Library

 

html

Agency PageCareer Trainee Program, GRU Style
Career Trainee Program, GRU Style, Richard Framingham. By consolidating information derived from a number of different Soviet sources, it has been possible to reconstruct the process Soviet intelligence uses to spot, screen, train, and assign case officers. The procedures herein outlined had their beginnings in the mid-1940's, were generally established by the mid-1950's, and to our knowledge remained substantially in effect as late as 1961 and projected at least to 1964. The system described is that of the GRU, the military intelligence organization. State Security, the KGB, operates separate but similar machinery, in addition to having a hand, as we shall see, in the GRU's...
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II, Edwin C. Fishel. The few historians who have thought seriously about Civil War intelligence have generally concluded that it left much to be desired. They are near the truth, though not necessarily for the right reason. The belief held by some that intelligence in that war was more than ordinarily laden with error is an example of a wrong reason. Another is the assumption that it was seldom of much influence in battlefield decisions. The valid reason for deprecating Civil War intelligence is the limited scope of both the Northern and the Southern effort. Intelligence was not pursued on a scale that seems commensurate with the size and desperateness of the conflict. What was pursued was almost altogether military, and even the military sector was not fully covered: strategic intelligence was severely subordinated to the tactical...
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Agency PageMilitary Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II
Agency PageThe Investigation of UFO's
The Investigation of UFO's, Hector Quintanilla, Jr. Unidentified flying objects are not a new phenomenon. In 593 B.C. Ezekiel recorded a whirlwind to the north which appeared as a fiery sphere. In 1254 at Saint Albans Abbey, when the moon was eight days old, there appeared in the sky a ship elegantly shaped, well equipped and of marvelous color. In 1520 in France there were sighted a round-shaped object with rotating lights and two fiery suns. In 1874 in Texas a farmer reported seeing a dark flying object in the shape of a disc cruising in the sky at a wonderful speed. These are a mere sampling of the many such events recorded by historians. The modern era of UFOs, however, can be dated from 24 June 1947, when a flyer made some strange observations which national news coverage and authors with a poetic license so played up as to excite public entertainment of a notion that our planet had been visited by unknown vehicles from outer space...
Agency PageMilitary-Economic Estimating: A Positive View
Military-Economic Estimating: A Positive View, Julie O. Kerlin. In an article entitled "Economic Intelligence in Defense Planning" in a recent issue of this journal,1 Colonel Clyde C. Wooten examines aspects of the economico-military research done on the Soviet Union as input to systems analysis of U.S. defense needs. He concludes with some exasperation that the data are unusable, the methodology questionable, and the product spurious.2 In this essay we shall examine the character of the product and show that in the process an intelligent methodology provides a logical ordering for data which are indeed sparse but which can be used to advantage in place of an otherwise unknown, intuitive input into military judgments. Military plans must reflect, among other factors, judgments concerning the potential enemy; exposing the basis for these judgments and putting the data into logical array improves the plans and provides flexibility through control of changes in the data.