service records suggest otherwise. Angleton was in London, assigned to X-2 (OSS counterintelligence) at the Ryder Street building, where Philby worked, for just under 14 months during WWII. Philby was assigned to Washington, DC, where Angleton was working, from the fall of 1949 to May 1951, or about 19 months. While Philby visited Angleton once while the latter was in Italy, the time they could have had regular contact was much less than six years.a A second error, linked to the first, occurs on page 16 where Holzman writes that in London Angleton “was tutored and for a time in effect supervised . . . by Philby. (16) A related comment that Philby, “having taught the art of counterintelligence to Angleton,” appears on page 382. No evidence has ever been produced that this protégé relationship existed, and Holzman does not source either comment. One of Angleton’s colleagues in London at the time, William Hood, stated their contact was occasional due to the seniority gap between the two.b Holzman adds “that it has been said by a recent observer that Philby was Angleton’s ‘uncle’ in counterintelligence matters”; but he doesn’t source that comment either. Then on page 270, Holzman writes that former Soviet agent Michael Straight was Philby’s “old Cambridge friend.” Straight always denied ever meeting Philby, and he entered Cambridge University more than a year after Philby left. Holzman does not produce a source that contradicts Straight.

On the matter of Philby’s students, the Michael Leonidovich Bogdanov mentioned in endnote 25, page 357, is not the Michael Bogdanov, KGB, that was a Philby student. Holzman does cites a source for this claim, but his source doesn’t mention the same Bogdanov that Holzman does. And finally, Angleton was not “chief of the counterintelligence staff until 1973” (359); he stayed until December 1974.

Kim Philby and James Angleton reviews previous opinions, many questionable; is poorly sourced; and contains too many errors.

Mapping The Great Game; Explorers, Spies and Maps in Nineteenth-Century Asia, by Riaz Dean (Casemate, 2019) 293, footnotes, bibliography, photos, maps, glossary, index.

In 1840, British army captain Arthur Conolly wrote to his colleague Major Henry Rawlinson, a newly appointed political/intelligence officer in India, that “You’ve a great game, a noble game, before you.” Years later after Conolly had lost his head in Bokhara trying, unsuccessfully to save another colleague from the same fate, Rudyard Kipling popularized the phrase in his novel Kim applying it to the “strategic rivalry between Russian and Britain” for territory in Asia. The Russians referred to the situation as the “tournament of shadows.” (3) And though some scholars take issue with that account of the term’s origins,c that is the context used in Mapping The Great Game.

The book is presented in four parts. Part one describes the early efforts of the British East India Company to determine whether Russia intended to invade India, and if it did what route would it take. As Lord Ellenborough, president of the Board of Control for India put it, “We ought to have Information. [emphasis in the original] The first, second, and third thing a government ought to always have is Information.” (35) In short before the question of a Russian approach could be answered, they needed maps. Author Riaz Dean discusses the work of various British officers dispatched to acquire the geographical knowledge needed before Britain invaded Afghanistan and launched that failed war.

Throughout the first half of the 19th century, as the events described in part one were taking place, two civilian explorers, William Lambton and George Everest, were conducting the Great Trigonometric Survey (GTS) of India. Dean tells their story in part two, explaining that while conducting their mapping survey “They were

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b. Phone conversation with William Hood and the author, May 9, 2004, 1030hrs.
expected to gather intelligence about the people they encountered and the rulers... noting important commercial and military details.” (70) But Dean concentrates on the mapping, which consumed the entire careers of the two men, without explaining why they did nothing to satisfy Ellenborough’s need for maps and information.

Part three follows chronologically and focuses on the British use of local inhabitants who could cross borders with impunity. Called pundits (local explorers) they also secretly gathered “information about foreign lands [and] in the eyes of... neighboring governments they were spies.” They were very successful in accomplishing both missions in countries like Tibet, China, and Russia, though the Russians suspected they had dual missions.

The final part of Mapping The Great Game covers Russia’s territorial acquisitions in the Turkestan region and the successful British attempts to secure its northern borders after the Second Afghan War. While Dean’s emphasis is on mapping, he leaves the reader with a good appreciation of how intelligence was collected and integrated in the days before formal military intelligence units or civilian organizations.


