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Language, Culture, and Cooperation in Scientific and Technical Intelligence

Lily E. Johnston

The following article was adapted from a paper that was a finalist in the 2007 DNI Galileo Competition, a program that awards authors of papers proposing innovative solutions to Intelligence Community challenges.

Summary

The findings of recent studies of Intelligence Community treatment of S&T and weapons issues suggest that the community is ill-prepared to meet its mission of mitigating technological surprise. Author Lily Johnston of the CIA argues that the IC must better understand the challenges posed by today's global scientific and technological environment and adjust to meet them. Until the IC rewards fluency in the language of this dynamic field and culture, it will not learn about or understand new foreign S&T developments in their social, political, or military contexts.

Johnston proposes paths for improvement, including the fostering of greater S&T expertise, better understanding of the consequences of dual-use technologies, creating proficient S&T collectors, effectively leveraging combined S&T expertise in teams, and seamlessly integrating analysts, collectors, and subject matter experts.

Introduction

The Intelligence Community [is] particularly vulnerable to surprise by 'rapidly changing and readily available emerging technologies whose use...may result in serious and unexpected threats.' ... One senior administration official...described the IC's capability to conduct this kind of all-source S&T and weapons analysis as 'pretty poor' and 'mediocre at best'."1

Sobering comments such as the one above, taken from the report of the WMD Commission of 2005, are the rule, not the exception, in discussions regarding the health of S&T intelligence—i.e. the ability of this community to collect and analyze foreign intelligence and to produce the products that generate policy options. The commission's report and the work of other Intelligence Community study boards spurred reform efforts across the com-

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
Two things must happen if we are to do more than optimize a system that is fundamentally flawed.

- First, we must understand that the world of science and technology has a culture and a language of its own, and we must expand the number of people capable of living and communicating in that culture. In effect, we must put “S&T” alongside Mandarin, Pashto, and Farsi in importance as we recruit and develop people to work in traditional hard-target fields.

- Second, we must redefine cooperation at three levels—between analysts and collectors, among IC components, and between IC components and academia and industry. This will require creation of a new system in which S&T language and culture experts retain their skills and credentials in order to gather and make sense of foreign scientific and technical intelligence.

The solution I propose—creation of integrated teams of multi-disciplinary S&T officers, doing both collection and analysis—is a hard approach to a hard problem. My recommendations invoke the spirit of the recommendations of the WMD Commission and IC study boards and build on them in the hope of addressing potential pitfalls and several concerns.

These recommendations are also made in the recognition that no single solution exists to meet the challenge of improving work in scientific and technological intelligence. Efforts on a broad front are needed, and, to the credit of the S&T intelligence community, many tangible and practical matters are being addressed.

The World Isn’t Round, the War Isn’t Cold: the Changing Nature of S&T

We are confronting adversaries who are achieving exponential improvements in their operations through widely available, cutting-edge technology in which their R&D costs are any CEO’s dream: zero.... We do face a daunting set of challenges in today’s world, and they are different challenges from those of the last century—not only because our adversaries are different in kind and character, but also because their weapons and technical resources are different in kind and character.

Science and technology has and will continue to revolutionize the world we live in—how we do business, how we communicate, even how we conceive of our personal identities. Developments happen so fast that new electronics are a generation old almost immediately after they are purchased, and basic research begins growing stale only a year or two after it is published.

More than ever, new technologies have the potential to be adapted and adopted by our adversaries in undesirable ways. The IC cannot afford to wait until basic research matures into weapons systems or measurable threats before focusing its attention on them. Emerging technologies form a critical part of the IC’s S&T intelligence portfolio, but as more emphasis is placed on basic R&D, we are learning that it poses an entirely different set of challenges for analysts and collectors than we are used to.

First and foremost, S&T intelligence is becoming increasingly complicated as more and more commercial technologies with potentially disruptive or unintended applications come to market. The so-called dual-use problem means we cannot simply identify R&D programs, but must also assess their intent. Cellular phones, for example, are nearly ubiquitous in daily life, but it is when the owner intends to use one as part of a detonator for an explosive device that it becomes disruptive.
Capability assessments without indications of intent are nearly meaningless in the world of dual-use technology. However, determining intent is by far the harder problem, one that relies more heavily on human and signals intelligence than on any other INT. Therefore, it is more important than ever that the S&T intelligence community come together to find solutions to our shortfalls in this area.

Ironically, though we are dying of thirst for HUMINT and SIGINT on intent, we are simultaneously drowning in vast, ever-increasing amounts of open source S&T information. Three principal characteristics can describe the change in the global practice of science and technology: expansion, acceleration, and convergence. Expansion and acceleration are the most intuitive: there is more information available (expansion), and it is accumulating faster and faster (acceleration). Convergence describes two or more disciplines coming together to solve problems at the junctions between them, sometimes resulting in new, discrete fields of study.

Expansion and Acceleration.

Science and technology, more so than other domains of interest to the IC, faces an exponential increase in the amount of baseline information openly available. Like all analysts, S&T analysts monitor new developments—players moving pieces on a game board. Less common to other analytic disciplines is that the rules of the game change almost as quickly as players move their pieces. A political, economic, or military analyst trained 10 years ago will have had to keep up with changes in policy, for example, but will not necessarily face having to learn an entirely novel system of governance over those 10 years. Science and technology analysts, however, will, over a decade, certainly face new areas of study, new technologies, and new fundamentals of how the world works.

Regardless of the metric—number of journals, terminal degrees in science and engineering, conferences, or patents—the numbers all say the same thing: the continued growth of S&T activity around the world is undeniable. Yet as the S&T literature expands and is generated increasingly quickly, there are precious few indications within the IC that we have acknowledged the challenge, much less adjusted to address it.

Convergence.

Interviews with leading US scientific experts conducted as part of a National Science Foundation study revealed that "many researchers believe that the most promising research problems now require multiple techniques and perspectives that are beyond the capacity of individual laboratories." Additionally, that: "[R]esearch has become more collaborative in practically all respects. Scientific articles more frequently involve authors from more laboratories, more institutions, and institutions in more countries. Collaborators are more often trained in different disciplines. ...Collaborations with researchers in other institutional sectors, especially industry, were becoming more common." As the data, research areas, industries, and centers of excellence multiply and converge, the S&T intelligence community will have to learn to converge with them or risk missing the most innovative developments in science and engineering.

Convergence in basic research (depicted on the next page) is occurring faster than academic training programs can keep up. Therefore, S&T intelligence officers will need to cover topics and areas that will stretch the limits of their training. One (partial) solution to this problem would be to assemble teams of officers with enough overlap in expertise to allow them to help each other provide broader coverage, but not so much overlap that they are redundant. Deliberate assembly of teams is important—it is unlikely to occur by happy accident—to foster environments in which officers come together and create
more than the sum of their number in their research and their products.

The point is to suggest that S&T intelligence is different—not harder—than any other discipline. But S&T intelligence becomes harder when those who practice it must, for lack of alternatives, use tradecraft appropriate for other disciplines. Fundamentally different disciplines outside of the IC require fundamentally different ways of evaluating them within the IC.

A Note on Expert Partnerships

Although it is a successful interaction mechanism with academia and the private sector, it is insufficient compared to what is required. The Intelligence Community needs more consistent advice than that provided by unpaid professionals and more contemporary advice than that provided by intelligence scientists who have not published research in over a decade.8

Perhaps the biggest question this paper must answer is “Why aren’t current proposals to improve partnerships with subject matter experts good enough?” To be fair, we have not yet given stronger doses of the current methods much chance to work. However, no current proposal addresses the

A representation of interconnected scientific paradigms (convergence) created by Kevin Boyack and collaborators for an article “Mapping Science” on http://sandia.gov/news/features (accessed 27 May 2008). The graphic portrays 800,000 scientific papers, showing relationships between them and scientific disciplines. The strings emanating from the 776 red clusters of papers are words common to each scientific paradigm reflected in that cluster’s papers. See Sandia.gov for a more detailed explanation.
problem of trying to be two places at once.

Being an intelligence officer is often a more-than-full-time job, and cutting-edge S&T is no different. We can ask scientists to try and bridge the gap, but until there is an incentive structure that can adequately compensate them for being only part-time scientists, we will never get the level of effort that is required. Few scientists would risk their careers out of the goodness of their hearts to help the IC, regardless of their belief in our mission. We can ask intelligence officers to do the same, but as I will discuss below, our officers will never truly be accepted (back) in the S&T world and be granted the access they need without a drastic change in the nature of their jobs and in the institutional support they receive.

The Language Barrier

Outcome: Establishes incentives for the IC to more quickly attract and hire highly qualified Americans to include first-generation Americans whose native language skills and cultural experiences are indispensable to facing current and future national security challenges.9

The formula on the opening page of this article is an intentionally obtuse equation to make a point. It is known to biochemists as Hill’s equation for cooperative binding. The reference might be considered obscure, even by those with backgrounds in the life sciences, but it highlights three points:

• It describes a type of cooperation that I will revisit in the conclusion;

• Scientists and engineers use languages unique to their fields;

• It is a reminder (particularly for those of us who at one time used the Hill equation) that, like all languages, what once was at your fingertips is easily lost, replaced by other knowledge that is tapped more often. The colloquial expression holds: use it or lose it.

Equations and concepts are the building blocks of the language S&T experts use to communicate with one another.

That situation is roughly analogous to the one facing the S&T officer who has been sequestered in the IC for 15 years; who has followed a topic in an area outside his primary area of expertise (expertise that would be dated in any case); and who communicates findings primarily to non-scientific audiences. In this circumstance, trying to stay fluent in S&T is like trying to stay fluent in French by skimming Parisian papers twice a week and participating in a weekly language club. It can be done, but it is exceedingly difficult. Myriad incentives exist to develop and maintain foreign language expertise in the IC, but there are no serious, concerted efforts to recruit, maintain, and enhance S&T language capability.

Furthermore, if we add in the challenge of convergence, our metaphorical French-speaker would now be burdened by having to learn the words in Russian, Portuguese, German, and Italian that have suddenly become essential to understanding new developments. It would be unreasonable to expect all officers involved in S&T intelligence to be “fluent,” but a cadre of analysts and collectors must be if the IC is to keep up.
Without insider-level credibility, officers do not have the access required to know what is happening in emerging S&T.

The Culture Barrier

Current analysis often fails to place foreign S&T...in the context of an adversary’s plans, strategy, policies, and overall capabilities. Failure to think creatively about how to develop an analytic cadre with deep understanding of cultures very different from our own will seriously undermine the Community’s ability to respond to the new and different intelligence challenges of the 21st century.

Establishing bona fides are part and parcel of human interactions, especially in intelligence work. Not everyone can be trusted, but an exchange of information between two parties helps establish a measure of mutual credibility and trust. Likewise, the absence of certain facts or behaviors can betray someone as an outsider instantly. The science and engineering communities are no different: their members can easily distinguish insiders from imposters.

Vocabulary is one mechanism for identifying those who belong, but suppose an IC officer can overcome that obstacle. Far and away, the most common yardsticks for judging S&T prowess are the “Big P’s”: pedigree, publications, and patents. You are an insider if you have:

- learned from well-respected names in the field; published peer-reviewed original research; or have filed patents in the past year. In some S&T areas, historical relationships with intelligence and defense communities makes interaction easier, particularly if information can be shared at the classified level.

In emerging S&T, where very few scientists have experience with the IC, much less clearances, the experience is different. There, wariness and hesitation to talk to intelligence officers—especially if those officers appear to be unconnected to the R&D community—colors all interactions and generally stymies intelligence gathering.

Without insider-level credibility, officers do not have the access required to know what is happening in emerging S&T in real time—before it appears in peer-reviewed venues, often years after the articles were first researched and written. They instead must rely on open-source literature and research. Imagine trying to do economic analysis for tomorrow’s policy decisions with years-old data. That kind of a lag in reporting would be intolerable in any other intelligence area of interest; yet it is the rule in S&T intelligence.

The challenge of gaining insider access is not a new one. Indeed, tacit acknowledgement of it probably explains our systematic reliance on academic and industrial subject matter experts (SME) to report back to the IC. The glaring flaw in this strategy is that the vast majority of our SMEs have little inkling of how the IC works or what would be important to analysts.

It gets worse when, as is typical, our SMEs are reporting to HUMINT collectors who do not have strong backgrounds in S&T and are not equipped to judge what information is of value. Our generalist collectors work hard, but through no fault of their own, they often do not understand the subtleties of the S&T community. We have placed an incredibly unfair burden on collectors, asking them, in effect, to operate in a foreign language and in an environment into which they cannot blend.

Another flaw in the current system is that because we tend most often to interact with US scientists, it is heavily biased by the US scientific culture. Even when such SMEs report observations from overseas, they are like Parisians observing Quebec: their recollections are either without context, or more insidiously, unconsciously interpreted through the lens of US S&T practices.

Few US-based SMEs are intimately familiar with the fund-
ing, tenure, intellectual property, defense S&T, and collaborative climates outside of the United States. Acquisition of this type of knowledge abroad takes time and experience abroad. Managers of other intelligence specialities understand the critical importance of extended time in target countries. So why should S&T intelligence be any different?

Finally, we must address the S&T intelligence culture within the Intelligence Community. Interagency cooperation on S&T issues is probably as strong today as it has ever been, but only through the enormous, largely volunteer, effort of a few individuals. Even with such positive cooperation, however, there still exists a pervasive “agency first, IC second” mentality.

Without question, agencies have differing priorities for S&T intelligence, but it is time to use these differing perspectives as assets rather than excuses to solidify stovepipes. Additionally, IC components often neglect their “blue” or US-based counterparts in the Department of Energy’s national laboratories and the Defense Department research labs. Program managers and researchers in these environments often have excellent insights on state-of-the-art R&D and have significantly more freedom to move in the academic and industrial S&T sectors.

Not only do different perspectives strengthen our analyses, but they also maximize the use of resources by avoiding duplication of efforts and the multiplication of requirements. A shared community-based collection program might go a long way toward supporting the spirit of cooperation that is slowly growing within the S&T intelligence community.

**...Require Radical Solutions**

[The IC] should develop and manage a range of new overt and covert human intelligence capabilities. In particular, a “Human Intelligence Innovation Center”...should be established to facilitate the development of new and innovative mechanisms for collecting human intelligence.12

We found inadequate [IC] collaboration and cooperation, analysts who do not understand collection,...ineffective systematic use of outside experts...[and] a shortage of analysts with scientific and technical expertise.13

This fundamental ignorance of collection processes and principles can lead to serious misjudgments, and we recommend that the [IC] strengthen analyst training in this area.14

There is a fundamental disconnect between analysts and collectors, and it is particularly pronounced in S&T intelligence. Generally, neither analysts nor collectors have the (S&T) language or cultural credentials to gather and process the information required to adequately cover today’s S&T landscape. Increasing, and to some degree formalizing, the interactions between analysts and outside experts alleviates this burden somewhat, but ultimately what we need are inside experts. Additionally, it is not clear that the increased contact with outside experts has affected the collection process measurably (that is, led to more debriefings, more intelligence reports, improved access, etc.).

Why Expert Outreach Only Takes Us So Far

All reform efforts currently underway in the S&T intelligence community are absolutely necessary—they just may not be sufficient to meet the challenges. What more might we try? What follows is a “thought experiment” that presumes an ideal world in which budgetary and bureaucratic impediments are minor. It is offered in the hope that it provides a pathway to real change, but written with the full knowledge that it contains major impracticalities and other shortcomings.
Building Blocks

In practice, it may ultimately be more feasible to tackle the problem S&T intelligence faces in smaller pieces. Any proposed solution must contribute to the creation of the following conditions:

1. S&T officers become “inside experts,” largely by being given better mechanisms to maintain their language and cultural credentials throughout their career—and are rewarded for doing so;

2. The importance of intent in dual-use S&T assessments, and therefore the importance of all sources—not just open sources—is understood, and programs are designed accordingly;

3. Collectors have proficiency in S&T language and are able to move freely in foreign scientific communities, academic and industrial;

4. Teams of S&T officers are assembled to ensure that their combined expertise can cover cutting-edge S&T that may not fit squarely under any single officer’s portfolio;

5. S&T analysts gain deep understanding of the collection process, and S&T collectors gain deep understanding of analysis;

6. Additional mechanisms are created to encourage, if not require, S&T intelligence officers to work across agency barriers in order to maximize resources and the number of perspectives on a given issue.

There will be lots of ways to address some or all of these pieces, but might there be a single model that accommodates them all to some degree? Perhaps it would look something like the following.

**One Concept: The Science and Technology Analytic Collection Cell**

This concept is inspired by at least two small pilot efforts (not specific to S&T) already underway in the Intelligence Community. Teams of six to ten officers from IC agencies (or the office of the DNI) would form what could be called S&T Analytic Collection Cells (STACCs).

Recruited early in their science or engineering careers, these officers would be trained as hybrids, part analyst, part collector, with officers later choosing to emphasize one track or the other.

Following extensive IC training, STACC officers would return to the outside S&T community, rotating back into their careers, but as intelligence professionals as well as subject matter experts. Eventually, the STACC teams would be assembled, and each officer’s outside S&T career would migrate overseas in conjunction with those of their teammates. With day jobs in the local S&T community, these officers would be in exceptional positions to unobtrusively observe what is happening in foreign S&T at very granular levels. But the officers would also be able to put developments into the context of the regional S&T environments in which they are working.

These teams could also include venture capital investors, science writers, intellectual property lawyers, and others who would add different and important perspectives to our understanding of S&T systems worldwide. Teams would meet regularly in secure venues to engage their colleagues with other expertise, share observations, brainstorm new intelligence questions, submit reports, and support analysts producing finished intelligence.

Due to the enormous resources and energy that would be required to run and manage these teams, relatively few of them could operate at any given time. They would certainly not be designed to replace any part of the current analysis or collection process. They would only augment it. Such an undertaking would demand an incredible amount from the officers participating, as well as of the support structure to orchestrate it. Neverthe-
less, we need significant innovation to change how we do business in S&T intelligence, and whether it happens piece-meal or more holistically, as in the STACC model, that innovation will never come without a price.

