“Station”

Capturing the Potential of Outlier Ideas in the Intelligence Community

OSS and Free Thai Operations in World War II

Reviews

Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform

Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean and The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs

A Mind War: Intelligence, Secret Services and Strategic Knowledge in the 21st Century

Edward Bancroft: Scientist, Author, Spy

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence in 2011
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Vol. 55, No. 4 (Extracts, December 2011)
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This ink and watercolor work by James Hart Dyke is one of a collection of illustrations of intelligence work and life Hart Dyke prepared while serving as “artist in residence” in the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service, MI6. His work was commissioned as part of the organization’s commemoration of its centennial in 2009. Selections from the collection can be seen in various locations on the world wide web, including Mount Street Galleries.com and www.guardian.co.uk. (Art reflecting CIA activity was featured in *Studies in Intelligence* 52, No. 2 [June 2008].)

—Printed with the permission of James Hart Dyke and MI6.
Outlier:
—A data point far outside the norm for a variable or population;
—An observation that “deviates so much from other observations as to arouse suspicions that it was generated by a different mechanism”;
—A value that is “dubious in the eyes of the researcher”;
—A contaminant.

Source: J. Osborne, “The Power of outliers (and why researchers should ALWAYS check for them),” http://pareonline.net/htm/v9n6

In war you will generally find that the enemy has at any time three courses of action open to him. Of those three, he will invariably choose the fourth.

—Helmut Von Moltke

With that quip, Von Moltke may have launched a spirited debate within his intelligence staff. The modern version of the debate can be said to exist in the cottage industry that has been built on the examination and explanation of intelligence failures, surprises, omissions, and shortcomings.¹ The contributions of notable scholars to the discussion span multiple analytic generations, and each expresses points with equal measures of regret, fervor, and hope. Their diagnoses and their prescriptions are sadly similar, however, suggesting that the lessons of the past are lost on each succeeding generation of analysts and managers or that the processes and culture of intelligence analysis are incapable of evolution. It is with the same regret, fervor, and hope that we offer our own observations on avoiding intelligence omissions and surprise. Our intent is to explore the ingrained bias against outliers, the potential utility of outliers, and strategies for deliberately considering them.

Of all the examinations of intelligence surprise and failure, Richards Heuer provides perhaps the most succinct characterization of the problem:

Major intelligence failures are usually caused by failures of analysis, not failures of collection. Relevant information is discounted, misinterpreted, ignored, rejected, or overlooked because it fails to fit a prevailing mental model or mind-set.

In his construction, Heuer identifies three reasons information is omitted from consid-


All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Outliers are data and hypotheses that analysts may too quickly dismiss.

What Are Outliers and Why Do They Matter?

Outliers have an unfortunate reputation: they are suspect, different, error, deviation, fraudulent. Throughout life we are trained and encouraged to think of them negatively. If they do not fit the data of our normal distribution, we are often encouraged to ignore them, purge them, or delete them. This tendency is very powerful and very useful. It keeps us from pursuing many strange ideas.

What are outliers in the context of the intelligence profession? Outliers are data and hypotheses that analysts may too quickly dismiss. They may be the imaginative, even prescient analyses policymakers cannot bring themselves to believe. Intelligence analysts generally possess healthy doses of skepticism to help them avoid the pitfalls of hubris and self-delusion, but, sadly, this is insufficient, for the outliers that ultimately prove to be the seeds of surprise are outlandish, unthinkable, and wholly anomalous. For example:

- Russia would destabilize the balance of power by deploying tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba.
- North Vietnam would invade South Vietnam in the spring of 1975, resulting in the complete collapse of the South Vietnamese government.
- An Islamic cleric would distribute sermons via cassettes, and the Iranian people would then overthrow their government.
- Yugoslavia would not remain intact through the 1990s.
- A construction company owner from Saudi Arabia would declare war on the United States and destroy two US embassies, a US Navy destroyer, and conduct an attack on US soil that would kill thousands.
- Saddam Hussein would abandon his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.
- A fruit vendor’s self-immolation in Tunisia would set off a firestorm of demonstrations for self-determination across the Near East.
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Examples from the finance industry.

Not only do we find outliers impossible to take seriously, but we dismiss the accurate reader of outliers as someone with extrahuman powers. Take Warren Buffett. His ability to beat his peers and the markets on a consistent basis has earned him the moniker the “Oracle of

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2 The Special NIE on Cuba records the IC’s unwillingness to support the hypothesis of nuclear missiles in Cuba. This required analysts to ignore eight refugee reports (outliers) out of thousands of reports as bad data. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/revisiting-sherman-kent2019s-defense-of-snie-85-3-62.html


4 NSC staffer Gary Sick later concluded, “The Iranian revolution… refused to conform to the conventional wisdom of the day, and contemporary analyses often had to say about the prejudices and assumptions of the observer than about the new reality being created in the mosques and in the streets of Iran.” Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985), 106.

5 In this case, the Intelligence Community correctly estimated the situation, but was considered the outlier in a policy community unwilling to accept that forecast. (Based on interview with the NIE author, August 2011).
Omaha.” Yet he possesses no oracular powers. Instead, he deeply investigates the company he is considering investing in. He visits it and gets to know the leaders and the customers. Then he conducts a detailed financial analysis of the firm to determine its worth, and he patiently waits for the markets to distort the price to a low enough level that he is willing to buy in. It is nothing more than the wisdom of the outlier trouncing the wisdom of the crowds.

In hindsight, Buffett looks like a genius, but he looked the fool when he put his entire life savings into a single company for his first investment, with no diversification and no hedging, something his peers could have easily perceived as blind recklessness. He defied all the basic conventions and accepted norms of investing. It appears that making the first outlier call requires not only deep conviction backed up by solid analysis, but also professional courage. Not everyone demonstrates this courage. Our personal relations and our desire for group cohesion often stifle dissent. 6 For example,

An economist at Yale University, [Robert] Shiller is a leading scholar, a tenured professor, an innovator, and the author of the 2000 book Irrational Exuberance, which warned the boom in the tech stocks was really a bubble set to burst. He wrote in a 2005 edition of Irrational Exuberance that there could be “a substantial increase in the rate of personal bankruptcies, which could lead to a secondary string of bankruptcies of financial institutions as well.” A recession would follow, perhaps even “worldwide.” Thus, Robert Shiller can reasonably claim to be one of the very few economists who predicted the disaster of 2008. Unlike anyone else, he was a member of a panel that advises the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. But when the advisory panel met in 2002 and 2003, Shiller did not shout and jump up and down on the table. “I felt the need to use restraint,” he recalled. The consensus in the group was that there was no bubble and no need to raise interest rates. To suggest otherwise was distinctly uncomfortable. Shiller did make this point, but “I did so very gently, and felt vulnerable expressing such quirky views. Deviating too far from consensus leaves one feeling potentially ostracized from the group, with the risk that one may be terminated.” 7

This example demonstrates how uncomfortable it can sometimes be to hold a contrarian or outlier idea.

**Examples from within the IC.**

Consider the “heretics” of the IC who have dabbled in the dark arts of open-mindedness and radical skepticism. One of our earliest cases can be traced to the autumn of 1952. That year a group of open-source translators in the Foreign Documents Division and analysts at CIA noticed differences in the way Russian and Chinese propaganda treated common subjects, especially in their descriptions of communism. The analysts focused on specific omissions in the Chinese—a striking example was absence of the term “Stalinism”—even while propaganda continued to embrace Marxism-Leninism. The group made other observations in 1953 and in 1954 after the death of Josef Stalin. These observations, however, failed to convince their colleagues, managers, and policy-makers who were convinced that communism was an indivisible bloc. They remained unconvinced a Sino-Soviet split was happening until Russia and China fought each other briefly in 1969. 8

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6 There are strong incentives for analysts to be loyal to their issue managers and group chiefs.

It turns out that our analysts were not alone in this conviction. An even greater heretic than the analysts on China drew the same conclusion almost half a year before the IC analysts first gave credence to the idea. In February 1952, Franz Borkenau, a “student of history, Comintern organization man, freelance journalist and historian, father of Kremlinology, and philosopher of history” wrote an analysis for the US Department of State, which began:

In the view of this writer a profound conflict between the Communist regimes of Russia and of China is in the long run as certain as anything predictable in politics. Its necessity can be demonstrated by a very simple formula. Totalitarian regimes live by an inherent urge to establish their absolute, “totalitarian” control as far as they can. A totalitarian regime, and more especially the Russian regime, is striving for absolute world domination. It therefore cannot have genuine allies, but must try to subjugate everything within its reach. This is incompatible with the obvious Chinese quest for national independence. How might US foreign policy toward China have been different if the IC and the White House had come to accept the feasibility of this outlandish idea in 1953 or 1954? Perhaps it would not have changed our commitment to the Chinese Nationalists and Taiwan, and it is unlikely to have colored our thinking toward China’s entry into the Korean War. Yet imagine if the United States had taken before 1967 Richard Nixon’s advice of that year, “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors.” Would the “Domino Theory” have carried the same weight? Would we have intervened in Vietnam to the degree we did?

The Quest for the Wisdom of Crowds

The first phase of collection and the insight.

Our interest in outliers was born out of Internet-based surveying that Clint Watts undertook on 2 January 2011. The purpose of that survey was to test the ability of crowds to make accurate hypotheses about future counterterrorism issues in the event of Usama Bin Laden’s death. The survey attracted a little over 30 voters (we will call this the “at large” sample). An additional 30 respondents (professionals known by the author to have significant terrorism and counterterrorism expertise) were queried separately, resulting in two samples of 30 or more voters each.11

As we reviewed the survey design and sample test results, we noted how frequently respondents selected what appeared to be safe or conventional answers. The “at-large” sample made selections that would be expected from people fed a steady diet of mainstream media. The professionals’ selections suggested they had some unique knowledge that steered them away from popular sentiment—although they too herded or clustered together around certain answers. More surprising, both the “at-large” and “professional” responses selected the “Status Quo/No Change” option at high rates across all questions (see graph on facing page).

The results of this initial survey prompted us to consider an entirely different hypothesis: outliers in the survey might provide more important insights into a post-Bin Laden, non-status quo world. Those that responded outside the “typical” responses of their professional group and especially...
for an option other than the status quo became particularly interesting to us. Those providing outlying responses also often provided their reasoning in the question’s comment section. This suggested that they anticipated their answer broke from mainstream views. Their responses and comments provided the richest insights and prompted us to alter the intended purpose of the surveys. This insight prompted us to ask, “How can we find the most insightful outlier opinions in a crowd of responses?”

The second phase of collection.

From March to April 2011, we crafted a more exhaustive survey designed to evaluate several key dimensions of al Qaeda’s future. The “Al Qaeda’s Strategy 2011–2012” survey queried visitors to the Watts blog, SelectedWisdom.com, and personal contacts of ours beginning on 27 April 2011. The strategy poll asked respondents to answer 11 questions on the future of al Qaeda in a post–Bin Laden world. The survey concluded by asking respondents to estimate their confidence level and to provide demographic background on their profession, education, international experience, and information sources. Altogether, 325 respondents answered this survey to some degree (82 percent completed all questions).12 Little did we know how prescient the survey would become.

Fortuitous events

US Special Operations forces killed Usama Bin Laden on 2 May 2011, only five days after we had initiated the “Al Qaeda’s Strategy 2011–2012” survey. Bin Laden’s death provided a unique opportunity to compare perspectives immediately before and immediately after the elimination of the organization’s key leader. On the morning of 2 May 2011, we conducted a third web-based poll, including again the questions from the initial “post–Bin Laden” poll of 2 January 2011 and some of the same questions queried the week before in the “Al Qaeda’s Strategy 2011–2012” survey. From 2 May 2011 through 20 May 2011, 160 voters participated, answering 11 questions about the implications of Bin Laden’s death.13 Like the previous week’s poll, this survey asked respondents to rate their confidence and provide demographic information on their profession and education. Combined, the two polls engaged just under 400 respondents, who answered completely. The survey provided raw material with which to evaluate the notion of outliers.

Interpreting the results.

In the second and third surveys we deliberately sought outliers. This required a much different survey design. First, the poll consisted of cognition problems, and most of the questions were highly complex counterterrorism issues truly requiring some expertise. For example, the question, “What will be the chief consequence of Usama bin Laden’s death?” provided voters 12 options, all of

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12 The AQ Strategy poll collected responses from 325 unique voters. However, only 82 percent of the respondents completed all of the survey’s questions. The responses were collected between 27 April 2011 and 17 May 2011.
13 The post–Bin Laden poll executed on 2 May 2011 included some of the same voters from the “Al Qaeda’s Strategy 2011–2012” poll from the week of 27 April 2011 and the first post–Bin Laden poll conducted on 2 January 2011. For this third overall poll and second “post–Bin Laden” poll, there were 160 total respondents and 85 percent completed all questions asked.
which were interrelated and required respondents to think through the dynamics of each response in picking their best estimate. This complexity (not unlike real life) appeared in most cases to push voters to the status quo.

Second, we wanted to understand the relationship between the opinions of respondents and the information sources upon which they based their opinions. Our crowdsourced sample predominately consisted of English-speaking Americans with limited international travel. For the most part, these respondents receive terrorism-related information via mainstream television and newspapers, with some social media commentary on mainstream media content. This limited Western information stream contributed to herding around common Western media perspectives. For example, the “Post-UBL Survey” (2 May) asked, “Which al Qaeda leader has the necessary attributes to become al Qaeda’s global leader?” The majority selected “Ayman al-Zawahiri”—a commonly cited figure in global media usually referred to as “the number-two man in al Qaeda.” Selecting this response was logical and expected. However, the first person identified as interim leader of al Qaeda and potential successor to Bin Laden was instead Sayf al-Adel, a longtime al Qaeda veteran not well known to international media. Of 130 respondents to this question, only five selected Sayf al-Adel, and only one respondent pointed to al Jazeera as an information source.14

While Bin Laden’s successor ultimately turned out to be Ayman al-Zawahiri, the crowd demonstrated the potential to be swayed by popular sentiment or media reporting. For example, the academics in the sample clustered around one answer before Bin Laden’s death and then shifted en masse to another answer after his death. This raises important questions about whether to use outside academic experts to fill knowledge gaps in government communities or for assistance with estimating the future course of events.

Third, we noted from Philip Tetlock’s findings in Expert Political Judgment and Dan Gardner’s commentary on them in Future Babble that confidence levels may be, at best, immaterial and at worst, deceptive. Even so, we asked respondents to estimate their confidence in the responses they provided in the survey.

Tetlock conducted an experiment over many years collecting more than 27,000 expert judgments. Tetlock found most expert predictions were no more accurate than random guessing. Of particular interest to the question of confidence, Tetlock looked specifically at the accuracy of media pundits, concluding that the bigger the media profile of the expert, the lower the expert’s accuracy. Gardner argued that media pundits share a common characteristic: confidence. A talking head who hedges or appears dubious does not attract the same ratings that a bold and confident one does. We prefer confidence, but are we good judges of confidence?

Admittedly our sample of “experts” differed from Tetlock’s “experts.” While some readers may argue that Tetlock’s experts do not resemble our experts in the way they consider problems, what we found in our survey is consistent with Tetlock’s findings that accuracy and confidence levels do not necessarily go together. We found that respondents with master’s degrees were slightly more confident, on average, than respondents with PhDs. Even more interesting, these respondents were more confident than individuals with bachelor’s degrees, but so were respondents with associate degrees or only high school diplomas!

The Theory of the Wisdom of Outliers: Hunting for Red and Brown Foxes

To describe the kinds of cognitive processes he saw demonstrated in his experiments, Tetlock borrowed from a Greek saying, “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing,” that was popularized in Isaiah Berlin’s 1953 essay The Hedgehog and the

14 Poll results #3, http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=277
In his research, Tetlock determined that it was how experts think, not what they think, that resulted in accurate future forecasts, and he characterized his experts into two categories of thinker. The better-than-average prophets he labeled “foxes.” Tetlock thought very differently...they had no template. Instead, they drew information and ideas from multiple sources and sought to synthesize it. They were self-critical, always questioning whether what they believed to be true really was. And when they were shown they had made mistakes, they didn’t try to minimize, hedge, or evade. They simply acknowledged they were wrong and adjusted their thinking accordingly. Most of all, these experts were comfortable seeing the world as complex and uncertain—so comfortable that they tended to doubt the ability of anyone to predict the future. That resulted in a paradox: the experts who were more accurate than others tended to be much less confident they were right.

The other class Tetlock called hedgehogs. These were individuals who were not comfortable with complexity or uncertainty...they sought to reduce the problem to some core theoretical theme...they used that theme over and over, like a template, to stamp out predictions...these experts were also more confident than others that their predictions were accurate...why wouldn’t they be? They were sure their One Big Idea was right and so the predictions they stamped out with that idea must be too.

