Crystal Balls and Glass Bottles, William A. Gray. During the summer of 1952 American XXXXXX technical intelligence officers met near Frankfurt/Main with a German electronics engineer recently returned from Leningrad. This "Dragon" returnee described in some detail a costly development project then under way in the Svetlana Works engineering department, where he had been assigned by the Soviets. The project was to design a novel radar tube, unusually large, with a very high peak power output, operating at metric (VHF) wavelengths, and having a duty cycle (percentage of time active) several times higher than was then common practice for pulse radars. This first-hand report provided authoritative confirmation of information reported earlier by other returnees. The Germans thought the project quite ambitious, in view of the rather primitive technology then prevailing at Svetlana. It had a further meaning for us...
Quality ELINT, William H. Nance. Most of electronic intelligence is devoted to the intercept and analysis of radar signals in order to locate radar sites and establish the general characteristics of radar systems. This type of Elint, usually called "radar order of battle," has proved to be of great value in the Viet Nam air war, where the U.S. Air Force and Navy both conduct large-scale Elint operations in support of air strike missions...
An Elint Vigil, Unmanned, Edmund L. Soohoo. One of the more difficult electronic intelligence collection problems is that of picking up the signals associated with a missile. It is particularly difficult for the smaller missiles, such as surface-to-air types which transmit signals of relatively low power, if they are besides not often fired. A case in point is the Soviet SA-2 missile Guideline, older versions of which are used extensively against U.S. aircraft in North Viet Nam. The newer models are so far deployed only in the Soviet Union and a few Bloc countries, notably East Germany...
A Value for Information, Max S. Oldham. Which is more valuable: our knowing the exact number of Soviet ICBMs, or our knowing the exact number of Soviet ABM interceptors? Is it worth more to us to learn the precise location of Soviet ICBMs or to learn the exact range of Soviet defensive fighter planes? Answers to questions like these are important determinants in decisions about procurement and use of intelligence collection systems. One method to help reach the answers to such questions in the field of strategic capability is described in this paper...
Pricing Soviet Military Exports, Milton Kovner. Understandably, the USSR has been reluctant to disclose the magnitude of its military exports, either in monetary or in quantitative terms. The U.S. intelligence community has estimated that such exports to non-communist underdeveloped countries totaled about $3.5 billion during the period 1956-1966. A review of the various approaches to the fixing of this dollar value and its components, the ambiguities that the figures embody, and their residual significance and usefulness may be of interest for the methodological and conceptual problems it illustrates...
Soviet Reality Sans Potemkin, Gertrude Schroeder. Statements about the size and growth of the Soviet economy in relation to that of the United States have long occupied an important place in intelligence estimates of the USSR's capabilities. So also have statements about the comparative levels of living in the two countries and how they are changing over time. CIA's current estimates are that the Soviet gross national product is somewhat less than half of U.S. GNP and that per capita consumption is about one-third...
Counterintelligence vs. Insurgency, Carlos Revilla Arango. The counterintelligence force of established government authority enjoys certain advantages in its conflict with that of an insurgent organization. It has greater human and material resources. It operates on a sure financial base, has powers of investigation and control, and commands assets in the form of files and records which are not easily built up by the insurgents. Its officers have legal status and secure places of work instead of the hunted life of the dissidents. These advantages often suffice to guarantee the government success...
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