Conclusion

The IC faces a daunting task in trying to reform S&T intelligence—our old methods are no longer enough to monitor the global S&T environment for disruptive applications. These are untested waters, and whatever course we choose will be risky and difficult. But this cannot be an excuse for not trying. Historically the IC loves nothing more than a hard problem, and likes nothing less than surprise with disastrous consequences. There is no guarantee that if we attempt to tackle the hard problem that we won’t be surprised, but leaving S&T intelligence as it stands certainly invites disaster.

Positive cooperativity in enzyme binding, as described by Hill’s equation, means that an initial binding event makes more likely subsequent events at other sites. Enzyme binding is an awkward analogy for the practice of S&T intelligence, but it does remind us that some things in nature were optimized for groups, not pieces acting in isolation. We cannot adequately examine S&T issues as individual analysts and collectors any longer, and we cannot solve the S&T intelligence problem as individual agencies.

We must build on the momentum generated by the IC study board and reports of the WMD Commission and find innovative solutions to the problems they pose. Their recommendations are a starting point, but they are evolutionary; alone, they will not fundamentally change the system. It is up to the S&T intelligence community, working from the top and the bottom, to spur the revolutionary changes that we need to keep up with a revolutionary era in science and technology.

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Endnotes


3. The other domains include politics, economics, military analysis and weapons system analysis. The latter is often lumped together with S&T intelligence. Without debating the issue, for the purposes of this paper, I will assume that S&T intelligence is separate from mature weapons systems intelligence.


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. “The study team was often told that biology in particular had become markedly and radically more interdisciplinary, developing increasingly strong links to physics, mathematics, statistics, engineering, and various kinds of environmental science....Computational sciences, including mathematics and statistics as well as computer sciences, were another area where researchers reported substantial growth in interdisciplinary work.”


11. Ibid., 389.


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To Improve Analytical Insight

Needed: A National Security Simulation Center

Rachel K. Hanig and Mark E. Henshaw

The quality of IC analysis is inconsistent, and the challenges to sustaining a superior analytic track record look more formidable all the time.

Intelligence analysis too often is like investing in the stock market—past performance is not an indicator of future results. The quality of IC analysis is inconsistent, and the challenges to sustaining a superior analytic track record look more formidable all the time. The bar has always been set high and is moving higher as policymakers demand that analysts:

• be “timely”—at least on par with the public media;

• be analytically correct 100 percent of the time while offering broader strategic views that include longer lists of potential outcomes;

• be strategically relevant on increasingly complex topics as the volume of raw information to filter and analyze grows.

This pressure for increased speed, accuracy, and consistent strategic relevance is one of the primary factors pushing the analytic corps towards risk aversion and its analytical consequences. Under the best of circumstances, even the most experienced IC analysts, those with years of study and experience invested in single accounts, make mistakes by falling prey to mental biases and mindsets, intelligence gaps, or even “lack of imagination.”

Given uneven hiring cycles in the IC’s ranks over the past few decades, it won’t always be the most experienced analysts making the judgments upon which policymakers might rely.

The following essay was a winner in the 2007 DNI Galileo Competition, a program that awards authors of papers proposing innovative solutions to Intelligence Community challenges.

The authors argue that creation of a National Security Simulations Center would strengthen the accuracy and insight of intelligence analysis, improve IC collaboration, and create a testing ground for new analytic tools and methods.
Even perfect access to perfect information would be unhelpful if the analytical models used to process it were deficient.

IC Initiatives to Improve Analysis: Building Blocks for a Larger Solution

The IC has responded to these challenges with three major initiatives. The first came immediately after 11 September 2001 with a call for more diligent adherence to analytic trade-craft “best practices.” The problem was and remains that there really are few standard methods of analysis. Analysts are left largely to their own devices in developing systems for processing intelligence and depend on coordination with other analysts to catch the errors.

The second and most broad-ranging of these initiatives picked up steam after the 2003 Iraq WMD NIE fiasco. Several solutions, including a number of winning Galileo papers, focused on giving analysts better access to data before analysis occurs and promoting better coordination after the fact. Improving the IC’s data organization and inter-and intra-agency sharing is a necessary but ultimately insufficient first step.

Better information sharing and data access are always useful, but information sharing and data access are not analysis. Even perfect access to perfect information would be unhelpful if the analytical models used to process it were deficient, and even perfect coordination among analysts might not be enough to guarantee the models’ quality. So this begs the question: How can analysts stress-test the quality of their analytical models, theories, and theses without waiting for history to prove them right or wrong?

The third major initiative promotes the use of alternative analytic tools and techniques. Again, these are very useful. But the approach is potentially flawed because many structured analytical tools and techniques are employed as individual mental exercises. Their effectiveness can still be undermined by sloppy thinking. Ironically, the analysts who need to use them most desperately are most likely to use them ineffectively or incorrectly, or just not use them at all. Nor can we guarantee that the coordination process will catch sloppy application of alternative analytical tools in all cases since many senior analysts, though experienced in traditional analytical tradecraft, are no more experienced in the craft of alternative analysis than their junior counterparts. Many senior analysts, in fact, prove to be the most resistant to using such techniques.

All three of the above initiatives are critical elements of a larger solution; but even if all three were perfectly executed, analysts would still struggle to meet several of the policymakers’ requirements during crises. Quality analysis cannot be rushed. Strategic insights take time to develop, but when a crisis breaks, the time for analysts to engage in deep thinking is often past.

Proposed Solution: The National Security Simulations Center

A solution that fuses all three initiatives together into a single whole and that resolves the problem posed by the pressure for analytical timeliness would be ideal. We propose that one solution is, ironically, both widely known and little practiced by the IC, simulations.

Why Simulations?

Simulations can be very effective in stretching analysis and strengthening the methodological rigor that policy consumers value and expect. The use of simulations is not new. The US military has used them for years, primarily as training tools to help troops develop tactical and joint-service coordination skills. It is unfortunate that the IC has used simulations for the same reason only intermittently at best—there has never been a central, Intelligence Community, simulation hub equivalent to the National Strategic Gaming Center at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, or the Wargaming Center at the Naval
Such simulations as have been conducted were usually performed under the purview of individual agencies. However, the intelligence failures of recent years suggest that the IC should be staging simulations for another purpose: to develop strategic insights into potential geopolitical developments.

Simulations are not predictive, but they can allow analysts to explore key analytic questions and conclusions in far greater depth than is possible from behind a desk or in meetings with other analysts. A properly organized geopolitical simulation forces analysts into dynamic, social, stressful situations that simulate real-world conditions to expose the participants' thinking, mindsets, biases, and assumptions to colleagues and observers positioned to identify analytic weaknesses.

Good simulations can also peel back the layers of intellectual cruft and weak analysis to expose new insights. A Useful Model
The US Naval War College in Newport, RI, has been a pioneer in the use of gaming and simulations to advance thinking about the nature of warfare and naval strategy. Early games in Newport worked out aspects of the Pacific campaign during World War II long before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. During the Cold War, the college's Gaming Department worked through a variety of conflict scenarios with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and other potential enemies in far flung locations.

More recently, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies has explored the implications of conflict in economically sensitive areas. In one series of simulations executives of financial trading institutions, military planners, foreign policy officials, and intelligence officers examined the economic implications of potential conflict scenarios. In addition, such groups have explored the impact of changing economic conditions on US security and military deployments. Increasingly, as multinational operations have become the norm, gaming has acquired greater international dimensions.

Integration and Collaboration
The NSSC could regularly stage large-scale simulations that would bring together analysts and managers from multiple agencies. Such simulations would give participants opportunities to share information, ideas, theories, and best practices in structured, realistic environments designed to push the participants toward common goals.

In this sense, the NSSC would function much like the NDU National Strategic Gaming Center for Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

The Director of National Intelligence already has the charter, provided by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 1023, 119B, to create national interagency centers that focus on intelligence issues. The National Counterterrorism Center and National Counterproliferation Center are two current examples. However, a National Security Simulations Center (NSSC) would not focus on any single issue that threatens US interests. Not only could it address threats of all kinds, it could deal with other community priorities, as seen below.
Players would be in position to identify intelligence gaps and to begin developing targeting plans to fill those gaps.

Center or the Naval War College Wargaming Center. Such simulations would teach participants how to work together during crises, who to call, and the capabilities of their IC counterparts. The personal connections developed in such an environment would be highly useful during real crises, as participants would better know who to call and would have practiced real-time coordination with their counterparts.

However, the NSSC could stage simulations that go far beyond practicing tactical responses to crisis scenarios. By having analysts participate in the scenario development process, it would also become a strategic analysis cross-pollination center. Previously proposed solutions to problems of community coordination and integration could be field-tested in controlled environments to determine their practicality and identify their strengths and weaknesses.

Engagement of outside experts

A simulation’s value rests directly on the quality of both the scenario and the participants. Backed by the DNI’s authority and resources, NSSC simulations could recruit high quality participants to lend expertise to scenario development and to participate in the simulations. It is not unreasonable to believe that former high-ranking government officials, corporate CEOs, leading academic thinkers, and other notable figures—including foreign participants—would be willing to participate in NSSC simulations. Their involvement would improve strategic analysis across the board and strengthen the outreach efforts of individual agencies, which now tend to be piecemeal and ad hoc. This would ensure that outside expertise finds broader audiences and becomes better aligned with the needs of individual agencies.

Staying ahead of geopolitical developments

The media’s rapid response to breaking events leaves the IC at a significant disadvantage in informing policymakers. The NSSC could help analysts remain both timely and strategically relevant by simulating as many events as possible before they happen, thereby buying analysts time that is irretrievably lost once an event actually occurs. In that sense, properly organized and managed, simulations could help analysts more quickly provide more informed perspective to policymakers.

In addition, as a simulation looked into potential developments, players would be in position to identify intelligence gaps and to begin developing targeting plans to fill those gaps.

Training new IC employees

The cyclical nature of hiring in the intelligence community is well documented and the number of analysts in the IC with less than five years experience has reached record highs. The NSSC could take the training of new people beyond the classroom by putting junior analysts into environments in which they could learn and practice tradecraft without having to worry about making embarrassing, or career-terminating, analytical errors or having their efforts dismissed or ridiculed by policymakers.

Alternative analysis techniques, which can be difficult to learn and properly apply, often lend themselves very well to being operationalized within simulations. Alternative futures analysis, Team A/Team B, and several others are particularly well suited for use in simulations.

The NSSC would also help new analysts learn how to better process the vast amounts of data available by teaching them how to determine what information would be most valuable to them and their policymaking customers. And, as they considered the relative importance of information, they could actually begin mining the data they would need in a given circumstance.
Like any craft, intelligence analysis, and especially alternative analysis, must experiment continuously with new tools and techniques. The NSSC would be ideally suited to serve as a laboratory in which analysts could develop and field-test tradecraft innovations before deploying them to the IC at large. In fact, simulations might well point analysts towards new tools and techniques that might otherwise remain undiscovered, or suggest new uses previously unconsidered for existing tools. By increasing the frequency of interaction among analysts focused on specific problems, the NSSC would improve the odds that innovations could emerge from such social networking. The NSSC could be an idea factory for experimental tradecraft.

In sum, the NSSC could be an organization fit to play many roles in the community. Which role it would play at any given time would depend on the kind of simulation chosen for the particular exercise. Tradecraft training, strategic insight development, and testing of analytical tools and techniques all could be managed under the single roof of the highly flexible center.

Building the National Security Simulations Center

Having outlined justifications for creating such a center, the questions become: What should the National Security Simulations Center look like and how might it work?

The NSSC would require, at minimum, four key organizational components (see graphic on following page):

• A Research and Analysis Staff (R&A)
• Simulations Design Staff (SD)
• An Analytical Tools and Techniques Development Staff (AT&TD)
• Private Sector/Academia Outreach Staff (PS&AO)

Research and Analysis Staff (R&A)

The primary responsibility of the R&A would be to work with IC subject matter experts—CIA analysts, NCS officers, and other IC members engaged in analytical or targeting functions—to identify and craft intelligence questions suited for scenario testing. This would require R&A to mount in-depth research campaigns on underlying issue areas to identify three major requirements of each scenario:

• Key variables, which must be observable and measurable in the real world by the IC; or if they aren’t observable (and therefore not measurable) could become so through the implementation of new technologies or collection programs.
• Intelligence gaps, so the simulation designers could understand in advance where the holes in the simulation scenario would be and how they could best be addressed.
• Environmental factors, including social, military, economic, diplomatic, and potential natural disasters beyond the control of key actors.

After a simulation is completed, R&A would be responsible for producing the analytic product documenting its key findings. Using appro-
appropriate analytical standards and tradecraft, the product would include key findings, warnings and indicators, and analytic conclusions. These might include strategic projections and key decision points and discussion of how things might have gone had different decisions been made. This analysis would all be directed toward extracting strategic insights that would give analysts and policymakers deeper understanding of the issues they face.

Simulation Design Staff (SD) The primary responsibility of SD would be to take polished analytical concepts prepared by R&A and develop simulation scenarios to address them. SD would devise scenario story lines and geopolitical conditions that would best illuminate hidden assumptions, insights, and potential outcomes. SD would also create game mechanics to move players through scenarios. Broadly speaking, this would include identifying needed government, private sector, non-state and state roles and organizing players and teams. SD would also be responsible for creating supporting game materials—maps, manuals, and other accessories—and driving development of the computer network that would be used to deliver to players game injects and scenario information and that would provide the means by which players and teams would communicate with each other and with simulation controllers.

Once a simulation design phase is complete, SD would be responsible for conducting the live exercise. Those who create simulation scenarios are usually best prepared to adjudicate players’ actions within those artificial environments. The skills of scenario designers and adjudicators directly affect the validity of any simulation’s results. This is not an activity that can easily be taught. Constructing plausible and useful present and future conditions
for a simulation and then managing the simulation is an art, not a science, and only time and experience teach it. SD would develop expertise as it created legitimate environments and judged players moves to ensure that simulation results would always be credible.

Analytical Tools & Techniques Development Staff (AT&TD)

To fulfill its mandate as an analytical research center, the NSSC would benefit greatly from having a separate team of methodologists who could observe simulations and explore new tools and techniques for addressing the problems players would confront. AT&TD could be an exceptional IC asset, as it could be a think-tank mandated to constantly drive analytical methodologies toward the cutting edge. It could develop and refine new approaches for tackling hard analytical problems until they were mature enough to be put to work in the IC.

Drawing from their respective charters and expertise, AT&TD, R&A and SD could cooperate to design simulation tools and techniques, with a particular focus on pioneering methods and software that could be used outside the center by analysts in small groups at their home facilities. Their work could be enhanced if the NSSC facility had a charter that, while allowing it to handle classified information, also allowed experimentation with new computer network technologies, and allowed for the simulation of 24-hour news media coverage.

The potential local and global influence of the media makes it an essential variable in the simulation environment. Accordingly, an NSSC facility would need distinct spaces, wired for Internet broadband communications and teleconferencing, where multiple teams of varying sizes—perhaps a dozen or more at a time—could play.

PS&AO would be responsible for identifying outside experts willing and able to contribute their time and talents to working side-by-side with IC analysts to design simulations and to play them out to develop the conclusions. Backed by the name and prestige of the Office of the DNI, the NSSC almost certainly would attract leaders from every relevant field, including former and current heads of state and other high-ranking government officials, corporate CEOs, technology visionaries, and key academic figures. Their appearance in a centrally managed simulation would also ensure that their expertise was more widely shared among all the agencies than possible under present circumstances.

Conclusion

At our core, IC analysts are, first and foremost, investigators and scientists. As professional intelligence officers we aggressively search for meaning and strategic understanding of the world and the forces affecting it. We do this to make sense of the present and to give our nation’s leaders insight, context, and prescience about the future. However, we have been asked to increase the quality and relevance of our insight even as the volume of data increases and the time available to make sense of it decreases.
The DNI National Security Simulations Center, a seemingly natural step in the evolution of the intelligence profession, would go a long way toward helping us to better understand the world and to better serve our policymakers.

The National Security Simulations Center could be a 21st-century model for processing and analyzing potential geopolitical developments before they happen. The center would provide additional ways of exploring why things happen, why they break, and what geopolitical levers influence global changes. It would also be a training ground for IC officers to hone their craft. Uncovering hidden assumptions, identifying new indicators, illuminating alternative outcomes, and developing and testing new tools and techniques are tasks inherent in the process of designing and running simulations. As aptly stated by Peter Schwartz in The Art of the Long View, “The scenario process provides a context for thinking clearly about the impossibly complex array of factors that affect any decision.”

Doing what we, as analysts and intelligence collectors, do is going to get harder. The state of the world continues to become more complex. As a nation, how well we continue to influence that complexity is directly related to how well we first make sense of it. The DNI National Security Simulations Center, a seemingly natural step in the evolution of the intelligence profession, would go a long way toward helping us to better understand that world and to better serve our policymakers.
Thinking About Rethinking: Examples of Reform in Other Professions

William Nolte

One of the major judgments of the 9/11 Commission was that among the failures contributing to the disasters of September 2001 was a “failure of imagination,” one that involved intelligence as well as other elements of America’s national security structure. Subsequent efforts to reform the Intelligence Community have been intended, at least in part, to deal with this failure. Prominent among these efforts has been the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that created the Director of National Intelligence and, not incidentally, provided a very broad definition of intelligence. It is in that latter, relatively unnoticed, provision that the United States may find an opportunity for something more important and lasting than organizational reform.

Too often in Washington, reform means “let’s fix the wiring diagram,” hoping that enhanced function and performance will follow form. It is at least possible that the opposite is true, that something resembling the Bauhaus precept of form following function (and in this case purpose) may lead to a better outcome. Doing so must include a fundamental rethinking of intelligence.

Such a process need not entail the wholesale abandonment of everything we have heretofore known or thought about intelligence. Some functions and even some organizations will surely survive a fundamental rethinking, with the survivors benefiting from the outcomes of a rethinking process, not presumptions that bar serious review and renewal.