Where Tetlock’s labels accounted only for attributes of thought he saw in his experts, we also wanted to account for the demographic attributes of individuals we surveyed, in order to determine if those qualities (i.e., education, profession, information sources) are influential. To characterize the participants in our surveys we adopted Tetlock’s labels and created variations of our own. If respondents’ answers to the demographic questions were within the 95 percentile of responses, they were considered to have typical demographic characteristics. If a respondent’s demographic response represented fewer than 5 percent of our sample, then the respondent was regarded as atypical demographically. We applied the same concept to respondents’ answers to forecasting questions, identifying those that were atypical substantively.

With these two measures, we created four categories of respondents:

- Hedgehogs—those with typical demographic characteristics who offered typical substantive responses
- Groundhogs—those with atypical demographics but who provided typical substantive responses
- Brown Foxes—those with typical demographic and outlier substantive responses
- Red Foxes—those with outlier demographic and outlier substantive responses.

We suspect that analysts could be characterized in one of these four ways, though it is likely that their characteristics will change over the course of a

15 Gardner, 27.
16 Tetlock believes that we are not permanently typecast in these categories; rather, each time we make an analytic judgment, we could be acting as a fox or a hedgehog.
17 Gardner, 26–27
18 Ibid., 26.
career, depending on specific assignments, the demographics of an analytic shop, and the knowledge and experience the analyst has on a particular problem. For instance, according to an analyst working on the CIA analytic team researching Iraq’s WMD program in 2003, the team contained analysts who could be described as hedgehogs and one groundhog. The groundhog acknowledged never going back and reviewing the earliest Curveball reporting, relying rather on the synopsis provided by the hedgehogs on the team.19 When the groundhog went back and read the original reports, that analyst started to demonstrate fox-like qualities.

Armed with these definitions, we began our analysis by recoding all of the responses into choices that were consistent with the sample and those that were outliers. For this recoding, we gave full outlier credit to any respondent who picked a choice that 5 percent of the population or less selected. We gave partial credit to respondents who were right at the outlier dividing line, especially when the outliers made up 5 to 7 percent of the responses and it was impossible to distinguish them. Some of our questions did not result in a clear outlier minority; instead, the respondents might have split 60:40 on a question, so we gave those in the 40-percent group partial outlier credit.

Next we looked for those respondents who provided atypical demographic responses and outlying responses, i.e., substantive opinions outside of the norm. Then we rank-ordered them based on the degrees to which responses were outliers and then filtered the respondents into our four categories. Out of 260 respondents, 73 percent fit the “typical” demographics. However, this same group also provided outlying ideas, so it was necessary to focus on the respondents with the highest degree of outlier ideas. We selected 13 red foxes (4 percent) and 14 brown foxes (4.3 percent). The 21 groundhogs were easily identifiable and formed only 6.5 percent of the sample.

Finally, we went back to the original survey and isolated the responses from the red and brown foxes to compare their ideas with those of the overall population. As expected, we found that these foxes had ideas different from the main population. For example, when asked what the most likely strategy for al Qaeda was in a post-UBL environment, the foxes’ selections spread across the spectrum of choices. In this case, the “irregular warfare attacks inside Pakistan to erode Pakistani-US cooperation” choice received the highest votes (22 percent) by the population and the strongest concentration of interest by the foxes.

In one experiment we cannot begin to understand whether attention should be given to the outlier ideas of brown foxes, red foxes, or areas of significant overlap between them. Additional experimentation across a

19 John E. Brennan interview with the analyst, 2010.
number of scenarios inside and outside this setting (on the scale of Professor Tetlock’s work) is required to determine if there is a definitive rule. Hopefully, crowdsourcing research, which is being sponsored by Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, will shed more light on this question. Therefore, we will conclude our discussion of the experiment and move to suggest a potential application of the theory.

A Potential Application of the Theory

Imagine back to the summer and fall of 2002. Intelligence analysts across the US government were assessing Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s WMD capability. Most inside the government were convinced Saddam maintained and continued to develop a major capability representing an existential threat to the United States. Some outlying opinions from intelligence officers and analysts suggested that may not have been the case. However, those opinions were few and spread throughout the government. This dispersed, dissenting perspective ultimately proved true, but it was overwhelmed by the majority opinion, led by confident experts, hedgehogs.

Though the IC has several methods devoted to countering groupthink (e.g., analysis of competing hypotheses), it is still a human process, as we saw with Dr. Shiller’s unwillingness to voice a strong opinion in the Federal Reserve meetings, and it is subject to human frailties. These methods are applied according to the predilections of the individual managers and analytic teams involved. Few of these teams are likely able to pattern-match and repeat the process of their best peers. The level of rigor is no doubt subjective and variable.

Internal polling designed to identify outliers can provide a systematic method to analytically hedge against the potential for groupthink. If executed properly, analytic managers can consciously explore alternative perspectives from otherwise overlooked foxes. Survey populations that overlap between the at-large population and the professional population can have interesting results, especially if the outside population includes members from the intelligence target group, region, country, or acceptable proxies. These polls could serve as preludes to analyses of competing hypotheses, helping identify the alternatives analysts are still worried about.

Here is how the process might work.

- First, the organization would survey all relevant members on a particular topic.
- Second, an independent arbiter (perhaps an ombudsman) could identify and vet potential outliers and their alternative analyses.
- Third, a leader would evaluate the entire analytical portfolio on the issue queried and compare it with the results of the internal poll. In the case of WMD for example, the organizational leader might note that almost 100 percent of the organization’s analytical horsepower is pursuing the hypothesis that Iraq sustains a massive WMD program. These results are compared with the internal poll results where 5 percent of respondents believe Saddam has no WMD capability.
- Fourth, the leader decides to make an analytical hedge based on the imbalance of resources committed to hypotheses. The leader decides to move a higher percentage of the organization’s analytical effort from the majority hypothesis that Iraq had WMD and then dedicate these resources to exploring an alternative hypothesis; Iraq does not have WMD.
- Fifth, the leader empowers this alternative analytical group by staffing it with the very outliers that selected the alternative possibility during the internal poll (rather than staffing the endeavor with members of the majority opinion who are inherently primed to discount alternative perspectives.) The leader must
The Wisdom in Outliers

also provide the alternative analysis team with time and dedicated collection to explore their hypothesis.21

The result is an organization responsibly leveraging its people and resources to identify and examine outlier ideas.

A possible by-product of this exercise might be the insight that comes from looking at trends in personal confidence levels. Another useful insight might come in the form of seeing how concentrated analysts’ information sources are and whether at-large, academic researchers and independent analysts use something new that the inside analysts might benefit from. In either case, these data are intended for mission-management purposes only, not something that would be shared with intelligence consumers. Intelligence managers would look at the responses and decide which potential hypotheses to hedge against by exploring them more deliberately.

Conclusion

It seems axiomatic: surprising outcomes were outliers until they occurred. If the IC wants to deliberately and systematically counter groupthink and reduce the potential for surprise, it should consider standard methods, like surveys, to elicit and then identify outlier ideas. The nascent theoretical method described in this article requires additional scrutiny and experimentation.

The concept of confidence also deserves fresh scrutiny. Policymakers may feel comfortable in receiving such barometric readings, but the evidence not only from our experiment but also from Tetlock’s work suggests that effort put into measuring confidence levels may be futile, with the time better spent on clearly identifying and explaining facts and underlying assumptions and dynamics.

The process of selecting and managing the inputs of outside advisers and experts also warrants further review. The groupthink seen among academics, not only in this study but also in the studies related to Tunisia and Egypt, is troublesome.22 Furthermore, the evidence from our survey demonstrating how quickly academics moved from one option to another following Bin Laden’s death, prompts many questions.

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Some readers might feel this isolates groupthink inside the alternative analysis team, and this may be true. In the lead author’s opinion, the outlier ideas are often spread thinly around the analyst population; concentrating them, temporarily, in one team brings a set of “doubters” together who may convince themselves otherwise.

21 As “dedicated” as any collection is.


Source Note:

War of a Different Kind

OSS and Free Thai Operations in World War II

Bob Bergin

"The Thai proved to be masters at manipulating the Japanese occupiers and adept at collecting intelligence."

Kermit Roosevelt

The situation in Siam was different from any that had ever confronted OSS in an enemy-occupied country. Instead of a resistance movement, such as was encountered in European countries, there existed in Siam what might best be described as a patriotic governmental conspiracy against the Japanese in which most of the key figures of the state were involved. The regent himself, the minister and chief of police, the minister of interior, the minister of foreign affairs, senior officers of the armed service, and many other ranking officials belonged to it.1

1 Kermit Roosevelt, Introduction to the 1976 edition, The Overseas Targets, War Report of the OSS, Volume II (Washington, DC: Carrollton Press Inc., 1976). The original version of War Report of the OSS was published in 1949 by the Government Printing Office, but it was classified Top Secret. The book was partially declassified in 1976 and reprinted commercially. Thailand was named Siam until 1939. At the time the War Report of the OSS was originally written, the country's name had reverted to Siam for a brief period (1946–49).

Bangkok, many within a few hundred meters of the OSS base. The base was established after more than a year of frustrating attempts to infiltrate Free Thai officers into Bangkok from China and from Ceylon. Success came when OSS-trained Free Thai officers made contact with the Thai underground that had formed inside the country—a fact unknown to the allies until April 1943.

The Thai proved to be masters at manipulating the Japanese occupiers and adept at collecting intelligence. OSS officers engaged in Thai operations—both inside the country and outside it—had to deal with situations different from anywhere else. Concerns about Britain's postwar intentions and Chinese regional ambitions had to be factored into intelligence operations. OSS officers had to walk a fine line, to have good working relations with the friendly British and Chinese services, while "playing a lone hand," and working...
When the Japanese invaded Thailand on 8 December 1941, the Thai government under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram aligned itself with the Japanese and declared war on Britain and the United States.

When the Thai government declared war on the allies, Thai students abroad volunteered to join the resistance movement, calling themselves the Free Thai. Volunteers in England were trained by the SOE; in America by the OSS. Inside Thailand, an anti-Japanese underground was formed under the leadership of Prime Minister Phibun's political rival, Pridi Phanomyong, the Rector of Thammasat University and regent to the 17-year-old King Anan Mahidon.

Early indications that a resistance movement inside Thailand existed could not be confirmed by the allies. The underground inside Thailand sent envoys to China to establish contact with the allies, but the envoys were intercepted by Tai Li, the Chinese Nationalist intelligence and security chief, who had no intention of permitting American or British intelligence operations inside Thailand. It was not until April 1943 that the allies learned that a Free Thai movement indeed existed inside Thailand.

Infiltration from China

In early 1944, both SOE and OSS started their attempts to infiltrate Free Thai officers into Thailand from China. Major Nicol Smith, former travel-writer and one of Donovan's personal recruits, was in charge of the OSS Free Thai operations. Because of prior agreements, the first OSS infiltrations had to be coordinated with Tai Li, whose assistance seemed to result in nothing but delays. In time, Smith started to think that the Chinese "might not want an intelligence mission to enter Siam."4

Meanwhile, the British SOE appeared to be more successful. Teams of SOE-trained Thai parachuted into North Thailand; others were landed by submarine. But none of these SOE agents established radio contact after their arrival.

Major Smith looked for another approach and found a Chinese Catholic priest who knew the land routes to Thailand. He offered the priest $1,000 to lead the Free Thai to the border. In May 1944, 11 Free Thai officers, in three independent groups, set off overland to Bangkok. This time

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2 One Free Thai member recalled that the Free French movement established in England soon after German occupation of France inspired his group's name. See Wimon Wiriyawit, Free Thai: Personal Recollections and Official Documents (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1997).

3 While US and UK officials may not have been able to confirm the existence of a resistance movement inside Thailand, citizens there would have known of the existence of the external Free Thai Movement and had a good idea of what was going on in the United States and England because, starting as early as mid-December 1941, Thailand was receiving regular Coordinator of Information, then OSS, propaganda broadcasts, as well as news from BBC, All India Radio, and other broadcast information.

they were dispatched without Tai Li’s assistance.

Operation HOTFOOT: Racing the British

At about that same time, another OSS infiltration plan was being put into action in Ceylon. Two Free Thai officers, Wimon Wiriyawit and Bunmak Desabut, completed training at the OSS facility at Trincomalee, Ceylon, and were to be infiltrated into southern Thailand by a British submarine. They set out on 8 August 1944, but when the submarine reached the Thai coast, they were not landed. The captain had received last-minute orders to proceed on another mission to the vicinity of Singapore. After a series of delays, caused by weather and mechanical problems, Wimon and Bunmak found themselves back in Trincomalee in early September—just in time to participate in Operation HOTFOOT.

There was concern, both in Washington and in the field, that once SOE established contact inside Thailand, the British would try to freeze OSS out of Thai operations. Colonel Richard P. Heppner, chief of OSS Detachment 404 in Ceylon, saw danger in this. He reported to OSS headquarters that the SOE plan “shows that the British are in dangerous competition with the United States in Thailand and that the future relations of our government with Thailand depend to a large extent upon the actions of our organization in that country.” He suggested maintaining “outward forms of cooperation,” with the British, but “to play more or less a lone hand.” He mentioned “preparing several operations which...have a good chance to succeed.”

The response from OSS headquarters noted that OSS Chief Donovan “feels that since the British want to make an independent show of the [Pridi] mission that gives us license to take the same approach.”

Heppner went to American theater commander Lt. Gen. Joseph Stilwell and secured his support for Operation HOTFOOT, which would preempt the British by getting OSS agents into Thailand as quickly as possible. Wimon and Bunmak would parachute in, establish contact with the Free Thai leaders, and prepare the way for an OSS presence in country. HOTFOOT would not be coordinated with the British.

A minor problem, Wimon and Bunmak had no parachute training, was quickly rectified with a training manual and practice jumps from stacked oil drums. On the night of 9 September 1944, after two drops were aborted by bad weather over the drop zone, the two Thai agents jumped from a B-24 bomber, 2,000 ft over Thailand’s Phrae Province.

Wimon Wiriyawit’s Adventures

Wimon landed in a tall tree, and spent the night nearby. The next morning he found no sign of Bunmak, and set off to make his way out of the dense jungle. After five days he came to a village, where he encountered a group of armed men. They told him they had earlier “arrested” a man dressed as a “paratrooper,” but he had escaped. Wimon had buried his uniform and was wearing “ordinary clothes,” shorts and a T-shirt, but the men now started to question him.

Wimon had devised a cover story. He told the men that he was an aide to Adun Dejarat, the director general (DG) of the Thai National Police and was on a secret mission for him. He took a chance and gave his true name—instead of using an alias...
The way was now open for OSS to establish its presence in Bangkok. OSS had won its race with the British.

as he had been trained to do. Adun, known to be one of the two rival leaders of the internal Free Thai, was reputed to know the name of every Thai student in the United States. If Adun recognized Wimon's name, he would know that Wimon's return had a political purpose.

The cover story worked. Wimon was handed off to provincial officials who wired the DG, who quickly telegraphed back. He asked that Wimon be sent to Bangkok "secretly," with an escort of plainclothes policemen.

On his arrival in the city, Wimon was taken to Police Special Branch headquarters, where he spent the night in a cell. The next morning, 22 September, he was taken to another Special Branch installation, and there he found seven of Nicol Smith's Free Thai agents who had walked in from China and eight SOE agents who had been infiltrated by parachute or submarine. All were in Special Branch custody. The mystery of why none of these agents had contacted their headquarters was now solved. Wimon was then told that DG Adun would meet with him that evening.

Wimon's meeting with Adun took place amidst great precautions. The two met at nightfall in the middle of a bridge, and Adun walked Wimon to a black sedan parked in a small lane. They talked while being driven through Bangkok's dark streets.

By Wimon's account, he told Adun that he was a messenger from OSS and that the United States would support the Free Thai, but only if the two major players—Adun and Pridi—would work together. Later that night, Adun took Wimon to a meeting with Pridi, and Wimon repeated the message he had given Adun.

Regular radio contact between Bangkok and OSS was soon in place, and the Free Thai started to operate. The way was now open for OSS to establish its presence in Bangkok. OSS had won its race with the British.

HOTFOOT II: OSS arrives in Bangkok

In January 1945, the first two OSS officers arrived in Bangkok. Richard Greenlee and Major John Wester had been brought in by two PBY Catalina flying boats that landed in the Gulf of Siam in the early afternoon of 25 January. They were met by a Thai Customs Department launch that transported them to Bangkok to start the process that would give OSS a base in Bangkok in the midst of the Japanese.

Richard Greenlee was a civilian, a former New York tax lawyer who was Chief of the Special Operations (SO) Branch at OSS Detachment 404 in Ceylon. He had no previous experience in Asia. John Wester had been employed by an international engineering firm before the war and had lived in Thailand for 18 years. OSS had sent him to China, and then Ceylon, to prepare Free Thai officers for infiltration missions, including operation HOTFOOT.

