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KAMEN: A Cold War Dangle Operation with an American Dimension

What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers

The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

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Soon after the coup d’État in February 1948 that brought the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) into power, the government granted the security services—civilian and military—unlimited freedom of action against any target, with no regard for the rule of law. The StB (Statni bezpecnost, the civilian state security apparatus) was especially cunning in adapting and combining the techniques of Nazi Germany’s Gestapo and the Soviet Union’s special services in the struggle against the StB’s primary targets: Americans and their Czech associates.

The StB embraced the view of its Soviet teachers that its mission was not merely to identify and neutralize existing opponents to the new order through routine investigative methods. Instead, the StB adopted a more proactive method: It created fictitious resistance organizations, dangled them as bait, and waited for potential new resisters—in addition to those already active—to be drawn to them.

Soviet special services introduced this approach to counterintelligence in postwar Eastern Europe with frightening success. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Wolnosci i Niezawislosci (WiN)—a Soviet and Polish Communist security (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa [UB]) joint operation—identified an underground organization, took it over, built it up, and used it to gain significant US, British, and Polish émigré support. They ran this fictitious scheme to discourage domestic resistance and to gain Western cash and intelligence technology. The ruse ended in December 1952, when the communists publicly declared themselves to be the creators and managers of WiN.¹

Smaller and less ambitious, but still lethal, dangle organizations were created in postwar Czechoslovakia. One such organization, SVETLANA, grew out of a plan to study public opinion in the country while it was still adapting to the Communist takeover. The StB soon realized that this could evolve into something bigger and more profitable. With the use of agent provocateurs, it merged its own fictitious underground organization with elements of the true anti-Communist resistance. The hybrid grew and spread with astonishing speed.

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¹ All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. © Igor Lukes.
Dangle organizations grew and spread with astonishing speed as StB agent provocateurs established full control over the genuine components of networks.

Many victims never realized they had fallen for an StB trick. Between 1949 and 1950, the service arrested close to 500 men and women who had joined SVETLANA. Some unfortunates had done so after a ceremony that included the signing of sworn anti-Communist declarations and distribution of SVETLANA membership cards, all under the watchful eyes of the undercover StB agents. A series of show-trials provided many opportunities to attack the West in general and the United States in particular as the alleged masters of SVETLANA. Although some of the defendants fervently believed they had “worked for the Americans,” the United States was never involved.²

In the end, there were 16 death sentences, more than 10 executions, several suicides, 20 life sentences, and close to 300 other prison sentences.³ To maintain operational cover, the StB had at least one of its own agent provocateurs executed, not an uncommon practice during that time.⁴ Antonin Slabik, SVETLANA’s putative “chief of staff,” was luckier and avoided that fate. He managed to emigrate under murky circumstances and died peacefully in Australian exile in 1981.⁵

WiN, SVETLANA, and other Eastern European variations on the same theme helped the Communist security services crush a significant segment of the opposition at the onset of the Cold War. The swift and deadly response by those services likely drove many potential resisters into resigned, passive acceptance of the new regime.

KAMEN: The United States as Bait

There were other operations of this kind, and some have remained largely unknown to this day. At least one directly involved the United States. Operation KAMEN (meaning “stone” or “border marker”) was one of the most cunning StB schemes. Launched only a few weeks after the February 1948 coup d’état in Czechoslovakia, KAMEN, like WiN and SVETLANA, was a copy of a stratagem that Stalin’s special services (in this case, the NKVD) had invented before WWII.

In the Soviet version, a provocateur would offer a person who feared arrest safe passage to freedom abroad. Guides posing as agents of a Western intelligence service would lead the victim to a location where the NKVD had created a false border post. Mistakenly thinking they were already safely outside Soviet territory, the would-be defectors spoke freely during “interviews” with undercover NKVD personnel, indicting themselves as well as family, friends, and whomever else had helped them along the way.

Soviet military counterintelligence also practiced this technique in postwar Germany, focusing mainly on Red Army soldiers. Some were eager to escape the Stalinist system, and Berlin, where one could cross from east to west with relative ease, was a magnet for such dreamers. Soviet agents posing as Westerners would deliver these would-be deserters to an apartment in East Berlin, where fake US Army personnel interviewed them. After a deserter had fully implicated himself and identified comrades with similar attitudes toward Soviet power, the illusion was burst, and the victim was brought to face an executioner.⁶

Organization. KAMEN followed this Soviet pattern with some local variations. Ultimate responsibility resided with the bosses of the StB (see table on right). Practical details of the kombinace, to use the contemporary terminology for a deceptive scheme, were in the hands of the personnel of Group BAa (internal state security), Sector I (Counter Intelligence), Referat 28 (directed against the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps [CIC], a generic term used for all US intelligence in the 1950s) and Referat 29 (its target was the US Embassy and Americans in Prague), and Sec-
Method of Operation. Typically, Joseph Janousek or Milena Markova of Department 3 (as an agent-provocateur) contacted a suspect government official, military officer, Czechoslovak employee of the US Embassy, or businessman, and claimed to have been sent by the CIC. The agent told the victim that, according to US sources, his downfall was imminent and offered safe passage across the Iron Curtain into the open arms of the United States. Waves of arrests had been directed against democrats, Catholic activists, intellectuals, military officers, and the property class, making the threat of arrest entirely credible.

Following painful decisions, individuals, couples, and families with small children, carrying only cash and jewelry, were escorted to the border area by StB agents posing as members of a resistance organization. They introduced the refugees to another StB agent, posing as a local smuggler or a bribed border guard official who then offered, for a fee, to take the refugees into the woods and across the German border. The victims were led, usually under cover of darkness, to a fictitious US Army post visible from afar at night. In reality, the building was well inside Czechoslovakia. (see map on next page) The post was guarded by StB agents posing as German border police and manned by StB agents wearing US Army uniforms. The difficult role of the US intelligence officer was frequently played by StB agent Amon Tomasoff ("Tony").

The final stages of KAMEN followed various scripts. Some victims were directed to take a copy of the protocol of their interview to a second American post, which they were to find unescorted. On the way, they were stopped by Czechoslovak border guards and placed under arrest. It was impossible for victims to deny their guilt, as they carried signed statements in which they boasted of their anti-Communist convictions and activities.

Given that the victims were moving at night through unfamiliar and dense woods, they tended to blame themselves for having lost their way and seldom realized that they had fallen for an StB provocation. Some firmly believed they had already been on German soil but were kidnapped by the border guards and taken back into Czechoslovakia.
The fake US Army officer occasionally chose a different ending. He told the applicants that their petitions for political asylum were denied and handed the victims over to the Czechs. The news that the US had turned down some applicants and forced them back into the arms of the StB trickled out of prisons and labor camps and had a desirable effect on the rest of the population. The message intended, and received, was that there was no escape, no hope, and that it was best to give up and submit to the Communist regime.

**Cases**

The first documented KAMEN case involved Jan and Jirina Prosvic. Jan an was a brilliant engineer, designer of household products, and a founder of the ETA Company, which produced irons, vacuum cleaners, and toasters. Prosvic was so committed to improving his products that he initially stayed on as a lowly employee after ETA had been nationalized by the Communist government. In addition, as parents of two daughters, Vera and Jana, the Prosvics had been unwilling to risk exile, although the authorities had started to harass them in early spring 1948: Prosvic was arrested, mistreated, and then suddenly released.

On 13 April 1948, only six weeks after the Communist takeover, Janousek approached the couple, introduced himself as “Johnny,” a CIC operative, and offered to arrange an escape. Mrs. Prosvic energeti-
cally turned down the offer and refused to discuss it. Even her husband was far from eager to risk crossing the border, living in a camp for refugees, and then starting anew abroad.

Janousek later testified that Prosvic had little desire to leave: "But since I knew I would earn a lot of money, I tried to talk them both into it." That first approach was followed by anonymous phone calls from supposedly well-meaning sympathizers who warned that another arrest was imminent. Then came a second visit by Janousek and more pressure. Mrs. Prosvic remained adamant: The family would stay at home. It took more anonymous calls and a third visit by Janousek to change the minds of these increasingly desperate people.

On 23 April 1948, the couple and their children met Janousek in the center of Prague. They drove together to Kdyne, a small town nearly 100 miles to the southwest. For a while they rested in the Hotel Modra Hvezda, located on a scenic square lined with old trees. At 10 p.m. Janousek introduced them to Stanislav Liska, the chief of the police station in Vseruby—a sad hamlet on the border. After Prosvic had paid a hefty fee of Kč 70,000 (other protocols mention the sum Kč 60,000), Liska left to make sure that the escape plan was in order.

At midnight, Liska returned to report that all was well. He drove the couple to Vseruby. They were stopped several times at roadblocks manned by security personnel, but Liska, wearing his uniform, "always knew what to say." The Prosvics were impressed. From the edge of Vseruby, Liska and the family continued on foot through Mysliva, a place so small that it no longer exists, and around a lake. Standing by a border marker, Liska pointed out a well-lit building in the distance: the supposed US Army post.

Tomasoff began by asking Prosvic about his connections with the anti-Communist underground, of which the engineer and businessman knew absolutely nothing. All other questions, such as "What do you think of Communism?" sounded politically illiterate to Prosvic. The interrogation continued: who knew about his escape, who helped him, what reliable friends could he recommend for the Americans to contact in Prague?

Prosvic did not like the questions and resented the interrogator's arrogant tone, and their conversation became tense. Nevertheless, he signed the protocol, as Tomasoff requested. But Prosvic was shattered to hear that his application for political asylum was denied. "We have no interest in Czech Communists," said Tomasoff. He drew his revolver and forced Prosvic into a car in which his frightened wife and daughters were already waiting. The family was without difficulty, and the fake German border guards invited them inside. There, a visibly nervous Tomasoff, wearing a US Army officer's uniform, offered the Prosvics a choice of Lucky Strikes or Camel cigarettes; he gave their daughters Swiss chocolate and allowed them to sleep in the waiting area. The office was decorated with a large US flag and portraits of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. A bottle of whiskey stood on the table.

In the only known photo of KAMEN in action, an agent in US Army uniform is shown interviewing a victim, a man named Jaroslav Hakr. A notation on the photo reads "Compromising photograph of Hakr with a CIC officer"—a pretender serving as "proof" of Hakr's disloyalty and as evidence for others considering flight that Hakr had been successfully led to safety. Photo courtesy of Archiv bezpečnostních služeb, ABS H-253.
speechless and could hardly believe it when the “Germans” drove them back to Vseruby, where they were handed over to Czechoslovak security officers. The Prosvics were interrogated and arrested, with the exception of the youngest daughter, who was too young to be processed by the judicial system.

The protocol, dated 24 April 1948, noted with satisfaction that “Prosvic carried with him lots of valuables, especially jewels.” Much of it disappeared into the pockets of Evzen Abrahamovic, Emil Orovan, and Tomasoff. But that was trivial compared with the property the Prosvic family had left behind. There was the “beautiful apartment,” to use the words of the StB, in Prague and a spectacular villa just outside the capital. Exquisitely furnished, both homes were filled with works of art. Even though the villa had belonged to Mrs. Prosvic, whom the court found innocent, the entirety of the Prosvic property was confiscated.13

Malac. Only five days after the Prosvic family had been sent back to Prague in handcuffs, the next victims of KAMEN, Oldrich and Ludmila Malac, were on their way.15 As an official of the Ministry of Interior, a democrat with contacts in the United States, and a security specialist, Malac was a prime target of the Communist regime.

During the war, Malac worked for Czechoslovak intelligence on behalf of the London-based government-in-exile.16 He was fired from the Ministry of Interior on 4 March 1948, an obvious prelude to more serious trouble. While Malac was contemplating his bleak future, J anousek came unannounced to see him in his apartment on Kamenicka Street in Prague.

