Of Moles and Molehunters:
A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977-92

An Intelligence Monograph

Center for the Study of Intelligence

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Erratum


Please replace page iii of this publication with the attached page.
Foreword

The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was established by CIA in February 1975 as an in-house think tank. The Center’s objectives are to contribute to a broader understanding of the art of intelligence and to assist in defining and analyzing major issues facing the profession. Questions about the Center’s activities may be addressed to its Director on 30214 (secure) or (703) 351-2698.

The CSI Monograph Program publishes individual or group research papers on the history, theory, or craft of intelligence. Included are studies by officers on rotation to the Center under its Fellows and Scholars Program, as well as manuscripts submitted by officers throughout the Intelligence Community. The publications are produced in consultation with interested components, but there is no formal coordination. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center or the CIA.

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Comments on this monograph may be directed to the author, Cleveland C. Cram, who holds the copyright. His home telephone number is (202) 966-6548. Mr. Cram was an officer in CIA’s Operations Directorate from 1949 to 1975, served as a Deputy Chief of Station in Europe for nine years, and later was a Chief of Station in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. After retiring, he did research for the Agency on various counterintelligence matters until 1992.

Mr. Cram served as a naval officer in World War II. He was educated at St. John’s University in Minnesota and took his master’s and doctoral degrees at Harvard.
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I. Introduction

This monograph has two parts. The first is an essay on the coun­terintelligence literature produced from 1977 to 1992. The second contains reviews of selected books from that period. The essay and reviews con­centrate on the major counterintelligence issues of the period. Highlighted are the controversial views of James Angleton, former head of CIA’s Counterintelligence (CI) Staff, about the threat posed by Soviet intelligence operations. Also featured is Soviet defector Anatole Golitsyn, whose claims about Soviet operations had a compelling influence on Western counterintelligence services beginning about 1962 and until 1975.

The study focuses mainly on books about the American, British, and Canadian intelligence and security services as they dealt with the Soviet intelligence threat, although it also mentions the services of other West European countries such as France, West Germany, and Norway. Not every book on espionage and counterintelligence published between 1977 and 1992 is reviewed; only those that are historically accurate, at least in gen­eral, and were influential are assessed. Excluded are some recent works—like *Widows*, by William R. Corson and Susan and Joseph Trento—because they are not reputable by even the generally low standards of most counterintelligence writing.

No study exists on Angleton’s efforts in retirement to spread his conspiracy and other theories through writers such as Edward J. Epstein. Nor has there been any substantial analysis of the impact in Britain of reve­lations such as the Blunt case, the false charges made against Sir Roger Hollis and his deputy, Graham Mitchell, nor of the events that led eventually to the famous *Spycatcher* trial in Australia. The books reviewed in this monograph appeared during these difficult times, and an effort has been made to put them in their historical perspective. Some of these publications, with their extreme assertions, distracted intelligence and security services from important challenges they faced in the last years of the Cold War. That they overcame these diversions reflects the common sense and decency ex­ercised by leaders of intelligence services in the post-Angleton years.

Readers of the entire monograph will find certain observations and comments in the essay reappear in individual reviews, often with more de­tail. The writer anticipates that the monograph will be used as a reference by some who may turn directly to a particular review without having read the essay. For that reason, the repetition seems worthwhile.
The author, a retired CIA officer, never served in the CI staff under Angleton but he worked closely with him from various stations throughout Europe and the Western Hemisphere. This study reflects that experience, research, and point of view. In some instances precise attribution to support certain statements that are made cannot be provided in this unclassified monograph because of classification restrictions, although the factual basis for these statements is sound.
II. Background Essay

The year 1974 was a watershed in literature about the CIA. Before that time, only a few outsiders, usually professional journalists, had written books critical of the Agency. Most of the others were neutral or even positive, especially those written by former Agency officials like Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick. But in 1974 a disgruntled former Agency employee, Philip Agee, published his highly critical book Inside the Company: CIA Diary. Books by other ex-employees—J. B. Smith, John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti (with J. D. Marks), and R. W. McGehee—followed in quick succession, each exposing highly confidential material.

These authors usually wrote about subjects of which they had special knowledge, and the cumulative effect was to breach the walls of confidentiality that had protected Agency operations and personnel. Although the net effect was damaging—especially in the case of Agee, who disclosed the identities of officers serving abroad under cover—information about sensitive operations against the Soviet Union and its intelligence organs was not compromised.

A Turning Point

The change that occurred in the mid-1970s began when Edward J. Epstein published a series of articles that later, in 1978, were the basis for his book Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald. The articles, and especially the book, publicized for the first time clashes that had occurred within the Agency between the Counterintelligence Staff and the Soviet Division over the bona fides of a KGB defector named Yuriy Nosenko.

Because Epstein’s writings contained so much information about sensitive CIA and FBI operations, it was generally assumed he had a willing and knowledgeable source, either a serving officer (considered doubtful) or a retired senior person with wide knowledge of anti-Soviet operations overseas and in the United States. Neither the articles nor the book was annotated, however. Epstein stated that he had spoken occasionally with James Angleton, the retired chief of CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff, but did not acknowledge that he was the source.1

1Subsequently—in Deception, published in 1988, a year after Angleton’s death—Epstein was more forthcoming regarding his sources. He admitted that, from 1977 onward, he had obtained large amounts of highly classified information from Angleton, N. S. Miller, Tennet H. Bagley, and others in the CIA, all of whom shared Angleton’s controversial views on the nature of the threat posed by Soviet intelligence operations.
James Angleton, head of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff from 1954 until his dismissal in late 1974. He propagated the theory of an omnipotent KGB conspiracy against American society and politics involving agent penetrations, deception and disinformation.

When Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Colby dismissed him in 1974, Angleton for the next six months spent part of his time at Langley, introducing members of the new CI Staff to such people as his defector friend, Anatole Golitsyn. Gradually, however, the former counterintelligence chief realized that his career with the CIA in fact was finished. The dismissal was a terrible blow; he became embittered and withdrew for a time into alcohol.

Later, the press began to seek him out, and this revived his combative spirit. Angleton began to play off one writer against another, planting his ideas and opinions among them. He also changed his luncheon venue from a local Washington restaurant to the more politically congenial atmosphere of the Army-Navy Club. A counterattack was planned against the Agency, in particular the new CI Staff. His objective was to prove how wrong its assessment of Soviet operations was and to indict his successors for negligence of duty.

In this period, Angleton, while not neglecting the possibility of KGB penetration, stressed his belief that the main threat came from KGB deception and disinformation. To support his thesis, he continually cited evidence that Golitsyn had provided. Angleton's ideas, propounded by Epstein and other writers, caught fire and created a virtual cottage industry of academic and think tank specialists on the issues he raised.
Anatole Golitsyn, a KGB officer who defected in 1961. His controversial claims about Soviet penetrations of CIA and other KGB operations were accepted by Angleton and precipitated the molehunting frenzy.

Angleton’s British allies took a different line. They concentrated on KGB penetration because events in the United Kingdom provided some exceptional examples, such as the treachery of Sir Anthony Blunt, which became public in 1979. Moles in Her Majesty’s government became a public scandal when the traitors in the so-called Cambridge “Ring of Five” were exposed, embarrassing the Thatcher government and culminating in the 1986 Spycatcher trial in Australia.

The American and Canadian Scenes

In 1975 Aaron Latham, a young writer interested in the CIA, contacted Angleton. Latham, who held a doctorate in literature from Princeton and was editor of New York Magazine, was attracted by Angleton’s association with Ezra Pound and other American poets. An initial two-hour call was followed by luncheon and visits to Angleton’s home and orchid sheds. Latham wanted to write about the CIA and claims he decided to do a fictional work on the advice of Victor Marchetti, a former CIA officer who had written one entitled The Rope Dancer. The result was Latham’s novel

1 H. A. R. “Kim” Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, and, identified later, John Cairncross.
called *Orchids for Mother*, published in 1977, about a CIA officer who is fired by the Director over differences in policy.

The protagonists obviously are Angleton and Colby. The Angleton character, "Mother" in the story, is portrayed as a genius whose talents are wasted, and the Director is an ambitious bureaucrat of dubious loyalty. The dismissed CIA man decides he must rid the Agency of this DCI. Distraught and depressed, the old veteran accomplishes this by sacrificing himself to an assassin he hires. In the process the Director is implicated and accused of murdering his antagonist. This bizarre and vicious tale did not sell well. Mrs. Angleton called the book "garbage" and claimed her husband never read it.

In the summer of 1977, Angleton developed a new forum for his ideas. He and like-minded associates organized the Security and Intelligence Fund (SIF) to defend US security and intelligence organizations and to raise money for the defense of two FBI officers then under indictment by the Carter administration. Here Angleton was on surer ground. He had the support of a large number of FBI retirees as well as many former CIA officers. This was the period when the Pike and Church Congressional committees were in full cry investigating and exposing CIA operations, and numerous ex-intelligence people believed they had gone too far. SIF raised more than $600,000 and within six months was reported to have more than 17,000 members. Angleton was chairman, and his friends held senior positions.

Soon thereafter, however, the US Attorney General decided not to prosecute the accused FBI officers, and the purpose for which SIF was created more or less evaporated. Angleton then converted it into a forum for spreading information about Soviet deception. The Fund remained in effect into the 1980s until, after Angleton's death and the coming of glasnost, it withered away.

Publication in 1978 of Edward J. Epstein's *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald* provided enormous stimulus to the deception thesis by suggesting that Yuriy Nosenko, a Soviet defector, had been sent by the KGB to provide a cover story for Lee Harvey Oswald, who the book alleged was a KGB agent. Epstein in effect wrote two books: one focused on Lee Harvey Oswald's Marine career in Japan, his time in Russia, and his return to the United States; the second gave Nosenko the key role in an alleged KGB deception operation designed to cover Oswald (and the Soviet Government) and negate Golitsyn's revelations.

Because Epstein cited so much classified information that could only have come from someone with intimate knowledge of the Nosenko case, blame for the leak naturally focused on Angleton and his supporters.
Thus, it came as no surprise when, 10 years after the former CI chief's death, Epstein admitted his sources had included Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and other ex-Agency associates who shared his views. Despite some negative reviews, the book sold well and was important in spreading Angleton's theory of a super KGB manipulating American society and politics through its sophisticated deception apparatus.

The theme of Legend was extended in a 1980 novel called The Spike by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. De Borchgrave, soon-to-be editor of the new Washington Times, and Moss were friends and admirers of Angleton, whose conspiracy theories were consistent with their own. Moss had been spreading Angleton propaganda for some time, such as the claim that Golitsyn had provided the lead to Philby. This caught the eye of Adm. Stansfield Turner, who was then DCl. When he asked the CI Staff about it, the staff replied from solid knowledge that the claim was false.

The inferior quality and crudeness of The Spike exceed even that of the Latham novel. Briefly, it told the story of a young liberal who had been taken in by leftists. He came to realize his error, thanks to guidance from an elderly, former CIA counterintelligence officer who had been fired by a Director obviously acting at the Kremlin's direction. Moscow's secret designs are revealed by a high-level KGB defector whose escape is managed by MI-6 because the CIA is so penetrated it cannot be trusted with the mission. The KGB defector identifies the Soviet agents in the White House, the CIA, and elsewhere in the government, and the wise old counterintelligence
chief, obviously meant to be Angleton, saves the country. Though far-removed from reality, the book was an alternate Book-of-the-Month Club selection.

The year 1980 was not entirely one of wine and roses for the Angletonians because *Wilderness of Mirrors*, written by David Martin, also appeared. Now considered a classic of intelligence literature, the book was the product of more than two years of interviewing CIA retirees, including Angleton. The latter at first favored the author with many secrets but then cut him off when he learned Martin was also in touch with Angleton’s CIA critics. One of these was Clare E. Petty, who had worked on Angleton’s staff and accepted his conspiracy theories but by this time had concluded his boss was either a giant fraud or a KGB agent. Martin originally intended to publish Petty’s view in *Newsweek* but abandoned that plan when Angleton threatened legal action.

*Wilderness of Mirrors* exposed Golitsyn as an unimportant defector who caused more trouble than he was worth, suggested Nosenko was genuine, and punched many holes in the Angleton myth. Publication provoked a lengthy and denunciatory review by Epstein in *The New York Times* and a long public statement by Angleton claiming Martin had robbed him of his phrase “wilderness of mirrors.” In fact, Angleton had himself lifted it from “Gerontion,” a poem by T. S. Eliot.

Events, however, were weakening Epstein’s faith in his master. In 1981, Prime Minister Thatcher was forced by the publication of Chapman Pincher’s *Their Trade Is Treachery* to admit that her government had investigated Sir Roger Hollis, the former Director General of MI-5, as an alleged Soviet agent. Mrs. Thatcher stated in Parliament that a high-level investigation of these charges found them to be false.

Some months later Epstein managed to interview Michel Goleniewski, a defector who had become convinced he was the last of the Romanovs but otherwise remained a sensible person. Epstein asked if Goleniewski thought Hollis was a KGB mole, an idea supported by Angleton. The defector replied in the negative and then listed the Soviet agents MI-5 had apprehended from the information he had provided, adding, “If the KGB had had a mole at the head of MI-5, you can be sure all these men would somehow have escaped.”

A further confusion of the issues occurred in 1979 and 1980 with the publication of a series of articles by Joe Trento, a reporter in Wilmington, Delaware. Trento launched a number of charges against Angleton, including some erroneous information about certain cases.
Sir Roger Hollis, former Director-General of MI-5, the British counterintelligence service. In 1981 Prime Minister Thatcher was forced to reveal in Parliament that Hollis at one time was suspected of being a Soviet agent, but that a high-level investigation had exonerated him.

Angleton’s response to the Trento articles was to attack DCI Stansfield Turner, who he assumed was the source of the classified information Trento cited.3

The next significant book involving Angleton was Henry Hurt’s Shadrin, published in 1981. While working on Legend as an assistant to Epstein, Hurt had become aware of the mysterious disappearance of Shadrin, a Soviet defector. Sensing there was a story there, Hurt began interviewing the missing defector’s wife and her lawyer. The Reader’s Digest agreed to provide financial support for the project, which began as a magazine article but quickly grew into a book. Fulton Oursler, then the chief editor of The Reader’s Digest, was a man of strong rightwing views and much influenced by the Angleton-Epstein theories. The inability of the US authorities to provide an answer to the mystery of Shadrin’s disappearance had provoked wide criticism. Hurt’s account not only revived the old Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy but also made it more current by citing the appearance of a mysterious KGB man referred to as “Igor.”

3At the time, this writer had interviewed Angleton on several occasions in conjunction with a history being written of the years when he was in charge of counterintelligence at CIA. (The interviews had ended because it had become evident that his judgment and veracity could no longer be trusted.) When Angleton queried the writer about whether he was responsible for the leaks to Trento, he was assured they had come from others. Angleton then proceeded to accuse Admiral Turner of being the source—a totally unfounded accusation.
Angleton doubtlessly contributed information to Hurt, but so did a number of FBI people who talked more than they should have. In sum, much classified information was made public that could only have endangered the safety of Igor, assuming he was genuine. This was a matter on which Agency people again divided: Angleton believed Igor was not genuine; others thought his valuable information proved his bona fides. The Hurt book, however, was essentially propaganda intended to benefit Mrs. Shadrin. Its attack on the Agency, the FBI, and the new CI Staff did not help her cause, and the book’s many inaccuracies distorted an already confused situation.

A number of other books appeared during the early 1980s: William Colby’s *Honorable Men*, in which he explains why he dismissed Angleton; Tom Powers’ *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, highly praising Angleton (a position from which Powers later retreated); and John Sawatsky’s *For Services Rendered*, on the Bennett case in Canada.

Leslie James Bennett, a longtime civilian employee of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service, was impugned by Clare Petty, then a major conspiracy theorist on Angleton’s staff. Angleton could have stopped the ensuing investigation but instead lent it impetus by suggesting that the Mounties consult Golitsyn. That sealed Bennett’s doom and in due course brought his dismissal from the service in 1972, even though there was no substantial evidence against him, and he passed his polygraph tests. The case tore the Mounties apart and gave ammunition to those who argued that the internal security service should be removed from the RCMP. Within a few years, Canada had a civilian security service. Sawatsky’s book drew considerable attention in Canada but little in the United States.

**The Decline of Conspiracism**

In the years after *Legend* was published, Epstein became a specialist on Soviet disinformation and deception that, along with “active measures” to which they are related, preoccupied a number of scholars and writers during the 1980s. They were encouraged by the testimony of several Soviet defectors as well as the indefatigable Golitsyn, who in 1984 added his own volume, *New Lies for Old*.