The late historian Carroll Quigley, long the scourge of

1 Readers may note in this title an allusion to “Thinking about Thinking,” the title of Richards J. Heuer’s first chapter in Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999). It is meant as a small tribute to what continues to be an essential work in the literature of professional intelligence analysis.
Bureaucracies and corporations can also renew, and that should serve as encouragement to those attempting to renew US intelligence.

first-year students at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, argued that societies establish armies, economies, justice systems, and a host of other bodies, as instruments to achieve societal goals. In this view, the initial focus of an organization is outside the organization, at the societal objective for which it was established. Of necessity, some amount of time, effort, and resources is needed to look within the organization, on its staffing, structure, and resources.

Over time, Quigley argued, the amount of effort extended in this internal, institutional, effort grows, ultimately competing with the effort expended on meeting the organization’s instrumental focus. The instrument thus tends to become a vested interest, allowing institutional survival to compete with societal needs as the organization establishes its priorities and deploys its assets. (Nietzche described a similar phenomenon when he noted that the greatest error in human effort came when we forgot what it is we originally intended to do.)

This is, of course, an old story, and history is littered with organizations that once dominated their environment but which eventually succumbed, either to competitors within that environment or to an environment so radically transformed that the organization could not operate within it effectively. Some of us are still old enough to remember when the building rising above Grand Central Terminal in New York City bore the name Pan Am rather than Met Life, or when US Steel was a symbol of American industrial might.

This is not simply a phenomenon for the private sector. In the early part of the 20th century, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, now struggling to redefine itself and in many respects struggling with its own traditions and legacies, was once a showplace for innovation in many areas of law enforcement, especially in its applications of science and technology.

The United States Army

Bureaucracies and corporations age, but they can also renew. That reality should serve as encouragement to the men and women now attempting to renew US intelligence. The United States has rarely witnessed, for example, a greater example, of institutional exhaustion than that experienced by the United States Army by 1975. A decade and a half later, however, the army demonstrated what a focused, courageous, and honest process of self-examination and self-renewal could produce. One aspect of the army's renewal was a willingness to think hard about itself, to dedicate resources to the effort, and to create save havens where rethinking could occur without interference from those who would have argued that fundamental rethinking was unnecessary or disruptive. The army's renewal effort produced, beyond improved institutional performance, a literature of that renewal. It is on such literature, across a range of institutions, that the rest of this article will focus.

The army after 1975 and the military services in general have a professional advantage over their civilian colleagues in the intelligence profession. Scholars of professionalism have long noted that the hallmarks of a profession include such characteristics as a defined (and presumably) lengthy process of professional education, including continuing education after admission.

3 Among the products of such a haven, the military services have used centers at the service and national war colleges, and sabbaticals for serving officers at outside think tanks. Douglas MacGregor's Breaking the Phalanx (1997) is but one example of the provocative work produced by this extraordinarily wise practice in intellectual investment. For an even more radical “insider” view of the future of war, see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (2007). Any study by a retired senior military professional beginning “War no longer exists” is worth at least a second glance.
to the profession; a strong fiduciary sense and a code of conduct or ethics; and, as a result of the other characteristics, a strong sense of identity.4

To continue with the army as an example, the stereotype of the US army between the world wars is of an impoverished institution in which officers languished in grade for a decade or more, equipment aged and became obsolete, and soldiers drilled in one sleepy, irrelevant garrison or another. Edward Coffman, in his wonderful The Regulars, paints a different picture, of an institution materially and financially strapped, to be sure, but intellectually rich and focused on what it could be and how it could function when called upon to defend the nation. Indeed, one could spend a great many years as a captain or major in the army of the 1920s and 1930s, but one could also spend a great deal of time in school, at the National War College, at one of the branch schools, or at the Command and General Staff College.

Mammals, when confronted with a freezing environment, concentrate oxygen in the brain, even at the expense of the limbs. Stupid or short-sighted bureaucracies react to freezes of a different sort by withdrawing budgetary oxygen from things like training and strategic studies to preserve day-to-day operation. The army leadership of the interwar period resisted this tendency, giving it a marvelous cadre of mid-grade officers ready for rapid promotion after Pearl Harbor. The intelligence agencies should make note of this example.

In the Private Sector

As noted above, the phenomenon of institutionalization takes place in the private sector as well as the public sector. And it takes place not just in steel or other manufacturing industries. In part because of the pace of environmental change surrounding it, entertainment is a private sector industry constantly reinventing and rethinking itself. One of the problems in the shift of instruments to institutions is that environmental change can invalidate expertise. A generation (or more than one, depending of the pace of change) that comes to lead because it captures the flow of the environment finds itself, over time, trying to retain its positions of leadership by defending its expertise against a newer generation that argues that what was once new and innovative has now become retrograde.

The leadership that assumed its position based on its mastery of the earlier environmental novelty, finds itself clinging to power by hoping for an environmental reprieve or simply by trying to discredit the insurgents. The American movie industry from the 1920s to the 1940s was a global phenomenon of wealth, corporate power, and glamour, a powerful combination. MGM used to boast it had “more stars than the heavens.”

Barely a decade later, the studio giants were gasping for life. By the 1960s, many of their fabled back lots were subdivisions, and by the 1990s, Discovery Communications could describe itself as a movie studio without the back lots and other front end investments of an earlier generation.5

Today, the question for Discovery is whether it is now the old line corporation defending its turf against insurgents. (MySpace.com is experiencing this phenomenon within even a more abbreviated cycle.) Moore’s Law may not yet apply to all corporate settings, but the half-life of success does seem to be shrinking.

Baseball

Perhaps no industry in American life has been over time surer of its purpose and its


rules than baseball. Except for free-agency and the opening of the game to minorities, few American traditions have survived for so long with, or so it seemed, so little change. The 90-foot diamond field and the 60 feet 6 inch pitching distance, probably determined more by happenstance than plan, seem eternal. A sharply hit ball to the shortstop by a fast runner produces an out by one step. The same ball hit by most catchers produces an out by two steps. True in 1940, almost certainly true in 2040.

But the free agency of players did create a fundamental change in the way teams acquired and retained players. And the assumption was that over time rich teams (those that could purchase players developed by poorer teams) would accumulate a stranglehold on talent. Michael Lewis’s Moneyball, subtitled “The art of winning an unfair game,” describes how several teams, starting with the Oakland Athletics, upended this assumption. In perhaps the most conservative of sports, the Oakland leadership, confronted with a market that could never allow them to compete with rich teams in New York, Chicago, or other major cities, took advantage of information technology and a willingness to rethink everything “everyone” knew about baseball.

The data they used was available to all their competitors, but their competitors neither used nor saw the data the way Oakland’s planners did. For 100 years, for example, baseball insiders knew that advancing a runner from first base to second by stealing a base was an advantage in scoring more runs. In the unfortunate event, the runner was less than swift, sacrificing the runner (i.e., intentionally making an out to advance the runner) was a wise move. Why? In part because John McGraw did it that way in 1903; and, therefore, everyone knew that was “the way we’ve always done it.”

Oakland General Manager Billy Beane, with the advantage of technology that permitted his staff to research every game, every at bat, every attempted stolen base in history, ran the data and discovered a simple reality: the way they’d always done it was wrong. Advancing a runner from first to second by giving up an out reduced a team's scoring chances. The risk of being caught stealing (and thus expending an out) outweighed the gain of successfully stealing the base. In sort, the most important asset a baseball team has is that it gets to keep trying to score until it commits, in most instances, 27 outs.

Sometimes, rethinking means discovering the new: new technology, new tools, new information. The data they used was available to all their competitors, but their competitors neither used nor saw the data the way Oakland’s planners did. For 100 years, for example, baseball insiders knew that advancing a runner from first base to second by stealing a base was an advantage in scoring more runs. In the unfortunate event, the runner was less than swift, sacrificing the runner (i.e., intentionally making an out to advance the runner) was a wise move. Why? In part because John McGraw did it that way in 1903; and, therefore, everyone knew that was “the way we’ve always done it.”

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Sometimes, rethinking means discovering the new: new technology, new tools, new information. In many cases, however, and one suspects this is especially true in data-rich and information-rich environments, the data or knowledge is already available. But it needs to be used, reused, or rethought. In the intelligence case, for example, we have “known” for half a century that most—85 per cent, 90 per cent?—of the information available to decision makers is from open source information.

Think of that: perhaps 90 percent of the information available to solve a problem is available from a source that occupies what percentage of the Intelligence Community’s time and attention. Certainly not 90 percent. Nor 80 percent. Nor, one suspects, 10 percent. Now the DNI has declared that open source will be the “source of first resort,” an encouraging (and correct) decision. All that’s left is to convince several large, complex, heavily capitalized secrets industries to abandon or at least alter “the way they’ve always done it.”

The better integration of open source information and expertise (expertise representing perhaps the greater part of both the problem and the opportunity), information sharing, and a fundamental review of security practices represent an iron triangle of intelligence reform.
and reconceptualization. Success in any demands success in all three. Failure in any reduces or perhaps eliminates any chance of success in the other two. It is difficult to imagine that even the talented, dedicated men and women of the US intelligence services can succeed in such a difficult task without embedding into their professional practice and culture the concept of ongoing, fundamental, scrupulously rigorous rethinking of who they are and what they do.

Let me draw several concluding thoughts. First, rethinking only happens when every option is on the table. When Douglas MacGregor suggested that the division was perhaps not the organizational principle for the 21st century army, he stepped hard on sacred ground. In this respect, he followed an important tradition of, among others, Billy Mitchell. History tells us the Mitchells of the world are often wrong but—and here’s the important point—not completely so. Air power never replaced armies and navies, but the discussion engendered by Mitchell was an important one.

Most of the effort at intelligence reform since 2001 or the

WMD controversy has been about better integrating the pre-existing intelligence agencies. Perhaps it’s worth suggesting that the intelligence agencies—and even the concept of an Intelligence Community—as we’ve known them deserve fundamental review. In a world, for example, where pandemic disease may be as great a national security issue as terrorism, aren’t the Centers for Disease Control important “intelligence” instruments, as the term is understood in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act?

If so, we could, as one option, add the flag of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to the other agency flags and seals that mark membership in the community, and get their people top secret clearances. And build enhanced security systems around their buildings and their computers. And make it difficult for their experts to interact with experts from other centers of expertise. But why would we want to do that? A better approach would be to realize that in the 21st century, intelligence will be primarily about information, and less about secrets. At that point, we could work on better integrating CDC (and state and local officials, and the private sector) into a trusted security network that is truly national and not just an instrument of one part of the federal government.

Perhaps “rethinking” intelligence means asking whether the better integration of the Intelligence Community is or should be an interim step. Perhaps the longer term question is whether the metaphor of an Intelligence Community needs to be rethought, in favor of something broader and more in keeping with today’s realities, such as a national security information network.

The second conclusion must be an express preference for instrumental thinking over institutional thinking. This is absolutely critical (and horribly difficult) in a time of environmental volatility. In the late 1930s, the chief of cavalry in the US army, MG John Herr, wrote the chief of staff recommending a significant increase in the number of horse cavalry regiments. He noted that the expansion of the battlefield had created a problem because it was impossible to increase the stamina of the horse proportionately to the growth of the battlefield. Herr’s recommendation was a system (called porteeing) in which the horses would be brought near the battlefield in trailers, where they would match up with troopers conveyed to the scene in trucks. At that point, the troops would mount and charge. It’s difficult to imagine that Kasserine Pass...
The Intelligence Community is one example of a metaphor gone rigid. So is the intelligence production cycle, a monument to 19th and 20th century industrial concepts.

could have proved worse, but porteeing might have made that possible.

The point is that MG Herr was carrying out his orders, which were to make the cavalry relevant and effective in a future war. His plan was the best he could do within those terms of reference, narrowly conceived. The danger is that institutions will almost always see the future narrowly conceived, that is, assuming the future of the institution. One of Herr’s protégés, LTC George Patton, saw the problem differently, that is to say, in terms of how to make the army, not the cavalry, effective and relevant. He soon transferred to the new armor branch, to his own benefit and that of the nation.7

Intelligence requires similar courage and clarity. The question cannot be how to fix CIA or NSA or any of the others. The question is what constitutes intelligence in the 21st century and what instruments are needed to conduct intelligence. Addressing the intelligence por-
tion of the national “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 commission requires an instrumental answer, not an institutional one.

Third, keep in mind that metaphors can be useful and important; they are rarely real. That is to say, most metaphors represent only a fragmentary view of a larger reality. The Intelligence Community is one example of a metaphor gone rigid. So is the intelligence production cycle, a monument to 19th and 20th century industrial concepts, focused on a sequential production line from needs to output and back again.

Does anyone think information works this way in the 21st century? Why shouldn’t collectors deal directly with end users? Do I really submit my information needs to Google, then let someone process, manipulate them, and assign them to someone for delivery? The dominant metaphor for the early 21st century information environment is either neural or cellular, and any structure attempting to react to that environment through sequential, industrial processes is doomed. Even more dangerous, it is protected from the fate of Pan American, TWA, Montgomery Wards, and other failed former industry leaders, only by the guarantee of an annual congressional appropriation. And it will survive institutionally, but it will not achieve success as an instrument of public policy.

Fourth, intelligence must be open—more open, perhaps—to lessons from other situations, other professions, and other industries. Roughly speaking, American intelligence is in its third generation (the first two being the Second World War and the Cold War, the period before 1941 serving as something of a pre-history.) This relatively limited past is further limited by insufficient attention to that past. The result is that US intelligence has tended to operate in a “constant present tense,” with inadequate investment in strategic looks to the future or to lessons from the past. Within this narrow framework, a preoccupation with “the way we’ve always done it” has been inevitable. Even if some practice has in reality only been in place for ten or 20 years, a virtual historical nanosecond.

The idea of a central intelligence agency was not discovered on a stone tablet. It was worked out within a bureaucratic and political context, and then it evolved further over time. NSA and NGA have their origins in differing (but analogous) forms of communication, information, and information formatting. But changes in the information environment should at least permit inquiry into whether the differences require separate institutions.

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7 See Coffman, The Regulars, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 270, 388. I often have to remind students, when they begin smiling at the Herr’s story, that this was a capable and competent officer doing the best he could in a hopeless conceptual framework. It is, I must admit, hard to avoid a bit of a smile when recounting that his final suggestion in reforming the cavalry was to restore the saber as the regulation side weapon for officers.
This is not to suggest an outcome. It is to suggest that US intelligence has much to learn and much to be encouraged by a deeper understanding of its development over time. The challenges are formidable, but they are not necessarily more daunting than those previous generations faced. More established professions—including law, medicine, and the military—have confronted more generations and more evolutions than intelligence, and there are important lessons to be learned from their experiences.

In the current climate, the financial services industry and the information technology industry seem to share many of the concerns of the intelligence services, among them information-sharing, including how how to provide information to some, while simultaneously denying it to others. That is, after all, the crux of the security dilemma.

To some degree, this means shedding a bit of the exceptionalism that has developed around intelligence over the last half century. “But we’re unique,” is something anyone who has worked in congressional affairs for any intelligence agency has heard over the years as they try to answer the question “Why do we have to tell them so much?”

Leaving aside the thought that the law, James Madison, and now decades of practice require it, the reality is that the Department of Agriculture is also unique: the country has only one such department. And NIH, NASA, and many other agencies deal in highly technical data. Add to these considerations the role of federal agencies outside the intelligence community, state and local government, the private sector, and the academic community in providing the information and expertise on which US security in the 21st century will depend, and an earlier sense of exceptionalism needs to be at least tempered.

Intelligence has much to protect from outside scrutiny. But it also has much to learn from professionals in public health, medicine, and other professions. Several years ago, Steven Levitt, in his entertaining and provocative Freakonomics, drew some explicitly impressionistic conclusions on a vast number of issues, including the decline of crime in the United States through the 1990s. Franklin Zimring, in The Great American Crime Decline, took great exception to Levitt’s conclusions, amassing an impressive amount of data in the effort.

The point is not to choose between Levitt and Zimring, but to note that two or more decades of research in criminology have given scholars and law enforcement officials enormous amounts of data on which to base training, education, and operational decisions involving the nation’s 18,000 or so law enforcement agencies. It is that data and the investment in study and rethinking that have taken law enforcement from a relatively low-prestige, hands-on profession to one in which research and innovation are highly regarded. It is not coincidental that American law enforcement, through such concepts as community-based policing and now intelligence-based policing, has become noted as a world leader in theory, doctrine, and practice.

Mature professions consider introspection and renewal to be critical to professionalism. The models and literature available to intelligence professionals as they rethink their future are almost unlimited. The only limits in fact are the limits of the intelligence imagination, which should, within law and an internal sense of ethics, be virtually unlimited.


9 I have said little about the medical profession, which Stephen Marrin and Jonathan Clemente have discussed in “Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking at the Medical Profession,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, 4. Works like Jerome Groopman’s How Doctors Think (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007) are worth examination because they encourage physicians to achieve a more effective balance between conceptual and technical tools in their professional practice.
The problem is, John Honeyman was no spy....Key parts of his story were invented...and through repetition have become accepted truth.

John Honeyman is famed as the secret agent who saved George Washington and the Continental Army during the dismal winter of 1776/77. At a time when Washington had suffered an agonizing succession of defeats at the hands of the British, it was Honeyman who brought the beleaguered commander precise details of the Hessian enemy’s dispositions at Trenton, New Jersey.

Soon afterwards, acting his part as double agent, Honeyman informed the gullible Col. Johann Rall, the Hessian commander, that the colonials were in no shape to attack. Washington’s men, he said, were suffering dreadfully from the cold and many were unshod. That bitingly cold Christmas, nevertheless, Washington enterprisingly crossed the Delaware and smashed the unprepared (and allegedly drunk) Hessians. Three days into the new year, he struck again, at Princeton, inflicting a stunning defeat upon the redcoats. Though Washington would in the future face terrible challenges, never again would the Continental Army come so close to dissolution and neither would dissension so gravely threaten the Revolution’s survival.

The problem is, John Honeyman was no spy—or at least, not one of Washington’s. In this essay I will establish that the key parts of the story were invented or plagiarized long after the Revolution and, through repetition, have become accepted truth. I examine our knowledge of the tale, assess the veracity of its components, and trace its DNA to the single story—a piece of family history published nearly 100 years after the battle.¹ These historical explorations additionally will remind modern intelligence officers and analysts that the undeclared motives of human sources may be as important as their declared ones—particularly when, as readers will see here, a single source is the only witness.