J anousek introduced himself as “J johnny,” a courier of the CIC. He insisted that Malac’s arrest was imminent, which was true, and proposed to arrange for his and his wife’s escape to the US-occupied zone of Germany. Given the purge raging all around, Malac knew his life was in danger, and he and his wife agreed to leave. On 30 April 1948, J anousek took them along the same sorrowful path the Prosvics had treaded before. From Prague they traveled to the Modra Hvezda in Kdyne, where Mrs. Malac emotionally begged her husband not to proceed; it was a trap, she insisted. He replied that it was too late, whereupon his wife—according to J anousek—suffered a nervous breakdown.17

On 1 May 1948, the couple went with Liska to Vseruby and further to the fake US Army post. There the StB’s scheme began to unravel. Malac immediately noticed that the two StB agents pretending to be Germans spoke non-native German. Although Tomasoff interrogated Malac wearing a US uniform, he spoke the sort of English he had learned among sailors, which was not enough to fool Malac, a lawyer who had spent time in the United States during the war (1943–44). Moreover, Malac noticed that Tomasoff used a Czechoslovak-made typewriter with a keyboard that an English-speaking user would have found confusing. It became clear to Malac that he was surrounded by actors. He refused to cooperate and was arrested, together with his wife. She was treated gently by the still tentative Communist system of justice, but her husband was sentenced to 15 years of hard labor.18 Although the KAMEN personnel had failed to fool Malac, the StB had nonetheless reached its objective and destroyed an opponent.
Sterbova. Malac proved to be far too sophisticated and knowledgeable to find Tomasoff's performance credible, but others believed the KAMEN scheme until the end. Such was the case with two women, Mrs. Marie Sterbova and her daughter, Vlasta, who experienced the KAMEN ordeal in June 1950. Mrs. Sterbova later confessed to the StB: “Having crossed the state border we were guided by a German customs officer to a CIC office where I made a complete statement regarding my underground organization. Subsequently, I received a letter recommending me to the CIC in Selb.”

Mrs. Sterbova trusted the fictitious American officer so completely that she agreed to answer in her own hand his semi-literate and grotesquely misspelled “Guestionaire.” Having declared herself a sworn enemy of Communism and a member of an underground resistance cell that she had created on behalf of the CIC, she helpfully identified a soldier when asked to list “Persons not agreeing with the present regime and wishing to escape [sic] across the frontier.” Mrs. Sterbova also wrote a note to a relative, stating that she was “safe and under American protection in Germany” and urging him to join the anti-Communist resistance. “I hope you won’t let me down,” she added.

Vlasta filled in her own form, providing more names of current and potential members of the resistance.19 The two women were then escorted out by a fake German policeman, who indicated the direction they were to follow and turned back. “I don’t know how it happened,” Mrs. Sterbova recounted, “but the moment the German official left us, we were arrested by the Czech border guards, taken to Cheb and the same day we were back in Prague.” Both women were convinced they had been kidnapped from German territory. After intense interrogations, Mrs. Sterbova suffered a breakdown and died in prison in December 1951.20

Bozena. Some not only never reached safety but died en route, possibly in ill-fated attempts to escape after they realized they were being tricked. Such most likely was the case of Bozena, a “beguiling, vivacious, lovely blond girl of 20,” who caught the attention of the StB as a girlfriend of Walter Birge, an assistant to Ambassador Laurence A. Steinhardt at the US Embassy in Prague. In the summer of 1948, at the end of their last date, Bozena told Birge with an air of mystery: “Maybe next time we meet, it will be in the West.”

When she dropped out of existence, Birge anxiously investigated her disappearance among her friends. What he discovered was appalling. Bozena had received an offer from an unknown man to take her across the border. She trusted him so much that she invited seven friends to join her. Several days later, the whole group was found in the woods close to the border, mowed down by an automatic weapon.21

Military targets. KAMEN was frequently used against military officers. Major Josef Hnatek, a Czechoslovak Air Force officer who had served as a pilot with the Royal Air Force (RAF) and was a decorated veteran of the Battle of Britain, was dismissed from service shortly after the Communist coup. An StB agent approached him in May 1948 and offered to help him escape across the Iron Curtain. The police protocol puts it simply: “From the very beginning the escape was arranged and directed by the security organs (KAMEN).”

Hnatek also invited his brother and a friend. They traveled with a group of 11 others to Marienbad and then on to the Czechoslovak-German border. They were interrogated through the night. After they had completed the necessary forms, the phony American told them they were “unreliable for the West,” and they were handed over to Czechoslovak authorities. “The financial means obtained from the arrested men were applied to benefit Operation KAMEN,” states the protocol, without offering any further details. The military court sentenced Hnatek to death; this was changed on appeal to 16 years, and subsequently to 15 years, in prison.22
KAMEN claimed many other victims in the officer corps, especially among those who had distinguished themselves in the war against Germany. Air Marshal Karel Janousek, RAF, the highest-ranking Czechoslovak Air Force officer in Great Britain during the war, was lured into KAMEN shortly after the Communist takeover. He was sentenced first to 19 years and then to life in prison. Inevitably, KAMEN sowed seeds of mistrust among the officers and made it impossible for them or anybody else to distinguish between professional provocateurs and genuine operatives dispatched across the Iron Curtain by Western agencies.

In accordance with the harsh logic of Stalinism, KAMEN was eventually aimed at high-ranking Communists targeted in the purge, including, for instance, Vladimir Clementis, a life-long Communist who in 1948 replaced Jan Masaryk as foreign minister. On 28 January 1951, Clementis was snatched off the street in Prague and forced into a car. The StB crew introduced themselves as CIC agents who had come to rescue him from an imminent arrest and execution. He was put through the KAMEN routine, was brought back to Prague, formally arrested, tried and executed in the show trial centered around former CPC Secretary General Rudolf Slansky.

**Discovery**

The StB was understandably pleased by the productivity of KAMEN. Jindrich Vesely, chief of the StB in the late 1940s, testified before an internal commission in 1963: “I considered it then and still consider it now a clever, well thought out trick.”

The stratagem played out not only in Vseruby but also near Cheb, Marienbad, Domazlice, and other locations. But there were problems. Only a small fraction of the money and valuables confiscated from the would-be refugees was reported and placed in state coffers; the bulk disappeared into the pockets of those running KAMEN.

Even more shocking to StB inspectors was the discovery that the victims were sometimes chosen because they owned something desirable and not because they posed a threat to the regime.

About two weeks later, on 2 July 1948, there was another US protest. It stated that Czechoslovak security personnel had been seen moving about the border area in “American cars and wearing United States Army uniforms.” The embassy made it clear it had no intention of interfering with whatever methods Prague used to guard the borders, but it disapproved of the misuse of American uniforms and insignia.

Czechoslovak authorities rejected the protests with a sarcastic note of their own. They denied the existence of anything untoward in the Vseruby area and hinted that the Americans were being somewhat paranoic. Even the “most minute investigation in Vseruby has failed to find the smallest trace or suspicion of a misuse of American insignia or portraits of US statesmen. We maintain that the protest is based on a report of an unreliable informer.”

The American description of KAMEN was accurate, and Prague’s rejection of the US protest can be ignored as diplomatic persiflage. But how did the United States find out about KAMEN so quickly? This question can now be answered with complete certainty. The source was Stanislav Liska, the supposed escort to safety of the Provic family and more who would follow.

Liska was part of a network that gathered information for...
Cold War Deception

US Protest Note, 15 June 1948

For approximately four weeks, representatives of the Czechoslovak State Security Police (S.N.B.), dressed in full uniform with insignia of officers of the United States Army, have been conducting an office in a house on Czechoslovak territory in the western outskirts of the village of Vseruby. In the conduct of their business, these representatives are seated behind a desk on which there is conspicuously displayed a bottle of American whiskey, packages of American cigarettes and a small American flag. On the wall behind their desk is a large American flag and pictures of Presidents Truman and Roosevelt.

These S.N.B. representatives, dressed in uniforms of the United States Army, are assisted by other S.N.B. representatives who are dressed in uniforms of the German border police. According to factual evidence in the possession of the Government of the United States, the purpose of this office, as well as of the fraudulent misuse of the uniform of the Army of the United States and of the German border police, as well as the display of the American flag and pictures of the former and present presidents of the United States, is to supplement other measures taken by the Czechoslovak Government to prevent illegal departures from Czechoslovakia.

US Army intelligence from the winter of 1945 to the summer of 1948. The network was created by LtCol. Zoltan Józef Havas, US Army intelligence (MIS), stationed in Regensburg and Straubing in southern Germany. Liska had joined the police force in 1935 and became a decorated officer of its elite branch—the SOS (Straz obrany statu). Having served in the dangerous and often volatile prewar Sudetenland, Liska also acquired an admirable military record. He returned home and to his police work as soon as the Third Reich was defeated. In the winter of 1945, his chief, LtCol. Frantisek Havlick, invited Liska to join a US-run intelligence gathering network. Liska accepted the offer.

The network was initially productive, and Liska, one of the principal players, was the reason why the United States found out about KAMEN so quickly. He later testified that at the end of February or in early March 1948, Evzen Abrahamovic of the StB came to Vseruby, introduced himself as Dr. Evzen Breza, and told Liska, “You have been chosen...to run a certain operation in this area. You will take people across fake borders, we will arrange for a certain measure to take place, and interrogate them.” Abrahamovic then asked to be taken to Mysliva, where he made a detailed plan of the area, and then left for Prague. He did not know that Liska, whom he had just recruited to be one of the main actors in KAMEN, was a part of the US network.

Like other networks of its kind, this one eventually was wrapped up by the StB. Two men—Havlicek and Liska’s deputy at Vseruby, police officer Vadav Snajdr—were sentenced to death, and others were sent to dig uranium for many years.

Details contained in the US protest of KAMEN turned out to be Liska’s downfall. It was obvious that the description of the fake US Army post could have come only from someone who had been there. There had to be a rotten apple in the group that ran the operation in Vseruby, and that group was small. An internal investigation concluded that Liska was the traitor, and he was arrested on 10 December 1948.

The experienced policeman knew how to conduct himself in such circumstances. Despite harsh treatment and long interrogations by Abrahamovic, he was cleared of all suspicion and, after five months in prison, was released because of lack of evidence. When other people around him continued to be arrested, Liska decided not to test his luck any further, and he crossed the border to the US-occupied zone in Germany on 12 August 1949.

Liska found no respite west of the Iron Curtain, however. His life in the refugee camp in Ludwigsburg took a dramatic turn shortly after he arrived; he ran into Jan Prosic, his first victim in KAMEN. It turned out that after his arrest in Vseruby, Prosic was sentenced to a forced labor camp, but the enterprising engineer escaped, fled the country, and made his way to Ludwigsburg, where he ultimately had the pleasure of confronting the man who had deceived and ruined him and...
Cold War Deception

Operation KAMEN was a fiendishly clever scheme with real counterintelligence potential. However, the StB bosses failed to exploit it because they were focused on destroying the “class enemy.”

his family. Prosvic reported Liska to the US authorities as a Communist spy.

Liska was arrested by US Military Police and interrogated. In his defense he typed out a long statement, wherein he revealed his three years of work for US intelligence, his contribution to the unmasking of KAMEN, and his other activities on behalf of the democratic cause.38 The US authorities at the camp did not charge Liska with espionage on behalf of a Communist power, as they did in countless cases involving double agents, nor did they exclude him from consideration for a visa to another Western country. Instead, they accelerated his departure, most likely to Canada. This suggests that Liska’s description of his morally ambiguous role in the Cold War was accurate.

Closure and Aftermath

After Liska’s departure in August 1949, two other actors in KAMEN, the fake German border guards, crossed into the US-occupied zone in Germany. It would have been natural for the StB to discontinue the operation at this point, yet KAMEN continued until August 1951, when Radio Free Europe (RFE) warned against the deception.39 Focusing on Svaty Kriz on the Czechoslovak-German border, some 2 or 3 km from Cheb, RFE described the ersatz US Army post and the tragedy that played out there when three US Embassy employees—two young Czech women and a man—arrived for their interrogation by the supposed US Army officer. This was followed by a dramatic portrayal of the Prosvic case, narrated by several voices. The script concluded with a stern warning to “Dr. Evzen,” i.e., Abrahamovic, and to other top officers involved in KAMEN.

Like most such threats floating over the heavily fortified Iron Curtain on jammed radio waves, this one was without teeth. Tomasoff, the fake US Army officer, died in January 1953 of a brain tumor. But the other mastermind, Abrahamovic, was more fortunate. He was injured in the fall of 1949 in a mistaken shoot-out between two StB undercover teams in Prague. Each was independently seeking to arrest a foreign agent, and at least one StB officer was killed by friendly fire. Abrahamovic’s injury made it possible for him to weather the Stalinist purge while recovering at a spa.

Abrahamovic ultimately continued on to a long and happy life as a director of a large department store. He was still alive as of October 2010, at the age of 89, living in the Czech Republic. Until some two or three years ago, undisturbed by any of the geopolitical upheavals that beset his country after the Velvet Revolution of 1989, he could be seen lunching regularly at the same place as the notorious traitor Karel Köcher.