Epstein’s *Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA* was published in 1988, a year after Angleton’s death. Like *Legend*, its predecessor, it has two parts. The second part describes various deceptions practiced through the centuries and can be ignored; it says nothing new. The first 105 pages, however, are interesting. Therein Epstein repeats the old theories about Nosenko and, in his acknowledgments, names all his sources for the past years, including Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and Sullivan. He also asserts that his informants wittingly gave him sensitive information.
This is an astonishing set of revelations. The feeling that this book is Epstein's last hurrah, at least in the world of intelligence, is hard to avoid. With glasnost, he apparently sensed that the days of the conspiracists were numbered. It was time to take the money and run.

Ron Kessler, an investigative journalist who writes frequently on espionage, in 1988 published *Spy vs Spy: The Shocking Story of the FBI's Secret War Against Soviet Agents in America*. The book is an excellent review of the FBI counterintelligence division's work against Soviet agents during roughly the past twenty years. In it he chronicles the damaging activities of the U. S. Navy spy, John Walker, as well as Ronald Pelton, who had penetrated the NSA. Both of them worked for the KGB.

Kessler also recounts the disastrous career of Edward Lee Howard, the only CIA officer ever to defect to the USSR. For CIA people, his account of two penetrations of the Agency during the period James Angleton was chief of counterintelligence is riveting: one agent, Karl Koecher, worked for the Czech Intelligence Service, which passed his material to the KGB, and the other was a long-term agent of the Chinese Intelligence Service. These two agents are the only moles known to have penetrated at the CIA. *Spy vs Spy* provides the layman an excellent inside view of how the FBI operated successfully against Soviet agents in the U. S. At the same time, Kessler is critical, when appropriate, of FBI errors.
In 1991 an English writer, Tom Mangold, published Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter, to which he devoted three years of intensive work and $300,000 of Simon and Schuster's money. Mangold has carefully sourced his book, the research is impressive and impeccable, and the writing is good if at times a bit overwrought. But it is far more a history of the Agency's CI Staff for the last 10 years under Angleton's command than it is a story about the man himself. As history it is accurate and fair, although the absence of a chapter on liaison with Israeli intelligence (chopped out by the editor) is unfortunate.

The book caused considerable commentary because Mangold claimed he had interviewed 208 CIA retirees, until it was noted that John Ranelagh, another English author, had interviewed even more CIA retirees for his book, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA. Mangold's conclusion that counterintelligence suffered at Angleton's hands during the Cold War when the Agency most needed common sense and honesty is well established and supported by numerous examples.
The USSR published a stamp honoring H. A. R. Philby for his service as a "mole" within the United Kingdom's MI-6.

A second book about Angleton and the old CI Staff followed only 10 months after Cold Warrior. Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered CIA by David Wise, the veteran intelligence writer, is also well researched and smooth reading. It concentrates on the hunt for "Sasha," a Soviet agent who, Golitsyn claimed, had provided the Russians valuable information. That search for the supposed mole within CIA severely damaged the careers of some CIA officers. Because his sources did not have the complete "Sasha" story, however, Wise has presented a somewhat distorted account. Otherwise, the Wise book is accurate and can serve as a useful cautionary tale for management.

The complete "Sasha" story resides in the archives of CIA's Counterintelligence Center, where access to it remains highly restricted.
The British Connection

The intelligence literature discussed below is by British authors and deals almost solely with British events. None of the books is anti-CIA. Several express some respect for James Angleton, although this attitude also was in retreat among British authors by the end of the 1980s. A few of the books explore the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy, and some think Golitsyn helped British intelligence. Most of the writing in varying degrees criticizes MI-5, the British internal security service. Less attention is given to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)—Britain’s foreign intelligence arm, otherwise known as MI-6—except where the Philby and Blake cases are discussed.

Angleton helped at least three of the authors, but poor sourcing makes it hard to determine the amount of information he gave them. He in fact played an important role in igniting a series of events that embarrassed the Thatcher government. Had Thatcher not enjoyed such strong majorities in the House of Commons, one or more of these affairs might have brought her government down.

Angleton, dating from his early contacts with H. A. R. “Kim” Philby, had a keen interest in British intelligence affairs. Partly on his recommendation, Golitsyn spent nearly five months in Britain in 1963 and met with British security and intelligence people several times afterward.
Golitsyn made a powerful impression on two British officers in particular: Arthur Martin, the senior counterespionage officer in MI-5, and Stephen de Mowbray, a junior officer in MI-6 who served in Washington in the mid-1960s. Both men admired Angleton and largely accepted Golitsyn’s ideas about penetration and deception, despite the fact that most of the earlier British believers in his allegations had become apostates.

Angleton’s influence in MI-5 and MI-6 declined further during the early 1970s, but Martin and de Mowbray remained in contact with Golitsyn. In the early 1980s, the two British officers helped Golitsyn prepare his book *New Lies for Old*. De Mowbray fervently believed the West was not sufficiently alert to the threat of Soviet deception. He was especially annoyed when a paper he had prepared on Soviet penetration, with special reference to Hollis, received no response from 10 Downing Street, even after he had personally delivered it to Prime Minister Thatcher’s secretary.

In 1978 Andrew Boyle, an English writer, came to Washington to do research at the National Archives on a book he was preparing on the career of an Englishman rumored to have been a Soviet agent during World War II. The subject was Sir Anthony Blunt, Keeper of the Queen’s Pictures, who had long been a target of gossip revolving around his homosexual lifestyle as well as his close association with Guy Burgess and Kim Philby. To avoid getting himself in legal difficulty, Boyle codenamed the subject of his book “Maurice” after a homosexual character in an E. M. Forster novel. During his research in Washington, Boyle met Angleton, and as a result his book *The Climate of Treason* includes frequent respectful references to him.

*The Climate of Treason* appeared on 5 November 1979. Within 10 days it forced Mrs. Thatcher to disclose in Parliament Blunt’s 1964 confession to having been a Soviet agent while working for MI-5 during World War II, and that he had been granted immunity from prosecution in order to obtain full disclosure of his treachery. This agreement had been kept a secret for 15 years, during which time he worked for the Royal Household and was given a knighthood by the Queen. The shock of Boyle’s exposure of Blunt was only the first and least damaging of several revelations of treachery that were in store for Mrs. Thatcher. At the time, however, her long and revealing statement about Blunt seemed to confirm that she was an exponent of unusual candor who intended to demystify the secret world of intelligence. The question of how much penetration there had been of the foreign, secret, and security services in the 1940s and 1950s seemed to be moving toward an answer. Mrs. Thatcher’s statement made the Boyle book a best seller, earning its author a reputation and much money.

For some inexplicable reason, Boyle included a story that brought him considerable trouble and damaged his enhanced reputation. In Chapter Nine, “Enter the Fifth Man,” he introduces a figure codenamed “Basil”
who he suggests was a homosexual nuclear scientist serving in the British Embassy in Washington with Donald Maclean. From this slender evidence he offers this person as a likely candidate for "The Fifth Man," the then-unidentified fifth member of the group of traitors from Cambridge University. The press soon found an elderly British scientist in Washington named Dr. Wilfrid Basil Mann, by then an American citizen who, during the period 1949-51, had served under Philby in the MI-6 office of the British Embassy as a scientific officer in liaison with the CIA.

Dr. Mann denied he was "The Fifth Man," and rather belatedly the American authorities came to his rescue with assurances that he was not a Soviet agent and never had been. Both Boyle and Angleton remained silent, however, and it was left to Dr. Mann later to write his own rebuttal in which he set the record completely straight. Boyle had never interviewed Mann, nor did he apologize after the affair was resolved.

Dr. Mann, who had a personal friendship with Angleton in the Philby days, remains perplexed regarding the origin of the spurious story. We know that Angleton and Boyle had a close relationship during Boyle's stay in Washington. Angleton probably confirmed Boyle's suspicions of Blunt and, at some point in his circular and obscure way of speaking, very likely provided some information about Dr. Mann. For unexplained reasons, Boyle got the story wrong and foolishly included this distorted version in his otherwise quite admirable book. Dr. Allen Weinstein, author of Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case, later called the libeling of Dr. Mann a "case of blatant McCarthyism based on gossip from spook informants."

The early 1980s were marked by more trouble for Mrs. Thatcher from the secret world. There was the union trouble at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the conviction of Geoffrey Prime for spying for the Soviet Union, but the worst blow of all came with the publication in 1981 of Their Trade Is Treachery by Chapman Pincher, an investigative journalist. The Pincher book was to prove a major political problem because it triggered a series of events culminating five years later in the Spycatcher trial in Australia.

To some extent the book was the result of a conversation between Jonathan Aitken, a Tory member of Parliament, and James Angleton in Washington in December of 1979, just a few days after Mrs. Thatcher had made her admission regarding Blunt. For reasons best known to himself, Angleton apparently hinted to Aitken that the Blunt revelations were just the tip of a mammoth problem, which might well lead to an investigation of penetrations of MI-5 and MI-6. Aitken was fascinated and asked for more data, but Angleton demurred and said he would think about how next to proceed. Upon his return to England, Aitken found a letter from Angleton telling him to speak to Arthur Martin and Christopher Phillpotts, both of
whom had been involved in molehunting for British counterintelligence. They told Aitken exactly what Angleton intended he should hear: that, beginning in 1963, the government had investigated Graham Mitchell and Roger Hollis as putative Soviet agents. The letter Aitken subsequently sent Mrs. Thatcher reflects what they told him, and a copy is in an appendix to the Pincher book.

Aitken told Pincher most of what he had learned from Martin and Phillpotts, but then, in the early autumn of 1980, events took an even more bizarre turn. Lord Rothschild secretly brought Peter Wright, a former member of MI-5, to England from Australia and introduced him to Chapman Pincher. This led to a working partnership between Wright and Pincher resulting in the eventual publication of Their Trade Is Treachery, which revealed the investigations within MI-5 of Hollis and Mitchell as possible Soviet agents and many other MI-5 secrets. It was this book that forced Mrs. Thatcher, in yet another admission to the House of Commons, to confirm the investigations had taken place but that subsequent reviews revealed no evidence to support the charges.

When Pincher’s book became a bestseller, it was not public knowledge that the major source for his sensational revelations was Peter Wright, who was quietly tucked away at his Australian stud farm. Nor was it common knowledge that Angleton had played a role in launching the project. There was, however, much speculation about the source for so much sensitive material.

The mystery was resolved in 1986 when Peter Wright had completed a book, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, and was moving to have it published in Australia. Upon learning this, the British Government got an injunction to stop its publication. The trial that followed revealed that Wright had been the main source for Pincher’s allegations in Their Trade is Treachery against Hollis and Mitchell. A small group within the British Government (including MI-5) knew this and could have stopped Pincher from publishing his book but decided not to do so. Pincher, in effect, thus had published with implicit government approval.

This revelation during the trial seriously undermined the British Government’s position and prompted publication of Wright’s Spycatcher in many countries. When the case finally made its way to a final hearing in the House of Lords, the judges found themselves unable to uphold the obligation of confidentiality on which the government depended. As the affair unfolded between 1985 and 1988, the government’s efforts to stop publication were perceived as absurd and desperate.
Peter Wright, a counterespionage specialist in MI-5 who was obsessed with the belief that British security services, including MI-5, were penetrated by Soviet agents. After his forced retirement, the Thatcher government’s efforts to stop publication of Wright’s book Spycatcher culminated in a highly publicized trial.

Mrs. Thatcher assigned Sir Robert Armstrong to present the British Government’s case in the Australian court. He did not do well; he was a reluctant witness and was harried by a disrespectful young Australian lawyer, Malcolm Turnbull. Armstrong admitted he was the government’s “fall guy” in the effort to exhaust every recourse against Wright’s book. He will always be remembered for his locution during the trial that in his job sometimes one had “to be economical with the truth.”

The book that prompted Mrs. Thatcher’s futile effort was Peter Wright’s but was ghostwritten by Paul Greengrass. Wright could not have anticipated that, by an accident of fate, it would be propelled onto the best-seller lists and thus make him a fortune. He had two grievances against MI-5, his former employer:

- Its failure to give him the full pension to which by any standard of decency he was entitled, a failure for which under secrecy regulations he possessed no redress.

- MI-5’s determination that it could not be proved that Hollis had been a Soviet agent, a position that was strongly reinforced in a subsequent official study by Lord Trend, a former Cabinet Secretary.
The Spycatcher trial in 1986 generated three books worth reading. The most spirited, although a bit prejudiced, is Turnbull's account of the trial in Sydney entitled The Spycatcher Trial. The second is Pincher's The Spycatcher Affair. Although self-exculpatory, it is a good account of what took place between 1980 and the trial. The third book is Molehunt by Nigel West, which summarizes the trial from a pro-Thatcher point of view. In addition, a chapter in David Hooper's Official Secrets called “The Wright Case: A Tale of Perversity” is an excellent summary by a British solicitor who participated in the case as a member of Turnbull's team.

In the end, a cartoon that appeared in a London daily after the trial perhaps summed it up best: A group of bewigged barristers is shown in the office of Her Majesty's Attorney General, and one is commenting: “So far the legal fees come to approximately ten million pounds—wouldn't it have been cheaper to have increased the old codger's pension in the first place?”

Counterintelligence Histories

Two books on counterintelligence history are Robert Lamphere's The FBI/KGB War: A Special Agent's Story, published in 1986; and Gordon Brook-Shepherd's The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors, published in 1988. These two works describe the counterintelligence benefits flowing from defectors and other exceptional events, such as the break into the KGB ciphers achieved at the end of World War II.

Lamphere's book concentrates on the FBI's work against the Soviet intelligence services' operations in the United States. Although Soviet espionage operations had been suspected for some time, details of these activities were obtained through the defection in Canada of Igor Gouzenko and in America of Elizabeth Bentley and others who had been involved in the Soviet spy apparatus. Their revelations were supplemented by an unusual accomplishment in the cryptographic field.

Lamphere had the good fortune to be assigned to handle the FBI's liaison with the National Security Agency (NSA). While there he was the Bureau's principal contact with Meredith Gardner, the cryptographic wizard, about the time he broke the KGB cipher system. Using the fragmentary but valuable information obtained from this breakthrough, Lamphere participated in uncovering some of the major Soviet espionage rings then in operation. His work included the Philby case as well as interrogating the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, pursuing Harry Gold, assisting in the Judith Coplon trial, and other memorable cases of the immediate postwar period.
Conflicts with J. Edgar Hoover led to Lamphere's early resignation from the Bureau. In writing his book, his excellent memory was reinforced by access to FBI records. NSA, after considerable pressure was brought to bear, gave Lamphere permission to describe in elementary detail Gardner's magnificent achievement against the KGB cipher system. It is a gripping story well and accurately told.

*The Storm Birds*, Brook-Shepherd's excellent history of the postwar Soviet defectors, benefited from assistance by the British intelligence and security services and the CIA. As a result, the author produced an accurate and complete story about most of the major Soviet defectors, all but one of whom (Shevchenko) had served with the KGB or GRU. He eschewed the controversial issues featured in many of the other books in this collection, although he devotes a chapter each to Anatole Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko and gives each objective and fair consideration. Brook-Shephard's summaries of those defections are probably the most accurate evaluations available to the public and help to make comprehensible the two men and the issues associated with them.

These two histories constitute a mine of important information on the early defectors, both American and Soviet, as well as detail on later ones, like Oleg Gordievsky, who provided inside information at critical
Col. Oleg Penkovsky, an Anglo-American spy who played a vital role in helping to identify Soviet missiles secretly installed in Cuba. Claims that he was under KGB control were finally refuted in 1979 by a comprehensive survey of the case.

periods in history. The books also illustrate how important the defectors were, not only in helping Western intelligence and security services but also in alerting the Western public to the Soviet threat. Counterintelligence officers should read both of them.