Origins and Evolution

The Honeyman story has a substantial pedigree in published histories. First publicly appearing in 1873 in a New Jersey journal, the tale has since 1898 been a mainstay in Revolutionary War histories. In that year, William Stryker,
In 1898 William Stryker announced that the Honeyman story was a “well-established tradition.”

That changed in 1957, when Leonard Falkner, a features editor at the New York World-Telegram & Sun, published “A Spy for Washington” in the popular history magazine American Heritage. The piece brought widespread attention to Honeyman’s exploits and cemented his reputation as Washington’s ace of spies in Americans’ minds. Two years later, John Bakeless, a former intelligence officer and author of Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes: Espionage in the American Revolution, portrayed Honeyman in the most glowing terms.

In March 1961, as part of NBC’s Sunday Showcasedrama series, Honeyman’s adventure was celebrated before a national audience. Titled “The Secret Rebel,” the special tantalized viewers with the advertising line, “It was tar and feathers for the ‘traitor’ who claimed to know George Washington!” A decade later, Richard Ketchum’s bestselling history of the Trenton and Princeton campaign, The Winter Soldiers (1972), again paid lavish tribute to Honeyman.

As recently as 2000, Thomas Fleming, a Fellow of the Society of American Historians and an extraordinarily prolific narrative historian, reasserted Honeyman’s essential contribution to Washington’s Trenton victory. Until that battle, “New Jersey had been on the brink of surrender; now local patriots began shooting up British patrols, and the rest of the country, in the words of a Briton in Virginia, ‘went liberty mad again.’” The Wikipedia entry on Honeyman reflects this view.

More recently, however, the Honeyman story has diminished in importance, at least among general historians. Perhaps owing to its broad canvas, David McCullough’s 1776 omits him, while Washington’s Crossing, David Hackett Fischer’s exhaustive examination of those remarkable nine days between 25 December 1776 and 3 January 1777, hedged on the question of authenticity. “[The story] might possibly be true, but in the judgement of this historian, the legend of Honeyman is unsupported by evidence. No use of it is made here.”

Intelligence historians, perhaps paradoxically, tend to give more credence to Honeyman’s achievements. George O’Toole’s Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA repeats the traditional story. The CIA’s own useful history, The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence, notes that Honeyman’s intelligence work “came at a critical time for the American side” and permitted “a strategic victory in political and morale terms.”
Deconstructing Honeyman

The Honeyman story may be partitioned into the five fundamental components that repeatedly appear in accounts of his heroics. Linked together in a narrative, they may be defined as the "Ur-version" of Honeyman's espionage career.

Claim: John Honeyman, of Scottish ancestry, was born in Armagh, Ireland, in 1729 and was a soldier in General James Wolfe's bodyguard at the battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759, where the British victory eventually led to the creation of Canada. He helped bear the fatally wounded Wolfe from the field. Honeyman, however, was never a willing recruit and disliked being dragooned as a redcoat. Soon after Wolfe's death, Private Honeyman was honorably discharged and made his way south. He reappears in Philadelphia in 1775. In the interim, he became a weaver, butcher, cattle-dealer, and the husband of Mary Henry. In early 1776, they and their young children move to Griggstown, New Jersey.

Evaluation: At the time of Honeyman's birth, there was no record of a family of that name living in the Armagh area, making the circumstances of his birth difficult to certify. Alternatively, he may have been born in Fife, Scotland, though one genealogist has speculated that he was the son of a Captain John Honeyman, who had arrived in New York sometime before 1746 and embarked on a small expedition against Quebec that year. Honeyman the future spy was indubitably a Protestant, and almost definitely a Presbyterian. Despite the uncertainty of his birthplace, he appears to have taken the king's shilling in Armagh and to have sailed with Wolfe to Canada in 1758.

There is no evidence, however, that he was reluctant to join the army and, if nothing else, the faith Wolfe reposed in him indicates that he performed his duties with alacrity and enthusiasm. If his father
The two men decided that Honeyman "was to act the part of a spy for the American cause."

were Captain Honeyman, the colors would have been a natural avenue for the young man. The unsubstantiated belief that Honeyman was suborned into donning a uniform is almost certainly a later embellishment intended to demonstrate that this Scotch-Irish "outsider" was secretly disaffected from his English overlords decades before the Revolution—and thus explaining his future actions on Washington's behalf. In truth, if Honeyman were alienated from the Crown during 1775–76, it would most likely be owed to his being a Presbyterian (so antagonistic were his co-religionists toward established authority that King George III once joked that the Revolution was nothing but a "Presbyterian War.").

As for his wife and young family, the traditional story tends to stand up to scrutiny. Mary Henry was from Coleraine, another Protestant part of Ireland, and records indicate that she was eight years his junior. Honeyman also had seven children, of whom at least three were born before the family moved to Griggstown (Jane—the oldest—Margaret, and John.)

Claim: In early November 1776, as Washington's battered forces were retreating from New York and New Jersey into Pennsylvania, Honeyman arranged a private meeting with the general at Fort Lee, New Jersey. He had gained access by brandishing a laudatory letter of introduction from Wolfe and declaiming his attachment to the cause of independence. The meeting was a necessarily hurried one, but (in the words of the chief 19th century source) the two men decided that Honeyman "was to act the part of a spy for the American cause" while playing "the part of a Tory and quietly talk[ing] in favor of the British side of the question." In other words, Honeyman was to present himself as a Loyalist while the Americans were nearby, but once Washington had departed and the British occupied the rump of New Jersey, his mission was to collaborate with the enemy, selling the army cattle and horses and supplying its soldiers with beef and mutton. He was to operate behind enemy lines, travel alongside the army, and leave his wife and children at home. As a camp follower, Honeyman would be in an excellent position to observe British movements, dispositions, fortifications, and logistics, plus gain advance knowledge of the enemy's designs.

Evaluation: Washington's movements affirm that such a meeting could have taken place. The general was based at his headquarters in White Plains, New York, between 1 and 10 November and thence Peekskill between 11 and 13 November, ruling out Honeyman's recruitment in that period; upriver from Manhattan, White Plains and Peekskill were quite a trek from Griggstown. However, Washington was at Fort Lee, only 50 miles away) from 14 November to the 17th or 18th. The chronology therefore fits the story. However, it might fit only because Honeyman's later popularizers checked the dates and applied them to the tale for authenticity's sake.

Also plausible, perhaps surprisingly, is that such a meeting—between a walk-in volunteer and the commander of an army—would take place. The 18th century world was a smaller and more intimate one than our own. Washington might well have set aside a few minutes for one of Wolfe's veterans and suggested that he glean what information he could and transmit it to him.

There is no record, however, of this meeting and not once is John Honeyman mentioned in Washington's voluminous correspondence and papers. Even so, it could be argued that so informal was the gathering that no record was kept, though, considering Honeyman's alleged centrality to Washington's surprise victory, his total omission, especially after the triumph, is suspicious.
More troublesome is the question of historicity: Does Honeyman’s plan...accord with what we know of Washington’s rudimentary intelligence apparatus?

just be counted as the real founding father of American intelligence-gathering. He would last only a few months in the job, but it was he who conceived the idea of embedding agents among the British. Major John Clark was among the first of these remarkable individuals. He spent some nine months living undercover and unsuspected on Long Island, all the time making precise observations of British troop strength. It is important to realize, however, that Clark’s success was almost certainly unique. Sackett’s few other agents tended to last about a week, having either switched sides or suffered exposure.

Clark’s achievement was actually a strike against adopting the agents-in-place policy. As success was so unlikely, Washington would not be convinced that replacing reconnaissance, the traditional form of spying, was worthwhile until as late as September 1778. In that month, he cautiously authorized one of Sackett’s successors to “endeavour to get some intelligent person into the City [of New York] and others of his own choice to be messengers between you and him, for the purpose of conveying such information as he shall be able to obtain and give.”

In this light, the claim that Washington was discussing precisely such matters with an untried civilian like Honeyman two years before, in November 1776, looks distinctly weak. This impression is confirmed by Washington’s correspondence of that month. At the time, Washington was more concerned about the Continental Army’s lack of soldiers, food, and even shoes, stemming desertion, and keeping his militia under arms than he was with aggressively acquiring intelligence of British movements in New Jersey for a battle he was in no state to wage. Upon meeting Honeyman, a veteran of the British army, Washington would have been more likely to recruit him as a sergeant than as a spy.

Claim: Apparently, once Honeyman had acquired sufficient intelligence from the British, he was to “venture, as if by accident, and while avowedly looking for cattle, go beyond the enemy lines as to be captured by the Americans, but not without a desperate effort to avoid it,” in the words of the 19th century account of his espionage work. By this stratagem, Honeyman would be able to maintain his cover as a Tory sympathizer when word of his arrest reached the British. To add verity, Washington was supposed to offer a reward for his arrest, on condition that Honeyman was captured alive and brought directly to his headquarters.
The story of Honeyman’s escape from prison is plainly ridiculous, and the entire set-up for his capture inordinately complex.

So it was that late in December 1776, having ascertained the British deployments around Trenton and “aware that the discipline [there] was very lax, and knowing too that the holidays were approaching, when a still greater indulgence would probably be permitted,” Honeyman resolved to recross the line and pass his intelligence to Washington. Keeping to the plan that he and Washington had cooked up, Honeyman walked to the Delaware and pretended to be in search of his lost cattle. After some time, he espied two American scouts and a prolonged pursuit ensued. Honeyman was captured only when he slipped on the ice as he tried to jump a fence. Even then, he violently resisted capture, but with two pistols pointed at his head he surrendered.

Dragged directly to Washington’s tent, Honeyman continued his masquerade by theatrically trembling and casting his eyes downward in shame. Washington instructed his aides and guards to leave and held a private debriefing with Honeyman before ordering the spy to be locked in the prison until morning, when he would be hanged following a court-martial. By a remarkable coincidence, a fire erupted in the camp that night and Honeyman’s guards left to help put it out. When they returned, nothing seemed amiss, but Honeyman had made good his escape. The fire, according to this account, had been set on Washington’s orders to permit the spy to flee, and Washington himself feigned extreme anger that the “traitor” had escaped custody.

Evaluation: The story of Honeyman’s escape from prison is plainly ridiculous, and the entire set-up for his capture inordinately complex. There is no record of any of it happening. Still, a lack of documentation in these situations is not uncommon and, in fact, in late 1776 and throughout 1777—menacingly dubbed the “Year of the Hangman” for the resemblance of its three sevens to gallows—hundreds of suspected Tories were rounded up (and usually hanged following a courts-martial).

It is therefore more than possible that Honeyman fell into the hands of American scouts. But why? It could be that he looked willing to alert a British patrol that enemy troops were in the area, or that he might even have been probing the American pickets for information to sell to the British. His determined struggle to avoid capture might have been prompted not by a desire to keep intact his cover as a well-known Tory but by the fact that he actually was a well-known Tory. He knew the penalty for collaboration.

Once Honeyman was in Washington’s camp, the general would have been most interested in quizzing him about the British positions and possible preparations for an assault. After all, at the time Washington had been warning his senior commanders to remain vigilant against a surprise attack. More proactively, he asked them on 14 December to “cast about to find out some person who can be engaged to cross the River as a spy, that we may, if possible, obtain some knowledge of the enemy’s situation, movements, and intention; particular enquiry to be made by the person sent if any preparations are making to cross the River; whether any boats are building, and where; whether any are coming across land from Brunswick; whether any great collection of horses are made, and for what purpose.”

Honeyman advocates have suggested that the spy Washington intended to “cross the River” was Honeyman, but this is to misinterpret the letter. It was not sent to one commander asking him to find a spy (and, in any case, if Washington and Honeyman were so chummy, why didn’t the general ask for Honeyman by name?), but to at least four field officers requesting that they “cast about” among their units for someone suitable with military experience. This is exactly what he
had done earlier that summer when Nathan Hale volunteered for service. Washington, in short, did not have any agent readily to hand, let alone the civilian Honeyman. Moreover, Washington assumes that the spy is to cross the river from the American side, in Pennsylvania, and sneak through the British lines to elicit intelligence and come back. Honeyman, however—as the established story specifically states—was already based on the British side, in New Jersey.

Claim: News of Honeyman's escape enraged his family's Patriot neighbors in Griggstown. "It was well known there that he had gone over to the English army, and he had already received the title of 'Tory J ohn Honeyman,' but now, 'British spy, traitor and cutthroat,' and various other disagreeable epithets, were heard on every side," declares the primary source account.26 An indignant, howling mob surrounded his house at midnight, terrifying his wife and children. Mary eventually invited a former family friend (now the crowd's ringleader) to read out a piece of parchment she had hitherto kept safely hidden. Upon it was printed:

To the good people of New Jersey, and all others whom it may concern,

It is hereby ordered that the wife and children of John Honeyman, of Griggstown, the notorious Tory, now within the British lines, and probably acting the part of a spy, shall be and hereby are protected from all harm and annoyance from every quarter, until further orders. But this furnishes no protection to Honeyman himself.

Geo. Washington
Com.-in-Chief

Evaluation: This famous "letter" of Washington is the most bizarre and sensational twist in the Honeyman tale, but there is not a whit of substantiation for it. No such letter has turned up in the Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, even though the general enjoyed a most efficient secretarial staff that retained copies of all correspondence leaving his headquarters and dutifully filed that arriving. Though apparently a treasured Honeyman heirloom, it has since disappeared.

If Washington did write such a letter, it could only serve as proof of Honeyman's service if one understands the words "acting the part of a spy" to mean in the service of Washington, an interpretation only possible if one ignores the letter's pointed exclusion of the "notorious Tory" Honeyman from the general's "protection." Indeed, since the letter was evidently written some time before, it only lends weight to the suspicion that Honeyman had long been known as a pro-British activist.

It has been traditionally assumed that the letter's magnanimity toward Mrs. Honeyman and her children verifies the Honeyman-as-spy story. But the seeming contradiction between its generosity toward the family and the exclusion of Honeyman from protection was not uncommon either in the day or for George Washington. Benedict Arnold's treachery was, for instance, of the darkest dye, and yet Washington allowed his wife and children to join the disgraced general in New York, even as he set in motion secret plans to kidnap Arnold and bring him back for execution.

Likewise, Washington took a surprisingly benign view of James Rivington, America's first yellow newspaperman and, as proprietor of the New York-based Royal Gazette, a sworn enemy of his during the war. Rivington's publishing house had been the "very citadel and pest-house of American Tory-ism," and his rag packed with the grossest and most incrediblly libelous accusations against Washington.27 And yet, once the British evacuated the city...
in 1783, Washington directed that Rivington and his property be protected from mob violence. Though there are some who say that Washington’s decision was prompted by Rivington’s alleged spying on his behalf later in the war, a more or equally likely explanation was the general’s dislike of social disorder and his firm attachment to the principle of press freedom.28

**Claim:** After his escape, Honeyman surrendered to the British and entered the enemy camp. Astounding guards with tales of his derring-do, he demanded to be taken to Colonel Rall immediately. The Hessian commander was dutifully amazed and asked him question after question about the whereabouts and strength of the Americans. Honeyman accordingly spun a tale about Washington’s army being too demoralized and broken to mount an attack, upon which Rall exclaimed that “no danger was to be apprehended from that quarter for some time to come.” It was a fatal error.

Honeyman, knowing his ruse could not last long once Washington crossed the Delaware and understanding that “there was little if any opportunity for the spy to perform his part of the great drama any further,” then vanished until the end of the war. In 1783 he “returned to his home the greatest hero of the hour. The same neighbors who had once surrounded his humble dwelling and sought his life, again not only surrounded it, but pressed vigorously for admittance, not to harm, but to thank and bless and honor him, and to congratulate and applaud his long suffering but heroic wife.”29

**Evaluation:** There is not a shred of proof to this tale. It is hardly likely that an officer as shrewd and as experienced as Rall would have fallen for such an obvious ruse, and the entire structure of the tale is based on the assumption that Washington sent Honeyman in to lull the opposition several weeks before by posing as a Tory, Washington’s ultimate intention always being to mount an attack. Hence the elaborate scheme to allow him to “escape” back across the enemy line. But had he?

Washington in fact seized an unexpected and risky opportunity to surprise Rall. The raid luckily paid off in spades. He despatched three columns across the Delaware to arrive simultaneously at dawn. In the event, just one made it successfully and it was by the greatest of good fortune that Hessian patrols did not discover the invasion sooner. Washington’s was a makeshift scheme, not a strategy plotted with grand-masterly skill and executed thanks to Honeyman’s predestined mission to mislead Rall.

Regarding Honeyman’s sudden disappearance after deceiving Rall, a rather more probable explanation is that he, a known collaborator, feared falling again into the hands of the revolutionaries. Honeyman, in fact, did not completely vanish but flitted in and out of sight in for the rest of the war. According to court records, for instance, on 10 July 1777—more than six months after his “disappearance”—he was the subject of an official proceeding to seize his property “as a disaffected man to the state” of New Jersey.30 In early December of that year, another record shows that he was actually caught, jailed, and charged with high treason by the state’s Council of Safety.31 Honeyman was again lucky: the “Year of the Hangman” fervor for prosecuting suspected Loyalists had already subsided and two weeks later he was temporarily released after pledging a bond of £300.32

Then, on 9 June 1778, he was indicted for giving aid and succor to the enemy between 5 October 1776 (about two months before he allegedly performed his patriotic service) and June 1777.33 He pleaded not guilty, and no further action was taken, but in March 1779 he was threatened with having his house and property sold as a result of the indictment.34 The sale, like the
trial, never took place, leading his supporters to assert that “highly placed authorities were able to prevent actual trial, a trial which would have endangered his usefulness” as an American double.35

Perhaps, but a less conspiratorial interpretation might be that, given the administrative chaos of those years, the constantly shifting allegiances of the population, the carelessness with which law clerks kept records, the Council’s habitual concessions to expediency, the lack of hard evidence against such a relatively minor collaborator as Honeyman, and the diminishing enthusiasm of the revolutionary authorities to pursue low-level instances of “disaffection,” Honeyman was slapped on the wrist and warned to keep out of trouble.