Tomasoff’s boss, Evzen Orovan, became the head receptionist and StB rezident (code name OTA) in the Alcron Hotel, now the Radisson Blu, in Prague. He assisted in all the operations the StB ran against westerners in the Alcron. His StB employers viewed him as completely reliable until 2 July 1969, when he suddenly left for Israel with his third wife. They traveled with valid passports and exit permits but never returned.40

Operation KAMEN was a fiendishly clever scheme with real counterintelligence potential. However, the StB bosses failed to exploit it because they were focused on destroying the “class enemy” and not on gathering intelligence and learning the truth about US activities in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, their victims could reveal little, and while KAMEN did serve the interests of the StB and its CPC bosses by heightening distrust and insecurity among democrats, its real impact was the destruction of the lives of innocent victims and the corrupt enrichment of Communist thugs.

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Endnotes


2. National Archives and Records Administration, NARA, College Park, MD. Laurence Steinhardt, US Embassy, Prague, to the Secretary of State, Washington, 30 April 1948, 860F.00/4-3048. The embassy strictly followed Ambassador Steinhardt’s view that once the police state had been formed in February 1948, all armed resistance became futile and counterproductive.


7. AMI, H 796. The most comprehensive description of Operation KAMEN comes from the pen of one of its main protagonists, SNB (Police) Sergeant Stanislav Liska, Ludwigsburg Camp, no date. See also “Akce KAMENY,” UDV, Prague, 10 May 1996. Milena Markova was blackmailed into employment with the StB in 1947 on the basis of her less than honorable behavior during the Nazi occupation. Having successfully used her several times, the StB decided she had become a liability and arrested her in 1949. Having been held incommunicado in a solitary cell without any explanation, Markova hanged herself.

8. Amon Tomasoff (1922–1953) left Czechoslovakia in 1937 and entered the United States. In October 1944 he walked into the Soviet Consulate General in New York City and was received by Anatolii Yakovlev; he offered his services as a spy. After a severe lecture never again to come near the consulate, Tomasoff was introduced to an NKVD officer who called himself Alex. The Russian became particularly attentive when Tomasoff told him he was in the United States Merchant Marine and knew of fellow sailors who had smuggled Trotskyite literature to Soviet personnel during trips to Murmansk. Tomasoff and Alex worked together in the United States, observing strict tradecraft rules until the end of August 1945, when Tomasoff returned to Czechoslovakia. In Prague, Tomasoff contacted security specialists in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CPC) who directed him to join the CPC intelligence apparatus, ZOB. Having lived in Great Britain, Canada, United States, and South America, Tomasoff claimed to speak Russian, Polish, Hungarian, German, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Hebrew, Yiddish, Danish, Norwegian, Hindi, and Latin. I am grateful to Colonel Adolf Razek of UDV, Prague, for documents on Tomasoff. The most comprehensive treatment of this figure is in Prokop Tomek, “Amon Tomasoff,” Securitas Imperii 12 (2005): 5–28.

9. AMI, 319-38-6, AMI 13065, and AMI 4219.


12. AMI, 4219.


14. Ibid.

15. AMI, 319-22-6.


20. Frolik, 141–42.

21. Walter Birge, Mémoirs, 253–54. This is an unpublished manuscript. I am grateful to Mr. and Mrs. Birge for giving me a copy.


Endnotes (cont.)


29. AMI, sector II Ab to sector III Aa, 24 June 1948, Jiri Wehle, chief of III/Ab; and AMI, sector III Aa to sector III Ab, “Reply to the American Protest Note.”

30. AMI, 44516, Record of Interrogation of Emil Sztwiertnia, 14 April 1950, and Reports from Germany, 3 May 1950.

31. AMI, 596973, “Causa Zoltan Josep Havas.” Born in 1920 in Czechoslovakia, Havas moved to the United States in 1937 on Columbus Day and became a US Army intelligence officer. He was discharged as a Lieutenant Colonel. Using police chief Frantisek Havlicek (code-named Sumava) as his point man, Havas (he signed his notes as “Zofka”) created an intelligence network that involved mainly policemen serving along the border. Havas later worked for the New York Times in Paris. He returned to Prague as a journalist on various occasions in the 1960s and was always closely followed by the StB.


33. AMI, 319-38-6. In light of the fact that both Havlicek and Liska were part of a US Intelligence network, it is ironic to read the former’s evaluation of his subordinate. Havlicek found Liska’s station in Vseruby to be in “excellent” condition. He admired Liska’s “considerable achievements, especially in the field of special measures in the border area…” The evaluation also stressed Liska’s active membership in the CPC.

34. AMI, H 796, Stanislav Liska, “False Border,” Ludwigsburg.

35. Ibid. According to Liska’s testimony, Vadav Sna jdr played one of the German guards.

36. Ibid.

37. AMI, A8-1355.


39. OSA, Budapest, 300-30-31/box 18. The program was broadcast on 31 August 1951.

40. AMI, 638585.

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In the First Person

What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers

Martin Petersen

Martin Petersen is a retired senior CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI) officer and the author of a number of articles on intelligence and intelligence analysis. In late 2009 he was asked by then–director of intelligence Michael Morell to create a course for managers on reviewing analytic products and teaching tradecraft, which became the Art of Review Seminar. This article is adapted from remarks delivered to DI managers in September 2010.

An advantage of getting older is increased perspective. I have been doing, thinking and writing about intelligence and intelligence analysis for almost 40 years now. The business we are in has changed a great deal in that time, but more in its form than in its fundamentals.

I want to focus on three broad topics: understanding the customer, the importance of a service mentality, and the six things I learned in doing and studying intelligence analysis during my career in the DI. While these experiences are drawn from work in the CIA, I believe the principles apply across the Intelligence Community (IC).

Understanding the Consumer: Five Fundamental Truths

I believe every intelligence product must be rooted in a strong understanding of the audience it is written for, and I believe there are five fundamental truths about the analytical products and their consumers.

**Truth number one: the product is “optional equipment” for many key consumers.**

The most precious commodity in Washington is not information—there is an overabundance of information, data, opinion, and secrets—but time. The “future” in Washington is four years at its longest point and every day it is one day shorter. It is not surprising then that consumers of our services are in a hurry and that they are very busy people; the president’s day is actually planned in five minute increments. These people have many, many sources of information, and many of the people we...
Lessons in Serving Policymakers

serve believe they are better plugged into the world than we are. And in many cases, they are.

Our customers in the policymaking realm often do not understand our mission, our values, or our standards. They tend to be skeptical of intelligence, especially if they are new to the policymaking world. They formed their views about who we are, what we do, and how we do it from the same sources other Americans do: popular media, the press, and congressional reports—not always the most accurate or sophisticated of sources and generally not the most flattering. Our consumers have strong world views and clear policy agendas, and they often assume we have a policy agenda, too.

It is not surprising then that policymakers do not always see how we can help them: “After all, I, the policymaker, am smart and have excellent sources of information (including all the ones you have), and I am very busy, so why should I spend some of my most precious commodity on you?” The reality for intelligence officers is that we must woo them, sell them on the need for our services, and demonstrate the value of our material daily through its timeliness and its sophistication. If you are an intelligence officer, the title will often get you in the door, especially the first time, but it will not keep you there. Newcomers to the IC may not realize that the CIA presence in the Oval Office during the George W. Bush administration was the exception, not the rule.

If the IC is going to be part of the regular routine in the White House, not only must we have something to say that people there cannot get somewhere else—which has to be more than having secrets—but we have to be mindful of how we deliver it. We are not only optional equipment; we are also guests at their dinner party. If we spill the wine, insult the host, and overstay our welcome, we will not be invited back.

Speaking truth to power first requires access to power. My personal experience is that our consumers will take frequent bad news and unhappy assessments as long as they are well-reasoned, supported by data and argument, and presented without rancor, value judgments, or arrogance.

**Truth number two: the written product is forever.**

A colleague who spent half his career in the DI and half in the National Clandestine Service (NCS) once said only half jokingly, “You know what the DI’s problem is? You guys write things down. In the NCS we believe in the oral tradition.” He was right in the sense that the written word is forever. Once it is printed, there is no taking it back or modifying it.

Briefings and background notes are important parts of doing the mission, but they leave no permanent record. One can fight over what was said in a briefing, but the written word is in black and white. It is the World Intelligence Review (WIRE) article, the serial flyer, the intelligence assessment, and the national intelligence estimate (NIE) that end up in the archives, and it is the paper product that gets held up at a congressional hearing or eviscerated on an editorial page.

And when I say forever, I mean forever. Relatively few people have read the now infamous NIE done in 2002 on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but everyone knows what it says. And everyone years and years from now will know what it said, because it is viewed—rightly or wrongly—as fatally flawed and responsible for the second Iraq war. It will never go away, and it joins the pantheon of other real and imagined CIA failures. Every time we publish, we go “on the record” and the record is there forever, for the second guessers, the hindsight experts, and anyone with an agenda. Thus, our judgments need to be as precise as we can make them, supported by evidence and argument, and accurately reflect our level of confidence every time.
Truth number three: the public does not segregate success and failure.

Critics of intelligence, our customers, and the general public do not say that the products of a certain office in CIA or DIA are really great, but that the products of another office in that agency are awful. Nor do they say that one type of analysis, say political, can be trusted, but that our work on something else, say S&T is unreliable. Nor will they say that although they were wrong last time, we can trust them this time.

No, customers remember, and they question. Sometimes they question fairly, but often they do not, especially those customers who find what is being said to be inconvenient or “unhelpful” in advancing a policy position they favor. From the CIA alone, I can produce a list of what I call “everybody knows”: everybody “knows” the CIA failed to predict the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 or the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 or the Indian nuclear test in 1998 or this or that. The facts are often far more complex, but they have entered the popular mythology. And the consumers of intelligence say out loud “Why should I trust you on this issue when you were wrong on that one?” Weak performance in one DI area immediately calls into question all work in the CIA.

President Kennedy famously said of the CIA that its successes will be secret and its failures will be trumpeted. To which I add my own corollary: in the intelligence business success is transitory, and failure is permanent.

Truth four (closely related to truth three): our individual and collective credibility—and thus our ability to do the mission—rides on every piece of finished intelligence that goes out the door.

Sad to say, no one cares what I think about a particular issue—and no one cares what you personally think either. They do care tremendously about what the CIA or DIA—or name the IC organization—thinks. The finished intelligence products that go out the door are not personal products but corporate ones.

IC products have brand names, and they are important and powerful ones. They can open doors, but they will not keep any analyst inside circles of power if that brand name is devalued by shoddy work. Our customers read our products for many reasons: to learn, to make better decisions, to know what the President’s Daily Briefing tells the president, to look for ammunition in a policy fight, or to discredit what the IC says.

Every poorly-reasoned piece of finished intelligence tarnishes a brand name a bit and over time can produce cracks in the trust they place in us to live up to our tradecraft. When that happens there is nothing one can say and eventually the broader trust is lost. Ask BP and Toyota. One bad oil well and a few sticky accelerators undid years of excellent performance, and shouting “but our record is still better than that of [someone else]” makes no difference. We do not drill oil wells or build cars. We do the mission—the mission of protecting the United States. Our ability to “raise the level of the debate” or to “help policymakers make the best decisions possible” or to “speak truth to power”—however one defines the mission—rests on one thing and one thing only: our reputations for analytic rigor, objectivity, and total integrity. Lose that and we lose everything.

Truth five: our customers are smarter and more sophisticated than we give them credit for; they have their own independent sources of information and analysis with which we are competing.

And these customers are continually changing. We have to establish our credibility and usefulness individual by individual, administration by administration. There is no down time when it comes to quality.
These five truths demand tradecraft excellence, they demand exacting standards. (see the DI Quality Framework above for an example), and they demand the pursuit of perfection. They demand that we learn from our past, and they demand that we ask the best of ourselves every time. To do the mission; to serve the policy-maker; to protect the nation—requires nothing less.

The Importance of a Service Mentality

Excellence requires more than a standard of quality. I believe it also demands a specific approach to the craft of intelligence analysis: it requires a service mentality. A service mentality is the opposite of a product mentality, which often seems to drive the work of intelligence analysis, and the difference is easiest to explain by comparing the two. In a product mentality, the focus is on the producer, who thinks of a product as his or hers. It is also about packaging that product and disseminating it widely. Success is measured in numbers—how many units were produced or how many received each unit. It is about filling a book or producing a product to demonstrate that an analyst is ready for the next big step in a career.

In a service mentality, the focus is on the customer—the consumer of our services—and specifically on how best to meet the customer’s needs. It is not about the author or the producing component; it is about the recipient. It is about helping that customer understand an issue. It is about being timely, relevant, expert, and corporate in our approaches to providing service, intelligence analysis. Success is measured not by the number of units produced, but by how well the product addresses and answers the specific concerns of an identified and targeted audience.
Product and service are not mutually exclusive. Ideally every product we produce should be infused with a service mentality—although we often act like we are in the product business. What difference does it make? When the product is more important than the service it provides, we relax our standards to get the product—another unit of production—off the assembly line and out the door. Close enough becomes good enough, and the brand name suffers.