Two More of Special Note

Finally, two other books are essential reading for the counterintelligence specialist, and for anyone else interested in recent events affecting that field of intelligence. The first is the magisterial work by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Operations From Lenin to Gorbachev*. Published in 1990, it is the only complete and definitive history of the KGB at this time. As such, it demands inclusion in this study. The second work is *The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War* by Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, published in 1992. This is a detailed story of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, easily the greatest Anglo-American espionage success of the Cold War. Its counterintelligence significance rests on the fact that this superb operation was run under the nose of the KGB in Moscow, an embarrassment of major significance to the Soviets.
Both books also make important contributions to the conspiracist controversy. On the one hand, Gordievsky, from his unique position in the KGB, was able to assure his British friends that Hollis, Mitchell, Liddell, and Lord Rothschild were never Soviet agents. Equally important is a definitive chapter in the Schecter-Deriabin book that makes clear that, for the major period of his intelligence production, Penkovsky was not under Soviet control, and his product was not and could not have been deception. The controversy over whether he was bona fide (fueled largely by Angleton and Golitsyn) had arisen after Penkovsky’s arrest on 22 October 1962 and was only put to rest within the CIA’s Directorate of Operations in 1979 by a long-overdue study of the case. That the Agency made important documentary material available to Schecter and Deriabin so they could provide many of the details to the public via their excellent book was a laudable action by Dr. Robert Gates, who was DCI at the time.
III: The Literature

Chronology of Publications


1984  New Lies for Old by Anatole Golitsyn. Recommended only for what Golitsyn said and thought. Not reviewed.


1991  Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter by Tom Mangold. Recommended. Reviewed on page 64.

Reviews of Selected Books


Epstein is a bright and able writer who took his M.A. at Cornell and his doctorate in government at Harvard. He made a name for himself with his book Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth, his master’s thesis at Cornell. It was one of the first serious works to expose the shortcomings of that Commission. Epstein became aware of the Yuriy Nosenko case through The Reader’s Digest, and this led to his acquaintance with James Angleton. Their association flourished, and Angleton became Epstein’s major source on Nosenko and the controversy surrounding his defection. Eventually The Reader’s Digest sponsored Epstein’s research to the tune of $500,000. Legend, the book that resulted, was a bestseller, projecting the author to the forefront of those who were proponents of Angleton’s theories. Following its publication, Epstein wrote numerous articles for New York, Commentary, and other publications, mostly—though not always—supportive of the Angleton theories.

Legend has two parts: the first is about Nosenko and Angleton’s belief that he was part of a KGB deception operation; the second is about Oswald’s sojourn in the Soviet Union following his service with the Marine Corps in Japan. While in Japan the book suggests that Oswald acquired information about U-2 flights flown from the airfield at which he was stationed.

In brief, Epstein accepted Angleton’s conclusion that “Nosenko was a Soviet intelligence agent dispatched by the KGB expressly for the purpose of delivering disinformation to the CIA, FBI, and the Warren Commission.” In this scheme, Oswald, the supposed lone assassin of President Kennedy, probably was working for the KGB. (Nosenko said this was not true.) Oswald, having defected to the USSR in 1959 and returned three years later, had been living a “legend,” a false biography concocted for him by the KGB.

A central theme in both parts of the book, carefully stated and always present, was that the highest level of the Intelligence Community, and certainly the CIA, was penetrated by a “mole” working for the KGB. Although this mole had not been found by 1978, the best “proof” that one existed, according to the book’s argument, was Nosenko’s assertion that he knew of no penetration, thereby contradicting statements made by a
“Mr. Stone,” who subsequently proved to be Anatole Golitsyn. Epstein thus promoted the twin beliefs of deception and penetration by the KGB, Angleton’s theory that came to be called derisively “the monster plot.”

Epstein’s source notes state that his work is based on interviews with Nosenko and retired CIA and FBI officers. He lists Gordon Stewart, Admiral Turner, Richard Helms, James Angleton and members of his CI Staff, William Sullivan and Sam Papich of the FBI, and others connected with the Golitsyn and Nosenko cases. Epstein carefully camouflaged his sources by never quoting them directly, but clearly a number of CIA officers provided an immense amount of classified information. This leaking about sensitive Soviet cases was on a scale the CIA had not experienced before. But, because Epstein so cleverly refrained from pinpoint sourcing, exactly which CIA or FBI officers provided classified information could not be determined.

In 1989 the mystery was solved when Epstein published a second book, *Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA*, which again dealt with the contentious old cases, including Nosenko and Golitsyn. Angleton, his major source, by then was dead, and Epstein revealed who his informants had been. (See review of *Deception*, page .) Although the presentation of these highly classified cases shocked most observers, within a year the entire Nosenko case was opened to the public by the US House Select Committee on Assassinations.

*Legend* sold well, and conspiracy buffs found it a welcome addition to the growing literature on the Kennedy assassination. Many others, however, found the book confusing, its claims extravagant, and its conclusions unsupported by evidence. One of the chief critics, George Lardner of *The Washington Post*, wrote: “What Epstein has written . . . is a fascinating, important, and essentially dishonest book. Fascinating because it offers new information about Oswald, about the KGB, and about the CIA. Dishonest because it pretends to be objective, because it is saddled with demonstrable errors and inexcusable omissions, because it assumes the KGB always knows what it is doing while the CIA does not. It is paranoid. It is naive.”

Nevertheless, *Legend* unquestionably set the tone for the debate that subsequently ensued in the media about the Nosenko affair. It gave Angleton and his supporters an advantage by putting their argument adroitly—if dishonestly—before the public first. Not until David Martin responded with *Wilderness of Mirrors* was an opposing view presented coherently.

Andrew Boyle's book (published in England under the title *The Fourth Man*) is recommended, despite its numerous errors of fact and interpretation, because it is a good read on the Cambridge spies. It also has some slight historical significance: its publication on 5 November 1979 forced Prime Minister Thatcher only 10 days later to confirm that Sir Anthony Blunt, a wartime officer with MI-5 and later Keeper of the Queen's Pictures, had been a Soviet agent. In the original edition, Boyle used the codename "Maurice" (taken from an E. M. Forster novel about a homosexual) to disguise the identity of Blunt and avoid legal complications. Hints and pub gossip for years had referred to a senior British official, usually described as homosexual, as a member of the Cambridge group of spies who had yet to be identified publicly. The Official Secrets Act—a powerful force preventing disclosure of the truth by serving or retired British intelligence officers—prevented absolute confirmation of the rumors.

The Official Secrets Act has no authority in the United States, however, and in 1978 Boyle went there to continue his research and to talk with James Angleton. Neither in his book nor at any time before his death from cancer in 1988 did Boyle ever admit to receiving classified information from Angleton. Despite this, many indicators in the book, especially in the chapters on Philby and "The Fifth Man," strongly suggest his influence. Angleton probably also provided some conclusive evidence about Blunt. From his past position as CIA chief of counterintelligence, he knew about Blunt's confession from the British services. Because senior FBI counterintelligence officers also held such knowledge, Boyle may have received such sensitive information from more than one American source.

In addition to exposing Blunt, *The Climate of Treason* is good social and political history; it is packed with information on the political climate of the times and provides a detailed review of the Cambridge spies from Burgess and Mclean through Blunt and Philby. Despite certain drawbacks, it provides an excellent account of this unusual group. (Only John Cairncross, now identified as "The Fifth Man," remains to be treated in detail in open literature.) It is far superior to John Costello's long-winded *Mask of Treachery* (William Morrow and Company; New York, NY, 1988), which runs off the rails with its conclusion that "The Fifth Man" was Guy...
Liddell, a distinguished MI-5 officer whose career extended from the early 1920s until 1956. Authorities on every hand have denounced this allegation, and it degrades the credibility of Costello's work overall.

The Boyle work, however, suffers from a grotesque and inexplicable error, which may confirm his association with Angleton and the latter's contribution to the book in terms other than the revelation about Blunt. Chapter nine, entitled "Enter The Fifth Man," rambles on for 40 pages describing in elliptical terms an atomic scientist who was a double agent informant somehow controlled by James Angleton (invariably referred to as "brilliant" and "penetrating"). The scientist was British, had been in the British Embassy about the time of Maclean's tour in Washington, and was codenamed "Basil."

Because of the implications, journalists searched frantically for Basil's identity. Boyle refused to supply it, claiming it was the responsibility of the Americans, who also knew his identity. Eventually, the press discovered that a Dr. Wilfrid Basil Mann had been in the British Embassy during the period Philby and Burgess were there. Dr. Mann had remained in America after that tour, had become an American citizen in 1959, and was working at the National Bureau of Standards. The press contacted him at his home in Chevy Chase, Maryland, but Mann denied emphatically that he was Basil and, rather tardily, the American authorities allowed that he was a loyal American citizen. Most reporters missed the essential ingredient of the story, that James Angleton and Dr. Mann had been friends at least since the period when he and Philby were in Washington together. Puzzled, the press grudgingly backed away from the controversy.

In 1982 Dr. Mann produced his own brief book on the issue entitled Was There a Fifth Man? in which he details his career as a scientist and proves convincingly that Boyle's allegations were nonsense. We now know conclusively that the Fifth Man (if we can really believe Golitsyn's assertion about a "Ring of Five") was John Cairncross, who was not an atomic scientist.

So where did Boyle get his idea about Basil as the Fifth Man? Neither he nor Angleton, both now dead, ever divulged anything further on the question, and the full truth will probably never be known. If Dr. Mann has suspicions, he has kept them to himself. Because Angleton was his friend for many years, Mann will probably not speculate in a fashion that would be degrading to Angleton's memory. Whatever the case, unsubstantiated claims about Basil's identity tend to downgrade the credibility of Boyle's work. The claims were false and, in any case, the issue was peripheral to the main story.

In later editions, while Boyle abandoned his codename "Maurice" for Blunt—there no longer being any need to continue the fiction—he retained the mysterious "Basil" but provided no further elucidation.
In an interview with this writer in February 1992, Dr. Mann stated that Boyle had never contacted him in advance and had not apologized for the distress and embarrassment he had caused after the story was proved false. Strong evidence indicates that Angleton told Boyle stories about Mann but never provided the details, thus leaving a false impression on this gullible journalist, who should have checked his facts.


This is the best and most informed book written about CIA operations against the Soviet target during the 1950s and 1960s. It includes a penetrating critique of two of the most prominent CIA officers involved, William K. Harvey and James Angleton. Citing interviews with retired CIA officers, material acquired under the Freedom of Information Act, and open sources, including evidence derived from the House Committee Hearings on Assassination, Martin crowds an exciting and generally accurate story into 228 pages.

During his research for the book, Martin became convinced that, while Harvey was an important figure, Angleton was the subject around whom major controversy swirled; furthermore, substantial evidence indicated that he had damaged CIA severely (especially its counterintelligence operations) and that his forced resignation by CIA Director William Colby had been necessary and long overdue. After his dismissal, Angleton continued a guerrilla action against the Agency, the new CI Staff, and Colby, launching a minor propaganda campaign which he fueled with calculated leaks, playing one journalist against another.

Martin did not name his sources, footnote the book, or provide a bibliography and other academic paraphernalia. In his foreword he noted that Angleton was one of his principal sources and that he “... was a marvelous education in the ways of the CIA. Over time, he explained to me its organization, its personnel, its modus operandi, and its internal rivalries.” It was from Angleton, Martin continues, that he first heard some of the more colorful stories about Bill Harvey. When Martin called Harvey, however, the latter always hung up.

Angleton refused to continue his cooperation after learning that Martin was in touch with Clare Edward Petty, who had become suspicious of Angleton’s motives when working for him and had begun to speculate that perhaps Angleton was the mole for whom the Agency searched. It appears likely that Petty generously contributed information about his former
boss, the molehunt, the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy, and many other subjects covered in the book. Martin identifies few other ex-CIA sources, although he claims they were legion.

The book was well received by almost every reviewer, sold out quickly, and is now a collector’s item. Many readers found it especially interesting because the enigmatic Angleton had become a well-known figure by 1980. Epstein’s Legend had painted him as a counterintelligence genius wrongly dismissed at the height of the Cold War, an act many observers hinted was close to treasonable.

Martin took a different tack, revealing Angleton as self-centered, ambitious, and paranoid, with little regard for his Agency colleagues or for simple common sense. Epstein, the lone critic of the book, responded by writing a long review for The New York Times Book Review that was filled with vituperative comments, loose charges, and what some might consider character assassination. Angleton himself entered the fray with a three-page public statement denouncing Martin and accusing him of having stolen his phrase “Wilderness of Mirrors.”

Henry Hurt was a freelance writer and researcher for The Reader’s Digest when he met Edward J. Epstein. He assisted Epstein on the research for Legend and was influenced by his theories on intelligence matters, which were derived from Angleton. In 1979, Hurt met Ewe Shadrin, the wife of the Soviet defector who disappeared in Vienna in December 1975 while on a mission for the FBI and CIA. Soon thereafter, Hurt met Ewe’s aggressive young lawyer, Richard Copaken, and from this association a plan developed for Hurt to write an article for The Reader’s Digest about Ewe’s missing husband. The article rapidly grew into a book for the Digest under the direction of Fulton Oursler, a right-wing editor and an enthusiastic supporter of Angleton.

Copaken took Hurt in hand and put him in touch with a number of people associated with the Shadrin case, including several FBI officers. Epstein introduced him to Angleton, who apparently facilitated a surprise visit by Hurt to Golitsyn at the latter’s hideaway in upstate New York (an

*Angleton had actually lifted the term, without attribution, from “Gerontion,” a poem by T. S. Eliot. Martin later said he had heard Angleton use it in the midnight sessions and, discerning no copyright, had appropriated it as the title of his book.
event that rattled Golitsyn, forcing CIA to move him to a new location in the south for security reasons). When Hurt’s book was published in 1981, the mystery of Shadrin’s disappearance remained unsolved. Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin were frustrated and confused by seeming US Government indifference to their case, although in fact the agencies concerned were doing everything possible to extract information from the largely uncommunicative Soviets. Then Vitali Yurchenko in 1985 defected to the CIA—albeit briefly—and in his debriefing asserted that the KGB had killed Shadrin accidentally during his meeting with its agents in Vienna.

Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov (Shadrin) was born in 1922 in the USSR. He chose the Soviet Navy for a career and proved to be an exceptional officer, a man of high intellect, great charm, and wide interests. With advanced training in nuclear missiles, he was at age 27 the youngest destroyer captain in the Soviet Navy and obviously was destined for top command. In 1959 his ship was stationed in Gdynia, Poland, supporting a training program for Indonesian naval officers. There Artamonov met and fell in love with Ewe Gora, a young dentistry graduate from an anti-Communist Polish family. Marriage seemed impossible, given the Navy’s restrictions and the antipathy of Ewe’s parents for all Soviets, so he proposed defection. She accepted, and in a daring and dangerous escape they crossed the Baltic to Sweden in a commandeered naval launch.

He came to America under CIA auspices and proved a gold mine to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Under their new identity bearing the name Shadrin, Nick and Ewe made remarkable progress. He earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in engineering; she opened a successful dental practice. They made many friends, mostly among high-ranking intelligence officials. But then problems developed. Because ONI could not get him the necessary security clearance for higher level work, Shadrin finally was assigned to a unit of defectors serving as translators in the new Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He understandably was distressed.

This situation changed radically in 1966 when a KGB officer (“Igor” in the book) arrived on an official assignment in Washington. Hurt’s account of Shadrin’s association with a complex operation that ensued is much degraded because the author was forced to build his case wholly on verbal testimony. Nevertheless, he managed to collect considerable information and had help from Copaken’s aggressive investigation. Several FBI officers apparently told Ewe Shadrin and her lawyer more than they should have. The Angleton-Epstein roles emerge in the portion dealing with Igor’s background and his bona fides.

Throughout the book, Hurt flays the Agency and the FBI for having allowed Shadrin to proceed with his mission in Vienna, a city where the KGB could control the situation. It was an admitted gamble that had
succeeded in previous cases, and Shadrin was willing to proceed. Hurt introduces the issue of Igor's credibility, questioning whether the operation should have been undertaken when there were so many questions about the risks involved. The author describes Igor's credentials as resting to some degree on two defectors he regards as phony: (Fedora, a KGB agent who had worked for the FBI) and Nosenko (sweeping aside as irrelevant the Agency's acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides). Hurt describes Epstein's Legend as his main source for questioning Nosenko's authenticity, but he also cites an FBI study done in 1980, which, he claims, concluded Fedora was a false defector.

Readers of Shadrin should bear in mind that Hurt was attempting to generate maximum publicity for Ewe Shadrin to improve her leverage with officialdom. As a result, the book totally disregards the issue of Igor's personal security. If Igor was genuine, his security should have been paramount, and he should never have been mentioned.

Hurt apparently never understood, or refused to believe, that Igor had been a source of valuable counterintelligence information; one of his leads caused the apprehension of a long-term KGB spy who had done enormous damage to American interests. Although Igor had been mentioned in American press articles as early as 1978, the source of the leak had not been identified, and the cases derived from his information were still being developed. The book forcefully propelled the Shadrin case and the mysterious Igor into the public's consciousness. What action, if any, the Soviets subsequently took toward Igor is unknown to this writer, but if he suffered imprisonment or death at the hands of the KGB, Hurt and his allies bear a heavy responsibility.

