Library

 

The Face of Moscow in the Missile Crisis

Cuban missile crisis, 1962, Soviet efforts at,
Previous

CONFIDENTIAL

Missile Crisis

against the U.S. attaches, and showed it on television and in fourteen Moscow movie theaters simultaneously.
From the viewpoint of crisis management and intelligence, this suppression of any outward sign during the Cuban crisis reemphasizes the Soviet ability to control news and deceive the people by that subtlest of propaganda devices, the half truth. And as well as could be observed during that week, the Soviet public responded exactly as their leaders desired. One only hopes that this control would not be successful in suppressing all indications of preparation for hostilities if there really were such preparations.
Did the Soviets never intend to do anything but withdraw from Cuba if it came to a showdown? Were the Kremlin leaders prepared for miscalculation and explosion of the crisis into open conflict? To what degree was the Soviet military machine alerted to this possibility? From the worm's-eye view in Moscow, such questions could not be answered. But complete domination of the internal environment assured the Soviet leadership a high degree of flexibility in utilizing psychology and propaganda. In this respect crisis management as practiced by the Soviet Union has the advantage over its counterpart in democratic countries.
36

CONFIDENTIAL


Previous

Posted: May 08, 2007 08:06 AM
Last Updated: Aug 05, 2011 08:55 AM