To infuse every product with a service mentality requires two things of intelligence analysts: One is a set of standards—the DI Quality Framework in CIA's case; the other is mastery of a simple technique—asking two questions before writing or briefing: who is the primary audience for this piece and what is the specific intelligence question they need help with?

It is very hard for the author of a piece to have a service mentality when he or she is focused on a broad intelligence topic rather than a specific intelligence question. It is the difference between “we need a piece on the demonstrations in Tunisia” and “we need a piece on the options the Tunisian government has for addressing the cause of the demonstrations.” A good intelligence question has the following properties: it bounds or narrows the subject matter to be addressed; it generally contains a what, who, why, or where is it going element; it is specific as to the topic or event being addressed; and it is a question and generally not a “yes or no” question.

It is possible to have many different intelligence questions for the same event. Current intelligence pieces generally work best when they are organized around one central question, although they may touch on others. Which question to focus on is determined by who is selected as the primary audience and what that audience is most interested in or most needs to understand.

Forty years of experience have taught me that failing to identify a specific audience and an intelligence question up front is often at the root of the weakest analytic efforts. In the Art of Review Seminar we talk about “The Road to Ruin,” the first step on which is not clearly defining the issue to be addressed. This in turn easily leads to other, too common, failings in analytical writing:

A failure to present a clear basis for judgments.

A weak piece typically speculates on what happens next but seldom provides the reason an analyst believes the speculation is correct. The most underused word in CIA DI analysis is “because.” Every “may” and “likely to” and “could” requires a “because” statement or its equivalent—the reason we believe what we believe. Absent the “because,” or its equivalent, that article is just another opinion in a town full of opinions.

The use of imprecise language.

It is not so much that language in a work of analysis is opaque but that the point it is trying to make does not come through. It is stating that “X benefits from Y” without providing a standard by which to measure the benefit or spelling out precisely how and why X benefits. Words like “limits,” “benefits,” “suggests,” and all adverbs need a “because” or “why” or “how” to convey precise meaning. Internal inconsistencies, not surprisingly, are often rooted in imprecise language.

The Six Things I Learned

We all learn the craft of intelligence analysis by doing. The lessons are iterative and frequently opaque, and they generally come slowly. Often they are only clear in looking back. Now looking back over nearly 40 years, I think I have learned the following six things.

First, how one thinks about the mission affects deeply how one does the mission.

I think the intelligence analyst’s mission is less about “connecting the dots” (although sometimes it is) or predicting the future (although sometimes it is) or speaking truth to power (although
we often do) than it is about understanding the world. Dots and prediction and truth can cause us to narrow our focus in a world of intelligence challenges that are characterized by their complexity and most important, by their dynamic nature. In 40 years I learned that quite often the most important piece of the puzzle, and often the hardest one to get a handle on, is what the United States is doing in a given situation—or, in military intelligence terms, understanding the “Blue” component of a situation.

I always thought of my job as “bounding uncertainty” and by doing so helping make my guy smarter than their guy, whether it was across a conference table or across a battlefield and enabling our policymakers to make the best decisions possible given the time and information available. Sometimes that involved connecting dots or predicting courses of action or providing warning, but it always meant understanding the forces at work in any situation—the key variables and drivers and our adversary’s perspective. It is the difference between strategic understanding and tactical command of an issue.

Second, intelligence failures come from failing to step back to think about underlying trends, forces, and assumptions—not from failing to connect dots or to predict the future.

When our focus becomes too tactical we fail to see the strategic. We must learn to step back from time to time and ask ourselves: what are we not seeing that we would expect to see if our line of analysis were correct. The IC’s 24-hour production cycle often makes this hard to do, but because it is hard to do, it is essential that we do it.

An understanding of history and culture is key to coming to grips with the assumptions that underpin much of our analysis. And I am not talking about our history and culture, but the history and culture of the countries we work on as the people and leaders of those countries understand them. Every analyst—regardless of discipline or role—needs a deep appreciation of how a people see themselves, their historical ambitions, and their grievances. For analysts focused on foreign leaders, or politics, or economics, it is essential that they understand how power is acquired, the preferred way of exercising power, and the acceptable and unacceptable uses of power, as well as the defining life experiences of the key actors in the countries they specialize in.

Third, good analysis makes the complex comprehensible, which is not the same as simple.

The key to making the complex comprehensible is having in mind a specific audience and a very precise intelligence question for the analysis to tackle. Data dumps and murky analysis almost always are rooted in trying to write about a development without first asking, “Who is my audience and what specific question does it need answered?” It is that difference between “we need a piece on the rioting in Athens” and “we need a piece on the government’s options for addressing the underlying cause of the rioting.”

We do very well as a rule in responding to questions from policymakers. We come up short when we have to supply the audience and the question ourselves and we start to write before we have done all the thinking. If we think in terms of answering well defined questions, we can make complex situations comprehensible, and we also stand a better chance of making clear what we know and do know accurately, conveying our level of confidence, and presenting a convincing basis for our judgments.

Fourth, there is no substitute for knowing what one is talking about, which is not the same as knowing the facts.

Former CIA Director Michael Hayden once famously said, “If it is a fact, it ain’t intelligence.” The business of intelligence analysts is more about putting facts in perspective than it is hav-
ing command of the facts. We are paid not for what we know, but for our ability to think about what we know—or think we know. It is about knowing what is important. It gets back to those assumptions, drivers and variables I dwell on.

Sources—clandestine, open source, technical, diplomatic, etc.—are not the same as knowledge. Sources are not the equivalent of, or a substitute for, expertise, the type of knowledge I talked about in the second thing I learned. All sources are best thought of as opinions, some more authoritative than others, but all should be subject to careful reflection and comparison to what we know and believe. The dangers in sources are three-fold:

- We tend to give greater credence to those that support what we already believe.
- Sources are not a scientific sample but a small slice of a much larger and more complex information picture.
- They never answer the critical question of what are we not seeing but should see if our analysis were correct.

During one of the most challenging times in my analytical career, I worked for the finest analyst I ever knew. In the middle of the Tiananmen Crisis in 1989—when everyone's hair was on fire—I found him late one afternoon going through a stack of musty old reports. I asked him what he was doing. He said, "I am looking for things that did not make sense then, but do now." He found some, and it profoundly affected our line of analysis.

Fifth, intelligence analysis starts when we stop reporting on events and start explaining them.

Our production cycle puts a premium on being agile, quick, and smart. It is often 24 hours or less. The DI is one place where a consumer can ask a question and get an answer—a thoughtful and considered one—overnight. It is one of the DI’s greatest strengths. It is also one of its great vulnerabilities. It makes it harder to step back and think about underlying causes, drivers, and variables, especially in a crisis situation. My Tiananmen story is the exception. My career as an analyst taught me that lesson one (how we think about the mission) and lesson two (understanding forces at work) are the key to operationalizing lesson five—the need to explain events.

Sixth, managers of intelligence analysts get the behavior they reward, so they had better know what they are rewarding.

This is a message for all managers and all who aspire to management. It is my experience that if you have clear standards and are seen as consistent and fair in applying them, your unit will live up to the standard. And, you must also hold yourself to the same standards. If you value analytic trade-craft, talk about it and practice it. If you want open communication where different interpretations are considered, invite it. If you want honesty, be honest. And reward the behavior you profess to value.

There is a Chinese proverb: "If your vision extends one year, grow wheat; if it extends 10 years, plant trees; if it extends 10,000 years, grow and develop men." Managers, your job is to grow men and women who can do the mission. The standard of success, I believe, is uncompromisingly simple: "Did I leave the unit I led stronger than I found it?"

Why It All Matters

If there is an underlying reality to all that I have learned, it is the obvious: we are in a very difficult business. It is more life and death now than it was in my heyday. The consequences of getting analysis wrong are much greater now. Intelligence is also more "political" now in the sense that what is done today is more open than it has ever been and as a result more subject to partisan sniping.
There are some who say the United States is a declining power or that it is the source of many of the world’s problems. Time will tell on the first question, but I believe the United States is a force for good in the world, and how powerful a force depends as much on our knowledge as on our military and economic might. I tell intelligence analysts I teach that more often than not they are the source of that knowledge. It is their professionalism and tradecraft that provide checks on the system, light the way, and leverage US power. All the dollars spent on intelligence—the collectors in the field, the technical systems, and the lives at risk—are for naught, unless that knowledge comes together in what analysts do every day.

As the deputy executive director at the CIA, I addressed each class of just-promoted CIA Senior Intelligence Service officers, and each time I asked for a show of hands of those who believed they would never see WMD used on US soil in their lifetimes. The question always startled them, and I never saw a single hand raised. We cannot afford to accept anything less than the pursuit of perfection. We cannot accept anything less than holding ourselves to the highest standards. We cannot accept anything less than our best effort every time, every day. The potential consequences are too great.

And I know it is damn hard. Intelligence analysis is less fun than a policy rotation or an overseas assignment. It is less honored and romanticized than other aspects of the Great Game. It is frustrating. It is exhausting. And even the best efforts will be picked at. The analyst’s work will be criticized by the knowledgeable and the ignorant alike. It will even be demonized at times—indeed, independent of its quality—and it will always be hostage to the politics of the moment.

But—and I say this with my four decades of perspective—what intelligence analysts do has impact. It matters. I have seen the quiet victories of intelligence and the mistakes averted, and I have seen critics become advocates because of what analysts do every day.

What intelligence analysts do matters. I have seen the quiet victories…mistakes averted…and critics become advocates.

We all chose careers in intelligence for the same reason: to make a difference, to do the mission. The colleague who teaches the Kent School’s Art of Review Seminar with me tells a story about Abraham Lincoln, who in one of the darkest hours of the Civil War attended a Sunday service in that little church that still stands across from the White House. On his way back, he was asked by a fellow parishioner what he thought of the young reverend. Lincoln replied that he had a strong voice and clear message, but that he failed to do one thing; he failed to ask us to do something great.

I am asking every analyst who reads this to do something great. Do what brought you here. Do the mission every day to the best of your ability. And, may God bless you for doing it.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

The Dreyfus Affair: Enduring CI Lessons


For the Soul of France: Culture Wars in the Age of Dreyfus, by Frederick Brown. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), xxv + 304 pp., notes, index.


John Ehrman

Officers new to counterintelligence (CI) and overwhelmed by the scope of what they need to learn often ask the same question: “Where do I start?” The best place might be the Dreyfus affair. The tale of French Army Captain Alfred Dreyfus, his wrongful conviction for treason, and how the argument about his guilt plunged France into turmoil is as dramatic and riveting as any true story can be. Just as important, it took place at the dawn of the modern intelligence era, when governments were forming the permanent, professional intelligence services that we know today. Its timing made the affair not only the first modern CI case but also the first modern CI disaster—that is, not just an investigative and legal error, but one that spilled over from the intelligence world into the sphere of mass politics, with consequences for culture and society as well.

Is there anything new to be learned about the Dreyfus affair? More than 115 years have passed since Dreyfus was convicted of treason, and it has been more than a century since he was exonerated. With the facts of the case long settled, the archives thoroughly mined, and hundreds of books and articles published, it would seem unlikely that there is much left to be discovered or said. As the appearance of three new books within a year indicates, however, scholars still can find new ways to look at the affair and draw fresh insights from it.

Editor’s Note: Readers familiar with the events are welcome to jump to the reviews of the three new works on the subject, beginning on page 26, at “The Irresistible Topic.” Those new to or only slightly familiar with the case will want to read on to make the reviews more meaningful.

An Apparent Success

The Dreyfus affair began, ironically, as an outstanding CI success. After the disaster of the Franco-Prussian War and collapse of the Second Empire in 1870, France began to develop a modern military intelligence system and, during the 1880s, added a substantial CI capability, housed in a unit of the General Staff called the Statistical Section. Commanded by Col. Jean Sandherr, the Statistical Section caught several spies in the army during the late 1880s, ran numerous double agents, and built extensive surveillance networks to watch the movements of foreign—and especially German—diplomats in Paris. One of the section’s most valuable recruits was Madame Marie Bastian, a cleaning woman who worked in the German Embassy and the apartments of German diplomats. The Germans routinely tore up sensitive documents and dropped the scraps into their wastebaskets, which Mme. Bastian dutifully emptied. Starting in 1889, she began delivering the contents of the embassy’s
wastebaskets to officers of the Statistical Section. Much of what she handed over was ordinary trash, but the French frequently reassembled and translated important documents.¹

One of Mme. Bastian’s deliveries, in September 1894, contained a torn-up note in French that, when pieced together by the Statistical Section, proved to be a list of French military secrets someone had given to the German military attaché. An investigation started immediately, and suspicion soon fell on Capt. Alfred Dreyfus, a 35 year-old Jewish artillery officer from a wealthy family in the lost province of Alsace, then serving on the General Staff. The investigators quickly concluded that the handwriting on the note, known as the bordereau, belonged to Dreyfus, and he was arrested on 15 October and charged with treason.