Hurt also exaggerates what he terms Agency incompetence and bungling in the Shadrin case, assigning guilt roughly in the following order, to Colby; George Kalaris, Angleton's successor as head of the CI Staff; and Len McCoy, Kalaris's deputy. He cites lack of surveillance in Vienna and the failure to notify Washington immediately when Shadrin's absence was discovered. Much of the blame he puts on Cynthia Hausmann, Shadrin's case officer in Vienna, whom he accuses of being distant and insensitive to Ewe Shadrin when Nick was found to be missing. Most experts agree that full surveillance was of doubtful utility in this case and that an immediate cable to Washington would have been of little help. Under the circumstances, Hausmann's cautious and restrained conduct seems laudable. Hurt's outrage on these points is both naive and absurd.

Shadrin reflects the influence of Angleton but accords him a secondary role. Our ignorance of Igor's fate abides. Perhaps in this new age of dispensation in Moscow we may one day receive the answer.

This book's importance is historical; it was the instrument that forced Mrs. Thatcher to admit to Parliament that Sir Roger Hollis, former Director General of MI-5, had been under investigation some years earlier as a possible Soviet agent. The book's detailed exposition of the case against Hollis and Graham Mitchell, his deputy, makes interesting reading as an example of the "mole mania" that gripped senior officers in the American and British intelligence and security services. These services now accept that the case against the two men was circumstantial and that they were innocent. The West also now has confirmation of that conclusion from Oleg Gordievsky, a KGB defector. Other supporting data on this matter have been received from retired KGB officers in Moscow.

Chapman Pincher had been a gadfly of the British Government for years on intelligence and defense matters in his position as a senior reporter for Lord Beaverbrook's *Daily Express.* At the time this book appeared, there was some reason to believe James Angleton was responsible for leaking information to the author about the Hollis and Mitchell cases (Angleton had known about them at CIA as Chief, CI Staff) but Pincher denied it. Nevertheless, he lends credence to this suspicion on page two by noting that Mrs. Thatcher had been warned about the explosiveness of the Hollis case by Jonathan Aitken, a Tory MP and son of the late Lord Beaverbrook. Aitken claimed to have learned about Hollis from "former members of MI-5, SIS and the CIA." On page three, Pincher wrote what sounds very familiar to those acquainted with Angleton's practice of calculated leaks: "The view of the loyal MI-5 officers who uncovered the evidence is that the Russians had penetrated both the Security and Intelligence Services so deeply, and for so long, that they not only neutralized them but effectively ran them. I have established that this is also the view of senior officers of the CIA, who had been alerted to the facts."

All of this, of course, is false. No senior CIA officer (except Angleton) had accepted the case against Hollis, nor was the CIA about to press Mrs. Thatcher for an investigation of the matter, as Pincher implies. On the contrary, the firm view of CIA counterintelligence in 1980 was that the case against Hollis was the work of a small group of retired British intelligence officers, including Peter Wright and Stephen de Mowbray. The CIA officers to whom Pincher refers obviously were Angleton and a few of his adherents, all of whom had been in retirement since 1974 or earlier and had since been leading a vendetta against the new counterintelligence officials at CIA. The people Pincher cited regarded Arthur Martin, Wright, and de Mowbray as allies in their battle to prove Golitsyn's charges of massive penetration of the Western services.
Angleton, probably inspired by the revelations Mrs. Thatcher had been forced to make about Blunt, decided in late 1979 to thrust himself into the center of the Hollis controversy. He did this, according to Pincher, by leaking information on the Hollis case to Aitken, who was then visiting Washington. Angleton told Aitken he believed there would be a major investigation of MI-5 and MI-6. When Aitken asked why, the former counterintelligence chief replied he would think of some way of answering the question.

When Aitken returned to London he found a letter from Angleton awaiting him which advised him to talk with Arthur Martin, formerly of MI-5, and Christopher Phillpotts, formerly chief of MI-6 counterintelligence. Angleton had written Martin about his talk with Aitken and probably wrote Phillpotts as well. Martin and Phillpotts apparently told Aitken much of the story about the Hollis and Mitchell investigations; Aitken in turn used this information in his “warning” letter to Mrs. Thatcher. Aitken was close to Pincher and also told him the story, including the part about his personal warning to Mrs. Thatcher through a “confidential and personal” letter. Angleton’s role was made clear to Pincher, who in turn referred to him in the book.

Thus, Pincher knew a great deal, but as yet he did not have the whole story. The massive amount of inside information in his book came from another source. In September 1980, Pincher writes, Lord Rothschild introduced him to Peter Wright, and Pincher spent an evening debriefing him on a number of intelligence issues, especially the Hollis and Mitchell cases. Later they reached a financial agreement, and Pincher flew to Australia where he could debrief Wright at his leisure. It was an astonishing lode. Pincher could hardly grasp his good fortune. He became wholly convinced that Hollis had been a spy. Two years later he produced a second book on the subject, Too Secret Too Long, which sold well, but its premise was not proved. Then two years after that, Wright took center stage himself with the publication of his own book, Spycatcher. It was banned in Britain, but the circus trial in Australia prevented its being banned there. As a result, sales of this otherwise ordinary book skyrocketed and overnight made Wright a multimillionaire.

The truth about Angleton’s contribution to the Hollis problem was not revealed until the famous Spycatcher trial in Australia in 1986, when a copy of Aitken’s letter was submitted to the court as evidence. Angleton was certainly the instrument by which Aitken learned of the Hollis affair, and Pincher got that information secondhand from Aitken. But the details came from Wright, who gave Pincher his information in return for money.

7 Later, in Too Secret Too Long, Pincher exclaimed, “To someone as obsessively curious as I am about the secret services, it was like being led into Aladdin’s cave with nuggets and jewels sparkling everywhere!”

This book might well have been titled “James Bennett: A Counterintelligence Tragedy” because that is what it describes. Bennett’s fate is a cautionary tale that should be read carefully by every officer dealing with security and counterintelligence. Sawatsky’s book is also one of the best on the Angleton era, although it deals with only one slice of it. Golitsyn plays a role in the book, but Sawatsky does not otherwise touch upon the major controversies that plagued the counterintelligence scene at the time.

He did interview some CIA retired officers but collected the bulk of his evidence from Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) personnel who were involved in the Bennett case. He concentrates entirely on the Canadian scene and allows few distractions from the central story, a vivid and truthful account of the destruction of an excellent civilian officer of the RCMP Security Service. Accounts in the official CIA Counterintelligence Center (CIC) files verify Sawatsky’s story.

Sawatsky is a Canadian journalist who cut his teeth on intelligence and security affairs with an earlier book called *Men In The Shadows,* a general account of the RCMP Security Service. Shortly thereafter, Ian Adams, a Canadian author, published a novel that was a thinly disguised story of the alleged role of Leslie James Bennett as a Soviet spy. A senior civilian official in the RCMP for many years, all in counterintelligence work against Soviet Bloc services, Bennett had been forced out of the service in 1972, supposedly on health grounds. After a brief period in South Africa, he settled in Australia. When the Adams book appeared, Bennett struck back at its innuendo with a libel suit. In the ensuing trial, much about the highly secret case became public knowledge.

Armed with these details, Sawatsky went after the rest of the story. It is safe to assume that Bennett told Sawatsky his side of the story and provided the names of friends who could fill in additional detail and color. It also seems likely that, as Sawatsky pursued his investigation, those who believed Bennett guilty were ready to tell their story, and those who preferred to believe him innocent were equally ready to talk. This kind of argument and counterargument, stimulating each side to blurt out more than it had originally intended, is perfect for the investigative journalist. Sawatsky had a field day. Former RCMP personnel talked freely and in
great detail. The result is an astonishing book that reads like security service files, except that it is livelier and better written.

Readers of books about counterintelligence in this period will find a common thread running through them, including Sawatsky’s book: the belief intensely held by a small group of Western counterintelligence officers in the 1960s and 1970s that the Soviets had penetrated their services and that the penetration explained why things had gone wrong. This conviction rationalized many otherwise inexplicable anomalies and accounted for the failures of their services in the struggle against Soviet Bloc intelligence.

On pages 265-66, Sawatsky tells how suspicion fell on Bennett when Clare E. Petty, one of Angleton’s counterintelligence officers, told some stories out of school, the kind of airy theorizing in which Petty specialized—extreme speculation unsupported by fact. It was enough to ignite a conflagration. When Angleton learned of Petty’s indiscretion, he was furious but did not go to the Mounties and advise caution. Instead, he poured gasoline on the fire by suggesting that the RCMP consult Golitsyn. It was to be Golitsyn’s last big case, and he took full advantage of it. Only a year earlier he had visited Ottawa and stayed at the Bennett home discussing cases for hours, an event Bennett thought had made them close friends. Now the defector declared Bennett to be a KGB mole. This was all the RCMP needed to hurtle off to disaster.

Bennett was an outsider, a civilian employee and thus something of a rarity in the RCMP. He had been in the counterintelligence branch for two decades, had access to everything, and was not the most popular of men. A Welshman who entered the RCMP in the early 1950s, he had raised several generations of commissioned and noncommissioned Mounties, trying to instill in them the discipline, perseverance, objectivity, and dedication that counterintelligence work requires.

In the course of his career, it is safe to say Bennett made some enemies. A dry, dyspeptic man with a fierce dedication to his work, he was known to arrive regularly at the office at seven in the morning and not leave until seven at night, an addiction to duty that was later to be used against him. He had a biting tongue and could be acutely critical of young, raw recruits from the Canadian prairies with nothing more than a high school education whom he was trying to mold into counterintelligence officers. In the long run, although he was widely respected (nowhere more than with the foreign services in liaison with the RCMP), some of those who passed through the counterintelligence section of the security service hated him. This was probably an unspoken factor in the accusations against him.
Despite its enormous complexities, Sawatsky tells well the story of the investigation, the confrontation, the interrogation, and the ultimate decision that Bennett had to leave. It was a terrible, wrenching hour for the distinguished Director General of the Security Service, John K. Stames, when he finally made that decision. Bennett, never in good health, was put out of the RCMP on a medical discharge. Stames himself left the security service not long after, and within a few years the whole organization was closed down, eventually to be replaced by a civilian service.

After Bennett's libel case made this scandal public, the Canadian Government carried out its own inquiry. In 1980 the Solicitor General of Canada, Mr. Francis Fox, told the House of Commons Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs that "there was no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Bennett was anything but a loyal Canadian citizen." Financial compensation for his obvious loss of income plus his personal humiliation was not mentioned. The incubus of Angleton still seemed to hover over the case. Bennett was living in exile in Australia on a paltry medical pension when, in March 1993, the Canadian Government finally cleared him of the charges that he was a Soviet spy. He subsequently received $140,000 as compensation.

It had been known for some time to insiders, however, that RCMP Security Service counterintelligence analysts had very good reason to believe their service was penetrated. So much had gone wrong for which no explanation could be found that the mole theory, even without its promotion by Angleton and his adherents, became increasingly plausible. The believers in penetration thus were right in this instance, except for one thing: they suspected the wrong man. Because Bennett seemed to be the most probable choice, for the reasons outlined in Sawatsky's book, the investigation was launched. Powerful arguments were submitted against the idea that Bennett was a Soviet agent, but, once the investigative machine had started, it developed sufficient momentum so that other candidates apparently never were even considered.

As Mangold's Cold Warrior reveals, after Angleton left CIA the new team of CI Staff analysts, hard-nosed experienced professionals, more inclined toward gritty work than long martini lunches, took a hard look at the Bennett case and found it wanting. This revisionist view did not go down well when presented to Ottawa, but gradually responsible officials in the RCMP began to back away from their conviction that Bennett was a spy. Mangold concludes his Bennett chapter by describing the revelation of the penetrator's true identity, whom Mangold codenamed "TANGO."

TANGO, we now know—thanks to a well-documented Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC-TV) television program which aired in March 1993—was a deceased RCMP Security Service sergeant named Gilles
Brunet. The son of an assistant commissioner of the RCMP, Brunet had lived hard and fast in Montreal nightclubs and foreign resorts, far overspending his modest salary. Despite sound evidence supporting his role as Soviet spy (the penetration the Mounties thought was Bennett), legal action was never brought against Brunet before he died in 1984. Except for Mangold’s brief reference to the case, the issue might have ended there had it not been for the CBC-TV program, which marshaled impressive evidence to support the charge that Brunet, not Bennett, was the spy. The CBC-TV program concluded with an interview in Moscow with Gen. Oleg Kalugin, the retired chief of KGB counterintelligence. Kalugin confirmed, but did not identify anyone by name, that the KGB had a very valuable mole in the RCMP Security Service. Almost certainly the mole was Brunet.


Robert Lamphere is a stubborn and determined man who fights to win. He demonstrated this trait in his battle with the National Security Agency (NSA) over whether he could tell the story about breaking the KGB ciphers during World War II and the resulting consequences of that achievement in the struggle against Soviet espionage and subversion. NSA, with strong support from its British counterpart, GCHQ, had steadfastly denied him permission to reveal from his personal experience how effective the material derived from the break had been.

In retrospect, NSA and GCHQ were foolish to refuse Lamphere’s initial request, but the story had been closely held, and it was difficult to alter an attitude that had prevailed over four decades. Lamphere understood this, and his narrative reveals only the barest details. The FBI probably pressured NSA to yield on the issue since the Bureau helped Lamphere, who had been one of its special agents, by allowing him access to some of his memoranda and special reports. Lamphere persisted because the story is central to much of his book.

He had entered the FBI fresh from law school in 1941 and in due course was assigned to the New York field office. There he worked on the Soviet espionage squad and experienced firsthand the benefits of the information obtained from the first two defectors, Igor Gouzenko in Canada and Elizabeth Bentley in the United States. By the end of the war, he was fully occupied with Soviet cases and well on his way to becoming an expert in Soviet espionage. Especially interesting are his accounts of meetings with such oldtime Communist luminaries as Ruth Fischer and Hede Masing, who
gave him vital information when Lamphere was helping the prosecuting attorney in Gerhard Eisler’s trial. Lamphere’s autobiography is such good history one wishes for more detail on many of the cases he describes, although that can usually be obtained from other accounts.

In the fall of 1947, William K. Harvey, then a major figure in the Soviet section of the CIA’s Washington field office, arranged to have Lamphere transferred from New York to the nation’s capital. Harvey had been pushed out of the FBI before joining the CIA. What Lamphere does not say, but what is important, is that Harvey’s transfer gave CIA its first knowledge of NSA’s breaking of the Soviet ciphers. Before that, the FBI had restricted knowledge of the break to its British counterpart, MI-5, which, with NSA’s agreement, was informed by GCHQ.

A short time later, MI-6 also was given the information because of an investigation into an espionage lead relating to someone in the Foreign Office. The investigation occasionally required coordination in Washington, so it was necessary to consult Peter Dwyer, the MI-6 representative, then acting for both MI-5 and MI-6 in the British Embassy. Thus, Dwyer’s successor, H. A. R. “Kim” Philby, was indoctrinated into the compartmented operation. Lamphere states that Philby immediately gave the precious secret to his Soviet masters (true) but then goes on to say Sir Roger Hollis had given it earlier (not proved).

This egregious error comes from Lamphere’s uncritical acceptance of Chapman Pincher’s unsubstantiated judgment in Their Trade Is Treachery that Hollis was a Soviet agent. Lamphere did not have the benefit of Gordievsky’s knowledge on the subject, but he ought to have given some value to the word of Prime Minister Thatcher, who stated to the British Parliament that the official investigation had found no evidence to support the allegation against Hollis. Lamphere even gets wrong the period when Hollis was Director General, giving it as 1952-56 when it actually was 1953-65. Because James Angleton is credited with having critically read the book, it is astonishing that this error went uncorrected. In fact, although Lamphere cannot be blamed for being ignorant of the event, knowledge of the break of KGB ciphers reached the Soviets in 1948 from an Army Security Agency (ASA) officer, William Weisband, two years before Philby confirmed the information.

This otherwise excellent history tells the fascinating story of how the KGB code was broken. A brilliant American, Meredith Gardner, then working at ASA’s headquarters Arlington Hall, made the initial breakthrough. When Lamphere arrived from New York, the decrypted breakouts were few and not well understood. He asked permission to work on them and in this way met Gardner. They became a formidable team.
From this beginning flowed information of great value to the FBI in its effort to understand and identify the myriad Soviet agent networks then at work in the United States. Lamphere saw the potential of this product and developed it for use without endangering the source. His superiors had the good sense to comprehend this development; even J. Edgar Hoover seems to have allowed this section to operate without his usual unhelpful intrusions.