The two were housed in a compound near Wajirawut College, where they were joined by some of the Free Thai who had been infiltrated. Pridi came to discuss his "war plan," which

7 All the infiltrators had been arrested almost as soon as they entered Thailand. Two of the OSS Free Thai who had walked from China were killed by the Thai police, apparently for gold they were carrying. Nicol Smith's misgivings about Tai Li were well founded. According to a March 1945 OSS intelligence report, the Thai police had "a complete photographic record of the China group with correct names and ranks of each," the latter based on intelligence provided by Tai Li's organization. Reynolds, 186.

8 There was speculation why Adun and Pridi met with Wimon when they would not meet the Free Thai who had infiltrated from China. China itself may be the answer. Wimon had been dispatched via India, Southeast Asia Command headquarters, and thus was free of any taint of association with Tai Li's organization. In addition, the Free Thai China group's "arrests" were known within the Thai government, while Wimon's unusual arrival in Bangkok had kept him under the radar.

9 Ironically, the Catalinas that flew OSS missions between Kandy, Ceylon, and the Gulf of Siam were provided and flown by the British Royal Air Force (RAF).
called for coordinating American landings along the Gulf of Siam with a Thai uprising. Greenlee deferred consideration of any military action to Washington and raised OSS interests in Thailand, including black propaganda operations, the insertion of more trained agents, and supply of the Thai underground "on an ever increasing scale."  

Greenlee stayed five days, was exfiltrated to Kandy, and flown to Washington. He carried messages from Pridi for President Roosevelt and General Donovan and gifts, a solid gold cigarette case for the president and a silver one for Donovan. Wester stayed behind as the chief of the OSS mission in Bangkok.

What Greenlee and Wester Accomplished

The OSS War Report focused on the long term political aspects of what Greenlee and Wester had accomplished:

The OSS officers underestimated what was really the most significant element in the situation: the fact that they were not dealing with the usual underground groups, but with the responsible and official heads of a sovereign state... By sending two American officers to discuss policy on the highest level with the Regent himself, OSS forced him to commit himself to a course of action....

The best OSS political card "was to hold out hope of official American support to Siam in her struggle to maintain her territorial integrity against suspected British designs." This was delicate, as "it was also necessary to avoid stirring up the Siamese against the British. Military considerations required that Siam cooperate with the British clandestine services as well as the OSS...."  

Over the long term, this worked in America's favor: What OSS accomplished through its support of the Free Thai and short tenure in Bangkok would serve the US government well in the years leading up to and through the era of the Vietnam War and in ways the writers of the War Report could not have anticipated. But OSS officers on the ground had more immediate concerns and, as the War Report notes:  

While the OSS officers probably did not realize the full implications of their success, they shrewdly diagnosed the peculiar character of the

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10 Reynolds, 278.
situation in Siam and developed an operational plan to meet it.\footnote{Ibid.}

This would become evident in coming months. Although the Thai continued to organize guerrilla groups upcountry, and the OSS supported them, as it became clear that no American military operation would be carried out in Thailand, OSS shifted its emphasis from special operations to intelligence collection.

**Living in the Bangkok Bull's Eye**

Greenlee returned to Thailand in April. He brought with him OSS Captain Howard Palmer, a graduate of Harvard law school who had been born in Thailand and spent his childhood there. They found that the OSS one-man-Bangkok-show, John Wester, had developed serious medical problems. Left to himself, Wester grew conscious of being the only American in Japanese-occupied Bangkok, “never knowing at what moment he might be betrayed or discovered, he lived in almost unbearable tension.”\footnote{Smith and Clark, 225} There were 60,000 Japanese in the country, 7,000 of them in Bangkok, many within 100 m of the OSS base. For two months Wester had spent day and night locked in a small dark room, where he maintained the radio link between the Free Thai and OSS headquarters in Ceylon.

When Wester’s condition deteriorated—he became violent and had to be restrained—the Thai decided that the lack of female companionship was at least partly responsible:

> They figured that two months of solitary confinement in that room would upset anyone completely. They evacuated an entire residential section of the city, rented a house, stocked it with eight young ladies who were expected to cure whatever ailed John and at the same time provide an ounce of protection for Dick and me. They even detailed extra policemen to the neighborhood to insure complete security.

Greenlee and Palmer begged off, and “missed a party that cost the Thai something like a thousand dollars!”\footnote{Ibid., 227–28. Smith quotes Howard Palmer.}

It was decided that Wester would have to be evacuated. Palmer would become the acting chief of the OSS Bangkok station.

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Ex-filtration of a Flying Tiger Pilot

The release and ex-filtration of an AVG Flying Tiger Pilot held as a POW in Bangkok is an excellent illustration of how the Free Thai operated under the noses of the Japanese and how Thai operational thinking obscured the Japanese view of events and ensured the security of Free Thai and OSS activities in Bangkok. This operation coincided with the plan to evacuate John Wester.

In late 1944, when Nicol Smith started his attempt to infiltrate Free Thai agents from China without Tai Li’s assistance, he called on the US Fourteenth Air Force Commander Claire Lee Chennault for help in establishing a radio station and jumping-off point for the agents. Chennault had just built an air strip at Szemao on China’s border with Laos and agreed that Smith could set up his radio station there. Because the area was remote and it would eat up much time if horse caravans were used to move the required heavy equipment and supplies there, Chennault offered aircraft to fly it in. In return, he told Smith that once Thai agents were successfully placed into Thailand, he would have a favor to ask.

In early 1945, after the Free Thai agents were established in Bangkok and communicating,
Smith reported back to Chennault. Chennault showed him a map of north Thailand where one of his AVG pilots, William "Black Mac" McGarry had parachuted into heavy jungle three year earlier. McGarry had been the pilot of one of six AVG P-40s that had attacked the Japanese Air Force at Chiang Mai on 24 March 1942. His aircraft was damaged by ground fire and McGarry had to abandon it before he could reach the Burma border. Other AVG pilots had seen McGarry land safely on the ground, and Chennault thought there was a good chance that McGarry was now a POW. He asked Smith if the Free Thai underground might be able to locate him.

Chennault had his answer four days later. McGarry was a POW. He was being held in a compound on the grounds of Thammasat University. His guards were Thai, supervised by the Japanese, but under Free Thai control. Chennault asked if Smith could "find out from McGarry if possible, whether he is in condition to leave and willing to attempt an escape." Word from Bangkok came back quickly: McGarry was fit for an escape attempt.

The Free Thai had devised a plan: McGarry would feign illness and be moved from one hospital to another until he just disappeared. If his disappearance became an issue with the Japanese, it would be explained that McGarry had died and been cremated in the customary manner. McGarry would be taken by Customs Department boat to the Gulf of Siam where he would be picked up by a Catalina dispatched from Ceylon. (In the end, two RAF Catalinas were used for the exfiltration, which also would take Wester and four Thai Air Force officers to Ceylon.)

There was some concern with this plan among the senior Free Thai. McGarry had become too well known; his absence would surely be noted by the Japanese on one of their periodic visits. That would mean trouble. The day before McGarry was to be moved from the compound, Police Director General Adun announced a better plan. He had arranged a fake release order that "purportedly" came from him. The order directed the Thai chief of the internment camp to turn McGarry over to the police officer who brought the order. If the Japanese later noted McGarry's absence—as was most likely—the Camp chief would explain that he had turned McGarry over at the request of the director general and then produce the release order to prove it. When the Japanese then came to DG Adun to find out what was going on, Adun would show them that the release order was a forgery and that it could not possibly have come from him.

On 14 April 1945, Pridi arrived at the OSS safe house at about 8:30; Adun about 30 minutes later, with McGarry in tow. McGarry was stunned. He had no idea of what was happening to him until he was suddenly introduced to the OSS officers. He did not seem overjoyed, Palmer wrote. "Understandably, he did not have two words to say all evening."

Wimon Wiriyawit, who had been put in charge of the exfiltration, described the run to the gulf. McGarry and the others boarded a Thai Customs Department boat that had been docked on the Chao Phraya

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15 McGarry wandered the northern Thai hills for three weeks before Thai police found him. He was turned over to the Japanese Army, interrogated and brought to Bangkok. Pridi convinced the Japanese that as the Thai had "captured" him, McGarry should remain a Thai prisoner, albeit under Japanese supervision. The compound in which McGarry was held was on the grounds of Thammasat University and in line of sight from Pridi's office as the university rector. From the earliest days, Pridi was convinced that the Japanese could not win the war. He believed that a show of good will toward an American POW would pay dividends when the war ended. Author interview with Free Thai Piyo Chakkaphak.

16 Smith and Clark, 191.

17 There is no record of Japanese reaction after McGarry's successful exfiltration. According to Wimon, the Japanese were outraged when they found McGarry missing. They knew they had been tricked, but were not quite sure how or by whom. Author interview with Wimon Wiriyawit.

18 Ibid.
As the parachutes drifted down, the spectators and the drill teams ran to help themselves.

River behind the house. To minimize the possibility of encounters with the Japanese, the boat crossed the Chao Phraya river and entered the network of klongs or canals that criss-crossed the area and led south toward the Gulf of Siam.

Adding to the difficulty of the journey was Wester's illness. In his delirium he would often shout out in English. Whenever a Japanese patrol boat came into sight, one of the Free Thai officers would get up on deck and dance a ramwong, a traditional style of Thai dance in which the enthusiastic singing and musical accompaniment of the boat's crew would drown put the sick man's shouts. Below decks, Wimon and McGarry crouched with submachine guns ready, just in case the Japanese became curious and decided to come aboard.

The boat entered the Gulf of Siam and headed south to the vicinity of Prachuab Kiri Khan, where it lay hidden to await nightfall and the arrival of the Catalinas. The two aircraft arrived, a bit behind schedule, but the boarding of personnel and offloading of equipment was otherwise uneventful. The two Catalinas returned to Ceylon, where McGarry was transferred to a B-24 and flown over the Hump to Kunming, where Chennault and two of his former AVG comrades met him on the runway.¹⁹

A Hard Life in the Palace of Roses

When Major Nicol Smith was secretly flown into Thailand in July 1944, he found Howard Palmer had things well in hand; Palmer had gained 15 pounds living behind enemy lines and the OSS base had been ensconced in Wang Suan Kulap, the Rose Garden Palace, or Palace of Roses, a property belonging to the royal family that previously had been occupied by the deposed prime minister. There were six radio transmitters in the former PM's bedroom now, and his study was occupied by six Free Thai who coded messages for transmission to OSS in Ceylon. Smith later wrote: "I am sure that no secret agents trying to deliver a country from oppression ever enjoyed such palatial quarters, as we of the OSS living in Siam's Palace of Roses."²⁰

Palmer and the Free Thai were very active collecting information, and Smith met some of the agents. One, a colonel in Thai intelligence, lunched with Japanese officers almost every day and wrote up everything they told him. Punctually, at 5 p.m. he would stop by for a drink with Palmer. He brought in so much information, Palmer said, that two Free Thai radio men were kept busy sending it out.

In addition to intelligence collection, the OSS and Free Thai engaged in other kinds of operations. One of them, Operation SUITOR, on June 18, 1945, was quite spectacular.

Operation Suitor: A Comic Opera

Bangkok's hospitals had been suffering from a serious shortage of medical supplies and OSS arranged a parachute drop to alleviate it. As the drop zone, Palmer selected the Praman Ground in front of the Royal Palace, where all grand ceremonies were held. He cautioned the Thai that measures would have to be taken to assure that the supplies did not fall into the wrong hands.

On 18 June 1945, the day chosen for the air drop, two companies of Thai soldiers were detailed to put on a show of fancy drill. Word had gone out, and the Thai public came to the Praman Ground in great numbers to watch. The Free Thai had trucks standing by and men designated to retrieve the containers.

At noon, Bangkok's air raid sirens sounded. Aircraft engines were soon heard, and nine P-38 fighters were spotted

¹⁹ Author interview with AVG and Fourteenth Air Force pilot Edward Rector, who had been McGarry's wing man on the Chiang Mai raid. The other former AVG pilot waiting with Rector was Charles Older.

²⁰ Smith and Clark, 236.
flying low along the Chao Phraya River. Minutes later, a B-24 bomber appeared overhead and, at about 300 feet, roared across the Praman ground, dropping eight parachutes of different colors. Then a second B-24 went over and a third, each dropping parachutes as it passed. An occasional burst of Japanese machine gun fire was heard.

Then the P-38s appeared. Four put on a show by buzzing low over the crowd, while the five others went after a machine gun position that had fired on them. Their strafing killed four Japanese soldiers and five Thai. At least one round from a P-38 hit less than 10 ft from Brigadier Hector, a "British liaison officer," presumably the local SOE representative to the Free Thai, who had come by to watch. When they met later, Greenlee assured Hector there was "no malice aforesought in the scare our planes had given him." 21

As the parachutes drifted down, the spectators and the drill teams ran to help themselves. Fighting broke out among them. By the time the Japanese arrived, there was little left for them. It was a comic opera, Palmer said, but a hugely successful one. The medicine had been delivered and over 10,000 Thai had witnessed the American drop. The Japanese had lost a lot of face.

The War Ends

One morning in August 1945, OSS officers Alec MacDonald and Jim Thompson and their Free Thai teams were on board a C-47 flying over Thailand, preparing to parachute into Ubon Province. 22 They were part of an OSS operation to infiltrate "214 Americans and 56 Free Thai to train 12 guerrilla battalions of 500 men each." 23

The pilot suddenly entered the cabin, "shouting, his arms waving. 'It's over,' he was yelling. 'The goddamn war is over!'" The news triggered more shouting, back-slapping and even sobbing among the Thai. Then came the Thai cheer: Chai Yo! Chai Yo!

The C-47 returned to Rangoon. The next day MacDonald and Thompson in another C-47 landed at Bangkok's Don Muang airport, which was "patrolled by scores of armed Japanese soldiers." 24 It was "decidedly eerie. We stared at them; they stared at us. They did not bother us." The war would not be over until the formal surrender on 2 September 1945.

MacDonald and Thompson were taken to the Palace of Roses to meet Howard Palmer. Palmer was a short-timer and left for the United States within the week, leaving Thompson, a US Army major, as the Bangkok OSS chief. The OSS station was to become the official US affairs establishment until State Department officers arrived in Bangkok, almost a year later. In the meantime, Thompson and MacDonald would be amateur diplomats, dealing with the prime minister, the Thai Foreign Office, and all allied embassies.

Then Thompson decided to leave for the United States. He would be discharged and return to Bangkok as a civilian. MacDonald then became the OSS station chief. As a US naval reserve lieutenant, MacDonald became the ranking American officer in Thailand. As such, he
was the US representative at the formal surrender of the Japanese forces in Thailand. Two weeks later, MacDonald again represented the OSS at a final military review, where the Free Thai were formally disbanded.

MacDonald decided it was time for him to return to civilian life. Bangkok’s only prewar English-language daily newspaper was gone, and MacDonald saw fertile ground to grow a new English-language paper. He wrote his own orders to the nearest US naval base, at Subic Bay in the Philippines, where he signed the forms that ended his four and one half year navy career, which he largely spent with the OSS. The four enlisted men of the Bangkok OSS staff were sent to join the US legation. “It was, by coincidence, at just this juncture that back in Washington President Harry Truman abruptly ruled the US Office of Strategic Services out of existence.”25 The OSS mission in Bangkok was over.

What did the Japanese know about the Free Thai and the OSS Presence?

The Japanese suspected there was a Thai underground and that it had links to the outside. Over time they had captured OSS agents being infiltrated and suspected others had been successful. They reported upcountry air drops to Pridi and suggested that as regent he take care of this problem, so they would not have to. The Japanese apparently had no strong suspicion of Pridi’s Free Thai role and never uncovered the Bangkok OSS presence. When OSS first started to operate in the Palace of Roses, the Japanese were told that the Thai police Criminal Investigation Division (CID) was setting up a radio transmission station in the palace. If their direction-finding equipment picked up OSS transmissions, the Japanese would think it was Thai CID.

Before the move to the Palace of Roses, the base had moved several times for security reasons. The relocation to the palace had been precipitated by a fruit vendor near the former base, who had casually commented to his customers that “those Americans sure eat a lot of bananas.” Palmer described how he moved to another house on the Chao Phraya River while Greenlee and Wester were still there. They borrowed a car and a driver from the Thai Army. As they drove through crowded city streets, the car’s horn started blowing. By one account, it was a helpful Japanese soldier who finally disconnected a wire to stop it—without ever noticing the OSS officers in the back seat.

When former Free Thai were asked how they managed to get away with as much as they did in dealing with the Japanese

**Because of their feelings of superiority and their attitudes toward the Thai, the Japanese could never believe that the friendly Thai among whom they lived could be capable of such skillful subversion.**

This photo of a group of Free Thai members and US officers was one of many shown in a CIA Museum exhibit in 2000 entitled “Historic Photographs and Memorabilia of Thailand’s OSS Heroes. The photos and many of the artifacts have been transferred to the Thai government.
during the occupation, their answers were usually similar to Free Thai veteran Piya Chakkaphak's: “Because of their feelings of superiority and their attitudes toward the Thai, the Japanese could never believe that the friendly Thai among whom they lived could be capable of such skilful subversion.”

