Counterintelligence vs. Insurgency

ideal CI program against insurgents in Latin America, sketch of,
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CI vs. Insurgency

But if he ever finds himself in a situation which gives him little hope for the future, he may remember this invitation.
The Volunteer
A public plea of this nature, if inefficient, is secure in that it enables the respondent to pick his own time and often place in which to make contact. He can not only satisfy himself of the good faith of the advertiser, but also take time to develop or organize the information requested. In taking these steps he commits himself of his own volition; he is not brought to heel by the pressures of prison life. It is true that a defector is not necessarily a great prize in terms of what he can give. He may have come over because of lack of advancement in the dissident organization or he may have lost contact with its leaders and resigned himself to recovering what he can by selling the past. But an aggressive counterintelligence program often brings unexpected rewards; and a public plea for information is an aggressive action, not a desperate alternative.
As he presses to expose or identify the personnel and activities of the insurgency, as he engineers arrests and provokes the dissidents to act against their own kind, as be intensifies the suspicion which pervades the enemy ranks, the counterintelligence officer often serves as midwife to the birth of dissidents within the dissident organization. Young guerrillas find that its chains of discipline fetter their movements and spirit more thoroughly than the regime it is dedicated to overthrow. They are gradually discouraged by the denigration of its leadership, provocations against its members, publicity for its noxious activities, offers of rewards for information about it, and the ever-increasing controls and suspicion it promotes. In time, some of them begin looking for a way out, for a door from the garden; and someday one finds this door. I believed something had to be done.   Things are not good in Peru; it is wrong to be hungry.   Things must be changed, but not in the way of Luis de la Puente.   What do you think we can do?
The counterintelligence officer must now ask many questions.   What does he really want? Money? Sanctuary? Revenge? Or is he an agent of the adversary?   If he comes in good faith, what information can he provide? Can he identify the secret leaders, their safesites, caching points, and couriers? Does he hold a position of any importance? If he does, who knows that he is here? Will he return


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Posted: May 08, 2007 08:17 AM
Last Updated: Aug 05, 2011 01:11 PM