Costing Nuclear Programs, Alan B. Smith. How much has the Soviet Union, Communist China, or France spent on its nuclear program? What is the cost of the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte or of the nuclear test site in French Polynesia? Is the allocation of funds for these installations proceeding on schedule? How much has West Germany spent on what facets of nuclear research and development? What would it cost India, Israel, or Japan to convert its present program for developing miclear electric power facilities to production of nuclear weapons? The intelligence community is frequently called upon to supply answers to questions such as these for two primary reasons-to gauge the burden nuclear programs impose on the economies of the countries concerned, and to compare the sizes of different countries' programs. ...
On the Trail of the Alexandrovsk, Dwayne Anderson. Most often, in military intelligence, photographs are studied with the purpose of establishing military capabilities. Barracks, revetments, and launchers are counted to determine order-of-battle strength. Missiles, tanks, and submarines are measured to determine their characteristics. In one case, however, this process led to an unusual cornbination of photographs and the belated discovery of a Soviet operation that had peaked at the crucial juncture between the buildup and withdrawal of strategic missiles in Cuba. ...
The Mariner as Agent, Art Haberstich. In surveying the possibilities for access to a denied country, the intelligence officer's eye naturally falls upon the fleets of merchant ships which steam in and out of its ports, shuttling back and forth to the outside world, each vessel potentially a carrier of the paraphernalia of espionage, each seaman a potential agent. It is common knowledge that intelligence services use seamen of their own or friendly countries' merchant fleets to make clandestine port observations in denied areas. The potential for clandestine activities broadens considerably, however, when we consider for use as carriers and agents the merchant ships and seamen of the target country itself. ...
Adversary Agent Radios, James J. Fauth. Any intelligence service has a lively interest in the tradecraft devices of its competitors. When an agent radio can be subjected to professional examination, it reveals something of the sponsoring service's technical and operational capacity. More than two dozen such radios from the Communist Bloc have been surfaced in the West in the past fifteen years. Some of these have been physically available to us for precise technical evaluation. On others we have had only photographs and non-technical descriptions furnished by other services, but even these give us an idea of the sophistication of the communications system and the kind of operations it serves. The samples range from crude, handmade, manually keyed transmitters to top-quality production-line automatic high-speed equipment. ...
Alias George Wood, Anthony Quibble. The German diplomatic courier was carrying, when he cleared Swiss customs, a 12-by-18-inch manila envelope with two red wax seals bearing the imprint of the Foreign Office and addressed to the German Legation, Bern. When delivered to the legation its seals were undisturbed, but it had shrunk to a 10-by-15 size and grown thinner. Actually, of course, the smaller envelope had been only a part of the contents of the larger, and the rest was destined not for the Nazi diplomats but for their enemies. This sleight-of-hand was performed a number of times before the spring of 1945, but the first time was on Tuesday 17 August 1943. The courier's name was Fritz Kolbe. ...
The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.
Please check our site map, search feature, or our site navigation on the left to locate the information you seek. We do not routinely respond to questions for which answers are found within this Web site.
Employment: We do not routinely answer questions about employment beyond the information on this Web site, and we do not routinely answer inquiries about the status of job applications. Recruiting will contact applicants within 45 days if their qualifications meet our needs.
Because of safety concerns for the prospective applicant, as well as security and communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return phone calls, e-mails or other forms of communication, from US citizens living outside of the US. When you return permanently to the US (not on vacation or leave), please visit the CIA Careers page and apply online for the position of interest.
Solicitations to transfer large sums of money to your bank account: If you receive a solicitation to transfer a large amount of money from an African nation to your bank account in exchange for a payment of millions of dollars, go to the US Secret Service Web site for information about the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud or "4-1-9" Fraud scheme.
If you have information which you believe might be of interest to the CIA in pursuit of the CIA's foreign intelligence mission, you may use our e-mail form. We will carefully protect all information you provide, including your identity. The CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not engage in US domestic law enforcement.
If you have information relating to Iraq which you believe might be of interest to the US Government, please contact us through the Iraqi Rewards Program —
Contact Us Form
The United States and its partners continue to face a
growing number of global threats and challenges. The CIA’s mission
includes collecting and analyzing information about high priority
national security issues such as international terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks,
international organized crime and narcotics trafficking, regional
conflicts, counterintelligence threats, and the effects of environmental
and natural disasters.
These challenges are international in scope and are priorities for
the Central Intelligence Agency. If you have information about these or
other national security challenges, please provide it through our secure
online form. The information you provide will be protected and
confidential. The CIA is particularly interested in information about
imminent or planned terrorist attacks. In cases where an imminent
threat exists, immediately contact your local law enforcement agencies
and provide them with the threat information.