The Legacy of the OSS Bangkok Experience

The OSS experience in Thailand was one of the most complex situations an intelligence organization faced during World War II. The Japanese enemy was not the biggest obstacle to operational success. Post-war interests of the Chinese and British allies had to be factored into operational planning. The importance of “unilateral” intelligence operations quickly became evident. The British were our closest allies during the war, and American feelings against British colonialism and its possible revival after the war are now largely forgotten. SEAC, the joint, Anglo-American Southeast Asia Command under Admiral Louis Mountbatten, often became to Americans fighting in the theater “Save England’s Asiatic Colonies.” The Chinese represented a similar problem, but, constrained by geography, they were easier to deal with.

On the other hand, the significance of dealing closely and openly with an ally—in this case the Free Thai—showed how effective joint operations could be run. As the OSS War Report points out, the OSS was not just running intelligence agents who were part of a resistance movement, but dealing with the “key figures of the state” on matters of great importance. Perhaps a unique situation in World War II, but a preparation for what CIA would face in the world to come.

The Bangkok experience underlined the importance of diagnosing “the peculiar character” of a situation, and developing “an operational plan to meet it.” This is as fundamental as it get for an intelligence service. It requires a service’s ability to be open and flexible, to accept a situation for what it is—not as one would like it to be—and to work within that context.

The greatest legacy of the OSS-Free Thai experience was the relationship between the two nations that was formed from it. Thailand became one of America’s staunchest allies in Asia, from World War II’s end through the era of the Vietnam War. And the biggest beneficiary of this relationship was the OSS successor, the CIA.

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In Defense of Irrelevance


Reviewed by Roger Z. George

It is now more than eight years since the start of the 2003 Iraq War and more than a decade since 9/11. Not surprisingly, national security analysts have more than a few personal memoirs to chose from in gleaning what can be learned about decisionmaking and the uses of intelligence from these watershed events. This holiday season, book buyers will have yet another, this one from Dr. Paul Pillar, who served as deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) prior to 9/11 and as National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Middle East as the George W. Bush administration marched to war in Iraq. Pillar, now teaching at Georgetown University, is a serious analyst of foreign policy as well as a former senior intelligence analyst with long experience interacting with policymakers. Thus, his views add significantly to the public picture of the policy-intelligence relationship of the Bush administration.

I must acknowledge that early in my career I worked with Dr. Pillar on the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and later had many conversations with him about intelligence and policy. I find Pillar’s treatment of his subject sophisticated and informative as well as personal. It is also provocative. Indeed, readers will be struck by the strident tone that Pillar—known as a cool-headed, soft-spoken official for his entire career—uses in describing myths about intelligence, the misuse of it under the Bush administration, and the misguided attempts to reform the Intelligence Community (IC) after 9/11. Pillar weaves these themes throughout the book’s 13 chapters, leaving the reader with a sense that intelligence is more a victim than a perpetrator of failure, and that it is more often irrelevant than wrong. Hence, the American proclivity to reform the IC is not only unnecessary but usually ill-conceived and counterproductive.

Pillar begins with a compelling case for how misunderstood intelligence and its missions are. He debunks key myths—such as “intelligence drives policy” or “the intelligence bureaucracy resists change.” Instead, he finds that most often, intelligence is either irrelevant to policy or more influenced by it than the reverse. Likewise, he defends the IC’s record of internal adaptation, for which there is little external appreciation or credit given. What most bothers Pillar, however, is the policymakers’ and public’s misconception that the IC is all about “prediction.” Pillar has written elsewhere on this topic, but his treatment in this book is compelling. He notes that outsiders are forever assigning blame for “failures” that amount to not predicting a particular outcome. Yet, predictions are seldom what intelligence is really in the business to do; rather, it should be bounding uncertainty by highlighting the range of possibilities that numerous and dynamic international factors can produce. These are inherently unpredictable and lead to “surprises” that even the best intelligence cannot avert. In fact, Pillar notes, most of what the IC usefully does for the policymaker is focused on tactical intelligence support to implementing strategy, not futuristic crystal-ball gazing regarding unknown unknowns.

What Pillar calls the “fixation on intelligence failure and reform” is illustrated best by his treatment of the 9/11 Commission. He
echoes many of the criticisms raised by outsiders like Judge Richard Posner—namely, that the analysis of the attack and its causes does not track with the set of recommendations. Unlike Posner, however, Pillar focuses heavily on the politics and personalities of the commission. He credits public and 9/11 families' pressure for “accountability” as the driver of unnecessary reforms. As evidence of this, he points to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which duplicated and, he says, complicated many of the existing responsibilities of CTC, where he had served.

As further evidence of the political nature of the 9/11 reforms, Pillar angrily asserts that the CIA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) played politics with its work. He claims the OIG had issued a routine management review of CTC’s activities and given it a clean bill of health just before the 9/11 attacks. Then, he asserts that OIG did a “180 degree” shift by producing a new, post-9/11 report that found plenty of analytic flaws in CTC. For the reader, the routine OIG “audits” of CIA offices are typically focused on a component’s management practices and procedures rather than on detailed analytic or operational performance. In 2007, the CIA made public a redacted version of the executive summary of its post-9/11 report—completed in June 2005—which had been requested by two congressional committees to evaluate specific assertions regarding CTC’s analytic work not addressed in the earlier audit. Whether this OIG report was “cooked,” as Pillar suggests, or merely an objective response to a legitimate oversight request is obviously in the eye of the beholder. But there is no doubt that hindsight analysis often uncovers shortcomings not evident to dedicated analysts and managers at the time.1

Pillar goes further in skewering the competence of the 9/11 Commission Report by claiming commission members were ill-informed and often spoon-fed the preconceived ideas of the Executive Director, Phil Zelikow. This former colleague of many Bush appointees is said to have taken the job, already having concluded that the leadership of the IC should be split off from the CIA director’s responsibilities, partly as “punishment.” This prejudice, Pillar writes, along with others produced a commission that was more an “advocate than investigator,” prompting “precooked” recommendations that did not fit the evidence but did fit with the preconceived mindsets of the commissioners, the staff, and its director. In Pillar’s view, Zelikow was a particularly poor choice given his closeness to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. (They had worked and written books together.) Zelikow is depicted as protective of the Bush administration and determined to place blame on the IC’s failures of “imagination.” That charge, Pillar notes, is nonsense, as it was intelligence that “played a significant role in helping to guide policy” regarding terrorism and al-Qaeda in the first place. In his view, the IC’s early identification of a nascent threat, its focused collection efforts, and its serious reporting of the threat—all of which occurred years before 9/11—“was a model of how strategic warning ought to work.” But this did not fit the script, he claims, so commission staff reports cited selectively or ignored many analytic products on al-Qaeda’s formation, focusing solely on the absence of any national intelligence estimate (NIE) after 1995 as proof the IC was not doing its warning job. One might add that no policy-maker saw it necessary to request one.

The book’s coverage of the run-up to the Iraq War will strike readers as familiar, given the many available books and monographs that detail the broken interagency system, the strong mindsets of senior Bush administration officials, and their hostility toward the CIA. Pillar’s narrative adds a dimension in its portrayal of a frustrated senior intelligence official who is shocked at the calculated way in which policymakers dismissed, misused, or distorted available intelligence to serve the single-minded purpose of launching a war against Saddam Hussein. Pillar uses such terms as “war makers” and “warhawks” to describe senior national security officials, suggesting he saw all of the dysfunction in the Bush adminis-

tration as a design more than a flaw. Moreover, he seems to conclude—by touching on other well-known policy-intelligence blunders in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere—that the mental “images” held by policymakers are the chief culprits of what are often described as intelligence failures. These strong mindsets cause intelligence, good or bad, to be largely irrelevant to major decisions. In an odd way, he defends both: on the one hand, the Bush administration challenged and then ignored the solid CIA analysis that found no links between Iraq and al-Qaeda; on the other hand, the White House did not depend on the flawed Iraq/WMD judgments for its decisionmaking but rather exploited them to justify its march to war.

Pillar proves convincingly that the timing of the October 2002 NIE on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) made it irrelevant to the summer 2002 White House decisions to plan the war. He also acknowledges his co-responsibility in managing the NIE, but notes he had no role in its technical judgments; in hindsight, he admits he might have said more about alternative explanations for Saddam’s inscrutable behavior, but claims there was no compelling evidence to support such suppositions, and one is left with the unsatisfactory feeling that no firm judgments could have been made about such scenarios. In the end, Pillar concludes that no intelligence truly mattered in the major Bush decisions on the invasion or the postconflict reconstruction.

So, is a reader to presume then that the IC did its job—even if its work was irrelevant—as best it could, in both the 9/11 and Iraq cases? Readers, particularly those outside the IC, may find it unsatisfying that Pillar offers almost no reflections on any alternative courses of action senior CIA and NIC managers might have taken in either case. He either ignores or was not privy to the senior-level thinking regarding the policymakers’ misuse of Iraq intelligence. This omission is surprising given his belief that it was blatant, widespread, and frequent. His narrative also is at odds with the WMD Commission Report as well as the SSCI inquiry, which found no politicization. He appears somewhat defensive when he explains that a Washington Post op-ed writer had questioned why intelligence officials had not leaked their views on the distortion of intelligence. Pillar claims, correctly, that it would have been unprofessional as well as wrong. He ultimately defends the Agency by arguing that congressional oversight committees were themselves smitten by the Bush administration’s war campaign, and the press largely had bought the arguments as well, providing few opportunities for dissenters to speak out legitimately. Yet, if the politicization was as blatant and prevalent as he asserts, it seems as though there would have been more internal uproar. More explanations for senior management’s passivity would help the reader understand why this case was so different from other historical cases he cites, where senior managers did push back, even if they did not win the day.

Adding to the sense of helplessness, his final chapters conclude that what reform has been proposed is misguided and likely to do more harm than good. He does not highlight any specific areas where the IC might need to improve either its process or its analysis, presumably because he has earlier asserted that such internal adaptation is constant, comprehensive and usually effective. But he does propose some policy reforms of his own. These are largely focused on more congressional oversight against politicization and more routine production of unclassified key analytical judgments. These steps, he believes, would make intelligence more balanced and less susceptible to misuse. Yet, he admits that these improvements are unlikely to be instituted. The reviewer has to agree. If members of Congress were more interested in oversight of the intelligence process, then they would have read the NIEs that the NIC had produced. They did not. Moreover, the regular production of unclassified key analytical judgments is likely to hamper analysts from producing candid assessments, precisely the reverse of what Pillar seems to suggest is what analysts are supposed to produce. Earlier he acknowledges that the release of the Iraq WMD key judgments, as well as an ill-conceived “white paper” with similar if less nuanced findings only obscured the many caveats and qualifiers that decisionmakers needed
to read. Presumably, a similar unsatisfying outcome would result from the release of key judgments on other topics, that is, judgments (assertions) containing no real intelligence or assessment of the evidence that remains hidden from view.

Finally, Pillar’s strong recommendation that the IC treat Congress and the Executive Branch as more coequal consumers is probably a nonstarter. He argues it would help to deter future administrations from ignoring or misusing intelligence and would educate Congress. However, no president is prepared to have everything he asks of the IC shared with Congress. Moreover, placing intelligence even more in the middle of the two branches would cause presidents to rely less on the IC and would scarcely guarantee that Congress would use intelligence wisely, especially given the kind of polarization that exists in Washington today.

Given the bleak picture Pillar paints regarding the irrelevance and misuse of intelligence, he might have focused more on the IC’s positives in the realm of practical intelligence support. Such examples might then be an antidote to the next “surprise,” which is sure to conjure up the same myths Pillar so strongly laments about American intelligence. Still, this book is a healthy warning to future administrations that they are the ones who will make intelligence useful and relevant, not the IC itself.
Intelligence in Public Literature

Driving the Yanquis Bananas (The Feeling was Mutual)


Reviewed by Thomas G. Coffey

In a scene in Woody Allen’s film Bananas, US paramilitaries are flying to the troubled, Latin American backwater San Marcos, where insurgents are attempting to overthrow the military junta. One paramilitary asks out-loud, “[are we] for or against the government?” “The CIA is not taking any chances,” responds another officer, “some of us are for it and some of us are gonna to be against it.”

As authors von Tunzelmann and Rasenberger tell it, US officials did indeed try to have it both ways in the Caribbean, with policy fluctuating between hostility toward repressive regimes of all political types, and supporting regional leaders who served as bulwarks against the perceived threat of communism in the region. The result of US policy, in von Tunzelmann’s view, was overwhelming political and economic hardship for the citizens of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba. Intelligence officers supporting US policymakers found themselves just as conflicted in their approach towards covert action and in their intelligence analysis. These two books offer unique insights into the trickiness, if not hazards, of this relationship.

Von Tunzelmann’s Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean chronicles in fascinating fashion US attempts to have it both ways with Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, François Duvalier of Haiti, and, to a lesser extent, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, mostly during the 1950s and 1960s. The dictators, while contemptuous of the conflicted US policy, recognized the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations could be manipulated. Although it was inevitable US patience would eventually wear thin with these leaders (Duvalier in the mid fifties, Batista in the late fifties, and Trujillo in the early sixties), they played the game masterfully, sensing Washington would usually default to their sides to prevent communism from taking off in the region.

After a thorough look at the history of these countries and the rise of their leading figures, von Tunzelmann centers her story on Castro's takeover of Cuba and the reaction of Washington, Santo Domingo, and Port au Prince. The reader is treated to a retelling of the never-gets-old story about the Kennedys—and Eisenhower—having CIA officers press the Mafia to assassinate Castro, as well as tales of the Bay of Pigs and Cuban missile crisis.

Von Tunzelmann offers particularly unique insights about Castro, once he was finally well ensconced in Havana, with Washington fearing the establishment of “another Cuba” or a “Dominican Castro,” because communist movements were wrongly assumed to be either so large or well disciplined that they could easily take over any democratic opposition with a little help from Castro.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
The author also does a good job of attempting to understand Castro’s perspective. Lost on US officials was the possibility that Castro wanted little to do with these Caribbean basket cases. Although early on, Castro did back insurgents using Cuba as a base to launch invasions against Haiti and the Dominican Republic—after all, both these countries’ leaders had made similar moves against him—von Tunzelmann notes Castro had little interest in being an occupier. Perhaps Castro and his advisers wondered at what stage of proletariat evolution Haiti was when its leader felt it necessary to kill every black dog in Port-au-Prince because Haitians believed these dogs were the reincarnation of an opposition leader who had gone into hiding.

Red Heat goes wrong in some places. Von Tunzelmann belongs to the school of thought contending that the US hard-line policy toward Castro helps sustain his regime and repressive apparatus, but she decries US engagement with Duvalier’s Haiti and Trujillo’s Dominican Republic. To underscore their repressiveness, the author gives detail after detail about the cruelties Duvalier and Trujillo inflicted upon their citizens, but no such descriptions are reserved for Castro and his repressive regime. She introduces race into a discussion of Kennedy’s decision to park the fleet outside Port-au-Prince because Haitians believed these dogs were the reincarnation of an opposition leader who had gone into hiding.

More than the domestic cruelties and foreign manipulations of Batista, Trujillo, and Duvalier, it was the increasingly hostile anti-US rhetoric and communist leanings of Castro that drove the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations the most bananas. US officials went up a tree and out on a limb to overthrow Castro by having the CIA devise an exceedingly ambitious operation at the Bay of Pigs. 50 years after the Bay of Pigs disaster, Jim Rasenberger does a terrific job of documenting the faults of all parties engaged in the operation in The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. Unlike some Bay of Pigs accounts, this retelling, much to the author’s credit, spreads the blame around.

The brainchild of Richard Bissell, the CIA’s deputy director for plans, the Bay of Pigs operational plan took shape under Eisenhower—although Ike stressed no formal “plans” were made during his tenure. The operation called for the invasion of Cuba by 1,400 of its exiles—covertly supplied and trained in Guatemala by the CIA, US military, and National Guard officials. The exiles were to establish a beachhead and after 7 to 10 days incite a sufficient mass of Cuban citizens to join them in overthrowing Castro. If these goals were not met, the exiles would establish an alternative government that would receive US political and, supposedly, military support. In the worst case of the exiles failing to establish a beachhead, they were to withdraw to the mountains as a guerrilla force.