On October 9, 1924, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) received a cable from its station in Riga, Latvia, containing an English translation of a letter to the Central Committee of the British Communist Party (CPGB) from Grigori Zinoviev, the head of the Bolshevik Communist International (COMINTERN). It was accepted as genuine by important British players, who viewed it as a blatant inducement to revolution, military mutiny, and an exhortation to pressure Parliament to ratify an Anglo-Soviet trade treaty. When leaked to the press days before a general election, the government’s Tory opponents used it to show, among other things, that Labour “was in thrall to the ‘Reds’ in Moscow.” (4) Labour blamed ‘the Zinoviev Letter’ for their loss, setting a precedent that still resonates today. As recently as 2017, when then-Prime Minister Theresa May made accusations of foreign interference in a British election, it drew comparisons with the Zinoviev Letter incident.

This is the more remarkable since the authenticity of the letter has never been established after “early enquiries were contradictory and inconclusive.” The CPGB denied receiving it, Zinoviev denied writing it, no original in Russian has ever been found, and there is evidence to support the view that it was a forgery. Nevertheless, the controversy surrounding the letter surfaced “in successive general elections, in the context of atomic espionage, the treachery of the Cambridge spies... and even the Falklands War.” (5) British historian Gill Bennett examines these issues in The Zinoviev Letter.

Bennett was not the first to try and sort out the letter’s provenance. In fact, this is her second attempt. Her first was the consequence of parliamentary questions arising from the publication of a book by Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, *The Crown Jewels*, that contained a chapter on the Letter based in part on KGB files. Bennett was then chief historian of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and she was tasked to examine all the Zinoviev Letter files and make a definitive report. Her research showed that some 30 years before, Millicent Bagot, the MI5 Soviet specialist—and model for John le Carré’s Connie Sachs—had conducted a similar review. Then, in addition to numerous media accounts, Bennett found a weakly sourced book entitled *The Zinoviev Letter* that claimed Sidney Reilly—the “Ace of Spies”—convinced MI6 that the letter was genuine.

In *The Zinoviev Letter: The Conspiracy that Never Dies*, Bennett analyzes the “theories and allegations” associated with each of these sources and others recently published, for example, Keith Jeffery’s *MI6*. (225) In particular she goes over the arguments for forgery in great depth, noting that though Zinoviev denied writing it, “he said he

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would in principle have signed a draft of those terms if
presented to him.” (229) In general, she presents a much
broader and explicit picture of how the letter has affected
past events and suggests that, as a conspiracy theory, it is
unlikely to expire.

Gill Bennett is left with a historian’s frustration for not
finding a smoking gun. But she has given the reader a
most comprehensive scholarly and valuable treatment of
the subject to date.

Memoir

The Unexpected Spy: From the CIA to the FBI, My Secret Life Taking Down Some of the World’s Most Notorious
Terrorists, by Tracy Walder with Jessica Anya Blau (St. Martin’s Press, 2020) 249, no index.

Tracy Walder gave her resumé to the CIA recruiter at a
University of Southern California job fair in 1998. It was
almost a whimsical act, certainly it wasn’t planned. She
was 20 years old. In 2000 she entered on duty and for
nearly four years worked hard as an intelligence officer
in the United States and overseas. In 2004 she left CIA
and joined the FBI, where she remained for less than two
years before leaving to teach high school. She is cur-
cently on the board of Girl Security, a nonprofit company
that “explores girls’ understanding . . . of U.S. National
Security.”

Now Tracy Walder has written her memoir, The
Unexpected Spy, in which she makes “every effort to be
accurate and true in my recounting” with some cave-
ats. With a few exceptions, she has changed the names
and personal details of all FBI agents and CIA officers
mentioned as well as other people she has encountered.
Similarly, she has removed the names of most cities and
countries visited and made the nature of her work “de-
liberately vague.” (xi) With all those constraints, can her
story be of some interest, even benefit, to readers?