Dreyfus was court-martialed and convicted in December, and sentenced to life in prison. On 5 January 1895 in the courtyard of the École Militaire, Dreyfus was publicly degraded—his badges of rank and decorations stripped, and his sword broken over the knee of a sergeant—and sent to Devil’s Island, a hellish rock off the coast of French Guiana. Frenchmen of all political persuasions expressed their relief that the traitor had been caught and given an appropriately harsh sentence. Except for Dreyfus’s brother, Mathieu, wife, Lucie, and lawyer, Edgar Demange, all France ignored the captain’s claim of innocence and seemed content to forget about him.²

France’s problems extended to the economic and demographic spheres. The Industrial Revolution was late coming to France and, through the end of the 19th century, French economic growth lagged behind those of other major European states. Its population remained more rural, its industries were less capital-intensive, and its productivity growth was lower than Britain’s or Germany’s—Europe’s economic and technological powerhouse—and overall growth in the 1880s and 1890s was low enough that economic his-


Historians have talked of France's stagnation during the period. Comparisons with Germany, of course, were critical to the French. Even as they talked bravely of the inevitability of another war and gaining revenge for the humiliation of 1870, Frenchmen knew that their country was falling behind in the vital indexes of national power.\(^a\)

By far the ugliest manifestation of France's nervousness, however, was the wave of anti-Semitism that had been spreading across the country since the late 1880s. It started in 1886, when a racist journalist named Édouard Dru-mont published *La France Juive*, a book that blamed all of France's troubles on Jews. Dru-mont and others, using the new media of mass newspapers and inexpensive books, found a nationwide audience for a message built on the ancient theme that Jews were treacherous outsiders. Conservative Catholics, blaming Jews for the republic's anticlericalism and accusing them of conspiring against Christianity, and socialists, who held Jews responsible for the evils of capitalism, also took up the cause. Although anti-Semitism had peaked and was in decline as a political movement by 1894, in large part because it lacked a coherent program and strong leadership, it still remained, as one historian of the phenomenon has noted, "a considerable latent force" in French society.\(^b\)

Amidst the troubles of the Third Republic, the French army occupied a unique position. The army not only was the country's defense against Germany, but it also was expected to be the instrument—having been reformed and modernized after the war—with which France eventually would gain revenge for its defeat. But the army's role went beyond the military sphere, and during this period was intimately connected with France's conception of itself. With the country so divided, the conscription-based army was the only institution that Frenchmen had in common and upon which they all looked with respect. The army, in turn, saw itself as rising above the country's political squabbles and petty problems to embody the true spirit of France. Still, however, because of the mystical conception of its role, as well as the widespread fear that anything that undermined the army's claim to infallibility would increase France's vulnerability to Germany, officers and many civilians believed that the army had to be exempt from any external criticism.\(^c\)

### The Case Returns

Even before Alfred was deported to Devil's Island, Mathieu, Lucie, and Demange began working to void the conviction and secure a new trial ("révision"). As they approached senior political figures and journalists seeking support, the trio gradually learned that Drey-fus's conviction had been far more than a ghastly mistake and miscarriage of justice. Sandherr and other senior officers were truly convinced that Dreyfus was guilty—they believed the handwriting on the bordereau to be his and took it for granted that a Jew would be predisposed toward treason, but they also understood that the investigation had been badly flawed and that the case against him was weak. In the weeks before the trial, they had searched for additional evidence but, finding little, began forging documents to shore up the case. They secretly gave a file combining real and forged documents to the judges at Drey-

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fus's court martial and, with the defense unaware of the file's existence and unable to refute it, convinced them to convict the captain. Mathieu found out about the file in February 1895, and its existence became public knowledge in September 1896, when L'Éclair—an anti-Dreyfus newspaper seeking to refute articles by Dreyfus's supporters (Dreyfusards)—cited it as irrefutable proof of his guilt.

In the meantime, the case against Dreyfus fell apart, causing the leadership of the army to take desperate measures to maintain the fiction of his guilt. In early March 1896, another of Mme. Bastian's deliveries contained a note that became known as the petit bleu, which indicated a French traitor still was providing military secrets to the Germans. Commandant Georges Picquart, who had succeeded Sandherr as commander of the Statistical Section, immediately started an investigation. Picquart had observed Dreyfus's trial for the Ministry of War and General Staff and believed him to be guilty, but Picquart also was a thorough and honest investigator. As he went to work on the petit bleu and reviewed the Dreyfus evidence, Picquart found the truth: the handwriting of the bordereau and the petit bleu was that of Major Ferdinand Esterházy, an officer chronically in debt and with a well-earned reputation as a scoundrel. With Picquart beginning to press his superiors to arrest Esterházy—and they, in turn, determined to preserve the army's image and conceal their own misdeeds—the deputy chief of the General Staff in October 1896 sent Picquart on a mission to eastern France and, from there, in December assigned him to a post in Tunisia. With Picquart out of the way, General Staff officers conspired directly with Esterházy to forge more documents to add to the case against Dreyfus and discredit Picquart.

The truth could not be suppressed indefinitely, however. Until the revelation of the secret file, Lucie, Mathieu, and Demange mostly had worked behind the scenes to gain support for révision, and the public paid little attention to Dreyfus. Now, Lucie petitioned the Chamber of Deputies for révision, bringing the case greater prominence in the newspapers and public arena. Next, while on leave in Paris in June 1897, Picquart told his lawyer what he had learned. The lawyer, in turn, passed the information to some of the same individuals whom Mathieu Dreyfus had approached for help.

With these revelations, events began to move swiftly, and public support for révision grew. L'Aurore, a newspaper edited by Georges Clemenceau—a politician who initially believed Dreyfus guilty, but who now supported révision—started publication in October 1897 and became the major Dreyfusard platform. In mid-November, Mathieu—upon learning that Esterházy had written the bordereau—published an open letter to the minister of war accusing the major. Another investigation followed, and Esterházy, demanding a trial to clear his name, was court-martialed in January 1898. The Dreyfusards had great hopes for the trial—the evidence against Esterházy was strong, and a conviction promised to exonerate Dreyfus and force révision. But the General Staff, determined to cover its tracks, manipulated the trial behind the scenes, and the major was acquitted on 11 January. It was this sham trial and prearranged verdict that led the novelist Émile Zola, who already was a leading voice for the Dreyfusards, to write and publish in L'Aurore two days later his “Letter to M. Felix Faure, President of the Republic,” or, as Clemenceau concisely titled it, “J'Accuse.”

The Affair

The publication of “J'Accuse” started the 20-month period during which Dreyfus dominated French politics and society, and that is remembered as the heart of the affair. Zola, in prose that retains its power even today, accused the army of multiple violations of the law and named the officers responsible. His goal was to challenge the government to try him for libel and thus give the Dreyfusards another chance to present their case in court. Again, however, the army thwarted the Dreyfusards. Zola was tried on a narrow charge that effectively excluded evidence relating to Dreyfus. Despite damning testimony from Picquart, the Dreyfusards lost when Gen. Raoul de Boisdeffre, the chief of the General Staff, intimidated the court.
with a reminder of the army's central role in French life. "If the nation does not have confidence in the leaders of its army, in those who bear the responsibility for the national defense," he told the court, "they are ready to relinquish that onerous task to others. You have but to speak." Zola was convicted on 23 February and in July fled to England to avoid imprisonment just a few days after Picquart was jailed on a trumped-up charge of divulging state secrets by telling his lawyer the previous year what he had learned.

The affair now engulfed France, bringing the various forces in French life into a massive collision. To a modern American audience, the depth of division and feelings ignited by the affair are almost incomprehensible. In US history probably only the climax of the debate on slavery in 1860 was similar. The factions arranged themselves on each side, and each organized mass groups and demonstrations. On the Dreyfusard side, pressing the legal and political cases for révision, stood an alliance of republicans, secularists, modernizers, and socialists, as well as those conservatives appalled by the injustice of the case and by the army's extralegal maneuvering. Leading the fight against Dreyfus was the army, which claimed that no legal basis existed for révision, that reopening the case would weaken the army disastrously, and that the calls for révision were a Jewish plot to undermine the army and France. The army was joined by traditionalists, nationalists, the Catholic clergy, and anti-Semites, each of whom saw révision as a threat to their particular conception of what it meant to be French. Intellectuals on both sides wrote voluminously—the affair marked the emergence of the intellectuals as a force in French politics—and the press carried their arguments to every corner of France. The affair focused, too, on the place of Jews in France. Anti-Dreyfusards tarred Jews as traitors or worse, and anti-Semitic newspapers, including Drumont's Libre Parole and much of the Catholic press, spread vile anti-Jewish propaganda and imagery. Not surprisingly, anti-Semitic rioting swept France and Algeria in early 1898, leading an American journalist to note that in "France today, it is perilous to be a Jew."

As the affair continued in the streets and newspapers, the legal maneuvering went on. Finally, on 3 June 1899, France's highest court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, granted révision and ordered a new trial. On 9 June, Dreyfus boarded a French cruiser, and he arrived in France on 1 July. Zola, meanwhile, had returned to Paris on 4 June, and Picquart was released from prison on 9 June.

Politically, too, the Dreyfusards seemed to have gained the upper hand. On 22 June, a Dreyfusard, René Waldeck-Rousseau, formed a center-left coalition government. A stronger individual than most previous Third Republic prime ministers, Waldeck-Rousseau was determined to end the turmoil that threatened the republic. He moved quickly to restore discipline to the army by reassigning or retiring senior officers involved in the affair. He also ordered the arrests of prominent anti-Semites for fomenting unrest and suspended the salaries of Catholic clergy who were speaking out against the government.

Dreyfus's second court martial began on 7 August 1899 in the town of Rennes. Counting the Esterházy and Zola trials, it was the fourth

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a De Boisdeffre quoted in Bredin, The Affair, 268.
time the case had come to a court and, once again, army witnesses insisted that the evidence confirmed Dreyfus's guilt. On 9 September, the court-martial convicted Dreyfus of treason, but this time with attenuating circumstances, and sentenced him to 10 years. The absurdity of the verdict—Esterházy had publicly admitted in July that he had written the bordereau and, in any case, how could treason be excused?—appalled the world. The judges, wrote the New York Times in a comment typical of foreign reaction, “looked more guilty” than Dreyfus ever had.a

With France exhausted by the affair and the object of worldwide ridicule, a solution had to be found. After the Rennes verdict, Waldeck-Rousseau began working with other Dreyfusards to arrange a pardon, which President Emile Loubet granted on 19 September 1899. Two days later, the minister of war, Gen. Gaston de Galliffet, instructed the army that the “incident is over,” and, in December 1900, an amnesty law was passed, excusing all misdeeds related to the affair. The Dreyfus affair quickly died away, although Alfred continued to pursue révision of the Rennes verdict and complete exoneration. Finally, on 12 July 1906, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned Rennes, declaring that “of the accusation against Dreyfus, there is nothing that remains standing.” On 20 July, in the same courtyard where he had been degraded almost 12 years before, Dreyfus was restored to the army with the rank of commandant and was made a knight of the Legion of Honor.b

The Irresistible Topic

The drama of the affair has made it irresistible to writers. All of the major participants wrote books and memoirs, the first appearing while the affair still was unfolding, and hundreds of works have appeared since. Amidst this wealth of written accounts, however, that of Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair (published in French as L’Affaire in 1983, with the US edition appearing in 1986), remains the best available in English. Bredin, a prominent French lawyer, tells the story carefully and with precise detail. His prose, however, is never ponderous, which makes the book’s 500-plus pages easy to read, especially as he gives his readers a good feel for the passions that swept France. Given his reliability as a historian and his literary skill, Bredin is unlikely to be surpassed for many years. Nonetheless, in the past two years three authors have tackled the Dreyfus affair. Each has looked at it from a different point of view, and each is worth reading for different reasons.