While Gardner and Lamphere were trying to make use of the decryptions against the Soviet networks, the CIA was just getting established. Lamphere pulls no punches in describing how Hoover did his best to hamper its development, even to the point of playing up to the British services against the Agency. The author’s approach to Hoover is refreshing. On the one hand, he is frank in describing Hoover’s endless playing of politics and his tyrannical and often irrational administrative practices. On the other hand, he respects the way Hoover guarded the Bureau’s rights and managed to keep it on an even keel despite sniping from many quarters. Lamphere recognized the need for an intelligence service that would operate abroad and acknowledged the importance of the Bureau and the Agency working together toward the same goal.

High on Lamphere’s list of Hoover’s vengeful actions was the way he directed liaison with CIA. He put it entirely in the hands of a devoted sycophant, Zeke de Loach, with the objective of obstructing the Agency wherever possible. De Loach faithfully carried out this mission. Eventually the respected and revered Sam Papich replaced him, but de Loach nonetheless continued to create difficulties. Lamphere makes no secret of his belief that this was one of the most shameful and damaging of Hoover’s many transgressions, particularly because it happened when the closest counterintelligence cooperation was required to meet the demands placed on both FBI and CIA by the burgeoning Cold War.

Reading Lamphere’s stories about how the Bureau operated, one understands why the atmosphere there became slightly psychotic under Hoover’s leadership. An example was Hoover’s handling of relations with MI-5 on the Fuchs case. MI-5’s William Skardon had broken Fuchs and obtained his confession that he worked for the Soviets, but many aspects of his American Communist associations remained unanswered. Hoover wanted Fuchs questioned by an FBI officer. MI-5 replied that the Attorney General of Great Britain could not permit this while Fuchs’s appeal was being considered. Hoover flew into a rage but could not budge London.

The appeal finally was denied, and MI-5 indicated the way was clear for the FBI to question Fuchs. Lamphere’s superior selected him to do the debriefing. Hoover intervened at the last moment with instructions that Hugh Clegg, a Bureau officer in liaison with MI-5 during the war, should be present as a watchdog over the British, Lamphere, and the London FBI
representative, John Cimperman. This was an unpleasant situation because
the British disliked Clegg from their wartime experience with him, and
Lamphere resented him tagging along.

Hoover’s intervention produced a great deal of needless acrimony,
but in the end cool heads carried the day; Skardon and Cimperman kept
Clegg in the background and let Lamphere do the questioning. It was
Lamphere’s skill that brought the trip to a successful conclusion; during the
debriefing he got Fuchs to identify Harry Gold as his major contact in the
atom spy ring.

Lamphere continued to manage the exploitation of the decrypted
KGB material, including the clues that led to the eventual arrest of Ethel
and Julius Rosenberg. The cipher material was supplemented by valuable
information from defector sources such as Gouzenko and especially former
American Communists including Bentley, Budenz, and Chambers.

Lamphere was allowed on occasion to lecture CIA training courses
(perhaps without Hoover’s knowledge), which must have been of immense
help to the young Agency, then only beginning to learn the arcane art of
counterintelligence. Another example of a behind-the-scenes cooperative ef­
fort was Lamphere’s plan, formulated with James Angleton, to kidnap in
Israel a vaunted Soviet spy, Joseph Katz. The plan was discovered by
Hoover, who put an immediate end to it. Later, when Katz resided in
Britain, the CIA and FBI cooperated on a scheme to debrief him in London
(with MI-5 knowledge and help). Katz, however, remained uncooperative
and took his secrets with him to the grave.

Although this book has a few errors and the story has perhaps been
gilded a bit by Lamphere, it nevertheless remains one of the best histories
of US counterintelligence. It is especially valuable for its coverage of the
intense activity that followed the breakthrough on KGB ciphers and the
defectors. These developments provided conclusive evidence that the war­
time Soviet ally had been spying in the United States for two decades and
had in fact accelerated this activity during the war.

Despite the excitement and satisfaction he derived from such impor­
tant work, Lamphere eventually became fed up with Hoover’s irrational
management, and in 1955 he left the Bureau for a successful career with the
Veterans Administration. He later had yet another successful career in busi­
ness with a major insurance company. A man of many parts and obvious
ability, Lamphere has written a book that should be required reading for
counterintelligence officers.
Peter Wright’s *Spycatcher*, although filled with errors, exaggerations, bogus ideas, and self-inflation, is one of the outstanding works in the field of intelligence literature to appear in the last three decades. It covers matters that have been explored before and repeats much that is already known to the well-informed intelligence officer, but it is so full of bombast, the joy of the hunt, English eccentricities, and factual data that it must be required reading for anyone interested in intelligence.

When it was published, the British Government was driven to such irrational distraction that it initiated a series of foolhardy and hopeless countermeasures. These actions failed to stop the book’s publication, ensured the British Government’s embarrassment, and made the author—whom the government had hoped to punish—a wealthy man. Tom Mangold affirms that Wright told him the book in 1989 had brought him some Australian $2 million (about US $3 million). Recently, adding insult to injury, the European Community High Court ordered the British Government to pay damages to two London newspapers which had been prevented from carrying excerpts of the book.

By any standard, Peter Wright is a genuine character who could have flourished only in England. In its present nonimperial status, integrated into Europe and without the menace of the Nazis or Bolsheviks, this kind of eccentric will probably never emerge again. But anyone who ever heard Wright in full flight delivering a lecture on the pre-World War II Comintern apparat in the United Kingdom or dilating on his interrogation of Blunt and his comintern/Communist friends will never forget the experience. He had an astonishing memory for arcane facts, and his mere presence—with his patriarchal countenance, his bald pate with its crown of wispy white hair, and the curious defect of speech (between a lisp and stammer)—made a strong impression on the most jaded observer.

There are three parts to the Wright story, all of equal importance in understanding what happened—from his first peddling of information to Pincher, to the infamous Granada television show in which he first spilled his secrets to millions of viewers, to writing *Spycatcher* with the help of Paul Greengrass. The first part covers Wright’s obsession, beginning with Golitsyn’s 1963 visit to England, that the British services, particularly MI-5, were penetrated by the Russians. In this belief he was supported and encouraged within his own service by his mentor Arthur Martin, who at that
time was considered the senior counterespionage expert in MI-5. Later he began an association with Angleton, who also encouraged him in his obsessive ideas about penetration. After Martin’s removal in 1965, the leadership of the mole hunters fell upon Wright, a mantle he willingly accepted.

But then other views began to be heard: the Mitchell case sputtered out; Hollis retired and, with his departure, the immediacy of action tended to decline; Golitsyn’s stock within the British services began to fall and mole hunt fever began to recede. Suddenly Wright found himself alone with his convictions. He tried everything to make members of the new leadership listen, but they turned a deaf ear. The old man and his obsession became an embarrassment. The problem then was how to ease him out of the service.

The second aspect of Wright’s story is the man himself. He was never a popular figure in MI-5, especially with senior management. He was a scientist (actually he had studied agriculture at Oxford) whose application of his special discipline to intelligence work did not always win acceptance by his colleagues. When he allied with Martin, another nonestablishment outsider, and the two began pressing for a more aggressive resistance to Soviet intelligence in the United Kingdom, they were hailed by young junior officers as heroes. In the process, however, they antagonized many of the conservative oldtimers, and especially the top management, Roger Hollis and Graham Mitchell.

After Golitsyn’s visit and the investigation of Mitchell began, the division between the followers of Martin and Wright and those who questioned the penetration idea became more pronounced. Wright was even more isolated after Martin’s departure, but the new Director General, Furnival Jones, continued to allow him considerable leeway. Nevertheless, as he neared retirement, he was virtually isolated. Many felt his obsessive mole hunt was distracting the service from its primary tasks as well as threatening the cohesion and morale of the service. All of this shook Wright’s confidence, and he began to feel an outcast.

A prudent observer, noting so many skeletons in MI-5’s closet (Blunt, Mitchell, Hollis, for example) and that Wright was a retiree of such mercurial temperament and precarious financial status, would have advised some effort to ensure that he left the service in a favorable state of mind. Instead the old man was denied a sizable portion of his retirement annuity to which he was clearly entitled, thus making certain he left with a burning grievance.*

*Before entering MI-5, Wright had worked about a dozen years as a research scientist for the Royal Navy. It was agreed that this service would count as time in establishing the amount of his pension. Upon his retirement, however, Wright was told that, for some arcane bureaucratic reason, MI-5 could not incorporate the earlier service in determining his final pension sum. When he complained this was a violation of trust, he was waved off. The sum he received was unbelievably small.
In desperation Wright finally was forced to move from England to the Australian island of Tasmania, where he hoped to establish a stud farm that might prosper, and where conditions were better for his deteriorating health. There he also was beyond the reach of the British Official Secrets Act. At about this time, when his financial condition had become truly serious, a call came from Lord Rothschild precipitating events that were to wound both Wright and the British Government. (Further details about those events are provided in the review of Chapman Pincher's *The Spycatcher Affair.*)

It can be argued that the rigid rule is that an officer does not break an oath to which he has solemnly given his word, and that therefore what Wright did was both morally repugnant and a criminal action. On the other hand, the British Government and MI-5, by denying him his legitimate pension, had done Wright a wrong for which he had no recourse under the secrecy arrangements in Britain. It should also be borne in mind that he was a far-right, rock-hard Tory. That his own kind and MI-5 would so mutilate him was a spiritual shock from which he never recovered. His actions from that time forward were out of character, but at the trial he got his revenge. As he descended from the witness box at the conclusion of his testimony, Wright was heard to mutter, "That will fix the bastards."

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Nigel West is the pseudonym of Rupert Alason, a Tory Member of Parliament. His book covers the investigations by MI-5 into the Hollis and Mitchell cases as well as the work of the "Fluency" committee. Because West does not know the facts about Fluency, he exaggerates its effectiveness. The work of the committee covered much ground but with few results. Although it found no Soviet penetration of either MI-5 or MI-6, but several MI-6 officers were forced to resign for reasons never explained. The book also looks at the career of Guy Liddell, a distinguished MI-5 officer who retired in 1953. Unlike John Costello (*The Climate of Treason*), West concludes Liddell could not have been the "Fifth Man," this being written before the Andrew-Gordievsky book identified John Cairncross as the one who deserves that dubious title.

The most interesting part of *Molehunt* is West's commentary on the *Spycatcher* trial in Sydney. He obviously took great delight in observing the miserable situation in which his competitor, Chapman Pincher, found himself as the embarrassing story emerged of Wright's collusion with Pincher.
All the clever stories and coverups Pincher had created to protect the identity of his true source for *Their Trade Is Treachery* were suddenly exposed, much to the delight of the public and all the journalists who had suffered Pincher’s scoops and inside stories. The trial exposed him as having concocted a sordid deal to pay the old spycatcher a paltry sum for his information which, converted into a book, had brought Pincher several hundred thousand pounds.

Chapters six and seven cover the background to Pincher’s relations with Wright and Lord Rothschild, providing information not revealed in either Pincher’s or Turnbull’s books. In particular, West reveals the degree of knowledge that senior British intelligence officials, particularly in MI-5, and the Cabinet Secretary possessed regarding Pincher’s manuscript of *Their Trade Is Treachery*. He also demonstrates that the illicit means by which they acquired the manuscript tied their hands legally as regards bringing action to prevent publication. This conundrum allowed Pincher’s book to appear, even though the top people in the British Government knew its contents violated the Official Secrets Act. According to West, British intelligence authorities had analyzed the book’s contents line by line and deduced the source to be Wright. They confirmed this by discovering Pincher’s air tickets for his trip to Tasmania. That information, grudgingly revealed during the Sydney trial, degraded the British Government’s case in trying to force an injunction against Wright’s book, whereas Pincher’s earlier work had been allowed to go into print with no objection. These two chapters are among the best in this well-researched and well-written book.

In his last chapter West again considers the issue of Soviet penetration of MI-5, emphasizing the belief (strongly held by Martin and Wright) that MI-5 contained a mole from the wartime period up to perhaps the mid-1960s. After a cursory examination of the most prominent suspects, West settles on Mitchell as the most likely candidate. He makes a general case, but his major effort emphasizes the paper Mitchell wrote for Prime Minister Macmillan that, in effect, cleared Philby. The paper was replete with errors and downplayed Philby’s role in the case of the “missing diplomats” (Burgess and Maclean), but this alone hardly makes the case against Mitchell. West notes other minimal points about Mitchell, such as his alleged dislike of defectors, but does not make a strong case against him.

Gordievsky, in his book *KGB: The Inside Story*, cleared both Hollis and Mitchell. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, former Chief of Counterintelligence in the KGB, confirmed to this writer in 1992 that neither Hollis nor Mitchell had worked for the KGB. It would be a kind gesture if the present Russian
Government would make an official statement to this effect, thus lifting forever the shadow that remains for the relatives of these falsely accused men. Mitchell himself was spared this last indignity from West; he died in 1985.


This book is a useful antidote to Chapman Pincher's The Spycatcher Affair (subject of the next review). It is an entertaining and accurate account of how a brash young Australian barrister destroyed the British Government's effort to prevent Peter Wright from publishing Spycatcher, his story about the alleged Soviet penetration of British intelligence and security services.

The author of The Spycatcher Trial, Malcolm Turnbull, was that barrister. He was 32 years old at the time of the trial, a legal circus that attracted worldwide attention. Turnbull was educated in Australia and had won a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford for two years, during which time he was employed by the London Times. He married well socially in Australia and had excellent political connections, which proved of immense help as the case progressed.

A shrewd observer of human foibles and the fickleness of the media, Turnbull employed a number of stratagems to outwit the British legal team, including outfitting Wright with a drover's hat in order to give him an Australian character. (He also prudently got him Australian citizenship before the trial began.) Turnbull employed a shrewd English solicitor to help him understand the British legal thicket and Paul Greengrass, Wright's ghost writer, to provide insights on what had propelled Wright's activities of recent years. Greengrass's role was especially important because Wright's memory was failing, and he was inclined on occasion to change or embroider his story.

Peter Wright's Spycatcher had received more legal attention than almost any other book of its kind in history. The trial involving its author in Sydney, Australia, in 1986 represented an extraordinary nexus between the secret security and intelligence services, the law, and the media. What began as an attempt by MI-5 to muzzle one of its former officers ended with the British Government on trial in Australia.
In 1985, frustrated by his failure to persuade the British Government to act against what he considered continued Soviet penetration of the British intelligence and security services, Wright signed a contract with Heinemann’s of Australia to publish his dossier of “facts.” He was motivated largely by a desire for vengeance against his former employers for what he considered their malicious refusal to give him his proper pension, but he was also hopeful of making enough money to keep his stud farm afloat. (Wright had sampled the largess that came as his share of Pincher’s *Their Trade Is Treachery*, and he found it gratifying.) His incapacity to write anything but the worst bureaucratic prose, however, led him to hire Greengrass as his ghost writer.

Within weeks, news of the book leaked out, and the legal battle began. Prime Minister Thatcher, presumably on the advice of MI-5, pursued Wright through the courts in Australia, Britain, and other parts of the world. Wright, equally dogged and with the support of his publisher, remained determined that his book should appear in print. When Turnbull took up the case in early 1986, the betting odds were that Wright had a 1-percent chance of winning. The ensuing three-week trial in Sydney, in particular Turnbull’s brilliant cross-examination of British Cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, is the centerpiece of the book. The trial turned the case in Wright’s favor, and the attendant publicity made *Spycatcher* an international best seller. Wright became a millionaire several times over.

For intelligence officers there is an especially compelling story (pages 53-55) told concerning the use of the “old boy” network in a backdoor attempt to make the injunction watertight. An English friend told Turnbull of the British Government’s intention to request the Australian Government's help in stopping publication of Wright’s book. This was to be done through intelligence links between the two countries. Through his political connections, Turnbull confirmed the truth of this story (which originated in a conversation between two senior British officials overheard in the pissoir of the Garrick Club in London). Furthermore, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization Australian (ASIO) and the Australian Department of Defense were apparently keen to demonstrate their loyalty to Britain and the Western intelligence “club.” Turnbull fired off a letter to Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, Minister for External Affairs Bill Hayden and others emphasizing that “Australia should not run to Mrs. Thatcher’s whistle; it should not protect Britain from the consequences of its past crimes.” It had the desired effect. Although Australia sided with Britain in trying to stop the external publication of Wright’s book, Australian intervention thereafter was as innocuous as possible.
Turnbull provides a full and often amusing account of this celebrated legal event. He explains Wright’s motives in publishing and those of the British Government in relentlessly pursuing the case. The story could easily be the plot for a film as he recreates the drama of the trial that caught the imagination of the world.