Indeed it can if you are looking for insights into a career
such as hers. Each chapter is a glimpse of some part of
her life though, not in chronological order. She begins
with the story of her interrogation of a terrorist, who after
“hours of seemingly casual conversation . . gave me ex-
actly the information that I had come for. And another pod
of terrorists were [sic] stopped before they could kill.” (14)

This is followed by a chapter on her early life in
California where she was born in 1978. After overcom-
ing hypotonia—poor muscle tone—she went on to grade
school, endured bullying from her female classmates
only to be selected as a “Homecoming princess.” Perhaps
because her father was a university professor, she was
always more interested in social issues and international
affairs. And when she was accepted at USC she joined
the Delta Gamma sorority, majored in history, and in her
junior year gave her resumé to the CIA recruiter.

After describing the CIA application experience, with
emphasis on the polygraph, Walder covers her early as-
signments at Headquarters, assignment that were influ-
cenced by 9/11. And she challenges the 9/11 Commission
conclusion suggesting that the “snafu between the
CIA and the FBI might be where the blame lies.” (44)
It was during that time, while on shift work, that she
met President G. W. Bush, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, Vice President Richard Cheney and
DCI George Tenet when they stopped by her section early
in the search for Usama bin Laden, then in the mountains
of Tora Bora. “It was clear to me,” she writes, “and to
everyone else. . . that an aerial bombing would be the best
way to flush al-Qaeda out of the caves.” (62) She was
disappointed when it wasn’t done.

Some four months after 9/11, Walder was accepted
as a “staff operations officer in the Weapons of Mass
Destruction office of the Counterterrorism Center.” (67)
After more training, Walder went on assignments in the
Middle East and Africa, then after the March 2004 terror-
ist attacks in Madrid, for which she felt some responsibil-
ity, (187) she decided to apply to the FBI, ostensibly to
limit her overseas travel, though one wonders if that can
be the entire story. Perhaps the details were obliterated in
one of the many portions of the text blacked out by the
classification reviewers.

Walder’s time in the FBI wasn’t quite what she had hoped. She was harassed during boot camp—they didn’t believe she had been in the CIA—and her subsequent assignment to Los Angeles was not in the counterintelligence field as she had hoped. She quit the FBI after 15 months and, still in her twenties, went to graduate school, married, and started a family. For a while she taught a high school girls class in spycraft whose aim was encourage them to enter government service.

The Unexpected Spy concludes with an unconvincing explanation of why Walder didn’t pursue her career in government—as if she herself is not sure why. (234–35) In any event, her memoir is atypical and hardly looks like a roadmap to a career in intelligence.

**Intelligence Abroad**

**ASSASSINS: The KGB's Poison Factory 10 Years On**, by Boris Volodarsky (Frontline Books, 2019) 322, footnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

In the preface to this follow-on to his first book on the KGB’s “Poison Factory,” author Boris Volodarsky provides superfluous autobiographical detail—as he did in his first book—before finally revealing himself as a former Soviet special operations officer and . . . a British intelligence historian and academic.” (2) ASSASSINS goes on to update the reader on cases covered in the first volume, while adding a number of new operations.

The updated cases include the poisoning of Nikolai Khokhlov, who survived, and Alexander Litvinenko who did not; the assassination attempt on Lenin; the assassination of Trotsky; and the story of Soviet assassin Bogdan Stashinsky. New cases include the loss of the “96 people on board Polish Air Force One,” Natalia Estemirova in Chechnya, Alexander Perepilichny, and Boris Berezovsky in England, Boris Nemtsov in Moscow, and Pavel Sheremet in Kiev, to name a few. Two attempted assassinations are also discussed. The best known is Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England. (2–3) Lesser known, but of at least equal importance, is the attempt on the life of Oleg Gordievsky, of which more below.

To understand the players involved, Volodarsky provides a review of the current Russian intelligence services. He begins with the well known SVR, the FSB, and “the genuinely elite foreign intelligence agency . . . the GRU.” (4) Then there is the Federal Protection Service, “a euphemism for bodyguarding the high and mighty,” and finally the less well known “very special agency,” the Presidential Security Service (SPB), headed by Victor Zolotov, president Putin’s personal bodyguard, “that can operate anywhere in the world.” (6)

Returning to the attempt on Gordievsky’s life, Volodarsky candidly acknowledges that Gordievsky accused him of the deed, (202) though he was never charged. No explanation is given in the narrative and in several places Volodarsky is complimentary of Gordievsky and his service to MI6. On the other hand, without providing substantiation, he challenges Gordievsky’s account of his escape from the Soviet Union. And that fact raises two other issues worth mentioning about ASSASSINS. The first is the weak documentation. With the exception of a few footnotes, this is a ‘trust me’ account. The second issue is more subtle; Volodarsky insinuates himself into nearly every case mentioned—including the Ghost Stories operation that had nothing to do with assassination—implying his firsthand word is enough. But for academics, scholars, and just the curious, it is not.