Key pillars to the plan were the rallying of a large underground of Castro opponents, catching the Cuban regime by surprise, having an escape route for the exiles, and destroying the Cuban air force. Rasenberger, in a clear and systematic fashion, tells of the undoing of each of these pillars, with the real nail in the operation’s coffin being Kennedy’s decision to cancel the second round of exile airstrikes against Castro’s air force, fearing the strikes would raise the volume of the invasion and give away US involvement. His last minute decision enabled Castro to strafe exile aircraft, shipping, and soldiers to devastating effect during the beach landing. The damage doomed the exile force, which held the beachhead for only three days before being overrun.

Rasenberger is hard on Kennedy, who is portrayed as a victim of his own misunderstandings, if not delusions, about the operation and of an ad hoc national security apparatus he promoted. The president did not press National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to systematically solicit and condense the views of the foreign policy team. Nor did Bundy control the flow of information to the president, who essentially functioned as his own staffer. Yet even in the absence of a gatekeeper, officials at meetings
with the president often failed to give their views. This does not let Kennedy off the hook, for Senator William Proxmire, presidential aide Arthur Schlesinger, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson shared their strong misgivings. While Proxmire, Schlesinger, and Bowles gave wordy and moralistic critiques, Acheson looked more at the nuts and bolts of the operation, distilling its main flaw this way: “It does not take Price Waterhouse to figure out that 1,500 Cubans are not as good as 25,000 [the size of the Cuban army].” Kennedy was duly warned, Rasenberger argues, and is not a victim as portrayed by some of his confidants.

At the same time, the author goes relatively easy on the CIA, whose officers were largely guilty of poor communication and unwillingness to abandon a changed invasion plan. Direct in their briefings to the president, Bissell and Allen Dulles were mostly at fault for errors of omission and for putting on the hard sell. The two officers failed to underscore the importance of the airstrikes. They also did not make clear that US military assistance for the provisional government would be required if a mass overthrow of Castro did not take place. Lastly, they did not underscore that moving the landing site effectively negated any chance of the exile force escaping slaughter or imprisonment if Castro’s army prevailed.

A broader definition of culpability for CIA officers should apply, starting with their ignoring some basic tenets of covert action in the Bay of Pigs action. The operation was too big, involved too many parties, and developed over too long a period to be kept covert. Bureaucratic and interagency turf issues undercut vetting of the operational plan. Paradoxically, given how knowable this operation became, Bissell and the Cuba Task Force kept to themselves, pushing aside the heads of clandestine operations and the analytical group, all of whom knew Castro was very popular and not susceptible to a mass uprising. Although Bissell did make parish calls to State and Defense Department officials about the operation, he fed the perception this was a CIA show. In the end, neither of these department heads offered support when—with US involvement obvious to the world—the time came to make the case for the second airstrikes.

Von Tunzelmann and Rasenberger both have a flair for spotting the telling anecdote, and there are many in each book, including

from von Tunzelmann:

Kennedy, struck by the audacity of Khrushchev placing missiles in Cuba, wondered how the Soviet leader would feel if Washington placed missiles in Turkey. McGeorge Bundy reminded Kennedy that the US military had done just that.

Kennedy did not publicly gloat after the missile crisis, but did crow to his friends about the payback Khrushchev received for his bullying behavior during the earlier summit with Kennedy in Vienna.

and from Rasenberger:

All attempts at plausible deniability aside, a CIA officer—a frogman scouting the beach in advance—fired the first shot of the Bay of Pigs invasion at a local militiaman.

The exiles fought tenaciously to protect two of the landing zones before having to retreat. In one battle, Cuban army dead and wounded—500 dead, 1,000 wounded—vastly outnumbered those of the exiles—20 dead, 50 wounded, despite the Cuban Army having 20 tanks and outnumbering the exiles 7 to 1.

A reading of both books provides some additional lessons for intelligence officers conducting operations and analysis in such a charged, uncertain policy environment:

Excessive corner cutting on covert action to keep up a fiction. Cancellation of the “too loud, WWII-like” second strike against Castro’s air force doomed any chance the Bay of Pigs had of success. Dulles and Bissell later regretted not telling Kennedy the operation would fail without a second strike. In a larger sense, the operation gave policymakers—who wanted to overthrow Castro while not being held accountable for it—the false sense that they could avoid the hard decisions and consequences of an overt invasion by using covert action. Ken-
nedy seemed to recognize this and had the Joint Chiefs draw up invasion plans for Cuba soon after the Bay of Pigs.

Briefing covert action is an exercise in advocacy. In The Brilliant Disaster, Dulles had no qualms acknowledging his briefing of the Bay of Pigs plan involved advocacy. “It isn’t your job to say, ‘Well, that’s a rotten plan I’ve presented.’” National security team members Robert McNamara and Rusk could have provided sanity checks but remained oddly aloof during the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs, even though their departments had a huge stake in a successful outcome given their indirect roles in the operation. Rasenberger speculates all wanted to do something about Castro but had no better ideas. Kennedy, Dulles, or Bissell would have benefited greatly if one of them had pressed policymakers to challenge the plan.

Some covert actions inevitably risk revealing the US hand. Given the exile community’s inability to keep a secret and the “Made in the USA” design of the Castro assassination schemes—use of the mafia, exploding sea-shells, and melting poisons—a successful attempt on the Cuban leader’s life would have exposed the US role with potentially enormous consequences for US policy. Likewise when it came to Trujillo, the CIA, according to von Tunzelmann, proposed giving the opposition high-powered rifles that were hard to come by in the Dominican Republic. Yet neither book talks of any US contingency planning to deal with the fallout of a successful assassination attempt. In any event, Johnson shut down the “damned Murder Incorporated” upon taking office.

Groupthink can negatively affect analysis and policy. Paradoxically, much of the conflicted nature of US policy towards the Caribbean resulted from what von Tunzelmann calls the “central myth of the Cuban revolution,” which states that as few as 12 communist insurgents had stolen an island from a well-armed, pro-US dictator. However, Castro had wide connections to a large opposition under-ground, and Batista lacked both the will to fight and the inclination to make necessary political changes, so he essentially handed Cuba to Castro. Washington’s belief in the myth allowed Trujillo and his successors, as well as Duvalier, to scare US officials when a strong opposition threatened these Caribbean leaders by saying the communists, even if small in number, had infiltrated the opposition. The fallback policy position for Washington was usually to side with the known strongman than risk a communist takeover.

Conflicted analysis is vulnerable to policymaker cherry picking. Intelligence analysis along the following lines comes up all too often in the books: “The possibility that Juan Bosch (successor to Trujillo) was secretly procommunist or a party member cannot be ruled out.” Months later, analysts found “no evidence that Bosch is a communist...but he could be overwhelmed by communists.” This reading of Bosch sank him in the eyes of the Kennedy administration. Near the end of Bananas, the disheveled, college dropout turned rebel leader of San Marcos, Fielding Mellish, describes his administration’s predicament this way: “The Americans won’t recognize us—they think we’re communists. The communists won’t recognize us—they think we’re American puppets. The one person who recognizes us was arrested on a morals charge.” It’s debatable whether the democratically elected Bosch of the Dominican Republic had even this much international support in 1963. Von Tunzelmann clearly sees Bosch as one of the more progressive and sympathetic figures in a region unable to overcome Washington’s default policy supporting regional strongmen while trying to have it both ways. Two years later Johnson sent 23,000 US troops to put down an insurgency led by Bosch, who was forced to join a provisional government. He then went on to lose elections to the American-backed candidate the following year.

Johnson was now free to send US soldiers to a part of the world where lots of communist insurgents actually existed: South Vietnam.

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# A Mind War: Intelligence, Secret Services and Strategic Knowledge in the 21st Century


**Reviewed by Larry L. Watts**

Reviewer’s Note: I had the advantage of both the original Romanian version—to which the bibliographic information above refers—and a merely satisfactory, unofficial English translation encumbered by too many unnecessary definite articles, odd translation choices, and confusing run-on sentences that severely compromise intended meaning and damage overall intelligibility. An official, more rigorous, translation would redress most of these problems and make the work accessible to English-language readers.

Twenty-two years after their chaotic revolution, Romanians who count themselves as representatives of civil society and the fourth estate are still more likely than not to describe Romania’s intelligence services and the intelligence task itself in terms suggesting illegitimacy and abuse. With retroactive tunnel-vision, they commonly evoke only that part of the former security intelligence apparatus (the Securitate in Romanian parlance) implicated in political policing and the most egregious forms of human rights violations as characteristic of the intelligence profession and those who serve within it. Except for the services of defunct states—East Germany in particular—this phenomenon and its persistence is unique in the former Soviet Bloc. And its political impact has been appreciable, as quite a few of the journalists and civil society representatives noted above have themselves gone on to become heads of publicly funded institutions, members of government, presidential advisers, and even directors of intelligence.

An important element of subtext is the fact that Director Maior’s unprecedented 2007 appointment from a major opposition party was partly driven by the repeatedly expressed fears of civil society that presidential administrations and ruling parties regularly employed intelligence services for partisan political purposes. Indeed, while none of the authors dwells on it, the issue of politicization arises in several of their presentations. Fortunately, Maior is also one of a handful of defense and security intellectuals actually qualified for such a position, having served as deputy defense minister in charge of Euro-Atlantic integration and reform during Romania’s NATO accession. He is also an experienced diplomat and former charge d’affaires in Ireland.

The immediate aims of Maior’s work are to define strategic knowledge and the purposes of intelligence in democratic society, and to iden-
tify and explicate intelligence actors, processes, and products; the necessary or desirable structure of intelligence in the current security environment; and the nature of 21st century intelligence transformation—especially regarding professional management. Maior’s target audience is broad, including political elites, journalists, and academic analysts involved in the public debate, as well as professors, researchers, and students who seek to understand these issues or whose work would be better informed through their understanding.

For the most part, Maior and his contributors succeed in laying out the principal contours of the debate and providing a road map of accessible online sources for those interested in its specific elements. Particularly impressive are the contributions of the SRI intelligence professionals in this volume. There is Maior himself on the nature of strategic knowledge and intelligence transformation in the 21st century; Mihaila Matei on intelligence transformation and management processes; Florian Coldea on counterespionage; Ionel Nițu on early warning and avoiding surprise; Nicolae Iancu on cybersecurity; and Valentin Filip on parliamentary relations and control. These presentations, along with intelligence scholar Florina Cristiana Matei’s contribution on intelligence effectiveness under democracy, form a coherent whole, consistent both in their use of terminology and authorities, and in their recapitulation of debates and issues.

There are, however, large differences in the acquaintance of other contributors with the current debates and their theoretical unpinnings, which sometimes strikes jarring and incongruous notes. This is particularly the case of Stejrel Olaru’s contribution on the transfer of former Securitate archives. This example, nonetheless serves to demonstrate in striking fashion the aforementioned biases of civil society representatives (e.g., the casting of “civil society” as an unmitigated good, when leading representatives involved in the archive transfer had been “persons of interest” for Romania’s anti-KGB unit prior to 1990 and were exposed for concealing their intelligence links afterward). Also out of place, in my opinion, are the media-oriented study of Vasile Sebastian Dincu and the contribution on open source intelligence by Gabriel Sebe, whose focus, terminology, and evaluation criteria are markedly different from those of the intelligence professionals. While the cognitive and perceptual aspects of the intelligence mission are indeed fascinating and important, introducing general and official audiences to the topic would be better served with a less esoteric approach.

While working well as introduction to the central themes, debates and developments of contemporary intelligence transformations, the volume works significantly less well as a historical overview of the Romanian experience, albeit with exceptions. For example, two of the four contributions to the third section (“Intelligence Services and Democracy: The Romanian Experience”) give virtually no specific information about Romania whatsoever. Of the remaining two, one by Remus Ioan Tețfurăcu presents a comparative analysis of US and Romanian access to information regimes. The other, that of Olaru, focuses on the transfer of communist-era security and intelligence archives during the postcommunist transition. It may well be that the difficulty of interpreting the intelligence role of the Securitate in the communist dictatorship, the nature of the 1989 revolution and the post-communist transition and the role of the security intelligence service within it still necessitates a separate treatment, at least until interpretational benchmarks can be persuasively documented and commonly agreed. Given that these topics are still objects of highly polemical and often politicized debate, this will take some time.

In fact, the best coverage of the Romanian experience is not in this section at all. It is at the end of the second section on “Intelligence Services and Security Challenges in the 21st Century,” namely, Sergiu Medar’s “Romanian Intelligence Services in the 21st Century.” Although not very strong on overall theory, Medar’s is the best among the professional intelligence contributions on specific developments and implementation within the sphere of Romanian intelligence. Unfortunately, Medar’s chapter is largely limited to the transformation of military intelligence, which he headed during 1999–2005, and there is no cor-
respondingly detailed approach to Romania's foreign or domestic services. The informative contribution by another security professional with firsthand experience, former Defense Minister Ioan Mircea Pa•cu, on Romania's failure to exploit strategic opportunities since 1989 also would be better situated in the section on the "Romanian Experience," although perhaps pitched more broadly as an essay on recurrent strategic challenges and vulnerabilities.

Along with these organizational quibbles, I found the tendency of contributors to note specific Romanian examples in passing, with no explanation or citation, particularly annoying and problematic. Whenever public controversy exists over the meaning and interpretation of specific cases, including at least some of these examples, further explanation and/or citation of authority is mandatory.

That said, this effort is by far the most sophisticated and comprehensive approach thus far to the intelligence challenges of the 21st century to appear in Romania to date. It provides a firm grounding in the evolution and elements of intelligence transformation and the new frontiers of the debate and promises future work that will inform participants in Romania's debate over intelligence and provide texts for future intelligence professionals and scholars as well. For non-Romanians, the book is useful as a reflection of thinking in Romanian intelligence regarding the transformations now underway and as an indicator of concerns, old and new, that preoccupy their professionals. It is also of interest for those looking comparatively at intelligence reforms and preoccupations in the postcommunist space.

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Edward Bancroft: Scientist, Author, Spy


Reviewed by John Ehrman

We like to believe that the Revolutionary War showed Americans at their best. With the odds stacked against them, the liberty-loving colonists put together a government and army and overthrew the British rule that threatened their freedoms. Along the way, the leaders of the rebellion proclaimed the new country’s independence in a document that still inspires, and the fledgling government carried off several diplomatic coups that did much to help seal the victory. But there was a more ambiguous side to the story as well. Not every colonist favored independence or saw the British as tyrants. Indeed, some maintained their loyalty to the crown and believed that it would be best for everyone if the colonies remained under British rule. One of these men was Edward Bancroft, and in a new biography, Edward Bancroft: Scientist, Author, Spy, historian Thomas Schaeper gives us the story of this remarkable man.

Edward Bancroft is hardly a familiar name to Americans today. Born in Massachusetts in 1745, he was apprenticed as a youth to a doctor in Connecticut but ran off in 1763, eventually reaching what today is Guyana. There he worked as a physician on local plantations and traveled through the region, researching plant and animal life for a book—An Essay on the Natural History of Guiana in South America—he published in 1769 after he moved to London. The book made Bancroft a prominent scholar—it remained authoritative for more than a century—and propelled his rapid rise in London’s social and literary circles. Bancroft also continued to travel, speculated in North American land, and, as the political crisis developed between England and her North American colonies, became a spokesman for the American cause and a close associate of Benjamin Franklin, who represented the colonies in London.

Because of Bancroft’s prominence as a friend of the colonies and his relationship with Franklin, when the Continental Congress sent the first American diplomat, Silas Deane, to Paris in 1776, it instructed him to contact Bancroft for support. Bancroft joined Deane in July 1776 and stayed in Paris with the American diplomatic mission for almost the entire remainder of the Revolution. Bancroft became a key member of the group, working closely with Franklin—who joined the mission in December 1776 and later was made ambassador—handling much of the paperwork, drafting reports and correspondence, and translating. He was present for meetings with the French and for almost all of the Americans’ internal discussions. Unfortunately, however, during his brief trip to England in August 1776, the British had recruited Bancroft as a spy.

One of the strongest parts of the book is Schaeper’s exploration of Bancroft’s motives for spying. Bancroft has long been condemned as a traitor to his country—“perfidy” was the word the great US diplomatic historian, Samuel Flagg Bemis, used to describe Bancroft’s work—but Schaeper points out that, before making this accusation, one must first ask, “what was his country?” (61) When the Revolution began, Schaeper notes, most colonists still thought of themselves as Englishmen rather than citizens of a separate entity. Even among the rebels and their leaders, the view that they were defending their rights as Englishmen...
Edward Bancroft

...held until after the outbreak of war. Bancroft shared this view and, Schaeper concludes, saw himself as a “subject of the British Empire, and he hoped that the empire would remain intact.” Thus, when the British government asked for his help, he gave it willingly. In Schaeper’s account, Bancroft was a spy, but not a traitor.