The first of the books, by lawyer-novelist Louis Begley, is Why the Dreyfus Affair Matters. At just over 200 pages of narrative, it is the shortest of the three, and Begley provides a concise and workmanlike narrative of the affair. Indeed, anyone who is new to Dreyfus and simply wants a quick overview of the case will be satisfied. But Begley has a greater purpose for his book. It is part of a Yale University Press series called “Why X Matters,” which tries to show the current relevance of people and ideas from the past. For Begley, the relevance comes from the war on terror, the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and questionable charges against detainees at Guantanamo. “Just as at the outset of the Dreyfus Affair the French found it easy to believe that Dreyfus must be a traitor because he was a Jew, many Americans had no trouble believing that the detainees at Guantanamo—and those held elsewhere—were terrorists simply because they were Muslims,” he writes.(43) Begley’s heroes are the Dreyfusards and those he sees as their modern-day heirs in the United States—the whistle-blowers, lawyers, and judges who have stood up against “kangaroo trials” and “redeemed the honor of the nation.”(45)

Begley has a point, but it is not as strong as he believes. He certainly is correct that the Dreyfus affair is a reminder of the need for...
great care in making serious charges and of humanity's almost infinite capacities for injustice and hysteria. But Americans do not need to look to Dreyfus for that lesson; we have cases like Leo Franks, the Scottsboro Boys, My Lai, and Watergate to show us our own records of injustice and the covering up of official misdeeds. More important, the United States in the first decade of the twenty-first century is not France in the 1890s. There are no serious challenges to the legitimacy of our republic, no institution makes the French army's claim of being exempt from criticism, and US administrations have not used slander or forged evidence to cover up crimes. Rather, the debates about Guantanamo and the treatment of prisoners have been typical of how modern American politics work through controversial issues for which there are few precedents—slowly and hesitantly, surrounded by noise, and with the fear of making an irrevocable mistake outweighing any desire to rush to a conclusion. This muddle may be unsatisfying, but it also means that the United States is not ripping itself apart or indulging in the kind of ethnic hatred that marked the French debate about Dreyfus.

In this telling, the Dreyfus affair becomes just one more front in France's internal conflicts. Indeed, Brown's account of the affair takes only 50 of the book's 250 pages of text, and it seems notable more for its intensity than for the issues in play. Every factor at work during the affair had been on display since 1870, and many of the individuals who would play major roles in the controversy had come to prominence in the episodes Brown describes; French cultural and political history from 1870 until Dreyfus's arrest seems to be a long rehearsal for the climactic period from his degradation to the Rennes verdict. The risk of this approach is that the affair might start to lose its visibility and no longer seem as important an event as we are used to viewing it. Nonetheless, For the Soul of France is the account for those who like their history presented with linear themes and who want to know the long background to specific events.

The last of the three books, by Oxford University historian Ruth Harris, is Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century. This is a comprehensive history of the affair and goes well beyond the standard narrative approach, such as that used by Bredin. Instead, Harris dives deeply into the people, ideas, and cultural phenomena of the affair. The result is a book of great complexity, filled with many surprises. The history of the affair has been written from the Dreyfusard side,
which has given us a portrait of brave and good Dreyfusards fighting the reactionaries and bigots. By digging deep, however, Harris shows that the situation was much more complicated. Early on, for example, she shows that the army’s relationship with Dreyfus was uneasy long before the discovery of the bordereau.

Dreyfus owed his advance to reforms—enacted after the Franco-Prussian War—that created a modern staff system and opened opportunities for Jewish officers who, until then, would have been on the margins of the army. But traditionalists disliked the reforms, many of which were copied from the Germans. By 1894, the traditionalists were regaining power in the army, and the officer corps was again closing to outsiders; Harris speculates that Dreyfus’s career probably would not have lasted much longer, even if he had never come under suspicion of espionage.

Harris finds other crosscurrents to explore. One intriguing aspect was the role of the many Alsatians who were involved in the affair and who, like the Jews, were in a difficult position. “Alsatians insisted on their Frenchness, but they were often seen as the embodiment of Germanness. They thus had to position themselves against the prejudices and storms that such polarized categories created,” she writes. (74) Dreyfus, in an unfortunate reflection of his Alsatian origin, spoke French with a German accent, which made him doubly suspect. This also leads to her portrait of Picquart, whom the Dreyfusards held up as a great hero of the affair, but who also typifies the contradictions within many of the players. Picquart was an Alsatian, which made it that much easier for his superiors to hound him and portray him as a pawn in external conspiracies; he was a shrewd bureaucrat but fudged some aspects of his investigation to protect his career; he was an intellectual and a polymath in an army that distrusted too much cleverness; and he shared the anti-Semitism of the officer corps.

Harris undertakes many other interesting explorations, each of which shows that nothing about the affair can be taken at face value. For example, Harris shows how Dreyfus became a useful object for both sides as they pursued their broader political goals, and she covers the Dreyfusards’ propaganda and myth-building as well as the anti-Dreyfusards’ use of Catholic martyrology to build support for their cause. Elsewhere, Harris wonders why many on the right insisted on Dreyfus’s guilt despite the evidence and their own unease with anti-Semitic excesses. The answer, she says, lies in their memories of political battles from years past. “When they saw Joseph Reinach and Georges Clemenceau, who had been tainted by the Panama Scandal, running the Dreyfusard campaign, they were appalled that such politicians should now claim the moral high ground,” she explains. (217) Harris also has a fascinating chapter on salonnieres and mistresses of powerful men—what is French history without them?—who played critical roles in the affair. On the Dreyfusard side, too, Harris reveals that backbiting and self-serving behavior were the norm.

This is an insightful and sophisticated book. Harris’s micro-level view of the affair gives a vivid demonstration of how and why people acted as they did, and few come out as purely good or bad. She also tells us much about what was happening around France and how the affair played out in the provinces. This is not an easy book, however. The prose is clear and generally lively, but the level of detail means that in some places it is hard going. Nor is this the book for anyone new to the affair. A reader who plunges into Dreyfus without either a familiarity with French history and politics or without first reading Bredin or Brown is unlikely to get very far. Those with the background, however, will find it an exceptionally rewarding work.

Dreyfus and Counterintelligence Today

As interesting as Brown’s and Harris’s approaches to Dreyfus are, some may wonder what relevance these books, and the affair, have for us today. There are several answers to this question. The most obvious, from Begley, is that the affair is a timeless warning about injustice. The memory of Dreyfus does indeed remain a touchstone for those who want to call attention to wrongful judgments. Unfortunately, this also leaves the affair vulnerable to
The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

For US intelligence officers, the affair has an entirely different relevance. It is a basic truth in the CI world that intelligence services are products of their societies and reflect the histories, politics, morals, and cultures of the populations that supply their officers. Studying these topics is an important part of any effort to understand the behavior of an intelligence service, which is the essence of CI work. In the Dreyfus affair, this means understanding why the Statistical Section and the army, at every turn, doubled and redoubled their bets against Dreyfus. Their behavior is incomprehensible without an understanding of the anxieties and conflicts that wracked France at the end of the 19th century. Today, too, no one will understand the behaviors of the US, British, French, Israeli, or Russian intelligence services—and, for that matter, the different ways they respond to espionage cases—without knowing the contexts in which they are situated. A CI officer needs to be a historian, sociologist, political scientist, and cultural analyst, all at once.

I began this essay by suggesting that an aspiring CI officer begin learning his craft by studying the Dreyfus affair. The contributions of Begley, Brown, and especially Harris remind us that Dreyfus is the starting point for modern CI history and show that the case is a model for approaching the study of CI and espionage. The large and varied number of factors involved makes a final point, as well. Anyone planning to do serious CI work has a lot of studying to do.

For Further Reading

The Dreyfus affair has generated an enormous literature—the Library of Congress catalog lists more than 150 books, in both English and French—beginning with works written shortly after Dreyfus's conviction and continuing to the present.

Three books are indispensable to understanding the affair. The first is Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair (New York: George Braziller, 1986), originally published in French as L'Affaire (Paris: Julliard, 1983). Bredin, a French legal scholar, covers both the case and the political and social aspects of the affair in depth, and with insights that make his work the best single volume on the affair. After Bredin, the best account is Marcel Thomas, L'Affaire Sans Dreyfus (Paris: Fayard, 1961). Thomas, a French archivist, is more narrowly focused than Bredin and based his work on a deep familiarity with the original documents from the case; unfortunately, his book has never been translated. The third book is an English collection—translated by Eleanor Levieux and edited by Alain Pagès—of Zola's

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The Lessons for CI of the Dreyfus Affair

articles on the affair, The Dreyfus Affair: “J’accuse” and Other Writings (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), which also contains a useful chronology and capsule biographies of the major figures. Although not central to understanding the case, Alfred Dreyfus, Five Years of My Life, 1894–1899 (New York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1901) provides extracts from Dreyfus’s letters and prison diary and gives a good sense of his character.


For a collection of images generated by the affair, as well as essays on its artistic, legal, literary, and intellectual aspects, see Norman Kleeblatt, The Dreyfus Affair: Art, Truth, and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

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Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics

Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope by Chalmers Johnson

Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 by Adam D. M. Svendsen

A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World by Emile Nakhlieh

Securing the State by David Omand

Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism by Stewart Baker

Spies, Lies and the War on Terror by Paul Todd et al.

The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence by Bassey Ekpe

General

Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage by Eamon Javers

Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professional’s Guide to Covert Surveillance Training by Peter Jenkins

History


Spies of the First World War: Under Cover for King and Kaiser by James Morton

ULTRA versus U-Boats: Enigma Decrypts in the National Archives by Roy Conyers Nesbit

Memoir

In Pursuit of Shadows: A Career in Counterintelligence by Thomas M. Slawson

Intelligence Abroad


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Current Topics

Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope by Chalmers Johnson (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2010), 212 pp., index.

In his 1964 book about Ozaki Hotsumi, the principal agent in the Richard Sorge Soviet spy network in pre-war Japan, the late University of California professor and former CIA analyst Chalmers Johnson hinted at his views of the American democratic system when he wrote that after the war “it was difficult for the Japanese people to comprehend that the Americans intended to subvert the older order and replace it with a ‘democratic’ one.”  

(201) Dismantling the Empire is less subtle. It criticizes the United States for being “a foreign imperialist” and its “democracy peddlers” (62) for their dismal record in Iraq and Afghanistan. (29) Three of the four essays in the book attack the CIA and its putative ineptitude in the two countries.

Essay number two is a review of Timothy Weiner’s book Legacy of Ashes.  

Here Johnson linked our current situation in the Middle East to “blowback” from the 1953 coup in Iran and to US assistance to the mujahedeen resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan. Then follows inaccurate history when the book states that President Truman never meant to permit the CIA to conduct clandestine operations. Johnson then went on to challenge the need for military bases—they should be dismantled—and called for shutting down the military industrial complex. The military establishment that has “created a worldwide sexual playground” and whose troops “have been taught to think of [foreign] inhabitants as inferior to themselves,” (194) the book intones, should be reduced in size and kept at home. These steps, it argues, must be taken before the US economy collapses and the country is bankrupted.

In the end, Johnson recommended that the CIA be abolished and replaced by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This done, he argued, “we must liquidate our empire or else watch it liquidate us.”

Dismantling the Empire is a thoughtful book, but it lacks sources, offers no alternative solutions, and does not assess the practical impact of the recommendations. The book should not go unchallenged.


As a visiting scholar at Georgetown University during 2007, Adam Svendsen conducted more than 60 “elite” (xi) interviews, most off the record and not cited in this book, concerning intelligence cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. While acknowledging the overall importance of the relationship and that it “is almost universally recognized as being remarkably close and enduring,” (3) Svendsen considers only the period between 2000 and 2005. After outlining the general nature of “US-UK intelligence relations” and its “gains and strains” as he puts it, (3-8) Svendsen addresses interoperability, which he concludes “has been enhanced, and intelligence liaison appears to be structurally even closer,” (30) although he acknowledges persistent differences. To illustrate, Svendsen presents two case studies. The first describes the relationship as it deals with terrorism, but Svendsen’s vague language detracts


from his argument and leaves the reader aching for simple explanations. For example, in stressing that the “intelligence liaison relationship is overwhelmingly important as a mode of activity” he goes on to say that “functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’ were the dominant drivers.” (40)

The second case study deals with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and counterproliferation efforts, which Svendsen finds have mixed, though complex, results. He includes commentary on the policy aspects of the Iraq war and criticism of the United States for “bypassing... experts and advisers in both the UK and US intelligence and diplomatic communities.” Likewise, he points out that a UK government commission report was critical of the British intelligence services on the WMD issue. This section also considers problems associated with counterinsurgency operations by special operations forces in Iraq.

For intelligence professionals, there is little new in this book. For academics, Svendsen provides a different way of thinking about the relationship by dividing basic factors in the relationship into eight levels and then into two groups. Whether this approach is of value must be left to the reader. In the end, however, it does not change the view that the US-UK intelligence relationship is important and necessary to both countries.