Volodarsky concludes that “assassinations have been an integral part of Soviet foreign policy from Lenin to Putin.” (240) And he makes it clear that he thinks Putin will implement that policy on former colleagues and intelligence officers who challenge him. But since Volodarsky has himself accused Putin, he leaves the reader wondering how he has escaped Putin’s wrath.

ASSASSINS makes a powerful case for the long-term history and continued survival of assassination as state policy in Russia.

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Memoirs are distinguished from autobiographies by specific focus on a topic, and that is what journalist Richard Norton-Taylor offers in *The State of Secrecy*. For most of his 50-year career he battled secrecy in various forms, including digressions into playwriting, as he attempted to “expose wrongdoing by agents of the state, and the growing power of security and intelligence agencies.” (xii)

He had an early brush with intelligence after graduating from Oxford with a third-class degree in history, when MI6 interviewed him. It is not clear whether he was offered a position, only that he did not pursue a career as an intelligence officer. But he hints at continuing contacts in succeeding years, as he “followed the secret world in a constant game of cat and mouse.” (xix) He describes many of them, while noting one former senior intelligence officer called him a “long term thorn in the side of the intelligence establishment.” He immediately adds, “I hope this book explains why.” (xix) In a sense his book does just that but perhaps not entirely in the favorable light he tries to create.

It is true he has had some fascinating assignments, for example his six weeks covering the Peter Wright trial in Australia, where Sir Robert Armstrong denied he lied by insisting he “was being economical with the truth.” (100) A real “gotcha moment.”

But most of the book taunts the intelligence establishment, its history, its current policies and secrecy, about which Norton-Taylor is bluntly forthright. For example: the government mandarins “can subvert their elected bosses . . . by deciding what to pass on to ministers and what to withhold;” (93) secrecy is imposed to cover up wrongdoing and prevent embarrassment; (128) official secrecy covers up what the government is up to now.” (141) And then there is the preferential access to material given certain authors, while it is denied to others and the many spy case files more than 30 years old are still withheld. (149)

And, without any experience of spying, Norton-Taylor devotes a chapter to critiquing spies and spy cases, for example the handling of the Cambridge Five. While arguing they were protected by class—except for Cairncross—and adding that Philby’s father “had been “a senior intelligence officer” (194)—he never was—his key point is that the associated secrecy undermined national security, though he offers few specifics.

The class factor also features in his account of the other spy cases he discusses. This includes George Blake, the Jewish immigrant MI6 officer and later Soviet agent, whom he interviewed in Moscow after Blake escaped Wormwoods Scrubs prison. The Michael Bettaney case—a former MI5 officer who tried to sell material to the KGB—and the Geoffrey Prime case—a formed GCHQ officer working with the KGB—are explained by “the neglect of senior managers in the security and intelligence agencies protected by a wall of secrecy.” Just how that occurred is not explained.

*The State of Secrecy* is also rather bitter about the Official Secrets Act of 1989, which “like its predecessors, is a political weapon designed to frighten officials and journalists.” (127) And these attitudes are not new, writes Norton-Taylor, they date to the year 1250. (117) To make his point, he includes a chapter on ‘Spies: The Uses and Abuses,’’ in which he summarizes the history of the principal intelligence agencies before concluding that “Far from needing the protection of an ever higher wall of secrecy, they should be subjected to more rigorous independent scrutiny, including by journalists.” (172) He returns to this point when discussing his role in publicizing the CIA rendition program and writes, “Scandals, wrongdoing and unlawful activities have been exposed not by Parliament but by a few whistle-blowers and journalists. (218, 235)

While Norton-Taylor’s litany of problems include some truths, only one solution to the problems of secrecy emerges from the pages of *The State of Secrecy*: give journalists unrestricted access to all information and let them make the decisions about what, if any, secrets should be kept. A conclusion better imagined than experienced.

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