This type of response was by no means unique. By 1778–79, New Jersey’s punishment system had become little more than pro forma as the British threat receded. Furthermore, property confiscations for loyalty to the Crown were rarely executed after 1777, as Patriots discovered that such cases were difficult to prove and, just as pertinently, they realized that personal quarrels, official graft, and greed were leading all too often to false accusations. (The head of the New Jersey confiscations department, for instance, ended up in the enviable position of “owning” several lovely properties formerly belonging to accused Tories.)36

As for Honeyman’s “triumphant” return, sometime after Lord Cornwallis’s 1781 surrender at Yorktown, passions had cooled, and he would have gone home and reconciled himself to the reality of Washington’s victory, as did many thousands of displaced Loyalists and former Tory militiamen.

So concludes the tale of John Honeyman. How and when did this story originate? Therein lies the solution to the mystery.

The Story’s Genesis

The Honeyman story was first made public in the aftermath of the Civil War. Honeyman himself had died on 18 August 1822.

The Honeyman story was first made public in the aftermath of the Civil War. Honeyman himself had died on 18 August 1822. In 1873, a new, and unfortunately short-lived, monthly magazine named Our Home (edited, revealingly, by one A. Van Doren Honeyman, later the author of the Honeyman family history) published a long article by Judge John Van Dyke (1807–78), the heroic Honeyman’s grandson, a three-time mayor of New Brunswick, two-time congressman, and one-time justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, lately retired to Wabasha, Minnesota, where he became a state senator.37 “An Unwritten Account of a Spy of Washington” first fleshed out the Honeyman legend in all its colorful and memorable detail. At the time, Van Dyke’s revelations made a significant stir and were given additional publicity by their prominence in Stryker’s popular Battles of Trenton and Princeton.

The timing of Van Dyke’s Our Home memoir is key. The newly reunited nation was preparing for the centenary celebrations of the Declaration of Independence. Having but recently emerged from the bloodiest of civil wars, Americans were casting their minds back to those worthy days when citizens from north and south rallied together to fight a common enemy.

For Van Dyke and his editor, Honeyman could be upheld as a gleamingly patriotic exemplar to former Unionists and Confederates alike. The author was also an old man, and would die just five years later. He may well have taken what could have been the last opportunity to seal his family’s honorable place in the nation’s history. Not long after Van Dyke’s death, in fact, organizations such as the Sons of the American Revolution (1889) and the Daughters of the American Revolution (1890) would spring up to celebrate the unity and purpose of the Founding Fathers, and Honeyman was exalted as representing their ideals.
Van Dyke swabbed a thick layer of typically Victorian sentimentality and romanticism over the Honeyman story. In terms of intelligence writing, the post-1865 era is remarkable for its fanciful descriptions of espionage practice, its emphasis on beautiful belles using their feminine wiles to smuggle messages to their beaus in camps opposite, and its depiction (accompanied by imaginative dialogue and entertainingly cod accents) of hardy, lantern-jawed heroes valiantly crossing the Mason-Dixon line and masquerading as the enemy. Needless to say, there is little attempt in the spy memoirs of the time to relate intelligence input to actual operational output, yet somehow every agent succeeded in saving the Union (or Confederacy) in the nick of time. As Van Dyke’s article appeared soon after the initial flood of Civil War spy memoirs, it would perhaps not be outlandish to suspect him of being influenced by the genre.

In the hands of John Van Dyke, then, John Honeyman—hitherto a man of modest accomplishments and abilities—became the quintessential American hero. Far from being the questionable character and man of uncertain loyalties who emerges from history’s dusty documents, Honeyman was in fact a glorious lion heart and Washington’s secret warrior—with the achievements and adventures to match.

The Secret Revealed

Judge Van Dyke most likely colorized the Honeyman story, as we’ve seen, but he did not invent it. In a letter dated 6 January 1874, the judge revealed that he had originally heard the story from the “one person who was an eye and ear witness to all the occurrences described at Griggstown”: his Aunt Jane, Honeyman’s eldest daughter, who had been about 10 or 11 in the winter of 1776/77.

Aunt Jane had been present when the Patriot mob surrounded the house after Honeyman’s escape and “she had often heard the term ‘Tory’ applied to her father. She knew he was accused of trading, in some way, with the British; that he was away from home most of the time; and she knew that their neighbors were greatly excited and angry about it; but she knew also that her mother had the protection of Washington,” wrote Van Dyke. “She had often seen, and read, and heard read, Washington’s order of protection, and knew it by heart, and repeated it over to me, in substance, I think, in nearly the exact words in which it is found in the written article.”

Aunt Jane, therefore, is the sole source for Honeyman’s exploits. As Jane died in 1836, aged 70, Van Dyke must have elicited the details from her at least some 40 years before he published them in Our Home—plenty of time, then, for him to have mixed in lashings of make-believe, spoonfuls of truth, and dollops of myth to Aunt Jane’s original tale, itself stitched together from her adolescent memories of events that had occurred six decades previously.

Importantly, Jane was the only child of Honeyman’s never to have married. According to a contemporary description, “she was a tall, stately woman, large in frame and badly club-footed in both feet. She was a dressmaker, but had grace of manners and intelligence beyond her other sisters.” Would it be any wonder if clever, imaginative Jane—doomed to long spinsterhood by her appearance, and fated to look after her aged and ailing father for decade after decade—had embroidered a heroic tale to explain what had really happened?

One question still remains. How had Jane Honeyman come to invent a tale of a man involved in valiant deeds of spying for Washington while stoically suffering the abuse of his neighbors, family, and ex-friends?

The answer may lie in the dates. John Honeyman died in the summer of 1822. One year before, the up-and-coming novelist James Fenimore Cooper...
Cooper's historical romance, The Spy, rescued the secret agent from his squalid 18th century reputation as a paid trafficker of information and painted him as a noble figure.

Cooper's historical romance, The Spy, rescued the secret agent from his squalid 18th century reputation as a paid trafficker of information and painted him as a noble figure.
It is high time to bury the John Honeyman myth: a spy he never was.

suppose that Aunt Jane read it sometime after her father died. Could she, in order to consecrate her father's silent martyrdom and hush those neighbors still gossiping about his wartime past, have merely plagiarized Cooper's basic plot and final twist?

Yet the Honeyman story's myriad anachronisms and suspiciously detailed narrative signal Judge Van Dyke's handiwork. For patriotic and social reasons, it was he who not only colorized the tale, but broadened its focus, thrust, and intent far beyond what Aunt Jane had ever envisaged. Between them, Jane and the judge endowed a most ordinary man with an extraordinary—and almost wholly fake—biography. It was John Honeyman himself, strangely enough, who is innocent of telling tall tales. For more than half a century, he remained resolutely silent about his wartime behavior (as well he might, given his not altogether sterling record.) Van Dyke, who “was with him very often during the last fifteen years of his life, and saw his eyes closed in death,” heard nothing of his grandfather’s past in all that time. His life was a blank slate upon which anything could be written. And so when Aunt Jane handed her nephew the ball, he ran with it.

That was more than a century and a quarter ago, and it is high time to bury the John Honeyman myth: a spy he never was.

Endnotes

Endnotes (Cont.)

6. The article, which appeared in that year’s August issue, is available online at http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1957/5/1957_5_58.shtml.


8. The sparse details available for this program can be found at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0417034/.


14. A. Van Doren Honeyman, The Honeyman Family (Honeyman, Honyman, Hunneman, etc.) in Scotland and America, 1548–1908 (Plainfield, NJ: Honeyman’s Publishing House, 1909), 94. The story that Honeyman aided the stricken Wolfe to the rear might be true. Francis Parkman, the 19th century American historian and author of Montcalm and Wolfe, noted that after the general was hit for the third time “he staggered and sat on the ground. Lieutenant Brown, of the grenadiers, one Henderson, a volunteer in the same company, and a private soldier, aided by an officer of artillery” carried him out of danger. The anonymous “private soldier” might have been Honeyman, though there are several other claimants for the honor. See F. Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (London, UK: Macmillan & Co., 2 vols., 1885), II, 296. Regarding Honeyman’s religion, in addition to the other evidence we possess, we know he is buried in Lamington Presbyterian Church Cemetery, Somerset County, New Jersey.


16. Some family records are missing, but Van Doren Honeyman, 117–18, pieces together what there is.

17. Van Dyke, 221.

18. This chronology is based on the dated series of letters Washington wrote at the time, all of which are printed in P. Chase et al (eds.), The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 16 vols. so far, 1985-continuing), VII.
Endnotes (cont.)

20. Van Dyke, 221.
21. Ibid., 221–22.
23. See Rose, Washington’s Spies, Chap. 2. Later, Washington expressed alarm at the prevalence of these courts-martial, saying that he was “not fully satisfied of the legality of trying an inhabitant of any State by military law, when the Civil Authority of that State has made provision for the punishment of persons taking Arms with the Enemy.” See Washington letter to William Livingston, 15 April 1778, Washington Papers.
25. Stryker, 88, implies thus.
26. Van Dyke, 223.
30. Van Doren Honeyman, 113.
35. O’Shea and Pleasants, 177. See also Van Doren Honeyman, 114–15.
37. The author is indebted for these biographical details to Michael Christian, librarian of the Sons of the American Revolution.
Endnotes (cont.)


41. Cooper, 406.

42. Cooper, 409–15.

❖ ❖ ❖
An Intelligence Role for the Footnote: For and Against

In the Autumn 1964 issue of Studies in Intelligence, a pseudonymous CIA analyst, John Alexander, wondered why a regular feature of academic writing, the footnote, did not exist in intelligence writing. In the next issue, another practitioner of the business of intelligence analysis, from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, rejected his argument.

More than 40 years later, footnotes citing sources and their qualities have become more nearly the norm, in practice and by directive, in the Intelligence Community, as recommended in the following from the report of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Recommendation 10. Finished intelligence should include careful sourcing for all analytic assessments and conclusions, and these materials should—whenever possible in light of legitimate security concerns—be made easily available to intelligence customers. We recommend forcing analysts to make their assumptions and reasoning more transparent by requiring that analysis be well sourced, and that all finished intelligence products...provide citations to enable user verification of particular statements. (p. 412)

A Modest proposal for a revolution in intelligence doctrine

An Intelligence Role for the Footnote

John Alexander

After some dozen years’ immersion in intelligence, I still find myself reacting uncomfortably to its rather cavalier disregard for the footnote. In that strange way each profession has of altering accepted words to its own meanings, “footnote” in the jargon of the intelligence community designates primarily the notation of a major disagreement on the part of a member with an otherwise
agreed estimate. Here, however, I am referring to the footnote in its academic, scholarly, or scientific sense, as a device for identifying and in some cases even evaluating the source material used for a particular textual statement. Such a footnote is deeply scorned by practitioners of intelligence and makes only a rare appearance in most intelligence products.

During my years of intelligence apprenticeship I of course noted the omission, but I assumed that the master craftsmen knew best and there were very good reasons for it. I assumed that the suppression of footnotes was part of one’s overall conversion from scholarship to intelligence: the paramount need of intelligence was a timely answer to a current problem. Intelligence could not afford the luxury of extended research, the comforting security of having explored all possible sources, the devotion of a lifetime of effort to the isolation and exact determination of one particular item of knowledge culminating in a painstaking and exhaustive documentation of the entire research process.

And now, I suppose, after these several years I am something of a master craftsman myself. I have my brood of apprentices—and I teach them the same doctrine and they practice it. But throughout the whole process I continue to be troubled. I wonder if the abandonment, for the most part, by the intelligence community of the somewhat elaborate and carefully developed apparatus of scholarship has been altogether to the good. I wonder if we have not in fact been paying for it by an undesired but real degradation of the intelligence effort.

Bare Heights

As one trained in the rigorous academic disciplines, I find abandonment of the reassuring apparatus of scholarship disturbing in itself. But it is more than this general loss that disturbs me. There are certain specific practices that also provoke a sense of uneasiness. For example, and I find this quite ironic, the higher the level of the intelligence product, the less complete is its visible documentation. In other words, the more serious its import and the closer it is to the influential official who will act upon it, the slighter is its overt back-up.

At the lowest level, of course, is the raw intelligence report. This report is generally extraordinarily well evaluated and supported. No scholar could really, within the normal limits of national security, ask much more. The source, particularly in CIA-originated reports, is carefully and intelligently described as to his professional knowledge and competence, his outlook, his opportunity to gather the information, and his previous reliability. Not only the date of acquisition of this information but place as well is given. In some reports the rapporteur also provides a field evaluation of the substantive information elicited from the source. The user of this kind of report can easily and effectively apply the canons of evidence in evaluating and testing the information.
But as we move up the ladder of intelligence reports the documentation gets sparser. The NIS (National Intelligence Summary), to use a well-known example, is in effect a scholarly monograph, digesting a great multitude of raw reports. Its total documentation usually consists of a single, very brief paragraph commenting on the general adequacy of the source material. No individual item within the NIS section can be tracked down to a particular source or specific group of sources. As one moves in the NIS from the individual chapter sections to the overall brief, the documentation becomes even more general and less meaningful.

At the more exalted level of the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate), documentation even in the generalized form of comments on sources has usually disappeared altogether. One is forced to rely on the shadings given to "possibly," "probably," and "likely" and on other verbal devices for clues as to the quantity and quality of the basic source data. These examples from the NIS and NIE are paralleled in a great many other publications of similar refinement. One may admire the exquisite nuances and marvel at what a burden of knowledge and implicit validation the compressed language of a finished "appreciation" can be forced to carry, but one cannot help being concerned about the conclusions. Upon what foundations do those clever statements rest?

If the final products were at least based upon documented intermediate inputs, the uneasiness might be somewhat less. But in my own experience the "contributions" or inputs, with the exception of certain economic papers, are normally devoid of any specific identification of the kinds and types of reports or other evidence upon which they are based. And in my experience those inputs are often based on other inputs prepared at a lower echelon until at last we reach the analyst with access to the raw data. At the upper level of joint or national discussion and negotiation and compromise, which eventuates in the exquisite nuance, the carefully hedged phrase, or sometimes a dissenting footnote, the remove from the original evidence can be, and often is, considerable.

The situation is not, of course, quite as dire as I have portrayed it. The intermediaries, in the process of review and consolidation of inputs, do query the preparers of these concerning items of unusual importance or of a critical nature, and in some cases they join the basic analyst in an examination of the raw data itself in order to get a firmer grasp of a particular issue. Furthermore, the final product, before being accepted and promulgated, is often returned to the analyst who prepared the initial input, and he has an opportunity to note any deviations from what he believes the situation to be. These processes do provide a measure of control and cross-check, some assurance that the available material has been thoroughly exploited and properly interpreted. But such processes seem partial and makeshift at best. They do not
always occur. And they do not, of course, provide external participants in the final product with any real insight into the quality and quantity of material utilized by their fellow participants.

**Topside Review**

Another situation that troubles me—and this is a related problem—is the vast array of editors and reviewers under various guises and the several levels of examination to which an intelligence product is subjected before it is finally approved for publication. What concerns me is not the review, but the basis upon which it is accomplished. I recognize that many of these reviewers are highly talented, experienced individuals. Many are extremely devoted and conscientious and do their best to do a thoroughgoing job. But what basis do they have for their exalted “substantive” review?

In my experience, these reviewers have not generally—the notable exception would be members of the Board of National Estimates—been systematically exposed to the current take of raw data. Their knowledge of current intelligence events is based on hurried reading of generalized intelligence reports or on sporadic attendance at selected briefings. They are not aware in any particular instance—nor should they be—in any real detail of the material actually available on a particular subject. How do they know that this study in their hands for review has indeed explored the appropriate material? What variety of data has been utilized? Has the most recent material been examined? How can they do a spot-check on a particular item? Was a certain report seen, read, evaluated, and then discarded as erroneous, or was omission of the data in it inadvertent?

Lacking the apparatus of documentation, the reviewer generally has available only two methods by which to analyze the draft before him. One is to discover an internal inconsistency that calls into question the paper’s overall accuracy or logic. The other is to find a statement that seems to contradict something he may have seen recently in his generalized reading and, on a hunch, to question its validity. The great bulk of any study, despite the reviewer’s best intentions, is beyond his capability to question, analyze, evaluate, or critically review. What a haphazard and random method this is for high-level substantive critique!

As a result much high-level review, in my experience, has consisted of the discovery of occasional typographical errors, small inconsistencies in numbers cited in different paragraphs or on different pages, minor inconsistencies in nomenclature, say between a figure or chart and a textual reference, unpreferred usage in spelling or hyphenating certain words, and other venial errors which a diligent proofreader should have caught. Any commentary on substantive validity, depth of research, or adequacy of analysis has been rare and exceptional. The minor changes are dutifully made, assurances given that more care will be exhibited
next time, and the study is accepted and published as the agency’s or the community’s considered view.

I know that this is the system we live with, and I know that it often works surprisingly well. I know also that at times there are many vigorous discussions involving substance, and that in this oral exchange there is often a rigorous testing of propositions by an examination of the pertinent evidence. But much reviewing is done without this stimulating personal dialogue, without considering the evidence, and it is of this that I seriously wonder, is it worth the time and effort? Are we in fact getting our money’s worth? Or are we not deluding ourselves? Is the review structure we have erected to assure ourselves that we are getting a high quality product not for the most part really a mere facade? Does the Emperor have any clothes?

Undocumented Analysis

If reviewing is sometimes a pious, well-intentioned fraud (one that I myself have had to commit), analysis at the basic journeyman level also at times leaves much to be desired. Not all analyses, of course, are based directly on the raw data, with its usable annotations and evaluations. Much analysis incorporates so-called finished intelligence, some of which is poorly dated, and the exact sources of which are not at all identified. Even the good and conscientious analyst does not know, nor does he have any means of learning, upon how solid a foundation that finished intelligence is based. It has an official imprimatur; so, not having supporting raw data in his files or time to procure and re-examine it—and, more important, following the traditional procedure of analysts—he uses it in his own study. His product eventually becomes a new piece of finished intelligence, which he or his successor will use in yet another study. And so the fragile structure can continue to be built of fragile materials. The weaknesses continually compound.

