The Birth of Central Intelligence, Arthur B. Darling. There was more than economy in mind as Director of the Budget Harold Smith corresponded with General Wm. J. Donovan in August 1945 about liquidating the Office of Strategic Services. On the same day Smith advised the General that agencies with no peacetime activities had to go, Donovan expounded once more in a letter to him the principles which should govern a centralized U.S. foreign intelligence system. Donovan believed those principles were already at work in the OSS. But since it was to be abandoned, another agency should be set up immediately to take over its valuable assets and aid the nation in "the organization and maintenance of the peace."
The Science Attaché Program, Wilton Lexow. World War II clearly demonstrated that science had joined economics as a no longer merely academic discipline but a practical factor to be reckoned with in the international arena. The Department of State, recognizing that this new factor would make itself felt more broadly than in strict application to weaponry, established as early as 1947 a Science Staff in its London embassy and a small Washington supporting element in its Bureau of Economic Affairs. It was not until 1949, however, that a full-dress study was made of the implications of the new factor for the organization and functioning of the Department.
The Face of Moscow in the Missile Crisis, William F. Scott. Soviet brinkmanship in the Cuban crisis of October 1962 focused the attention of Kremlinologists on a relatively new concept in the lexicon of international conflic, "crisis management." This term encompasses both the chess-like moves one opponent makes externally against the other and the internal measures he takes to control the crisis at home. It is on the latter that this article will chiefly bear.
Atlases as a source, William Terechow. Soviet atlases, world atlases as well as those devoted to the USSR itself, have attained a degree of cartographic excellence which ranks them among the best in the world. There are no American atlases comparable to them, nor are there likely soon to be, given the concept of American publishers that an atlas is "a collection of maps in a volume." The contrasting Soviet concept has been summarized by the noted Soviet cartographer K. A. Salishchev: "An atlas is not just a grouping of various geographic maps nor their mechanical assemblage. It is an integral system of maps which are organically related and complement one another, a system that is governed by the purpose of the atlas and the peculiarities of its use."
R&D for Intelligence Processing, CODIB Task Team VI. The team considered conceptual and managerial aspects of establishing R&D programs for intelligence data handling to be more crucial and more in need of immediate attention than technical aspects. Rather than concern itself with what technical approaches should be adopted, what type of equipment is best suited to a particular application, and the like, it therefore sought answers to such questions as the following. To what degree are the several USIB members' R&D programs for intelligence data handling mutually supportive? Are existing and planned programs adequate in size, balanced in content, technically sound, and adequately organized, managed, and funded? Can the technical leadership for such programs be improved? How should policy be established for a coordinated community program? What outstanding opportunities might be seized as immediate practical objectives of R&D? How might shortcomings in present data handling be translated into R&D requirements and communicated to the technical leadership of the community?
Okhrana Agent Dolin, Rita T. Kronenbitter. The provincial branch chiefs of the imperial Okhrana were not required in 1904 to report to St. Petersburg the names and assignments of their informants and secret agents. Only in very exceptional cases did they seek headquarters' advice about some outstanding agent. One such case was that of Ventsion Moiseev-Moshkov Dolin (pronounced Dallin). Young Dolin, who had a four years' record of good work as agent and informer but had been on ice for several months, came one day in June that year to his former case officer wanting to be put in prison. What he really wanted, of course, was reemployment; a duly advertised arrest was the almost standard procedure for building cover. The case officer, Captain Shultz, newly appointed chief of the Okhrana branch in Ekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk), was undecided whether to comply.