First published in England in 1989 under the title *The Web of Deception*, this book is one of three major works dealing with the *Spycatcher* trial in Australia, the other two being *Molehunt: The Full Story of the Soviet Spy in MI-5* by Nigel West and *The Spycatcher Trial* by Malcolm Turnbull. All three are of interest, but the Pincher book is required reading to understand the hodgepodge of events that led to the trial.

Pincher was intimately involved with Wright in an earlier book called *Their Trade is Treachery*. In the trial, Turnbull, the Australian lawyer, attempted to prove that Pincher had corrupted Wright with money to obtain the first bits of information on the Hollis case, and then allegedly cheated Wright out of his monetary rewards. On both these points, as thorough as Turnbull was, he failed to make a watertight case; yet the charges were vastly embarrassing to Pincher.

The real issue in the Australian trial was the legitimacy of the British Government’s case, together with the veracity of its Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong. He had been sent from London to speak to the court—or, as Sir Robert himself admitted in an unguarded moment, “to be the fall guy.” In the end, both the government and Sir Robert were embarrassed and, worse still, they lost the case. Meanwhile, the trial had generated international interest, so much in fact that an American publisher decided to produce Wright’s book in the United States, thereby ensuring the spectacular financial success that made Wright a rich man.

To understand this complicated story, it is necessary to start with James Angleton. As Pincher relates, Jonathan Aitken, a Tory MP and son of Lord Beaverbrook, saw Angleton in Washington during a private visit in December 1979. Mrs. Thatcher had just confirmed in Parliament Sir Anthony Blunt’s role as a Soviet agent. In a private conversation Angleton warned Aitken that more was to come and that he believed there must be a full inquiry into both MI-5 and MI-6. Astonished, Aitken asked why. Angleton said he would think of a way to answer the question, and that perhaps Mrs. Thatcher should be warned. When Aitken returned to London, he found a letter in which Angleton provided the names of Arthur Martin...
and Christopher Phillpotts, who had retired respectively from MI-5 and MI-6. Aitken invited them to the House of Commons for a drink and learned about the Hollis and Mitchell cases. On the basis of this information, Aitken delivered a warning letter marked “confidential and personal” to the Prime Minister.

Aitken later contacted Pincher, whom he had known for years, revealed what he had learned of the Hollis and Mitchell cases and showed him the confidential letter he had delivered to Mrs. Thatcher. According to Pincher, the detailed letter included the charge “that our Security Services were penetrated by Soviet agents at a far more secret level than that at which Philby, Burgess, Maclean, and Blunt were operating,” and it named as the principal secret agents Sir Roger Hollis and Mr. Graham Mitchell.

Pincher was involved in the Spycatcher trial from the start through his association with Peter Wright, which began with a meeting at Lord Rothschild’s home in Cambridge on 4 September 1980. At this meeting, Wright explained to Pincher his past employment with MI-5, his move to Tasmania, his precarious financial position, and his raging belief that MI-5 had been and still was penetrated by Soviet agents. He noted Andrew Boyle’s success with his book on Blunt, which had flushed out the old spy. Wright said he wanted to do the same thing and was writing a book on Soviet penetration of MI-5, but his bad health and lack of financial resources endangered its completion. To get Pincher’s attention, Wright spilled some of his secrets, prompting the author to agree to assist him with the book. A financial agreement followed, and Pincher went to Tasmania to debrief Wright. He then returned to England for further research and, writing furiously, had a completed manuscript in hand by the end of 1980.

The role of the late Lord Rothschild, who paid for Wright’s air ticket from Australia to England and return, remains clouded to this day. In 1980, Lord Rothschild was a pillar of respectability in English life. He had served in MI-5 through World War II, earning the George Cross for heroism, headed one of the largest merchant banks in the United Kingdom, and led a brain trust for then-Prime Minister Heath. Whatever prompted him to bring Wright to England and pass him along to Pincher, the bizarre events that followed tarnished his reputation.

If the Rothschild role appears peculiar, the developments that followed Pincher’s selection of a publisher and their subsequent actions are genuinely mind-boggling. The publisher, Sidgwick and Jackson, after reading the synopsis, explained that, because the book would breach the Official Secrets Act, the risk of publishing would be high. Given the sensitivity of the manuscript, every precaution would have to be taken so that MI-5 would
not learn of it and initiate retributive action. Eventually the publisher sought advice from an unidentified person who occasionally served as a confidential arbiter of taste and prudence concerning new book projects. The publisher and Pincher agreed to accept this person's advice and abide by his decision. Within a few days the "arbiter" called for more information on the book. Throughout the negotiations, Pincher kept Wright's role secret. Complicated arrangements were made to pay his share of money from the book through a bank in the Netherlands Antilles. The arbiter never learned of Wright's role in the book, and Lord Rothschild distanced himself from the project.

A further curious development occurred when the arbiter brought into negotiations "a friend" upon whose advice he much relied, Sir Arthur ("Dickie") Franks, then Chief of MI-6. His identity became known at the Sydney trial, which produced evidence that in March 1981 Franks told MI-5 that Pincher was producing a book about the Security Service. About this time, Sir Robert Armstrong was advised (probably by MI-5) of the book's contents. Meanwhile, the book was being edited, and arrangements were being made to sell portions to the daily press. Pincher was much relieved when it appeared in book shops late in the spring of 1981.

Their Trade is Treachery was an immediate sensation, particularly because within days it forced Mrs. Thatcher again to admit, as in the case of Blunt, that a sensitive matter of great security importance had been kept secret. She announced that both the Director General of MI-5 and his deputy had been investigated as possible Soviet agents, but in both cases no proof was found to substantiate these charges. Sir Roger Hollis was dead, but Graham Mitchell was alive and living in Surrey. While the announcement embarrassed the British government, it devastated Mitchell and his family. Pincher later brushed aside these repercussions, claiming that such personal tragedies are merely the result of investigative journalism and part of the price that people must pay for freedom of the press.

Much of The Spycatcher Trial is devoted to assailing Pincher's erstwhile colleague, Peter Wright, for what Pincher claims were false statements to the court. He also denounces the Australian legal system, Justice Powell (the judge in the case), and especially Malcolm Turnbull, the brash, aggressive young Australian lawyer who handled the case for Heinemann's. The evidence Turnbull brought forward damaged Pincher's already suspect reputation. Pincher is also offended by the treatment of the main British Government representative, Sir Robert Armstrong. He admits, however, that Armstrong's performance left something to be desired, especially after his famous admission to the judge, on one occasion, that "perhaps I was being economical with the truth."
Wright was not the only person to profit from the *Spycatcher* trial; it also made Pincher a rich man. Despite the wounds he claims to have suffered, sales of his original book on Hollis—*Their Trade Is Treachery*—went into five editions as a result of all the publicity.

In the aftermath, MI-5 was hauled over the coals by the media, left and right, for incompetence, for being penetrated by hordes of Soviet agents, for numerous illegal activities, and for a lack of responsibility to the Prime Minister. Although the affair embarrassed the government, the Prime Minister’s safe majority in the Commons assured that Mrs. Thatcher would not suffer serious political damage. Her position, in fact, improved when it was found that the Labor Party leader, Neil Kinnock, had covertly tried to make political profit from the trial through his contacts with Turnbull in Australia.

The public person who suffered most because of the trial was Sir Robert Armstrong, whose long career ended on an inglorious note. Before the trial he was considered a sure bet upon retirement to become Provost of Eton College, one of England’s most prestigious sinecures. The trial demolished that possibility. Mrs. Thatcher tried to ease the pain by making him a life peer the following year, but the public image of him will always be one of the supercilious “Pom” trussed up and barbecued by a sneering Malcolm Turnbull.

Pincher’s transparent effort in this book to put his literary activities in the best light and to exonerate himself from association with illegal or shady dealings does not succeed. In addition, he fails to cast a critical eye upon the machinations of Whitehall, which in the end permitted his book *Their Trade Is Treachery* to be published while Wright’s later effort brought down the weight of the British Government against publishing *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer*.

Perhaps the Australian trial was a fitting conclusion to this mess. It is a cautionary tale.


With publication of this book, Gordon Brook-Shepherd, a British foreign correspondent turned historian, has done the best work of his long career. As intelligence history dealing with Soviet postwar defectors, it is not only an exciting read but is accurate in almost every respect.
Compressed within its 303 pages is the story of how the Western intelligence services, largely denied the possibility of obtaining information from within the Soviet Union, came to realize the enormous intelligence value of those Soviets who risked their lives to make the leap to freedom.

Brook-Shepherd immersed himself thoroughly in the details of the defections and comprehends how these events affected the secret world of intelligence, making judgments that are objective and fair. He achieved this kind of professional knowledge partly from work on his earlier book, *The Storm Petrels*, which recounted the story of prewar defectors from the Soviet Union. With this experience, plus generous help from CIA and the British intelligence services, he has written a fascinating account of how and why so many senior Soviet intelligence officials defected and the impact they had on the West.

The author deals with his complex subject in chronological fashion, starting with the first postwar defector, Igor Gouzenko in Canada. It is difficult today to comprehend how little Western governments knew about Soviet espionage and subversive activity prior to Gouzenko’s defection in September 1945. This event and the revelations that flowed from it stunned both statesmen and the public. The effect on the United States was enormous when combined with the defections from Communism of Americans like Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz, and Whittaker Chambers, all of whom made significant contributions to the growing mass of evidence about Soviet illegal activities.

In Canada, where Prime Minister Mackenzie King seemed unable to grasp the enormity of Soviet transgressions, Gouzenko’s act laid the groundwork for establishing a security service in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In Britain, Gouzenko’s information also had an electric effect, but behind-the-scenes agents such as Philby were often able to blunt its force.

Although Gouzenko was the first Soviet intelligence officer to defect after the war and the impact of his disclosures are almost beyond measure, Brook-Shepherd does not include him amongst the postwar defectors he describes as “giants.” He defines a giant as one who dominated the scene in the sense that his contribution went beyond his normal professional assets to play a strategic role in postwar history. The three he puts in this category are Penkovsky, “Farewell,” and Gordievsky. All of the defectors he examines were intelligence officers of either the KGB or GRU with one exception: Arkady Shevchenko, the one-time under Secretary-General at the United Nations. He was included because of his personal and political significance.

*For example, Philby singlehandedly, without drawing attention to himself, managed to prevent a position paper urging stronger action against the Soviets from reaching Prime Minister Atlee.*
The book also examines the motives of the Soviet defectors. A primary and nearly constant impulse was fear—often sheer terror—of what awaited them upon their return to Moscow for transgressions they may have committed. In addition they shared a common reaction to their experience when they visited the outside world: shock at the gray misery of the Soviet Union in contrast to the freedom and affluence of the West (even in the old days, the Soviet-occupied zone of Austria seemed like Heaven compared to what they left behind in the USSR). This contrast with the Soviet homeland shook the faith of many Soviet intelligence officers despite the lavish privileges they enjoyed but were denied ordinary Soviet citizens.

Although the seed usually was planted early for defection, it often took some other reason to trigger the act. These included marital problems, petty disputes or jealousies within the Soviet community (always a very isolated group), or simply the hope for a better life in the free world. Whatever the case, all the motives for defection when taken together reveal a disgust with the oppressive Soviet regime, which really means the basic reason was ideological.

Gouzenko’s difficulty in finding any person or agency who would listen to his story highlighted a gaping deficiency in the way Western intelligence and security services handled defectors. During the war when the Soviet Union was adulated as a heroic ally, there were few defectors. One of them, Victor Kravchenko, who was not an intelligence officer, had a difficult time escaping from the Soviet Purchasing Mission in Washington in 1944 and was lucky to have survived. His defection was not publicized, and his story was published only after the war when attitudes toward the USSR changed.

Other attempted defections had a less happy ending. The most famous was that of Konstantin Volkov, described in some detail in Brook-Shephard’s book. The foiling of his attempt was almost certainly Philby’s most desperate and successful coup. Volkov had approached the British consulate in Istanbul shortly after the end of the war with an offer of information which, had he not been neutralized by Philby’s quick action, undoubtedly would have lead to the exposure of all Soviet agents in Britain. Another case in which Philby succeeded in derailing the information, if not the informant, was that of Ishmael Akhmedov, a GRU officer who defected to the Turks during wartime. Later, during this tour as MI-6 chief in Istanbul, Philby prevented Akhmedov’s information from reaching the West except in truncated form. The episode highlights a neglected aspect of the damage Philby inflicted on the West. CIA eventually got access to Akhmedov, but not until 10 years after his defection!

The last example of Philby’s infamous service to the KGB that is discussed by Brook-Shephard concerns a young English-speaking GRU officer named Vladimir Skripkin. This little known case began in Tokyo in
early 1946 when Skripkin made overtures to both American and British authorities. For some reason he received no encouragement from the American side. Because he was soon to be posted back to Moscow, he then made a pass at the British, leaving with them an address in Moscow where he asked to be contacted. Upon his return, he was seized by the KGB and never heard of again. Two KGB defectors (Rastvorov and Deriabin) told CIA later that Skripkin had been given away by a British intelligence source, who almost certainly was Philby.

*The Storm Birds* then turns to a series of defections in 1954 that were touched off in part by the execution of Lavrenti Beriya, head of Stalin’s secret police. By this time, Western services—the CIA in particular—were more alert and had improved the system for receiving and handling defectors expeditiously. The first in this wave was Yuri Rastvorov, a KGB officer who initially approached the British but changed his mind and went to CIA instead. The next was KGB officer Peter Deriabin, whose defection in Vienna and escape from the Soviets was skillfully managed by CIA. Brook-Shepherd provides details of Deriabin’s KGB background that demonstrate how valuable his information was to the West.

An account of Nikolai Kokhlov’s defection follows. The KGB had dispatched Kokhlov to West Germany to assassinate the leader of the National Alliance of Russian Solidarity, an anti-Soviet organization. Instead he turned himself over to CIA, which used his information to launch a series of operations, some successful and some failures. The Agency capitalized on the defector’s assassination mission by developing anti-Soviet propaganda from it. Kokhlov wrote a book about the affair and was resettled in the United States, where he made a successful career in academia.

Finally, Brooke-Shepherd tells the harrowing story of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, the KGB husband and wife team in the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Australia. They managed to escape to freedom in 1954 with the assistance of ASIO, although the wife was nearly kidnapped back to the USSR. Photographers captured on film the clumsy intervention of the KGB security goons, and the picture of Mrs. Petrov being dragged shoeless across the airport tarmac to a waiting plane gave the Soviets a very black eye. From their long service, mostly as cipher clerks, the Petrovs provided valuable information, including the first knowledge that the “missing diplomats,” Burgess and Maclean, were in Moscow. Like Gouzenko in Canada, they also identified a number of KGB agents in the Australian Government and trade unions. The successful management of the defection gave the fledgling ASIO a special boost and put it in the league of major security services.
Two chapters are devoted to the Penkovsky case. This is a well-done summary that, however, has been overtaken by the more exhaustive study entitled *The Spy Who Saved the World*, by Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin, published in 1992. Next are the stories of the two most controversial defectors, Anatole Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko. The complexity of these related episodes provides a true test of the author's ability to analyze vast amounts of information and testimony. In both cases, he has done a good job of sorting out the facts and arriving at fair judgments. He obviously had help on the Golitsyn chapter from MI-5 and MI-6 and perhaps some guidance from CIA. Brook-Shepherd puts Golitsyn in perspective regarding the value of his product and his later career as troublemaker, especially for the Agency. The author does the same with Nosenko, dealing fairly with the charges by Edward J. Epstein and others about Nosenko's testimony concerning Oswald. Someone in the CIA, however, should have told Brook-Shepherd that Admiral Turner in 1978 gave Nosenko a clean bill of health and that every Director since, including William Casey, accepted that conclusion, leaving no doubt that the defector was and is genuine.

In a chapter entitled "Pluses and Minuses," the case of Oleg Lyalin in Britain takes first place, particularly because this KGB officer's defection in 1971 triggered the famous deportation of 105 Soviet diplomats from the United Kingdom. The "minuses" are the several Soviet intelligence officers who, within one year (1971-1972), defected to US authorities and then later redefected to Russia. Only one is worthy of detailed consideration, a young KGB lieutenant named Artush Oganesyan who brought the latest issue of the KGB's "Watch List" when he crossed the Soviet border into Turkey. This was the annually revised catalogue of Soviet citizens of all sorts—ballet dancers, opera singers, scientists, athletes, officials, and intelligence personnel—who had failed to return from visits to the West. Oganesyan provided other valuable information as well, but in the eyes of James Angleton, the "Watch List" cast suspicion on the defector because it contained the name of Yuri Nosenko. The counterintelligence chief thought his suspicions confirmed when Oganesyan and his young wife suddenly redefected to the Soviets. Current CIA officials and Brook-Shepherd do not share this view.

