The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
We read every letter, fax, or e-mail we receive, and we will convey your comments to CIA officials outside OPA as appropriate. However, with limited staff and resources, we simply cannot respond to all who write to us.
Please check our site map, search feature, or our site navigation on the left to locate the information you seek. We do not routinely respond to questions for which answers are found within this Web site.
Employment: We do not routinely answer questions about employment beyond the information on this Web site, and we do not routinely answer inquiries about the status of job applications. Recruiting will contact applicants within 45 days if their qualifications meet our needs.
Because of safety concerns for the prospective applicant, as well as security and communication issues, the CIA Recruitment Center does not accept resumes, nor can we return phone calls, e-mails or other forms of communication, from US citizens living outside of the US. When you return permanently to the US (not on vacation or leave), please visit the CIA Careers page and apply online for the position of interest.
Solicitations to transfer large sums of money to your bank account: If you receive a solicitation to transfer a large amount of money from an African nation to your bank account in exchange for a payment of millions of dollars, go to the US Secret Service Web site for information about the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud or "4-1-9" Fraud scheme.
If you have information which you believe might be of interest to the CIA in pursuit of the CIA's foreign intelligence mission, you may use our e-mail form. We will carefully protect all information you provide, including your identity. The CIA, as a foreign intelligence agency, does not engage in US domestic law enforcement.
If you have information relating to Iraq which you believe might be of interest to the US Government, please contact us through the Iraqi Rewards Program —
Contact Us Form
The United States and its partners continue to face a
growing number of global threats and challenges. The CIA’s mission
includes collecting and analyzing information about high priority
national security issues such as international terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks,
international organized crime and narcotics trafficking, regional
conflicts, counterintelligence threats, and the effects of environmental
and natural disasters.
These challenges are international in scope and are priorities for
the Central Intelligence Agency. If you have information about these or
other national security challenges, please provide it through our secure
online form. The information you provide will be protected and
confidential. The CIA is particularly interested in information about
imminent or planned terrorist attacks. In cases where an imminent
threat exists, immediately contact your local law enforcement agencies
and provide them with the threat information.
The Failure of Cosmos 57, Frank A. Whitmire, Edward G. Correll. On 12 February 1965 the Soviets flew an unmanned test vehicle in their equivalent of the Gemini program. After being injected into orbit, Cosmos 57 was tracked for one revolution, but then its telemetry ceased and a whole covey of objects appeared on radar screens where it should have been. Five weeks later, 18-19 March, came the flight of Voskhod 2, from which cosmonaut Leonov stepped out through an airlock for man's first "walk" in space. It became clear that Cosmos 57 had been an automatic prototype of the Voskhod 2, flown primarily to test the operation of the airlock. Finding out what went wrong with the test and why its failure did not delay Voskhod 2 has been an interesting exercise.
The Watchdog Committee Question, John S. Warner. For the last ten years or so there have been spasmodically recurring calls in the Congress and the press for the establishment of a joint congressional committee to act as watchdog over CIA and intelligence activities generally. The usual implication is that such a committee would function with respect to intelligence in much the same way the joint Committee on Atomic Energy does for the atomic energy program and AEC. The Executive Branch has taken an official position, though not publicly, against the idea; but there are many thoughtful people both in the Congress and in the intelligence community who are inclined to favor it. This paper examines the issues and their history in the hope of helping put intelligence officers, at least, in a position to make an informed judgment.
Paris Okhrana 1885-1905, Rita T. Kronenbitter. The numerical strength of the Okhrana at home and abroad has been subject to much exaggeration. According to some Communist versions published both before and after the revolution, tens of thousands of Okhrana officials and agents in mufti were placed in every province of the Empire to prey upon the peaceful people and brutalize them. The agency is pictured as running a police state within the autocracy, subject to no authority and exerting its power on all, from the Tsar and his court down to the remotest muzhiks. The Okhrana's own documents show that this picture is largely propaganda.
Notes on the Wennerström Case, Alexander Mull. The story of Stig Wennerström, the Swedish air attaché who for 15 years served as a Soviet agent in Moscow, Washington, and Stockholm, has been told well from open sources, principally his own testimony, in H. K. Ronblöm's book. From the professional viewpoint Ronblöm brings two big points out especially well—the Soviet recruiter's pitch based on the important role the Swede could play in maintaining the international balance of power and world peace, and then the permanent Soviet handler's command over him as "the best friend I ever had." Nevertheless, being written for a popular audience, the book naturally slights some details of handling technique and tradecraft revealed in the testimony that are of interest to intelligence officers. These notes cover the most salient such features.
Concerning Espionage and Social Courtesy. Of the many ways in which adversary intelligence services go about recruiting agents a particularly insidious one is by "social contact," when officers of the service operating under diplomatic cover first approach their targets at receptions, parties, sports affairs, conventions, etc., or through social calls at home. This approach is distinguished by the fact that it initially carries no hint of resemblance to the classical methods of recruitment that depend upon blackmail or other kinds of duress. Far from upsetting the target, it presents itself to him as a pleasant relationship apparently devoid of any kind of danger. This is exactly why he needs to be put on his guard against it.
Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I), Edwin C. Fishel. The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.