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Counterintelligence vs. Insurgency

ideal CI program against insurgents in Latin America, sketch of,
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CI vs. Insurgency

tion's blunders in managing the crisis. At the very time when they might pose as champions of the people they have the least opportunity to capitalize on events. On the afternoon of May 24, 1964, a riot at the National Sports Stadium in Lima cost the lives of 301 persons. The Peruvian government was prompt in suspending constitutional guarantees before the dissidents could exploit the breakdown of law and order which took place that night, and they were powerless to add to the disaster.
As the government establishes curfews, increases its street patrols, and activates checkpoints on roads leading to the capital, counterintelligence can increase its knowledge by studying the interrogation reports on persons who travel in violation of the curfew. If the government requires registration of all firearms, the investigation and interrogation of violators may open up new channels to the insurgency. Or, on advice of counterintelligence, police may raid the home of a known member of the insurgent organization. The arrest and detailed interrogation of all persons found there should pave the way for further action.
Counterintelligence can begin its own harassment of the insurgent organization by exploiting the arrest of individual members. Assume that six self-confessed Marxist-Leninists have been detained by the authorities. (In Peru, charges are not pressed against a person for his political philosophy. But a pistol was found during a search of the premises, and none of the prisoners admits to ownership: grounds to hold and question.) They are being investigated. Advise the press in the course of the investigation that not all the prisoners have been cooperative. The implication will disturb their friends; which of the six have been cooperative?   (Or is it a police trick?   Yet they cannot assume it to be a police trick.) Treat the prisoners kindly and arrange for their early release. Their friends will interrogate them-perhaps to the government's ultimate advantage.
Counterintelligence can denigrate individual leaders of the insurgency by publicizing their lapses in morality or high level of living. For example Paulino Mamani, the champion of the poor with the bank account of two million soles. Arrange for an interview by reporters following his release from prison. Take photographs of his home, his car, his maid, his children and their school. In a feature story, speculate about his plans for the future. Travel abroad? A vacation in Lima? He must patronize some restaurants in Cuzco. Interview one of the owners, and ask for the names of Mamani's
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Posted: May 08, 2007 08:17 AM
Last Updated: Aug 05, 2011 01:11 PM