The special case of Arkady Shevchenko, who held an exalted position at the United Nations in New York, is also treated. When his interest in defecting became known, the CIA managed to convince him to work in place as long as possible. This turned out to be more than two years. When, in 1978, the order came for his return to Moscow, he openly defected, wrote a bestseller about his experiences as a senior Soviet diplomat, married an American woman, and quietly settled into American life.
All of the final cases Brook-Shepherd covers fall roughly within the 1975-85 timeframe. A GRU officer, Vladimir Rezun, who defected to the British in Switzerland in 1978, brought considerable information, the most alarming being specifics about the Red Army’s Spetsnaz or Special Purpose Forces units. These units, present in every part of the Soviet military, were tasked to employ sabotage, terror, and other extreme action in the event of war. Under British direction, Rezun, using the pseudonym “Victor Suvorov,” wrote several books about his experiences in the Soviet military, emphasizing the role of Spetsnaz units. The British let Brook-Shepherd talk to Rezun, following the example of CIA, which had made several of its defectors available to him.

Victor Levchenko, a KGB officer engaged in active measures in Tokyo, defected to the CIA in 1979. He had been in Tokyo since 1975 and was able to reveal not only organizational details of Soviet intelligence in Japan but also the extent of Soviet penetration and collaboration within the Japanese Government and the media. He also provided inside information on KGB active measures worldwide. Mounting interest in the subject at the time made these revelations especially valuable. Levchenko subsequently wrote a book and lectured widely about Soviet “special measures.”

The penultimate defector case discussed in the book is that of Vladimir I. Vetrov, known as “Farewell.” His story begins in France and ends in Moscow with his execution in the early 1980s. Aside from its lurid aspects (including a murder and a mistress), the case is of special interest because it revealed, in excruciating detail, Soviet efforts to obtain scientific and technical information from the West. Even more alarming, Farewell’s reporting disclosed how successful this massive KGB endeavor had been and that much of it was directed at US industry.

Early in his career, Farewell was stationed in Paris where he made many contacts. Several years later he contacted the French. When his information became available, President Mitterand instructed the French intelligence service to share it with the United States. The voluminous product and the insight it provided into the intricate Soviet system for collecting scientific and technical intelligence was of inestimable value to the US Intelligence Community. Farewell had moved steadily upward in the KGB department responsible for technical and scientific espionage abroad, and from that vantage point he could monitor Soviet operations and scientific requirements. Without question he was one of the most important agents ever to work for the West. Within the constraints of the limited information released by the French, Brook-Shepherd has done an excellent job in presenting this story.

The author concludes his book with a brief chapter on Oleg Gordievsky, who defected in 1985. By the time Brook-Shepherd was completing his work, however, Gordievsky was busy writing his own story in
collaboration with Dr. Christopher Andrew. Undoubtedly for this reason—and the fact that, when *The Storm Birds* was published, the defector's wife and children were still held hostage in the USSR—Brook-Shepherd obtained only minimal information about Gordievsky's background and achievements. It is nonetheless sufficient to make a lively conclusion to this remarkable book.


Ronald Kessler, one of the most prolific American writers on espionage, has in this book produced an interesting and useful compendium of cases covering FBI operations against foreign spies (mostly Soviet) in the United States. Although CIA officers can find at their headquarters more accurate and complete summaries for many of the events Kessler covers, this book is a handy introduction to some of the most important espionage cases the Bureau handled during the past two decades. It is of special interest because it describes briefly two serious penetrations which did great damage to the CIA during the period that James Angleton was chief of the Counterintelligence Staff.

For exciting reading, Kessler's description of the apprehension of John Walker, the US Navy warrant officer who for years delivered high grade communications intelligence to the KGB, is unsurpassed. He also includes the story of how Ronald Pelton, the Soviet spy at the National Security Agency (NSA) was caught, tried, and imprisoned, as well as an account of the defection of the renegade CIA officer, Edward Lee Howard, to the Soviet Union in 1985. Kessler presents these cases from the FBI viewpoint, using layman's language to describe how the FBI's counterintelligence division did its vital work. In doing so, as *The New York Times* book review stated, Kessler takes full advantage of "an opportunity to distinguish between what is folly and what is fruitful in such an important but little known area."

For CIA readers the two most fascinating cases, aside from the dreadful Howard disaster, are the ones involving Karl and Hana Koecher—agents for the Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) and thus for the KGB—and the saga of Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a long-time agent of the Chinese Intelligence Service whose target was the CIA. Kessler devotes considerable attention to the Koechers; he visited Prague after they were turned over to the Soviets (in exchange for famous dissident Nathan Sharansky) in order to
interview them about their activities in the United States, but as good spies they stonewalled. There is no doubt, however, that Karl Koecher, who was a translator of Russian material, had passed volumes of information to the CIS, which in turned passed it to the KGB.

One significant result of his treachery was the arrest by the KGB of Aleksander D. Ogorodnik, an immensely productive CIA source in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose identity Koecher passed to his Czech handler. (Ogorodnik foiled the KGB by taking a suicide pill the CIA had given him before he could be taken into custody.) Koecher managed somehow to pass a lie detector test and became a CIA contract employee in February 1973 with a top secret security clearance. Kessler emphasizes that Hana Koecher was an attractive blonde, and he alleges that she and her husband cultivated numerous people in Washington through their swinging lifestyle without providing any proof that this facilitated their espionage activity. The FBI arrested them in 1984.

The case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin is equally fascinating. Chin began spying for the Chinese Intelligence Service as early as the Korean War but was not employed by the CIA until 1952. In 1970, he became a US citizen and a CIA staff employee with top secret clearances.

Being fluent in three Chinese dialects, Chin was in great demand and was considered the CIA's best translator. Upon his retirement in 1981, he was awarded the Career Intelligence Medal. In addition to translating foreign broadcasts and publications, Chin had access to information about clandestine CIA operations in China as well as other sensitive intelligence material. Because his reporting to his Chinese masters was so voluminous, the FBI had to assign a considerable contingent to review his production, according to the FBI's post mortem. The Bureau learned of his treachery, Kessler says, from a defector not otherwise identified but presumably Chinese. FBI interrogators cleverly used the defector's information to obtain a general confession from Chin. He was found guilty after a jury trial and sentenced to prison, where he later committed suicide. Kessler notes, correctly, that, aside from Karl Koecher, Chin is the only other known mole to have penetrated the CIA.

Kessler also provides details of other FBI counterintelligence cases, including so-called "dangle" operations and double agents. The book is slightly marred by the stories the author intersperses in a rather jumbled way instead of relating them in an orderly series. His reporting, however, is sound and accurate, being based largely on interviews with FBI officers who actually were involved in the cases described. The book is a valuable contribution to counterintelligence literature on the FBI experience. The last chapter is a thoughtful commentary on the problems posed for counterintelligence operators in a democratic society.

Epstein published *Deception* in mid-1989, just as the Soviet Union was on the verge of its demise in the autumn of 1991. The concurrent dismantling of the KGB, its major intelligence arm, led almost overnight to the disappearance of what was once a small industry in the West employing dozens of self-appointed experts in universities and think tanks who were devoted to the study of Soviet deception, disinformation, and subversion. Their endeavors, and Epstein's book, now have the smell of attic dust.

Like its predecessor *Legend*, *Deception* has two parts. The first 105 pages explain Angleton's theories, as developed by Epstein, largely from lengthy interviews with Anatole Golitsyn. The remainder of the book describes various forms of deception. One chapter is devoted to another Soviet defector, Vitali Yurchenko, who Epstein believes is a KGB provocateur similar to Nosenko. The conclusion is a long chapter on glasnost, which Epstein dismisses as simply another massive KGB deception.

The most arresting information in the book is the author's confession regarding his sources for this book and *Legend*. After Angleton died on 11 May 1987, Epstein apparently felt free to admit that the former chief of CIA counterintelligence had been his major source since 1976 when they first met.\(^1\)

Most astute observers had concluded that Angleton was leaking classified information to Epstein and others, but nothing was officially done to caution the discredited cold warrior. On the other hand, when CIA found that Clare E. Petty had been leaking classified material to the press, he received an official warning letter. Even in forced retirement, Angleton enjoyed protected and special status, as he had when he was at the Agency.

In Part One, Epstein recites again, as in *Legend*, the Angleton belief in the KGB program of deception and penetration, which the former CI Staff chief had heard about from Golitsyn and then embellished. One of Golitsyn's major claims, made almost immediately after his defection, was that the KGB would soon send another defector to "mutilate" Golitsyn's leads, as Angleton invariably put it. Thus when Nosenko defected to the

\(^1\)Angleton had referred Epstein to his assistants, Miler and Rocca, and provided introductions to retired CIA counterintelligence officer William Hood and FBI officers William Sullivan and Sam Papich. Angleton also sent Epstein to England to see Stephen de Mowbray, the former MI-6 officer and a devoted disciple of Golitsyn, and to Belgium to see a former Chief of Station, Tennent (Pete) Bagley, another believer. In *Deception*, Epstein provides an amusing account of the clandestine circumstances under which they met, indicating Bagley clearly understood he was discussing sensitive matters.
CIA in 1964, Angleton viewed him as the predicted plant. This in turn ensured that Golitsyn would maintain his primacy as the CI Staff’s resident expert on the subject.

When Nosenko did not confess that he was a false defector, CIA incarcerated him for three years under severe conditions. Epstein blames this action entirely on the management of the Soviet Division in CIA’s Directorate of Operations, and he portrays Angleton as agonizing helplessly on the sidelines. This is patently absurd. Angleton was aware of all the legal considerations associated with such action and of the construction of the prison quarters but never raised an objection. If he had, as Epstein claims he did, one word from him to Director Richard Helms would have prevented Nosenko’s detainment.

This is but one of many errors and misinterpretations in the book. Like Legend, it is propaganda for Angleton and essentially dishonest. The errors are too many to document here, but one more example will give the flavor. On page 85, Epstein cites Golitsyn’s assertion that Soviet intelligence was divided into an “outer” and an “inner” KGB to support the deception program. Nothing, however, can be found in any of Golitsyn’s debriefings that remotely supports this. Moreover, no other Soviet source or defector has ever reported the existence of two KGBs, including the most senior defector of recent times, Oleg Gordievsky.

Golitsyn probably developed this fiction after visiting England, when other evidence indicates he began to embroider and fabricate. One exasperated senior FBI officer wrote to Director J. Edgar Hoover: “Golitsyn is not above fabricating to support his theories.” Epstein, who makes considerable pretensions to scholarship, should have been more conscientious in checking such stories with more responsible sources before labeling them as fact.

In summary, this is one of many bad books inspired by Angleton after his dismissal that have little basis in fact. An interview with Epstein in Vanity Fair magazine in May 1989 suggests he too has had second thoughts about Angleton and even about Golitsyn, his pet defector. Epstein admitted that Golitsyn shaped Angleton’s views and possibly was a liar. The interview ended with the remark: “Actually, I don’t know whether to believe Angleton at all!”
Andrew, Christopher, and Gordievsky, Oleg.  

This is an excellent and comprehensive work by the brilliant Cambridge University historian, Christopher Andrew, in collaboration with Oleg Gordievsky, the most remarkable and productive Soviet defector of recent times. When Gordievsky made his thrilling escape from Moscow in 1985 and was safely in British hands in London, his active career as a penetration of the KGB was finished. His British friends fully realized, however, that he remained a gold mine of information on the KGB’s operations, personnel, and organizational structure. Indeed, because he had been involved in researching histories of several different divisions at KGB headquarters, he possessed a unique knowledge of the organization’s operations. Many defectors from the Soviet services had to decide to leave almost on the spur of the moment and therefore had no chance to collect special information or documents. By contrast, Gordievsky, after deciding to defect, had over a decade during which he continued to collect information and respond to British intelligence requirements. Circumstances prevented him from bringing documents when he escaped, but it is clear from the voluminous detail in this book that he did his job with uncommon attention to detail.

Gordievsky’s service in the KGB began in 1962. For nine years he served at the Center in Moscow and in Copenhagen organizing operations by KGB illegals. This was followed by 13 years doing political intelligence work in Copenhagen, at the Center, and in London, where he was deputy resident. His senior positions at the Center and in London gave him exceptional access. Despite his unqualified success as a KGB apparatchik, Gordievsky harbored doubts about both the KGB and the Soviet system. These doubts peaked in 1968 when he watched the repressive Soviet forces sweep away the freedoms that had begun to flower during the Prague Spring. It was then that he decided the Soviet system had to be brought down and that one way to weaken it was to work secretly from within.

Having made his fateful judgment, he approached the British. After careful assessment on both sides, he began working with British intelligence in 1974—yet another example of ideological defection, a man turning against his government because of its despotic and inhuman nature. Gordievsky’s decision was an act of great courage involving enormous risk, the nature of which most of us in the West can barely imagine.
British authorities were anxious to find a competent historian who
could be brought aboard to assist Gordievsky in organizing and writing his
story. The selection of Christopher Andrew to coauthor this massive work
was especially fortunate. The young Cambridge don had established himself
earlier as an intelligence historian of the first order with the publication of
his Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community.
Andrew not only was the right kind of professional; as a bonus the readers
got his rather puckish humor that often lightens the sometimes complex
detail.

These formidable collaborators have not disappointed their readers.
Previous to this book there had been (with the exception of the John Barron
books KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents and KGB Today: The
Hidden Hand) no really substantial or comprehensive work focusing on the
Soviet foreign intelligence service. George Leggett and John Dziak had
done scholarly studies on the Cheka, a very early antecedent of the KGB,
and there were scattered works on other aspects, but no truly comprehensive
history. It is ironic that just as the KGB faded from the contemporary scene,
its demise should be marked by such a distinguished literary monument.

The book's publication in late 1990 drew immediate attention and
was widely reviewed, usually with generous praise. Professor Robin Winks
of Yale was typical, writing in the Boston Globe: "This massive and unique
collaboration may well be the best book yet written on the actual practice,
as distinct from the theory, of intelligence. There can be no contest as to its
being the most fascinating history of the KGB now available." But not all
reviewers were so friendly. A few leftwing commentators took exception to
the late Harry Hopkins being described as an "unconscious source," and
there was additional grumbling about the book's treatment of the
Rosenbergs, Hiss, and some other American figures of the World War II
period. On the right, predictable criticism was directed mainly against the
authors' remarks on Angleton's responsibility for promoting, with unfor­
tunate results, deception and conspiracy theories within CIA and the British
and Canadian services.

There are factors that some serious critics highlighted and should be
considered when reading the book. As the authors noted early on, it was not
always possible while Gordievsky was with the KGB for him to research
securely matters that were not within his normal range of work. For this
reason there were some gaps that had to be filled by references to secondary
sources, not all of which can be considered entirely reliable. Another
restriction on Gordievsky's material has been largely unnoticed: what he
produced immediately became official material and was classified accord­
ingly by British intelligence. One suspects that much of his information
thereby could not be made available for the book under restrictions of the
Official Secrets Act. How much was withheld for that reason is impossible
to say.
Despite these difficulties, the majority of reviewers, especially the professional experts, lauded the book not only as a good read but also as an invaluable reference work. This writer can verify the latter fact; his copy grows more tattered by the week.

Although the book did not answer all the questions, it did its best on some high-priority issues. For the British, an obvious burning issue was the accuracy of the claims by Peter Wright and others that various Britons had worked for the Soviets. On this point, Gordievsky was able to do special research and could assure London that Hollis, Mitchell, Liddell, Lord Victor Rothschild, and others had not been in the employ of the KGB. In fact, several senior KGB officers, noting the ruckus in the British media caused by the allegations, had come to believe the whole matter was some arcane British intelligence operation, the exact nature of which the KGB had not been able to divine. Additionally, the authors made a point of noting the long-sought "Fifth Man" was John Cairncross, a name known to specialists but unknown to the public. Cairncross has since admitted his role as a Soviet spy and is currently writing his own book about his espionage career. His access was staggering, and his value to the Soviets was among the highest of the so-called "Cambridge Five."