Another danger is the overconfident, glib, and persuasive analyst who writes his studies “off the top of his head.” He can prepare a report rapidly and defend it with great self assurance, relying on his memory and general knowledge of the subject matter. Sometimes this assurance is justified. But how do we know when? Then there is the intermediate intelligence officer who sometimes, for whatever reason, ignores his analytical staff and prepares a report on his own, again off the top of his head. It gets into the chain, and how is the next reviewer, or even consumer, to know that it has no substantial basis of research?

The hazards of insufficient documentation are evident enough to need no further elaboration. The value of proper documentation, moreover, and the system for it are not unknown to intelligence officers of the community. Most, whether in uniform or out, have at some time in their formal training been exposed to documentation and its virtues, if only in the preparation of a term paper. Many continue to evaluate externally prepared reports and monographs in part by reference to
their bibliographies and footnotes. The scholarly habits persist—except in the intelligence field itself.

**Source Protection**

Part of the reason for this condition is an item of cardinal intelligence doctrine: do not betray the source. Concern for protection of sources is of course legitimate, but it can be carried to extremes. As illustrated above, there appears to be a contradiction in the respective application of this doctrine to raw reports and to finished intelligence. Meticulous definition of the source in an individual raw report is accepted (and correctly) as necessary to the proper appreciation of the report's content. It would appear equally necessary in finished studies derived therefrom.

Meticulous definition of the source in a raw report is accepted (and correctly) as necessary to the proper appreciation of the report's content. It would appear equally necessary in finished studies derived therefrom. The argument can be made that finished intelligence has a wider circulation than the raw reports and that there is therefore a greater risk of jeopardizing sources by identifying them in the finished product. In some cases this concern may indeed be valid—and could certainly be met by producing undocumented versions for the bulk of the circulation. But for internal consumption by operating officials who want to know (or should want to know!) the actual amount, validity, and reliability of the basic information, a documented form should be available. And it should certainly be available during the process of shaping up the final report to the intermediate analysts, reviewers, and negotiators.

I am not persuaded, however, that fear of source compromise is a wholly valid argument. Footnotes will reveal report numbers, subjects, place of origin, and rapporteurs, but would not necessarily identify sensitive sources. Many sources are open or obvious and could be cited without danger. If a source is particularly sensitive, even its nature need not be revealed, but a neutral documentary reference should make it possible for a properly cleared user to run it down. (In exceptional cases of extremely sensitive sources it might of course be necessary to prepare versions at that level of sensitivity.) With effort and imagination, I believe that the source-compromise problem can be successfully met. One practical suggestion is included in the procedure recommended below.

**Practical Difficulties**

Another argument that can be and often is advanced is that documentation is time-consuming and time is a luxury that intelligence cannot afford. Admittedly it is time-consuming to prepare documentation; it would increase analytical, typing, and perhaps reproduction time. It could even be argued that it would increase editing, review, and final processing time. This is a plausible argument—but anyone familiar with the realities of much intelligence production will, I'm afraid, be unimpressed. Anyone who has been personally involved with the time
lags in production of NIS sections, say, with the prolonged back-and-forth traffic of editing and "nit-picking" at most routine papers, will not believe that in much intelligence production time is quite so greatly of the essence. I strongly feel that the additional burden would be more than compensated by the improved substantive quality of the final product and that, as a matter of fact, much time would be saved. There would, for example, be no frustrating searches for the uncited sources of questioned statements.

It can also be argued that footnoting is a cumbersome, awkward, and excessively time-consuming method of documentation—and here I would agree. I would not, for intelligence purposes, advocate the adoption of the formal, extended-entry, bottom-of-the-page footnote system, requiring exasperatingly frequent repetition of document source and title and producing further complications in proper textual alignment and pagination. I would propose a very simple system based upon that used in scientific journals. In this system sources are listed in a single bibliography and numbered serially. Textual references to sources are made in parentheses following the relevant statement by use of two groups of numbers separated by a comma, the first identifying the source by the number it has in the bibliography and the second giving the page reference.

Extended discussions of particular source problems can appear as a series of appended numbered notes, referenced in the text by the appropriate note number in parentheses. This system is easy to employ and should present no difficulties to the analyst; it should cause only minor inconvenience to the consumer. And if a particular report needs to be sanitized quickly of specific source references the bibliography and appended notes can simply be detached.

Why documentation has languished so long and amiably in desuetude in the intelligence community I do not know. Inertia and the relief from old academic requirements may be part of the answer. But however it came about, the present non-documentation system is well established and flourishing. The habit is almost an addiction. Efforts to upset it fly in the face of human laziness, tradition, even vested interest. In a sense, it is job protection for the mediocre analyst: it does not expose his work to careful examination. Years of living with undocumented intelligence has blunted our perception of its dangers and inadequacies. The voice of protest—or is it conscience?—that is sometimes heard is exceedingly small. Yet I think it is challenging.

**Import an Old Revolution**

It seems to me that we need a major revolution in intelligence doctrine. What we need is the intelligence equivalent of the Academic Revolution that occurred in our schools of higher learning some hundred years ago when modern research methods were first introduced, primarily from Germany. This Academic Revolu-
tion, as all students of intellectual history know, brought to graduate academic disciplines (both scientific and humanistic) the tools, concepts, and apparatus of modern scholarship. Along with concepts of free inquiry, thorough exploitation of original sources, and objectivity it brought the requirement for precise documentation. A common methodology and certain common standards were developed; and the field of scholarship, originally the domain of the self-trained amateur, gradually became professionalized.

Intelligence is undergoing this kind of evolution. Its operations are becoming professionalized; a professional esprit and a common methodology are gradually developing. This journal has been an important step in that direction, following the classic pattern: it provides a necessary forum for the discussion of professional problems and helps create a common background of classic cases, basic concepts, general principles, and key problems in intelligence. It is in this forum that I should like to see argued out the advantages and disadvantages of a proper documentation of intelligence conclusions and findings. I have stated—perhaps overstated?—the case in its favor as a real necessity. Is there a valid defense for the status quo?

In addition to a serious, probing, and hopefully rewarding discussion of the problem, I would also recommend experimental application of the proposed doctrine to some specific areas of intelligence production. As a beginning, I would suggest it be tried on selected NIEs and NISs, with careful evaluation of the results after reasonable trial periods. Do they seem worth the additional encumbrances? What is the response of consumer officials to the improved documentation? Has there indeed been a qualitative improvement in the product? Or is it clear that formal, detailed documentation has no real part to play in intelligence, that it is and has been properly excluded from intelligence methodology?

In addition to this formal trial on standard products, it seems to me that policy officials requesting ad hoc intelligence studies or reports could very well consider including among their proposed terms of reference a requirement for thorough documentation. Since such a requirement may not occur to them (assuming they are unlikely to have read this particular plea), the intelligence officials discussing the proposed terms of reference might suggest it be included. Let us make the offer and see if it is opted.

The end result of this discussion and selective application should be the development of an agreed working methodology for intelligence documentation. The methodology must be realistic. I should not like to see (and shudder at the possibilities!) the establishment of inflexible requirements for its application. The apparatus of documentation should be applied only where it helps, not where it hinders. Certainly daily field operational intelligence is an area where it might prove to be an impediment and costly luxury. But through intelligent trial and error a practical doctrine should evolve.
A system that has proved its worth in every other professional field surely deserves careful examination and consideration by members of this one. It does not seem too soon to consider applying here the concepts of a revolution now some hundred years old.

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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 8, No. 4 (1964)

A “master craftsman” from State’s intelligence bureau takes up the challenge and presents the case

Against Footnotes

Allan Evans

The eloquent lead article in the last issue challenges anyone to come forth with a valid defense of the status quo that prevails in our community with respect to footnotes. Age predisposes me to defend status quos; my frequent statements in talking to intelligence officer groups put me on the spot to repeat my arguments against the use of footnotes. It may be that these views are conditioned by circumstances in the Department of State and that these circumstances differ materially from those in the Department of Defense—if so, it will be all the more useful to unearth variations in the taste and requirements of major groups of consumers at whom our community is aiming. Let us see what can be said.

Customer is King

The first and most important arguments are that our customers won’t read fat papers and “almost certainly” in overwhelming majority don’t want to be bothered with documentation. I think no truth in our business is more thoroughly substantiated by experience (either footnoted or not) than that the impact of a paper varies in close inverse relation to its size. We have, of course, the NIS, which is indifferent to bigness, but it is an intelligence document of a very special kind, designed for universal reference. The Department of State issues stout papers, but for policy more often than intelligence purposes. There are technical areas of the government which revel in extensive analyses. So far, however, as the general run of day-to-day operation in this Department goes, our Bureau is prepared to stand by the idea that, other things being equal, the shortest paper has the most impact.

In closely related vein, our consumers are not going to spend their time summoning up the documents they see referred to in footnotes. They think of our intelli-
gence papers as the product either of particular analysts whom they know by name and whom they have learned to trust, or of a particular organization which they trust to employ analysts who are reliable. They expect Intelligence to speak as authority, to present its conclusions with confidence, and they don't want it to transfer to them the responsibility of reviewing the evidence all over again.

Indeed, many consumers couldn't review the evidence. Many readers—those overseas, for example—simply don't have the files of material that we use here at headquarters. Why tantalize them with alluring footnote references to luscious sources that are inaccessible to them?

I appreciate the excellent suggestion that footnotes be organized in the modern manner at the back of the paper and be therefore removable. When for special reasons footnotes are actually used, the device would be valuable. In the usual case, however, it would leave unjustified superscript figures throughout the text, to annoy people and intrude a real if small barrier to smooth absorption of the message. There might well be physical problems about tearing out and restapling. These are minutiae, but in the bulk they might grow important. I doubt that the real answer to the problem with consumers lies along this line.

Quality and Control

These then are two positive arguments against introducing an apparatus of footnotes into intelligence papers. Let us now look at some of the arguments put forward in favor of this procedure. As an historian, I can only applaud the appeal to the past in evocation of the great scholarly revolution brought about by German methods. . . . Perhaps we should patronize the scholarly revolution of our own age rather than that of the past, and stress the production of ideas.

As an historian, I can only applaud the appeal to the past in evocation of the great scholarly revolution brought about by German methods. Perhaps we should patronize the scholarly revolution of our own age rather than that of the past, and stress the production of ideas.

There is worry that without footnotes mediocre analysts will float texts which are unreliable. What about the danger that mediocre analysts, under cover of footnotes, will float texts in which they are able to avoid the challenge of decisive thinking? I don't say that only one of these two dangers exists. I think that they both exist, and I suspect that they rather cancel out as arguments one way or the other.

The article suggests that without the footnote the operation of review and upper-level control is a hollow pretense. The answer here would be in brief that without good supervision and control no amount of footnotes will guarantee quality, but that if the supervision and higher control are good the footnotes will not be necessary. I think the article is a little unfair to the reviewer. According to the terms set forth, every reviewer would have to be an expert in the subject of the
paper he was reviewing, or would have to make himself an expert by reading all
the material in the footnotes. Teachers, I think, will realize that this concept is
too categorical. With good but not infinite knowledge of the subject, and with
sound intuitions about how style, logic, and marshalling of ideas relate to accu-

cacy and integrity of thinking, teachers and scholars do very well at reviewing
the works of students and colleagues. These are the qualities required in the
leaders of intelligence operations; without these qualities no apparatus will make
intelligence products worth the money.

It is true that the judgments of an NIE float in the empyrean and impress with
their apparently unrooted boldness. It is also true, however, that the writers of
those sentences approach them with prayer and fasting, and work them out in
fiery give and take, often over long periods of time, in working groups which can
test to their heart’s content the background of information and fact that underlies
each agency’s opinion. If sometimes our NIEs approach being a little too empy-
rean, so do the problems that our superiors and world affairs force us to examine.

Intracommunity Practice

There are many lesser points. Certainly
for intercommunication within the intel-
ligence community indications of source
might be useful; it would be a question
of time and effort. As for the awful
thought that many analysts may take
advantage of the status quo to scamp their scholarly attention to detail in intelli-
gence work, I should argue both that most of them are thoroughly dedicated and
that the few who do try to get away with it are quickly found out. As a matter of fact,
the working drafts of analysts often do have annotations, and are carefully filed for
reference.

There is one small suggestion in the article on which comment requires a refer-
ence to the inner workings of a friendly agency; let me nevertheless rush in and
remark that some part of the difficulty about documentation may be peculiar to
the Defense Department because of its habit of sending estimators rather than
the basic analysts to working groups. Is it possible that this mode of operating
through layers accounts for some of the feeling that we lack full exchange of
working data? I venture to suggest that the advantages and disadvantages of
this procedure well merit discussion.

In the end, there is one final and to my mind clinching argument. . . . [W]ho will footnote the
future?
The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America

Reviewed by Michael Warner

Once upon a time, serious and well-meaning people believed communism to be the wave of the future. They thought that only scientific socialism could build just societies in which the arts and the intellect could flourish; that the Soviet Union was the place where the future existed today; and that the avuncular Josef Stalin was the only true opponent of fascism in all its capitalist and warmongering forms.

Once upon a time, the Central Intelligence Agency ran a world-wide covert action campaign to counter such nonsense in societies in which communism might take hold. Almost every CIA station had case officers dedicated to working with labor unions, intellectuals, youth and student organizations, journalists, veterans, women's groups, and more. The Agency dealt directly with foreign representatives of these groups, but it also subsidized their activities indirectly by laundering funds through allied organizations based in the United States. In short, the Agency's covert political action depended on the anti-communist zeal of private American citizens, only a few of whom knew that the overseas works of their ostensibly independent organizations were financed by the CIA until the campaign's cover was disastrously blown in 1967.

British historian Hugh Wilford has just given us the best history of the covert political action campaign to date. Wilford is now associate professor of history at California State University (Long Beach), but before arriving there he spent years in pursuit of the documentation that he sensed had to exist in the organizational remains of the groups that the Agency had funded. His work brought him metaphorically to my door at the CIA History Staff, as the truth-in-reviewing code obliges me acknowledge. Full disclosure also bids me say that I wrote on the covert action campaign in a still-classified monograph published by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1999.

Where I had viewed the CIA's campaign from the inside looking out, Wilford's new book The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America does the job from the outside in. Wilford exploits contemporary public accounts, memoirs, and, most important, the remaining files of the various private groups involved. The Mighty Wurlitzer surpasses early attempts like Peter Coleman's The Liberal Conspiracy (1989) and Frances Stonor Saunders' Cultural Cold
Review: Mighty Wurlitzer

War (2000). The former book had examined only one organization, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and took a congratulatory tone that was disliked by some reviewers. The latter cast a wider net and surveyed a congeries of cultural, artistic, and intellectual groups, but its conspiracy-mongering style undermined its judgments.

Unlike these efforts, Wilford writes, he provides “the first comprehensive account of the CIA’s covert network from its creation in the late 1940s to its exposure 20 years later, encompassing all the main American citizen groups involved in front operations.” He adds that he set out to portray “the relationship between the CIA and its client organizations in as complete and rounded a manner as possible” given his lack of access to CIA files: “My hope is that, by telling both sides of the story, the groups’ as well as the CIA’s, I will shed new light not only on the U.S. government’s conduct of the Cold War, but also on American society and culture in the mid-twentieth century.” On both of these scores, Wilford does better than the earlier works.

The Mighty Wurlitzer succeeds at its first goal of presenting as comprehensive a survey as can be expected without access to CIA files. In doing so, Wilford has surely saved a wealth of detail from oblivion. He located and studied the yellowing archives of mostly forgotten organizations like the National Student Association, the American Congress for Cultural Freedom, the Committees of Correspondence, and the Family Rosary Crusade. Few historians work as hard as he did to capture the fading memories of a private America in the age just before cheap copy machines. His method frequently uncovered details that no longer exist in the CIA’s official memory, such as the personal ties between early CIA officials and the officers of American voluntary organizations that would soon receive Agency subsidies.

Wilford falls short, however, in his second aim for The Mighty Wurlitzer, that of explaining both sides of the relationship between the Agency and its private clients. Despite his careful research, he did not explore all available sources and avenues. For example, Wilford spoke with very few veterans, whether former Agency employees or officers of the relevant front groups. Doing so would have added texture to his tale, particularly with regard to the inter-personal dynamics inside and outside the CIA that played such large roles in these operations. Wilford’s choice of incidents, groups, and individuals to discuss, moreover, makes for a rather choppy narrative. The Mighty Wurlitzer jumps from episode to episode and group to group, detailing each in turn but leaving the reader wondering about the connections between them. This is not a glaring flaw and it is more than compensated for by Wilford’s larger insight. Though he does not quite succeed in showing the Agency’s side of the story, he still gets one big point right.

Here it might help the reader to understand that the insinuating sub-title of this book is a bit of a misnomer. My complaint may not be with Wilford at all but rather with his publishers at Harvard; “How the CIA Played America” sounds like something coined in a marketing office. Wilford explains the title derived

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from a 1950s quip by CIA operational chief Frank Wisner, who reportedly spoke of his directorate's complex of front organizations as a "mighty Wurlitzer"; a big theater organ "capable of playing any propaganda tune he desired."[7] Wilford does not claim the CIA "played" America, in the sense of duping gullible presidents or Congresses for the purpose of pursuing its own foreign policies. Instead, he means to say that the CIA used Americans, indeed, the whole country, as instruments in a mission that for two decades had bipartisan support in this nation: the goal of demonstrating to communism's adherents and a candid world the multifarious variety and hence the superiority of liberal democracy.

This point was made well in a declassified CIA History Staff study of DCI Allen Dulles that Wilford might not have seen. (Absence of a bibliography in The Mighty Wurlitzer makes it hard to be certain.) In discussing CIA's covert political action campaign, the study explained that it had survived so long because presidents and key Congressmen held "a fairly sophisticated point of view" that understood that "the public exhibition of unorthodox views was a potent weapon against monolithic communist uniformity of action." The CIA subsidized freedom in order to expose the lies of tyrants—and then winced silently when that freedom led to an occasional bite on America's hand.