What a spy he was! Bancroft was the asset that case officers and analysts today dream about, and Schaeper gives copious details about how Bancroft went about his work. With his unlimited access, Bancroft had no need to recruit subsources or make potentially alerting queries. He copied documents or wrote his own summaries of papers and meetings, and kept the British fully informed of all aspects of Franco-American diplomacy, French commercial and financial assistance to the Americans, and French military planning. Bancroft’s communications methods were no different than those that already had been in use for centuries and, except writing everything by hand, still are used today. He sent his information to London, either openly as letters or via trusted couriers—often using code language or invisible inks (Bancroft was a skilled chemist)—or through dead drops in Paris. Above all, his communications were timely; Bancroft’s information reached London within a few days, meaning that the British were far better informed about Franco-American diplomacy than was Congress, which had to wait weeks for information to arrive from Paris. Finally, nothing in Schaeper’s account suggests that Bancroft presented any serious handling problems. With his patriotic motivation, he seems to have worked diligently and with few complaints.

As good as his account of Bancroft’s espionage is, Schaeper is most perceptive when he answers another important question: What did Bancroft’s information accomplish? Schaeper’s answer is, fortunately for the United States, not very much. This essentially was because the British were unable to make effective use of their intelligence windfall. Sometimes, the problem was that the British were afraid to use Bancroft’s information. For example, before the French and Americans signed their formal alliance in February 1778, Bancroft regularly gave London advance notice of the departure schedules of scores of ships leaving French ports with aid for the colonists. The British government declined to intercept them, however, fearing that violations of neutral rights would provoke the French. Throughout the war, moreover, Lord North’s government was poorly organized and plagued with infighting and indecision that often kept it from acting on Bancroft’s information. In one case, in the spring of 1778, Bancroft told London that a French fleet under the Comte d’Estaing would be sailing from Toulon for North America and that Deane would be a passenger. The British had ample time and resources to intercept and destroy d’Estaing’s force, but North allowed the internal debate to go on so long that London missed the opportunity. This was by no means a unique case. The British had no system for evaluating incoming intelligence and integrating it with political and military decisionmaking and so, notes Schaeper, the government generally was unable to take action on Bancroft’s priceless information. Indeed, it is a classic example of a problem that continues to plague governments.

With the end of the Revolutionary War, Bancroft’s espionage career came to a close, and he resumed his prewar pursuits. He traveled briefly to the United States on business and became involved in numerous ventures, none of which ever amounted to much. Building on his work in Guyana, Bancroft continued to research chemicals and dyes, and published books and articles until almost the time of his death in 1821. Money was tight in his later years, and he died broke. His espionage remained a secret, and his reputation as an American patriot remained intact until the late 1800s, when researchers found the evidence in British archives.

Schaeper’s is a decidedly revisionist biography, taking a sympathetic view of a man who for more than a century has been condemned

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as a traitor. The best part of this approach is that it not only reminds us that Bancroft was a man of many accomplishments outside of espionage, but it also makes us remember that sometimes the question of loyalty is not as clear-cut as we would like to believe. Unlike many of the most notorious modern spies—people such as Alger Hiss or Aldrich Ames—Bancroft was not in a situation where taking one side over the other was a clear act of betrayal. Instead, he was living in a more fluid situation, where many saw rebellion as the wrong approach in a dispute with a system with which they had no fundamental quarrel. We would do well to remember this when dealing with spies who come from places where loyalty to a modern nation-state is much weaker than ties to tribe or locality—what appears to us as loyalty may look very different to others.

Overall, Edward Bancroft is well worth reading. Schaeper tells a good story about politics, diplomacy, and espionage, and leaves his readers with much to think about.

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Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Topics
The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, by Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (eds.)
Spying In America in the Post 9/11 World: Domestic Threat and the Need for Change, by Ronald A. Marks

General
Business Confidential: Lessons for Corporate Success from Inside the CIA, by Peter Earnest and Maryann Karinch

Historical
AREA 51: An Uncensored History of America’s Top Secret Military Base, by Annie Jacobson
How The Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History, by John Prados
Mission Accomplished: SOE and Italy 1943-1945, by David Stafford
Scientist Spies: A Memoir of My Three Parents and the Atom Bomb, by Paul Broda
Second to None: US Intelligence Activities in Northern Europe 1943–1946, by Peer Henrik Hansen
SNOW: The Double Life of a World War II Spy, by Nigel West and Madoc Roberts
The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America’s Search for Security after the Cold War, by Loch Johnson
The Tizard Mission: The Top-Secret Operation That Changed the Course of World War II, by Stephen Phelps

Memoir
King’s Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, by Jack O’Connell with Vernon Loeb

Intelligence Abroad
Mumbai 26/11: a day of infamy, by B. Raman
Spooks: The Unofficial History of MI5 From Agent ZIGZAG to the D-Day Deception 1939–1945, by Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas
Spooks: The Unofficial History of MI5 From the First Atom Spy to 7/7, 1945–2009, by Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas
TREACHERY: Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups—Six Decades of Espionage, The True History of MI5, by Chapman Pincher

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Current Topics


The importance of culture—the shared values, goals, and practices that characterize how an institution, organization or group functions—has been emphasized frequently in the media and in congressional hearings since 9/11. It is not, however, a new concept within the IC. In his memoir, Bob Gates commented on cultural dominance of the clandestine service at the CIA.1 Outsiders have also recognized the importance of internal cultures. Professor Loch Johnson commented on the “different analytical cultures” in the IC and the challenges they pose.2 More generally, Dr. Rob Johnston studied the variables in analytic culture within the IC as a whole.3 Former intelligence analyst Roger George and law professor Harvey Rishikof also understand the importance of culture in the IC, but with an innovative difference—they examine it as part of the National Security Enterprise (NSE). Their definition of the NSE is curiously creative: the “formal government institutions found in the executive branch and the Congress.” To varying degrees, the media, think tanks, lobbyists, and the courts also are parts of the NSE. (2–3) They argue persuasively that each of these elements has a distinctive culture that must be understood if the intelligence system is to function properly. And then comes the surprise: there has been no one book that describes the cultures of the enterprise’s components. The National Security Enterprise fills that gap.

In order to accomplish their goal, George and Rishikof—who are also contributors—assembled contributions from experts in the various NSE organizations. The first 10 chapters focus on the principal players in the executive branch—DOD, DNI, State, NSC, CIA, FBI, and DHS. The authors describe the cultures of their organizations while indicating how each affects the mission. The chapters on Congress and the Supreme Court look at how they handle intelligence issues and these institutions’ idiosyncrasies, about which an intelligence officer must be aware. The next three chapters deal with lobbyists, think tanks, and the media. Understanding their cultures is important to appreciating how they deal with intelligence issues. The final chapter summarizes the answers to the question each author addresses: “how can such diverse organizations and cultures successfully adapt” to today’s new conditions, while maintaining their unique cultures and effectiveness? (334)

The National Security Enterprise widens the perspective for those interested in how the IC functions, or should function. While the editors emphasize their work is not comprehensive—not every organization is covered, and more can be said about those that are—it is an important first step. It is also essential reading for students and potential managers. A really valuable addition to the intelligence literature.

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Former CIA intelligence officer Ronald Marks doubts the IC can accomplish its domestic anti-terrorism mission while preserving civil liberties unless it undertakes major reforms. Spying In America defines the problem in detail and suggests a series of remedies.

After supplying background on the constitutional and historical origins of American civil rights, Marks discusses what intelligence is and is not. Then he examines the nature of the domestic and foreign terrorist threats, identifies what needs to be protected in the effectively borderless US environment, and then mentions various plans—coordinated by DHS—to prevent terrorist attacks. Next he discusses the role of intelligence at home and abroad, historically and under current conditions. In a chapter that addresses why it is so difficult for intelligence agencies to “get it right,” he focuses on organizations at various levels of government and the often competitive, rather than cooperative, approaches that merely complicate matters. Since some journalists and academics have advocated reforming the domestic security elements of the IC along the lines of Britain’s MI5, Marks considers that option. In the end he concurs with the former head of MI5, Stella Rimington, who said: “Americans would never tolerate the level of intrusiveness into their daily lives that the British do with MI5 and other elements of domestic intelligence gathering.” (93)

The penultimate chapter treats balancing civil rights and domestic intelligence. Marks considers the historical record in peace and war, the terrorist threat and the limitations it imposes, the consequences of excessive restrictions imposed on activities both by private sector and government organizations, and the potential for abuse in cyberspace.

Spying In America concludes with a series of recommendations intended to improve domestic security. Most are common sense, but step four, a “New Intelligence Community” is radical reform by any measure. It stresses major organizational and congressional changes that would take decades to implement. While his measures are detailed, Marks doesn’t allow for the disruption the reforms he proposes would create in ongoing activity.

In general, Marks has provided a primer on major problems of intelligence in a world faced with global terrorism. It is a worthwhile contribution and deserving of serious attention.

General

Business Confidential: Lessons for Corporate Success from Inside the CIA, by Peter Earnest and Maryann Karinch. (New York: AMACOM, 2011), 222 pp., bibliography, glossary, index.

At first glance, one might assume this is another book on “competitive intelligence” or methods of corporate espionage. But one would be wrong. It addresses the question: “What can businesses learn from the intelligence discipline, particularly the methods and practices of clandestine operations?” (8) In answering that question, Peter Earnest—a former CIA officer who now is the executive director of the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC—has teamed with Maryann Karinch to produce an account of how the techniques Earnest acquired during his career can be applied to solve problems faced by corporations. His key assumption is that both endeavors require the confidential collection, analysis, and dissemination of information.

The book is divided into three sections. The first identifies CIA and corporate interests and deals with the techniques for hiring the right people. The second discusses the intelligence cy-
cle and relates its various methods and techniques to satisfying similar business demands. The third is devoted to organizational improvement—creating and managing a public image, dealing with awkward situations, and handling change and damage assessment. The authors often illustrate these topics with examples from Earnest’s CIA experiences. In one case, when describing essential personnel characteristics, he cites as an exemplar the highly respected former chief of station in Athens, Richard Welch. (18–19) When discussing problems of personnel performance and eliciting information, the authors relate the story of CIA agent Polish Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, with whom Earnest worked after Kuklinski’s defection. (85, 100)

To some extent, Business Confidential is both a career memoir and a bold challenge to rethink some of the frequent criticisms leveled at the CIA. Whether the book presents new material and ideas is for business readers to decide. But, at a minimum, it makes a strong argument that the intelligence profession has much in common with the way corporate America does business.


In 1979, CIA officer Antonio Mendez headed the team that, with the help of the Canadian embassy in Tehran, rescued six State Department officers trying to avoid joining other “guests” of the Ayatollah in the just-seized US embassy there. In the foreword to this book, academic Toby Miller refers to Mendez’s article—published previously in this journal—about that operation as follows: “the CIA preens in public about using Hollywood expertise, collusion, and cover to undertake its ugly neologism, ‘exfiltration,’ of people from Iran.” (ix) This expression of academic freedom, if not a demonstration of objectivity, assumes a relationship between “the world’s most powerful intelligence agency (the CIA) and its most powerful anti-intelligence agency (Hollywood).” (xi) The authors of Hollywood and the CIA report the results of their investigation into the nature of this presumed relationship, or as they characterize it, the “representations in (mainly) Hollywood film [sic] of the Central Intelligence Agency.” (1)

Chapter one establishes the authors’ view of the CIA as an agency that has “cost, at a conservative estimate... hundreds of thousands of lives.” (2) It goes on to enumerate the CIA’s operational failures, including excessive outsourcing, 9/11, and the Ames case, among others. In this way they create an image for what they acknowledge is “the iconic power of the CIA” (2) that they look for in the films examined in the study. The chapter also includes a lengthy discussion of the considerable literature that comments on espionage in the movies. A final section describes their methodology and the basis for “randomly” selecting the 134 movies used in the study. (23) The films are described in five chapters covering five decades, from the 1960s to the 2000s. Some films selected don’t mention the CIA, but this does not bother the authors, who assert that “the relative absence of the CIA does not exclude the possibility of an unseen, even unspoken, background presence of the agency on the lives of the on-screen characters and situations.” (22)

The criteria for judging a film are specified in the appendix. They are both arbitrary and subjective, for example, “rate the competency of the CIA’s portrayal in the film” and “does the CIA exhibit coercive power on non-US citizens in the film?” (183–85) The discussion of the ratings by the various raters tends to be long, complicated, and very subjective, and hardly profound. When the authors conclude that there is a trend since the 1960s toward representing the CIA as “ambiguous/neutral” or even “black” (182), one is left wondering, so what?

Hollywood and the CIA is an intriguing title, and it discusses some fine films that in most cases mention the CIA. But the only relationship the narrative offers, and that it does implicitly, is the public's fascination with the genre—a fact any moviegoer knew long before this study appeared.


Sherman Kent was a Yale professor, an OSS veteran, and a senior CIA analyst when he wrote an article in the first issue of this journal, discussing the attributes the intelligence profession possessed and one that it did not. As Kent phrased it, “What we lack is a literature.” Since then, with a single exception, genuine progress toward remedying that deficiency has been made in every category of the profession. The exception are reference works that seek to provide definitions of essential terms and succinct summaries of personalities, events, and cases. There have been many contributions that seek to lay claim to filling this gap. Though their quality varies, all have failed. In general, they all possess a single disqualifying characteristic—failure to check their facts with readily available sources. The present volumes are colossal examples of this failure. More than 600 factual errors of various types appear among the approximately 700 entries.

Numerous examples illustrate the problem. Lona and Morris Cohen were not “couriers for the Rosenberg-Greenglass-Fuchs nuclear spy ring.” In fact, there was no Rosenberg-Greenglass-Fuchs spy ring; Fuchs was handled separately. (1) Philby was never “declared persona non grata.” (19) Herbert Yardley did not create “the American intelligence network during WW I.” (32) Henry Stimson did not form the “Signal Intelligence Service.” (33) the Army did that. The Germans did not rely exclusively “on the Enigma machine” during WW II. (35) “Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee…” did not lead “to the arrest and conviction of Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg and Julius Rosenberg;” (80) Venona accomplished that feat. Philby was not a “double agent” (80) or a KGB general (614). George Blake was never in the Special Operations Executive, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, or the Foreign Office and was not recruited by the KGB in 1950. (93) Anthony Blunt did not recruit Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, J ohn Cairncross, and Guy Burgess. (98) No “Polish mechanic working in a German cipher factory” constructed a mock-up of the Enigma machine in France that was “subsequently smuggled out of Poland by British agents.” (307) The evidence supplied by GRU defector Igor Gouzenko did not lead “MI5 to the espionage activities... of Klaus Fuchs”; Venona did that. (341) Edward Lee Howard defected to the Soviet Union in 1985, not 1986. (378) Oliver North was a lieutenant colonel, not a colonel, and he was never attached to the “NSA staff.” (404) Sadly, many errors could have been avoided had contributors only checked the references cited at the end of each entry; in some cases running a spelling checker would have done the trick.

There are also a number of curiosities. Despite the title, the encyclopedia contains entries for SMERSH, MI5, MI6, Mata Hare, Mossad, and Nigel West, but nothing in the entries links them to American espionage. And then some important cases are omitted. For example, nothing is said of Kendall Myers and his wife, who spied for Cuba. Some terminology is out of date, for example, although the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) became the National Clandestine Service several years ago, only “DO” is used. And the term “conduction of intelligence” suggests the need for a copy editor. Lastly, the reference to Philby as “the hired man” rather than

6 See for example the Historical Dictionary series published by Scarecrow Press.
the “third man” is typical of the many other careless errors found.

There is no excuse for an encyclopedia—a basic reference work—to be so unhampered by scholarship or quality control. No other profession would tolerate it, nor should ours. For these reasons and its $180 price, caveat lector!

**Historical**


Will Irwin’s first book, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944*, told the story of more than 50 three-man teams dropped behind German lines to aid the French resistance. But nine Jedburgh teams were held in reserve to support Operation Market Garden, the failed allied attempt in 1944 to seize the bridge at Arnhem in the Netherlands—the engagement was depicted in the motion picture, *A Bridge Too Far*. In his most recent book, Irwin tells the story of three of the Market Garden teams—Clarence, Claude and Dudley—as typical of the experiences encountered by all.

“Never volunteer” is a military maxim that has saved many a soldier considerable aggravation. But in order to serve in the OSS one not only had to volunteer; one wasn’t even told what one was volunteering for—“exciting duty” was as close a description as one could get. The technique produced some fine officers. Irwin describes the recruitment of several members of the Jedburgh teams and in the process reveals the kind of personnel needed for special operations. He follows them through additional training in England, the formation of the teams, and their eventual parachute drop into Holland. The risks associated with operations behind enemy lines were heightened in this case because the Germans had captured the previous 50 Special Operations Executive personnel dropped into Holland to aid the resistance—this despite repeated attempts by those dropped to warn headquarters the Abwehr was controlling their transmissions. Fortunately, this funkspiel (radio game), or das Englandspiel, as the Germans called it, was terminated by the time of Market Garden, although the Jedburgh planners did not know it. (6ff) The captured radiomen were not as fortunate; only four survived. (11)

The mission of the Jedburgh teams dropped in support of Market Garden was first to contact and supply resistance elements. Then, when given the signal, they were to destroy bridges and otherwise impede German movement. Through no fault of their own, as Irwin describes in detail, their results were mixed and the Jedburghs were either captured or killed.