The book’s revelations came just as the Soviet security system was crumbling, soon to be replaced by a new and different apparatus designed to function within a democracy. Under the new dispensation, there is some reason to believe that secrets from the KGB archives may be released, which will answer many still-outstanding questions. Scholars have organized to assist their Russian counterparts toward this end. Western publishers also are interested in this prospect. Crown Publishers of New York has begun publishing a series of books based on revelations from the KGB archives, the first of which was written by John Costello, an author of spy books, and Oleg Tsarev, a former KGB officer. This work was published in June 1993. What has been released from these archives so far is of rather ancient vintage, mostly for the period 1930-50. Genuine documentation from that period could be explosive. The real issue is how selective the authorities in Moscow will be and what kind of spin they will attempt to put on any story evolving from such archival material. Most specialists expect that what is likely to emerge will not reflect adversely on the KGB or its predecessor organizations and that objective truth is not likely to be well served.

*Cold Warrior* is the only book published on counterintelligence during the period reviewed that focuses on James Angleton as the central subject. All of the others deal with him as a secondary issue, although he was a primary source for several of those works. Mangold’s book is highly critical of Angleton but is not anti-CIA except in the sense that its conclusion raises some penetrating questions about the Agency’s management of counterintelligence during the last decade of Angleton’s term.

Mangold, the senior correspondent for the BBC program “Panorama,” began work on this book in 1987. He came to the United States in search of a research assistant and found an extraordinarily able one in Jeffrey Goldberg. Together they made a formidable team, especially since they entered the project with no preconceived notions nor any special ax to grind except to write an honest and objective book that would sell well. They were fortunate to obtain some unique assistance when two previous writers on intelligence, David Martin (whose *Wilderness of Mirrors* remains a classic) and Professor Robin Winks of Yale; both offered encouragement and suggested names of persons to interview.

Mangold and Goldberg got no help from the CIA; their repeated requests for material under the Freedom of Information Act were rejected. Despite this disappointment, Goldberg on his own turned up much new material, and Mangold’s main sources of information were numerous retired CIA and FBI officers who were willing to talk either on or off the record.11

*Cold Warrior* skims over Angleton’s life before his Agency career but is not really a biography; it is much more a study of the man as chief of counterintelligence beginning in 1954, concentrating on the period from 1962 until his dismissal in late 1974. The year 1962 is a turning point because that is when Golitsyn appeared on the scene (having defected in Finland in December 1961), a development that dominates the story. Before that, Angleton’s career was largely noncontroversial. With the arrival of Golitsyn, however—and especially after his return from England in the late summer of 1963—Angleton took complete control of the controversial defector (much to the relief of the Soviet Division, which had previously

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1Mangold cites the startling figure of 208 retired CIA officers that agitated some people at Langley until they were reminded that John Ranelagh, in researching his classic *The Agency*, had interviewed many more. However, Ranelagh’s book was considered benign and had a vague blessing from CIA management, which realized Mangold’s book about Angleton, if honest and objective, could only cast a dark shadow over past events.
been responsible for him) and was promptly mesmerized by some of Golitsyn’s most extreme theories. That influence on Angleton ultimately led to the infamous molehunt which is the core of Mangold’s story. It would have been helpful had he noted that, despite the numerous disasters flowing from the Angleton-Golitsyn collaboration, the Israeli branch of the Counterintelligence staff during that period enjoyed some important intelligence coups. Mangold in fact had compiled a chapter on Angleton and the Israeli connection, but it was removed by his editor because she judged the material as not sensational enough.

Some of the sources for the most explosive material in Cold Warrior were from neither CIA nor FBI. General Sir Charles Spry, former head of the ASIO, gave Mangold the story about Golitsyn’s relationship with a joint counterintelligence group involving the US and English-speaking countries of the British Commonwealth. Excellent journalistic sources in Ottawa told Mangold the story about the “Tango” case in Canada and its relevance to the charges against Bennett. Bennett himself provided his account of why he was dismissed from Canada’s security service. While in Australia, Mangold gleaned further background on Angleton from Peter Wright, the former British counterspy.

Most reviewers hailed Cold Warrior as a major triumph of research and writing, especially because the sourcing was so relentlessly detailed compared with other books on the Angleton phenomenon. The notes on sources, in fact, comprise the best part of the book, providing solid information in support of the main theme. This was a constant source of contention between Mangold and his editor, who opposed what she regarded as its excessive detail. Mangold remained adamant, arguing that, in the case of a figure as controversial as Angleton, every fact should be sourced to the fullest extent.

As might be expected, however, not even the sourcing stilled the pro-Angleton critics of the book. They declared it inaccurate but were hard pressed to provide sensible rebuttal. Some complained that the book did not acknowledge the former counterintelligence chief’s many successes, without providing any details. One vigorous critic did cite the absence of any treatment of what he alleged was Angleton’s singular accomplishment: that there was no (known) penetration of CIA during his 20-year stewardship. This is nonsense; there were no counterintelligence successes, only disasters. In fact there were two penetrations during his tenure (one Czechoslovak and one Chinese). Angleton’s molehunts and other associated activities did nothing to prevent such breaches of security and probably distracted those whose main task was to prevent them. Furthermore, Golitsyn assured Allen Dulles that the KGB had no penetration of CIA. He later
changed his story and said there was one, a switch obviously intended to preserve his primacy as Angleton’s resident authority on Soviet intelligence. Nosenko likewise told his debriefers he knew of no penetration but, because this by then contradicted Golitsyn, he was subjected to hostile interrogation and jailed for three years.

The molehunts without question were the centerpiece of Angleton’s career, but the search for traitors had ramifications involving Nosenko and many other controversial issues. Within the Agency itself, the hunt focused on only a handful of officers in the Directorate of Operations. Some of them suffered considerable humiliation or their careers were blighted; others were forced out of the Agency. Four major cases that were shown to the FBI were rejected by the Bureau as unworthy of further serious investigation. In each instance there was no substantial evidence against the individual who was accused.

All of this was done at the whim of Golitsyn, who often was allowed by Angleton to review CIA personnel and operational files. Angleton’s irresponsible behavior in this regard did not prevent Soviet successes but instead sowed distrust and confusion. The incompetence of the KGB and, more likely, the Agency polygraph program’s successes deserve the lion’s share of the credit for preventing penetrations even though the polygraph operators did not cover themselves with glory on the two that occurred.

The disruption might have been worse had not more prudent and rational authorities intervened in opposition to Angleton’s recommendations. (DCI Richard Helms’ release of Nosenko and SIS Chief Sir Dick White’s refusal to countenance the return of the defector Yuri Krotkov to the Soviets spring to mind as examples.) This book is not a complete catalogue of Angleton’s misdeeds. The mother lode of evidence about them in the archives at Langley is by no means exhausted. Mangold’s informants told him only what they knew or wished him to know. Much was withheld, and the informants often knew only a small part of the story. Moreover, at his editor’s request, Mangold cut out a great deal of material.

Cold Warrior nevertheless is an honest and accurate book. Mangold’s conclusion is inescapable: something was seriously wrong with CIA counterintelligence under Angleton. Some trait in the man’s character, at once attractive and repulsive—his intellectual arrogance perhaps—apparently led him to make serious misjudgments. What Mangold was able to cram into his 403 pages is devastating to Angleton’s reputation, due largely to numerous knowledgeable sources the author found among CIA and FBI retirees. It was human nature for them to want to put the record
straight, but many undoubtedly violated their oaths in speaking so frankly. So had many others who some years before had spoken to Edward Jay Epstein.


David Wise, sometimes described as the dean of espionage writers, has produced a readable and accurate account of the molehunt in CIA under James Angleton in the 1960s. It seems a slight exaggeration, however, to describe it as an event that “shattered the CIA.” Although he writes that the hunt involved more than 50 cases, just eight of them are discussed in the book and only three in detail. He also mentions Angleton’s atrocious accusation that David Murphy, another senior Agency officer, was a Soviet agent, but Murphy’s refusal to talk to Wise limits his treatment of that issue. The molehunt and its victims are the centerpiece of the book, but the author gives the reader a fascinating overview of Angleton’s multifold activities in collaboration with Anatole Golitsyn, his defector-turned-mentor.

When Wise began his research for this book, he probably intended to produce a full biography of Angleton but soon learned Tom Mangold had beat him off the mark by over a year in preparing his *Cold Warrior*. Wise had to regroup, and he decided instead to concentrate on the molehunt. This proved to be a worthy topic. Using the testimony of several former CIA officers whose careers suffered because of Angleton’s suspicions of them, the author provides an exceptionally interesting narrative. His stories of Peter Karlow, Paul Garbler, Richard Kovich, Vasia Gmirkin, George Goldberg, and others are an appalling testament to Angleton’s paranoia and CIA management’s failure to bring him under control.

The fact that so many senior officials were willing to be quoted reflects the depth of their feelings, which were suppressed for years, regarding the many injustices perpetrated under Angleton’s direction. Wise did careful and extensive research on the events he describes, using footnotes to amplify and document his story, although he does not provide the kind of supportive detail that is the hallmark of the Mangold book.

While *Molehunt* is highly critical of Angleton, his supporters did not attack it as viciously as some did Mangold’s work. *Cold Warrior* had appeared one year earlier and was like a heavy douse of cold water on the former counterintelligence chief’s conspiracy theories. Many reviewers
perhaps were becoming accustomed to Angletonian mischief by the time the Wise book appeared with more evidence of it. Among the pro-Angletonians, two such dousings in rapid succession did much to dampen their enthusiasm for further verbal combat.

Wise devotes considerable attention to Igor Orlov, who was thought to be the Soviet penetration molehunters were seeking on the advice of Golitsyn. At KGB headquarters Golitsyn heard of "Sasha," which he thought was the codename for an important source. Later, after studying classified CIA files in Washington, he concluded Sasha was Igor Orlov. Orlov, indeed, was a likely candidate; he was never a CIA officer but had served the Agency in Germany as a contract agent doing operational support work. As such he would have been a useful source for the KGB, although he never had access to the kind of intelligence Golitsyn claimed an agent in Germany had produced. About that time the Soviets did have a valuable American military source in Germany. Golitsyn probably had seen material received from both sources and concluded that the product from the military officer, which often contained CIA finished intelligence, had come from Orlov. The simple fact is the two sources were confused in Golitsyn's mind.

His confusion persisted throughout the molehunt and thwarted its effectiveness, despite available evidence that should have clarified the issue. Not the least of this evidence was Golitsyn's own lead on that military officer plus one from Nosenko on the same person. Because Nosenko was not thought to be genuine, however, his vitally important lead was never followed up by the Agency's counterintelligence staff and matched with the Golitsyn lead. If the two leads had been considered together, investigators would very likely have been led to the military officer, who was not associated with CIA but passed Agency material to the KGB whenever he had the opportunity. The molehunt would at least have been a partial success and, with the apprehension of the true spy, Angleton would have been a hero.

The officers associated with the molehunt who knew the whole story would rather forget this embarrassing failure. Thus it seems likely Wise never heard from them the complete tale, causing him to make more of Orlov than he deserves. None of this, however, diminishes Wise's well-told story about Orlov, on whom Golitsyn and Angleton had concentrated so much attention.

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12All of this is reminiscent of the Vassall case in the United Kingdom for which Golitsyn provided the initial lead. This prompted a lengthy search that was concluded when Nosenko's additional information was followed up, permitting MI-5 to identify the culprit in short order. In other words, the British were not handicapped, as was Angleton, by suspicion of Nosenko's bona fides.
Wise's *Molehunt* is an important addition to the literature of the Angleton period. It is the last of a trilogy of books critical of Angleton that includes David Martin's *Wilderness of Mirrors* and Tom Mangold's *Cold Warrior*.


This thrilling account of one of history’s greatest espionage cases has many counterintelligence elements that merit consideration in this review. Especially interesting is chapter seven entitled “The Aftermath” in which the authors examine what went wrong in the saga of Oleg Penkovsky and the various claims that he was under hostile control. Anyone reading that chapter will surely be compelled to read the entire book. The story from start to finish is one of the great yarns of modern intelligence literature, and its treatment in this work fully justifies the award it received from the National Intelligence Study Center for the best national intelligence book published in 1992.

The book was a joint effort by Jerrold Schecter and Peter Deriabin. Schecter did most of the interviewing and all of the writing while Deriabin did much of the research and translation of documents. Schecter was TIME-LIFE bureau chief in Moscow from 1968 to 1970 and later served on the National Security Council staff from 1977 to 1980. The author of four books, he was instrumental in bringing Khrushchev’s memoirs to the West. Peter Deriabin was with the KGB, mainly in the First Chief Directorate from 1947 until his defection in 1954 in Vienna, where he worked in counterintelligence. He was a consultant to the US Army and CIA until his retirement in 1982. He died in 1992, shortly after the book was published. With such a formidable combination, it is not surprising that the book is so well written and accurate.

Fortunately for the history of intelligence, Schecter and Deriabin in 1987 appealed to CIA under the Freedom of Information Act to open its files so they might write a biography of Col. Oleg Penkovsky. Because 25 years had passed since the case had been terminated, permission for access to the Penkovsky material was granted subject to security clearance by the CIA Publications Review Board. The release of the material did not constitute an Agency endorsement of the author’s point of view or the factual
accuracy of the manuscript. In addition to extracting material from the files, Schecter managed to talk to some key players from both CIA and MI-6 about their experiences.

Colonel Penkovsky’s position as a trusted senior officer in the Soviet military intelligence headquarters in Moscow gave him unique access to military information desperately needed by the West. He jeopardized his personal security by providing voluminous material to American and British contacts during three visits to the West (two to London and one to Paris) and, when in Moscow, to Britons assigned to receive his material there. In Moscow the frequency of his operational meetings with the wife of a British Embassy official during the autumn of 1961 may have attracted the attention of the KGB, which already knew that her husband was an MI-6 officer. Earlier, Penkovsky had risked exposure by making several attempts to contact Western intelligence through random approaches to American tourists and a Canadian diplomat.

Perhaps the greatest risk of all, however, lay in the massive volume of high-quality material Penkovsky provided to a wide audience of US and UK intelligence customers. Although the most stringent security controls were maintained, several Soviet spies may have had access to the material. That Penkovsky was the source was never revealed to them, but if Soviet authorities in Moscow saw examples of what the West had obtained, they at least would have been alerted that a massive leak existed.

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 revealed Penkovsky’s unique value. He had provided manuals and other detailed technical information on Soviet missiles that helped identify the devices Khrushchev had secretly installed in Cuba. The authors tell this story well, and they leave no doubt about the magnitude of Penkovsky’s contribution in assisting President Kennedy and his advisers to make their fateful decisions.

As the case developed, questions naturally were raised constantly about Penkovsky’s true status. Was he genuine, or was he a Soviet double agent providing false information for some deceptive purpose? The conclusion that he was not a double agent was based on the judgment the Soviets would never release so much high-quality material to support a deception. Clinching this view was the first batch of material passed by Penkovsky, which included valid lists of Soviet agents abroad as well as GRU officers under false cover. The agents in particular would never have been sacrificed by an intelligence service, especially by the Soviets, who usually provided only “chicken feed” to the target intelligence service during double-agent operations. The view that Penkovsky was genuine, although frequently challenged, prevailed throughout the operation and was supported by on-the-spot assessments of MI-6 and CIA officers who dealt directly with him.
Even Angleton concluded that, while he thought Penkovsky was some kind of crazy anarchist, his material was undoubtedly genuine.

Only after the operation ended did strong doubts about Penkovsky's genuineness begin to emerge. The principal articulator of this skepticism was Golitsyn who, as he learned more about the case, became more voluble in asserting that Penkovsky was controlled by the KGB. In due course, Angleton was persuaded. Meanwhile, CIA's Soviet Division (as well as MI-6) was reexamining the operation. Obsessed as that division then was with the Nosenko case and other divisive issues, it was difficult to resolve the question, but the great majority of officers involved in the case remained convinced Penkovsky was genuine.

Not until 1978, four years after Angleton's dismissal, was there a truly comprehensive survey of the operation. This massive study established beyond a doubt that Penkovsky, through the period of his association with Anglo-American intelligence, was not under Soviet control. It firmly concluded that material provided by Penkovsky was genuine and highly valuable. The study expressed some uncertainty about how he was compromised, but after a CIA officer was arrested at the deaddrop site, it was clear the operation was finished.

The case was a classic espionage operation run successfully by CIA and MI-6 at a critical time under the very nose of the KGB. Some aspects of the case will continue to be debated, a recent example being an exchange between Schecter and Thomas Powers (author of The Man Who Kept the Secrets) in the 24 June 1993 issue of The New York Review of Books. Whatever the arguments of detractors like Golitsyn and Powers, Penkovsky played a vital role in helping the West at a moment of mortal danger. His heroic story could not be better told than it is in The Spy Who Saved the World.