Wilford grasps this point, and adds another. When the CIA played America like a mighty Wurlitzer, he argues, "U.S. citizens at first followed the Agency's score, [but] then began improvising their own tunes, eventually turning harmony into cacophony."[10] In that, The Mighty Wurlitzer is certainly correct. Wilford has explained for an academic audience what CIA case officers learned the hard way in the early Cold War. Covert political action always requires willing partners, and they almost always work two agendas at once: that of the intelligence agency that subsidizes them, and that of their own faction within the private organization or movement they represent. "Who co-opted whom?" was a little joke whispered by former officers of the National Student Association once they joined CIA to run Covert Action Staff's Branch 5—and thus took over the youth and student field in the Agency's larger campaign.

Why is this important? Because scholars and graduate students will someday follow Wilford's lead. His judicious approach should set the standard for their studies. Second, it matters because some quarters inside and outside government argue today that America needs to replicate the successes of the CIA's covert political action campaign for the Global War on Terror. The Mighty Wurlitzer might not convince them that that's a bad idea, but Wilford's observations should give them pause to consider the risks and unintended consequences of projects that they are unlikely to be be able to control completely.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

SPYCRAFT: The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda


Reviewed by Hayden Peake

On 11 July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt designated William J. Donovan as Coordinator of Information, with “authority to collect and analyze all information and data [on a worldwide basis] that may bear on national security.” To accomplish the mission, the COI was authorized to “employ necessary personnel...and [provide] services” for what became the first US government organization with a worldwide intelligence mission.1 Donovan quickly created the Research and Analysis Branch and began passing reports to the president. Intelligence collection and sabotage elements soon followed, but Pearl Harbor postponed the formation of a research and development capability. Planning for it began in the spring of 1942, and the R&D unit became official on 17 October. By that time, COI had become OSS.2 SPYCRAFT explains why an R&D capability was needed, how it was formed, what it accomplished, and how it evolved into the CIA’s Office of Technical Services (OTS).

After a short discussion of R&D support operations during WW II, SPYCRAFT describes the bureaucratically bumpy early Cold War years, as CIA leaders worked to adapt their wartime intelligence experience to establishing and running the nation’s first professional peacetime espionage organization. It was uncharted territory, and the Agency struggled to accomplish its primary mission—determining the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat—while hiring new people, creating a new organization, and developing the techniques and equipment required for clandestine operations. To add to the level of difficulty, it soon became clear that CIA’s main adversary, the KGB, had far more experienced officers and better equipment.3

3 Among the sources for these data were GRU agent Peter Popov and KGB defector Peter Deriabin. For details see William Hood, MOLE (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1973), and Peter Deriabin with Frank Gibney, The Secret World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1959).
SPYCRAFT tells how this imbalance was overcome. The principal authors — both experienced in the field of clandestine devices⁴ — focus on the R&D Branch, which became the Operational Aids Division, and then, under Allen Dulles, the Technical Services Staff (TSS) and the Technical Services Division (TSD). They avoid sterile discussion of wiring diagrams and budgets, however, by keeping the narrative operationally oriented with short case studies. For example, the problems of early post-war deficiencies in equipment are illustrated by a chapter on Soviet Army Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, the GRU walk-in who supplied missile data critical to the success of US management of the Cuban missile crisis. Had the cameras available to him had greater capacity and the radios he used faster transmission rates, the need for many face-to-face meetings would have been reduced and Penkovskiy’s arrest avoided or delayed.

SPYCRAFT points out how technical limitations in the Penkovskiy case were overcome thanks to some very innovative, frequently unorthodox, officers who often gave management migraines and thanks to the transistor, which led to miniaturization and the digital era. These new technologies reduced the difficulty of handling agents behind the Iron Curtain, especially in Moscow. Two cases make this point in SPYCRAFT. The first is that of a Soviet agent code-named TRIGON, who was recruited in Latin America. To permit contacts after he returned to Moscow, a plan based on dead drops was developed. SPYCRAFT tells how TRIGON used a special document copying camera, the T-100, which was a major improvement over the Minox, to record his secrets and relay them to his Moscow handler, CIA officer Martha Peterson. The case ended with Peterson’s arrest as she filled a dead drop with material for TRIGON—he had been betrayed by a Czech penetration of the CIA. Photos of Peterson undergoing KGB interrogation and the hollow rock concealment device she used are among the more than 200 illustrations contained in the book.

The second example of this type of technical support began in January 1977, by which time TSD had become OTS. A few months before the TRIGON case ended, Adolf Tolkachev, an engineer working on Soviet stealth technology projects, made repeated and ultimately successful attempts to convince the Moscow station and Agency that he was a genuine walk-in, not a KGB provocation. Between then and 1985, OTS provided Tolkachev with special high-quality and high-capacity miniature cameras, false documentation, a short-range agent communication (SRAC) device, and other support that allowed him to become a very valuable agent with minimum risk. His arrest in May 1985 and subsequent execution was not due to tradecraft errors, inadequate equipment or superior KGB surveillance—he was betrayed by former CIA officers Edward Howard and Aldrich Ames.⁵

SPYCRAFT also mentions OTS operations that didn’t involve foreign agents. CKTAW, for example, referred to a special device attached to an underground communication cable in the Moscow area that recorded transmissions between the Krasnaya Pakhra Nuclear Research Institute and the Ministry of Defense.

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⁴ Robert Wallace is a former director of CIA’s Office of Technical Service. H. Keith Melton is an author of intelligence books and collector of intelligence hardware and artifacts. Henry R. Schlesinger writes about intelligence technologies for Popular Science Magazine.

Other special hardware tasks described include the development of a quiet helicopter, hard-to-detect audio surveillance and concealment devices, the development of long-life batteries—a development that contributed to making pacemakers practical—silent drills, and Acoustic Kitty, a novel but unsuccessful attempt to implant a clandestine listening device in a cat's ear.

As OTS grew to meet the demands of operators in the field, so did the breadth of expertise in the service. SPYCRAFT discusses these areas too: the making of disguises and the forensic documentation laboratory for the detection of forgeries and fabrications and creation of documentation for foreign operations. Also mentioned are the devices developed to monitor activity along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia and Vietnam.

Many of the OTS scientists and engineers are given pseudonyms in SPYCRAFT, though the operations they reveal actually took place. Three who are identified in true name demonstrate the risks one accepts in the supporting clandestine service operations in a hostile country. The three were sent to Cuba in 1960 under nonofficial cover, using tourist passports, to install listening devices in an embassy in Havana before it was occupied. They were betrayed and spent more than three years in a Cuban jail without admitting their CIA employment. (249ff)

Terrorism was a problem for the CIA by the late 1970s. SPYCRAFT has a chapter on OTS's roles in several counterterrorism operations, including the identification of the terrorists who blew up Pan Am Flight 103, the tracking of an al-Qa'ida forger-terrorist, and support to CIA teams in Afghanistan in 2001. In each case new methods and techniques were developed to solve the technical problems.

The final chapters in SPYCRAFT are something of a primer on human and technical intelligence. They cover the fundamentals of clandestine tradecraft—agent recruitment, handling, and security—and OTS operations in the era of the Internet. They also discuss special imagery collection devices, for example, the Insectohopter, a clever but ultimately unsuccessful device modeled on a dragonfly. Another technique explained is the use of steganography to hide intelligence in digital images. The case of Cuban agent and onetime DIA intelligence analyst, Ana Montes, is used to illustrate the mix of techniques and equipment—cell phones, digital disks, laptops, steganography, and one-time pads—involved in modern operations.

As with all writings by CIA employees, SPYCRAFT was submitted to the CIA Publications Review Board (PRB) to make sure no classified material was included. The authors of SPYCRAFT have impishly included in encrypted form, using a one-time pad, the required statement that the PRB reviewed the publication. (xxv) Instructions for deciphering the statement are in an appendix. The clear text is also included, in the endnotes.

In his foreword, former DCI George Tenet, writes that books about "the CIA's operations...often obscure...the technological origins of the gadgets [and] the people who make them." SPYCRAFT fills that gap. Well documented and thoroughly illustrated, it is a long overdue tribute to an unsung group of “techies” and all who support them in achieving amazing technical breakthroughs under difficult conditions.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations, Yonah Alexander (ed.)

Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark. Reviewed with:

The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him, Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins

America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise, David Armstrong and Joseph Trento


General Intelligence

Intelligence, Crises and Security Prospects and Retrospects, Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes

Historical

Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914, Martin Thomas

Historical Dictionary of World War Two Intelligence, Nigel West

I Engaged in Intelligence Work, Colonel Dinh Thi Van

The Kravchenko Case: One Man’s War On Stalin, Gary Kern

A Man of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave, Australian Codebreaker Extraordinary, Ian Pefenningwerth

Programmed to Kill: Lee Harvey Oswald, the Soviet KGB, and the Kennedy Assassination – The Training of a Dedicated Agent, Ion Mihai Pacepa

Secrets and Lies: A History of CIA Mind Control and Germ Warfare, Gordon Thomas

Spies and Revolutionaries: A History of New Zealand Subversion, Graeme Hunt

Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party, John C. Schmeidel
Current


The dust jacket's claim that this book offers “a counterterrorism road map for the 21st century” is not supported by the narrative. What the book does is review, through the analysis of seven academics, the experiences of six countries—the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Egypt, and Sri Lanka—in dealing with terrorism historically and after 9/11. For reasons not mentioned, the potentially valuable contributions of the United Kingdom and Spain are excluded. For the cases discussed, attention is focused primarily on legislative actions to prevent and counter terrorist operations. If terrorist acts have diminished, the assumption—which some will question—is that the actions were correct. In the United States, for example, the reorganization of the Intelligence Community is thus seen as the correct course of action.

While each country has unique characteristics and histories of successes and failure, which are discussed in detail, the editor finds “policy implications” that apply generally. The first is that nations must “act unilaterally and in concert to develop credible responses and capabilities to minimize future threats.” The second is equally insipid: “There are no simplistic solutions.” As challenges evolve, “nations must adjust and act accordingly.” The third continues the trend by invoking the requirement for “patience, resolve, perseverance, political will, and relentless pursuit of terrorists.” The fourth recommends policies that will lead to apprehension of operatives, destruction of command and control elements, denial of support, and infliction of severe punishment. Too little is said about how the policies should be implemented. (215)

In short, Counterterrorism Strategies provides an interesting review of terrorism as experienced by six countries and viewed by academics, but it presents nothing new and certainly no strategies for the future that have not already been implemented.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.


By the time *Time* dubbed A.Q. Khan the “Merchant of Menace” in 2005, he was known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. After obtaining a PhD in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, in 1972, Khan found work at the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO) in the Netherlands, a subcontractor to URENCO, a uranium enrichment facility. Here he began developing contacts with European contractors supporting the program. Then, taking advantage of the casual security atmosphere at FDO, he acquired top secret documents that he knew would be helpful to Pakistan’s fledgling atomic bomb program. In July 1974, after India’s first successful nuclear detonation on 18 May 1974, he wrote to Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan’s prime minister, and offered his assistance; it was accepted. Between then and May 1998, when Pakistan exploded its own atomic bomb, Khan, with the support of the Pakistani government, formed companies to do the work. He acquired the essential materials from firms around the world, using legal and illegal methods. At some point, Khan expanded his efforts to include a black market in nuclear weapons technology that involved North Korea, China, Iran, and Libya, acquiring a personal fortune in the process. His efforts did not go unnoticed by various intelligence agencies, and in 2004, despite his status as a national hero, Khan was arrested and made a public confession.

The three books cited above agree on these basic facts. They also agree that the United States and its European allies could and should have stopped Khan and Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program, especially its links to the “axis of evil” nations. In something of a surprise, they also acknowledge that the intelligence agencies involved were aware of the problem from the 1970s on and recommended various actions to stem or at least delay Pakistan’s acquisition of the bomb, actions that were, in most cases, overruled by the governments concerned.

Deception takes the strongest position. Beginning with the Carter administration, the authors argue that the United States, supported by Britain and other European countries, allowed Pakistan to acquire “highly re-

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stricted nuclear technology." (2) More to the point, they allege that the State Department and US intelligence agencies that warned of the proliferation problem were ignored, that federal laws were broken, that Congress was lied to, and that careers were intentionally ruined when analysts dared to speak truth to power. These charges, based on interviews and secondary sources, are judgment calls, not the result of irrefutable facts, and could have different interpretations. And while Deception mentions various Middle Eastern crises administrations were forced to deal with and even includes mention of several unsuccessful attempts by US secretaries of state to persuade Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program, the authors do not realize or acknowledge that once India had acquired the bomb, nothing short of war could prevent Pakistan from at least trying to do the same. Beyond these points, Deception adds more historical, personal, and political detail than the other books. It also looks beyond Khan's confession and presents facts that suggest that successive Pakistani governments have been at least equally complicit with Khan in continuing nuclear proliferation. Levy and Scott-Clark see little hope for change so long as the United States and Britain need Pakistan in their war on terror.

The Nuclear Jihadist is mostly a biography of Khan, whom the authors credit with being “one of the principal architects of the second nuclear age.” (xv) And while the book also analyzes the proliferation problem, its other common thread is the role and actions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an organization scarcely mentioned in the other books. As to the futile efforts of the United States and its NATO allies to stop Pakistan's nuclear program, Nuclear Jihadist is more balanced and detailed than Deception. One example of this is the handling by Frantz and Collins of the case of France's decision to cancel its contract with Pakistan. Both books discuss the successful efforts of the United States and Britain to neutralize Libya's nuclear program, although The Nuclear Jihadist relies more heavily on George Tenet's memoir, while Deception adds details from other sources. There are also some factual differences, including Khan's claim reported in Jihadist that he got a degree from the University of Karachi. Deception alleges that Pakistan's intelligence service determined that Khan acquired his education entirely in Europe.  

Jihadist has a chapter titled “Spy Games,” that will disappoint: it really deals with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Frantz and Collins provide documentation in the form of “hundreds of hours of interviews” and books about Khan, with endnotes available on a Web site; they are not very helpful. 3 The questioning reader is left with “trust us, we're journalists.”

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2 Deception, 22–23. The source cited by Frantz and Collins, Khan's official biography by Zahid Malik, A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb (Islamabad: Hurmat, Publications, 1992), is unreliable according to Deception. No sources permitting resolution of the differences are cited in any of the books.

3 Chapter 7, located on the web www.thenuclearjihadist.com. Some endnotes are included in the book.
America and the Islamic Bomb is a concise and readable presentation of the A. Q. Khan story, based partly on primary sources not used by the other two books. Nevertheless, with few exceptions, the material and the conclusions are the same. One item discussed only in this book is the relatively minor role US Congressman Charlie Wilson played in supporting the Pakistan nuclear program and US aid to Pakistan in return for support during the Afghan war against the Soviets. On the other side, Armstrong and Trento do not mention the agent Dragonfly, whose story about an atom bomb being driven around New York City ready to be detonated caused some concern but turned out to be untrue. The other two books used the case to illustrate the urgency of stepping up non-proliferation programs.

Each of the books mention and summarily reject two principal arguments for not having taken stronger steps to prevent Pakistan from acquiring the bomb and cooperating with China, North Korea, and Iran in the process. The first is that since the likelihood of Pakistan’s success was high in any event, it is better to monitor the program to learn what and who is involved so that action can be taken if things get out of hand. That is of course, what happened. The second reason the authors find unacceptable is that other foreign policy objectives—the Cold War and then the War on Terror—were of higher priority than the possible spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists and unscrupulous nations. They scoff at Zbigniew Brzezinski’s answer to a journalist’s question about “whether he regretted giving arms and advice to future terrorists.” Brzezinski responded, “What is more important to the history of the world: the Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet Empire.”

These authors condemn all US presidential administrations since Carter’s for failing to meet the proliferation challenge. But the final outcome is still unknown; it may yet be achieved and nuclear holocaust avoided.


Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias adds important qualifications to Sun Tzu’s most famous sound bite, “Know your enemy!” The book argues that in order to defeat the unconventional forces, or non-state actors, attacking Western nations today, it is essential to really understand the hows, whys, and wherefores that drive them to kill. The authors recognize that this is not a new idea and cite Lawrence of Arabia as the premier exemplar of its effective application. But, in the post–Cold War era, they suggest the approach has been ignored. What is new here is their proposed framework that “will allow the intelligence analyst” to provide “commanders with an operational-level assessment of how internal warfare is conducted by mod-

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4 Armstrong and Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb, 230.
ern warriors.” To achieve this goal, they identify six key questions to be answered using an “interdisciplinary approach anchored in historical, anthropological and cultural studies.” (37)

The six questions are framed in conventional terms: concept of warfare, command and control, area of operations, targets, constraints, and role of outside actors. The answers, they suggest, may be found by analyzing clans and tribal actions in the unconventional wars fought in Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Out of this come six unsurprising “lessons learned...fundamental principles...indispensable prerequisites.” (269) For example: know in detail the tribal traditions and clan relationships; recognize that conventional constraints on the use of force on non-combatants don't apply. They are significant because the case studies make clear the penalties for ignoring them. Put another way, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias leaves no doubt that knowing today's enemies is essential to national survival.

General Intelligence

Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, Intelligence, Crises and Security Prospects and Retrospects (New York: Routledge, 2008), 268 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

The 11 articles by 14 contributors in this volume are based mainly on papers given at a conference at the University of Wales in 2005. While the title of this volume does not convey a theme, the preface suggests that it might be the changes necessary in the processes of estimative intelligence in an era of a “new constitutional order.” (x) Leaving aside the ambiguity of the term “new constitutional order,” none of the articles discuss the concept nor suggest reasons for changing estimative processes. A better characterization may be found in the stated aim of the conference itself, “a critical evaluation of the role of intelligence in relations between states, and to explore what lessons might be drawn from a variety of case studies for the contemporary exploitation and management of secret intelligence.” (3)

The first article summarizes the subsequent contributions. They include interesting historical studies of how intelligence served the British during 1877–78, 1922, 1938, and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–64. Studies of intelligence and counter-insurgency in Morocco and Syria after WW I complete the historical lessons presented. The later chapters are focused on contemporary topics and include one that, according to the editors, “emphasizes the potentially crucial importance of open sources that are frequently neglected,” a topic barely mentioned in the article. What the chapter does do is use open sources to provide an insightful critique of the post-9/11 changes affecting intelligence analysis, organization, and management (for example, why a DNI?). The chapter on CIA covert action “and the abuse of
human rights,” which deals with the Gladio stay-behind networks in post-WW II Europe, lacks any relevance. The author of that chapter makes no attempt at objectivity or documentation before concluding: “the CIA should not be engaged in terrorism” or operate prisons that “share features of the Soviet Gulag.” (126) Among the other chapters, one that is very interesting deals with the intelligence services of neutral states, Switzerland in this case. Two valuable contributions assess the role of legislative oversight and accountability in relation to intelligence. The topic of deception is covered in an article by a former Israeli intelligence officer—the only contributor with operational intelligence experience—who uses the Yom Kippur War as an exemplar. What is absent from this collection is a summary chapter that relates the articles to the overall aim or theme. This difficult task is left to the reader.

