Valediction, Sherman Kent. My colleagues on the Board of Editors have asked that I mark my retirement from the Board with a backward glance at the beginnings of the Studies in Intelligence and a drawing of some sort of balance sheet. What follows is, I trust, a minimally autobiographical, but nevertheless wholly personal appraisal of the journal's accomplishments and disappointments...
Interaction in Weapons R&D, David S. Brandwein. Intelligence may be thought of as having two missions in relation to military planning and weapon system development. The primary mission is to provide information on the weapon systems of potential enemies so that counterweapons may be developed. That is, if we can gather valid and timely intelligence for projections of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the opponent's military systems, we can develop weapons capable of penetrating his defense and blunting his offense. A secondary mission is to furnish information on the foreign development of weapon system components which parallel our own designs. Here, the objective is to take advantage of their R&D to produce better weapons for ourselves, thus gaining time and reducing our own development costs...
Foretesting a Soviet ABM System, Edward Tauss. The summary presentation of this particular case history in inductive analysis will show how a slim amount of data may give a basis for determining the general characteristics and net capabilities of a new Soviet system before the Soviets themselves have a firm prototype of it. Such an accomplishment would not be noteworthy when U.S. R&D has already broken trail along the line of development in question, but when it is the USSR that is doing the pioneering it is much more controversial and difficult to foresee the outcome. The advantages of doing so, of course, are that it gives the U.S. developers a critical lead time in which to take countermeasures and a basis for objective planning—no small matters in the race toward Armageddon...
Insurgent Counterintelligence, Carlos Revilla Arango. The leaders of an insurgent movement anticipate and counter efforts by established authority to acquire information about their organization and activities. The success of the Irish revolutionists must be ascribed in large part to the operational achievements of their security chief Michael Collins, who made it his job to know in advance what the British were going to do, on what information they based their action, and the identity of their sources. He succeeded in this by gaining direct, personal access to metropolitan police records. A subject of his protective interest later wrote:
About a fortnight after my return I received from him, not a copy, but the original of the report from the police of the districts through which I had passed. ... The fact that such an original document should have come into my hand was an example of the thoroughness with which Collins worked his intelligence system and enabled the 1. R. A. to know what its enemy was thinking and often what the enemy proposed to do...
Central Intelligence Under Souers, Arthur B. Darling, The first Director of Central Intelligence was well aware of the latent power bestowed on this office by the President's Directive of January 22, 1946. Admiral Souers wished to see the functions of the Director mature under the guidance of the departmental secretaries and the personal representative of the President who constituted the National Intelligence Authority. But he also knew that many in the Army, the Navy, and the Department of State were still resisting every thought of a central intelligence organization which might overpower their own intelligence agencies. The Authority, the Director, and the Central Intelligence Group were bolstered by no supporting legislation from the Congress. They rested only upon this Directive by the President to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. And the President's legal authority to issue the Directive was, with the expiration of his wartime powers, at best questionable. Souers appreciated that this was no time to foster misgiving or animosity. No rough waters should be raised as Congress approached a reorganization of the national military establishment in which the central intelligence system would have a part...
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