Dr. Emile Nakhleh was born in Palestine, raised as a Greek Catholic, and attended a Franciscan high school in Nazareth. After immigrating to the United States 51 years ago, he attended St. John’s University (a Benedictine school in Minnesota), Georgetown University (run by the Jesuits), and American University in Washington, DC. He taught at Mount Saint Mary’s University, a Catholic school, for 26 years before becoming a scholar in residence and then a senior analyst at the CIA, where he specialized in political Islam. His duties, especially after 9/11, included briefing policymakers in the executive branch and members of Congress. To gain contemporary perspective, he traveled to more than 30 Muslim countries in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Fluent in Arabic, Nakhleh interviewed Islamic scholars, government officials, intelligence officers, radical leaders, and ordinary citizens. The results of these interviews convinced him that most Muslims want peace, not conflict. They admire America and desire a better relationship. By contrast, Nakhleh cites discussions in US media and public opinion polls to show that most Americans “view the Islamic world through the prism of terrorism.” (xi). A Necessary Engagement presents his assessment of how these contradictory views can be reconciled.

The first of the four chapters provides background on political Islam and Islamization (the spread of Islamic political influence). Nakhleh stresses that his Muslim interlocutors condition progress on ending the Iraq “occupation,” reducing—not ending—military operations in Afghanistan, halting renditions, and treating prisoners humanely. Most Muslims, he notes, “expressed strong interest” in participating in a democratic political process. Jihad, they insist, is viewed by most Muslims as a religious effort. (3) The radicals take a different path, and Nakhleh discusses their views at length.

The second chapter deals with how the US Intelligence Community, in particular the CIA, views political Islam. There are some surprises here. Nakhleh argues that the CIA has pursued Islamic expertise for far longer and with more success than is commonly reflected in the press. The real problem before 9/11, he argues, is that policymakers failed to take seriously the existing warnings regarding the threat of Islamic activism. The claim attributed to Richard Perle that the CIA “failed to understand and sound an alarm at the rise of jihadist fundamentalism,”
he writes, “is patently false.” (39) Nakhleh describes in considerable detail successful efforts to establish internal expertise (training, language skills, overseas assignments, and graduate studies), to battle bureaucratic impediments, and to build closer relationships with specialists from academia during the 16 years he was at the CIA. 

The final two chapters discuss what Nakhleh calls “public diplomacy” or the effort to convince Muslims that “the so-called war on terror is not a war against Islam.” (71) He provides a lengthy discussion, with supporting evidence, to show that the negative view of America held by many Muslims is policy driven and not a clash of values or ideas. The most prominent example is the invasion of Iraq, an action that Muslims tend to view as a deplorable attack on Islam, not as a logical response to 9/11. Here too, Nakhleh describes the differing views of “Islamic reformists and modernists,” including the Muslim Brotherhood, so that the reader can better grasp the complexity of the Islamic world.

Nakhleh lays out a “public diplomacy blueprint” for changing, if not correcting, the Muslim view of American national objectives. It is not a cookbook remedy, but a summary of practical measures and the necessary accumulation of knowledge and expertise that must precede them. He also takes into account the inherent risks and potential benefits of such an effort.

A Necessary Engagement is an articulate, stimulating treatise on a controversial topic. Moreover, it presents a candid, yet optimistic, challenge to the tendency to view all Islam as a breeding ground for terrorists. Well written, well researched, and well worth reading.

Securing the State by David Omand (London: Columbia/Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2010), 345 pp., endnotes, index.

Sir David Omand joined the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in 1969 and rose to become its director in 1996. He went on to serve in the Ministry of Defence, in the Home Office as permanent secretary, and in the Cabinet Office as the first security intelligence coordinator. He retired in 2005 and became a visiting professor at King’s College London. Securing the State reflects this unique background and commands serious attention. The book begins with an examination of Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s three-part, 14th century fresco inside the Hall of Peace in Siena, Italy, which depicts the features of bad and good governments. Bad government is shown in “the exercise of arbitrary power” and in the conduct of the associated vices of “cruelty, betrayal, fraud, terror, internal discord, and conflict.” Good government is shown flowing from “peace, stability and security, prosperity, and culture.” (2) Omand suggests that in the centuries since the fresco’s creation, the characteristics of bad and good government have remained constant, but achieving the latter while avoiding the former has become more complex.

Securing the State examines the conditions needed for civil security, which he defines as “a sense of public confidence that it is safe to go outside, work and play, and get on with one’s life...the heart of good government.” (7) The first four chapters discuss the evolution of the “public value” of security, intelligence, national resilience, and civic harmony as they have evolved through the Cold War and into the current era of terrorist threats. He places particular emphasis on the national infrastructure necessary to manage risk and reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts and their effects. Omand defines this as national resilience, “the ability of society to bounce back as quickly as practicable into patterns of normal after a major disruption.” (60) Central to his thesis is the protection of civil liberties, especially in the development of policies to deal with threats from radical movements that “see themselves as the vanguard of a wider global movement.” (87).

The next chapters look at innovative, yet practical, steps to achieving a state’s security goals. A chapter is devoted to the intelligence cycle, a well-known topic, which Omand expands with developments from open sources, secret sources
and “personal protected data.” (120) This is followed by a discussion of “elucidation,” which Omand describes as a combination of analysis and assessment that begins with the receipt of intelligence reports. “Analysis,” he writes, is more than “validation,” and assessment is more than analysis.” (150) The latter is a complex process that includes the problem of validation. Other factors include data sharing, single-source issues, fragmentary data, speaking truth to power, cognitive biases, and the role of authority. He also gives examples of how to solve problems using the scientific method, brainstorming, and Richards Heuer’s competing hypotheses techniques.

The concluding chapters cover the relationship between analysts and policymakers—essentially realists vs. idealists—at various levels of government. Topics include surprise and intelligence failures, and the ethical considerations associated with countering terrorism. There is a summary chapter, “Intelligence Design—Building Intelligence Communities,” that reviews the concepts discussed in the book. The final chapter returns to the Lorenzetti fresco and considers how it might be viewed from a modern perspective, emphasizing the importance of history and recognizing that in today’s world “the public must accept...that there is no general right to know about intelligence sources and methods, but the public has the right to oversight of the intelligence agencies.” (325)

Throughout Securing the State, Omand applies his perceptive analysis to both the British and American intelligence communities in a narrative that demands a reader’s close attention. Given his extensive experience, it is well worth the effort.

**Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism** by Stewart Baker (Stanford, CA: Hoover institution Press, 2010), 370 pp., endnotes, index.

After serving as General Counsel at NSA and on the Robb-Silberman Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Stewart Baker joined the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as assistant secretary for policy. DHS was two years old and still somewhat bureaucratically unsettled. Skating on Stilts is the story of Baker’s four-year tenure working to develop policies on border security, airline travel, cybersecurity, and ways to counter bioterrorism.

The central theme of the book is that necessary intelligence reforms are difficult to implement because the technology that would make improvements possible is viewed as too invasive by privacy advocates on both sides of the Atlantic. Before addressing these issues Baker reviews the failures that preceded 9/11, including the prohibition of information sharing among government agencies—the so-called wall—and the actions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. He then summarizes the programs he initiated to improve security, especially with regard to travel and data sharing. The balance of the book is devoted to the battles fought to implement these programs.

Baker provides extensive detail about opposition to whole-body scanners and efforts by privacy groups in Europe and America to prevent the use of technology to collect passenger data that would help track and identify suspected terrorists. (27ff.) In one chapter he recounts actions by a FISA judge to discipline an FBI agent because his proposals failed to “protect the civil liberties of terrorist suspects.” (39ff.) In his discussion of the Patriot Act, which Baker judges to be “a modest set of changes in the right direction,” (73) he explains how legal actions by civil liberties groups have inhibited essential data gathering efforts.

Despite obstacles, progress was made, according to Baker. The Europeans caved when DHS threatened to deny Europeans entry into the United States unless requested passenger data were provided. To show that this would not solve the entire problem, however, he reviews the “Christmas Day” bomber case in which authorities failed to act on available data.

On the subject of cybersecurity, Baker, lukewarm to existing national strategy, outlines the danger of inadequate preventive measures,
though he doesn’t detail what he would measures he would adopt. Likewise, in the chapter on biosecurity he describes the conflicts between intellectual property concerns and the need for improved biosecurity standards. Relying on biotechnology companies to demonstrate that they have met security requirements is fraught with danger, he argues.

Skating on Stilts is easy reading, but it is a serious treatment of the conflict between the need for improved security and the privacy and other concerns that oppose making better use of available technology to provide that greater safety. Baker doesn’t pretend to have all the answers, but he makes a strong argument that early action is critical to preventing the next terrorist attack.


There are no spies or lies mentioned in this book. There is an extensive discussion of the “war on terror.” Its political perspective is in keeping with the articles Mr. Bloch coauthored in Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, a book containing an introduction by Philip Agee.3 The authors of Spies, Lies and the War on Terror argue that “a key enabling factor” in the war on terror “has been the use of intelligence to legitimize expedient and often illegal military adventure and civil repression.” (1) To justify the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they claim, “intelligence was simply massaged and fabricated to fit predetermined policy.” (3)

After a discussion of intelligence and Islam from the Cold War to the present, the authors analyze what they term “spinning the peace” to explain how the U.S. government uses the media to gain public support. They go on to attack the concept of “preemptive war,” renditions, and unwarranted “bugging and data mining.” (86ff.) Turning to Europe, they examine the role of intelligence in the European Union and the “rapid unaccountable growth of databases of personal information.” (163) The authors conclude that “intelligence is more than ever a coin with two sides: a tool for gaining knowledge and a tool for exercising government power.” (169) The benefactors of the Global War on Terror, they add, are “arms manufacturers, mercenaries, demagogues, and authoritarians of every stripe.” (170)

These views are supported by extensive source notes, but the same sources could be used to justify contrary interpretations. Spies, Lies and the War on Terror presents an unbalanced assessment flowing from flawed assumptions. For an alternative analysis of the same topics, consult David Omand’s Securing the State reviewed earlier in this issue of “Bookshelf.”


British strategic consultant Bassey Ekpe challenges the “widely held view” that collective intelligence “is infeasible and incompatible with the UN system.” The reason, he suggests, is that the concept is “widely misunderstood, partly because there is no known detailed study of such a concept.” His book is intended to fill that gap. He concludes that “with suitable refinements, an intelligence structure need not be incompatible with the UN system.” (1)

Ekpe’s approach to the problem is mostly academic and his structure somewhat disorganized. He first discusses methodology, frameworks, paradigms, a variety of considerations in the UN system, and the rationale for collective action. He then considers the UN itself, its charter, organization, and components of collective security. This is followed by two chapters on intelligence concepts and processes—strategic and tactical—with some

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theoretical considerations tossed in. Some chapters seem less applicable. For example, the chapters “Relevance of Authority in the Anarchy Paradigm” and “Micromotives and Macrobavior in the Theory of Collective Action,” just to cite two examples, is obscure.

The final part of the book deals with precedents in UN collective intelligence, UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) in Iraq being one exemplar. The issues raised may lead some to ask why the book didn’t start with this topic. The practical problems and their possible solutions are evident.

That the UN requires information and intelligence to perform its peacekeeping missions is a given. Likewise, the UN’s acquisition of intelligence is complicated by national secrecy issues. Whether the complex considerations described by Ekpe are a necessary prerequisite for dealing with these issues is unclear. The Rationale for Collective Intelligence is indeed one approach, but a more common sense, experience-based alternative should be considered.

General


Investigative journalist Eamon Javers doesn’t explain what prompted him to spend nearly five months collecting information on Diligence LLC, a corporate intelligence firm with an office in Washington, DC, before meeting with its CEO, Nick Day, a former MI5 officer, in January 2007. But he does say that the experience revealed a world of corporate espionage of which he had been unaware. His findings are revealed in Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy. At the outset, Javers raises the fundamental question: Is corporate spying “right or wrong?” (xi) He never answers the question directly, but he proposes in his epilogue—in the interest of what is good for society—the creation of a “spy registry” modeled on lobbying disclosure rules coordinated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. (185)

Between his opening question and the epilogue, Javers tells some fascinating stories of corporate espionage and security operations. He shows how corporate spies travel the globe seeking the secrets of competitors, surveilling human targets, and providing security for VIPs. For example, he writes of the Peloquin firm, which arranged refuge in Bermuda for the deposed Shah of Iran in 1979 and two corporate espionage firms that worked for Howard Hughes—one of which exposed Clifford Irving’s false claims to have cowritten the autobiography of Hughes. Perhaps the most unusual case involves the Walmart Corporation, which hired a commercial satellite company to provide images of its stores and their neighborhoods so Walmart could determine why some stores did better than others. (212ff.)