Historical


Long before he was hailed as “Lawrence of Arabia” by American journalist Lowell Thomas, intelligence officer T. E. Lawrence “had dreamed of bringing about self-government for the Arabs.” That this did not occur after WW I, despite his heroic efforts, was for Lawrence a major disappointment. For imperial Britain and France, however, it was a singular victory that needed only to be consolidated by sound, traditional colonial government. *Empires of Intelligence*—more accurately meaning *Empires and Intelligence*—chronicles attempts by both nations to impose this result through what British author Martin Thomas calls an “intelligence state.” He defines this concept to embrace domestic security elements, including the police, that collect and analyze information and, if necessary, act to counter domestic conditions that could adversely affect political stability and imperial control during the inter-war period.

Thomas compares French intelligence operations in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria with those of the British in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt, and Sudan. In the process he shows how each country drew on its colonial governing experience to penetrate the indigenous societies and gather the information necessary to achieve “consensual rule” (4) and to control political participation. The first chapter discusses the social background, training and field experience of the personnel assigned intelligence or security tasks. Subsequent chapters are devoted to specific French and British intelligence and security operations in their respective colonies as they attempted to deal with political instability and revolts by

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urban elements and the nomadic Bedouins. He argues persuasively that the revolts were not a consequence, as some claimed, of "external manipulation," (300) but rather the result of growing domestic anticolonialism to which insufficient heed was paid.

Thomas's extensively detailed and well-documented analysis concludes that the inevitable failure of colonialism was in part a result of the inability of the "intelligence state" to accomplish unrealistic goals. Similarly, it suggests lessons that apply in today's operations in the same regions. Western political norms cannot be imposed on Arab nations. Empires of Intelligence is a fine example of what can happen when history is either forgotten or ignored.

Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of World War Two Intelligence (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2008), 306 pp., bibliography, chronology, index.

Nigel West's fourth contribution to the Scarecrow Press Historical Dictionary intelligence series continues his precedent of providing a fine bibliographic essay, an index he creates himself, and an absence of source notes. Unfortunately, the essay itself is not indexed, but the dictionary entries include most of the books and individuals discussed.

There are entries for most of the WW II belligerents, though there is no mention of the contributions of Australia or Belgium. Similarly, some of the major atomic spies—the Rosenbergs, Ted Hall, Klaus Fuchs to name a few—are excluded, as are key OSS officers and operations in China. As might be expected, there is some duplication. For example, the Cambridge spies, the Double Cross operation, and VENONA have appeared in the other volumes in the series, although with less detail here. But most topics, for example, the WW II intelligence services of Argentina and Brazil, have not been covered before.

In sum, this useful but not comprehensive treatment leaves many topics for future volumes.


After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in June 1954, the Vietnamese government expanded its Intelligence Bureau (IB) and began sending officers to the South to report on French and ultimately American military operations. Dinh Thi Van, a married provincial party worker, was surprised and honored when she was suddenly assigned to the IB and instructed to learn "the enemy's strategic schemes, what is new about their military assistance and their equipment, and how the U.S. forces became involved in Vietnam." (3) To accomplish this goal, she first convinced her

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6 The other three are on international intelligence, British intelligence, and Cold War counterintelligence.
husband to “agree to a remarriage” and begin a new life without her. After training, she was sent south to begin her mission. In I Engaged In Intelligence Work she tells of her day-to-day experiences, which included communication problems, an “urgent mission” to determine what the enemy knew about NVA forces in Laos, recruiting agents in the South, and talking her way to freedom after being arrested. The final chapter describes her role in the Tet offensive (1968) after which she continued to operate until the US withdrawal in 1975.

Sadly, she gives few details about what she did. The translated narrative is a bit awkward, but the message is clear: the North Vietnamese were dedicated to achieving victory no matter what the price in human life. Moreover, the US military never adapted to the consequences of that motivation, if perceived. Neither did it understand the extent to which the NB penetrated the South Vietnamese Army and society to keep the North Vietnamese apprised of the situation. Colonel Dinh tells a moving personal story that at the same time illustrates the problems of countering the effectiveness of an ideologically motivated enemy working to protect the homeland.


With, A Death In Washington: Walter G. Krivitsky and the Stalin Terror, Russian scholar and linguist, Gary Kern, set the gold-standard for defector case studies. Besides adding much to what Krivitsky said in his 1939 memoir, In Stalin’s Secret Service, Kern explained the circumstances of his “suicide” in a Washington hotel. Krivitsky’s case set a precedent for Soviet defectors to the United States: once granted asylum, they were debriefed, urged to find a job, applied for citizenship, helped to write a book, and then sought obscurity to avoid Soviet retaliation. In The Kravchenko Case Kern shows how Victor Kravchenko followed this precedent in all respects but the last; obscurity was not for him. He had messages to deliver.

Kravchenko’s case differs from Krivitsky’s in three other major respects: he was not a Soviet intelligence officer; he was a member of the Soviet elite assigned to the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, DC; and he had planned his defection before leaving the Soviet Union. At least that is how he explained his motivation to the FBI and the public. Kern finds no basis to question him on this score. Kern tells the story in 13 long and detailed chapters. The first describes Kravchenko’s origins in the Ukraine, his family background, education, marriages, and often stormy work and party relations. He pays particular attention to his gradual realization

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8 Walter G. Krivitsky, In Stalin’s Secret Service: An Expose of Russia’s Secret Policies By the Former Chief of Soviet Intelligence in Western Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939).
that the social conditions created under Stalin, especially the purges and collectivization, were vastly different from the party propaganda that was accepted by the world. Opposition from inside would guarantee at least a trip to the Gulag—thus his clever plan to defect.

In succeeding chapters, Kern covers Kravchenko’s first contacts with Americans who might help him defect, the 1944 defection itself, his decision to go public, and the writing of his first book, I Choose Freedom—a worldwide best seller. The intense and loud Soviet response to the book charged, inter alia, that Kravchenko was a wartime Red Army deserter (not true) and that he did not write the book, also untrue, although he had a ghost translator/editor. All this led to a trial in France, with Soviet witnesses, which Kravchenko won. He then wrote his second book, I Choose Justice. With profits and a reputation from both books, Kravchenko pursued a capitalist-socialist dream in Peru. After initial success, he ran out of funds and returned to the United States in the 1960s in a failed effort to raise money. He died, officially, by his own hand, on 26 February 1965.

Kern adds depth and detail to each period and principal event of Kravchenko’s life. Based largely on archival material, letters, and interviews with those who knew Kravchenko, Kern briefly tells of those who helped or influenced him, almost always in very trying circumstances—writers Isaac Don Levin and Eugene Lyons are premier examples. Kern adds accounts of the world events that shaped Kravchenko’s decisions, the KGB operations against him, and the agents who reported on him (some putative friends), his obstreperous behavior, his family and marriages, his relations with the media, and his contacts with Congress and the FBI.

In the end, readers are likely to infer two questions. First, did Kravchenko commit suicide or did the KGB finally get its man? Second, is there contemporary relevance here? Kerns concludes suicide is most likely but presents curious details that leave room for doubt. He doesn’t comment directly on the second question, but the case has genuine counterintelligence value, since defector handling is still a challenge and Kravchenko’s experiences are valuable precedents. The Kravchenko Case is exhaustive, though not exhausting.

Ian Pefenningwerth, A Man Of Intelligence: The Life of Captain Theodore Eric Nave, Australian Codebreaker Extraordinary (NSW, Australia: Rosenberg Publishing Pty Ltd., 2006), 304 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The 1991 book Betrayal At Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt, coauthored by James Rusbridger and Captain Eric Nave (RN, Ret.), revealed that Nave, a Japanese linguist assigned to the Royal Navy in Sin-

Singapore, helped break the Japanese Naval code JN-25A. The book went on to claim that this breakthrough enabled the British to learn well before 7 December of Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Even more startling, the authors wrote that Nave knew Winston Churchill had been informed and that Churchill declined to tell President Roosevelt in order to get America into WW II. Betrayal At Pearl Harbor was published in the United States after several respectable British houses turned it down. The conspiracy theorists gave it serious reviews, but code expert David Kahn, among others, attacked it for its many errors of fact and the lack of evidence supporting the principal claim. Nave denied the role attributed to him in later interviews, but after he died in 1992 at the age of 94, the controversy continued.

A Man Of Intelligence, a biography of Nave's impressive career, sets the record straight. Author Ian Pefenningwerth shows that Rusbridger, a convicted felon and fantasist journalist in desperate need of money, wrote the critical parts of the book without consulting Nave. Using Australian and British naval records, Pefenningwerth shows that Nave was not even assigned to Singapore at the time Rusbridger claims the Japanese code was broken. Moreover, the code mentioned in the book, JN-25A, was not the one that would have carried the critical intelligence. He also shows that Nave was a brilliant code breaker whose WW II service included assignments in Australia's signals intelligence bureau and later in MacArthur's Central Intelligence Bureau in Brisbane. After the war, Nave helped establish Australia's Defense Signals Bureau and later served in the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), analogous to the FBI.

A Man Of Intelligence will be ignored by conspiracy devotees, but accepted with gratitude by intelligence historians and clear-thinking readers.

Ion Mihai Pacepa, Programmed to Kill: Lee Harvey Oswald, the Soviet KGB, and the Kennedy Assassination - The Training of a Dedicated Agent (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 349 pp., endnotes, index.

In his first book, Ion Pacepa told of his life as a Romanian intelligence officer who achieved high rank and worked closely with the KGB before defecting to the United States in the late 1970s. The present work applies his knowledge of KGB operational tradecraft to the case of Lee Harvey Oswald to determine whether Oswald was a KGB agent. As the title suggests, Pacepa is convinced Oswald was recruited. He concludes that Oswald most likely succumbed to a clever honey trap when he served with the US Marines in Japan, where he provided secret details about the U-2 and became a dedicated communist. After his discharge from the Marines,

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Pacepa says, Oswald made a “secret trip” to Moscow, which became public when he unexpectedly renounced his US citizenship and demanded to remain in the Soviet Union. Whether Oswald’s story, up to this point, was contrived by the KGB is not clear, but, according to Pacepa, he was later trained in the use of microdots and as a marksman before being dispatched on an assassination mission in the United States. Oswald’s marriage and dissatisfaction with life in the Soviet Union were part of his cover story to explain his return to the United States, where he was handled by a KGB illegal. When Khrushchev decided not to conduct any more foreign assassinations, Oswald was ordered to stand down, but he declined and decided to show the Soviets what he could do by assassinating President Kennedy. Jack Ruby was then instructed to kill Oswald to keep him quiet, according to Pacepa.

What evidence does Pacepa provide for his imaginative story? Only his analytical skills and his experience with the KGB. The book is filled with terms like “must have,” “could very possible have,” and “of course, there is no way of knowing.” It also fails to account for Oswald’s frequent statements while in the service that he was a Marxist. They were so frequent, in fact, that Pacepa claims Oswald’s Marine buddies nicknamed him Oswaldovich. Equally baffling is Oswald’s retention of a security clearance in the mid-1950s, when, by most accounts, anyone openly espousing Marxist views would have lost his clearance and been dismissed from the service.

An equally likely explanation for Pacepa’s version is what R.V. Jones called Crabtree’s Bludgeon: “No set of mutually inconsistent observations can exist for which some human intellect cannot conceive a coherent explanation, however complicated.”

Programmed to Kill presents a conceivable explanation of Kennedy’s assassination, but it is also implausible. Pacepa doesn’t connect the dots, he adds new ones. A health warning is warranted.


In his 1999 book, Gideon’s Spies, British journalist Gordon Thomas made the never documented claim that a Mossad agent, codenamed MEGA, had penetrated the Clinton White House to spy on the president. In the present work, a revision of an earlier book on the same subject, he alleges that the CIA worked to perfect “the ultimate killing machine: germ microbes.” As to sources, he refers to 22,000 never-before-published docu-

ments relating to CIA programs, but he doesn't identify one from that
group that supports his allegation. He also cites interviews, depositions,
and affidavits but does not relate them to specific events. There are no
endnotes! None of these sources is linked to Thomas's sensational charges,
among them that the CIA murdered Frank Olson and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb
and that Richard Helms planned to have Frank Olson murdered. He does
include photos of documents dealing with the CIA's MKULTRA program,
but these were all given to congressional committees in the 1970s and
have nothing to do with murder. The photos also reproduce an "assassina-
tion plan" that the author alleges was written by Gottlieb, but the pages
are undated and do not identify an author or any organizational associa-
tion. Thomas claims to have been an acquaintance of the late CIA officer
William Buckley, who was killed while held as a hostage by terrorists in
Lebanon, and attributes quotes to him extensively in support of some
charges, but he offers no corroboration. Buckley's colleagues will find most
of these assertions spurious. No doubt anti-CIA conspiracy theorists will
delight in this book. Scholars and other serious students of intelligence
may ignore it without penalty.

Graeme Hunt, *Spies And Revolutionaries: A History of New Zealand Sub-
version* (Auckland, NZ: Reed Books Ltd., 2007), 352 pp., endnotes, bibliography,
appendix, photos, index.

The spread of Bolshevik communism began in 1919. It eventually exported
espionage and subversive operations to New Zealand as it did most other
countries. With some activist exceptions, New Zealanders, however, paid
little attention to hints of communist subversion. As journalist Graeme
Hunt explains, even in 1969 "it was fashionable to dismiss the Cold War
as American propaganda." (8) With the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the release of documents by the US and Russian governments, Hunt real-
ized that "the fear many Western leaders [including New Zealand's]
shared of communism in the 1940s to the 1970s was not exaggerated." (9)
Spies And Revolutionaries recognizes this reality and adds historical per-
spective by discussing spying and subversion in New Zealand from the
start of its European settlement to the present.

The first three chapters cover foreign and domestic threats to New
Zealand's stability. In the former category he includes political actions by
the Fenians, as well as French, Russian, Japanese movements, and inevi-
tably Marxism. The latter is typified by the indigenous Maori and other in-
surgencies. The six succeeding chapters cover the post-WW I Red Scare
and the spread of Soviet subversion that led to the formation of the New
Zealand Security Services, which Hunt covers in considerable detail. The
chapter entitled "Trinity's Traitor" adds new material on Paddy Costello,
one of the lesser known "Cambridge spies," "who became the most impor-
tant New Zealand spy recruited by the Soviet Union." (168) It was Costel-
lo, serving in New Zealand's Paris embassy, who provided New Zealand
passports to Americans Peter and Helen Cohen (aka KROGER) that al-
allowed them to serve as KGB illegals in Britain as part of the Molody espionage network. Hunt adds new details on this episode, including photos of the passports. Of nearly equal importance to Costello were two other New Zealanders who became Soviet agents, Ian Milner and Bill Sutch. Milner, a Rhodes Scholar, eventually defected to Czechoslovakia. Sutch, once a member of the government, stood trial but was not convicted. Hunt presents new data that support his guilt. The many other cases described, most seldom mentioned in the literature of espionage, leave no doubt that the Soviets penetrated New Zealand politically as long and as thoroughly as other Western targets.

The final two chapters discuss terrorism in New Zealand, including the Rainbow Warrior attack, a case linked to 9/11, and the impact on security of the revelation that “New Zealand had been used as a base by people wanting to learn about or make weapons of mass destruction.” (288) Spies And Revolutionaries is well documented, well written, and well worth reading.

John C. Schmeidel, Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party (New York: Routledge, 2008), 208 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendix, index.

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the files of the former Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS), Stasi for short, were gradually opened to the public. As onetime officers, agents, and informants were identified, many were interviewed, and they added important corroboration to the data in the files. The result has been a series of Stasi studies; John Schmeidel’s book is the latest and compares favorably with Mike Dennis’s, The Stasi Myth and Reality. In six well-documented chapters, Schmeidel covers the Stasi’s origins and principal players, the politics that dominated the organization, the tradecraft employed to recruit the massive domestic informant system that penetrated every aspect of society including educational institutions at all levels, churches, and cultural organizations—formal and informal—and the very successful foreign espionage operations. The final chapter examines the links between the Stasi and various terrorist groups.

Schmeidel’s book contains some relatively minor differences with the Dennis book. One concerns the definition of the term Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IM), which Schmeidel translates as “unofficial colleague,” whereas Dennis uses “unofficial collaborator.” Both books discuss the many variations of

17 For a discussion of the Molody network and the ultimate fate of the Cohens, see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, The KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations From Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Sceptre, 1991), 44ff.
IMs the Stasi defined and since these included informers pressured into cooperation, “colleague” has a positive connotation that really doesn’t apply. “Collaborator” is more neutral and is the better term. Similarly, both mention many counterespionage cases to illustrate points. In Schmeidel’s analysis of the Popov and Penkovskiy cases, he refers to them as “walk-in defectors,” (8) although neither defected. Later, he adds that Penkovskiy “made two walk-in attempts to offer his services to the Americans at the embassy in the heart of Moscow,” something he never did.20 (110) Finally, Schmeidel does not accept Markus Wolf’s moral equivalence argument that officers and agents of the foreign intelligence element of the Stasi, the HVA, should not be damned by the reputation of the domestic security elements. (110)

Overall, Stasi is a thorough, though not definitive, and generally well-sourced treatment of the MfS that illustrates the ultimate futility of using a secret police force to preserve a dictatorship.

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20 For the full story of Penkovskiy’s attempts to contact the West see, Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World (New York: Scribner, 1992).