The balance of this well documented book gives a sometimes exciting, often poignant, account of how the captured Jedburghs endured imprisonment in a series of POW camps. When an allied rescue mission failed, their problems only worsened. Although they made multiple attempts to escape, only two succeeded. They all displayed an abundance of valor.

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Investigative reporter Annie Jacobson begins her story by asserting that “Area 51 is a riddle. Very few people comprehend what goes on there, and millions want to know.” Then she bookends the problem: “To many, Area 51 represents the Shangri-La of advanced espionage and war fighting systems. To others it is the underworld of aliens and captured UFOs.” (3) Area 51 attempts to justify both views. For those who want to know about the CIA U-2 and A-12 (OXCART) programs tested at the Nevada Test and Training Range and at Groom Lake—the correct names for what Jacobson persists in calling Area 51—this account will be informative. Though based primarily on interviews with former employees at the site, it adds little to the more than 300,000 entries produced by a Google search on “Area 51 declassified.” Alternatively, independent studies by aviation historian Chris Pocock and CIA chief historian David Robarge are more concise and more solidly documented. 8

For those concerned with aliens and UFOs, however, Jacobson offers new data. A few open sources aside, Jacobson relies on a single unidentified man who, she insists, is telling the truth. His truth concerns a super secret “black” project that involved a “crashed craft …” that contained “child-size aviators … two of [whom] were comatose but still alive … attached to a life support system.” Contractors were engaged, he continues, to examine the aviators, who had been created by “Joseph Mengele” at Joseph Stalin’s behest. As to why this had been done, Jacobson’s source explains that “Stalin sent the biologically and/or surgically modified, reengineered children in a craft over New Mexico, hoping it would land there … Stalin’s plan was for the children to climb out and be mistaken for visitors from Mars.” This would demonstrate that “when it came to manipulating people’s perceptions, Stalin was the leader with the upper hand.” (370–73)

Although Area 51 has 84 pages of endnotes, most are explanatory or refer to a personal recollection. None add credibility to the story told by the unnamed source. There are many facts not sourced at all. Although Jacobson writes that the book is nonfiction, the juxtaposition of fact with science fiction is so strong, it casts doubt on the entire book. As a contribution to intelligence literature, it falls rather short.


During the many years Professor Hollis Todd taught optics, statistics, and photographic theory at the Rochester Institute of Technology in New York, he argued with force that there was no summary measure, no single factor, that could explain or account for a complex phenomenon—be it technical or historical. Author John Prados, the director of the National Security Archive and author of several books on the Vietnam War, applies this principle in his discussion of how the Cold War ended. The revolt by the peoples of the Soviet Bloc nations, he suggests, may have been a deciding cause, but it also immediately raises the question: why did they revolt when they did? Were economic, political, diplomatic, or intelligence forces involved, and, if so, how did they interact to influence the outcome?

In How The Cold War Ended, Prados concentrates on the period from 1979 to 1991 in examining the key events of the time with a view to identifying their roles in the outcome. He considers Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev

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and the forces they tried to control, and the explanations offered by other historians on their contributions. Throughout the study, Prados implies that questions remain to be answered in order to understand what really took place so that the present can be managed without making the same mistakes.

After a review of just what the Cold War was, Prados devotes the succeeding five chapters "to one or a few threads of multiple causality and [he] layers that new understanding onto the basic story." (xvii) These threads include the players, programs and plots, institutions and operators, popular movements, national pride, culture and economics, and what he terms the "shadow Cold War"—the role of intelligence. A short section at the end of each chapter discusses what he calls "doing" history. In these, he analyzes the events presented in the chapter, using various criteria to show how the questions asked and the analytical techniques applied can influence the conclusions reached.

The chapter on the shadow Cold War considers the contributions and impact of Soviet intelligence, US Defense Department intelligence, and CIA analysis and operations—i.e., espionage and covert action. Prados acknowledges that CIA analysts "managed to track the broad outlines of Soviet decline pretty well." But when it came to "predicting revolutionary change...in the final analysis the CIA did not quite manage to do it." (178) As to the effect of KGB activity, Prados concludes it "was not capable of turning the course of the Cold War." (167) CIA espionage, Prados concedes, made some positive contributions, but "did not win the Cold War." (168) Perhaps the most controversial judgment he renders concerns covert action: "In Afghanistan, the Soviet decision to change direction preceded the advent of the CIA's newly rearmed Afghan rebels." (161) Just how Prados knows this is unclear.

A summary chapter at the end of How The Cold War Ended makes clear how difficult it is to attach significance to individual parts of complex historical events. This is a very thoughtful and provocative book that does not pretend to be the last word on the topic. The final question he asks and answers is "Who won the Cold War?" "In the last analysis, no one won the Cold War, or perhaps everyone did." (190)


The preparation of official histories became standard British practice as a consequence of the humiliation administered to them by the Boers during 1899–1902. Thus in 1945, the British Cabinet Office commissioned Oxford historian William Mackenzie to write a one volume official history of the recently disbanded Special Operations Executive (SOE). Since SOE operations involved cooperation with many other secret organizations that did not wish details made public, the history was not declassified until 2000.9 This did not, however, prevent former SOE officers from publishing memoirs of their wartime experiences, some a mix of fact and colorful exaggeration. Thus, in 1966, to set the record straight, the government revised its policy and authorized publication of a series of WW II SOE country-specific histories with sensitive detail excluded. M.R.D. Foot’s SOE in France10 was the first; Mission Accomplished is the last.

At the outset, author David Stafford emphasizes that the book includes SOE operations performed in Italy in conjunction with various anti-fascist organizations in that country. Operational support to other countries from bases in Italy is omitted. Stafford begins his account with the allied invasion of Italy at Salerno in September 1943. From then until the liberation of Italy in April 1943, SOE teams worked with and supported the resistance. He soon makes clear that the resistance was not just one group of patriotic

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Italians. There were anti-fascists who had fought the Germans and opposed the king. There were others who supported the monarchy. Then there were elements of the Mussolini-led military who turned their allegiance to the allies. One group that irritated all the resistance groups was the expatriates who had lived abroad and returned just in time to share the spoils of victory. The SOE teams also liaised with the Servizio Informazione Militari (SIM), the Italian military intelligence organization that switched sides after Italy surrendered. And then there were the communists who fought well and demanded logistical support but marched to their own political drummer. Finally, the SOE teams had to coordinate with elements of MI6 and MI9—the group that helped escaped prisoners—and the OSS, whose stubborn insistence on independence sometimes created difficulties. Stafford tells how the SOE teams dealt with them all—often at the same time—while trying to follow the often conflicting orders from their masters based in Cairo, Morocco, and London.

Stafford’s event-filled account follows the SOE teams from their arrival in Salerno to their work behind enemy lines in Northern Italy, as they coordinated supply drops, dealt with double agents, and provided critical radio communications. Toward the end of the war they also worked with SOE and OSS elements in Switzerland. One of the many colorful anecdotes Stafford includes concerns Major Malcolm Munthe, who wore his kilts into battle. At one point, an American destroyer pulled up to the dock at which Munthe was helping to unload supplies and a lieutenant commander asked that he look after 32 of Mussolini’s political prisoners, who were on board. Munthe was surprised for two reasons. First, it was not part of his mission—but he did it—and second, the officer was Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., who dropped off his passengers and promptly sailed away. (22)

In his concluding comments on the SOE legacy in the Italian campaign, Stafford quotes a report that noted that “the partisan movement would have existed even without [SOE] assistance, and the allies would have won the military campaign if they had not been in the field.” (335) But the support the SOE provided saved lives and helped create a reliable postwar ally. Mission Accomplished is a fine history that finally documents the SOE contribution in that part of Europe.


The Venona decrypts made public in 1995 contained the cryptonym ERIC, which neither the Americans nor the British had been able to identify—the KGB wasn’t talking. ERIC’s true name, Engelbert Broda, and his role as a physicist in the British atomic bomb was eventually revealed in the book Spies.11 It was only then that Paul Broda knew for sure that his father had been a Soviet agent.

Adjusting to the fact his father had been an atomic spy for the Soviets was not exactly a new experience for Paul. When he was 14, in 1953, his divorced mother, Hilde Broda, married British physicist Alan Nunn May after he completed his sentence for passing atomic secrets to the Soviets. When death parted the couple 49 years later, Paul decided to write the story of his mother and the two spies she married.

Scientist Spies is based in part on discussions with Nunn May, his unpublished memoirs, and his deathbed statement. Paul also used MI5 documents, letters from his birth father, and interviews with family and friends. The story examines why his fathers spied for the Russians, whether they had any regrets (they didn’t), why one was caught while the other escaped, and the impact those events had on members of the family.

11 John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 65. For Hayden Peake’s review, see “The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf, Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 3 (September 2010).
The MI5 documents revealed that Austrian physicist Engelbert Broda, or Berti as he was called, was a communist when he arrived in Britain in 1938 with his wife Hilda. Berti was active in the Austrian Centre, a social club for communists that had been penetrated by MI5. As a result, he was interned for two periods at the beginning of the war. In late 1941, at the request of fellow physicists, he was cleared by MI5 to accept a position in the Cavendish Laboratories at Cambridge University to work on the atomic bomb project. He was joined a few months later by his friend and fellow communist, Nunn May. In 1942 Berti contacted another communist friend, Edith Tudor Hart—the KGB spotter that introduced Kim Philby to his recruiter—and offered his services. They were promptly accepted. (150–51) Berti met with his handler every two or three weeks until 1946, when he returned to Austria. Though suspected of spying and subjected to periodic surveillance, he was never caught.

Nunn May was less fortunate and his case is well known. He was caught because the GRU defector, Igor Gouzenko, produced documents that incriminated him. Paul reveals that Nunn May was frequently asked whether he regretted his spying and his response was that the only thing he regretted was getting involved with atomic research.

Paul Broda presents a sympathetic account of life in the 1930s when communism was popular. He makes clear that his fathers never changed their political views but does not explain how they rationalized their beliefs while remaining in the West. Scientist Spies fills another niche in the story of the atomic spies so captivated by communism that they betrayed their country and never came to regret it.


In his official history, SOE in Scandinavia, British historian Charles Cruickshank wrote that the “OSS...wanted to establish itself in Denmark, where another factor in the equation would have caused problems. Happily [they] were persuaded...to drop the idea.” 12 Danish historian Dr. Peer Hansen tells a different story in Second To None, a translation of his doctoral dissertation, Da Yankeerne Kom Til Danmark (When the Yanks Came To Denmark).

Denmark was a special case in the German occupations in WW II. In return for passive collaboration, the Copenhagen government was left in place and functioned throughout the war. But that is not to say Denmark failed to resist, as Hansen documents. The British established contacts with the Danish Intelligence Service (DIS) and resistance elements through its mission in Sweden, beginning in 1940. By 1943 the Brits were passing selected portions of Danish intelligence reports to their OSS allies. But the OSS wanted the complete originals. Furthermore, the OSS wanted “to use Denmark as a base for intelligence activities inside Germany—a task that wasn’t being performed by the British.” (40) Thus, the OSS, operating from Sweden—the unit was named Westfield—gradually developed its own sources in Denmark. Second to None tells how this was done.

Part I of the book is devoted to the details of organization, lines of communication, personnel assignments, and relations among the OSS, the British, the DIS, and other Scandinavian intelligence services. Hansen describes how the DIS provided agents to penetrate Germany and collect information useful to the OSS during the coming Allied occupation. Looking ahead and seeking to avoid any taint of collaboration with Nazi intelligence, the DIS worked to create a relationship with the Americans that would last after the war and permit it to conduct valuable operations against the Soviet Union and Poland.

Hansen describes several operations intended to achieve these ends. One, Operation Tissue, illustrates the problems that the OSS encountered. While it did place Danish agents in Berlin, their preparation took months, and they didn't arrive until 14 March 1945. Thus the reports they sent back had little impact on the war. Then, the principal agent, "Birch," was arrested by the Soviets, only to be released two weeks later. The British suspected he had become a Soviet agent, and the Soviets said he was a German agent. The question was never resolved.13

Part II of Second To None deals with several overlapping postwar topics. These include the specifics of Danish-American intelligence cooperation, the intelligence links among other Scandinavian countries, and the emerging Soviet threat. Hansen shows how dealing with these issues in the era of demobilization was further complicated in September 1945 by abolition of the OSS and the creation of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), followed by the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). He describes how, despite losses in personnel, Danish-American intelligence conducted operations into occupied East Germany and eventually Poland where Danish SIGINT capability was significant. Counterintelligence operations were also conducted to identify Danes who collaborated with German intelligence or were suspected of being communists. In each of these areas Hansen identifies the personnel involved and reviews many of the operations, implemented and planned, to develop the required intelligence.

The title of the book is a quote from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's assessment of the Danish intelligence contribution to the war. (107) Hansen's research in US and Danish archives has produced a unique book on a topic not treated in any depth elsewhere. It, too, is second to none.


Arthur Owens was an electrical engineer with a patent on an innovative storage battery that extended the amount of time submarines could remain submerged. In the early 1930s he formed a business and soon had clients in Britain and Germany. The British Admiralty was interested in the details of his contacts with the Reichsmarine and, in collaboration with MI6, requested his cooperation. He readily agreed. Then, seeking to enhance his profits, Owens disclosed his role with the Admiralty to the Germans and offered to provide them details of his interactions with it. They, too, readily agreed and furnished him a code and a cover address in Germany. But unbeknownst to the German security service—the Abwehr—the address Owens was given had been compromised, and he quickly came under suspicion as a German agent by MI5.

From that point on, Owens's activities were closely monitored. In December 1936, during a meeting in Germany, the Abwehr moved to formalize what had become a productive relationship by offering regular payments, providing a transmitter, and requesting specific military data that would require Owens to acquire subagents in Britain. After agreeing to the recruitment, Owens returned and promptly informed MI5. Then he offered to continue working for the Abwehr under MI5 control. Code named SNOW, Owens thus became the first agent in the WWII Double Cross System.

This much of SNOW's story has been told before.14 Authors Nigel West and Madoc Roberts have added details obtained from material released by the British National Archives and from interviews with surviving members of the Owens family. The authors describe the complex

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double agent handling techniques MI5 developed using SNOW as a test case. While his true allegiance was at times suspect, West and Roberts document some major contributions. For example, his controlled radio transmissions allowed the Bletchley Park codebreakers to begin reading the Abwehr traffic that identified others agents in Britain. Other messages established a detailed order of battle of the German army. At the same time, his deceptive responses to Abwehr tasking protected the reality of the circumstances in Britain. These accomplishments were, of course, unknown to him.

It was not all smooth sailing for SNOW. When his wife, Jessie, learned he had a mistress, she took the children—Robert and Patricia—and left, but not before denouncing him as a Nazi spy and for recruiting Robert to spy for the Germans as well—the boy would later go to jail for doing just that. Jessie went on to charge that Owens only told MI5 of his work for the Abwehr because he thought he was under police surveillance. Thus when the war started he was arrested and for a while transmitted to his German masters from prison. When the Germans demanded face-to-face meetings, MI5 was forced to allow Owens to travel to Hamburg and then Portugal. When his performance in Portugal raised doubts about his loyalty to Britain in 1941, he was imprisoned again, this time for the balance of the war.

Owens' MI5 handler, Tar Robertson, gave him £500 after the war but that was the only recognition he received. After unsuccessful attempts to start a business with his son Robert (now out of jail), Arthur Owens found a new mistress, changed his surname to White and disappeared. The authors managed to learn that he started a new family and lived quietly in Ireland working as a self-employed chemist and frequenting the local pub, the Keyhole, until his death in 1957. Owens left behind three children; two (Robert & Patricia) by his first and only marriage, and one (Graham White) by his last mistress. Patricia and Graham only learned of his life as a spy after his death. By that time Patricia had become an actress and starred in the science fiction cult film, The Fly. Graham, found it hard to accept that the quiet man he knew as father had been a major double agent.

West and Roberts have answered many of the questions that surrounded the career of double agent SNOW. But as to "which side was Arthur Owens really on" they conclude that only he knew for sure. (206)


The US intelligence has been the subject of 40 commissions since 1946. Professor Loch Johnson was on the staff of two of them. He wrote an award-winning book about his experiences on the first, the Church Committee, and now he has written one about the second, the Aspin-Brown Commission.

The Threat on the Horizon is not just another lethally dull, detailed account of a commission's investigative activities. Johnson has included many personal observations and anecdotes about himself and those with whom he worked. The result is an unusual view of why the Aspin-Brown Commission was created, what it sought to accomplish, how it functioned, and the impact it had, as seen from Johnson's perspective.