Javers provides details of well-known firms like Kroll Associates and some less familiar ones like the Hamilton Trading Group—Javers says former CIA officer Jack Platt runs the group. Also involved in it was former KGB officer Gennady Vasilenko, who, Javer writes, was abducted by past comrades and imprisoned in Russia—he was recently released as part of the exchange for the 10 Russian illegals arrested in the United States in the summer of 2010. Russian intelligence officers, writes Javers, are not uncommon in the corporate espionage business in America. Another example is former GRU officer Yuri Koshkin, who runs the Trident Corporation in Arlington, Virginia. The company tracked digital pirates making illicit copies of Disney films in Moscow.

Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy is well written and documented. The ubiquity of the corporate espionage world it exposes raises genuine concerns over privacy, though, as Javers acknowledges, not questions of legality. It is a topic that is not going to go away.

Surveillance, the intentional, often prolonged watching of something, is not only a key element of espionage tradecraft. In fact, it has also become an accepted, even expected, ingredient of civilian life, thanks in part to 9/11. Author Peter Jenkins built his expertise in surveillance while serving in the British army and in private business. When corporate, government, and security service demands necessitated well-trained personnel, Jenkins helped address that need with his first book on the subject, Covert Surveillance, in 2000. Revised editions with a new title followed. Surveillance Tradecraft, an oversized, extensively illustrated, softcover book is the third.

The 14 chapters in this guide cover the various forms of surveillance—covert, mobile, foot, and static—under all conditions, plus operational planning and the new high-tech equipment required; the Minox camera is no longer state of the art. There are also chapters on surveillance detection and, perhaps most important, “evidence and law.” The narrative provides suggestions for implementation—there are no absolute rules, just well-tested experience—on everything from specific techniques and staffing to data recording and report writing. Short case summaries emphasize methods and outcomes. An interesting observational skills test is provided on page 325. The only technique not included is internet monitoring.

Jenkins makes clear that surveillance, no matter how high-tech, is often physically demanding, if not boring. But if one wants to learn what is involved in this essential operational technique, this book is the place to start.

History


Otto Katz was a defendant in the 1952 Soviet-sponsored purge trial in Prague. He was charged with championing the cause of Jews, fraternizing with Hollywood film stars, and working for Noel Coward in British intelligence and for American intelligence as well. All true. What was omitted, and what he was not allowed to say, was that all this had been done at the bidding of Soviet intelligence, which he had served loyally, using numerous aliases, for most of his adult life. The Nine Lives of Otto Katz tells the story of this remarkable spy.

Born on 27 May 1895, Katz was a German-speaking Czech Jew. A high school dropout, he served briefly in the Army during WW I, after which he sought his fortune in Berlin—he later claimed to have discovered Marlene Dietrich there. After joining the Communist Party of Germany, he went to work for the arch Soviet propagandist, Willi Münzenberg. Sent to Moscow for training, Katz returned in time to ghost-write and edit one of the most famous anti-Nazi books of the interwar years, The Brown Book of the Reichstag Fire and Hitler Terror, a work of propaganda that blamed the Reichstag fire on the Nazis. In Moscow he had been given the mission of spying on Münzenberg, which he obediently did.

By 1935 Katz was in France staging anti-Nazi, pro-communist demonstrations in Paris. Speakers for the occasion included E. M. Forster, Bertolt Brecht, Aldous Huxley, John Dos Passos and Upton Sinclair. Later that same year, Katz was sent to the United States, where he lived for a time in New York, encouraging young writers in “Red” Greenwich Village. He also met with a number of Soviet agents operating against the Roosevelt administration, including Hede Massing and members of the notorious Ware group. Then it was off to Hollywood to exercise his in-
fluence in the communist cause in the name of anti-fascism. There he worked with Peter Lorre, Marlene Dietrich, Greta Garbo, Charlie Chaplin, and Frederic March, among others. Katz returned to Europe in 1936 and served the Soviets in the Spanish Civil War. By 1940 he was back in the United States, where he came to the attention of the FBI and was forced to leave for Mexico. He spent the war years there (240) and returned to Czechoslovakia in 1946 after stops in America and France.

Author Jonathan Miles’ biography fills in the colorful details of this extraordinary agent of influence who figured prominently in the promotion of communism in much of the Western world. In thanks, Stalin made sure Katz was rewarded with a trip to the gallows. The Nine Lives of Otto Katz is a stirring tale of dedicated service that reveals the realities of Soviet espionage.


Readers who enjoyed the recent authorized and unauthorized histories of the British intelligence and security services will find little new in this book. Except for a few comments in the introduction on Alfred Redl, the Russian agent in the Austrian Army, and some stories about the Kaiser’s female spies, the cases and agents are the same. Mata Hari, Henry Landau’s White Lady network, the Zimmermann telegram, the spy panic in Britain, Somerset Maugham, and Room 40 are typical examples. Sidney Reilly, “Ace of Spies,” is inexplicably omitted. Spies of the First World War is well written and well documented, however, and will do nicely for those wishing a succinct, easy-reading overview.

ULTRA versus U-Boats: Enigma Decrypts in the National Archives by Roy Conyers Nesbit (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2008), 248 pp., bibliography, photos, index of U-boats.

In his book Seizing The Enigma David Kahn told how British codebreakers attacked the German naval codes and made victory possible in the Battle of the Atlantic. He cited contributing decrypted messages but not their actual content. With the release of the ULTRA decrypted messages by the British National Archives, historian Roy Nesbit was able to correlate decrypted message content with resulting anti-submarine operations. ULTRA versus U-Boats presents his research.

Nesbit worked through more than 100,000 messages and selected 200 for this study. Many are reproduced in the book. Messages on pages 70-72, for example, reveal U-boat position and movement data, and an accompanying narrative provides detail about specific U-boats and attacks.

ULTRA versus U-Boats is a history of the Allied battle against U-boats, beginning with the period before the Enigma decrypts were available. Nesbit describes the terrific British losses and the largely ineffective counter-measures initially employed. The situation gradually reversed as the ULTRA intelligence became available and as the US Navy became a player. Among the examples of decrypted messages are those used in the Allied anti-submarine campaign in support of land operations in Africa and Italy. By January 1944, the German U-boat force had been reduced to 168 boats manned by inexperienced crews—this was “two-thirds of [the force’s] strength nine months previously, despite a continuous flow of replacements.” Nearly 270 new U-boats were undergoing trials, but by then it was too late, although the large number of new vessels in the pipeline demon-

strated the ineffectiveness of Allied attacks on U-boat production facilities.

Nesbit includes photographs showing naval vessels involved in the battles, some actual battle scenes, and aerial shots of targets. The final decrypted message in the book is the order for all U-boats to comply with the conditions of surrender in 1945. (244).

ULTRA versus U-Boats is a fine contribution to WW II naval history.

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**Memoir**


In flight school, Tom Slawson’s instructors convinced him that he had a bright future in the Air Force, but not as a pilot. He applied to the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), encouraged by the prospect of counterintelligence (CI) duties. In Pursuit of Shadows tells the story of his career as an Air Force CI officer.

OSI had been established in 1948 by an FBI special agent, Joseph Carroll, who was then given a reserve commission as a colonel and brought on active duty as a brigadier general. The 14-week training program Slawson entered was staffed by other former FBI agents. It concentrated more on criminal investigation practices and techniques than CI. But much of the tradecraft was the same, and Slawson describes it in detail. During his initial assignment Slawson paid his dues doing background investigations in the United States. After further training he was sent to Okinawa, where he finally got a chance to learn CI in the field. After another tour in the States, Slawson served in Vietnam, where he worked CI cases with the South Vietnamese and participated in the planning of the Son Tay raid. His next overseas tour was in Libya as it closed the US air base after Qadhafi took power. Slawson’s final assignment was in Britain, where CI was the main focus of his duties.

Throughout the book, Slawson describes the CI cases he worked on, the periodic bureaucratic conflicts with Army CI elements, and difficulties encountered with CIA field stations. In the final chapter, he discusses many of the valuable lessons he learned during his career. In an epilogue, he expands his views on CI, concluding that “on balance the United States has not done a very good job in CI.” (195) Unfortunately, a source for this judgment is The Secret History of the CIA by Joseph Trento, the most inaccurate book ever published on the subject.

In Pursuit of Shadows paints a good picture of everyday military CI, its adventurous cases, and its less stimulating administrative duties. It is a first-rate introduction to the profession.

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**Intelligence Abroad**


The nation of Israel was proclaimed on 14 May 1948. The next day, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq declared war on the new state. When the war ended a year later with an Israeli victory,

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165,000 Arabs remained within Israel's borders—15 percent of the new country's population. They were declared citizens of a country they strongly opposed and which most wanted annihilated. In order to establish political control and prevent violence, the Israeli security forces—mainly the police, the Army, and Shin Bet—moved quickly to create networks of informers within the Arab communities. They were largely successful, and Good Arabs is their story.

To those familiar with Israeli domestic intelligence operations, the use of informers to monitor Arab activities will come as no surprise. But revealing operational details is a different matter. Thanks to the recent release by the Israeli state archives of security files for the period of 1948–67, author Hillel Cohen was able, for the first time, to document and describe in detail specific objectives, individual recruitments, and agent-informer handling methods.

What Cohen calls the "collaborator class" gradually emerged with informers who penetrated all levels and activities of Arab life in Israel. At first the Israeli Arabs were cooperative. Many offered their services as "consultants," others wanted to continue relationships with Zionists formed before the war (21), and some collaborated just to put food on the table—resources were scarce in the new state. Informers were recruited among village leaders, the working class, and potential militant groups. Some helped security forces battle the constant infiltration of Arabs who returned illegally to their former villages in Israel after finding life in the no-man's land outside its borders too difficult. Others, however, assisted the "infiltrators," as they became known, while feigning cooperation with authorities.

As political opposition among the Arabs grew, actively provoked by the Israeli Communist Party, the demands on Israeli counterintelligence to recruit informers increased. Giving many examples, Cohen writes of Israeli emphasis on influencing Arab teachers and what they taught in an effort to "shape political consciousness of Israeli Arabs" (235) and limit dissension and resistance. Chapter 5 describes this program in detail.

Israeli efforts to control their Arab citizens had only limited success. Arab opposition to the Israeli state was never eliminated and Good Arabs shows that maintenance of control was a constant struggle. The insights provided in this thoroughly-documented book make clear why the Arab-Israeli conflict persists to this day.


Books on Arab intelligence services are in short supply. Yaacov Caroz, a former Mossad officer, published the most recent one, *The Arab Secret Services*, in 1978. Owen Sirrs, a former senior intelligence officer and Arab specialist at DIA and now with the University of Montana has produced a fine, well-documented volume on the Egyptian intelligence service—al-mukhabarat in Arabic—that adds significantly to public knowledge. While the focus of his book is on the Egyptian service—"the oldest, largest and most effective in the Arab world"—Sirrs discusses those in other Middle Eastern countries as well.

The book is divided into four parts and begins in 1910. The first part deals with the British-sponsored service (under the Egyptian monarchy) designed to counter threats from nationalist and Islamic parties and, later, the Axis powers in WW II. It concludes with the failure of the service to prevent the coup in July 1952 that brought Nasser to power. The second part is concerned with the Nasser period (1952-70), when the domestic security service, or GID (General Investigations Directorate), the EGIS (Egyptian General Intelligence Service)—modeled after the CIA (44)—and the MID (Military Intelligence Department) were established. The major

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threats during this formative period came from the Muslim Brotherhood, dissident military officers, and communists. Sirrs also examines how the services performed during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Yemen Wars in 1962-67, and the 1970 War of Attrition. Part three deals with the services under Anwar Sadat (during 1970-1981), their operations associated with the 1973 war with Israel, and the services’ failure to prevent Sadat’s assassination. Part four brings the story to the rule of the now deposed President Hosni Mubarak. The principal operations discussed here include threats from the local Islamic community and how they have been sternly and effectively muted. Sirrs also explores the controversial role of the mukhabarat—he uses this term synonymously with intelligence service—and the CIA’s rendition program.

In each part of his book, Sirrs analyzes the mukhabarat performance in several areas: collection, evaluation, counterintelligence, covert action, and liaison with foreign services. Background data on principal figures, human rights issues, organizations, and power struggles are also included. Several short case summaries illustrate operations. For example, he reviews the controversial case of Ashraf Marwan, whom both Egypt and Israel claim as their best agent. As Sirrs notes, Marwan died under suspicious circumstances and the ambiguity remains.

“One in four Arabs is Egyptian,” write Sirrs. (197) This fact and Egypt’s close links to the United States make this book an important source for the general reader, for students of international relations, and certainly for anyone desiring to become a professional intelligence officer.

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