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Agency PageMission to Birch Woods
Mission to Birch Woods, Henry S. Lowenhaupt. I suppose I remember so distinctly working on nuclear targets for the U-2 missions of late August 1957 because this was my first direct experience with reconnaissance operations, and first impressions are lasting. Besides, it was a striking reminder of my 1944 mission from a basic Training camp in Alabama to a telephone number in Knoxville, Tennessee, which turned out to be the secret atomic city of Oak Ridge. Here in 1957 my prime target was a secret atomic city known as the Post Box, Tomsk, in central Siberia...
Agency PageIdentifying the Future Threat
Identifying the Future Threat, Herbert C. Rothenberg. Although threats to the position or security of the United States include all conditions disruptive of world peace, such as political instability, hunger, and disease, we shall be concerned here only with threats of a predominantly military nature which derive from advances in the physical sciences and engineering, and we shall analyze the problem of projecting such threats from the research done to achieve the advances. Experience of the recent past with complex modem weapon systems has shown that in general a period of 10 to 15 years is required to bring a new system from the research stage to utilization. This is then the outer limit in time of such projection. At the near end, minor improvements which can be effected in periods of 5 years or less can generally be predicted by fairly straightforward extrapolation from current capabilities. The critical period in our anticipation of new enemy weapon systems therefore lies from 5 to 15 years ahead...
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageMicrotechnology
Microtechnology
Agency PageSingapore's People's Association
Singapore's People's Association, Walter B. Kimball. The outbreak of insurgency in many parts of the world has already made a marked imprint on mid-twentieth century history. Concern over the relationship of our national interests to insurgent movements has led to a widespread and continuing involvement of many elements of our government in countering insurgencies. Underlying this involvement is the stubborn fact that insurgency is basically a political problem, a fact frequently obscured by the commitment of military and paramilitary forces in efforts to counter insurgent movements...
Agency PageThe Vietnamese as Operational Target
The Vietnamese as Operational Target, Titus Leidesdorf. Like the Chinese, the Vietnamese project the image of a homogeneous people, proud of their heritage and their ethnic superiority and comforted by a great sense of unbroachable unity. But like the Chinese, they manifest this sense and appearance of unity almost wholly as a defense against outside forces, and it masks a diversity of characteristics and attitudes which far transcends it. More compelling than the Chinese sense of a common personality is his awareness of the differences between a Yunnan peasant and a Peking intellectual; and what stirs the Vietnamese more than his sense of ethnic pride is his conviction that he's better than a Northerner (if he's from the South), or than a Southerner (if he's from the North), or than either (if he's from Hue). The regional differences are only the most obvious in a catalog of dimensions along which individual Vietnamese differ, and in an intensely individualistic people these differences are a constant threat to the unity and purpose of any organized effort...
Agency PageWith Vandenberg as DCI (Part II)
With Vandenberg as DCI (Part II), Arthur B. Darling. ORE 1, published on July 23, 1946, as the first product of the new Office of Research and Evaluation, was a masterly demonstration of what could be done by a single person in correlating, evaluating, and producing strategic intelligence. It had involved coordination too, of a sort, but not the kind that its author, Central Reports Staff chief L. L. Montague, wished to have. From his wartime experience on the Joint Intelligence Staff, he had proposed that full-time assistants in the new Central Reports Staff should both represent their respective departments and at the same time work with him to synthesize departmental intelligence and produce national estimates. As Staff Chief he would decide, subject to DCI ratification, what the CIG estimate would be; the departmental representatives would record, subject to their chiefs' approval, any substantial dissents from that estimate...
Agency PageWith Vandenberg as DCI (Part II)
With Vandenberg as DCI (Part II)
Agency PageWith Vandenberg as DCI (Part II)
With Vandenberg as DCI (Part II)