Johnson's role, he tells us with comforting candor, began when he was a congressional fellow.
on Senator Church’s staff. Five years later, he returned to serve as the senator’s personal assistant on the Church Committee. When interviewed for the job, Johnson “reminded him that [he] knew virtually nothing about the CIA or any intelligence agency.” The senator replied, “I don’t either…but we’ll learn together.” (x)

After the 1976 presidential election, Johnson joined the newly formed House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) as its first staff director, and that is where he met Les Aspin. After three years, Johnson left the committee and returned to academia. With the end of the Cold War, some members of Congress and the media began openly questioning the need for the CIA, which, according to some, seemed to lack a mission. The president and Congress decided to quiet the talk by resorting to a weary familiar solution—they created a commission. Aspin was its first chairman; Johnson was his special assistant. Its objective, writes Johnson, “was to explore how well the CIA and its companion spy organizations managed the transition from the Cold War to a new world of terrorists, rogue nations, civil wars, and failed states.” (xvi)

Johnson describes in great detail how the membership was negotiated; the initial concerns of the members; the development of an expanding agenda; the meetings they held, including who attended and who did not; and funding issues. Other topics covered include the members’ extensive travel, the many interviews, and the assessments of national intelligence estimates. It will surprise no one that the staff did most of the work. Progress was uneven, mainly due to unanticipated events. For example, the appointment of a new DCI, John Deutch, was somewhat unsettling. Then there was a debate about the desirability of giving the CIA an environmental intelligence mission—not a popular idea in the CIA Directorate of Operations. (104) The most disruptive event, however, was the sudden death of Aspin. Johnson tells how the commission regrouped under a new chairman, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.

By the time the commission had written its final report, there were several other congressional committees looking into intelligence reform and competing with each other. None of them achieved much. The president essentially ignored the Aspin-Brown reform proposals. (361) And to no one’s great surprise, as Johnson readily acknowledges, “the intelligence community was unaffected in any large way by the Aspin-Brown inquiry.” (366)

The Threat on the Horizon ends with some conclusions and recommendations. Of particular significance is that “The Aspin-Brown Commission did have some influence on policy, but certainly nothing major.” (369) As for the IC agencies, they “deserve more credit for warning policymakers about a terrorist attack against the United States than is usually accorded them.” (372) The recommendations deal with reform in light of the commission’s work as it might be applied to efforts in the post 9/11 environment.

Professor Johnson has given us a richly documented and powerful study of what presidential commissions can and cannot accomplish. Future commission members would do well to study this book.


In 1939, while on vacation in Aberystwyth, Wales, British scientist John Randall, behaving as any sensible tourist would, visited an out-of-print book shop. There he found a translation of Electric Waves, a seminal treatise by Heinrich Hertz. When he read Hertz’s account of a simple device that generated high frequency radio waves, Randall realized the concept was the so-

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lution to the Radio Detection and Finding (RDF) problem that was perplexing British scientists. The idea was to use radio waves that could reach incoming German bombers and then be reflected back to a receiver so the aircraft could be detected long before their arrival over England. (The US Navy would later call it RADAR.) To that point in the war, the British had been unable to design a transmitter that could generate short wavelengths (microwaves) with sufficient power to travel to a target and back to a receiver. Hertz's device, with some modifications solved the problem. Called a cavity magnetron, it made airborne and shipboard radar possible and today powers all microwave ovens. The Tizard Mission is the story of how the British traded that discovery, along with their research on jet propulsion and their experiments on nuclear fission—"Britain's most precious secrets"—for financial and manufacturing support from America. (122)

Author Stephen Phelps takes a broad historical view in telling his story. He traces the origins of the Tizard Mission and British-American scientific cooperation from the bumpy days during WW I and the interwar period to the early days of WW II. He provides biographical sketches of the major players and describes the incessant bureaucratic maneuvering for funds, position, and recognition. Throughout, Sir Henry Tizard is the center of attention. Tizard had studied chemistry and mathematics at Oxford, but after learning to fly during WW I devoted himself to aeronautical research. As WW II approached, he headed a scientific committee that studied RDF and other techniques that could aid the military in time of war. But in the mid-1930s, Tizard's approach to weapons research conflicted with another scientist, Frederick Lindemann, a confidant of Winston Churchill. When Churchill became prime minister, Tizard was taken off the committee and the table was set for his mission to America.

Phelps reviews the turbulent political battles that preceded the mission on both sides of the Atlantic. In Britain, the intelligence services and the military ministries competed for influence. In the United States the initial difficulties centered on opposition to cooperation by the isolationists in Congress. Phelps also assesses the impact of Churchill's unofficial correspondence with Roosevelt before the former assumed power and the difficulties created by the State Department code clerk, Tyler Kent, who stole copies of the Churchill-Roosevelt exchanges. In the end, when the Americans were told of the cavity magnetron in 1940, cooperation followed promptly. radars using the device detected the incoming Japanese planes on 7 December, though the operator's warnings were ignored. The Tizard Mission also shared the results of British atomic research. That led to cooperation in the Manhattan Project and formed the foundation of the "special relationship" of the two countries.

The Tizard Mission is fascinating history; well documented, well told.

Memoir

King's Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, by Jack O'Connell with Vernon Loeb. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), 266 pp., index.

After high school, Jack O'Connell worked to save the $750 tuition needed to attend Notre Dame and play football. When an automobile accident ended that dream, he attended the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His studies were soon interrupted by WW II and Naval service on a minesweeper in the Pacific. He returned to complete his studies at George-town University in 1946 and then simultaneously pursued a PhD and a law degree. Then, with the help of a former MI6 officer and friend of Kim Philby—who O'Connell met in Washington, and later in his career in Beirut—he obtained a two-year Fulbright Scholarship to Punjab University in Lahore, Pakistan. While there, he studied Islamic law, learned Arabic,
travelled throughout the region, and was select-
ed for the 1952 Pakistani Olympic basketball
team. His master's thesis was on "whether it
was possible for an Islamic country to be a dem-
ocratic state." (xii) With these credentials, his
recruitment by the CIA was a no-brainer.

In 1958, O'Connell was sent to Jordan to in-
form the 22-year-old king about an impending
coup attempt. Although initially a resented out-
sider, O'Connell gradually developed a relation-
ship with the young King Hussein. O'Connell
subsequently served in Amman, where he solid-
ified the relationship. O'Connell left the Agency
in 1972 and joined a Washington law firm,
where he was J ordan's lawyer in the United
States. In this capacity he was a participant in
negotiating the Camp David Accords, the king's
1984 peace initiative, and, later, J ordan's recog-
nition of Israel. In 1990 he was asked to find an
American to write the king's biography. After
several unsuccessful attempts, including one
with Dick Helms, O'Connell decided to under-
take the task himself. King's Counsel is the re-
sult.

O'Connell has written a candid book that dis-
cusses the major events of King Hussein's rule
and—although the two men remained friends
until the king's death—does not pull punches.
When necessary, he is critical of the late king,
but he also writes that "Henry Kissinger insti-
gated the 1973 war against Israel." (xix) Other
topics include the development of a liaison rela-
tionship with the J ordanian intelligence service,
the events of the Six Day War—from both the
CIA and J ordanian perspectives (51ff)—and the
difficulties encountered by a chief of station in
dealing with a temperamental ambassador. Per-
haps the most controversial event in the US-J or-
danian relationship had to do with a financial
subsidy provided to the king. When it was ex-
posed in an article by Bob Woodward, it "left the
readers with an erroneous sense that the king
was on the take, a CIA lackey." (137) O'Connell
sets the record straight. At the initiative of the
king's son and successor, O'Connell has main-
tained his links to J ordan after Hussein's death,
and he devotes some space to the consequences.

King's Counsel concludes with O'Connell's
views of the contemporary problems of the Mid-
dle East. He is particularly sensitive to the po-
tential impact of Iran's nuclear program and the
need for a negotiated settlement between Iran
and Israel. As to the CIA, he is not sanguine: "It
hurts me to say it, CIA has made far more [mis-
teakes] than it should have in recent years." (243)
O'Connell has written more than a biography of
a king, it is a valuable memoir with an unusual
perspective on events in the Arab world.

**Intelligence Abroad**

*Mumbai 26/11: a day of infamy*, by B. Raman. (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2009), 272 pp.,
annexures, photos, index.

B. Raman retired in 1994 as head of the Coun-
ter-Terrorism Division of the Research & Analy-
sis Wing (R&AW), India's foreign intelligence
agency. He was then appointed to the Indian Na-
tional Security Advisory Board and served in a
number of other high-level intelligence posi-
tions. He has testified on terrorism before two
committees of the US House of Representatives
and is the author of four previous books on intel-
ligence. In Mumbai 26/11, Raman first reviews
the evolution of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the ter-
rorist organization with links to al-Qaeda that
conducted the attack on Mumbai during
26–29 November 2008. He then describes how
LeT grew "from a sub-continental to a global ji-
hadi terrorist organization," with links in many
Asian and Western nations, including the Unit-
ed States. (24) Next he reviews the many at-
tacks LeT committed on the way to Mumbai; the
empty claims by Pakistan to have banned the
organization; LeT's funding mechanisms; and
the complex infrastructure that sustains LeT's
operations. He goes on to cite various US and In-
dian government and press accounts prior to
2008 that designated LeT as “a dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate that has demonstrated its willingness to murder innocent civilians.” (45) Still, the Mumbai attack was a surprise.

After an account of the attack itself, Raman examines several likely explanations for the surprise. The first is “the totally disjointed manner in which the entire [Indian] counter-terrorism machinery” functioned, “without any synergy in thinking or action.” (93) Then he looks at Pakistan’s failure to take any effective action against LeT and the inadequacies of the US polices that have allowed Pakistan to continue its support of terrorism against India. Raman concludes by calling for a comprehensive inquiry to identify necessary preventive measures and toward this end offers 22 “points of action” that he asserts would help prevent future Mumbai-like attacks.

Mumbai 26/11 is a thoughtful treatment of a persistent problem that threatens not only India, but most Western nations as well.


With two exceptions, the two volumes of Spooks follow the approach the authors established with their previous book: narrow margins, small, densely packed type, without comments that explain purpose, method, or concept, and known cases omitted without explanation.19 The first exception is the endnotes: these two volumes have far fewer cites and none are given for many of the quotes. The second exception is the index: the first volume’s was grossly inadequate, but these don’t even have one. Are the volumes worth consulting? Perhaps, but within limits.

The chapters in the 1939-45 volume are mostly about the major WW II Double Cross System cases, about which books have already appeared. But the summaries in this volume are more thorough than those found in any of the so-called intelligence encyclopedias and are mostly based on primary sources in the British National Archives. There are also several chapters on MI5 organization, changes of leadership, and bureaucratic conflicts with various agencies that provide interesting background.

The limits on the value of the 1945-2009 volume are even more severe. Many important cases are not even mentioned; those that are receive less-than-comprehensive treatment—just a lengthy case outline. The Cambridge Five and the MI5 molehunt are two examples. This volume relies on fewer primary sources and more secondary ones, some of which have problems with accuracy—Peter Wright’s Spycatcher is an example. These limitations may be a function of the limited amount of material available in the Archives, but if that were the case, the authors should have said so up front. While these volumes may be a place to start when studying MI5 history, Wikipedia is probably an equally good alternative.


The first edition of Treachery (2009) was published in the United States before the appearance of Christopher Andrew's authorized history of MI5, Defend the Realm. Both dealt with the molehunt that plagued MI5 from the late 1960s well into the 1980s, but they came to vastly different conclusions. In this revised edition, Chapman Pincher has added his analysis of Professor Andrew's book, stressing the latter's key omissions and contradictions. In the former category, Pincher points out that Defend The Realm fails to mention the role played by Ruth Kuczynski (SONIA) and the other members of her family who were important GRU agents for the Soviet Union. This is particularly important from Pincher's point of view since he concludes SONIA was the Soviet agent who handled alleged GRU agent Sir Roger Hollis before and after Hollis became director general of MI5. Other Andrew omissions include a lack of comments on acknowledged Soviet agents, as for example, Tom Driberg (414), Claud Cockburn (508), James MacGibbon (114), Bruno Pontecorvo (349), Yuri Rastvorov (404) and Ernest Weiss, cases that Pincher treats and documents in some detail. Another important omission from Andrew's book is the failure to include the allegations concerning Hollis contained in a book by Einar Sanden. While unproved, Sanden's allegations are certainly worth of critical scholarly attention. The principal contradiction that Pincher identifies has to do with the identification of ELLI, a Soviet agent mentioned to Pincher by the GRU defector Igor Gouzenko. Pincher concludes ELLI was a GRU agent with links to Hollis, while Defend The Realm maintains ELLI was Leo Long, a KGB agent not involved with Hollis.

The revised edition of Treachery does not resolve the Hollis dilemma, but it does refine the arguments while providing considerable material for counterintelligence scholars. The many questions it raises and the interpretation Pincher provides need to be resolved. This is the stuff of dissertations and should not be ignored.

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Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence 2011

Current Topics and Issues

Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope by Chalmers Johnson (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11 and Misguided Reform by Paul Pillar (55 4 [December], Roger George)
Intelligence and International Security: New Perspectives and Agendas by Len Scott et al. (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)
Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 by Adam D. M. Svendsen (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth by Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (eds.) (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)
A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World by Emile Nakhle (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
Securing the State by David Omand (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping Tomorrow’s Terrorism by Stewart Baker (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
Spies, Lies and the War on Terror by Paul Todd et al. (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
Spying in America in the Post 9/11 World: Domestic Threat and the Need for Change by Ronald A. Marks (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)
The Threat Matrix: The FBI at War in the Age of Global Terror by Garrett M. Graff (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)
Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China by David Wise (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)
The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence by Bassey Ekpe (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)

General

Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage by Eamon Javers (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
Business Confidential: Lessons for Corporate Success from Inside the CIA by Peter Earnest and Maryann Karinch (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)
Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present by Timothy Walton (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)
Extreme Risk Management: Revolutionary Approaches to Evaluating and Measuring Risk by Christina Ray (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)
Hollywood and the CIA: Cinema, Defense, and Subversion by Oliver Boyd-Barrett, David Herrera, and Jim Baumann (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)
Intelligence: Critical Concepts in Military, Strategic, and Security Studies by Loch Johnson (ed.) (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)
Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professional’s Guide to Covert Surveillance Training by Peter Jenkins (55 1 [March], Bookshelf)
The Technical Collection of Intelligence by Robert M. Clark (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the Studies in Intelligence issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.
Historical

Abundance of Valor: Resistance, Liberation, and Survival: 1944–45 by Will Irwin (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)

America’s Nazi Secret by John Loftus (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)

AREA 51: An Uncensored History of America’s Top Secret Military Base by Annie Jacobsen (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith by D. K. R. Crosswell (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Behind Enemy Lines: The Autobiography of Britain’s Most Decorated Living War Hero by Sir Tommy MacPherson (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Betrayal: Clinton, Castro and the Cuban Five by Matt Lawrence and Thomas Van Hare (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the C.I.A., the S.A.S., and Mossad by Tony Geraghty (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

The Brenner Assignment: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Spy Mission of World War II by Patrick K. O’Donnell (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs by Jim Rasenberg (55 4 [December], Thomas Coffey)

A Covert Affair: Julia Child and Paul Child in the OSS by Jennet Conant (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Clinton’s Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief by Richard Sale. (55 2 [June], Matthew P.)

Double Death: The True Story of Pryce Lewis, the Civil War’s Most Daring Spy by Gavin Mortimer (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)


Edward Bancroft: Scientist, Author, Spy by Thomas Schaeper (55 4 [December], John Ehrman)

Empire and Espionage: Spies and the Zulu War by Stephen Wade (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Final Verdict: What Really Happened in the Rosenberg Case by Walter Schneir (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

The First War of Physics: The Secret History of the Atom Bomb 1939–1949 by Jim Baggott (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

For the Soul of France: Culture Wars in the Age of Dreyfus by Frederick Brown. (55 1 [March], John Ehrman)

Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia by Michael Korda (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)

How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History by John Prados (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)

The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb by Allen M. Hornblum (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

The Kremlin’s Geordie Spy: The Man They Swapped for Gary Powers by Vin Arthey (55 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Mission Accomplished: SOE and Italy 1943–1946 by David Stafford (55 4 [December], Bookshelf)


Our Man In Tehran: The True Story Behind the Secret Mission to Save Six Americans during the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Foreign Ambassador Who Worked with the CIA to Bring Them Home by Robert Wright (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond by A. Ross Johnson (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)


Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean by Alex Von Tunzelmann (55 4 [December], Thomas Coffey)

Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall by Jonathan Haslam (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)
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<td><strong>A Spy’s Guide to Santa Fe and Albuquerque</strong> by E. B. Held (55 3 [September], Bookshelf)</td>
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<td><strong>This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive</strong> by James S. Robbins. (55 2 [June], Clayton Laurie).</td>
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